chore: version packages

Plan-usage chip defaults ON on desktop (handhelds stay OFF), resolved
through a single planUsageChipEnabled() helper so the checkbox, the chip
and the create-time statusLineTelemetry flag cannot disagree. Correct the
stale "Cron button defaults ON" comment (it is OFF in code, template and
CSS) and the styles.css comment claiming the server strips the chip's
hidden class.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

.github/SECURITY.md

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Codeman launches AI coding sessions with `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, so th
 web UI is **by design a remote-code-execution surface for whoever can reach it**.
 The entire security model exists to control *who* that is. Please read this before
 exposing an instance beyond `localhost`. The full model lives in
-[`docs/security-architecture.md`](docs/security-architecture.md).
+[`docs/security-architecture.md`](../docs/security-architecture.md).
 
 ## Supported versions
 
@@ -75,4 +75,4 @@ subscribe and send time), and tmux session names discovered on the shared socket
 are validated against the safe-name pattern before reaching any shell call site.
 
 For the detailed rationale, defenses, and recommended secure setups, see
-[`docs/security-architecture.md`](docs/security-architecture.md).
+[`docs/security-architecture.md`](../docs/security-architecture.md).

.gitignore

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 .agents/
 skills-lock.json
 
+# Written by install.sh into end-user clones when setup finishes
+.install-complete
+
 # Dependencies
 node_modules/
 

.prettierignore

@@ -26,3 +26,6 @@ src/web/public/terminal-ui.js
 src/web/public/voice-input.js
 src/web/public/upload.html
 scripts/remotion/
+
+# Hand-maintained; Prettier escapes underscores in glob paths and corrupts paragraphs.
+CLAUDE.md

.prettierrc

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "singleQuote": true,
-  "semi": true,
-  "tabWidth": 2,
-  "printWidth": 120,
-  "trailingComma": "es5",
-  "endOfLine": "lf"
-}

