Files
Codeman/test/auth-security.test.ts
Aamer Akhter f0f43ddbad Require the hook-event secret unconditionally, not only under a managed tunnel
COD-54 gated the /api/hook-event + /api/status-telemetry localhost bypass
behind the shared X-Codeman-Hook-Secret only WHILE a managed tunnel was
running, keeping a plain localhost bypass otherwise. But Codeman can't detect
a user's OWN loopback reverse proxy (their own `cloudflared --url`,
`tailscale serve`, nginx -> 127.0.0.1), which proxies internet traffic into
the loopback origin with req.ip === 127.0.0.1 — so that setup kept the unsafe
plain bypass.

Require the secret on the loopback bypass unconditionally. Managed-session
hooks already always present it (X-Codeman-Hook-Secret from
$CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE, generated for every instance), so the legitimate
hook channel is unaffected; only the previously-unguarded own-proxy path is
now rejected. Drops the now-unused getTunnelRunning param from
registerAuthMiddleware.

Tests: cod54-hook-event-auth (tunnel-down now also requires the secret, plus
a good-secret positive case); auth-security (hook tests present the secret to
reach schema validation).
2026-06-14 12:46:58 -04:00

414 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Auth security tests — verifies security fixes:
* 1. Timing-safe password comparison (timingSafeEqual)
* 2. Hook event endpoint restricted to localhost
* 3. Session cookie TTL refresh on access
* 4. Startup fails closed when network-bound without auth
* 5. SSE client limit enforcement
* 6. Logout endpoint invalidates session
* 7. Settings schema rejects unknown fields
*
* Port: 3160 (auth tests), 3161 (loopback no-auth tests), 3162 (network override tests)
*/
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll, beforeEach, afterEach, vi } from 'vitest';
import { WebServer } from '../src/web/server.js';
import { TmuxManager } from '../src/tmux-manager.js';
import { SettingsUpdateSchema } from '../src/web/schemas.js';
import { getHookSecret, HOOK_SECRET_HEADER } from '../src/config/hook-secret.js';
const AUTH_PORT = 3160;
const NOAUTH_PORT = 3161;
const NETWORK_OVERRIDE_PORT = 3162;
const AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_PORT = 3220;
const NOAUTH_NETWORK_PORT = 3221;
const TEST_USER = 'admin';
const TEST_PASS = 'test-password-12345';
vi.spyOn(TmuxManager, 'isTmuxAvailable').mockReturnValue(true);
function basicAuthHeader(user: string, pass: string): string {
return 'Basic ' + Buffer.from(`${user}:${pass}`).toString('base64');
}
async function startAuthServer(port: number): Promise<{ server: WebServer; baseUrl: string }> {
process.env.CODEMAN_PASSWORD = TEST_PASS;
process.env.CODEMAN_USERNAME = TEST_USER;
const server = new WebServer(port, false, true);
await server.start();
return { server, baseUrl: `http://localhost:${port}` };
}
async function getSessionCookie(baseUrl: string): Promise<string> {
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Authorization: basicAuthHeader(TEST_USER, TEST_PASS) },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const setCookie = res.headers.get('set-cookie');
expect(setCookie).toBeTruthy();
const cookieMatch = setCookie!.match(/codeman_session=([^;]+)/);
expect(cookieMatch).toBeTruthy();
return `codeman_session=${cookieMatch![1]}`;
}
async function exhaustAuthFailures(baseUrl: string, prefix: string): Promise<void> {
for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Authorization: basicAuthHeader(TEST_USER, `${prefix}-${i}`) },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
}
}
describe('Auth Security', () => {
let server: WebServer;
let baseUrl: string;
beforeAll(async () => {
process.env.CODEMAN_PASSWORD = TEST_PASS;
process.env.CODEMAN_USERNAME = TEST_USER;
server = new WebServer(AUTH_PORT, false, true);
await server.start();
baseUrl = `http://localhost:${AUTH_PORT}`;
});
afterAll(async () => {
await server.stop();
delete process.env.CODEMAN_PASSWORD;
delete process.env.CODEMAN_USERNAME;
});
describe('Basic Auth', () => {
it('should reject requests without credentials', async () => {
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/status`);
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
it('should accept correct credentials', async () => {
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Authorization: basicAuthHeader(TEST_USER, TEST_PASS) },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it('should reject wrong password', async () => {
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Authorization: basicAuthHeader(TEST_USER, 'wrong') },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
it('should reject wrong username', async () => {
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Authorization: basicAuthHeader('hacker', TEST_PASS) },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
it('should reject empty authorization header', async () => {
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Authorization: '' },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
