Files
Codeman/src/web/routes/cron-routes.ts
T
DevvynandClaude Opus 5 4830e662f9 refactor(cli-registry): make CLI backends data instead of per-mode branching
Every run mode is now a `CliEntry` in `src/config/cli-registry/` — discovery
(search dirs, version + identity probes), the launch argv template, env
handling, the `capabilities` flags that replace per-CLI branching, and the
`overlays` that back the remote/docker pane commands. Code that used to ask
"which CLI is this?" reads the entry instead.

Behaviour is unchanged. `test/cli-registry-spawn-golden.test.ts` pins every
spawn command as a literal string, captured from the hand-written builders
before they were deleted, and `test/location-overlay-commands.test.ts` does the
same for all 20 remote and in-container pane commands.

Config can never contain shell text: an entry declares typed argv tokens,
literals are validated against a safe-word pattern at LOAD time (a bad literal
rejects the whole entry — a silently dropped `--no-approve` is not cosmetic),
and values resolve through patterns NAMED in code, so a user `clis.json` cannot
widen its own validation. `~/.codeman/clis.json` overrides any entry, read-only
in this release.

OMP is included as a registry entry rather than a tenth hand-written builder,
so `buildOmpCommand()`, the omp availability pre-flight, the omp arm of
`buildPathExport()` and the omp entries in the truecolor/NO_COLOR, alt-screen
and doctor ladders all drop out.

Guard rails:

- `test/cli-registry-no-id-branching.test.ts` fails the build if per-CLI-id
  branching reappears outside `stock.ts`, in any of its four shapes (`===`,
  `!==`, `switch`/`case`, `includes`) — an `===`-only version would miss the
  negated forms, which is how 36 of them survived an earlier pass. Every
  allowlisted branch carries its reason.
- `external`, `hooks` and `altScreen` stay three INDEPENDENT capabilities;
  deriving one from another shipped the `until=stop`-hangs-on-shell bug.
- `param` is two namespaces. `launch.params` keys, `configSetenv.fromParam` and
  `privilegedParams[].param` all name a LAUNCH param; the legacy `<Mode>Config`
  wire field is separate, bridged only by `legacyConfigAliases`. Getting
  `privilegedParams[].param` wrong is SILENT — it is the multi-user bypass
  clamp's only handle on a CLI's privilege switch, and a wrong name clamps
  nothing with no error and no failing test — so `schema.ts` rejects an entry
  naming a param it never declared.
- Registry data resolves AT CALL TIME (`sessionModeSchema()`,
  `allowedEnvPrefixes()`, `dependencyRegistry()`, the resolvers' `searchDirs`
  thunks). A module-level const freezes at first import, so a CLI enabled while
  the server ran moved the run menu but not that surface.
- Six fields are annotated DECLARED-FOR-LATER and read by nothing
  (`shortBadge`, `accent`, `capabilities.echo`/`wheelForward`/
  `keyboardAccessory`/`maxFrameBytes`): all frontend behaviour, transcribed
  rather than measured. A test pins the list so it cannot quietly grow.

Three user-visible changes, all deliberate and named:

- `probeDockerCliVersion()` derives the in-container binary from the registry
  rather than assuming it equals the mode name (`antigravity` runs `agy`).
- The remote CLI version probe now covers grok and deepseek, which the
  hardcoded map it replaces omitted while its own comment said the rule was
  "every mode except shell".
- `codeman doctor`'s CLI rows are generated from the entries, so Claude's
  install hint is the install command rather than a docs URL, five CLIs gain
  hints they never had, and the row order follows the catalog.

Also hardened along the way: `sessionModeSchema()` is bounded at 24 chars
(matching the `cliId` pattern) before its failure message quotes the value
back, and `deepMerge` skips `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` when reading
the hand-editable `clis.json`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WQkoi1cNegqVwZHgzx5SbJ
2026-09-02 08:26:45 +08:00

