review fixes: block Codeman's own credential-bearing JSON, make the inside-anchor test bite

Widening the servable extensions to EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS made ~/.codeman
JSON previewable for the first time, and the blocklist named only
state.json. But settings.json holds a credential BY SCHEMA
(voiceSettings.apiKey), push-keys.json holds the VAPID PRIVATE key, and
intents.json is written 0600 precisely because captured prompts can carry
secrets — all three were one authenticated click away once an agent
printed the path. Blocked alongside state.json, whose rule now also
catches state-* siblings.

The never-re-cuts-inside-an-anchor test used an unmatchable URL tail, so
it passed with the guard deleted; the fixture now carries a matchable
/tmp path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

CLAUDE.md

@@ -230,6 +230,8 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
 
 **Attachments** (live external document references; all wiring in `file-routes.ts`): a **registry** maps a stable `attachmentId` to a realpath-resolved, extension-allowlisted absolute path, so browser requests never carry arbitrary absolute paths. ⚠️ The **magic-link scanner** (`codeman://attach?...` in terminal output) is **prompt-injectable**, so its scan path is force-confined to the session workspace; a hostile prompt could otherwise exfiltrate arbitrary host files over SSE. The security gate is an extension **allowlist**, not a blocklist. `document-conversion-limiter.ts` caps converter spawns globally: without it, N large docs detected at once fork N multi-minute processes, which is a resource-exhaustion vector. → [architecture-invariants#attachments](docs/architecture-invariants.md#attachments)
 
+**File-path links (terminal + chat)**: a path an agent prints is clickable on BOTH surfaces and opens the file-preview overlay. ⚠️ ONE pattern (`FILE_PATH_LINK_PATTERN` / `absoluteFilePathPattern()` in constants.js) feeds the xterm link provider AND the response viewer's `_linkifyFilePaths()`; a fresh instance per call, since `lastIndex` is per-object state. The chat linkifier walks TEXT NODES with DOM APIs (the source is model output; never rebuild sanitized markup as a string) and skips subtrees already inside an `<a>`. ⚠️ **An out-of-workspace path is served through the ATTACHMENT routes, not the file routes** — `file-content`/`file-raw` are workspace-confined and 404 exactly the paths agents print most (a `/tmp` capture, Claude's scratchpad), so `openFilePreview()` registers such a path via `POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments` with **`notify: false`** (suppresses only the `attachment:detected` broadcast — same guard, same routes; without it every click also popped a card announcing the file already on screen) and renders by id. The click is an explicit action on the explicit, Origin-guarded route, which is what distinguishes it from the force-confined magic-link scanner. ⚠️ **Media extensions are single-sourced** (`VIDEO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS`/`AUDIO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` in `attachment-registry.ts`, imported by `file-content`'s classification) so a clip plays the same in or out of the workspace; a player needs all THREE of allowlist + a real `MIME_TYPES` entry (octet-stream renders a dead player) + the range-aware body. ⚠️ **`TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` IS `EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS`** (never a second list): if the viewer would edit it inside the workspace, it can be read outside. Widening READ must never widen RUN, so `html`/`htm` joined `svg` in `serveRawFile`'s download-only branch, other text goes out as inert `text/plain`+`nosniff`, and `~/.codeman*/state.json` joined `isSensitivePath` (it persists `envOverrides`, which can hold `GEMINI_API_KEY`). ⚠️ The terminal sends an **out-of-workspace** path to the preview instead of the log viewer (that one spawns `tail -f` and reaches only workspace + `/var/log` + `~/logs`); in-workspace text keeps the tail viewer and `file-stream-manager`'s allowlist is untouched. The image-watcher keeps its own narrow detection list, so none of this cards every file an agent writes. → [architecture-invariants#file-path-links-terminal--response-viewer](docs/architecture-invariants.md#file-path-links-terminal--response-viewer)
+
 **Filesystem path picker** (Link Existing "Browse" + the mobile keyboard's `📁 Path` key): lazy one-directory browsing via `GET /api/filesystem/browse`, with `GET /api/filesystem/preview` for the tapped file. Inserts the path **without** Enter, so the prompt is never submitted; the sibling `⌫ All` key clears only the unsent prompt and must never send the agent's `/clear`. ⚠️ This is a **second file-serving surface and inherits neither the attachment confinement nor its ownership scoping** — it allowlists Home, `CASES_DIR`, `/mnt/d` and `CODEMAN_FILE_PICKER_ROOTS`, blocks sensitive trees, and rejects symlink escapes **after** `realpath`. ⚠️ The optional `sessionId` is an ownership boundary that must be `canAccessOwned`-checked by hand (it does not go through `findSessionOrFail`), and in multi-user mode a non-admin gets only their own `userSpacePath` as a root: per-user spaces live INSIDE `homedir()`, so a `Home` root exposes every other user's workspace. Previews go through the same global conversion limiter, and Markdown/TXT/JSON are served as inert `text/plain`. → [architecture-invariants#filesystem-path-picker](docs/architecture-invariants.md#filesystem-path-picker)
 
 **File Viewer edit mode** (issue #212): the file-preview overlay edits workspace text files in place — `GET .../file-content?edit=1` + `PUT /api/sessions/:id/file-content`, policy in `src/config/file-editing.ts`. This is a **third file surface and the only one that WRITES**: read-path confinement (realpath + workspace + ownership) plus sensitive/blocked/`.git` denies and an extension **allowlist**; writes are `wx`-temp + rename (no `O_CREAT` anywhere = edit-in-place is structural); optimistic concurrency via sha256 `baseHash` → 409. ⚠️ `edit=1` never truncates and the client must never save a plain-preview buffer (the 500-line truncation would silently delete the rest). ⚠️ CRLF/UTF-8 guards: EOL re-applied server-side, non-UTF-8 refused via round-trip compare. → [architecture-invariants#file-viewer-edit-mode](docs/architecture-invariants.md#file-viewer-edit-mode), `docs/file-viewer-edit-plan.md`
@@ -296,7 +298,7 @@ Frontend JS modules have `@fileoverview` with `@dependency`/`@loadorder` tags. L
 
 **SSE staleness watchdog** (`computeSseStale()` in constants.js, `_checkSseStale()` + a 5s interval in app.js): an `EventSource` that stops delivering does not always error, so `onerror` never fires, the header dot stays green, and every SSE-driven surface (tab status dots, sessions created on another device, renames) freezes until the user reloads. ⚠️ The 15s server keepalive was an SSE **comment** (`:keepalive`), and comments are **invisible to `EventSource` by spec**, so there was nothing a client could observe: it is now the named `sse:heartbeat` event (`cleanupDeadClients()`, sse-stream-manager.ts), which is exactly why the frame had to change type. ⚠️ Staleness is judged **only while the status is `connected`** and the device is online; that guard is the loop breaker, since a forced `connectSSE()` leaves `connected` immediately and cannot re-fire while a reconnect is in flight. ⚠️ The liveness stamp is applied inside `addListener` itself, so every registered handler (the `_SSE_HANDLER_MAP` wrappers AND the directly-registered ones) feeds it from one place; the heartbeat's own listener is a no-op that exists **only** to be registered, since `EventSource` drops named events nobody listens for. ⚠️ The watchdog interval is cleared at the top of `connectSSE()` and nowhere else (its only teardown path); clearing it elsewhere stacks intervals. Recovery needs no new sync path: the reconnect re-runs `handleInit` → `_resetAllAppState()`. The forced reconnect logs one diagnostic line, because a middlebox that strips heartbeats presents as "silently reconnects every 45s".
 
-**Z-index layers**: subagent windows (1000), plan agents (1100), mobile/tablet fixed header (1200, `mobile.css`), modals on ≤768px (1300 — must beat the fixed header or the modal close button is buried), log viewers (2000), connection-loss overlay (2500, above the fixed header and modals), image popups (3000), local echo overlay (7).
+**Z-index layers**: subagent windows (1000), plan agents (1100), mobile/tablet fixed header (1200, `mobile.css`), modals on ≤768px (1300 — must beat the fixed header or the modal close button is buried), log viewers (2000), connection-loss overlay (2500, above the fixed header and modals), image popups (3000), response viewer (5000, backdrop 4999), file-preview overlay (5100 — must outrank the response viewer, which can launch it; at its old 2000 a path clicked in the chat opened BEHIND the chat), toasts/path picker (10000+, deliberately above the preview), local echo overlay (7).
 