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,288 @@
 # aicodeman
 
+## 1.9.3
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- Plan-usage chip now defaults ON on desktop, plus the reworked `xterm-zerolag-input` README.
+  - **Plan-usage chip defaults ON (desktop).** The `showPlanUsageLimits` chip (live 5-hour and weekly plan usage from the Claude statusline) used to be opt-in and default OFF, so most users never saw it. Desktop now defaults ON; handhelds still default OFF so the phone header stays minimal and the `mobile-header-buttons-policy` guard keeps passing. Devices with an explicitly stored preference keep whatever they chose, so nobody's OFF gets overridden.
+  - **One resolver behind the chip.** Added `planUsageChipEnabled()` in settings-ui.js and routed all three call sites through it: the App Settings checkbox, the chip's visibility, and the create-time `statusLineTelemetry` flag in session-ui.js. Those three had independent `?? false` / `=== true` defaults, and a chip revealed without the telemetry flag renders `—` forever, so a default flip on one site alone would have shipped a permanently empty chip.
+  - **Cron button comment corrected.** The App Settings comment claimed "Cron button defaults ON" while the code, the template (`btn-cron--hidden`) and the CSS all default it OFF. Verified against a fresh browser profile: the button is hidden and its checkbox unchecked out of the box. Comment now matches, and states why the two halves stay consistent.
+  - **Docs.** CLAUDE.md, `docs/architecture-invariants.md` and `docs/usage-limits-display-plan.md` updated for the new default and the single-resolver rule; the stale `styles.css` comment claiming the server strips the chip's hidden class at render was corrected (display is per-device, so the client reveals it).
+  - **`xterm-zerolag-input` README rework** (0.1.5 shipped the content; this republishes with the graphic and promo changes): replaced the misaligned 8-line keystroke-flow diagram with a two-line stock-vs-zerolag contrast, added a Codeman callout above the demo GIF with links to getcodeman.com and the repo, and rewrote the Origin section so it argues the extraction story instead of repeating the promo.
+
+## 1.9.2
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- Rewrite the `xterm-zerolag-input` package README as a value-first document and correct the drift that had accumulated against the source.
+  - Added the side-by-side phone demo GIF (`docs/images/zerolag-demo-20260728.gif`) as the hero image, referenced by absolute raw URL so it renders on npmjs.com as well as GitHub. The two-phone comparison shows 0ms local echo next to a 600ms-2.7s server echo on the same session.
+  - New "Why this one" comparison table, an explicit list of target use cases (SSH web clients, cloud IDEs, mobile terminals, container consoles), and a bundle-size badge (6.1 kB gzipped, measured from the ESM build).
+  - Corrected the test-count badge from 78 to the actual 175 tests across 5 files, in both the package README and the Published Packages section of the root README.
+  - Removed the stale "Unicode/emoji rendered at single-cell width" limitation. CJK, fullwidth forms and emoji have had double-width rendering and visual-column positioning since the wide-character fix; the honest remaining caveat (per-code-point width summing over-counts ZWJ grapheme clusters) replaces it.
+  - Documented the previously undocumented public `setPrompt()` method for switching prompt strategies at runtime, and the new "Wide characters (CJK, emoji)" integration section covering the optional `Unicode11Addon` path and the built-in range-table fallback.
+  - Documented `backgroundColor: 'transparent'`, corrected the `foregroundColor` default, and updated the grid-alignment math to reflect visual-column positioning rather than character index.
+
+  No source changes, docs only.
+
+## 1.9.1
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- Narrow the Run dropdown, and close the last two gaps in web-tab asset rewriting.
+
+  **The Run dropdown was pinned at its full width.** It capped at 300px, and the recent-session rows wanted 326px, so it always rendered at the cap and reached further across the terminal than it needed to. Now 250px, chosen as the width at which a `~/<dir>/<repo>` + timestamp row still fits whole, since identifying a session to resume is what that list is for. Three fixes were needed to make the narrower menu degrade instead of clip: the saved-URL label now has its own element, because `text-overflow` on the row button did nothing (a bare text node inside a flex container becomes an anonymous flex item that ellipsis cannot reach); `.hist-dir` got `min-width: 0`, without which a flex item refuses to shrink below its own text and pushes the date out of the box; and history rows are held to the container width, because the list's `overflow-y: auto` implicitly makes `overflow-x: auto` and let each row size to its own content and scroll sideways. Phone and tablet widths are unchanged, being set separately in `mobile.css`.
+
+  **A dashboard's own `/api/...` assets are relayed again.** The `Referer`-keyed 404 fallback, which rescues a root-absolute asset that no rewrite layer could reach, refused everything under `/api` outright. Dashboards commonly serve their assets from exactly that namespace, so those requests had no rescue at all. The refusal is now precise: the relay runs before the API-shaped 404, and the auth exemption refuses only paths that resolve to a REAL Codeman route, with `/ws/` and `/q/` still refused by prefix.
+
+  Two findings shaped that fence, both from probing Fastify rather than reading it. `hasRoute()` matches the registered PATTERN literally, so `/api/sessions/abc` reports no match against a registered `/api/sessions/:id` and would have granted an unauthenticated exemption on a live session-scoped route; `findRoute()` performs the real lookup and is what the fence uses. And `@fastify/static` is mounted at `/`, so it registers a root catch-all matching every path, which has to count as "no real route" or the fence would refuse every referer-form request and break the rescue that already worked. A root catch-all is distinguishable because it is the only route whose wildcard param comes back equal to the whole request path. The fence fails closed, and both edges are pinned in `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts`.
+
+  **`url()` inside runtime CSS is rewritten.** Measuring the fallback against a purpose-built dashboard showed one sink no relay can reach: a `<style>` element built by page script has no URL of its own, so the browser sends an EMPTY `Referer` with the image request it triggers. The injected URL shim now rewrites root-absolute `url()` in `<style>` blocks, both as markup and when a `<style>` node is inserted. Verified in Chromium: a stylesheet-only `/api/hero.png` and a runtime `<style>` `/api/late.png` both load, where both previously failed. The remaining known gap is self-navigation via `location.href`, which cannot be patched because `Location.href` is unforgeable.
+
+## 1.9.0
+
+### Minor Changes
+
+- 2667150: feat(mobile): browse and insert local file and folder paths
+
+  Add a root-confined filesystem picker to Link Existing and the extended mobile
+  keyboard bar. Selected paths remain editable at the active prompt, supported
+  images/documents/text files open in a safe inline preview, and a new one-tap
+  action clears only the current unsent input without invoking `/clear`.
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- 3cff98f: Fix two multi-user scoping holes in the new filesystem path picker. `GET /api/filesystem/browse` and `GET /api/filesystem/preview` accept an optional `sessionId` that contributes the session's working directory as a browse root, but they resolved it straight off the session map without an ownership check, unlike the nine other session-scoped handlers in the same route file. A non-admin could therefore pin another user's working directory as a root simply by passing their session id, then list and preview files under it. Both endpoints now run `canAccessOwned` and report 404, which also avoids confirming that a session id exists.
+
+  Separately, `Home` and `CASES_DIR` were unconditional browse roots for every caller. Per-user spaces live at `<USER_SPACES_DIR>/<username>`, which is inside `homedir()`, so the `Home` root alone exposed every other user's workspace to any authenticated user. In multi-user mode a non-admin now gets only their own space plus anything explicitly listed in `CODEMAN_FILE_PICKER_ROOTS`; `/mnt/d` is no longer offered by default, since a broad host mount should be an explicit operator decision in a multi-user deployment. Admins keep the host-wide roots, and single-user mode is unchanged.
+
+  Both holes are regression-guarded in `test/routes/file-routes.test.ts`, verified to fail against the previous code. Multi-user mode is opt-in and off by default, so single-user installs were never affected.
+
+- Web tabs: delete saved URLs from the Run dropdown, and fix images in proxied dashboards.
+
+  **Saved URLs are now manageable from the dropdown.** Each row under "Web / URL" gains a gear and an `x`, so a URL can be edited or deleted without first opening it as a tab. Previously the only delete path ran through the gear on an open tab, which was a dead end for a URL you no longer wanted open at all. Both controls stay permanently visible rather than hover-revealed, because the same menu is used on touch, and they get a larger hit box there. Deleting leaves the dropdown open on the remaining rows, and deleting the dashboard that is currently open also closes its tab and unmounts its frame.
+
+  **Runtime-injected images no longer 404.** A dashboard that renders its own markup from script (`card.innerHTML = '<img src="/api/hero?slug=x">'`, `img.src = '/api/slide'`) escaped every rewrite layer at once: `<base href>` never applies to a root-absolute URL, the server-side attribute rewrite only ever sees the initial document, and `runtimeUrlShim()` patched only `fetch`, `XMLHttpRequest`, `WebSocket` and `EventSource`. Those requests landed on Codeman's own root and 404'd, with a symptom that reads as an upstream fault: the dashboard's data loaded while every image stayed broken.
+
+  The shim now also covers the DOM URL sinks, so the request is never emitted in the first place and neither the `/api` fence in the 404 fallback nor the one in the auth middleware had to move. It wraps `innerHTML`, `outerHTML`, `insertAdjacentHTML` (including on `ShadowRoot`), `setAttribute`/`setAttributeNS`, and the `src`/`srcset`/`href`/`poster`/`data`/`action` property setters on img, source, media, video poster, script, iframe, embed, track, link, anchor, area, object and form, with a `MutationObserver` as a last net for sinks not patched above. Every rewrite routes through the same idempotent helper, which matters because unlike the server-side rewrite this one sees markup that may already be proxied, and a page re-injecting its own `outerHTML` would otherwise double-prefix. Everything is defensively guarded and marked so a double injection cannot wrap an already-wrapped setter.
+
+  Measured against a real dashboard: 693 image elements, 0 of them under the proxy prefix and 0 of 23 in-viewport images decoded before, 693 and 23 of 23 after. Covered by a new jsdom suite over the shim's DOM half and a new frontend suite over the dropdown rows. Known remaining gaps are documented in `docs/web-tabs.md`: a root-absolute `url()` inside a stylesheet injected at runtime, and self-navigation via `location.href`, which cannot be patched because `Location.href` is unforgeable.
+
+  Also in this release: a value-first README overhaul pointing at getcodeman.com, and the QR-auth distribution test now uses a chi-square check instead of a max-deviation threshold that failed on random variance.
+
+- bca56b4: Normalize Claude conversations in the response viewer. A Claude transcript is an append-only event log, so one logical exchange spans many JSONL rows: tool-result rows, meta/image/skill rows, compact summaries, task and team notifications, sidechains, replayed assistant snapshots, and multi-block assistant output. The viewer rendered a card per row, which produced duplicate and truncated cards that read as lost responses. Cards are now built at real human-turn boundaries, replayed assistant snapshots are deduplicated, and sidechain rows (which belong to subagents, not the main conversation) no longer leak in. An identical prompt that legitimately recurs after an assistant reply is still kept as its own turn.
+
+  Measured over 40 real transcripts: 3108 cards became 621, duplicate cards dropped from 74 to 8 (all of them genuinely repeated turns), no assistant text was lost, and the non-`context=full` last-response text was byte-identical on every file.
+
+  Also rebinds recovered sessions to their transcript. `reconcileSessions()` can recover a lost mux session as a `restored-<uuid8>` placeholder with a stale working directory, which made transcript lookup by cwd find nothing. The placeholder still carries the first eight characters of the conversation UUID, so the viewer now rebinds to the matching top-level transcript when exactly one candidate matches.
+
+## 1.8.3
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- 8c089a4: Add four light UI and terminal skins: Paper Gray, Solarized Light, Catppuccin Latte, and Rosé Pine Dawn. The Skin picker now groups Light and Dark options, and each light skin ships a matching xterm ANSI palette plus `color-scheme: light` so native selects, date pickers and scrollbars stop rendering as dark OS widgets on a light page. Terminals set `minimumContrastRatio: 4.5` under a light skin (main terminal and teammate terminals both), which keeps CLI output that assumes a dark background readable, and `applyTerminalSkin()` now refreshes the zero-lag input overlay so typed-but-unflushed text does not keep the previous theme's colors.
+
+  Elevated surfaces (modals, command palette, dropdowns, subagent and ultracode windows, file preview, attachment tray, mobile sheets) now resolve through shared `--floating-bg` / `--control-*` / `--banner-bg-*` / `--modal-backdrop` / `--elevated-shadow` tokens instead of hardcoded near-black rgba, so they follow whichever skin is active. On the Daylight skins this lifts modals slightly off the page background; OG Codeman pins its own near-black value to keep that palette neutral.
+
+  Also defines twelve CSS compatibility aliases (`--bg-primary`, `--bg-secondary`, `--bg-tertiary`, `--text-primary`, `--text-secondary`, `--border-color`, `--accent-color`, `--success`, `--error`, `--danger`, `--font-mono`, `--shadow-lg`) that panels and overlays already referenced in about 79 places but which were never actually declared, so those rules silently resolved to nothing. Status badges and accent-tinted pills (search filter chips and result badges, session tab mode pills, respawn state, Ralph priority and circuit-breaker badges, tunnel and voice status, mobile case picker) no longer keep their pale light-on-dark ink under a light skin, where it measured 1.0 to 1.9:1 and made the search filter chips invisible.
+
+  New static regression `test/skin-themes.test.ts` guards the four-way parity between the CSS token block, the xterm palette, the pre-paint allowlist and the Settings picker.
+
+## 1.8.2
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- Web tabs: open dashboard URLs as tabs beside agent sessions, plus terminal link fixes.
