Commit Graph
5 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
DevvynandClaude Opus 5 4830e662f9 refactor(cli-registry): make CLI backends data instead of per-mode branching
Every run mode is now a `CliEntry` in `src/config/cli-registry/` — discovery
(search dirs, version + identity probes), the launch argv template, env
handling, the `capabilities` flags that replace per-CLI branching, and the
`overlays` that back the remote/docker pane commands. Code that used to ask
"which CLI is this?" reads the entry instead.

Behaviour is unchanged. `test/cli-registry-spawn-golden.test.ts` pins every
spawn command as a literal string, captured from the hand-written builders
before they were deleted, and `test/location-overlay-commands.test.ts` does the
same for all 20 remote and in-container pane commands.

Config can never contain shell text: an entry declares typed argv tokens,
literals are validated against a safe-word pattern at LOAD time (a bad literal
rejects the whole entry — a silently dropped `--no-approve` is not cosmetic),
and values resolve through patterns NAMED in code, so a user `clis.json` cannot
widen its own validation. `~/.codeman/clis.json` overrides any entry, read-only
in this release.

OMP is included as a registry entry rather than a tenth hand-written builder,
so `buildOmpCommand()`, the omp availability pre-flight, the omp arm of
`buildPathExport()` and the omp entries in the truecolor/NO_COLOR, alt-screen
and doctor ladders all drop out.

Guard rails:

- `test/cli-registry-no-id-branching.test.ts` fails the build if per-CLI-id
  branching reappears outside `stock.ts`, in any of its four shapes (`===`,
  `!==`, `switch`/`case`, `includes`) — an `===`-only version would miss the
  negated forms, which is how 36 of them survived an earlier pass. Every
  allowlisted branch carries its reason.
- `external`, `hooks` and `altScreen` stay three INDEPENDENT capabilities;
  deriving one from another shipped the `until=stop`-hangs-on-shell bug.
- `param` is two namespaces. `launch.params` keys, `configSetenv.fromParam` and
  `privilegedParams[].param` all name a LAUNCH param; the legacy `<Mode>Config`
  wire field is separate, bridged only by `legacyConfigAliases`. Getting
  `privilegedParams[].param` wrong is SILENT — it is the multi-user bypass
  clamp's only handle on a CLI's privilege switch, and a wrong name clamps
  nothing with no error and no failing test — so `schema.ts` rejects an entry
  naming a param it never declared.
- Registry data resolves AT CALL TIME (`sessionModeSchema()`,
  `allowedEnvPrefixes()`, `dependencyRegistry()`, the resolvers' `searchDirs`
  thunks). A module-level const freezes at first import, so a CLI enabled while
  the server ran moved the run menu but not that surface.
- Six fields are annotated DECLARED-FOR-LATER and read by nothing
  (`shortBadge`, `accent`, `capabilities.echo`/`wheelForward`/
  `keyboardAccessory`/`maxFrameBytes`): all frontend behaviour, transcribed
  rather than measured. A test pins the list so it cannot quietly grow.

Three user-visible changes, all deliberate and named:

- `probeDockerCliVersion()` derives the in-container binary from the registry
  rather than assuming it equals the mode name (`antigravity` runs `agy`).
- The remote CLI version probe now covers grok and deepseek, which the
  hardcoded map it replaces omitted while its own comment said the rule was
  "every mode except shell".
- `codeman doctor`'s CLI rows are generated from the entries, so Claude's
  install hint is the install command rather than a docs URL, five CLIs gain
  hints they never had, and the row order follows the catalog.

Also hardened along the way: `sessionModeSchema()` is bounded at 24 chars
(matching the `cliId` pattern) before its failure message quotes the value
back, and `deepMerge` skips `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` when reading
the hand-editable `clis.json`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WQkoi1cNegqVwZHgzx5SbJ
2026-09-02 08:26:45 +08:00
Codeman maintainer ccb3afc9ee fix(multiuser): close cross-user web-layer scoping holes found in review
The opt-in multi-user feature's only enforcement is web-layer scoping
(all sessions share one OS account). An adversarial review found 8 critical
+ 7 high cross-user holes that defeated it, plus mediums; all fixed here.
Single-user (flag-off) behavior stays byte-identical apart from documented
consistency deltas.

Ownership / confinement:
- DELETE /api/sessions (bulk) + /:id now owner-scope / findSessionOrFail
- quick-start, cron (create+fire), scheduled runs confine workingDir to the
  owner's space; case link/docker-link/docker-import confine the host path
- resolveCasePath no longer resolves linked cases for non-admins; foreign
  remote/docker cases are skipped (fall through to the caller's own local case)
- history, subagents/workflows, mux-sessions, orchestrator, cron run-history,
  away-digest, and remote/docker host reads are owner- or admin-scoped

Permission policy (section 6.3):
- non-granted users are downgraded at every spawn site incl. legacy
  /api/scheduled, PlanOrchestrator one-shots, remote launch, and the cron-fire
  gemini/codex bypass switches; resolveClaudeModeForUsername now fails closed

Auth / store:
- verify-first login throttle (a correct password is never locked out),
  /ws terminal subject to the change-password lockbox, cookie fast-path
  re-validates identity live, role/grant changes revoke sessions, admin delete
  runs the last-admin guard before any teardown
- users.json: distinguish missing (ENOENT) from corrupt/unreadable so a bad
  read can't overwrite all accounts; unique per-process temp write path

Event streams:
- debounced session:updated + batched task:updated, clipboard, and push
  notifications route by owner (fail closed); getLightState hides machine-wide
  globalStats from non-admins

Tests: two suites updated to assert the fixed (secure) behavior. tsc, eslint,
and test:ci all green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 12:33:12 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 453605a58f feat(multiuser): phase 3, ownership threading + scoping
Threads per-user ownership through sessions, cases, cron, and the permission
policy. All scoping is a no-op in single-user mode (isMultiUserMode() guards).

