Files
Codeman/src/attachment-registry.ts
T
Codeman maintainer da999b130e feat(files): preview text files from outside the workspace, and stop routing them at a viewer that cannot read them
A .json/.log/.yaml/code path outside the session workspace was refused as an
unsupported type, and clicking one in the terminal made it worse: text goes to
the log viewer, which spawns `tail -f` and allows only the workspace, /var/log
and ~/logs, so it answered "Path must be within working directory or allowed
log directories" while the same path clicked in the response viewer previewed
fine. Two surfaces, two answers, for a file the session can already cat.

- TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS IS EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS (config/file-editing.ts),
  not a second curated list that would drift from it. The rule reads: if the
  viewer would open a file for editing inside the workspace, the same file
  outside it can be read. The suffix was never the confidentiality gate here,
  the path guard is (sensitive-file blocklist, /root and /etc trees, realpath
  before the check), and it still runs on every registration.
- Widening what can be READ must not widen what can RUN. html/htm join svg in
  serveRawFile's download-only branch, so markup is never served with a
  renderable type on our own origin; other text goes out as inert
  text/plain; charset=utf-8 with nosniff, matching what the path picker does.
  The preview reads through fetch(), which ignores the disposition, so a
  clicked .html still shows its source.
- ~/.codeman*/state.json joins isSensitivePath. It persists
  SessionState.envOverrides and the env allowlist admits key-shaped names
  (GEMINI_API_KEY, CLAUDE_CODE_*), so it can hold a live credential. Same
  treatment as hook-secret and users.json, and the rest of the tree stays
  attachable.
- The terminal sends an out-of-workspace path to the preview instead of the log
  viewer. In-workspace text keeps the tail viewer, which is the point of it, and
  file-stream-manager's allowlist is untouched: no `tail -f` on arbitrary host
  paths.
- The by-id text preview is bounded like the workspace one: a Range request for
  the first 512KB (a real partial read, not a discarded 50MB download) plus a
  500-line cap, with the footer saying so.

Verified on an isolated instance: a 1.1MB external log opens in ~1.8s showing
500 lines with "showing first 500 lines" in the footer; json, yaml and code
preview; an .html carrying a script tag renders as source and does not execute;
.svg is still refused; a terminal click on an external .yaml opens the preview
with no log viewer and no attachment card; an in-workspace .log still opens the
streaming tail viewer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 18:12:00 +02:00

293 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* @fileoverview In-memory attachment registry for live external document references.
*
* Session-local files keep using the existing workspace-scoped file routes. This
* registry is only for explicit, live external attachments that need a stable ID
* so browser requests never contain arbitrary absolute paths.
*/
import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
import { realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import { basename, extname, isAbsolute } from 'node:path';
import { isBlockedAttachmentPath, loadAttachmentGuardConfig } from './config/attachment-guard.js';
import { EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS } from './config/file-editing.js';
import { validateSessionFilePath } from './web/route-helpers.js';
import type { AttachmentDetectedEvent, AttachmentDetectedType } from './types.js';
/**
* Playable media extensions, single-sourced here because the WORKSPACE preview
* (`file-content`'s media classification) and the out-of-workspace attachment
* path must agree on what plays. They diverged once: a video an agent wrote
* inside the workspace played with a working scrub bar, while the same file in
* `/tmp` was refused as an unsupported type, which reads as a bug rather than a
* boundary. Serving is range-aware in both, which is what makes seeking work.
*/
export const VIDEO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set(['mp4', 'webm', 'mov', 'm4v', 'ogv']);
export const AUDIO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
'mp3',
'wav',
'ogg',
'oga',
'm4a',
'aac',
'flac',
'opus',
]);
/**
* Plain-text extensions, REUSING the File Viewer's edit-mode allowlist rather
* than curating a second list that would drift from it. The rule reads: if the
* viewer would open that file for editing inside the workspace, the same file
* outside it can be read here. `svg` and `env` are absent from that list by
* design and stay absent here.
*
* Why widen at all: the agent in the session can already `cat` any of these,
* and every path-shaped surface (the picker, the workspace viewer) can already
* show them. Refusing a `.log` an agent just wrote to `/tmp` bought no
* confidentiality, it only made the click fail. The confidentiality gate is the
* path guard that still runs on every registration (sensitive-file blocklist,
* `/root` and `/etc` trees, realpath before the check), not the file's suffix.