+
+  **Web tabs.** The Run dropdown gains a "Web / URL" section. A saved URL renders as a tab in the same strip as Claude/Codex/Gemini sessions, with the same Alt+1-9 numbering, an icon picker, and per-device tab order. Frames stay mounted while hidden (LRU-bounded), so switching tabs never reloads a dashboard.
+
+  Dashboards are proxied through Codeman's own origin, because a direct iframe fails three ways at once: an HTTPS Codeman cannot embed a plain-HTTP target (mixed content, with no override at all on iOS Safari), many dashboards send `X-Frame-Options: DENY`, and Codeman's own `default-src 'self'` CSP blocks cross-origin frames. Proxying dissolves all three and leaves the production CSP unchanged. The fetch happens server-side, so a tailnet-only or localhost-only dashboard is reachable from any device that can reach Codeman.
+
+  The proxy is not an API surface: it authenticates on a 192-bit capability in the path (memory-only, rolling TTL, bound to the minting user, revoked on edit or delete) and is exempt from the cookie and Origin checks, because a sandboxed iframe is opaque-origin and sends neither. The Host allowlist is never bypassed. Iframes omit `allow-same-origin` unless a URL is explicitly marked trusted, and `Authorization` plus the session cookie are stripped upstream in both modes so `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` cannot leak into a dashboard. Includes an HTTP and WebSocket proxy, redirect/cookie/`<base>` rewriting, a runtime URL shim for requests built by dashboard JavaScript, and CORS handling for the opaque-origin frame. New endpoints under `/api/webviews`, storage in `~/.codeman/webviews.json`, user guide in `docs/web-tabs.md`.
+
+  **Terminal links no longer truncate.** Three separate cuts, each producing a link that opened the wrong target or none at all:
+  - A single `&` ended the match, so every query string was cut. A WordPress edit link resolved to `?post=1479` and Claude Code's own `/login` URL was unusable. `&` is now part of a URL while `&&` remains a boundary.
+  - Links wider than the terminal were cut at the row boundary. The link provider now stitches continuation rows into one logical line and maps offsets back across rows. Handles both soft wraps (emulator, `isWrapped`) and hard wraps (a program wrapping its own output and emitting a newline, as Ink does), the latter being why the `/login` URL grew longer as the window was widened.
+  - Image and PDF paths were not matched at all, so pasted-screenshot paths rendered as plain text. They now link and open the file preview, which renders images inline.
+
+  **Also fixes** a pre-existing bug where `.toolbar`'s `backdrop-filter` created a stacking context that trapped the Run menu's z-index, letting the welcome overlay cover it: with no session open, every item in that menu (Claude Code included) was unclickable.
+
+## 1.8.1
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- Mobile toolbar: a dedicated Enter button, and Shell moves into the Run dropdown.
+
+  Submitting is a constant need on a touch keyboard, so on phones (≤430px) the toolbar slot that held "Shell" now holds a dark blue **Enter** button. Starting a shell, the far rarer action, moves into the expandable Run dropdown as `Terminal / Shell` (the Run button then reads "Run SH"). Desktop and tablet are unchanged: the green Run Shell button stays exactly where it was.
+
+  Enter is replayed through the terminal's own input path rather than posted to the input API. This matters because local echo is on by default on touch devices: the characters you type are buffered client-side and have not yet reached the PTY, so sending a bare carriage return would submit an empty line and leave your text stranded on screen. Replaying the keypress flushes the buffered text first, then submits.
+
+  Installer: re-runs and updates now preserve the existing network binding instead of silently reverting it, so upgrading no longer changes how the dashboard is reachable.
+
+  Default desktop header is cleaner: the file viewer is shown by default and the plan-usage chip is unchanged, while the token-count chip and lifecycle-log button now default off. Stored preferences are still honored.
+
+  Docs and repo housekeeping: fresh phone screenshots and a new hero GIF in both READMEs, contributor and total-commit badges, and a much shorter repo root. `SECURITY.md` moved to `.github/` (GitHub resolves it there, so the Security policy tab is unaffected), `SPEEDRUN.md` to `docs/`, the knip config to `config/`, and Prettier's config into the `"prettier"` key of `package.json`. `CLAUDE.md` was split so the always-loaded guidance is roughly half its former size, with the deep implementation detail preserved verbatim in `docs/architecture-invariants.md`.
+
+## 1.8.0
+
+### Minor Changes
+
+- Installer: choose your network binding, with LAN access as the new guided default.
+
+  The install script now asks at the end of setup how the dashboard should be reachable:
+  1. Any device on your network (0.0.0.0), the default. The installer prompts for a dashboard password (hidden input, confirmed twice); declining a password requires an explicit confirmation and the install ends with a prominent warning explaining the exposure.
+  2. This machine only (127.0.0.1), the safer option for tunnel/Tailscale setups.
+
+  The choice is wired into the generated systemd unit and launchd plist (values escaped for each format), the run-now launch path, and the printed URLs, which now include the detected LAN IP for instant phone access. Non-interactive installs keep the safe loopback default unless CODEMAN_HOST is preset, and the server binary's own default binding (127.0.0.1) is unchanged, so npm and manual installs behave exactly as before. New installer env presets: CODEMAN_HOST and CODEMAN_PASSWORD skip the prompts for automation.
+
+## 1.7.1
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- Mobile and UI polish plus docs refresh.
+  - Mobile: the header brand collapses to a single "C" home button on phones (<430px), freeing header space for session tabs while keeping the same tap target. The compact letter lives in its own span so i18n custom branding keeps rewriting only the full wordmark.
+  - UI fix: the absolutely-centered toolbar voice button no longer overlaps the case picker's chevron and "+" button. Below ~1500px (or with long case names widening the left toolbar group) it now falls back into normal flex flow where overlap is impossible; wide viewports keep the centered layout.
+  - Docs: README gains a hero pitch block with deep links, npm version + GitHub stars badges, and a star CTA; CLAUDE.md core-files table synced (Infra docker modules, app.js line count); blog article images added under docs/images/blog/.
+
+## 1.7.0
+
+### Minor Changes
+
+- Community release (thanks @shenlvkang-collab for all four PRs) plus documentation fixes.
+  - fix(mobile): per-device settings now key off a stable handheld classification (`MobileDetection.isHandheldDevice()`: touch plus UA form-factor tokens, with User-Agent Client Hints fallback) instead of the instantaneous viewport width, so an Android foldable that unfolds past the desktop breakpoint keeps `codeman-app-settings-mobile` and opt-ins such as the Response Viewer and Extended Keyboard Bar. Responsive layout stays width-driven. Adds an OPPO Find N5 (unfolded) device profile and a fold/unfold/reload Playwright regression test (mobile suite now 136 devices). (#162)
+  - fix(paths): `SAFE_PATH_PATTERN` now accepts Unicode letters and numbers (`\p{L}\p{N}` with the `u` flag), so working directories like `/mnt/d/AI/中文项目` validate in Create Session, Quick Run, and Scheduled Run. All shell-metacharacter, traversal, and absolute-path protections are unchanged. (#163)
+  - fix(ui): newly created run sessions render their tab immediately instead of waiting for the `session:created` SSE event (idempotent upsert from the POST response, with a `GET /api/sessions/:id` fallback for quick-start modes), and the Run button holds an in-flight lock (min 500 ms) so a double click cannot create duplicate sessions. (#164)
+  - feat(ui): the synced custom display name and per-device English/Simplified Chinese UI language are described in their own entry (#165); on top of that PR, `renderIndexHtml` no longer recomputes `windowTitle` on solo-session renders, so a detached window cannot reset the push-notification `hostTitle` prefix to the default name.
+  - docs: corrected the `sse-events.ts` fileoverview breakdown (148 event constants, was stale at 120; per-category counts refreshed, including Cron, Docker, Remote auto-reconnect, and Multi-user) and the CLAUDE.md SSE registry count; READMEs synced with the 1.6.2 installer behavior.
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- 8d9fc41: Add a synced custom display name and a per-device English/Simplified Chinese browser UI language picker under App Settings → Display.
+
+## 1.6.2
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- Installer (install.sh) reliability and safety overhaul, prompted by a review of the Linux flow:
+  - Install-completion marker (`.install-complete`): a bare re-run only takes the quiet update path when a previous install actually finished. Previously, a first install that failed during npm install/build (or was interrupted) left `.git` behind, so the retry silently became an "update" and the user never got the launch menu, the `codeman`/`tmux-chooser` symlinks, the PATH entry, or the `sc` alias. The marker is refreshed by updates and cleared by uninstall when the app dir is kept; added to .gitignore for end-user clones.
+  - `update` no longer runs an unconditional `git reset --hard` over local changes: interactive runs are asked to stash (declining keeps everything and skips the update), headless runs auto-stash with a dated message (same policy as scripts/self-update.sh).
+  - Service setup is verified instead of asserted: after starting codeman-web, the installer polls `systemctl --user is-active` (up to 6s) and only then prints "Codeman is running now!"; failures print an honest warning plus status/journalctl hints. Uses `restart` instead of `start` so re-running the installer over an already-running service actually loads the new build. A missing user D-Bus session (e.g. bare `ssh host 'curl | bash'`) is detected up front with copy-paste recovery commands instead of dying mid-setup via `set -e`. macOS gets the equivalent `launchctl list` verification, and the update path verifies its service restart too. The Cloudflare tunnel-service offer is skipped when service setup failed.
+  - Headless consent guard: with no interactive terminal AND no explicit `CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1`, the installer now refuses (with instructions) to run sudo package installs (git/node/tmux) or third-party `curl | bash` AI CLI installers, instead of silently taking the default-yes prompts. Explicit `CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1` keeps the previous full-auto behavior for CI/automation.
+  - AI CLI gate now recognizes Codex and Gemini (search paths mirrored from the CLI resolvers), so a box with only Codex or Gemini installed is no longer forced to install Claude Code/OpenCode. The install menu gains a "Skip" option (with npm install hints for Codex/Gemini), and the final reminder lists all four CLIs.
+
+  Docs: CLAUDE.md documents `src/remote-reconnect.ts` (pure COD-108 auto-reconnect backoff/eligibility logic) in the Infra table and the remote-sessions pattern.
+
+## 1.6.1
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- **Admin Panel for multi-user mode.** Admins in multi-user mode now get a prominent Admin Panel button at the top of the page (header, admin-only; the template ships it hidden and `admin-ui.js` reveals it after identity boot; hidden on phones per the mobile header policy, where user management stays reachable via App Settings > Users). It opens a full Admin Panel modal: a users table with role, enabled/disabled status, bypass-permissions grant, live sessions, active logins, case count, and last login; per-user actions for Promote/Demote, Enable/Disable, Grant/Revoke bypass, Reset password (copyable one-time password), Force logout, and Delete (with an optional "also delete their files" step); and a proper add-user form (role, optional password, bypass checkbox) replacing the old prompt() flow. Each user's cases open in a drawer listing their case folders (modified date, live-session badge) with per-folder delete. Two new admin endpoints back this: `GET /api/admin/users/:username/cases` and `DELETE /api/admin/users/:username/cases/:caseName`, guarded like `deleteUserSpace` (symlinks refused, realpath confined to the user's space, folders in use by a live session refused with 409, audit-logged). The panel and the App Settings Users tab live-refresh on the SSE `admin:usersChanged` event (now wired in app.js). New coverage in `test/admin-routes.test.ts` (list/delete, traversal + symlink refusal, non-admin 403) and `test/admin-ui.test.ts` (button reveal gating, panel render, case drawer); verified end to end against a live multi-user instance with curl and Playwright.
+
+  **Also in this release:** README/docs synced with 1.6.0 (remote SSH cases, session manager, permissions) and fixed installer prompts when run via `curl | bash`.
+
+  **Recap of the recent feature line, for readers catching up:**
+  - **Multi-user mode (shipped 1.5.0, opt-in `--multiuser` / `CODEMAN_MULTIUSER=1`).** Named users with scrypt-hashed passwords, per-user case spaces under `~/codeman-users/<name>/cases`, and full ownership scoping of sessions, cases, cron jobs, scheduled runs, search, file previews, and SSE/WS streams. Non-admin users default to Claude's classifier-guarded `--permission-mode auto`; shell mode, cron `launchCommand`, and skip-permissions bypass switches require the per-user `canBypassPermissions` grant (now toggleable from the Admin Panel). Admin API with one-time passwords, last-admin invariants, and an append-only audit log; self-service `/api/me` password change; `codeman users add|passwd|list|rm` CLI. Off by default is byte-identical to single-user. Note: multi-user separates workspaces for a trusted team; it is not a security boundary (all sessions share the host OS account), so pair it with Docker cases for real isolation.
+  - **Docker cases (shipped 1.4.0/1.4.1).** A case can run inside an isolated per-case container (any of the five CLI backends), with one-click "Run in Docker" quick-create, durable in-container tmux that survives Codeman restarts and resumes conversations after container stops, hardened container creation (cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, non-root, memory/pid limits, never privileged, never the docker socket), commit-safe seeded credentials, config-drift detection, GPU passthrough, and portable export/import bundles to move a whole case between machines.
+  - **1.6.0 highlights.** Remote SSH cases with durable remote tmux (survives SSH drops, auto-reconnect, shared multi-client attach, discover + attach with detach-not-kill); the Cmd+K session palette and unified Session Manager with pinning, cross-device tab order, and first/last prompt search; full-scrollback replay; and the multi-user permission downgrade now threading through to remote launch/attach.
+
+## 1.6.0
+
+### Minor Changes
+
+- Remote tmux durability, Session Manager polish, and an opt-in Cron button.
+
+  **Remote sessions: durability, discovery, and auto-reconnect** (PR #156 by @aakhter, COD-104 to COD-109)
