chore: version packages

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,19 @@
 # aicodeman
 
+## 1.9.1
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- Narrow the Run dropdown, and close the last two gaps in web-tab asset rewriting.
+
+  **The Run dropdown was pinned at its full width.** It capped at 300px, and the recent-session rows wanted 326px, so it always rendered at the cap and reached further across the terminal than it needed to. Now 250px, chosen as the width at which a `~/<dir>/<repo>` + timestamp row still fits whole, since identifying a session to resume is what that list is for. Three fixes were needed to make the narrower menu degrade instead of clip: the saved-URL label now has its own element, because `text-overflow` on the row button did nothing (a bare text node inside a flex container becomes an anonymous flex item that ellipsis cannot reach); `.hist-dir` got `min-width: 0`, without which a flex item refuses to shrink below its own text and pushes the date out of the box; and history rows are held to the container width, because the list's `overflow-y: auto` implicitly makes `overflow-x: auto` and let each row size to its own content and scroll sideways. Phone and tablet widths are unchanged, being set separately in `mobile.css`.
+
+  **A dashboard's own `/api/...` assets are relayed again.** The `Referer`-keyed 404 fallback, which rescues a root-absolute asset that no rewrite layer could reach, refused everything under `/api` outright. Dashboards commonly serve their assets from exactly that namespace, so those requests had no rescue at all. The refusal is now precise: the relay runs before the API-shaped 404, and the auth exemption refuses only paths that resolve to a REAL Codeman route, with `/ws/` and `/q/` still refused by prefix.
+
+  Two findings shaped that fence, both from probing Fastify rather than reading it. `hasRoute()` matches the registered PATTERN literally, so `/api/sessions/abc` reports no match against a registered `/api/sessions/:id` and would have granted an unauthenticated exemption on a live session-scoped route; `findRoute()` performs the real lookup and is what the fence uses. And `@fastify/static` is mounted at `/`, so it registers a root catch-all matching every path, which has to count as "no real route" or the fence would refuse every referer-form request and break the rescue that already worked. A root catch-all is distinguishable because it is the only route whose wildcard param comes back equal to the whole request path. The fence fails closed, and both edges are pinned in `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts`.
+
+  **`url()` inside runtime CSS is rewritten.** Measuring the fallback against a purpose-built dashboard showed one sink no relay can reach: a `<style>` element built by page script has no URL of its own, so the browser sends an EMPTY `Referer` with the image request it triggers. The injected URL shim now rewrites root-absolute `url()` in `<style>` blocks, both as markup and when a `<style>` node is inserted. Verified in Chromium: a stylesheet-only `/api/hero.png` and a runtime `<style>` `/api/late.png` both load, where both previously failed. The remaining known gap is self-navigation via `location.href`, which cannot be patched because `Location.href` is unforgeable.
+
 ## 1.9.0
 
 ### Minor Changes

CLAUDE.md

@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ When user says "COM":
 
 CI runs `npm run check:lockfile` on every push/PR, so lockfile drift fails the build even if the `version-packages` script is bypassed.
 
-**Version**: 1.9.0 (must match `package.json`)
+**Version**: 1.9.1 (must match `package.json`)
 
 ## Project Overview
 

docs/architecture-invariants.md

@@ -111,13 +111,13 @@ The general rule: **any new endpoint that turns a caller-supplied `sessionId` in
 
 **Origin-scoped, not path-scoped.** `/webview/<cap>/x/y` always maps to `<upstream origin>/x/y`, never `<upstream origin><saved path>/x/y`. Dashboards reference assets root-absolutely (`/public/build/app.js`), so origin-scoping is the only mapping under which those resolve; the saved URL's own path+query is used solely as what `/webview/<cap>/` itself serves.
 