*/
export const TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS: ReadonlySet<string> = EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS;
const SUPPORTED_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS = new Set([
'png',
'jpg',
'jpeg',
'gif',
'webp',
'pdf',
'docx',
'pptx',
'md',
'txt',
...VIDEO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS,
...AUDIO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS,
...TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS,
]);
export type AttachmentSource = 'detected' | 'external';
export interface AttachmentRecord {
attachmentId: string;
sessionId: string;
filePath: string;
fileName: string;
extension: string;
attachmentType: AttachmentDetectedType;
size: number;
mtimeMs: number;
timestamp: number;
source: AttachmentSource;
}
export interface AttachmentRegistrationResult extends AttachmentDetectedEvent {
attachmentId: string;
source: AttachmentSource;
rawUrl: string;
previewUrl: string;
thumbnailUrl: string;
}
export class AttachmentRegistrationError extends Error {
constructor(
message: string,
readonly statusCode: number = 400
) {
super(message);
}
}
/** Per-session attachment cap. Bounds memory against a client (or a
* prompt-injected magic-link flood) registering unbounded distinct paths. */
const MAX_ATTACHMENTS_PER_SESSION = 200;
class AttachmentRegistry {
private recordsBySession = new Map<string, Map<string, AttachmentRecord>>();
register(record: AttachmentRecord): void {
let records = this.recordsBySession.get(record.sessionId);
if (!records) {
records = new Map();
this.recordsBySession.set(record.sessionId, records);
}
records.set(record.attachmentId, record);
// Evict oldest (insertion-order) entries beyond the cap.
while (records.size > MAX_ATTACHMENTS_PER_SESSION) {
const oldest = records.keys().next().value;
if (oldest === undefined) break;
records.delete(oldest);
}
}
get(sessionId: string, attachmentId: string): AttachmentRecord | undefined {
return this.recordsBySession.get(sessionId)?.get(attachmentId);
}
findByFilePath(sessionId: string, filePath: string): AttachmentRecord | undefined {
const records = this.recordsBySession.get(sessionId);
if (!records) return undefined;
for (const record of records.values()) {
if (record.filePath === filePath) return record;
}
return undefined;
}
clearSession(sessionId: string): void {
this.recordsBySession.delete(sessionId);
}
}
export const attachmentRegistry = new AttachmentRegistry();
export function isSupportedAttachmentExtension(extension: string): boolean {
return SUPPORTED_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS.has(extension.toLowerCase().replace(/^\./, ''));
}
export function getAttachmentType(extension: string): AttachmentDetectedType {
const normalized = extension.toLowerCase().replace(/^\./, '');
if (['png', 'jpg', 'jpeg', 'gif', 'webp'].includes(normalized)) return 'image';
if (VIDEO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS.has(normalized)) return 'video';
if (AUDIO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS.has(normalized)) return 'audio';
if (normalized === 'pdf') return 'pdf';
if (normalized === 'pptx') return 'presentation';
if (normalized === 'md') return 'markdown';
// Everything else in the text family reads as text, including code and
// config: the card and the preview both treat it as a plain-text file.
if (normalized === 'txt' || TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS.has(normalized)) return 'text';
return 'document';
}
export function buildAttachmentRoutes(
sessionId: string,
attachmentId: string
): {
rawUrl: string;
previewUrl: string;
thumbnailUrl: string;
} {
const encodedId = encodeURIComponent(attachmentId);
return {
rawUrl: `/api/sessions/${sessionId}/attachments/${encodedId}/raw`,
previewUrl: `/api/sessions/${sessionId}/attachments/${encodedId}/preview`,
thumbnailUrl: `/api/sessions/${sessionId}/attachments/${encodedId}/thumbnail`,
};
}
export function buildFileThumbnailRoute(sessionId: string, relativePath: string): string {
return `/api/sessions/${sessionId}/file-thumbnail?path=${encodeURIComponent(relativePath)}`;
}
export function attachmentRecordToEvent(record: AttachmentRecord): AttachmentRegistrationResult {
const routes = buildAttachmentRoutes(record.sessionId, record.attachmentId);
return {
sessionId: record.sessionId,
filePath: record.fileName,
relativePath: '',
fileName: record.fileName,
extension: record.extension,
attachmentType: record.attachmentType,
timestamp: record.timestamp,
size: record.size,
attachmentId: record.attachmentId,
source: record.source,
...routes,
};
}
/** Options for {@link registerExternalAttachment}. */
export interface RegisterExternalAttachmentOptions {
/**
* The registering session's working directory. Required to enforce workspace
* confinement — either when the global mode is enabled
* (`attachmentConfineToWorkspace` / `CODEMAN_ATTACHMENT_CONFINE`) or when
* {@link forceWorkspaceConfinement} is set for this call.