+  - Durable remote launches survive an SSH drop: the agent runs inside `tmux -L codeman-remote new-session -A` on the remote host, and reconnecting lands back in the same session.
+  - Discover + attach: a "Discover existing sessions" action per remote host lists `codeman-*` tmux sessions on the host's canonical socket (started by the remote's own Codeman or another instance) and attaches to one. Attached (non-owned) sessions detach on tab close, never kill; a structural early-return in `killSession()` guarantees no remote `kill-session` can ever be issued for a session Codeman doesn't own (COD-105).
+  - Shared/collaborative sessions: per-session `window-size latest` so concurrent clients at different viewports don't clamp each other, plus a "shared - N clients" badge in discovery results (COD-106).
+  - Auto-reconnect watcher: a bounded-backoff (5s to 5m, ~6 attempts) watcher detects a dead remote pane and reattaches the still-running remote tmux session; intentional kills/detaches are guarded and never revived. Kill-switch setting `remoteAutoReconnect` (default on). SSE `remote:sessionDropped`/`sessionReconnected`/`reconnectExhausted`, with a manual Reconnect toast after exhaustion (COD-108).
+  - Owned durable sessions propagate `kill-session` to the remote on close (COD-109); the remote tmux prereq probe is skipped under the test runner (COD-104).
+  - All ssh command lines continue to flow through the single shell-safe `buildSshConnectionArgs()` (COD-107). New design doc: `docs/remote-sessions.md`.
+  - Maintainer additions: the discovery endpoint is admin-gated in multi-user mode, and the remote launch/attach chooser threads the multi-user permission downgrade (`claudeMode`/`allowedTools`) through to the remote agent.
+
+  **Session Manager: pinning, cross-device ordering, name/prompt retention** (PR #157 by @aakhter, COD-131/139/140/142/143/145)
+  - Session pinning: pin a session to the top of the Session Manager list (`POST /api/sessions/:id/pin`, `session:pinned` SSE, amber highlight + pin glyph). Pinned group orders most-recently-pinned first (COD-139).
+  - Pinned sessions survive kill: killing a pinned session demotes its record to a lightweight stopped entry instead of removing it, so it stays visible and resumable; cleanup skips pinned records (COD-142). The pin route also works on these persisted-only records, so a pinned-then-killed session can always be unpinned.
+  - Cross-device tab order: tab order syncs via server state (`PUT /api/session-order`, `session:orderChanged` SSE, persisted in `state.json`); the pushing device wins and server-only ids fall to the end, never dropped (COD-131).
+  - Resuming from the Session Manager keeps the session's original name instead of always synthesizing a fresh `w<N>-<dir>` one (COD-143).
+  - firstPrompt backfill for sessions whose Codeman id is not the transcript UUID (claudeSessionId join, then newest transcript in the same workingDir), and the most recent prompt is shown alongside the first and included in search (COD-140/145).
+
+  **Cron button now opt-in** (hidden by default)
+  - The Cron footer-toolbar button follows the same opt-in pattern as the Session Manager / Away Digest / File Viewer buttons: hidden by default, enable per device under App Settings -> Display -> Header Displays. Cron jobs themselves are unchanged.
+
+  Also: `docs/remote-sessions.md` synced with the shipped `-L codeman-remote` / `codeman-ssh-<id8>` naming.
+
+## 1.5.1
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- Docker session-mode deep-review fixes — the work intended for the skipped **1.4.2**, now merged onto the 1.5.x line — plus a recap of the multi-user mode shipped in 1.5.0.
+
+  **Docker resume actually works now.** `DockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId` was read at quick-start but never written, so the documented resume-after-container-stop never fired. Claude-mode docker panes now pin a deterministic conversation id (`claudeDockerPaneCommand()`): a fresh launch runs `claude --session-id <id> || claude --resume <id>` (a duplicate `--session-id` exits 1 "already in use", so the fallback resumes after a container stop/reboot — verified CLI behavior), an explicit resume runs `--resume <rid> || --session-id <sid>` so a stale id never dead-panes. The id is persisted at launch and again on hook / last-response conversation-id adoption. Verified end-to-end across a `docker stop` + relaunch and a full container recreate.
+
+  **Config-drift detection + recreate (was documented but entirely missing).** The `codeman.confighash` label was stamped but never read, so docker-host config edits silently never applied. Quick-start now compares via `checkDockerConfigDrift()` and refuses a drifted launch with `CONFLICT`; the UI confirms and calls the new `POST /api/docker-cases/:name/recreate` (refused while the case has live sessions), then relaunches with the new config. New SSE event `docker:containerRecreated`.
+
+  **Model picker now applies to docker sessions.** `modelOverride` was absent from `QuickStartSchema`, so the App Settings Claude Model choice was silently inert for docker runs. It is now accepted and applied via `updateCaseModel` for local and docker quick-starts (still rejected for remote, where the settings file would land on the wrong machine).
+
+  **Import hardening.** `importDockerBundle` validates the untrusted cross-machine manifest before trusting any field (`validateImportManifest`: engine/image/containerWorkdir/network/caseName/schemaVersion — a hostile `engine` could previously select the probe binary); the outer bundle tar gets the same member-traversal guard as the inner workspace tar; the quarantine image tag derives from the schema-validated case name.
+
+  **Remote-daemon correctness.** All docker probes and the base-image auto-build now honor a host's `context`/`daemonHost` (`dockerEngineArgv`) instead of always probing the local daemon.
+
+  **Smaller fixes:** commas are rejected in docker workspace/workdir/destination paths (a comma corrupts the `--mount type=bind,src=…` CSV spec, which shell escaping cannot protect); a dead `this.escapeHtml` reference in the exports refresh is fixed; `docker:importComplete` / `docker:containerRecreated` get frontend SSE listeners so other open tabs refresh; the File Viewer header button is hidden on phone headers like its siblings.
+
+  **Docs.** CLAUDE.md + READMEs synced with the current feature set, including a full zh-CN README re-translation.
+
+  **Multi-user mode (recap — shipped in 1.5.0).** Opt-in named users (`--multiuser` / `CODEMAN_MULTIUSER=1`, off by default) with per-user case spaces and full ownership scoping of sessions, cases, cron jobs, scheduled runs, search, file previews, and real-time SSE/WS streams. Non-admin users default to Claude's classifier-guarded `--permission-mode auto`; raw shell mode, cron `launchCommand`, skip-permissions, and the Codex/Gemini bypass switches require an explicit per-user `canBypassPermissions` grant. Machine-level resources are admin-only. Admin API (`/api/admin/users*`) with one-time passwords, last-admin invariants, and an append-only audit log; self-service `/api/me` + password change; and a `codeman users add|passwd|list|rm` CLI. Off by default is byte-identical to single-user. Note: multi-user separates workspaces for a trusted team; it is not a security boundary between mutually-distrusting users (all sessions share the host OS account) — pair with Docker cases for real isolation.
+
+## 1.5.0
+
+### Minor Changes
+
+- 0ab2416: Opt-in multi-user mode (`--multiuser` / `CODEMAN_MULTIUSER=1`, off by default).
+
+  Named users with individually scrypt-hashed passwords in `~/.codeman/users.json`, per-user case spaces under `~/codeman-users/<name>/cases`, and ownership scoping of sessions (create/list/delete/mutate, incl. bulk delete), cases, cron jobs + run history, scheduled runs, search, file previews, session history, away digest, subagent/workflow monitors, and real-time SSE/WS streams (including the debounced session/task update path, clipboard, and push notifications). A non-admin's `workingDir` is realpath-confined to their own space at every spawn/link path (session create, quick-start, cron create/fire, scheduled runs, case link/docker-link, docker import). Non-admin users default to Claude's classifier-guarded `--permission-mode auto`; raw shell mode, cron `launchCommand`, skip-permissions, and the Codex/Gemini bypass switches require an explicit per-user `canBypassPermissions` grant (enforced at every spawn site incl. one-shots, plan generation, scheduled runs, and remote launches). Machine-level resources (remote/Docker hosts + host reads, mux sessions, orchestrator, tunnel, self-update, settings) are admin-only. Admin API (`/api/admin/users*`) with one-time passwords, last-admin invariants (validated before any teardown), and an append-only audit log; self-service `/api/me` + password change; a frontend admin Users tab + change-password modal; and `codeman users add|passwd|list|rm` CLI. Also adds a global `auto` Claude startup permission mode. When off, behavior is byte-identical to single-user.
+
+  Auth hardening: the login throttle verifies the password before consulting the per-account failure bucket (a correct password can never be locked out); the `mustChangePassword` lockbox covers the WebSocket terminal; the cookie fast-path re-validates identity against the store each request (so a CLI/admin delete/disable/demote takes effect promptly); a role/grant change revokes the target's sessions. (Known limitation: a bare CLI `codeman users passwd` reset — no delete — does not by itself revoke an already-active cookie until it expires; use `codeman users rm`, the admin API, or a restart to force-revoke.) Data-integrity hardening: the store distinguishes a missing users file from a corrupt/unreadable one (so a transient read error can't overwrite all accounts) and writes via a unique per-process temp file; the earlier fire-and-forget `touchLastLogin` corruption race is serialized.
+
+  Note: multi-user mode separates workspaces for a trusted team; it is not a security boundary between users (all sessions share the host OS account). Pair with Docker cases for real isolation.
+
+## 1.4.1
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- **Docker session mode** hardening + fixes, plus a File Viewer header button.
+
+  **What Docker session mode is** (recap): a case can run inside an isolated, hardened Docker container instead of on the host, and any of the CLI backends (Claude, Codex, Gemini, OpenCode, or a plain shell) runs inside it. It is a location overlay on cases — not a new session mode — and the container analog of remote-SSH cases: a local tmux pane `docker exec`s into a durable in-container tmux, with exactly one long-lived container per case that multiple sessions share. The workspace, credentials, and conversation transcripts are bind-mounted so the agent is authenticated and resumable; containers are hardened by default (`--cap-drop ALL`, `--security-opt no-new-privileges`, non-root, pids/memory caps, `--init`, never `--privileged` or the docker socket) and export-safe. Start one with the one-click "Run in Docker" checkbox on Create Case, or the Docker tab for full control.
+
+  This release fixes the rough edges found running it for real:
+
+  Docker cases:
+  - **Seamless Claude auth in containers**: `~/.claude.json` is no longer bind-mounted as a single file (a mount point that broke Claude's atomic-rename config writes — forcing re-auth and, via failed in-place writes, corrupting the host `~/.claude.json`). It is now seeded as a writable, onboarding-complete copy, so a docker session boots straight to the prompt (no theme picker, login, or folder-trust prompt).
+  - **Claude-state isolation**: containers no longer bind-mount the whole `~/.claude` directory (which wrote backups/tasks/teams/settings back into the host). Only `~/.claude/projects` transcripts are shared (host watchers + `--resume`); credentials, settings, and stats-cache are seeded as writable copies; everything else stays container-local.
+  - **Codex/Gemini/gcloud/opencode isolation**: same treatment — codex shares `sessions/` + `history.jsonl` (response-viewer + resume) and seeds `auth.json`/`config.toml`; gemini/gcloud/opencode are whole seed-copies. Containers never write their credential state back into the host dirs.
+  - **Base image auto-builds on first use**: a missing `codeman/agent:base` no longer blocks case creation or launch; it builds locally on first use (concurrency-safe, with SSE progress toasts).
+  - **UTF-8 locale**: containers set `LANG`/`LC_ALL=C.UTF-8` so tmux renders Claude's box-drawing correctly (fixes `qqqq` line artifacts).
+  - **Create Case UI**: larger, collapsed-by-default "Run in Docker" settings with a shorter hint; dockerized cases show a short `(docker)` tag (or the custom host id) in the case menus.
+  - **Tab naming**: docker/remote (and codex/gemini/opencode) sessions now follow the `w<n>-<case>` convention instead of `codeman-<id>`.
+
+  Other:
+  - **File Viewer header button** (opt-in via App Settings, Header Displays): toggle the file browser panel from the header.
+  - Fixed a timezone-boundary flaky test in the away-digest route suite.
+
+## 1.4.0
+
+### Minor Changes
+
+- Add **Docker session mode**: a case can now run inside an isolated Docker container instead of on the host, with configurable network / resource / credential settings, multiple sessions sharing one per-case container, and one-click export to move a container (toolchain + workspace) to another machine.
+  - Docker is a location overlay on cases (not a new session mode), mirroring the remote-SSH feature: a local tmux pane runs `docker exec -it` into a durable in-container tmux server. The container is scoped to the case (`codeman-case-<name>`), so multiple sessions share it; killing one session never stops the shared container.
+  - New `/api/docker-hosts` CRUD, `/api/cases/docker-link`, and a `/api/quick-start` docker branch. Create Case gains a **Docker** tab. Base image is built locally via `scripts/build-agent-image.mjs` (node + claude/codex/gemini/opencode + tmux, secret-free, arbitrary-uid-writable HOME).
+  - Hardened by default: `--cap-drop ALL`, `--security-opt no-new-privileges`, non-root, `--pids-limit`, `--memory`==`--memory-swap`, `--init`; never `--privileged` or the docker socket. Convenient credential default bind-mounts host `~/.claude` etc. read-write (never captured by `docker commit`); a sealed profile is opt-in.
+  - Two-layer durability: reconnect after a Codeman restart reattaches the same live agent; a container stop/reboot resumes the conversation from the bind-mounted transcript via `--resume`.
+  - Export / import: full-image (`docker commit` + `save` + workspace tar + manifest) or workspace-only, to one portable `.codeman-container.tgz`; import validates checksums, guards path traversal, and re-tags the loaded image into a quarantined namespace. Instance-scoped boot reaper cleans orphaned containers. New `docker:*` SSE events. Docs in `docs/docker-cases.md`.
+  - Robustness: sets `CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR` in the container so claude launches regardless of workspace path. In-container hooks require the server to be reachable from the container (documented); on a loopback-only bind, idle detection falls back to output-based.
+
+  Also wire session, away-digest, and cron header-button visibility toggles in App Settings.
+
 ## 1.3.5
 
