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097d585278f4baa7242e2ccae1fd9b3e68869fd4
5
Commits
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4830e662f9 |
refactor(cli-registry): make CLI backends data instead of per-mode branching
Every run mode is now a `CliEntry` in `src/config/cli-registry/` — discovery (search dirs, version + identity probes), the launch argv template, env handling, the `capabilities` flags that replace per-CLI branching, and the `overlays` that back the remote/docker pane commands. Code that used to ask "which CLI is this?" reads the entry instead. Behaviour is unchanged. `test/cli-registry-spawn-golden.test.ts` pins every spawn command as a literal string, captured from the hand-written builders before they were deleted, and `test/location-overlay-commands.test.ts` does the same for all 20 remote and in-container pane commands. Config can never contain shell text: an entry declares typed argv tokens, literals are validated against a safe-word pattern at LOAD time (a bad literal rejects the whole entry — a silently dropped `--no-approve` is not cosmetic), and values resolve through patterns NAMED in code, so a user `clis.json` cannot widen its own validation. `~/.codeman/clis.json` overrides any entry, read-only in this release. OMP is included as a registry entry rather than a tenth hand-written builder, so `buildOmpCommand()`, the omp availability pre-flight, the omp arm of `buildPathExport()` and the omp entries in the truecolor/NO_COLOR, alt-screen and doctor ladders all drop out. Guard rails: - `test/cli-registry-no-id-branching.test.ts` fails the build if per-CLI-id branching reappears outside `stock.ts`, in any of its four shapes (`===`, `!==`, `switch`/`case`, `includes`) — an `===`-only version would miss the negated forms, which is how 36 of them survived an earlier pass. Every allowlisted branch carries its reason. - `external`, `hooks` and `altScreen` stay three INDEPENDENT capabilities; deriving one from another shipped the `until=stop`-hangs-on-shell bug. - `param` is two namespaces. `launch.params` keys, `configSetenv.fromParam` and `privilegedParams[].param` all name a LAUNCH param; the legacy `<Mode>Config` wire field is separate, bridged only by `legacyConfigAliases`. Getting `privilegedParams[].param` wrong is SILENT — it is the multi-user bypass clamp's only handle on a CLI's privilege switch, and a wrong name clamps nothing with no error and no failing test — so `schema.ts` rejects an entry naming a param it never declared. - Registry data resolves AT CALL TIME (`sessionModeSchema()`, `allowedEnvPrefixes()`, `dependencyRegistry()`, the resolvers' `searchDirs` thunks). A module-level const freezes at first import, so a CLI enabled while the server ran moved the run menu but not that surface. - Six fields are annotated DECLARED-FOR-LATER and read by nothing (`shortBadge`, `accent`, `capabilities.echo`/`wheelForward`/ `keyboardAccessory`/`maxFrameBytes`): all frontend behaviour, transcribed rather than measured. A test pins the list so it cannot quietly grow. Three user-visible changes, all deliberate and named: - `probeDockerCliVersion()` derives the in-container binary from the registry rather than assuming it equals the mode name (`antigravity` runs `agy`). - The remote CLI version probe now covers grok and deepseek, which the hardcoded map it replaces omitted while its own comment said the rule was "every mode except shell". - `codeman doctor`'s CLI rows are generated from the entries, so Claude's install hint is the install command rather than a docs URL, five CLIs gain hints they never had, and the row order follows the catalog. Also hardened along the way: `sessionModeSchema()` is bounded at 24 chars (matching the `cliId` pattern) before its failure message quotes the value back, and `deepMerge` skips `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` when reading the hand-editable `clis.json`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WQkoi1cNegqVwZHgzx5SbJ |
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ccb3afc9ee |
fix(multiuser): close cross-user web-layer scoping holes found in review
The opt-in multi-user feature's only enforcement is web-layer scoping (all sessions share one OS account). An adversarial review found 8 critical + 7 high cross-user holes that defeated it, plus mediums; all fixed here. Single-user (flag-off) behavior stays byte-identical apart from documented consistency deltas. Ownership / confinement: - DELETE /api/sessions (bulk) + /:id now owner-scope / findSessionOrFail - quick-start, cron (create+fire), scheduled runs confine workingDir to the owner's space; case link/docker-link/docker-import confine the host path - resolveCasePath no longer resolves linked cases for non-admins; foreign remote/docker cases are skipped (fall through to the caller's own local case) - history, subagents/workflows, mux-sessions, orchestrator, cron run-history, away-digest, and remote/docker host reads are owner- or admin-scoped Permission policy (section 6.3): - non-granted users are downgraded at every spawn site incl. legacy /api/scheduled, PlanOrchestrator one-shots, remote launch, and the cron-fire gemini/codex bypass switches; resolveClaudeModeForUsername now fails closed Auth / store: - verify-first login throttle (a correct password is never locked out), /ws terminal subject to the change-password lockbox, cookie fast-path re-validates identity live, role/grant changes revoke sessions, admin delete runs the last-admin guard before any teardown - users.json: distinguish missing (ENOENT) from corrupt/unreadable so a bad read can't overwrite all accounts; unique per-process temp write path Event streams: - debounced session:updated + batched task:updated, clipboard, and push notifications route by owner (fail closed); getLightState hides machine-wide globalStats from non-admins Tests: two suites updated to assert the fixed (secure) behavior. tsc, eslint, and test:ci all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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453605a58f |