-**The capability, and why the auth exemption is safe.** A sandboxed iframe (no `allow-same-origin`) is OPAQUE-ORIGIN, so every request it makes is cross-site: the `SameSite=lax` `codeman_session` cookie is never attached, and writes and WS upgrades arrive with `Origin: null`, which `isAllowedRequestOrigin` rejects by design. Cookie auth therefore cannot work. `src/webview-capabilities.ts` mints a 192-bit `randomBytes` token (memory-only, so a restart invalidates every outstanding one; rolling TTL; bound to the minting user; revoked on edit/delete) which `middleware/auth.ts` recognizes via `hasValidWebviewCapability()` to skip the cookie and Origin checks. ⚠️ The **Host allowlist is never bypassed**, so DNS-rebinding protection is intact. ⚠️ There is a second, `Referer`-keyed form of the exemption for root-absolute assets that `<base href>` cannot rewrite (`fetch('/api/data')`, `import('/chunk.js')`); it is the only exemption decided by a request-supplied header, so it is fenced to **safe methods on non-`/api`, non-`/ws`, non-`/q` paths**. Without that fence a page could present a webview Referer and skip auth on `/api`. `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts` pins every edge.
+**The capability, and why the auth exemption is safe.** A sandboxed iframe (no `allow-same-origin`) is OPAQUE-ORIGIN, so every request it makes is cross-site: the `SameSite=lax` `codeman_session` cookie is never attached, and writes and WS upgrades arrive with `Origin: null`, which `isAllowedRequestOrigin` rejects by design. Cookie auth therefore cannot work. `src/webview-capabilities.ts` mints a 192-bit `randomBytes` token (memory-only, so a restart invalidates every outstanding one; rolling TTL; bound to the minting user; revoked on edit/delete) which `middleware/auth.ts` recognizes via `hasValidWebviewCapability()` to skip the cookie and Origin checks. ⚠️ The **Host allowlist is never bypassed**, so DNS-rebinding protection is intact. ⚠️ There is a second, `Referer`-keyed form of the exemption for root-absolute assets that `<base href>` cannot rewrite (`fetch('/api/data')`, `url(/img.png)` in a stylesheet); it is the only exemption decided by a request-supplied header, so it is fenced to **safe methods on paths that resolve to NO registered Codeman route** (`matchesRegisteredRoute`), plus a blanket refusal of `/ws/` and `/q/`. Without that fence a page could present a webview Referer and skip auth on a real API route. ⚠️ The fence uses `findRoute()`, NOT `hasRoute()`: `hasRoute` matches the registered PATTERN literally, so `/api/sessions/abc` reports false against `/api/sessions/:id` and would hand out an exemption on a live route. It also has to treat `@fastify/static`'s root catch-all (mounted at `/`, matches everything) as "no real route", which is detectable because a root catch-all is the only route whose `*` param equals the whole request path. `/api` used to be refused by prefix instead, which permanently broke dashboards serving their own assets from an `/api/...` namespace. `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts` pins every edge.
 
 **Sandbox default.** The iframe carries `allow-scripts allow-forms allow-popups allow-downloads allow-modals` and gains `allow-same-origin` ONLY when the dashboard is explicitly `trusted`. A proxied page is served from Codeman's own origin, so granting it would let the dashboard read the Codeman document and drive the agent-spawning API. ⚠️ In **both** modes, `Authorization` and the `codeman_session` cookie are stripped before the upstream request (`buildUpstreamRequestHeaders`), because a trusted (same-origin) frame makes the browser attach Codeman's own Basic-auth header to every proxied request; forwarding it would hand `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` to the dashboard.
 
 **Two things a sandboxed frame breaks that are invisible to `curl`.** Both were found only by driving a real dashboard in a real browser, and both present identically as the dashboard's own "Failed to fetch" while the page itself renders fine:
 