 ### Patch Changes

CLAUDE.md

@@ -2,17 +2,23 @@
 
 This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
 
+> Deep implementation detail lives in [`docs/architecture-invariants.md`](docs/architecture-invariants.md). This file holds the rules that prevent mistakes; that file holds the mechanisms, file inventories, and the history behind each rule. Pointers below are written as `→ architecture-invariants#anchor`. When the goal is raw throughput, [`docs/SPEEDRUN.md`](docs/SPEEDRUN.md) is the fast-execution protocol (it removes ceremony, never the safety rules here).
+>
+> **This file is in `.prettierignore` on purpose.** Prettier's markdown printer escapes underscores inside the glob-heavy paths used throughout (`agent-*.jsonl` became `agent-\_.jsonl`, collapsing backtick spans and corrupting a whole paragraph). Do not remove the ignore entry, and do not run `prettier --write` on it.
+>
+> **Repo root is kept short on purpose** (the README sits below the file listing on GitHub). Config lives in `config/` (`eslint.config.js`, `knip.json`, the vitest configs), Prettier's config is the `"prettier"` key in `package.json`, and `SECURITY.md` is under `.github/`. Root-only files are the ones tools genuinely require there: `CLAUDE.md` + `AGENTS.md` (loaded from the root by Claude Code / Codex), `CHANGELOG.md` (changesets writes it next to `package.json`), `tsconfig.json`, `.editorconfig`, `.nvmrc`/`.npmrc`, `.prettierignore` (resolved relative to cwd), `LICENSE` (GitHub detection) and `install.sh` (its raw URL is the published install one-liner). Don't relocate those.
+
 ## Quick Reference
 
-| Task | Command |
-|------|---------|
-| Dev server | `npm run dev` (or `npx tsx src/index.ts web`) |
-| Type check | `tsc --noEmit` |
-| Lint | `npm run lint` (fix: `npm run lint:fix`) |
-| Format | `npm run format` (check: `npm run format:check`) |
+| Task        | Command                                                                                                                                                             |
+| ----------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Dev server  | `npm run dev` (or `npx tsx src/index.ts web`)                                                                                                                       |
+| Type check  | `tsc --noEmit`                                                                                                                                                      |
+| Lint        | `npm run lint` (fix: `npm run lint:fix`)                                                                                                                            |
+| Format      | `npm run format` (check: `npm run format:check`)                                                                                                                    |
 | Single test | `npm test -- test/<file>.test.ts` (or `npx vitest run --config config/vitest.config.ts test/<file>.test.ts`) — ⚠ **never** run bare `npm test`, see Testing section |
-| Build | `npm run build` (esbuild via `scripts/build.mjs`, NOT tsc — `tsc --noEmit` is type-check only) |
-| Production | `npm run build && systemctl --user restart codeman-web` |
+| Build       | `npm run build` (esbuild via `scripts/build.mjs`, NOT tsc — `tsc --noEmit` is type-check only)                                                                      |
+| Production  | `npm run build && systemctl --user restart codeman-web`                                                                                                             |
 
 ## CRITICAL: Session Safety
 
@@ -22,6 +28,13 @@ This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with co
 2. **NEVER** run `tmux kill-session`, `pkill tmux`, or `pkill claude` without confirming
 3. Use the web UI or `./scripts/tmux-manager.sh` instead of direct kill commands
 
+**The working tree is shared with other agent sessions.** Several Codeman sessions run against THIS one checkout, so another session can `git checkout` a different branch, or leave half-finished untracked files, while you are mid-task.
+
+- **Always `git branch --show-current` immediately before committing.** Observed 2026-07-27: another session ran `git checkout -b feat/web-tabs`, a commit silently landed there instead of master, and the follow-up `git push origin master` cheerfully reported "Everything up-to-date".
+- To land a commit on master **without** switching branches (which would yank the tree out from under the other session): `git push origin HEAD:master` then `git branch -f master HEAD`. Never `git checkout master` to "fix" it.
+- **Never `git add -A`/`git add .`** — stage explicit paths. A sweep will pick up another session's WIP.
+- Another session's broken WIP can block `npm run build`, since `tsc` is the first step and the build gates on it. That is not your bug to fix. ⚠️ `tsc` still EMITS on type errors, so a failed `npm run build` leaves a rebuilt `dist/index.js` compiled from their tree; check what it pulled in before restarting the service. To deploy frontend-only changes past a blocked `tsc`, run the asset stage of `scripts/build.mjs` (everything after the `tsc`/`chmod` lines is independent of it).
+
 ## CRITICAL: Always Test Before Deploying
 
 **NEVER COM without verifying your changes actually work.** For every fix:
@@ -30,15 +43,17 @@ This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with co
 2. **Frontend changes**: Use Playwright to load the page and assert the UI renders correctly. Use `waitUntil: 'domcontentloaded'` (not `networkidle` — SSE keeps the connection open). Wait 3-4s for polling/async data to populate, then check element visibility, text content, and CSS values
 3. **Only after verification passes**, proceed with COM
 
-The production server caches static files for 1 year, `immutable` (`maxAge: '1y'` in `server.ts`). To avoid stale frontend after a deploy, `renderIndexHtml` runs `cacheBustAssets(html)` — it appends `?v=<mtime>` to **every same-origin `.js`/`.css`** reference (mtime memoized ~1s so a burst of renders is cheap; external/already-versioned/missing refs untouched). Because `index.html` is served `no-cache`, a **normal reload now picks up edited modules/styles — no hard refresh needed** (the gesture bundle is injected separately with its own `?v=`). If you add an asset referenced by an *absolute* URL or from JS rather than a `<script>/<link>` tag, it won't be auto-busted.
+The production server caches static files for 1 year, `immutable` (`maxAge: '1y'` in `server.ts`). To avoid stale frontend after a deploy, `renderIndexHtml` runs `cacheBustAssets(html)` — it appends `?v=<mtime>` to **every same-origin `.js`/`.css`** reference (mtime memoized ~1s so a burst of renders is cheap; external/already-versioned/missing refs untouched). Because `index.html` is served `no-cache`, a **normal reload now picks up edited modules/styles — no hard refresh needed** (the gesture bundle is injected separately with its own `?v=`). If you add an asset referenced by an _absolute_ URL or from JS rather than a `<script>/<link>` tag, it won't be auto-busted.
 
 ## COM Shorthand (Deployment)
 
-Uses [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/) (`MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH`) via `@changesets/cli`. What SemVer actually covers (the CLI + documented env vars are public; the HTTP/SSE API, on-disk state, and experimental features are internal/unstable) is defined in `docs/versioning-policy.md`. Security reporting + known limitations live in `SECURITY.md`.
+Uses [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/) (`MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH`) via `@changesets/cli`. What SemVer actually covers (the CLI + documented env vars are public; the HTTP/SSE API, on-disk state, and experimental features are internal/unstable) is defined in `docs/versioning-policy.md`. Security reporting + known limitations live in `.github/SECURITY.md`.
 