139 lines
6.8 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* @fileoverview Cron Jobs routes.
*
* CRUD + enable/disable + Run Now + run history for `CronJob`s. These are
* separate from the legacy `/api/scheduled` (ScheduledRun) endpoints — see
* docs/cron-discovery.md §0.
*/
import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { getCli } from '../../config/cli-registry/registry.js';
import { ApiErrorCode, createErrorResponse } from '../../types.js';
import { CronJobSchema, CronJobUpdateSchema, CronJobEnabledSchema } from '../schemas.js';
import { canAccessOwned, getAuthUser, isWorkingDirAllowed, ownerFor, parseBody } from '../route-helpers.js';
import { canUsernameRunPrivilegedCommands } from '../../user-store.js';
import { isMultiUserMode } from '../../config/multiuser.js';
import type { CronJob } from '../../types/cron.js';
import type { CronPort } from '../ports/index.js';
import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
export function registerCronRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: CronPort): void {
// A job the caller may see/act on (own, or admin/single-user).
const canTouch = (req: FastifyRequest, job: CronJob | null | undefined): job is CronJob =>
!!job && canAccessOwned(getAuthUser(req), job.owner);
// ── Jobs ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
app.get('/api/cron/jobs', async (req) => {
const jobs = ctx.cron.listJobs();
if (!isMultiUserMode()) return jobs;
const user = getAuthUser(req);
if (user.role === 'admin') return jobs;
return (jobs as CronJob[]).filter((j) => canAccessOwned(user, j.owner));
});
app.post('/api/cron/jobs', async (req) => {
// No custom errorMessage: surface the schema's field-specific messages
// (e.g. "runAt is required for a one-time schedule").
const body = parseBody(CronJobSchema, req.body);
// Section 6.2: confine the job's workingDir to the owner's case space (mirrors
// POST /api/sessions). No-op allow-all for admins/single-user. workingDir is
// required by CronJobSchema so it is always present here.
if (!isWorkingDirAllowed(getAuthUser(req), body.workingDir)) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.FORBIDDEN, 'workingDir is outside your workspace');
}
// Section 6.3: shell mode / a launchCommand is arbitrary host-account execution.
// Resolve the owner's grant from the store (AuthUser.role alone can't tell a GRANTED
// regular user from a plain one); mirrors session-routes + the cron fire-time re-check.
if (
(getCli(body.agentType)?.capabilities.privilegedCommandGate || body.launchCommand) &&
!(await canUsernameRunPrivilegedCommands(ownerFor(req)))
) {
return createErrorResponse(
ApiErrorCode.FORBIDDEN,
'Shell/launchCommand cron jobs require the can-bypass-permissions grant'
);
}
return { job: ctx.cron.createJob(body, ownerFor(req)) };
});
app.get('/api/cron/jobs/:id', async (req) => {
const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
const job = ctx.cron.getJob(id);
if (!canTouch(req, job)) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Cron job not found');
return job;
});
app.put('/api/cron/jobs/:id', async (req) => {
const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
if (!canTouch(req, ctx.cron.getJob(id))) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Cron job not found');
const body = parseBody(CronJobUpdateSchema, req.body);
// Section 6.2: the update body is partial, so only confine when workingDir is set.
if (body.workingDir !== undefined && !isWorkingDirAllowed(getAuthUser(req), body.workingDir)) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.FORBIDDEN, 'workingDir is outside your workspace');
}
if (
(getCli(body.agentType ?? 'claude')?.capabilities.privilegedCommandGate || body.launchCommand) &&
!(await canUsernameRunPrivilegedCommands(ownerFor(req)))
) {
return createErrorResponse(
ApiErrorCode.FORBIDDEN,
'Shell/launchCommand cron jobs require the can-bypass-permissions grant'
);
}
const job = ctx.cron.updateJob(id, body);
if (!job) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Cron job not found');
return { job };
});
app.delete('/api/cron/jobs/:id', async (req) => {
const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
if (!canTouch(req, ctx.cron.getJob(id)) || !ctx.cron.deleteJob(id)) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Cron job not found');
}
return {};
});
app.put('/api/cron/jobs/:id/enabled', async (req) => {
const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
if (!canTouch(req, ctx.cron.getJob(id))) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Cron job not found');
const { enabled } = parseBody(CronJobEnabledSchema, req.body, 'Invalid request body');
const job = ctx.cron.setEnabled(id, enabled);
if (!job) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Cron job not found');
return { job };
});
// ── Run Now ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
app.post('/api/cron/jobs/:id/run', async (req) => {
const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
const job = ctx.cron.getJob(id);
if (!canTouch(req, job)) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Cron job not found');
const run = await ctx.cron.runNow(id);
return { run, activeAgents: ctx.cron.countActiveAgents(job.agentType, job.id) };
});
// ── Run history ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
app.get('/api/cron/jobs/:id/runs', async (req) => {
const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
// Owner-gate like every other :id handler so a foreign job's run history (session
// ids, names, deep links) isn't leaked; NOT_FOUND avoids disclosing existence.
if (!canTouch(req, ctx.cron.getJob(id))) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Cron job not found');
return ctx.cron.listRuns(id);
});
app.get('/api/cron/runs', async (req) => {
const runs = ctx.cron.listRuns();
if (!isMultiUserMode()) return runs;
const user = getAuthUser(req);
if (user.role === 'admin') return runs;
// Non-admin: keep only runs whose owning job the caller can access (drops runs
// whose job is absent from the map — defensive; deleteJob already cascades).
const ownerByJobId = new Map<string, string | undefined>(
ctx.cron.listJobs().map((j): [string, string | undefined] => [j.id, j.owner])
);
return runs.filter((run) => canAccessOwned(user, ownerByJobId.get(run.cronJobId)));
});
}