 **Respawn presets**: `solo-work` (3s/60min), `subagent-workflow` (45s/240min), `team-lead` (90s/480min), `ralph-todo` (8s/480min), `overnight-autonomous` (10s/480min).
 

docs/architecture-invariants.md

@@ -122,6 +122,24 @@ Implementation detail extracted from `CLAUDE.md` so that file stays small enough
 
 **Attachments** (live external document references; COD-37/#119 core, COD-38/#120 previews, COD-39/#121 history): all wiring in `file-routes.ts`. **Registry** (`attachment-registry.ts`): an **in-memory** map of a stable `attachmentId` → an absolute, `realpath`-resolved, extension-allowlisted file path, so browser requests (`GET /api/sessions/:id/attachments/:attachmentId/raw`) never carry arbitrary absolute paths; `POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments` registers one. **Magic links** (`attachment-magic.ts`): parses `codeman://attach?...` out of terminal output — ⚠️ this scanner is prompt-injectable, so the scan path is **force-confined to the session workspace** (a hostile prompt could otherwise make it read arbitrary host files over SSE); emits the `attachment:detected` SSE event. Security gate is an extension **allowlist** (`isSupportedAttachmentExtension`, in the registry/magic modules), not a blocklist; a separate path layer (`config/attachment-guard.ts`) confines reads to the workspace (`attachmentConfineToWorkspace`) and blocks sensitive trees (`/root`, `/etc`). **Previews + thumbnails** (COD-38): `:attachmentId/preview` + `:attachmentId/thumbnail` (and the workspace-file equivalents `file-preview`/`file-thumbnail`) render Office docs/PDFs via external converters (`pdftoppm` / LibreOffice `soffice` / Word-COM `powershell`); `document-preview-cache.ts` is a shared disk cache (de-dups _identical_ in-flight inputs), `document-thumbnailer.ts` does best-effort first-page images, and `document-conversion-limiter.ts` is a **global converter-spawn concurrency cap** (`runWithConversionLimit`) — without it, N distinct large docs detected at once fork N multi-minute converter processes = a localhost fork-bomb-shaped resource-exhaustion vector. **History drawer** (COD-39): `session-attachment-history.ts` tracks the last `ATTACHMENT_HISTORY_LIMIT` (100) attachments per session (`Session._attachmentHistory`, persisted via `SessionState.attachmentHistory`, replayed so externals re-register on reconnect); `GET /api/sessions/:id/attachments` is the list endpoint. ⚠️ The history drawer's launcher button is desktop-only — hidden on phones (regression-guarded; see `mobile-header-buttons-policy` test). Session-local files keep using the existing workspace-scoped `file-routes` paths; the registry is only for explicit live externals. **Codex generated artifacts** (COD-166/#150, `generated-artifact-attachments.ts`): codex-mode sessions ALSO scan (ANSI-stripped) output for `Saved to: file:///…` lines and surface those files as attachment cards with a relaxed trust policy — the allow decision runs on the **realpath-resolved** path against `os.homedir()`-anchored `~/.codex` marker dirs (symlink escapes fall back to force-confinement); gated to `mode === 'codex'` only (`source` is a REQUIRED param through the listener-deps chain — a dropped arg here silently kills the feature). Image thumbnails pass through jpg/jpeg/gif/webp.
 
+### File-path links (terminal + response viewer)
+
+A file path an agent prints is a link on both surfaces it can appear on, and clicking it opens the file-preview overlay. Three things make that work and each has bitten:
+
+**One pattern, two consumers.** `FILE_PATH_LINK_PATTERN` / `absoluteFilePathPattern()` live in `constants.js`; the xterm link provider (`registerFilePathLinkProvider`, terminal-ui.js) and the response viewer's `_linkifyFilePaths()` (app.js) both build a fresh instance from it. ⚠️ Fresh per call, never one shared object: `lastIndex` is per-object state on a `/g` regex. The pattern is anchored on a known absolute root and terminated by a known extension, so a fraction (`3/4`) or a date can't match and trailing punctuation stays out. Roots include `Users` and `mnt`, without which nothing was clickable on macOS or WSL. The linear-time guard and the "terminal-ui builds from the factory" structural check are in `test/link-provider-regex.test.ts`.
+
+**The chat linkifier walks text nodes.** `_linkifyFilePaths()` builds anchors with `createElement`/`textContent` on the rendered subtree, never by rebuilding sanitized markup as a string — the source is model output. Subtrees already inside an `<a>` are skipped (marked autolinks URLs; a nested anchor would swallow the click), and the anchor's text is the path verbatim so "copy code" still yields what the agent printed. `test/response-viewer-file-links.test.ts` pins both properties.
+
+**Out-of-workspace paths go through the attachment routes, not the file routes.** `file-content`/`file-raw` resolve against `workingDir` and 404 anything that escapes it, which is correct and unchanged — but the paths agents most often print (a `/tmp` capture, Claude's own scratchpad, another checkout) are exactly that, so clicking one used to report "File not found" for a file sitting on disk. `openFilePreview()` now detects the case (`_isExternalPreviewPath`, a string compare for ROUTING only; the real decision stays server-side) and registers the path via `POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments` first, rendering by id. ⚠️ That registration passes `notify: false`, which suppresses ONLY the `attachment:detected` broadcast — the guard, the registry entry and the by-id routes are identical either way. Without it every click also popped an attachment card announcing the file already filling the screen. ⚠️ The click is an explicit user action on the **explicit, Origin-guarded** registration route, which is why it may cross the workspace boundary at all; the passive magic-link scanner stays force-confined. A type outside `SUPPORTED_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` (`.svg`, `.bmp`) is refused with a message naming what IS previewable, rather than the registry's own policy term.
+
+⚠️ **The terminal routes an out-of-workspace path to the preview, not the log viewer.** The log viewer spawns `tail -f` and allows only the workspace, `/var/log` and `~/logs`, so an external `.log`/`.json`/code path answered `Path must be within working directory or allowed log directories` while the SAME path clicked in the response viewer previewed fine. `activate()` now checks `_isExternalPreviewPath` alongside `previewsInFileViewer`. In-workspace text keeps the tail viewer, which is the point of it (live follow); nothing widened `file-stream-manager`'s allowlist, so no `tail -f` is spawned on an arbitrary host path.
+
+**Text reuses the edit-mode allowlist; markup stays download-only.** `TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` IS `EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS` (`config/file-editing.ts`) rather than a second curated list that would drift from it: if the viewer would open a file for editing inside the workspace, the same file outside it can be read. The justification for widening is that the agent in the session can already `cat` any of these and the picker already previews them, so the suffix was never the confidentiality gate; the path guard is (sensitive-file blocklist, `/root` and `/etc` trees, realpath first). ⚠️ Two consequences had to be handled at the same time: `~/.codeman*/state.json` joined `isSensitivePath` (it persists `SessionState.envOverrides`, and the env allowlist admits key-shaped names like `GEMINI_API_KEY`, so it can hold a live credential), and `html`/`htm` joined `svg` in `serveRawFile`'s **download-only** branch so that widening what can be READ never widens what can RUN on our own origin. Text with no dedicated MIME entry goes out as inert `text/plain; charset=utf-8` + `nosniff`, matching the picker. The by-id text preview is bounded like the workspace one: a `Range` request for the first 512KB (a real partial read, not a discarded 50MB download) plus a 500-line cap, with the footer saying so.
+
+**Media is single-sourced across the two preview paths.** `VIDEO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` / `AUDIO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` live in `attachment-registry.ts` and are imported by `file-content`'s media classification, so a clip plays identically whether it is in the workspace or reached by id from outside it. They diverged first: the workspace path had its own inline sets and the registry allowlist had no media at all, so a video an agent wrote to `/tmp` was refused as an unsupported type while the same file inside the repo played. ⚠️ Three things have to line up for a player rather than a dead frame: the extension in the allowlist, a **real MIME entry** in `MIME_TYPES` (a `<video>` refuses to decode `application/octet-stream`, which presents as a player that renders and then does nothing), and the range-aware body (`serveRawFile` → `sendFileBody`) that makes the scrub bar work. `getAttachmentType()` returns the `video`/`audio` members of `AttachmentDetectedType` for them; the attachment card has no per-type CSS and its thumbnail falls back to the type label, since `generateFirstPageThumbnail` has no media branch and answers 204. ⚠️ The image-watcher keeps its OWN narrow detection list (`png/pdf/docx/pptx`), so this does not start popping cards for every video an agent writes.
+
+⚠️ **The preview overlay must outrank the panel that launched it.** `.file-preview-overlay` sits at `z-index: 5100`, above the response viewer (5000) and its backdrop (4999); at its historical 2000 a path clicked in the chat opened the overlay *behind* the chat, which reads as a dead link. It stays below the toast/picker band (10000+) so a "Saved" toast still lands on top.
+
 ### Filesystem path picker
 
 **Filesystem path picker** (Link Existing "Browse" button + the extended mobile keyboard's `📁 Path` key): a lazy one-directory-at-a-time browser over `GET /api/filesystem/browse`, with `GET /api/filesystem/preview` serving the tapped file. It starts at the active session's working directory (falling back to `/mnt/d`), hides dot entries, and inserts the chosen path **without** Enter so the prompt is not submitted. The companion `⌫ All` key clears only the current unsent prompt buffer and must never emit the agent's `/clear` command.