 When user says "COM":
+
 1. **Determine bump type**: `COM` = patch (default), `COM minor` = minor, `COM major` = major
 2. **Create a changeset file** (no interactive prompts). Write a `.md` file in `.changeset/` with a random filename:
+
    ```bash
    cat > .changeset/$(openssl rand -hex 4).md << 'CHANGESET'
    ---
@@ -48,15 +63,18 @@ When user says "COM":
    Detailed description of ALL changes since last release (not just the most recent commit — review full git log since last version tag)
    CHANGESET
    ```
+
    Replace `patch` with `minor` or `major` as needed. Include `"xterm-zerolag-input": patch` on a separate line if that package changed too.
+
 3. **Consume the changeset**: `npm run version-packages` (auto-bumps `package.json` files, updates `CHANGELOG.md`, runs `npm install --package-lock-only`, and verifies lockfile sync via `scripts/check-lockfile-sync.mjs` — all in one command; never hand-edit `CHANGELOG.md` or `package-lock.json` versions)
 4. **Sync CLAUDE.md version**: Update the `**Version**` line below to match the new version from `package.json`
-5. **Commit and deploy**: `git add -A && git commit -m "chore: version packages" && git push && npm run build && systemctl --user restart codeman-web`
+5. **Commit and deploy**: verify the branch first (`git branch --show-current`), then stage EXPLICIT paths — never `git add -A`, which has swept another session's WIP into a release. `git status --short` and account for every line before committing:
+   `git add <paths> && git commit -m "chore: version packages" && git push && npm run build && systemctl --user restart codeman-web`
 6. **Wait for CI**: after `git push`, TWO workflows fire per master push — `CI` and `Release` (the npm publish + GitHub release). List both runs for the pushed commit with `gh run list --commit $(git rev-parse HEAD) --json databaseId,workflowName` and watch EACH with `gh run watch <id> --exit-status`. Confirm both pass before considering the release done (`gh run list -L 1` returns only one of the two).
 
 CI runs `npm run check:lockfile` on every push/PR, so lockfile drift fails the build even if the `version-packages` script is bypassed.
 
-**Version**: 1.3.5 (must match `package.json`)
+**Version**: 1.9.3 (must match `package.json`)
 
 ## Project Overview
 
@@ -74,26 +92,29 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
 
 `npm run dev` = dev server. Default port: `3000` (override with `--port` or the `CODEMAN_PORT` env var). To run this beta isolated alongside a prod Codeman, use `scripts/run-beta.sh` (sets `CODEMAN_INSTANCE=beta` + `CODEMAN_PORT=5000`). Commands not in Quick Reference:
 
-| Task | Command |
-|------|---------|
-| Dev with TLS | `npx tsx src/index.ts web --https` |
-| Override window title hostname | `npx tsx src/index.ts web --title-hostname <name>` (default: `os.hostname()` — `codeman:<name>` is used for tab title, title-flash, and OS desktop notification prefix) |
-| Bind a non-loopback host | `npx tsx src/index.ts web --host 0.0.0.0` (or `-H`; env `CODEMAN_HOST`; default `127.0.0.1`). Without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` it **starts but warns loudly** — see Common Gotchas + `docs/security-architecture.md` |
-| Continuous typecheck | `tsc --noEmit --watch` |
-| Watch-mode test | `npm run test:watch -- test/<file>.test.ts` (always pass a file — bare watch includes the browser suites) |
-| Test coverage | `npm run test:coverage` |
-| Dead-code sweep | `npm run knip` (config in `knip.json`) |
-| Rebuild gesture overlay | `npm run build:gesture` (esbuild `packages/gesture-control/src/codeman/entry.ts` → `src/web/public/gesture/gesture-codeman.js`; commit the result) |
-| Gesture playground | `npm run dev` **in** `packages/gesture-control/` (standalone vite demo, fake tabs) |
-| Check public-asset formatting | `npm run check:public-assets` (prettier-checks `src/web/public/**` text assets; `scripts/check-public-assets.mjs`) |
-| Frontend JS syntax check | `npm run check:frontend-syntax` (`scripts/check-frontend-syntax.mjs`; runs in CI) |
-| CI-equivalent test sweep | `npm run test:ci` (full suite minus browser/perf — see Testing) |
-| Production start | `npm run start` |
-| Production logs | `journalctl --user -u codeman-web -f` |
+| Task                           | Command                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
+| ------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Dev with TLS                   | `npx tsx src/index.ts web --https`                                                                                                                                                                             |
+| Override window title hostname | `npx tsx src/index.ts web --title-hostname <name>` (default: `os.hostname()` — `codeman:<name>` is used for tab title, title-flash, and OS desktop notification prefix)                                        |
+| Bind a non-loopback host       | `npx tsx src/index.ts web --host 0.0.0.0` (or `-H`; env `CODEMAN_HOST`; default `127.0.0.1`). Without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` it **starts but warns loudly** — see Common Gotchas + `docs/security-architecture.md` |
+| Continuous typecheck           | `tsc --noEmit --watch`                                                                                                                                                                                         |
+| Watch-mode test                | `npm run test:watch -- test/<file>.test.ts` (always pass a file — bare watch includes the browser suites)                                                                                                      |
+| Test coverage                  | `npm run test:coverage`                                                                                                                                                                                        |
+| Dead-code sweep                | `npm run knip` (config in `config/knip.json`, passed via `--config`)                                                                                                                                          |
+| Rebuild gesture overlay        | `npm run build:gesture` (esbuild `packages/gesture-control/src/codeman/entry.ts` → `src/web/public/gesture/gesture-codeman.js`; commit the result)                                                             |
+| Build the docker agent image   | `node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs` (builds `codeman/agent:base` from `docker/agent.Dockerfile`; prerequisite for Docker cases; `--engine`/`--image`/`--no-cache`)                                            |
+| Gesture playground             | `npm run dev` **in** `packages/gesture-control/` (standalone vite demo, fake tabs)                                                                                                                             |
+| Check public-asset formatting  | `npm run check:public-assets` (prettier-checks `src/web/public/**` text assets; `scripts/check-public-assets.mjs`)                                                                                             |
+| Frontend JS syntax check       | `npm run check:frontend-syntax` (`scripts/check-frontend-syntax.mjs`; runs in CI)                                                                                                                              |
+| CI-equivalent test sweep       | `npm run test:ci` (full suite minus browser/perf — see Testing)                                                                                                                                                |
+| Production start               | `npm run start`                                                                                                                                                                                                |
+| Production logs                | `journalctl --user -u codeman-web -f`                                                                                                                                                                          |
 
 **CI**: `.github/workflows/ci.yml` (push to master/main + PRs, Node 22) runs two jobs: **(1)** `check:lockfile`, `typecheck`, `lint`, `check:frontend-syntax`, `format:check`, then a **server boot smoke test** (`tsx src/index.ts web --port 3151` must answer `/api/status` within 30s); **(2)** the **unit/integration test suite** via `npm run test:ci` (`config/vitest.ci.config.ts` — excludes the browser-driven `test/mobile/**` suite, `perf-*` benchmarks, and 3 Playwright tests). Tests are tmux-safe in CI: `TmuxManager` no-ops all shell commands under `VITEST` (see Testing).
 
-**Code style**: Prettier (`singleQuote: true`, `printWidth: 120`, `trailingComma: "es5"`). ESLint flat config (`config/eslint.config.js`) allows `no-console`, warns on `@typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any`. Ignores: `app.js`, `scripts/**/*.mjs`, `src/web/public/vendor/**`, `scripts/remotion/**`.
+**Code style**: Prettier (`singleQuote: true`, `printWidth: 120`, `trailingComma: "es5"`) — config lives in the **`"prettier"` key of `package.json`**, not a `.prettierrc` (keeps the repo root short; editors read it natively). `.prettierignore` stays at the root because Prettier resolves it relative to cwd. ESLint flat config (`config/eslint.config.js`) allows `no-console`, warns on `@typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any`. Ignores: `app.js`, `scripts/**/*.mjs`, `src/web/public/vendor/**`, `scripts/remotion/**`.
+
+**Prettier scope is deliberately narrow.** `npm run format` globs only `src/**/*.ts` and `src/web/public/**`, and `.prettierignore` then exempts most of `src/web/public/*.js` (app.js, styles.css, index.html, and 14 hand-formatted modules) plus `CLAUDE.md`. Those files are hand-formatted by design; `npm run check:public-assets` and `check:frontend-syntax` are what guard them (NUL bytes + JS syntax), not Prettier. Do not "fix" a file by adding it back to Prettier's scope.
 
 ## Common Gotchas
 
@@ -104,12 +125,12 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
 - **`envOverrides` flow `CLAUDE_CODE_*` / `OPENCODE_*` / `CODEX_*` / `GEMINI_*` / `GOOGLE_*` env vars** — Set via `POST /api/sessions { envOverrides }`, stored on `Session._envOverrides`, exported by `tmux-manager.buildEnvExports()` at spawn time, persisted in `SessionState.envOverrides`. **Do NOT** write these to `<case>/.claude/settings.local.json` — that's the old path and creates UI/disk drift. (`GOOGLE_*` is the deliberately-broad Vertex-AI namespace for Gemini — see Multi-CLI prefix discipline.)
 - **Effort is NOT an env var** — never carry effort as `CLAUDE_CODE_EFFORT_LEVEL`: the env var hard-locks effort and blocks in-session `/effort` switching (incl. ultracode). It flows as the dedicated `effort` payload field → `Session._effort` → `claude --effort <level>` for regular levels incl. `max` (the settings `effortLevel` key is `enum(["low","medium","high","xhigh"]).catch(undefined)` — `max` gets SILENTLY dropped there), or `claude --settings '{"ultracode":true}'` for ultracode (rejected by `--effort`). Both are soft defaults the user can override anytime. Legacy env-var entries are auto-migrated by the Session constructor and unset from tmux sessions in `applyEnvOverrides()`. See `buildEffortCliArgs()` in `session-cli-builder.ts`, tests in `test/effort-injection.test.ts`