-1. **Root-absolute URLs built at runtime.** `<base href>` only governs URLs the HTML parser resolves; `fetch('/api/data')` bypasses it and lands on Codeman's root. That is how most dashboards talk to their own backend. The `Referer`-keyed 404 fallback deliberately refuses `/api`, `/ws`, `/q` (widening it there would let a request-supplied header skip auth on Codeman's own API), so the fix is `runtimeUrlShim()`: a small script injected right after `<base>` that rebases root-absolute and same-origin-absolute URLs into the prefix. It removes the whole class inside the iframe instead of trading security for it. ⚠️ It must be injected even when the page ships its OWN `<base>` (an early return there silently breaks exactly the pages that need it most). ⚠️ **The DOM sinks are as load-bearing as `fetch`.** Patching only `fetch`/`XHR`/`WebSocket`/`EventSource` leaves `container.innerHTML = '<img src="/api/hero?slug=x">'` and `img.src = '/api/slide'` untouched, and neither of the other layers can reach those either (`<base>` never applies to root-absolute URLs, and `rewriteHtml()` only ever sees the INITIAL document, never markup built later by page script). The symptom is precise and easy to misdiagnose as an upstream fault: the dashboard's **data** loads while every **image** stays broken. So the shim also wraps `innerHTML`/`outerHTML`/`insertAdjacentHTML`, `setAttribute`/`setAttributeNS`, and the `src`/`srcset`/`href`/`poster`/`data`/`action` property setters, with a `MutationObserver` as a last net for sinks not patched above. Every rewrite routes through the same idempotent `rw()`, which matters because unlike the server-side rewrite this one sees markup that may ALREADY be proxied (a page re-injecting its own `outerHTML` would otherwise double-prefix). The DOM half is pinned in jsdom by `test/webview-proxy.test.ts`; `curl` cannot see any of it.
+1. **Root-absolute URLs built at runtime.** `<base href>` only governs URLs the HTML parser resolves; `fetch('/api/data')` bypasses it and lands on Codeman's root. That is how most dashboards talk to their own backend. The `Referer`-keyed 404 fallback is only a rescue (it fires after every real route missed, and only when the browser sends a usable `Referer`), so the fix is `runtimeUrlShim()`: a small script injected right after `<base>` that rebases root-absolute and same-origin-absolute URLs into the prefix. It removes the whole class inside the iframe instead of trading security for it. ⚠️ It must be injected even when the page ships its OWN `<base>` (an early return there silently breaks exactly the pages that need it most). ⚠️ **The DOM sinks are as load-bearing as `fetch`.** Patching only `fetch`/`XHR`/`WebSocket`/`EventSource` leaves `container.innerHTML = '<img src="/api/hero?slug=x">'` and `img.src = '/api/slide'` untouched, and neither of the other layers can reach those either (`<base>` never applies to root-absolute URLs, and `rewriteHtml()` only ever sees the INITIAL document, never markup built later by page script). The symptom is precise and easy to misdiagnose as an upstream fault: the dashboard's **data** loads while every **image** stays broken. So the shim also wraps `innerHTML`/`outerHTML`/`insertAdjacentHTML`, `setAttribute`/`setAttributeNS`, and the `src`/`srcset`/`href`/`poster`/`data`/`action` property setters, with a `MutationObserver` as a last net for sinks not patched above. Every rewrite routes through the same idempotent `rw()`, which matters because unlike the server-side rewrite this one sees markup that may ALREADY be proxied (a page re-injecting its own `outerHTML` would otherwise double-prefix). The DOM half is pinned in jsdom by `test/webview-proxy.test.ts`; `curl` cannot see any of it.
 2. **CORS on same-host requests.** An opaque-origin document treats EVERY request as cross-origin, including to the very host it was served from, so its `fetch`/XHR are CORS-checked and its preflights carry `Origin: null`. Static subresources (script/css/img) are NOT CORS-checked, which is why the page renders while its API calls die with an opaque `net::ERR_FAILED`. `buildProxyCorsHeaders()` echoes the origin (omitting `allow-credentials` for `null`, which browsers reject in combination), upstream `access-control-*` headers are dropped (they describe the dashboard's origin, not the frame's), and the proxy answers preflights itself rather than relaying them. ⚠️ `registerSecurityHeaders` answers EVERY `OPTIONS` with a bare 204 before routing, and its CORS block only emits headers for localhost origins, so that short-circuit **must** exempt a valid webview capability or every preflight fails. `curl` cannot reproduce any of this because curl does not enforce CORS.
 
 **Rewrites, each load-bearing** (pure + unit-tested in `src/web/webview-proxy.ts`): drop `x-frame-options` and the CSP `frame-ancestors` directive (the point of the proxy); drop `content-encoding`/`content-length` because undici's `fetch` already decoded the body (forwarding them makes the browser gunzip plaintext); rewrite `Location` for same-origin redirects only, handing CROSS-origin redirects back unchanged so this never becomes an open relay; rebase `Set-Cookie` `Path` onto the prefix and drop `Domain`; inject `<base href>` and rebase root-absolute `src`/`href`/`action`. `resolveUpstreamUrl()` returns null on anything escaping the upstream origin.

docs/web-tabs-fixes-plan.md

@@ -134,18 +134,57 @@ Two details that mattered:
 
 ---
 
-## Deliberately NOT done: widening the `/api` referer fallback
+## Follow-up (same day): the `/api` referer fallback, done safely
 
-Considered as defense in depth, and skipped. It would have to change **both**
-gates or it is useless on a password-protected instance, and the auth gate is the
-security-sensitive one: auth runs in `onRequest`, before routing, so it cannot
-tell a real Codeman API route from a 404. Dropping the `/api` fence would let a
-page holding a capability forge a `Referer` and reach Codeman's **real** API
-unauthenticated. Doing it safely means exempting only paths that match no
-registered route (via Fastify's `hasRoute`/`findRoute`), which is a separate
-change deserving its own review and its own cases in
-`test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts`.
+Originally deferred, then implemented on request. Both gates had to move, and the
+auth one is the security-sensitive half: auth runs in `onRequest`, before routing,
+so it cannot tell a real Codeman API route from a 404, and simply dropping the
+`/api` fence would let a page holding a capability forge a `Referer` and reach
+Codeman's **real** API unauthenticated.
 