src/attachment-registry.ts

@@ -11,9 +11,46 @@ import { realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
 import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
 import { basename, extname, isAbsolute } from 'node:path';
 import { isBlockedAttachmentPath, loadAttachmentGuardConfig } from './config/attachment-guard.js';
+import { EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS } from './config/file-editing.js';
 import { validateSessionFilePath } from './web/route-helpers.js';
 import type { AttachmentDetectedEvent, AttachmentDetectedType } from './types.js';
 
+/**
+ * Playable media extensions, single-sourced here because the WORKSPACE preview
+ * (`file-content`'s media classification) and the out-of-workspace attachment
+ * path must agree on what plays. They diverged once: a video an agent wrote
+ * inside the workspace played with a working scrub bar, while the same file in
+ * `/tmp` was refused as an unsupported type, which reads as a bug rather than a
+ * boundary. Serving is range-aware in both, which is what makes seeking work.
+ */
+export const VIDEO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(['mp4', 'webm', 'mov', 'm4v', 'ogv']);
+export const AUDIO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
+  'mp3',
+  'wav',
+  'ogg',
+  'oga',
+  'm4a',
+  'aac',
+  'flac',
+  'opus',
+]);
+
+/**
+ * Plain-text extensions, REUSING the File Viewer's edit-mode allowlist rather
+ * than curating a second list that would drift from it. The rule reads: if the
+ * viewer would open that file for editing inside the workspace, the same file
+ * outside it can be read here. `svg` and `env` are absent from that list by
+ * design and stay absent here.
+ *
+ * Why widen at all: the agent in the session can already `cat` any of these,
+ * and every path-shaped surface (the picker, the workspace viewer) can already
+ * show them. Refusing a `.log` an agent just wrote to `/tmp` bought no
+ * confidentiality, it only made the click fail. The confidentiality gate is the
+ * path guard that still runs on every registration (sensitive-file blocklist,
+ * `/root` and `/etc` trees, realpath before the check), not the file's suffix.
+ */
+export const TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS: ReadonlySet<string> = EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS;
+
 const SUPPORTED_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS = new Set([
   'png',
   'jpg',
@@ -25,6 +62,9 @@ const SUPPORTED_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS = new Set([
   'pptx',
   'md',
   'txt',
+  ...VIDEO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS,
+  ...AUDIO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS,
+  ...TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS,
 ]);
 
 export type AttachmentSource = 'detected' | 'external';
@@ -108,10 +148,14 @@ export function isSupportedAttachmentExtension(extension: string): boolean {
 export function getAttachmentType(extension: string): AttachmentDetectedType {
   const normalized = extension.toLowerCase().replace(/^\./, '');
   if (['png', 'jpg', 'jpeg', 'gif', 'webp'].includes(normalized)) return 'image';
+  if (VIDEO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS.has(normalized)) return 'video';
+  if (AUDIO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS.has(normalized)) return 'audio';
   if (normalized === 'pdf') return 'pdf';
   if (normalized === 'pptx') return 'presentation';
   if (normalized === 'md') return 'markdown';
-  if (normalized === 'txt') return 'text';
+  // Everything else in the text family reads as text, including code and
+  // config: the card and the preview both treat it as a plain-text file.
+  if (normalized === 'txt' || TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS.has(normalized)) return 'text';
   return 'document';
 }
 

src/types/tools.ts

@@ -63,7 +63,15 @@ export interface ImageDetectedEvent {
   size: number;
 }
 
-export type AttachmentDetectedType = 'image' | 'pdf' | 'document' | 'presentation' | 'markdown' | 'text';
+export type AttachmentDetectedType =
+  | 'image'
+  | 'video'
+  | 'audio'
+  | 'pdf'
+  | 'document'
+  | 'presentation'
+  | 'markdown'
+  | 'text';
 
 /**
  * Event emitted when a new previewable attachment file is detected in a session's

src/web/public/app.js

@@ -2004,6 +2004,17 @@ class CodemanApp {
     if (!body || body.dataset.rvBound === '1') return;
     body.dataset.rvBound = '1';
     body.addEventListener('click', async (ev) => {
+      // File path (_linkifyFilePaths): open it in the preview overlay, which
+      // resolves workspace and out-of-workspace paths alike.
+      const pathLink = ev.target.closest('a.rv-path');
+      if (pathLink) {
+        ev.preventDefault();
+        ev.stopPropagation();
+        const filePath = pathLink.dataset.path;
+        if (filePath) this.openFilePreview(filePath, this.activeSessionId);
+        return;
+      }
+
       // One-click copy: lift the raw source from the sibling <pre><code>.
       const copyBtn = ev.target.closest('.rv-copy-btn');
       if (copyBtn) {
@@ -2074,10 +2085,66 @@ class CodemanApp {
     const renderedText = document.createElement('div');
     renderedText.className = 'rv-text';
     renderedText.innerHTML = this._renderMarkdown(text);
+    this._linkifyFilePaths(renderedText);
     div.appendChild(renderedText);
     return div;
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Make absolute file paths in a rendered message clickable.
+   *
+   * The terminal's link provider never sees these: the response viewer is
+   * markdown, and a path the agent wrote as prose or inline code renders as
+   * inert text — so the file it just produced (a screenshot, a report) was one
+   * copy-paste away from being viewable instead of one click. Same pattern the
+   * terminal uses (constants.js), same destination (the file-preview overlay).
+   *
+   * Walks TEXT NODES and builds anchors with DOM APIs — never innerHTML, and
+   * never a string rebuild of already-sanitized markup: the source is model
+   * output. Subtrees already inside an `<a>` are skipped so an autolinked URL
+   * is never re-cut, and the anchor's textContent is the path verbatim, so
+   * "copy code" still yields exactly what the agent printed.
+   */
+  _linkifyFilePaths(root) {
+    if (!root || typeof document === 'undefined') return;
+    // Guarded: a stale cached constants.js must degrade to plain text, not throw
+    // out of the middle of rendering a message.
+    if (typeof absoluteFilePathPattern !== 'function') return;
+    const pattern = absoluteFilePathPattern();
+
+    // Collect first: replacing a node while the walker is positioned on it
+    // invalidates the traversal.
+    const walker = document.createTreeWalker(root, NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT);
+    const targets = [];
+    for (let node = walker.nextNode(); node; node = walker.nextNode()) {
+      if (node.parentElement?.closest('a')) continue;
+      pattern.lastIndex = 0;
+      if (pattern.test(node.nodeValue || '')) targets.push(node);
+    }
+
+    for (const node of targets) {
+      const value = node.nodeValue;
+      const frag = document.createDocumentFragment();
+      let cursor = 0;
+      let match;
+      pattern.lastIndex = 0;
+      while ((match = pattern.exec(value)) !== null) {
+        const path = match[1];
+        if (match.index > cursor) frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(value.slice(cursor, match.index)));
+        const link = document.createElement('a');
+        link.className = 'rv-path';
+        link.href = '#';
+        link.dataset.path = path;
+        link.title = path;
+        link.textContent = path;
+        frag.appendChild(link);
+        cursor = match.index + path.length;
+      }
+      if (cursor < value.length) frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(value.slice(cursor)));
+      node.parentNode?.replaceChild(frag, node);
+    }
+  }
+
   _getResponseViewerAgentLabel() {
     const mode = this.sessions.get(this.activeSessionId)?.mode;
     return mode === 'codex'

src/web/public/constants.js

@@ -893,6 +893,45 @@ function computeRewriteScrollLine(input) {
   return Math.max(0, (input?.baseY || 0) - linesFromBottom);
 }
 