 - **Model choice flows via `settings.local.json`, NOT `--model` or env** — the App Settings **Claude Model** picker (`claudeModel` in `settings.json`) is read by `session-ui.js` at session create (wins over the legacy 1M-Opus toggles `opusContext1m`/`opusContext1mEnabled`), sent as the `modelOverride` payload field, and `updateCaseModel()` (`hooks-config.ts`) writes/deletes the `model` key in `<case>/.claude/settings.local.json`. This is the intended exception to the envOverrides rule above: model legitimately lives in `settings.local.json` (a soft default — in-session `/model` still works); env vars do not
-- **Multi-CLI prefix discipline** — Codeman supports Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, and Gemini (`claude-cli-resolver.ts` / `opencode-cli-resolver.ts` / `codex-cli-resolver.ts` / `gemini-cli-resolver.ts`); env-var prefix is CLI-specific (`CLAUDE_CODE_*` vs `OPENCODE_*` vs `CODEX_*` vs `GEMINI_*`) and the `ALLOWED_ENV_PREFIXES` allowlist in `schemas.ts` enforces this. Gemini additionally allowlists the **broad `GOOGLE_*`** namespace (intentional — Vertex AI auth uses `GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT`/`GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS`/`GOOGLE_GENAI_USE_VERTEXAI` etc.; it's the loosest allowlist entry, affecting only the user's own spawned CLI). When adding settings, decide which CLI(s) it applies to and gate the env export accordingly — don't blindly forward all prefixes. See `docs/opencode-integration.md` for the resolver design pattern
-- **Zod `.optional()` rejects `null`** — accepts `undefined` only. When the frontend builds a request body with `JSON.stringify`, an explicit `null` field is preserved on the wire and fails validation with `INVALID_INPUT`. Convert `null` → `undefined` before stringifying (e.g. `field: value ?? undefined`), or declare the schema `.nullish()`. Real bugs caused: 0.6.4 (`durationMinutes` for ∞ respawn), and the same shape pattern hit `opusContext1mEnabled` in 0.6.3
-- **`xterm-zerolag-input` is single-source — edit the package, then rebuild the bundle** — the local-echo overlay source lives ONLY in `packages/xterm-zerolag-input/src/` (`zerolag-input-addon.ts`; also published to npm as a standalone library — see README "Published Packages"). It is bundled (esbuild → IIFE, with appended `window.LocalEchoOverlay` aliases) into the **gitignored** `src/web/public/vendor/xterm-zerolag-input.js` by `scripts/postinstall.js` (for dev/`tsx`) and into `dist/.../vendor/` by `scripts/build.mjs` (the `xterm-zerolag-input` esbuild step, for prod). `app.js` only **consumes** it via `new LocalEchoOverlay(terminal)` — there is NO inline copy to keep in sync. So: change behavior in the package source, then re-run the bundle step (`npm install` reruns postinstall; `npm run build` for prod); **never hand-edit `app.js` for overlay behavior or commit the gitignored vendor bundle**. A public-API break in the package still warrants a separate `xterm-zerolag-input` version bump in the changeset. Always test on mobile after touching it. See `docs/local-echo-overlay-plan.md`.
-- **Default bind is loopback-only; non-loopback without a password starts but warns** — since COD-29 (PR #107) the web server defaults to `--host 127.0.0.1` (was `0.0.0.0`). As of **0.9.0** binding a non-loopback host (`--host`/`-H`/`CODEMAN_HOST`) without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` **no longer refuses to start — it starts and prints a loud warning** listing the fixes (set `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`, bind loopback + tunnel/`tailscale serve`, or `--allow-unauthenticated-network` / `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1` to acknowledge → terser note). Host classification is `isLoopbackBindHost()` in `network-auth-policy.ts`; the warn-vs-start logic is in `server.ts` `start()`; flags wired in `cli.ts`. ⚠️ Operational note: the production systemd unit runs `node dist/index.js web --https` with no `--host`, so it binds **localhost only** — reach it remotely via `tailscale serve`/tunnel to `127.0.0.1`, or add `Environment=CODEMAN_HOST=0.0.0.0` + `Environment=CODEMAN_PASSWORD=…` to `~/.config/systemd/user/codeman-web.service`. A loopback bind is reachable through a same-host tunnel (cloudflared/tailscale → `127.0.0.1`) but NOT by a browser hitting the box's LAN IP. Auth user defaults to `admin`. **Full model: `docs/security-architecture.md`.**
-- **Instance isolation / multi-instance attach danger** — data dir (`~/.codeman`) and tmux socket (`tmux -L codeman`) are PROCESS-WIDE and shared by every Codeman on the machine, derived from `CODEMAN_INSTANCE` via `src/config/instance.ts` (`getDataDir()`/`dataPath()`/`DEFAULT_TMUX_SOCKET`). ⚠️ A 2nd instance on the SAME socket **discovers and attaches PTYs to the first instance's live sessions** (`tmux -L codeman attach-session …`), resizing/mutating them — `$HOME` isolation is NOT enough (tmux is system-global). To run two instances, give each a distinct `CODEMAN_INSTANCE` (scopes BOTH dir+socket: `~/.codeman-<name>` + `-L codeman-<name>`), or set `CODEMAN_TMUX_SOCKET` + `CODEMAN_DATA_DIR` individually. **`CODEMAN_INSTANCE` defaults to empty = the production layout (`~/.codeman`, `-L codeman`, port 3000)**, so this branch is safe to ship to master without disturbing existing installs. To run THIS beta alongside prod, launch with `scripts/run-beta.sh` (`CODEMAN_INSTANCE=beta` + `CODEMAN_PORT=5000`) — it never collides with prod's data dir/socket/port. Any new `~/.codeman/...` path MUST go through `dataPath()`, never `join(homedir(), '.codeman', …)`.
-- **Headless screenshots: `deviceScaleFactor` MUST be 1, and write unique filenames** — `scripts/capture-real-overview.mjs` (drives a live session in headless Chromium → overview PNG). Two traps, both observed 2026-06-14: **(1) DSF=2 doubles the console font.** xterm's WebGL renderer draws terminal glyphs at ~2× their nominal size under `deviceScaleFactor: 2`, while STILL reporting nominal cell dims (`terminal.cols`/`_renderService.dimensions.css.cell` say 8px/187cols — they lie), so it's invisible to any internal measurement and only the pixels reveal it. The HTML chrome (header/toolbar) is unaffected → ONLY the console font looks comically large. Default to **DSF=1** (script does); the image is 1× res but the font is true-to-browser. **(2) Stable filenames → stale renders.** Overwriting a fixed path (`claude-overview.png`) in place leaves OS image viewers (eog/feh) — and any HTTP client behind a long/`immutable` cache — showing the OLD render; the user reads it as "the fix didn't work". The script now mints a timestamped `claude-overview-<ts>.png` per run. ⚠️ This was a LOCAL image-viewer cache, NOT a Codeman serving bug: `file-routes` previews send `Cache-Control: no-cache` and `/api/screenshots/:name` sends none. The one real Codeman-side footgun: `server.ts` serves non-content-hashed static assets `public, max-age=31536000, immutable`, and `cacheBustAssets()` only rewrites `.js`/`.css` refs — a stable-named **image** referenced from public/ would go stale on overwrite. Reflect the per-device UI to match a real device when capturing: seed `localStorage` `codeman:skin`, `codeman-font-size`, and the desktop `codeman-app-settings` blob (the plan-usage chip is a per-device display key deleted from the server payload — a fresh browser hides it unless seeded; close side panels for a full-width terminal).
+- **Multi-CLI prefix discipline** — env-var prefix is CLI-specific (`CLAUDE_CODE_*` vs `OPENCODE_*` vs `CODEX_*` vs `GEMINI_*`) and the `ALLOWED_ENV_PREFIXES` allowlist in `schemas.ts` enforces this. Gemini additionally allowlists the **broad `GOOGLE_*`** namespace (intentional: Vertex AI auth needs `GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT`/`GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS`/`GOOGLE_GENAI_USE_VERTEXAI`; it is the loosest allowlist entry, affecting only the user's own spawned CLI). When adding a setting, decide which CLI(s) it applies to and gate the env export accordingly. Never blanket-forward all prefixes. Resolver design pattern: `docs/opencode-integration.md`
+- **Zod `.optional()` rejects `null`** — accepts `undefined` only. When the frontend builds a request body with `JSON.stringify`, an explicit `null` field is preserved on the wire and fails validation with `INVALID_INPUT`. Convert `null` → `undefined` before stringifying (e.g. `field: value ?? undefined`), or declare the schema `.nullish()`. This has caused real shipped bugs twice
+- **`xterm-zerolag-input` is single-source** — the local-echo overlay source lives ONLY in `packages/xterm-zerolag-input/src/`, and is bundled into the **gitignored** `src/web/public/vendor/xterm-zerolag-input.js` (dev, by `scripts/postinstall.js`) and `dist/.../vendor/` (prod, by `scripts/build.mjs`). `app.js` only **consumes** it via `new LocalEchoOverlay(terminal)`; there is no inline copy. So: change the package source, then rerun the bundle step (`npm install` for dev, `npm run build` for prod). **Never hand-edit `app.js` for overlay behavior, and never commit the gitignored vendor bundle.** Always test on mobile after touching it. → [architecture-invariants#xterm-zerolag-input-is-single-source](docs/architecture-invariants.md#xterm-zerolag-input-is-single-source), `docs/local-echo-overlay-plan.md`
+- **Default bind is loopback-only; non-loopback without a password starts but warns** — the server defaults to `--host 127.0.0.1`. Binding non-loopback (`--host`/`-H`/`CODEMAN_HOST`) without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` starts anyway but prints a loud warning; `--allow-unauthenticated-network` / `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1` acknowledges it. ⚠️ The production systemd unit passes no `--host`, so prod binds **localhost only**: reach it via `tailscale serve`/tunnel to `127.0.0.1`. A loopback bind is reachable through a same-host tunnel but NOT by a browser hitting the box's LAN IP. `install.sh` is separate and prompts for the binding (defaulting to LAN + a password), and preserves the existing binding on re-runs. → [architecture-invariants#default-bind-and-the-non-loopback-warning-path](docs/architecture-invariants.md#default-bind-and-the-non-loopback-warning-path), `docs/security-architecture.md`
+- **Instance isolation / multi-instance attach danger** — the data dir (`~/.codeman`) and tmux socket (`tmux -L codeman`) are PROCESS-WIDE and shared by every Codeman on the machine, derived from `CODEMAN_INSTANCE` via `src/config/instance.ts`. ⚠️ A 2nd instance on the SAME socket **discovers and attaches PTYs to the first instance's live sessions**, resizing and mutating them. `$HOME` isolation is NOT enough because tmux is system-global. To run two instances, give each a distinct `CODEMAN_INSTANCE` (scopes dir + socket together), or set `CODEMAN_TMUX_SOCKET` + `CODEMAN_DATA_DIR` individually; `scripts/run-beta.sh` does this for a beta alongside prod. **Any new `~/.codeman/...` path MUST go through `dataPath()`**, never `join(homedir(), '.codeman', …)`. → [architecture-invariants#instance-isolation-and-the-multi-instance-attach-danger](docs/architecture-invariants.md#instance-isolation-and-the-multi-instance-attach-danger)