-The remaining gap this leaves is narrow and documented in `docs/web-tabs.md`: a
-root-absolute `url(/img.png)` inside a stylesheet injected at runtime. Non-`/api`
-ones are already rescued by the existing referer fallback.
+What shipped:
+
+- `server.ts`: `tryWebviewRefererFallback` is tried **before** the API-shaped 404.
+  Reaching that handler already proves no route matched, and the relay declines
+  unless the `Referer` carries a live capability, so unknown `/api` paths still
+  get the envelope.
+- `middleware/auth.ts`: the `/api/` prefix refusal is replaced by
+  `matchesRegisteredRoute()`, which refuses the exemption for any path that
+  resolves to a real route. `/ws/` and `/q/` stay refused by prefix.
+
+Two findings that decided the implementation, both established by probing Fastify
+rather than by reading its docs:
+
+- **`hasRoute()` is the wrong tool and would have been a hole.** It matches the
+  registered PATTERN literally, so `hasRoute({url: '/api/sessions/abc'})` returns
+  false against a registered `/api/sessions/:id` and would have handed out an
+  exemption on a live, session-scoped API route. `findRoute()` performs the real
+  radix-tree lookup and is what the fence uses.
+- **`@fastify/static` is mounted at `/`, so it registers a root catch-all that
+  matches every path.** A match on it means "heading for the 404 handler", not
+  "real route", and it is distinguishable because a root catch-all is the only
+  route whose `*` param comes back equal to the whole request path. Without that
+  carve-out the fence would have refused every referer-form request and broken the
+  rescue that already worked.
+
+The fence fails closed, and `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts` pins both edges
+(a concrete URL onto a parametric API route stays 401; the dashboard's own
+`/api/...` namespace is served).
+
+### And the CSS gap, which the fallback could NOT close
+
+Testing the fallback against a purpose-built upstream showed the runtime-injected
+stylesheet case is unreachable by any relay: a `<style>` element has no URL of its
+own, so Chromium sends an **empty `Referer`** with the image request it triggers
+and there is nothing to key on. Measured directly:
+
+| sink | Referer the browser sends | fixed by |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `url()` in a proxied `.css` | the stylesheet's proxied URL | the referer relay |
+| `url()` in a runtime `<style>` | *empty* | `rwCss()` in the shim |
+
+So the shim also rewrites `url()` inside `<style>` blocks, both when they arrive as
+markup and when a `<style>` node is inserted (via the existing MutationObserver).
+
+The only gap left is self-navigation via `location.href = '/x'`, which cannot be
+patched because `Location.href` is unforgeable.

docs/web-tabs.md

@@ -103,11 +103,16 @@ layers cooperate so a dashboard talking to its own backend just works:
    proxy serves.
 3. A small injected script rebases URLs built at **runtime**, which the first two
    cannot see: `fetch('/api/data')` and `new WebSocket('/live')`, but equally
-   `card.innerHTML = '<img src="/api/hero">'` and `img.src = '/api/slide'`. That
-   second group is why images are covered too. A dashboard that renders its
-   thumbnails from script would otherwise show all its data and none of its
-   pictures, because `<base>` does not apply to root-absolute URLs and the
-   attribute rewriting only ever saw the initial document.
+   `card.innerHTML = '<img src="/api/hero">'`, `img.src = '/api/slide'`, and
+   `url(/img.png)` inside a `<style>` the page injects. That second group is why
+   images are covered too. A dashboard that renders its thumbnails from script
+   would otherwise show all its data and none of its pictures, because `<base>`
+   does not apply to root-absolute URLs and the attribute rewriting only ever saw
+   the initial document.
+4. As a last resort, a request that still lands on Codeman's own root is relayed
+   using its `Referer` to identify the dashboard. This only fires for a request
+   that already missed every Codeman route, and never for one that resolves to a
+   real route, which is what keeps it from being an authentication bypass.
 
 On top of that, the proxy answers those requests with CORS headers. That sounds
 wrong for same-host requests, but a sandboxed iframe has an *opaque* origin, so the
@@ -117,12 +122,10 @@ then every API call fails, which looks like the dashboard being broken.
 