it('should reject malformed authorization header', async () => {
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Authorization: 'Bearer some-token' },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
});
describe('Session Cookies', () => {
it('should issue session cookie on successful auth', async () => {
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Authorization: basicAuthHeader(TEST_USER, TEST_PASS) },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const setCookie = res.headers.get('set-cookie');
expect(setCookie).toBeTruthy();
expect(setCookie).toContain('codeman_session=');
expect(setCookie).toContain('HttpOnly');
expect(setCookie).toContain('SameSite=Lax');
});
it('should accept requests with valid session cookie', async () => {
// First, authenticate to get a cookie
const authRes = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Authorization: basicAuthHeader(TEST_USER, TEST_PASS) },
});
const setCookie = authRes.headers.get('set-cookie')!;
const cookieMatch = setCookie.match(/codeman_session=([^;]+)/);
expect(cookieMatch).toBeTruthy();
const cookie = `codeman_session=${cookieMatch![1]}`;
// Use the cookie without Basic Auth header
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Cookie: cookie },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it('should reject requests with invalid session cookie', async () => {
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Cookie: 'codeman_session=invalid-token-value' },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
});
describe('Logout', () => {
it('should invalidate session cookie on logout', async () => {
// Authenticate to get a cookie
const authRes = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Authorization: basicAuthHeader(TEST_USER, TEST_PASS) },
});
const setCookie = authRes.headers.get('set-cookie')!;
const cookieMatch = setCookie.match(/codeman_session=([^;]+)/);
expect(cookieMatch).toBeTruthy();
const cookie = `codeman_session=${cookieMatch![1]}`;
// Verify cookie works
const beforeRes = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Cookie: cookie },
});
expect(beforeRes.status).toBe(200);
// Logout
const logoutRes = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/logout`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { Cookie: cookie },
});
expect(logoutRes.status).toBe(200);
// Cookie should no longer work
const afterRes = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Cookie: cookie },
});
expect(afterRes.status).toBe(401);
});
});
describe('Rate Limiting', () => {
let rateServer: WebServer;
let rateBaseUrl: string;
beforeEach(async () => {
({ server: rateServer, baseUrl: rateBaseUrl } = await startAuthServer(AUTH_RATE_LIMIT_PORT));
});
afterEach(async () => {
await rateServer.stop();
});
it('should rate-limit wrong credentials after too many failed attempts', async () => {
await exhaustAuthFailures(rateBaseUrl, 'cod21-wrong');
const res = await fetch(`${rateBaseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Authorization: basicAuthHeader(TEST_USER, 'wrong-again') },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(429);
expect(res.headers.get('retry-after')).toMatch(/^\d+$/);
});
it('should allow an existing valid session cookie during auth failure lockout', async () => {
const cookie = await getSessionCookie(rateBaseUrl);
await exhaustAuthFailures(rateBaseUrl, 'cod21-cookie');
const res = await fetch(`${rateBaseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Cookie: cookie },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it('should allow correct credentials to recover from auth failure lockout', async () => {
await exhaustAuthFailures(rateBaseUrl, 'cod21-recover');
const res = await fetch(`${rateBaseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Authorization: basicAuthHeader(TEST_USER, TEST_PASS) },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(res.headers.get('set-cookie')).toContain('codeman_session=');
});
it('should clear failed attempt count after correct credentials recover access', async () => {
await exhaustAuthFailures(rateBaseUrl, 'cod21-clear');
const recoveryRes = await fetch(`${rateBaseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Authorization: basicAuthHeader(TEST_USER, TEST_PASS) },
});
expect(recoveryRes.status).toBe(200);
const wrongAfterRecovery = await fetch(`${rateBaseUrl}/api/status`, {
headers: { Authorization: basicAuthHeader(TEST_USER, 'wrong-after-recovery') },
});
expect(wrongAfterRecovery.status).toBe(401);
});
});
describe('Hook Event Endpoint', () => {
it('should allow hook events from localhost with the hook secret (no Basic auth)', async () => {
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/hook-event`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', [HOOK_SECRET_HEADER]: getHookSecret() },
body: JSON.stringify({
event: 'stop',
sessionId: 'nonexistent-session',
data: {},
}),
});
// Should pass auth (localhost bypass + hook secret) but may 404 on session — that's fine.
