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Codeman maintainer
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30 pages covering install, concepts, the dashboard, the agent CLIs, unattended
runs, remote and Docker cases, security and the HTTP API, plus a sidebar and a
footer. The wiki repo has no CI and no review, so docs/wiki is the source of
truth and .github/workflows/wiki-sync.yml mirrors it on every push to master.
The workflow refuses to mirror when docs/wiki is missing or holds no pages,
because it deletes before it copies and would otherwise publish the deletion of
every page. The footer carries a {{VERSION}} placeholder stamped at publish
time rather than a hand-written version, which went stale on every release.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
178 lines
8.3 KiB
Markdown
178 lines
8.3 KiB
Markdown
# Docker Cases
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Run a case inside its own container instead of directly on your host: for isolation, for a
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reproducible toolchain, and for the ability to pick the whole environment up and move it to
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another machine.
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A docker case is a **location overlay**, not a run mode. All seven run modes work inside a
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container. See [Core Concepts](Core-Concepts).
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## One-time setup: the base image
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The container needs an image carrying the agent toolchain (node, the CLIs, git, tmux). It
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builds itself on first use with progress streamed to the UI, or you can build it ahead of
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time:
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```bash
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node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs --no-cache
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```
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**Always pass `--no-cache`.** The CLIs are installed in a single `npm install -g` layer, so
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a plain rebuild reuses that layer from the cache and the CLIs stay frozen at whatever
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versions the image was *first* built with. This has shipped a broken CLI while reporting a
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successful build.
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A zero exit code proves the layers ran, not that the toolchain works. Verify:
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```bash
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docker run --rm codeman/agent:base bash -lc \
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'for c in claude codex gemini opencode agy pi; do printf "%-9s " $c; $c --version 2>&1 | head -1; done'
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```
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The image is secret-free. Credentials are delivered at runtime, never baked in, so exports
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never leak them. A full image lands around 1.6GB.
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Prerequisite: Docker or Podman with a reachable daemon.
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## The quick way
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On **Add Case → Create New**, tick **🐳 Run in an isolated Docker container**. That alone is
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enough: Codeman creates the case folder, spins up a hardened container with sensible
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defaults, and starts the session inside it.
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Expanding **Container settings** offers a template:
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| Template | Memory | CPUs | GPUs |
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| ----------------- | ------ | ---- | ------------------------------------- |
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| Small | 2 GB | 1 | none |
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| Medium (default) | 4 GB | 2 | none |
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| Large | 8 GB | 4 | none |
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| GPU | 8 GB | 4 | all (needs the NVIDIA container toolkit) |
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Disk is elastic: storage grows as data arrives, bounded only by host disk. Changing any
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setting creates a dedicated host profile for that case, so it never mutates the shared
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default.
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## The full way
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**Add Case → Docker** exposes everything:
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| Field | Meaning |
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| -------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| **Case name** | As usual. |
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| **Workspace path** | A real host directory, bind-mounted into the container at the **same absolute path**. |
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| **Host ID** | A reusable profile (image, network, resources). Share one across cases to share settings. |
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| **Network** | `bridge` (internet on, default), `none` (fully isolated), or a custom bridge. |
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| **Advanced** | Memory and CPU caps, host credential seeding, and whether to resume the last conversation on relaunch. |
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The same-absolute-path bind mount is what keeps the File Viewer, attachments, and watchers
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operating on real host bytes rather than a copy.
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## One container per case
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Exactly one long-lived container per case, shared by every session in it.
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- Killing one session kills only that session's in-container tmux. Siblings keep running and
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the container stays up.
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- Reconnecting after a Codeman restart lands back in the same live agent.
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- A container stop or a host reboot restarts the container and **resumes the last
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conversation** from the bind-mounted transcript.
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- Deleting the case removes the container. The workspace on the host survives.
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## Credentials
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Your existing host logins work inside the container without logging in again. Credentials
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are **seeded**: mounted read-only and copied in once at launch, so in-container CLIs never
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write refreshed tokens back to your host credential stores. Onboarding and trust prompts are
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pre-answered so no wizard appears.
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Turn seeding **off** for a sealed sandbox: no host credentials, and with `network: none`, no
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outbound access either. That is the profile for genuinely untrusted work; you log in inside
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the container instead.
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Bind mounts are excluded from image capture, so exports stay secret-free.
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One consequence worth knowing: Pi's credentials are seeded per file rather than as a whole
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directory, because that directory also holds sessions, extensions, and installed packages,
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which can be gigabytes. So in-container Pi sessions are invisible from the host, and `pi -c`
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inside a docker case sees only that container's history.
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## Isolation
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Every container runs hardened by default:
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- `--cap-drop ALL`
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- `--security-opt no-new-privileges`
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- Non-root, running as your host uid so workspace files stay host-owned
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- PID limit, memory cap with swap pinned to it, `--init`
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- **Never** `--privileged`, and **never** the docker socket
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Rootless engines without cgroup-v2 systemd delegation cannot enforce resource caps; linking
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such a host warns that the caps are advisory.
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## Configuration drift is refused, not ignored
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Editing a docker host's configuration (image, memory, network) after a container exists is
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detected on the next launch by comparing a configuration hash against the container's label.
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A mismatch **refuses the launch** and offers to recreate rather than silently running with
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stale configuration.
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Recreating is refused while sessions of that case are live. The workspace and the
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conversation both survive it.
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## Moving a case to another machine
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**Export**, from the Docker tab:
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| Option | Contents |
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| -------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| **Full image + workspace** | The whole toolchain, installed packages, and files, in one `.tgz`. |
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| **Workspace only** | Just the project files. Fast and small. |
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The container is paused across the capture so image and workspace are consistent, free space
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is checked first, and the intermediate image is cleaned up. Exports run in the background
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and notify you when the bundle is ready.
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**Import** on the other machine: copy the `.tgz` into `~/.codeman/docker-exports/` and
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import it into a new case. The manifest and per-member checksums are verified, the workspace
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tar is extracted with a traversal guard, and the image is loaded under a **quarantined tag**
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so it can never overwrite a local image. The destination supplies its own credentials, so
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nothing secret crosses machines.
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## Hooks need to reach the server
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In-container hooks (permission events, idle and stop notifications) call back to Codeman
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over the docker bridge gateway. If Codeman binds **loopback only**, which is the default and
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the production configuration, the container cannot reach it and **in-container hooks do not
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fire**.
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The session still works fully: idle detection falls back to output-based detection through
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the exec PTY, and with permission prompts skipped there is nothing to forward anyway.
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To enable them:
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```bash
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CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS=1
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```
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Codeman then starts a second listener bound to the docker bridge gateway that serves **only**
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the hook endpoints and rejects everything else with a 403. The bridge is host-internal, so
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this does not widen your network exposure. Add it to the service unit and restart.
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## Limits
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- Per-session environment overrides, effort, and per-CLI configuration are **rejected** for
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docker cases, because they do not cross into the container. Configure the container through
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the docker host's per-mode command override instead.
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- tmux must exist in the base image. It is a hard prerequisite and is probed when linking a
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host.
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- On macOS, Docker Desktop takes a dedicated uid path, and memory caps are subject to the
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VM's own ceiling.
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## Read next
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- [Core Concepts](Core-Concepts) - why this is an overlay rather than a run mode.
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- [Security](Security) - where containers fit in the model.
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- [Remote SSH Sessions](Remote-SSH-Sessions) - the other overlay.
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- [`docs/docker-cases.md`](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/blob/master/docs/docker-cases.md) - the full reference.
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