 ## Known limits
 
-- **Exotic loaders.** The three layers above cover normal `fetch`/XHR/WebSocket/
-  EventSource, normal markup, and the DOM sinks a page uses to build markup at
-  runtime. Something that constructs requests by an unusual route can still slip
-  through. Symptom: the page renders but a panel stays empty. The known remaining
-  gap is a root-absolute `url(/img.png)` inside a stylesheet the page injects at
-  runtime; one under `/api` has no fallback and will 404.
+- **Exotic loaders.** The layers above cover normal `fetch`/XHR/WebSocket/
+  EventSource, normal markup, the DOM sinks a page uses to build markup at runtime,
+  and `url()` inside stylesheets. Something that constructs requests by an unusual
+  route can still slip through. Symptom: the page renders but a panel stays empty.
 - **Root-absolute `location` navigation.** A dashboard that navigates itself with
   `location.href = '/login'` escapes the prefix, because `Location.href` is
   unforgeable and cannot be patched the way the other sinks are. A relative

package-lock.json

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
   "name": "aicodeman",
-  "version": "1.9.0",
+  "version": "1.9.1",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "aicodeman",
-      "version": "1.9.0",
+      "version": "1.9.1",
       "hasInstallScript": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "workspaces": [

package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "aicodeman",
-  "version": "1.9.0",
+  "version": "1.9.1",
   "description": "Mission control for AI coding agents - run 20 autonomous agents with real-time monitoring and session persistence",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "dist/index.js",

src/web/middleware/auth.ts

@@ -159,12 +159,48 @@ function hasValidWebviewCapability(req: FastifyRequest): boolean {
   // capability already implies an authenticated `POST /api/webviews/:id/open`, but
   // the exemption should stay no wider than the problem it solves.
   if (req.method !== 'GET' && req.method !== 'HEAD') return false;
-  if (url.startsWith('/api/') || url.startsWith('/ws/') || url.startsWith('/q/')) return false;
+  if (url.startsWith('/ws/') || url.startsWith('/q/')) return false;
+  // Anything that resolves to a REAL Codeman route is refused, which is the fence
+  // that keeps this from being an auth bypass. `/api/` used to be refused by prefix
+  // instead, but dashboards legitimately serve assets from their own `/api/...`
+  // namespace (`<img src="/api/hero?slug=x">`), and those requests were the one
+  // class the 404 relay could never rescue. See matchesRegisteredRoute.
+  if (matchesRegisteredRoute(req, url)) return false;
 
   const fromReferer = capabilityFromReferer(typeof req.headers.referer === 'string' ? req.headers.referer : undefined);
   return !!fromReferer && webviewCapabilities.resolve(fromReferer) !== undefined;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Whether `url` resolves to a route Codeman actually registered.
+ *
+ * `hasRoute()` is the wrong tool: it matches the registered PATTERN literally, so
+ * `/api/sessions/abc` reports false against a registered `/api/sessions/:id` and
+ * would hand out an exemption on a live API route. `findRoute()` performs the real
+ * radix-tree lookup and fills in `params`, which is what this needs.
+ *
+ * The one complication is `@fastify/static`, mounted at `/`, which registers a
+ * root-level catch-all that matches EVERY path. A match on that means "no real
+ * route, this is heading for the 404 handler", and it is distinguishable because a
+ * root catch-all is the only route whose `*` param comes back equal to the entire
+ * request path. `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts` pins both halves of that.
+ *
+ * Fails CLOSED: anything unexpected counts as a real route, which merely denies the
+ * exemption and restores the previous behavior.
+ */
+function matchesRegisteredRoute(req: FastifyRequest, url: string): boolean {
+  try {
+    const found = req.server.findRoute({ method: req.method as 'GET' | 'HEAD', url });
+    if (!found) return false;
+    const params = found.params ?? {};
+    const keys = Object.keys(params);
+    const isRootCatchAll = keys.length === 1 && keys[0] === '*' && `/${params['*']}` === url;
+    return !isRootCatchAll;
+  } catch {
+    return true;
+  }
+}
+
 /**
  * Register HTTP Basic Auth middleware with session cookies and rate limiting.
  * Only active when CODEMAN_PASSWORD is set.

