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Reported by @DodgyBadger. #237: the proxy wrapped each upstream fetch in a 30s `AbortSignal.timeout`, which bounded the ENTIRE exchange rather than the wait for response headers. A dashboard endpoint doing model inference, and any actively streaming response, both died at 30s as a generic 502 that Codeman never logged, so it read as an intermittent network error. The timeout now bounds time-to-headers only and is cleared the moment headers arrive, so a slow endpoint and a long stream both survive. The default moves to 300s because "the app is thinking" is normal for the dashboards people proxy; abandoned upstreams are reclaimed by the client-hangup abort rather than by this value. A browser that navigates away mid-request now aborts the upstream fetch, guarded by `writableFinished` for the same reason as `abortOnClientHangUp` in session-routes: `close` also fires after a completed response and must not abort anything. Header timeouts are logged as a warning with a sanitized identity (method plus origin plus path, never the query string, which can carry the dashboard's tokens), and a client hangup is deliberately not warned since nobody is listening and it would read as the dashboard being broken. The WebSocket handshake keeps its own 30s budget (`CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_WS_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS`), decoupled from the request timeout: a handshake is connection establishment, and waiting minutes on one only delays the browser's reconnect logic. #238: the web-tab guide covered sandboxed dashboards having no cookies, but not cookie authentication in front of Codeman itself (Cloudflare Access and similar), where a sandboxed frame's asset and API requests carry no auth cookie, bounce to the login provider, and leave the embedded app looking unstyled or broken while trusted mode works. Documented, and the Test button's result now says it probes server-to-upstream reachability only, not how the page behaves in a sandboxed frame. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
180 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
180 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
# Web Tabs (dashboards as Codeman tabs)
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Open any dashboard you run, Grafana, Uptime Kuma, Portainer, a status page on port
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4000, as a tab beside your Claude/Codex/Antigravity sessions. Codeman becomes one mission
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control instead of Codeman plus a pile of browser tabs.
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## Using it
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1. Click the chevron next to **Run** to expand the dropdown.
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2. Under **Web / URL**, pick **Add dashboard...**
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3. Give it a name and a URL, optionally hit **Test**, then **Save**.
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The dashboard opens as a tab immediately, and appears in the Run dropdown from then
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on. Web tabs sit in the same strip as session tabs, continue the same `Alt+1..9`
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numbering, and carry a globe icon so they never read as a running agent.
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Closing a tab (the `x`) only closes it. The saved dashboard stays in the dropdown.
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To delete it for good, use the `x` on its **dropdown row** (the tab's own `x` is
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close, not delete). Each dropdown row also has a gear for editing, so a saved URL
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can be changed or removed without opening it first.
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Switching tabs does **not** reload a dashboard. Frames stay alive in the background,
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so a dashboard that took a while to authenticate is still there when you come back.
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Past six live frames the least-recently-viewed one is dropped to bound memory
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(`CODEMAN_MAX_LIVE_WEBVIEW_FRAMES`).
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## Why dashboards are proxied
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A plain `<iframe src="http://your-box:4000">` does not work in the setup Codeman
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actually ships in, for three separate reasons:
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| Blocker | What happens |
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| ------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| **Mixed content** | Production serves HTTPS (behind `tailscale serve`). Browsers hard-block `http://` iframes on an HTTPS page, with no override, and none at all on iOS Safari. |
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| **Framing refusal** | Grafana, Portainer, Home Assistant and many others send `X-Frame-Options: DENY` or `frame-ancestors 'none'`. |
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| **Codeman's CSP** | `default-src 'self'` means `frame-src` falls back to `'self'`, so a cross-origin iframe is blocked before it starts. |
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Serving the dashboard **through Codeman's own origin** dissolves all three. So by
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default a web tab loads `/webview/<capability>/` on Codeman, and Codeman relays to
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the dashboard: stripping the framing refusal, rewriting redirects, cookies and
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root-absolute URLs, and relaying WebSockets so live panels actually update.