Sessions
- Session.owner stamped at every create path from req.authUser / job.owner:
  POST /api/sessions, /api/run, /api/quick-start, ralph start, cron launch,
  plan generation. Round-trips through recovery (MuxSession.owner mirror, read
  muxSession.owner ?? savedState?.owner) and the mux layer.
- findSessionOrFail(ctx, id, req) now does a NOT_FOUND owner check (never 403, so
  other users' session existence is not leaked); wired at ~50 call sites.
- List endpoints filtered by owner: GET /api/sessions, /api/sessions/unified
  (live+persisted+lifecycle scoped, host-wide transcripts admin-only), cron jobs.

Permission policy (section 6.3)
- resolveClaudeModeForUsername wraps getClaudeModeConfig at every spawn site so a
  non-granted user is forced to --permission-mode auto (bypass -> auto), including
  recovery (or a reboot would un-downgrade). buildPromptArgs now respects the
  session's claudeMode, closing the one-shot (runPrompt) bypass hole.
- Shell mode and cron launchCommand require canBypassPermissions: 403 at
  POST /api/sessions, /api/quick-start create, cron job create, AND cron fire time
  (re-checked against the owner's current grant).

Cases
- resolveCasesDir(user): per-user ~/codeman-users/<name>/cases in multi-user, the
  shared ~/codeman-cases otherwise. All case CRUD + ralph + plan + quick-start
  resolve through it. resolveCasePath is owner-aware.
- GET /api/cases scoped per user (own folders; legacy linked cases admin-only;
  remote/docker cases owner-filtered). RemoteCase/DockerCase gain owner, stamped
  at link/quickcreate/import.
- Remote + Docker host CRUD is admin-only.
- Non-admin workingDir confinement (the linchpin): realpath must resolve inside the
  user's space, enforced at POST /api/sessions and /api/run BEFORE any disk write.

Limits
- sessionCapacityState / sessionCapacityMessage centralize the global + per-user
  cap (CODEMAN_MAX_SESSIONS_PER_USER, default global/2), replacing the 6 copy-pasted
  MAX_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS checks.

Tests: test/ownership-scoping.test.ts (case isolation, host-CRUD gate, workingDir +
shell gates, and the scoping helpers). Deferred to phase 4: WS owner gate, SSE
fan-out filtering, file-route preview/thumbnail helper scoping, push routing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 04:02:46 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 84ab4ff07b fix(review): harden cron security, session lifecycle, skip policy (PR #141)
- Reject multi-line prompts end-to-end: schema refines on promptText/
  launchCommand, runtime check in resolvePrompt (prompt-file content;
  trailing newlines tolerated), matching cron-ui form validation — delivery
  is single-line only, so multi-line was silently corrupted (typed mode
  fused lines, paste mode submitted partials)
- Close the workingDir confinement bypass (arbitrary server-side file read,
  e.g. workingDir=/proc + /proc/self/environ): realpath-resolve workingDir
  before the containment check, reject '/' and blocked/pseudo-fs trees
  (/proc, /sys, /dev + the attachment-guard blocklist) at fire time AND at
  job create/update (workingDir must exist and be a directory)
- Session lifecycle: new per-job autoClosePreviousSession (default true,
  recurring schedules only; ignored for 'once') — the previous run's
  still-open session is closed via the normal cleanupSession path when the
  next run fires; UI switch added; 50-session cap math documented in
  docs/cron-guide.md §8
- skip_if_same_agent_running: count only live sessions (exclude
  stopped/error dead tabs), exclude sessions created by this job's own runs
  (fixes the fire-once-then-skip-forever self-deadlock), and a skipped
  'once' job stays armed and retries next tick instead of being consumed;
  liveness filter mirrored in cron-ui _countActiveAgents
- Wire launchCommand (was accepted+documented but dead): shell mode sends
  it via writeViaMux as the first input line after startShell readiness
  (single-line, schema-enforced); form field shown for shell agent type
- Record delivery failures: a false writeViaMux result now fails the run
  instead of recording a false 'prompt_sent'
- Cap saved jobs at MAX_CRON_JOBS (100) to bound state.json growth
- Surface field-specific schema messages (drop parseBody custom
  errorMessage on cron create/update)
- Tests: workingDir create/update validation, /proc bypass regression,
  single-line enforcement (schema+runtime+trailing-newline tolerance),
  live/own-session skip filtering, once-skip re-arm, auto-close on/off/once,
  job-count cap

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 19:25:42 +02:00
KrisandClaude Opus 4.8 9feaa0d6e5 refactor(cron): rename scheduler feature to cron
Rename the recurring-jobs feature scheduler->cron to disambiguate from the
legacy ScheduledRun system (/api/scheduled), which is left untouched:

- ScheduledJob->CronJob, SchedulerService->CronService
- /api/scheduler/jobs -> /api/cron/jobs; SSE scheduler:* -> cron:*
- state keys cronJobs/cronJobRuns
- files moved to src/cron/, cron-routes.ts, cron-port.ts, types/cron.ts
- frontend cron-ui.js, #cronModal, menu "Cron"
- docs moved to docs/cron-discovery.md + docs/cron-build-brief.md, README guides
- new tests: cron-service.test.ts, cron-time.test.ts

Green: tsc, lint, frontend-syntax, format, 30 cron + 9 legacy scheduled-runs tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PmvZR12aX2v8K7YhqxPUAU
2026-06-29 11:35:56 +05:30