+/**
+ * Absolute file paths in agent output, as ONE pattern with two consumers: the
+ * xterm link provider (terminal-ui.js) and the response viewer's markdown
+ * linkifier (app.js). They used to be able to drift, and a path that is
+ * clickable in the terminal but inert in the chat reads as a bug, not a policy.
+ *
+ * Anchored on a known absolute root (so an ordinary fraction or a date can
+ * never match) and terminated by a known extension (so the end of the path is
+ * unambiguous — a trailing `)` or `.` after the extension stays out). Longer
+ * extensions come first in each family (`tsx|ts`), so the trailing `\b` cannot
+ * be satisfied by the shorter branch mid-word.
+ *
+ * ⚠ Consumers must never share one instance: `lastIndex` is per-object state on
+ * a `/g` regex, so {@link absoluteFilePathPattern} mints a fresh one per call.
+ */
+const FILE_PATH_LINK_PATTERN =
+  /(\/(?:home|Users|tmp|var|private|etc|opt|mnt|srv|media|data|workspace)\/[^\s"'<>|;&\n\x00-\x1f]*\.(?:log|txt|json|md|ya?ml|csv|xml|sh|py|tsx|ts|jsx|js|mjs|cjs|css|html|toml|ini|sql|png|jpe?g|gif|webp|bmp|svg|pdf|docx|pptx|mp4|webm|mov|mp3|wav))\b/g;
+
+/** A fresh, zero-state instance of {@link FILE_PATH_LINK_PATTERN}. */
+function absoluteFilePathPattern() {
+  return new RegExp(FILE_PATH_LINK_PATTERN.source, 'g');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extensions the file-preview overlay renders itself. Everything else a link
+ * points at goes to the tail/log viewer, which is the right home for a growing
+ * text file and the wrong one for bytes (tailing a PNG shows binary noise).
+ */
+const FILE_PREVIEW_EXTENSIONS = new Set(
+  ('png jpg jpeg gif webp bmp svg pdf docx pptx mp4 webm mov mp3 wav').split(' ')
+);
+
+/** Whether a path's extension is one {@link FILE_PREVIEW_EXTENSIONS} covers. */
+function previewsInFileViewer(filePath) {
+  const ext = String(filePath || '').split('.').pop().toLowerCase();
+  return FILE_PREVIEW_EXTENSIONS.has(ext);
+}
+
 if (typeof window !== 'undefined') {
   window.CodemanHistoryFormat = { formatHistoryBytes, computeHistoryTruncationNotice, computeRewriteScrollLine };
+  window.CodemanFilePaths = { absoluteFilePathPattern, previewsInFileViewer, FILE_PREVIEW_EXTENSIONS };
 }

src/web/public/panels-ui.js

@@ -15,6 +15,11 @@
 
 const AWAY_DIGEST_LAST_VIEWED_KEY = 'codeman-away-digest-last-viewed';
 const FILE_BROWSER_SHOW_HIDDEN_KEY = 'codeman:fileBrowserShowHidden';
+// Bounds for the by-id text preview, mirroring what the workspace text preview
+// already does server-side (500 lines). The byte cap rides a Range request, so
+// a huge log is a partial read rather than a download the viewer throws away.
+const TEXT_PREVIEW_MAX_BYTES = 512 * 1024;
+const TEXT_PREVIEW_MAX_LINES = 500;
 const AWAY_DIGEST_SECTIONS = [
   ['needsAttention', 'Needs Attention'],
   ['completed', 'Completed'],
@@ -3234,6 +3239,65 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     if (headerBtn) headerBtn.setAttribute('aria-expanded', 'false');
   },
 
+  /**
+   * Whether a path is absolute and provably OUTSIDE this session's workspace.
+   *
+   * `file-content` / `file-raw` resolve every path against `workingDir` and
+   * refuse anything that escapes it, so an absolute path elsewhere on the host
+   * (an agent's `/tmp` scratchpad capture, a screenshot, another checkout) can
+   * only ever 404 there — it has to go through the attachment routes instead.
+   *
+   * A string compare is enough for ROUTING; the real containment decision stays
+   * server-side (realpath + guard) on whichever route the request lands on. An
+   * unknown workingDir answers false, leaving the historical path untouched.
+   */
+  _isExternalPreviewPath(filePath, sessionId) {
+    if (typeof filePath !== 'string' || !filePath.startsWith('/')) return false;
+    const workingDir = this.sessions.get(sessionId)?.workingDir;
+    if (!workingDir) return false;
+    const root = workingDir.endsWith('/') ? workingDir : `${workingDir}/`;
+    return filePath !== workingDir && !filePath.startsWith(root);
+  },
+
+  /**
+   * Register an out-of-workspace path as a live external attachment and return
+   * its id, so the preview can render it through the by-id attachment routes.
+   *
+   * `notify: false` keeps this quiet: the caller is already opening the file in
+   * the overlay, so the usual attachment card + unread badge would be noise on
+   * top of the thing the user just asked to see. The server still enforces the
+   * full attachment guard (blocked secret trees, extension allowlist, symlinks
+   * resolved), so a refusal here is a policy answer worth showing verbatim.
+   *
+   * @returns {Promise<{attachmentId?: string, size?: number, error?: string}>}
+   */
+  async _registerExternalPreview(filePath, sessionId) {
+    try {
+      const res = await fetch(`/api/sessions/${sessionId}/attachments`, {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ path: filePath, notify: false }),
+      });
+      const result = await res.json().catch(() => null);
+      if (res.ok && result?.success && result.data?.attachmentId) {
+        return { attachmentId: result.data.attachmentId, size: result.data.size || 0 };
+      }
+      const reason = result?.error || `Cannot open this file (HTTP ${res.status})`;
+      // The registry's type answer is a policy term, not an explanation, and the
+      // user just clicked a file they can see on disk. Say what IS previewable
+      // from outside the workspace instead.
+      if (/unsupported/i.test(reason)) {
+        const ext = (filePath.split('.').pop() || '').toLowerCase();
+        return {
+          error: `Cannot preview .${ext} from outside the session workspace (images, video, audio, PDF, Office documents and text files only).`,
+        };
+      }
+      return { error: reason };
+    } catch (err) {
+      return { error: err.message || 'Cannot open this file' };
+    }
+  },
+
   async openFilePreview(filePath, sessionId = this.activeSessionId, attachmentId = null) {
     if (!sessionId || !filePath) return;
 
@@ -3258,25 +3322,70 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
 
     const ext = (filePath.split('.').pop() || '').toLowerCase();
 
+    // Out-of-workspace path: mint an attachment id up front. Every branch below
+    // talks to a workspace-confined route, so without this the image/PDF ones
+    // render a broken frame and the text one reports a bare "File not found"
+    // for a file that is sitting right there on disk.
+    let externalError = '';
+    let externalSize = 0;
+    if (!attachmentId && this._isExternalPreviewPath(filePath, sessionId)) {
+      const external = await this._registerExternalPreview(filePath, sessionId);
+      attachmentId = external.attachmentId || null;
+      externalError = external.error || '';
+      externalSize = external.size || 0;
+    }
+    if (!attachmentId && externalError) {
+      footerEl.textContent = '';
+      bodyEl.innerHTML = `<div class="binary-message">${escapeHtml(externalError)}</div>`;
+      return;
+    }
+
     // Registered attachment: render straight from its by-id routes — images and
     // PDFs inline, Office docs via the server-converted PDF preview, text fetched
     // raw. (Workspace-path previews fall through to the file-content endpoint.)
     if (attachmentId) {
       const base = `/api/sessions/${sessionId}/attachments/${encodeURIComponent(attachmentId)}`;
       const IMAGE_EXTS = new Set(['png', 'jpg', 'jpeg', 'gif', 'webp', 'bmp', 'svg']);
-      footerEl.textContent = ext.toUpperCase();
+      const VIDEO_EXTS = new Set(['mp4', 'webm', 'mov', 'm4v', 'ogv']);
+      const AUDIO_EXTS = new Set(['mp3', 'wav', 'ogg', 'oga', 'm4a', 'aac', 'flac', 'opus']);
+      // Size when we just registered the file ourselves, so a path opened from a
+      // link reads like a workspace preview instead of a bare "PNG". History
+      // cards arrive with an id and no size and keep the short form.
+      footerEl.textContent = externalSize ? `${this.formatFileSize(externalSize)} • ${ext}` : ext.toUpperCase();
       if (IMAGE_EXTS.has(ext)) {
         bodyEl.innerHTML = `<img src="${escapeHtml(`${base}/raw`)}" alt="${escapeHtml(filePath)}">`;
+      } else if (VIDEO_EXTS.has(ext)) {
+        // Same markup as the workspace branch below, including playsinline: iOS
+        // otherwise hijacks playback into its own fullscreen player, which
+        // leaves this overlay behind it with no way back but its close button.
+        // The attachment raw route is range-aware, so the scrub bar works.
+        bodyEl.innerHTML = `<video src="${escapeHtml(`${base}/raw`)}" controls autoplay playsinline preload="metadata"></video>`;
+      } else if (AUDIO_EXTS.has(ext)) {
+        bodyEl.innerHTML = `<audio src="${escapeHtml(`${base}/raw`)}" controls autoplay preload="metadata"></audio>`;
       } else if (ext === 'pdf') {
         bodyEl.innerHTML = `<iframe src="${escapeHtml(`${base}/raw`)}" title="${escapeHtml(filePath)}"></iframe>`;
       } else if (ext === 'docx' || ext === 'pptx') {
         bodyEl.innerHTML = `<iframe src="${escapeHtml(`${base}/preview`)}" title="${escapeHtml(filePath)}"></iframe>`;
       } else {
         try {
-          const res = await fetch(`${base}/raw`);
+          // Bounded like the workspace text preview: a Range for the first
+          // chunk (the route is range-aware, so this is a real partial read,
+          // not a 50MB download thrown away) and a line cap on top. An agent's
+          // log can be enormous, and rendering all of it into one <pre> is how
+          // you lock up the tab on the file you wanted to glance at.
+          const res = await fetch(`${base}/raw`, { headers: { Range: `bytes=0-${TEXT_PREVIEW_MAX_BYTES - 1}` } });
           if (!res.ok) throw new Error('Failed to load attachment');
           const text = await res.text();
-          bodyEl.innerHTML = `<pre><code>${escapeHtml(text)}</code></pre>`;
+          const clippedByBytes = res.status === 206 && text.length >= TEXT_PREVIEW_MAX_BYTES;
+          const lines = text.split('\n');
+          const clippedByLines = lines.length > TEXT_PREVIEW_MAX_LINES;
+          const shown = clippedByLines ? lines.slice(0, TEXT_PREVIEW_MAX_LINES).join('\n') : text;
+          bodyEl.innerHTML = `<pre><code>${escapeHtml(shown)}</code></pre>`;
+          this.filePreviewContent = shown;
+          if (clippedByLines || clippedByBytes) {
+            const note = clippedByLines ? `showing first ${TEXT_PREVIEW_MAX_LINES} lines` : 'showing the start of the file';
+            footerEl.textContent = `${footerEl.textContent} (${note})`;
+          }
         } catch (err) {
           bodyEl.innerHTML = `<div class="binary-message">Error: ${escapeHtml(err.message)}</div>`;
         }