src/web/public/styles.css

@@ -3546,7 +3546,12 @@ body.touch-device .terminal-container .xterm .xterm-helper-textarea {
   padding: 4px;
   z-index: 1000;
   min-width: 190px;
-  max-width: 300px;
+  /* Every long row inside (recent-session paths, saved URL names) ellipsizes, so
+     the cap is a deliberate choice rather than a fit-the-content result: the menu
+     overlays the terminal and does not need to reach across it. 250 rather than a
+     rounder 240 because it is the width at which the common `~/<dir>/<repo>` +
+     timestamp recent-session row still fits whole, which is what that list is for. */
+  max-width: 250px;
   box-shadow: 0 8px 32px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.5), 0 2px 8px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.3);
 }
 .run-mode-menu.active {
@@ -3611,8 +3616,19 @@ body.touch-device .terminal-container .xterm .xterm-helper-textarea {
   max-height: 200px;
   overflow-y: auto;
 }
+/* `overflow-y: auto` computes overflow-x to auto as well, which makes this a scroll
+   container and lets a row size itself to its own content. A long path therefore
+   scrolled sideways instead of ellipsizing, and before the menu was narrowed it
+   simply pinned the menu at its max-width. */
+.run-mode-history .run-mode-option {
+  max-width: 100%;
+}
 .run-mode-option .hist-dir {
   flex: 1;
+  /* A flex item's default min-width is auto, so without this the path refuses to
+     shrink below its own text and pushes the date out of the menu instead of
+     ellipsizing. Only visible once the menu is narrow enough to force the choice. */
+  min-width: 0;
   overflow: hidden;
   text-overflow: ellipsis;
   white-space: nowrap;
@@ -12575,7 +12591,16 @@ html[data-skin="daylight-blue"] .welcome-btn-tunnel.active:hover {
   flex: 1 1 auto;
   min-width: 0;
   overflow: hidden;
+}
+/* The label needs its own element: `text-overflow` on the button does nothing,
+   because the button is a flex container and a bare text node in one becomes an
+   anonymous flex item that ellipsis cannot reach. Without this a long dashboard
+   name widens the whole menu instead of truncating. */
+.run-mode-web-name {
+  min-width: 0;
+  overflow: hidden;
   text-overflow: ellipsis;
+  white-space: nowrap;
 }
 .run-mode-row-btn {
   flex: 0 0 auto;

src/web/public/webview-tabs.js

@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
         const icon = w.icon ? escapeHtml(w.icon) : '<span class="run-mode-dot web"></span>';
         return `<div class="run-mode-row run-mode-row--web">
           <button class="run-mode-option run-mode-option--web" onclick="app.openWebviewFromMenu(${jsonId})" title="${escapeHtml(w.url)}">
-            <span class="run-mode-menu-icon">${icon}</span>${name}
+            <span class="run-mode-menu-icon">${icon}</span><span class="run-mode-web-name">${name}</span>
           </button>
           <button class="run-mode-row-btn run-mode-webview-edit" onclick="event.stopPropagation(); app.showWebviewModal(${jsonId})"
             title="Edit URL" aria-label="Edit ${name}">&#x2699;</button>

src/web/server.ts

@@ -855,14 +855,21 @@ export class WebServer extends EventEmitter {
     // the envelope hook into a contradictory HTTP 404 {success:true,...}.
     this.app.setNotFoundHandler(async (req, reply) => {
       const notFound = `Route ${req.method}:${req.url} not found`;
+      // A web-tab dashboard asking for a root-absolute asset (`fetch('/api/data')`,
+      // `import('/chunk.js')`, `url(/img.png)` inside a stylesheet) lands here,
+      // because `<base href>` cannot rewrite a URL built at runtime. Its Referer says
+      // which dashboard to relay to. Deliberately placed on the 404 path so every
+      // real Codeman route still wins.
+      //
+      // Tried BEFORE the API-shaped 404, because a dashboard's own assets commonly
+      // live under its `/api/...` namespace and were the one class this could never
+      // rescue. Reaching this handler at all already proves no Codeman route matched,
+      // and the relay declines unless the Referer carries a live capability, so
+      // genuinely unknown `/api` paths still get the envelope below.
+      if (await tryWebviewRefererFallback(req, reply)) return reply;
       if (req.url.startsWith('/api')) {
         return reply.code(404).send(createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, notFound));
       }
-      // A web-tab dashboard asking for a root-absolute asset (`fetch('/api/data')`,
-      // `import('/chunk.js')`) lands here, because `<base href>` cannot rewrite a URL
-      // built at runtime. Its Referer says which dashboard to relay to. Deliberately
-      // placed on the 404 path so every real Codeman route still wins.
-      if (await tryWebviewRefererFallback(req, reply)) return reply;
       return reply.code(404).send({ message: notFound, error: 'Not Found', statusCode: 404 });
     });
 