*/
sessionWorkingDir?: string;
/**
* Force workspace confinement for THIS registration regardless of the global
* setting. Used by the terminal-output `codeman://attach` magic-link scanner:
* terminal output is attacker-influenceable (a prompt-injected session can
* print an arbitrary path), so passive magic links may only reference files
* inside the session workspace. Deliberate cross-workspace attachment still
* works through the explicit, Origin-guarded `POST /attachments` route and the
* `codeman attach` CLI (which POSTs directly when a session id is known).
*/
forceWorkspaceConfinement?: boolean;
}
export async function registerExternalAttachment(
sessionId: string,
requestedPath: string,
options: RegisterExternalAttachmentOptions = {}
): Promise<AttachmentRegistrationResult> {
if (!requestedPath || !isAbsolute(requestedPath)) {
throw new AttachmentRegistrationError('Attachment path must be an absolute local path');
}
let resolvedPath: string;
try {
resolvedPath = realpathSync(requestedPath);
} catch {
throw new AttachmentRegistrationError('Attachment file not found', 404);
}
// COD-53: enforce the active attachment-guard policy on the symlink-resolved
// path before doing anything else.
const guard = await loadAttachmentGuardConfig();
if (guard.confineToWorkspace || options.forceWorkspaceConfinement) {
// Workspace-confined: the file MUST resolve inside the session's workspace.
// Applies when the global strict mode is on (opt-in, default OFF) OR when
// the caller forces it for this registration (the magic-link scanner — see
// forceWorkspaceConfinement). Strictly more restrictive than the blocklist.
const workingDir = options.sessionWorkingDir;
if (!workingDir || !validateSessionFilePath(workingDir, resolvedPath)) {
throw new AttachmentRegistrationError('Access to this file is blocked', 403);
}
}
// Blocklist (DEFAULT, also applied alongside confinement as defense in
// depth): pre-populated secret locations + the /root and /etc trees + any
// operator-configured extra trees. Symlinks are already resolved above.
// Cross-workspace attachment of non-blocked files stays allowed, so
// codeman-publish and the ~/.codeman review loop keep working.
if (isBlockedAttachmentPath(resolvedPath, guard.blockedTrees)) {
throw new AttachmentRegistrationError('Access to this file is blocked', 403);
}
const extension = extname(resolvedPath).toLowerCase().replace(/^\./, '');
if (!isSupportedAttachmentExtension(extension)) {
throw new AttachmentRegistrationError('Unsupported attachment type');
}
const stat = await fs.stat(resolvedPath);
if (typeof stat.isFile === 'function' && !stat.isFile()) {
throw new AttachmentRegistrationError('Attachment path is not a file');
}
const existing = attachmentRegistry.findByFilePath(sessionId, resolvedPath);
if (existing) {
existing.size = stat.size;
existing.mtimeMs = stat.mtimeMs ?? 0;
existing.timestamp = Date.now();
return attachmentRecordToEvent(existing);
}
const record: AttachmentRecord = {
attachmentId: `att_${randomUUID()}`,
sessionId,
filePath: resolvedPath,
fileName: basename(resolvedPath),
extension,
attachmentType: getAttachmentType(extension),
size: stat.size,
mtimeMs: stat.mtimeMs ?? 0,
timestamp: Date.now(),
source: 'external',
};
attachmentRegistry.register(record);
return attachmentRecordToEvent(record);
}