src/web/public/styles.css

@@ -9855,13 +9855,18 @@ kbd {
 
 /* ========== File Preview Overlay ========== */
 
+/* Above the response viewer (5000) and its backdrop (4999): a file path in the
+   chat opens this overlay, and at the old 2000 it rendered BEHIND the panel it
+   was launched from — the click looked dead. Same relationship the path picker
+   and its preview already have (10020 / 10030). Still below the toast and
+   picker band (10000+), so a "Saved" toast keeps landing on top. */
 .file-preview-overlay {
   position: fixed;
   inset: 0;
   background: var(--modal-backdrop);
   backdrop-filter: blur(6px);
   -webkit-backdrop-filter: blur(6px);
-  z-index: 2000;
+  z-index: 5100;
   display: none;
   align-items: center;
   justify-content: center;
@@ -12413,6 +12418,16 @@ kbd {
   border-bottom-color: var(--accent);
 }
 
+/* File paths linkified out of the message text. Monospace so a path still reads
+   as a path in prose, and break-all because these are long and the viewer is
+   narrow on a phone. Colour/underline come from the .rv-text a rule above. */
+.rv-text a.rv-path {
+  font-family: 'Fira Code', 'JetBrains Mono', 'SF Mono', Menlo, Monaco, monospace;
+  font-size: 0.92em;
+  word-break: break-all;
+  cursor: pointer;
+}
+
 /* Tables — scroll wrapper keeps table proper while allowing horizontal overflow */
 .rv-table-wrap {
   margin: 1em 0;

src/web/public/terminal-ui.js

@@ -1423,19 +1423,19 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
         // the whole tab on hover. Non-empty token + bounded reps is O(n).
         const cmdPattern = /\b(tail|cat|head|less|grep|watch|vim|nano)\s+(?:[^\s\/]+\s+){0,4}(\/[^\s"'<>|;&\n\x00-\x1f]+)/g;
 
-        // Pattern 2: Paths with common extensions.
-        // Image/PDF extensions are included so pasted-attachment paths
-        // (`.claude-images/paste-*.png`) are clickable; they open the file preview
-        // rather than the log viewer (see addLink).
-        const extPattern =
-          /(\/(?:home|tmp|var|etc|opt)[^\s"'<>|;&\n\x00-\x1f]*\.(?:log|txt|json|md|yaml|yml|csv|xml|sh|py|ts|js|png|jpe?g|gif|webp|bmp|svg|pdf))\b/g;
+        // Pattern 2: Paths with common extensions. Image/PDF/media extensions are
+        // included so pasted-attachment paths (`.claude-images/paste-*.png`) and
+        // screenshots an agent just wrote are clickable; those open the file
+        // preview rather than the log viewer (see addLink).
+        //
+        // The literal lives in constants.js because the response viewer linkifies
+        // the SAME paths out of markdown — one definition, two consumers. A fresh
+        // instance per call: `lastIndex` is per-object state.
+        const extPattern = absoluteFilePathPattern();
 
         // Pattern 3: Bash() tool output
         const bashPattern = /Bash\([^)]*?(\/(?:home|tmp|var|etc|opt)[^\s"'<>|;&\)\n\x00-\x1f]+)/g;
 
-        /** Extensions that should open the image/document preview, not the log viewer. */
-        const PREVIEW_EXTS = new Set(['png', 'jpg', 'jpeg', 'gif', 'webp', 'bmp', 'svg', 'pdf']);
-
         const addLink = (filePath, matchIndex) => {
           const startCol = lineText.indexOf(filePath, matchIndex);
           if (startCol === -1) return;
@@ -1454,9 +1454,19 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
             },
             activate(event, text) {
               // Tailing a PNG in the log viewer shows binary noise; the file preview
-              // already renders images and PDFs inline.
-              const ext = (text.split('.').pop() || '').toLowerCase();
-              if (PREVIEW_EXTS.has(ext)) {
+              // already renders images, PDFs, documents and media inline — and it
+              // now reaches files outside the workspace too, which is where an
+              // agent's screenshots and scratchpad captures actually land.
+              //
+              // Text goes to the log viewer, which follows a file that is still
+              // being written — but ONLY where it can actually read: it spawns
+              // `tail -f` and allows the workspace, /var/log and ~/logs, so an
+              // out-of-workspace path there answered "Path must be within
+              // working directory or allowed log directories" while the SAME
+              // path clicked in the response viewer previewed fine. The preview
+              // reads those through the guarded attachment routes, so external
+              // paths route there and the two surfaces agree.
+              if (previewsInFileViewer(text) || self._isExternalPreviewPath(text, self.activeSessionId)) {
                 self.openFilePreview(text, self.activeSessionId);
                 return;
               }

src/web/routes/file-routes.ts

@@ -23,12 +23,15 @@ import type {
 import { ApiErrorCode, createErrorResponse, getErrorMessage } from '../../types.js';
 import { fileStreamManager } from '../../file-stream-manager.js';
 import {
+  AUDIO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS,
   AttachmentRegistrationError,
   attachmentRecordToEvent,
   attachmentRegistry,
   buildFileThumbnailRoute,
   isSupportedAttachmentExtension,
   registerExternalAttachment,
+  TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS,
+  VIDEO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS,
   type AttachmentRecord,
 } from '../../attachment-registry.js';
 import { generateFirstPageThumbnail } from '../../document-thumbnailer.js';
@@ -67,6 +70,22 @@ const MIME_TYPES: Record<string, string> = {
   webp: 'image/webp',
   ico: 'image/x-icon',
   bmp: 'image/bmp',
+  // Media needs a real type, not the octet-stream fallback: a <video>/<audio>
+  // element refuses to decode an unknown type, so a missing entry here presents
+  // as a player that renders and then does nothing.
+  mp4: 'video/mp4',
+  webm: 'video/webm',
+  mov: 'video/quicktime',
+  m4v: 'video/x-m4v',
+  ogv: 'video/ogg',
+  mp3: 'audio/mpeg',
+  wav: 'audio/wav',
+  ogg: 'audio/ogg',
+  oga: 'audio/ogg',
+  m4a: 'audio/mp4',
+  aac: 'audio/aac',
+  flac: 'audio/flac',
+  opus: 'audio/opus',
   pdf: 'application/pdf',
   docx: 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document',
   pptx: 'application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.presentationml.presentation',
@@ -175,10 +194,16 @@ async function serveRawFile(
       );
     return;
   }
-  if (download || extension === 'svg') {
+  // Markup is download-only: served with a renderable type on our own origin it
+  // would be stored XSS. SVG was always here; HTML/HTM join it now that the text
+  // family is servable, so widening what can be READ never widened what can RUN.
+  // The preview overlay reads these through `fetch()`, which ignores the
+  // disposition, so a clicked .html still shows its source.
+  const markupOnly = extension === 'svg' || extension === 'html' || extension === 'htm';
+  if (download || markupOnly) {
     reply.header(
       'Content-Type',
-      extension === 'svg' ? 'application/octet-stream' : MIME_TYPES[extension] || 'application/octet-stream'
+      markupOnly ? 'application/octet-stream' : MIME_TYPES[extension] || 'application/octet-stream'
     );
     reply.header('Content-Disposition', buildContentDisposition('attachment', fileName));
     reply.header('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
@@ -186,6 +211,17 @@ async function serveRawFile(
     return;
   }
 