src/web/webview-proxy.ts

@@ -366,11 +366,11 @@ export function buildDownstreamResponseHeaders(
  * root, where it 404s. That is not a rare shape: it is how most dashboards talk to
  * their own backend, and it presents as the dashboard's own "Failed to fetch".
  *
- * The `Referer`-keyed 404 fallback catches some of these, but deliberately NOT
- * paths under `/api`, `/ws` or `/q` (widening it there would let a request-supplied
- * header skip auth on Codeman's own API). Rewriting inside the iframe removes the
- * whole class instead of trading security for it: the page never emits a
- * root-absolute request in the first place.
+ * The `Referer`-keyed 404 fallback catches some of these, but it is a rescue rather
+ * than a fix (it only fires for a request that already missed every Codeman route,
+ * and only when the browser sends a usable `Referer`). Rewriting inside the iframe
+ * removes the whole class instead: the page never emits a root-absolute request in
+ * the first place.
  *
  * ## Why the DOM sinks are patched too, not just fetch/XHR
  *
@@ -455,6 +455,14 @@ function rwAttr(n,v){
     return A.indexOf(k)===-1?v:rw(v);
   }catch(e){return v;}
 }
+// CSS built at runtime is the one sink NO relay can rescue: a <style> element has
+// no URL of its own, so an opaque-origin document sends an EMPTY Referer with the
+// resulting image request, and the 404 fallback has nothing to key on.
+function rwCss(s){
+  try{
+    return String(s).replace(/url\\(\\s*(['"]?)(\\/(?!\\/)[^'")]*)\\1\\s*\\)/gi,function(m,q,u){return 'url('+q+rw(u)+q+')';});
+  }catch(e){return s;}
+}
 // Each value goes through rw() rather than a blind prefix concat, because unlike
 // the server-side rewriteHtml() this runs on markup that may ALREADY be proxied
 // (a page re-injecting its own outerHTML), and rw() is the idempotent one.
@@ -465,7 +473,8 @@ function rwHtml(s){
       .replace(/(\\s(?:src|href|action|poster|formaction|data)\\s*=\\s*")([^"]*)(")/gi,function(m,a,v,q){return a+rw(v)+q;})
       .replace(/(\\s(?:src|href|action|poster|formaction|data)\\s*=\\s*')([^']*)(')/gi,function(m,a,v,q){return a+rw(v)+q;})
       .replace(/(\\ssrcset\\s*=\\s*")([^"]*)(")/gi,function(m,a,v,q){return a+rwSet(v)+q;})
-      .replace(/(\\ssrcset\\s*=\\s*')([^']*)(')/gi,function(m,a,v,q){return a+rwSet(v)+q;});
+      .replace(/(\\ssrcset\\s*=\\s*')([^']*)(')/gi,function(m,a,v,q){return a+rwSet(v)+q;})
+      .replace(/(<style\\b[^>]*>)([^]*?)(<\\/style>)/gi,function(m,a,b,c){return a+rwCss(b)+c;});
   }catch(e){return s;}
 }
 // Marked with __cmrw so a double injection (a page that re-runs the shim) cannot
@@ -530,12 +539,23 @@ try{
         }
       }catch(e){}
     };
+    var fixStyle=function(el){
+      try{
+        if(!el||el.tagName!=='STYLE')return;
+        var t=el.textContent;
+        if(!t||t.indexOf('url(')===-1)return;
+        var n=rwCss(t);
+        if(n!==t)el.textContent=n;
+      }catch(e){}
+    };
     var scan=function(node){
       try{
-        fix(node);
+        fix(node);fixStyle(node);
         if(node&&node.querySelectorAll){
           var l=node.querySelectorAll('[src],[href],[action],[poster],[data],[srcset],[formaction]');
           for(var i=0;i<l.length;i++)fix(l[i]);
+          var st=node.querySelectorAll('style');
+          for(var j=0;j<st.length;j++)fixStyle(st[j]);
         }
       }catch(e){}
     };

test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts

@@ -42,9 +42,16 @@ beforeEach(async () => {
   // Stand-ins for the real surfaces, so a reachable route means auth let it through.
   app.all('/webview/:cap/*', async () => ({ proxied: true }));
   app.all('/api/sessions', async () => ({ sensitive: true }));
+  // Parametric on purpose: the exemption's fence has to resolve a CONCRETE url
+  // against it, which is precisely what `hasRoute()` cannot do.
+  app.all('/api/sessions/:id', async () => ({ sensitive: true }));
+  app.all('/q/:token', async () => ({ qr: true }));
   app.get('/', async () => 'app shell');
-  app.get('/static/app.js', async () => 'asset');
   app.get('/webviewfoo/bar', async () => 'lookalike');
+  // Stand-in for @fastify/static mounted at '/', which is what actually serves
+  // /static/app.js in production. It matches EVERY path, so the fence must treat a
+  // root catch-all as "no real route" or the Referer form could never apply at all.
+  app.get('/*', async () => 'static asset');
   await app.ready();
 });
 