// The key assertion is it does NOT return 401 (COD-91: secret required even with no tunnel).
expect(res.status).not.toBe(401);
});
it('should reject hook events with invalid schema', async () => {
const res = await fetch(`${baseUrl}/api/hook-event`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', [HOOK_SECRET_HEADER]: getHookSecret() },
body: JSON.stringify({ invalid: 'data' }),
});
// Past the auth gate (valid secret) → schema validation should catch this (not a 401).
expect(res.status).not.toBe(401); // Not an auth error
});
});
});
describe('Settings Schema Security', () => {
it('should accept valid known settings fields', () => {
const result = SettingsUpdateSchema.safeParse({
tunnelEnabled: true,
ralphTrackerEnabled: false,
defaultClaudeMdPath: '/some/path',
});
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
});
it('should enforce tunnelEnabled as boolean', () => {
const result = SettingsUpdateSchema.safeParse({
tunnelEnabled: 'yes', // truthy string — should be rejected
});
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
});
it('should reject unknown fields (strict mode)', () => {
const result = SettingsUpdateSchema.safeParse({
tunnelEnabled: true,
maliciousField: 'injected',
});
expect(result.success).toBe(false);
});
it('should accept notification preferences', () => {
const result = SettingsUpdateSchema.safeParse({
notificationPreferences: {
enabled: true,
browserNotifications: true,
audioAlerts: false,
eventTypes: {
stop: { enabled: true, browser: true, audio: false },
},
},
});
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
});
it('should accept voice settings', () => {
const result = SettingsUpdateSchema.safeParse({
voiceSettings: {
apiKey: 'some-key',
language: 'en-US',
},
});
expect(result.success).toBe(true);
});
it('should validate nice value range', () => {
const validResult = SettingsUpdateSchema.safeParse({
nice: { enabled: true, niceValue: 10 },
});
expect(validResult.success).toBe(true);
const invalidResult = SettingsUpdateSchema.safeParse({
nice: { enabled: true, niceValue: 100 }, // Out of range
});
expect(invalidResult.success).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('No-Auth Server Startup Policy', () => {
let server: WebServer;
beforeAll(async () => {
delete process.env.CODEMAN_PASSWORD;
delete process.env.CODEMAN_USERNAME;
delete process.env.CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK;
server = new WebServer(NOAUTH_PORT, false, true, '127.0.0.1');
await server.start();
});
afterAll(async () => {
delete process.env.CODEMAN_PASSWORD;
delete process.env.CODEMAN_USERNAME;
delete process.env.CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK;
await server.stop();
});
it('allows loopback requests without auth when no password is configured', async () => {
const res = await fetch(`http://localhost:${NOAUTH_PORT}/api/status`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it('starts with a loud warning (not a hard failure) on a non-loopback bind without a password', async () => {
// Policy (0.9.0): loopback is the safe default, but opting into a non-loopback
// bind without a password no longer refuses to start — it starts and warns,
// pointing at how to secure it. See docs/security-architecture.md.
const warnSpy = vi.spyOn(console, 'warn').mockImplementation(() => {});
const networkServer = new WebServer(NOAUTH_NETWORK_PORT, false, true, '0.0.0.0');
await expect(networkServer.start()).resolves.toBeUndefined();
const res = await fetch(`http://localhost:${NOAUTH_NETWORK_PORT}/api/status`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const warned = warnSpy.mock.calls.flat().join('\n');
expect(warned).toMatch(/non-loopback host|NO password/i);
expect(warned).toMatch(/CODEMAN_PASSWORD/);
warnSpy.mockRestore();
await networkServer.stop();
});
it('allows non-loopback startup when CODEMAN_PASSWORD is configured', async () => {
process.env.CODEMAN_PASSWORD = TEST_PASS;
const networkServer = new WebServer(0, false, true, '0.0.0.0');
await networkServer.start();
await networkServer.stop();
delete process.env.CODEMAN_PASSWORD;
});
it('allows non-loopback startup with the explicit unauthenticated-network override', async () => {
const networkServer = new WebServer(NETWORK_OVERRIDE_PORT, false, true, '0.0.0.0', undefined, true);
await networkServer.start();
const res = await fetch(`http://localhost:${NETWORK_OVERRIDE_PORT}/api/status`);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
await networkServer.stop();
});
it('allows non-loopback startup with the explicit unauthenticated-network env override', async () => {
process.env.CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK = 'true';
const networkServer = new WebServer(0, false, true, '0.0.0.0');
await networkServer.start();
await networkServer.stop();
delete process.env.CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK;
});
});