+  // Plain text with no dedicated MIME entry (code, config, logs, csv, xml) goes
+  // out as inert text/plain rather than the octet-stream fallback, matching what
+  // the path picker already does. Never a type the browser would execute.
+  if (!MIME_TYPES[extension] && TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS.has(extension)) {
+    reply.header('Content-Type', 'text/plain; charset=utf-8');
+    reply.header('Content-Disposition', buildContentDisposition('inline', fileName));
+    reply.header('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
+    sendFileBody(reply, resolvedPath, stat.size, rangeHeader);
+    return;
+  }
+
   reply.header('Content-Type', MIME_TYPES[extension] || 'application/octet-stream');
   reply.header('Content-Disposition', buildContentDisposition('inline', fileName));
   reply.header('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
@@ -1099,8 +1135,10 @@ export function registerFileRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: SessionPort & Even
       // so the file viewer can open the same files.
       const ext = filePath.split('.').pop()?.toLowerCase() || '';
       const imageExts = new Set(['png', 'jpg', 'jpeg', 'gif', 'webp', 'svg', 'bmp', 'ico']);
-      const videoExts = new Set(['mp4', 'webm', 'mov', 'm4v', 'ogv']);
-      const audioExts = new Set(['mp3', 'wav', 'ogg', 'oga', 'm4a', 'aac', 'flac', 'opus']);
+      // Shared with the attachment registry so a video plays the same whether it
+      // sits in the workspace or is reached by id from outside it.
+      const videoExts = VIDEO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS;
+      const audioExts = AUDIO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS;
       const otherBinaryExts = new Set([
         'pdf',
         'zip',
@@ -1449,7 +1487,7 @@ export function registerFileRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: SessionPort & Even
   app.post('/api/sessions/:id/attachments', async (req, reply) => {
     const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
     const session = findSessionOrFail(ctx, id, req);
-    const body = (req.body || {}) as { path?: string };
+    const body = (req.body || {}) as { path?: string; notify?: boolean };
 
     if (!body.path || typeof body.path !== 'string') {
       reply.code(400).send(createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT, 'Missing attachment path'));
@@ -1458,7 +1496,15 @@ export function registerFileRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: SessionPort & Even
 
     try {
       const event = await registerExternalAttachment(id, body.path, { sessionWorkingDir: session.workingDir });
-      ctx.broadcast(SseEvent.AttachmentDetected, event);
+      // `notify: false` registers QUIETLY. The file-preview overlay uses it to
+      // mint an id for a path the user just clicked (a terminal or response-viewer
+      // link pointing outside the workspace): it is already opening the file, so
+      // the attachment card + unread badge would be noise announcing what is
+      // filling the screen. Default stays true — every other caller (the
+      // `codeman attach` CLI, codeman-publish) wants the card.
+      if (body.notify !== false) {
+        ctx.broadcast(SseEvent.AttachmentDetected, event);
+      }
       return { success: true, data: event };
     } catch (err) {
       if (err instanceof AttachmentRegistrationError) {

src/web/sensitive-path.ts

@@ -80,6 +80,23 @@ const SENSITIVE_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
   /\/\.claude\/\.credentials\.json$/,
   /\/\.codeman[^/]*\/hook-secret$/,
   /\/\.codeman[^/]*\/users\.json$/,
+  // Codeman's own state files. Named once `.json` became previewable outside
+  // the workspace: `SessionState.envOverrides` persists whatever the user set
+  // for a session, and the env allowlist admits key-shaped names
+  // (`GEMINI_API_KEY`, `CLAUDE_CODE_*`), so state can hold a live credential.
+  // `state[^/]*` rather than `state`: siblings like state-inner.json carry the
+  // same payload. Same reasoning as the two entries above, and it leaves the
+  // rest of ~/.codeman attachable.
+  /\/\.codeman[^/]*\/state[^/]*\.json$/,
+  // settings.json holds a credential BY SCHEMA (`voiceSettings.apiKey`, the
+  // Deepgram key); push-keys.json holds the VAPID PRIVATE key (enough to forge
+  // push notifications to every subscribed device); intents.json is written
+  // 0600 precisely because captured prompts can contain secrets, and is
+  // deliberately kept out of /api/search — it must not be readable through a
+  // different route instead.
+  /\/\.codeman[^/]*\/settings\.json$/,
+  /\/\.codeman[^/]*\/push-keys\.json$/,
+  /\/\.codeman[^/]*\/intents\.json$/,
 ];
 
 /**

test/link-provider-regex.test.ts

@@ -18,18 +18,25 @@ import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
 import { readFileSync } from 'fs';
 import { join } from 'path';
 
-const SOURCE = readFileSync(join(__dirname, '..', 'src', 'web', 'public', 'terminal-ui.js'), 'utf-8');
+const publicFile = (name: string) => readFileSync(join(__dirname, '..', 'src', 'web', 'public', name), 'utf-8');
 
-/** Extract `const <name> = /.../g;` from the shipped source and build the RegExp. */
+const SOURCE = publicFile('terminal-ui.js');
+// The file-path pattern lives in constants.js: the response viewer linkifies the
+// same paths out of markdown, and one definition is what keeps a path that is
+// clickable in the terminal from being inert in the chat.
+const CONSTANTS_SOURCE = publicFile('constants.js');
+
+/** Extract `const <name> = /.../g;` from the shipped sources and build the RegExp. */
 function shippedPattern(name: string): RegExp {
-  const m = SOURCE.match(new RegExp(`const ${name} =\\s*\\n?\\s*(/(?:[^/\\\\\\n]|\\\\.)+/[a-z]*)`));
-  if (!m) throw new Error(`pattern ${name} not found in terminal-ui.js`);
+  const literal = new RegExp(`const ${name} =\\s*\\n?\\s*(/(?:[^/\\\\\\n]|\\\\.)+/[a-z]*)`);
+  const m = SOURCE.match(literal) ?? CONSTANTS_SOURCE.match(literal);
+  if (!m) throw new Error(`pattern ${name} not found in terminal-ui.js or constants.js`);
   const lit = m[1];
   const lastSlash = lit.lastIndexOf('/');
   return new RegExp(lit.slice(1, lastSlash), lit.slice(lastSlash + 1));
 }
 
-const PATTERN_NAMES = ['urlPattern', 'cmdPattern', 'extPattern', 'bashPattern'];
+const PATTERN_NAMES = ['urlPattern', 'cmdPattern', 'FILE_PATH_LINK_PATTERN', 'bashPattern'];
 
 /** Lines that made 0.9.10's cmdPattern backtrack exponentially (>2s each). */
 const KILLER_LINES = [
@@ -116,15 +123,24 @@ describe('terminal link-provider regexes (shipped source)', () => {
     }
   });
 
-  it('extPattern links pasted image/PDF attachment paths', () => {
+  it('the file-path pattern links pasted image/PDF/media attachment paths', () => {
     // `.claude-images/paste-*.png` is what Codeman writes for a pasted screenshot;
     // without image extensions the path rendered as plain, unclickable text.
-    const ext = shippedPattern('extPattern');
+    const ext = shippedPattern('FILE_PATH_LINK_PATTERN');
     const cases = [
       '/home/arkon/default/claudeman/.claude-images/paste-1785164958410-d11eb7d0.png',
       '/tmp/shot.jpeg',
       '/opt/app/report.pdf',
       '/home/a/diagram.svg',
+      // An agent's own scratchpad capture — the path shape this whole feature
+      // exists for, and the one that used to open a "File not found" preview.
+      '/tmp/claude-1000/-home-arkon-default-claudeman/7b3fefd2/scratchpad/probe-run-native.png',
+      // macOS and WSL roots: unmatched before, so Mac users had no clickable
+      // paths at all outside /var and /tmp.
+      '/Users/arbbot/codeman-cases/report.docx',
+      '/mnt/d/captures/demo.mp4',
+      // Longer extension of a family must win over its prefix (tsx over ts).
+      '/home/a/src/App.tsx',
     ];
     for (const path of cases) {
       ext.lastIndex = 0;
@@ -134,6 +150,13 @@ describe('terminal link-provider regexes (shipped source)', () => {
     }
   });
 