feat(multiuser): phase 3, ownership threading + scoping
Threads per-user ownership through sessions, cases, cron, and the permission policy. All scoping is a no-op in single-user mode (isMultiUserMode() guards). Sessions - Session.owner stamped at every create path from req.authUser / job.owner: POST /api/sessions, /api/run, /api/quick-start, ralph start, cron launch, plan generation. Round-trips through recovery (MuxSession.owner mirror, read muxSession.owner ?? savedState?.owner) and the mux layer. - findSessionOrFail(ctx, id, req) now does a NOT_FOUND owner check (never 403, so other users' session existence is not leaked); wired at ~50 call sites. - List endpoints filtered by owner: GET /api/sessions, /api/sessions/unified (live+persisted+lifecycle scoped, host-wide transcripts admin-only), cron jobs. Permission policy (section 6.3) - resolveClaudeModeForUsername wraps getClaudeModeConfig at every spawn site so a non-granted user is forced to --permission-mode auto (bypass -> auto), including recovery (or a reboot would un-downgrade). buildPromptArgs now respects the session's claudeMode, closing the one-shot (runPrompt) bypass hole. - Shell mode and cron launchCommand require canBypassPermissions: 403 at POST /api/sessions, /api/quick-start create, cron job create, AND cron fire time (re-checked against the owner's current grant). Cases - resolveCasesDir(user): per-user ~/codeman-users/<name>/cases in multi-user, the shared ~/codeman-cases otherwise. All case CRUD + ralph + plan + quick-start resolve through it. resolveCasePath is owner-aware. - GET /api/cases scoped per user (own folders; legacy linked cases admin-only; remote/docker cases owner-filtered). RemoteCase/DockerCase gain owner, stamped at link/quickcreate/import. - Remote + Docker host CRUD is admin-only. - Non-admin workingDir confinement (the linchpin): realpath must resolve inside the user's space, enforced at POST /api/sessions and /api/run BEFORE any disk write. Limits - sessionCapacityState / sessionCapacityMessage centralize the global + per-user cap (CODEMAN_MAX_SESSIONS_PER_USER, default global/2), replacing the 6 copy-pasted MAX_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS checks. Tests: test/ownership-scoping.test.ts (case isolation, host-CRUD gate, workingDir + shell gates, and the scoping helpers). Deferred to phase 4: WS owner gate, SSE fan-out filtering, file-route preview/thumbnail helper scoping, push routing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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84ab4ff07b |
fix(review): harden cron security, session lifecycle, skip policy (PR #141)
- Reject multi-line prompts end-to-end: schema refines on promptText/ launchCommand, runtime check in resolvePrompt (prompt-file content; trailing newlines tolerated), matching cron-ui form validation — delivery is single-line only, so multi-line was silently corrupted (typed mode fused lines, paste mode submitted partials) - Close the workingDir confinement bypass (arbitrary server-side file read, e.g. workingDir=/proc + /proc/self/environ): realpath-resolve workingDir before the containment check, reject '/' and blocked/pseudo-fs trees (/proc, /sys, /dev + the attachment-guard blocklist) at fire time AND at job create/update (workingDir must exist and be a directory) - Session lifecycle: new per-job autoClosePreviousSession (default true, recurring schedules only; ignored for 'once') — the previous run's still-open session is closed via the normal cleanupSession path when the next run fires; UI switch added; 50-session cap math documented in docs/cron-guide.md §8 - skip_if_same_agent_running: count only live sessions (exclude stopped/error dead tabs), exclude sessions created by this job's own runs (fixes the fire-once-then-skip-forever self-deadlock), and a skipped 'once' job stays armed and retries next tick instead of being consumed; liveness filter mirrored in cron-ui _countActiveAgents - Wire launchCommand (was accepted+documented but dead): shell mode sends it via writeViaMux as the first input line after startShell readiness (single-line, schema-enforced); form field shown for shell agent type - Record delivery failures: a false writeViaMux result now fails the run instead of recording a false 'prompt_sent' - Cap saved jobs at MAX_CRON_JOBS (100) to bound state.json growth - Surface field-specific schema messages (drop parseBody custom errorMessage on cron create/update) - Tests: workingDir create/update validation, /proc bypass regression, single-line enforcement (schema+runtime+trailing-newline tolerance), live/own-session skip filtering, once-skip re-arm, auto-close on/off/once, job-count cap Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9feaa0d6e5 |
refactor(cron): rename scheduler feature to cron
Rename the recurring-jobs feature scheduler->cron to disambiguate from the legacy ScheduledRun system (/api/scheduled), which is left untouched: - ScheduledJob->CronJob, SchedulerService->CronService - /api/scheduler/jobs -> /api/cron/jobs; SSE scheduler:* -> cron:* - state keys cronJobs/cronJobRuns - files moved to src/cron/, cron-routes.ts, cron-port.ts, types/cron.ts - frontend cron-ui.js, #cronModal, menu "Cron" - docs moved to docs/cron-discovery.md + docs/cron-build-brief.md, README guides - new tests: cron-service.test.ts, cron-time.test.ts Green: tsc, lint, frontend-syntax, format, 30 cron + 9 legacy scheduled-runs tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PmvZR12aX2v8K7YhqxPUAU |