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A useful consequence: the dashboard is fetched **from the Codeman server**, so a
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tailnet-only or `localhost`-only dashboard works from any device that can reach
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Codeman, including a phone that is not on the tailnet.
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`direct` mode (a plain cross-origin iframe) still exists and is cheaper, but it only
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works for an HTTPS dashboard that permits framing. The **Test** button probes from
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the server and tells you which mode applies. Note what Test actually verifies:
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**server-to-upstream reachability, nothing else**. It does not exercise the browser
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sandbox, cookies, CORS, CSP, or any reverse proxy sitting in front of Codeman, so a
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passing Test does not guarantee the embedded page will render (see the
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cookie-authenticated reverse proxy caveat below).
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## The sandbox, and when to turn it off
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Because a proxied dashboard is served from Codeman's own address, it is
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*same-origin with Codeman* as far as the browser is concerned. Left unchecked, its
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JavaScript could read the Codeman page and call the API that spawns agents.
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So the iframe is sandboxed **without** `allow-same-origin` by default. The page runs
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in an opaque origin: it cannot touch Codeman, and it gets no cookies or
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`localStorage` of its own.
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Unchecking **Open sandboxed** grants `allow-same-origin`. Do that only for a
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dashboard you fully trust, and only if you need it, which in practice means a
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dashboard with its own login that stores a session in a cookie or `localStorage`.
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Even in trusted mode, Codeman never forwards its own credentials upstream: the
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`Authorization` header and the `codeman_session` cookie are stripped on the way out,
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so `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` cannot leak into a dashboard.
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⚠️ **Sandboxed tabs may not work when Codeman itself is behind a
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cookie-authenticated reverse proxy** (Cloudflare Access, Authelia, oauth2-proxy and
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similar). The sandboxed frame is opaque-origin, so its stylesheet, script, and API
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requests do not carry the proxy's authentication cookie; the proxy redirects them to
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the login provider, where CORS/CSP kills them, and the embedded app renders
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unstyled or broken while the Codeman page around it works fine. Trusted mode
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(**Open sandboxed** off) keeps a real origin and the cookie, so it works. The
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**Test** button cannot catch this: it checks that the Codeman *server* can reach the
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upstream, not that a sandboxed *browser* frame can load assets through the public
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authentication layer.
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## How the proxy authenticates
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A sandboxed iframe is opaque-origin, so every request it makes is cross-site: the
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`SameSite=lax` session cookie is not sent, and writes and WebSocket upgrades arrive
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with `Origin: null`. Cookie auth cannot work.
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Instead, opening a dashboard mints a **capability**: 192 bits of entropy in the URL
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path, held in memory only, with a rolling 12-hour TTL, bound to the user who minted
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it, and granting exactly one thing, relaying bytes to that one saved URL. Editing or
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deleting a dashboard revokes it, and a server restart invalidates every outstanding
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capability (tabs re-mint transparently on next click).
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## Limits and env vars
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| Variable | Default | Meaning |
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| ------------------------------------ | ------- | ------------------------------------------ |
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| `CODEMAN_MAX_WEBVIEWS` | 50 | Saved dashboards per owner |
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| `CODEMAN_MAX_LIVE_WEBVIEW_FRAMES` | 6 | Iframes kept mounted at once |
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| `CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_CAPABILITY_TTL_MS` | 12h | Rolling capability lifetime |
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| `CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_TIMEOUT_MS` | 30000 | Upstream request timeout |
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| `CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS` | 8000 | Timeout for the Test button |
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| `CODEMAN_MAX_WEBVIEW_HTML_BYTES` | 8MB | Largest HTML document rewritten |
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| `CODEMAN_MAX_WEBVIEW_SOCKETS` | 8 | Concurrent proxied WebSockets per dashboard |
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Saved dashboards live in `~/.codeman/webviews.json`. Which tabs you have open is
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per-device (`localStorage`), since that is workspace layout rather than config.