+  it('terminal-ui builds its path pattern from the shared factory', () => {
+    // Structural guard: a local literal here would drift from the response
+    // viewer's linkifier, which is the divergence the move exists to prevent.
+    expect(SOURCE).toContain('absoluteFilePathPattern()');
+    expect(SOURCE).not.toMatch(/const extPattern =\s*\n?\s*\//);
+  });
+
   it('cmdPattern arg group cannot match empty tokens (the exponential trigger)', () => {
     // structural guard: the dangerous construct is an empty-matchable token
     // inside a repeated group — `[^\s\/]*\s+` repeated. Check the pattern

test/response-viewer-file-links.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Response-viewer file-path linkifier (`CodemanApp._linkifyFilePaths`).
+ *
+ * The viewer renders markdown, so a path an agent wrote — "wrote the chart to
+ * /tmp/.../chart.png" — arrived as inert text: the terminal's link provider
+ * never sees the chat, and the file it just produced was a copy-paste away
+ * instead of a click. The linkifier wraps those paths in an anchor the click
+ * delegate hands to the file-preview overlay.
+ *
+ * Two properties matter more than the linking itself and are pinned here:
+ *
+ *  1. **The text is untouched.** Anchors are built from TEXT NODES with DOM
+ *     APIs, never by rebuilding already-sanitized markup as a string, so the
+ *     message reads identically and "copy code" still yields exactly what the
+ *     agent printed.
+ *  2. **Model output cannot become markup.** The source is model text; a
+ *     path-shaped string carrying HTML must stay text.
+ *
+ * Loaded via `vm` with a jsdom document injected (same technique as
+ * connection-indicator.test.ts — no per-file jsdom environment, which would
+ * externalize node:fs under vite).
+ */
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { performance } from 'node:perf_hooks';
+import { resolve } from 'node:path';
+import vm from 'node:vm';
+import { JSDOM } from 'jsdom';
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+
+const dom = new JSDOM('<!DOCTYPE html><html><body></body></html>');
+const { document, NodeFilter } = dom.window;
+
+function loadCodemanAppClass() {
+  const constants = readFileSync(resolve(import.meta.dirname, '../src/web/public/constants.js'), 'utf8');
+  const source = readFileSync(resolve(import.meta.dirname, '../src/web/public/app.js'), 'utf8');
+  const context = vm.createContext({
+    console,
+    performance,
+    setInterval: vi.fn(),
+    clearInterval: vi.fn(),
+    setTimeout,
+    clearTimeout,
+    requestAnimationFrame: vi.fn(),
+    HTMLCanvasElement: class HTMLCanvasElement {},
+    fetch: vi.fn(),
+    document,
+    NodeFilter,
+    localStorage: { length: 0, key: vi.fn(), getItem: vi.fn(), setItem: vi.fn(), removeItem: vi.fn() },
+    window: { addEventListener: vi.fn(), removeEventListener: vi.fn() },
+    MobileDetection: {},
+  });
+  vm.runInContext(`${constants}\n${source}\nglobalThis.__CodemanApp = CodemanApp;`, context);
+  return (context as { __CodemanApp: { prototype: { _linkifyFilePaths(root: unknown): void } } }).__CodemanApp;
+}
+
+const CodemanApp = loadCodemanAppClass();
+const APP_SOURCE = readFileSync(resolve(import.meta.dirname, '../src/web/public/app.js'), 'utf8');
+
+/** Render `html` into a detached .rv-text div and run the linkifier over it. */
+function linkify(html: string): HTMLElement {
+  const app = Object.create(CodemanApp.prototype) as { _linkifyFilePaths(root: unknown): void };
+  const root = document.createElement('div');
+  root.className = 'rv-text';
+  root.innerHTML = html;
+  app._linkifyFilePaths(root);
+  return root as unknown as HTMLElement;
+}
+
+const paths = (root: HTMLElement) => Array.from(root.querySelectorAll('a.rv-path'));
+
+describe('response viewer file-path linkifier', () => {
+  it('links an absolute path written as prose', () => {
+    const path = '/tmp/claude-1000/-home-arkon-default-claudeman/7b3fefd2/scratchpad/probe-run-native.png';
+    const root = linkify(`<p>Saved the capture to ${path} — have a look.</p>`);
+
+    const links = paths(root);
+    expect(links).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(links[0].getAttribute('data-path')).toBe(path);
+    expect(links[0].textContent).toBe(path);
+    expect(root.textContent).toBe(`Saved the capture to ${path} — have a look.`);
+  });
+
+  it('links a path inside inline code, which is how agents usually write one', () => {
+    const root = linkify('<p>See <code>/home/a/out/report.pdf</code> for the numbers.</p>');
+
+    const links = paths(root);
+    expect(links).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(links[0].getAttribute('data-path')).toBe('/home/a/out/report.pdf');
+    // Still inside the <code> span — the code styling is not lost.
+    expect(links[0].closest('code')).not.toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it('links every path in one text node and preserves the text between them', () => {
+    const root = linkify('<p>Compare /tmp/before.png with /tmp/after.png please</p>');
+
+    expect(paths(root).map((a) => a.getAttribute('data-path'))).toEqual(['/tmp/before.png', '/tmp/after.png']);
+    expect(root.textContent).toBe('Compare /tmp/before.png with /tmp/after.png please');
+  });
+
+  it('never re-cuts text already inside an anchor', () => {
+    // marked autolinks URLs; a path-looking tail inside one must stay whole, and
+    // a nested <a> is invalid markup that would swallow the outer link's click.
+    // ⚠️ The URL's tail MUST be a string the pattern matches on its own
+    // (`/tmp/...` here): with an unmatchable tail this test passes with the
+    // inside-anchor guard deleted, i.e. it pins nothing.
+    const root = linkify('<p><a href="https://example.com/tmp/shot.png">https://example.com/tmp/shot.png</a></p>');
+
+    expect(paths(root)).toHaveLength(0);
+    expect(root.querySelectorAll('a')).toHaveLength(1);
+    expect(root.querySelector('a')!.getAttribute('href')).toBe('https://example.com/tmp/shot.png');
+  });
+
+  it('leaves text with no path untouched', () => {
+    const root = linkify('<p>Ratio 3/4 on 2026/08/16, see src/app.ts</p>');
+
+    expect(paths(root)).toHaveLength(0);
+    expect(root.textContent).toBe('Ratio 3/4 on 2026/08/16, see src/app.ts');
+  });
+
+  it('cannot turn model text into markup', () => {
+    // The anchor is built with createElement + textContent, so even a
+    // path-shaped payload stays text. (`<` also ends a match, so the linkifier
+    // never spans into it in the first place.)
+    const root = linkify('<p>/tmp/x.png&lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)&gt;.png</p>');
+
+    expect(root.querySelector('img')).toBeNull();
+    expect(root.textContent).toContain('<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>.png');
+    for (const link of paths(root)) {
+      expect(link.innerHTML).toBe(link.textContent);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('is wired into message rendering and the click delegate', () => {
+    // The linkifier is only reachable through these two call sites; losing
+    // either leaves inert paths (no linkify) or dead links (no handler).
+    expect(APP_SOURCE).toContain('this._linkifyFilePaths(renderedText)');
+    expect(APP_SOURCE).toMatch(/closest\('a\.rv-path'\)/);
+    expect(APP_SOURCE).toMatch(/openFilePreview\(filePath, this\.activeSessionId\)/);
+  });
+});

test/routes/file-routes-attachment-path-guard.test.ts

@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ import {
   registerExternalAttachment,
   type AttachmentRecord,
 } from '../../src/attachment-registry.js';
+import { SseEvent } from '../../src/web/sse-events.js';
 