@@ -109,6 +116,21 @@ describe('the exemption applies to a live capability', () => {
     });
     expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
   });
+
+  it("covers the dashboard's OWN /api namespace, which no Codeman route claims", async () => {
+    // A dashboard serving `<img src="/api/hero?slug=x">` from page script is the
+    // case this exists for: the URL is root-absolute, so it lands on Codeman, and
+    // nothing here matches a real route. Refusing it by `/api` prefix (as this once
+    // did) left dashboard images permanently broken with no way to rescue them.
+    for (const url of ['/api/hero?slug=x', '/api/slide?owner=o&n=01', '/api/preview']) {
+      const res = await app.inject({
+        method: 'GET',
+        url,
+        headers: { referer: `http://localhost/webview/${capability}/panel` },
+      });
+      expect(res.statusCode, url).toBe(200);
+    }
+  });
 });
 
 describe('the exemption does NOT widen anywhere else', () => {
@@ -132,8 +154,8 @@ describe('the exemption does NOT widen anywhere else', () => {
     expect((await app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/webviewfoo/bar' })).statusCode).toBe(401);
   });
 
-  it('NEVER exempts the Codeman API, even with a valid capability in the Referer', async () => {
-    // This is the hole the Referer form would open if it were not path-fenced.
+  it('NEVER exempts a real Codeman API route, even with a valid capability in the Referer', async () => {
+    // This is the hole the Referer form would open if it were not fenced.
     const res = await app.inject({
       method: 'GET',
       url: '/api/sessions',
@@ -142,6 +164,42 @@ describe('the exemption does NOT widen anywhere else', () => {
     expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
   });
 
+  it('NEVER exempts a PARAMETRIC API route matched by a concrete url', async () => {
+    // The fence has to route `/api/sessions/abc` onto `/api/sessions/:id`. A literal
+    // pattern check (`hasRoute`) reports no match here and would hand out an
+    // exemption on a live, session-scoped API route.
+    for (const url of ['/api/sessions/abc', '/api/sessions/abc?x=1']) {
+      const res = await app.inject({
+        method: 'GET',
+        url,
+        headers: { referer: `http://localhost/webview/${capability}/panel` },
+      });
+      expect(res.statusCode, url).toBe(401);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('still refuses the websocket namespace outright', async () => {
+    // `/q/` is deliberately absent here: QR login is PUBLIC by its own bypass
+    // (an unauthenticated device is the entire point), so it can never demonstrate
+    // anything about this exemption. The `/q/` guard alongside it is belt-and-braces.
+    const res = await app.inject({
+      method: 'GET',
+      url: '/ws/anything',
+      headers: { referer: `http://localhost/webview/${capability}/panel` },
+    });
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
+  });
+
+  it('does not exempt an unrouted /api path without a live capability in the Referer', async () => {
+    expect((await app.inject({ method: 'GET', url: '/api/hero?slug=x' })).statusCode).toBe(401);
+    const stale = await app.inject({
+      method: 'GET',
+      url: '/api/hero?slug=x',
+      headers: { referer: `http://localhost/webview/${'Z'.repeat(32)}/panel` },
+    });
+    expect(stale.statusCode).toBe(401);
+  });
+
   it('does not let the Referer form carry a WRITE', async () => {
     const res = await app.inject({
       method: 'POST',

test/webview-proxy.test.ts

@@ -589,6 +589,41 @@ describe('runtimeUrlShim DOM sinks', () => {
     expect(imgSrc(dom)).toBe('');
   });
 
+  /**
+   * CSS is the sink no relay can rescue: a <style> element has no URL of its own,
+   * so an opaque-origin document sends an EMPTY Referer with the image request it
+   * triggers, and the 404 fallback has nothing to key on. Verified in Chromium.
+   */
+  it('rewrites root-absolute url() inside a <style> injected as markup', () => {
+    const dom = newDom();
+    dom.window.document.getElementById('box')!.innerHTML = '<style>#hero{background-image:url(/api/hero.png)}</style>';
+    expect(dom.window.document.querySelector('#box style')!.textContent).toBe(
+      `#hero{background-image:url(${PREFIX}api/hero.png)}`
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('rewrites url() in a <style> built with textContent, via the observer', async () => {
+    const dom = newDom();
+    const { document } = dom.window;
+    const style = document.createElement('style');
+    style.textContent = "#late{background-image:url('/api/late.png')}";
+    document.head.appendChild(style);
+    await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 10));
+    expect(style.textContent).toBe(`#late{background-image:url('${PREFIX}api/late.png')}`);
+  });
+
+  it('leaves relative, cross-origin and data: url() alone', () => {
+    const dom = newDom();
+    const css = [
+      'a{background:url(img/rel.png)}',
+      'b{background:url(https://cdn.example/z.png)}',
+      'c{background:url()}',
+      `d{background:url(${PREFIX}api/done.png)}`,
+    ].join('');
+    dom.window.document.getElementById('box')!.innerHTML = `<style>${css}</style>`;
+    expect(dom.window.document.querySelector('#box style')!.textContent).toBe(css);
+  });
+
   it('is idempotent when a value passes through two layers', () => {
     const dom = newDom();
     const img = dom.window.document.createElement('img');