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## How a dashboard's own API calls keep working
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Worth knowing, because it is where this feature does its least obvious work. Three
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layers cooperate so a dashboard talking to its own backend just works:
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1. `<base href>` handles relative URLs in the markup.
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2. Attribute rewriting handles root-absolute `src`/`href`/`action` in the page the
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proxy serves.
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3. A small injected script rebases URLs built at **runtime**, which the first two
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cannot see: `fetch('/api/data')` and `new WebSocket('/live')`, but equally
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`card.innerHTML = '<img src="/api/hero">'`, `img.src = '/api/slide'`, and
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`url(/img.png)` inside a `<style>` the page injects. That second group is why
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images are covered too. A dashboard that renders its thumbnails from script
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would otherwise show all its data and none of its pictures, because `<base>`
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does not apply to root-absolute URLs and the attribute rewriting only ever saw
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the initial document.
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4. As a last resort, a request that still lands on Codeman's own root is relayed
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using its `Referer` to identify the dashboard. This only fires for a request
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that already missed every Codeman route, and never for one that resolves to a
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real route, which is what keeps it from being an authentication bypass.
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On top of that, the proxy answers those requests with CORS headers. That sounds
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wrong for same-host requests, but a sandboxed iframe has an *opaque* origin, so the
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browser treats every one of its `fetch`/XHR calls as cross-origin even though the
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URL is on Codeman itself. Without those headers, a dashboard renders perfectly and
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then every API call fails, which looks like the dashboard being broken.
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## Known limits
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- **Exotic loaders.** The layers above cover normal `fetch`/XHR/WebSocket/
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EventSource, normal markup, the DOM sinks a page uses to build markup at runtime,
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and `url()` inside stylesheets. Something that constructs requests by an unusual
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route can still slip through. Symptom: the page renders but a panel stays empty.
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- **Root-absolute `location` navigation.** A dashboard that navigates itself with
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`location.href = '/login'` escapes the prefix, because `Location.href` is
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unforgeable and cannot be patched the way the other sinks are. A relative
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`location.href = 'login'` is fine (`<base>` covers it).
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- **Cross-origin redirects are not followed.** If a dashboard bounces to a different
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host (an external SSO provider, say), the proxy hands the redirect back unchanged
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rather than relaying it, because relaying would make this an open proxy. Use
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**Open in new tab** for those.
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- **Login-protected dashboards need trusted mode**, since a sandboxed frame has no
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cookie jar. A server-side per-dashboard cookie jar would lift this and is the
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natural next step if it becomes annoying.
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- **Cookie-authenticated reverse proxies in front of Codeman break sandboxed tabs**
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(#238). The sandboxed frame's requests carry no auth cookie, so the proxy bounces
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them to its login provider and the app loads broken while Test reports reachable.
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Use trusted mode behind Cloudflare Access and friends; see the warning above.
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- **Slow endpoints and the upstream timeout** (#237). The proxy waits
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`CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_TIMEOUT_MS` (default 300s) for the upstream's response *headers*,
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then streams the body without any time bound; a header timeout is logged
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server-side and answered as a 502 that names the limit. WebSocket handshakes use
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the separate `CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_WS_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS` (default 30s).
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- **Not a security boundary.** The proxy reaches whatever the Codeman server can
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reach. That is not an escalation for someone who already commands
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`--dangerously-skip-permissions` agents, but in multi-user mode it does mean a
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non-admin user's dashboard is fetched from the server's network position.
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## Where the code lives
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| Concern | File |
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| ------------------------ | --------------------------------------- |
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| Pure rewrite helpers | `src/web/webview-proxy.ts` |
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| Routes + proxy + sockets | `src/web/routes/webview-routes.ts` |
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| Capability tokens | `src/webview-capabilities.ts` |
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| Persistence | `src/webview-store.ts` |
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| Limits | `src/config/webview-limits.ts` |
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| Frontend | `src/web/public/webview-tabs.js` |
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| Auth exemption | `src/web/middleware/auth.ts` |
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