 const mockedStat = vi.mocked(fs.stat);
 const mockedRealpathSync = vi.mocked(realpathSync);
@@ -355,4 +356,250 @@ describe('file-routes attachment path guard (COD-53)', () => {
       attachmentRegistry.clearSession('test-session-mlc');
     });
   });
+
+  // ===== Media (click-to-preview parity with the workspace preview) =====
+  // A video an agent writes inside the workspace plays with a working scrub
+  // bar; the same file in /tmp used to be refused as an unsupported type. Both
+  // now go through the same extension sets, and the raw route has to answer
+  // with a real media Content-Type and a range, or the player renders and then
+  // does nothing.
+  describe('media attachments', () => {
+    it('registers a video and serves it as seekable video/mp4', async () => {
+      const content = Buffer.from('MP4DATA-0123456789');
+      mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: content.length, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
+      mockedCreateReadStream.mockReturnValue(Readable.from([content.subarray(4, 10)]) as never);
+
+      const res = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'POST',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
+        payload: { path: '/tmp/captures/demo.mp4', notify: false },
+      });
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
+      const body = JSON.parse(res.body);
+      expect(body.data.attachmentType).toBe('video');
+
+      const rawRes = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'GET',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments/${body.data.attachmentId}/raw`,
+        headers: { range: 'bytes=4-9' },
+      });
+      expect(rawRes.statusCode).toBe(206);
+      expect(rawRes.headers['content-type']).toBe('video/mp4');
+      expect(rawRes.headers['content-range']).toBe(`bytes 4-9/${content.length}`);
+      expect(rawRes.headers['accept-ranges']).toBe('bytes');
+    });
+
+    it('registers audio with an audio type and its real MIME', async () => {
+      const content = Buffer.from('ID3AUDIO');
+      mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: content.length, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
+      mockedCreateReadStream.mockReturnValue(Readable.from([content]) as never);
+
+      const res = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'POST',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
+        payload: { path: '/tmp/captures/take.mp3', notify: false },
+      });
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
+      const body = JSON.parse(res.body);
+      expect(body.data.attachmentType).toBe('audio');
+
+      const rawRes = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'GET',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments/${body.data.attachmentId}/raw`,
+      });
+      expect(rawRes.statusCode).toBe(200);
+      expect(rawRes.headers['content-type']).toBe('audio/mpeg');
+    });
+
+    it('answers no thumbnail for media instead of spawning a converter', async () => {
+      // generateFirstPageThumbnail has no media branch; the card falls back to
+      // its type label. This pins that the route reports that cleanly.
+      const res = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'POST',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
+        payload: { path: '/tmp/captures/clip.webm', notify: false },
+      });
+      const { attachmentId } = JSON.parse(res.body).data;
+
+      const thumbRes = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'GET',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments/${attachmentId}/thumbnail`,
+      });
+      expect(thumbRes.statusCode).toBe(204);
+    });
+
+    it('still refuses media in a blocked tree', async () => {
+      const res = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'POST',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
+        payload: { path: '/root/private/recording.mp4', notify: false },
+      });
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
+    });
+  });
+
+  // ===== Text family (code, config and logs outside the workspace) =====
+  // The agent in the session can already `cat` these, so refusing the click
+  // bought no confidentiality. The gate that matters is the path guard, which
+  // still runs, and markup must not become executable just because it is now
+  // readable.
+  describe('text attachments', () => {
+    it.each([
+      ['/tmp/run.log', 'log'],
+      ['/tmp/data.json', 'json'],
+      ['/tmp/conf/app.yaml', 'yaml'],
+      ['/tmp/src/index.ts', 'ts'],
+      ['/tmp/export.csv', 'csv'],
+    ])('registers %s as a text attachment', async (path, extension) => {
+      mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 40, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
+      const res = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'POST',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
+        payload: { path, notify: false },
+      });
+
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
+      const body = JSON.parse(res.body);
+      expect(body.data.extension).toBe(extension);
+      expect(body.data.attachmentType).toBe('text');
+    });
+
+    it('serves a text file with no dedicated MIME as inert text/plain', async () => {
+      const content = Buffer.from('boot ok\nstarted\n');
+      mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: content.length, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
+      mockedCreateReadStream.mockReturnValue(Readable.from([content]) as never);
+
+      const reg = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'POST',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
+        payload: { path: '/tmp/run.log', notify: false },
+      });
+      const rawRes = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'GET',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments/${JSON.parse(reg.body).data.attachmentId}/raw`,
+      });
+
+      expect(rawRes.statusCode).toBe(200);
+      expect(rawRes.headers['content-type']).toBe('text/plain; charset=utf-8');
+      expect(rawRes.headers['x-content-type-options']).toBe('nosniff');
+    });
+
+    it('keeps HTML download-only so readable never means executable', async () => {
+      // Serving markup with a renderable type on our own origin is stored XSS.
+      // The preview reads it through fetch(), which ignores the disposition, so
+      // a clicked .html still shows its source.
+      const content = Buffer.from('<script>alert(1)</script>');
+      mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: content.length, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
+      mockedCreateReadStream.mockReturnValue(Readable.from([content]) as never);
+
+      const reg = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'POST',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
+        payload: { path: '/tmp/report.html', notify: false },
+      });
+      const rawRes = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'GET',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments/${JSON.parse(reg.body).data.attachmentId}/raw`,
+      });
+
+      expect(rawRes.headers['content-type']).toBe('application/octet-stream');
+      expect(String(rawRes.headers['content-disposition'])).toContain('attachment');
+    });
+
+    it('answers a byte range for text so a huge log is a partial read', async () => {
+      const content = Buffer.from('0123456789abcdef');
+      mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: content.length, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
+      mockedCreateReadStream.mockReturnValue(Readable.from([content.subarray(0, 8)]) as never);
+
+      const reg = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'POST',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
+        payload: { path: '/tmp/big.log', notify: false },
+      });
+      const rawRes = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'GET',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments/${JSON.parse(reg.body).data.attachmentId}/raw`,
+        headers: { range: 'bytes=0-7' },
+      });
+
+      expect(rawRes.statusCode).toBe(206);
+      expect(rawRes.headers['content-range']).toBe(`bytes 0-7/${content.length}`);
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      ['/home/someone/.config/gh/hosts.yml', 'forge token'],
+      ['/home/someone/project/.env.json', 'dotenv'],
+      ['/home/someone/.codeman/state.json', 'codeman state (can hold envOverrides secrets)'],
+      ['/home/someone/deploy/credentials.yaml', 'generic credentials'],
+      ['/etc/codeman/dump.log', 'blocked tree'],
+    ])('still refuses %s (%s) now that text is servable', async (path) => {
+      mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 40, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
+      const res = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'POST',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
+        payload: { path, notify: false },
+      });
+
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
+    });
+
+    it('still refuses a type outside the family', async () => {
+      mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 40, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
+      const res = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'POST',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
+        payload: { path: '/tmp/drawing.svg', notify: false },
+      });
+
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(400);
+      expect(JSON.parse(res.body).error).toMatch(/unsupported/i);
+    });
+  });
+
+  // ===== Quiet registration (click-to-preview) =====
+  // The file-preview overlay registers a clicked out-of-workspace path to mint
+  // an id it can render by. It is already putting the file on screen, so the
+  // usual attachment card + unread badge would announce what the user is
+  // looking at. `notify: false` suppresses ONLY the broadcast — the guard, the
+  // registry entry and the by-id routes are identical either way.
+  describe('quiet registration', () => {
+    const outside = '/tmp/claude-1000/scratchpad/probe-run-native.png';
+
+    it('broadcasts by default, so the CLI and publish paths keep their card', async () => {
+      mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 128, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
+      const res = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'POST',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
+        payload: { path: outside },
+      });
+
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
+      expect(harness.ctx.broadcast).toHaveBeenCalledWith(SseEvent.AttachmentDetected, expect.anything());
+    });
+
+    it('registers and serves a clicked path without broadcasting when notify is false', async () => {
+      const content = Buffer.from('PNGDATA');
+      mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: content.length, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
+      mockedCreateReadStream.mockReturnValue(Readable.from([content]) as never);
+
+      const res = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'POST',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
+        payload: { path: outside, notify: false },
+      });
+
+      expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
+      const body = JSON.parse(res.body);
+      expect(body.data.fileName).toBe('probe-run-native.png');
+      expect(harness.ctx.broadcast).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+      // The preview renders from this route, so the id has to be live.
+      const rawRes = await harness.app.inject({
+        method: 'GET',
+        url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments/${body.data.attachmentId}/raw`,
+      });
+      expect(rawRes.statusCode).toBe(200);
+      expect(rawRes.headers['content-type']).toBe('image/png');
+    });
+  });
 });

test/sensitive-path.test.ts

@@ -73,6 +73,20 @@ describe('isSensitivePath', () => {
       ['codeman hook secret', `${HOME}/.codeman/hook-secret`],
       ['codeman user table', `${HOME}/.codeman/users.json`],
       ['codeman hook secret on a named instance', `${HOME}/.codeman-beta/hook-secret`],
+      // state.json persists SessionState.envOverrides, and the env allowlist
+      // admits key-shaped names (GEMINI_API_KEY, CLAUDE_CODE_*), so it can hold
+      // a live credential. Named once .json became previewable from outside the
+      // workspace.
+      ['codeman state file', `${HOME}/.codeman/state.json`],
+      ['codeman state file on a named instance', `${HOME}/.codeman-beta/state.json`],
+      ['codeman state sibling (same payload)', `${HOME}/.codeman/state-inner.json`],
+      // settings.json holds voiceSettings.apiKey by schema; push-keys.json holds
+      // the VAPID PRIVATE key; intents.json is 0600 because captured prompts can
+      // contain secrets and is deliberately kept out of /api/search.
+      ['codeman settings (Deepgram key)', `${HOME}/.codeman/settings.json`],
+      ['codeman push keys (VAPID private)', `${HOME}/.codeman/push-keys.json`],
+      ['codeman intent profiles', `${HOME}/.codeman/intents.json`],
+      ['codeman intents on a named instance', `${HOME}/.codeman-beta/intents.json`],
     ];
 
     it.each(blocked)('blocks the %s', (_label, path) => {
@@ -88,6 +102,7 @@ describe('isSensitivePath', () => {
       // The publish skill and the review-card loop attach from these trees, so
       // only their named secret members are blocked, never the whole tree.
       ['a codeman screenshot', `${HOME}/.codeman/screenshots/shot.png`],
+      ['a codeman lifecycle log', `${HOME}/.codeman/session-lifecycle.jsonl`],
       ['a claude transcript', `${HOME}/.claude/projects/proj/session.jsonl`],
       ['a claude team inbox', `${HOME}/.claude/teams/alpha/inboxes/bob.json`],
       // isUnderTree-style separator awareness: a sibling name that merely starts