+- **Headless screenshots: `deviceScaleFactor` MUST be 1, and write unique filenames** — under DSF=2 xterm's WebGL renderer draws glyphs at ~2× nominal size while still *reporting* nominal cell dims, so only the pixels reveal it and only the terminal font looks wrong. And overwriting a fixed output path leaves OS image viewers showing the old render, which reads as "the fix didn't work"; `scripts/capture-real-overview.mjs` mints a timestamped filename per run. Seed the per-device `localStorage` keys (`codeman:skin`, `codeman-font-size`, `codeman-app-settings`) so the capture matches a real device. → [architecture-invariants#headless-screenshot-capture](docs/architecture-invariants.md#headless-screenshot-capture)
 
 **Import conventions**: Utils from `./utils`, types from `./types` (barrel), config from specific `./config/*` files.
 
@@ -117,32 +138,33 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
 
 ### Core Files (by domain)
 
-| Domain | Key files | Notes |
-|--------|-----------|-------|
-| **Entry** | `src/index.ts`, `src/cli.ts` | |
-| **Session** | `src/session.ts` ★, `src/session-manager.ts`, `src/session-auto-ops.ts`, `src/session-cli-builder.ts`, `src/session-lifecycle-log.ts`, `src/session-task-cache.ts`, `src/session-pty-exit-breaker.ts`, `src/usage-limit-patterns.ts`, `src/usage-telemetry.ts`; `src/services/unified-session-service.ts` (merges live/persisted/lifecycle/transcript rows for `GET /api/sessions/unified`) | |
-| **Mux** | `src/mux-interface.ts`, `src/mux-factory.ts`, `src/tmux-manager.ts` ★ | |
-| **Respawn** | `src/respawn-controller.ts` ★ + 4 helpers (`-adaptive-timing`, `-health`, `-metrics`, `-patterns`) | Read `docs/respawn-state-machine.md` first |
-| **Ralph** | `src/ralph-tracker.ts` ★, `src/ralph-loop.ts` + 5 helpers (`-config`, `-fix-plan-watcher`, `-plan-tracker`, `-stall-detector`, `-status-parser`) | Read `docs/ralph-wiggum-guide.md` first |
-| **Orchestrator** | `src/orchestrator-loop.ts`, `src/orchestrator-planner.ts`, `src/orchestrator-verifier.ts` | Read `docs/orchestrator-loop-architecture.md` first |
-| **Cron** | `src/cron/cron-service.ts`, `src/cron/cron-time.ts` (pure next-run math), `src/cron/cron-input.ts` | Cron-style `CronJob`s. Read `docs/cron-discovery.md` first; distinct from legacy `ScheduledRun` (`/api/scheduled`) — see Key Patterns |
-| **Agents** | `src/subagent-watcher.ts` ★, `src/team-watcher.ts`, `src/bash-tool-parser.ts`, `src/transcript-watcher.ts`, `src/workflow-run-watcher.ts` | `workflow-run-watcher` is STANDALONE (never touches `subagent-watcher`) — see Key Patterns |
-| **AI** | `src/ai-checker-base.ts`, `src/ai-idle-checker.ts`, `src/ai-plan-checker.ts` | |
-| **Tasks** | `src/task.ts`, `src/task-queue.ts`, `src/task-tracker.ts` | |
-| **State** | `src/state-store.ts`, `src/run-summary.ts`, `src/session-lifecycle-log.ts` | |
-| **Infra** | `src/hooks-config.ts`, `src/push-store.ts`, `src/tunnel-manager.ts`, `src/image-watcher.ts`, `src/file-stream-manager.ts`, `src/remote-hosts.ts` (remote SSH hosts/cases — see Key Patterns) | |
-| **Search** | `src/search-service.ts` | Pure in-memory core for `GET /api/search` — see Key Patterns |
-| **Attachments** | `src/attachment-registry.ts`, `src/attachment-magic.ts`, `src/generated-artifact-attachments.ts` (Codex `Saved to:` artifacts), `src/session-attachment-history.ts`, `src/document-preview-cache.ts`, `src/document-thumbnailer.ts`, `src/document-conversion-limiter.ts`, `src/config/attachment-guard.ts` | See Key Patterns |
-| **Plan** | `src/plan-orchestrator.ts`, `src/prompts/*.ts`, `src/templates/` (`claude-md.ts` + `case-template.md`, the CLAUDE.md scaffold generated into new cases) | |
-| **Web** | `src/web/server.ts` ★, `src/web/sse-events.ts`, `src/web/routes/*.ts` (18 route modules + barrel; `session-routes.ts` ★), `src/web/route-helpers.ts`, `src/web/ports/*.ts`, `src/web/middleware/auth.ts`, `src/web/schemas.ts`, `src/web/self-update.ts`, `src/web/plan-usage-latest.ts`, `src/web/ws-connection-registry.ts` (per-tab WS supersede), `src/web/heic-jpeg-converter.ts` + `heic-jpeg-worker.ts` (HEIC→JPEG off-thread) | |
-| **Frontend** | `src/web/public/app.js` (~4K lines, core) + 6 infra modules (`constants.js`, `mobile-handlers.js`, `voice-input.js`, `notification-manager.js`, `keyboard-accessory.js`, `sanitize-html.js` — DOMPurify mXSS allowlist, COD-56) + 9 domain modules (`terminal-ui.js`, `respawn-ui.js`, `ralph-panel.js`, `orchestrator-panel.js`, `ultracode-panel.js`, `cron-ui.js`, `settings-ui.js`, `panels-ui.js`, `session-ui.js`) + 6 feature modules (`ralph-wizard.js`, `api-client.js`, `subagent-windows.js`, `ultracode-windows.js`, `input-cjk.js`, `image-input.js`) + `sw.js` | `ultracode-windows.js` = floating run windows w/ tab connector lines (additional to the dock panel) |
-| **Types** | `src/types/index.ts` (barrel) → 18 domain files (incl. `workflow-run.ts`, `search.ts`, `cron.ts`); also `src/types.ts` root re-export | See `@fileoverview` in index.ts |
+| Domain           | Key files                                                                                              | Notes                                                                                            |
+| ---------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **Entry**        | `src/index.ts`, `src/cli.ts`                                                                           |                                                                                                  |
+| **Session**      | `src/session.ts` ★, `session-manager`, `session-auto-ops`, `session-cli-builder`, `session-task-cache`, `session-order` (pure), `session-pty-exit-breaker`, `usage-limit-patterns`, `usage-telemetry`; `src/services/unified-session-service.ts` | Pure/unit-tested helpers are split out of `session.ts` on purpose                                 |
+| **Mux**          | `src/mux-interface.ts`, `src/mux-factory.ts`, `src/tmux-manager.ts` ★                                  |                                                                                                  |
+| **Respawn**      | `src/respawn-controller.ts` ★ + 4 helpers (`-adaptive-timing`, `-health`, `-metrics`, `-patterns`)      | Read `docs/respawn-state-machine.md` first                                                       |
+| **Ralph**        | `src/ralph-tracker.ts` ★, `src/ralph-loop.ts` + 5 helpers (`-config`, `-fix-plan-watcher`, `-plan-tracker`, `-stall-detector`, `-status-parser`) | Read `docs/ralph-wiggum-guide.md` first                                                          |
+| **Orchestrator** | `src/orchestrator-loop.ts`, `-planner`, `-verifier`                                                    | Read `docs/orchestrator-loop-architecture.md` first                                              |
+| **Cron**         | `src/cron/cron-service.ts`, `cron-time.ts` (pure next-run math), `cron-input.ts`                        | Read `docs/cron-discovery.md` first. Distinct from legacy `ScheduledRun` (`/api/scheduled`)      |
+| **Agents**       | `src/subagent-watcher.ts` ★, `team-watcher`, `bash-tool-parser`, `transcript-watcher`, `workflow-run-watcher` | `workflow-run-watcher` is STANDALONE and never touches `subagent-watcher`                        |
+| **AI**           | `src/ai-checker-base.ts`, `ai-idle-checker.ts`, `ai-plan-checker.ts`                                   |                                                                                                  |
+| **Tasks**        | `src/task.ts`, `task-queue.ts`, `task-tracker.ts`                                                      |                                                                                                  |
+| **State**        | `src/state-store.ts`, `run-summary.ts`, `session-lifecycle-log.ts`                                     |                                                                                                  |
+| **Infra**        | `src/hooks-config.ts`, `push-store`, `tunnel-manager`, `image-watcher`, `file-stream-manager`, `remote-hosts` + `remote-reconnect` (pure), `docker-hosts` + `docker-export` | Remote/docker case overlays; see Key Patterns                                                    |
+| **Web tabs**     | `src/webview-store.ts`, `webview-capabilities.ts`, `src/web/webview-proxy.ts` (pure), `src/web/routes/webview-routes.ts` | Dashboard URLs as tabs; NOT a SessionMode                                                        |
+| **Search**       | `src/search-service.ts`                                                                                | Pure in-memory core for `GET /api/search`                                                        |
+| **Attachments**  | `src/attachment-registry.ts`, `attachment-magic`, `generated-artifact-attachments`, `session-attachment-history`, `document-preview-cache`, `document-thumbnailer`, `document-conversion-limiter`, `config/attachment-guard` | See Key Patterns                                                                                 |
+| **Plan**         | `src/plan-orchestrator.ts`, `src/prompts/*.ts`, `src/templates/` (`claude-md.ts` + `case-template.md`) | `templates/` holds the CLAUDE.md scaffold generated into new cases                                |
+| **Web**          | `src/web/server.ts` ★, `sse-events.ts`, `routes/*.ts` (20 modules + barrel; `session-routes.ts` ★), `route-helpers.ts`, `ports/*.ts`, `middleware/auth.ts`, `schemas.ts`, `self-update.ts`, `plan-usage-latest.ts`, `ws-connection-registry.ts`, `heic-jpeg-converter.ts` + `heic-jpeg-worker.ts` |                                                                                                  |
+| **Frontend**     | `src/web/public/app.js` (~5K lines, core) + 23 modules + `sw.js`                                       | See Frontend section for the load order, which is authoritative                                  |
+| **Types**        | `src/types/index.ts` (barrel) → 20 domain files; also `src/types.ts` root re-export                    | See `@fileoverview` in index.ts                                                                  |
 
 ★ = Large, central file (>50KB) — read its `@fileoverview` first. All files have `@fileoverview` JSDoc — read that before diving in. Discovery aid: `grep -l '@fileoverview' src/web/routes/*.ts` lists all route modules; same grep works for `src/types/`, `src/web/public/*.js`.
 
-**Local packages**: `packages/xterm-zerolag-input/` — local echo overlay for xterm.js; single-source, bundled to the gitignored `vendor/xterm-zerolag-input.js` and consumed by `app.js` (see Gotchas). `packages/gesture-control/` (`codeman-gesture-control`) — hand-tracking overlay source; built to `src/web/public/gesture/gesture-codeman.js` via `npm run build:gesture` (see Frontend → Gesture control).
+**Local packages**: `packages/xterm-zerolag-input/` (local echo overlay, single-source, see Gotchas). `packages/gesture-control/` (`codeman-gesture-control`, hand-tracking overlay source, built via `npm run build:gesture`).
 
-**Config**: `src/config/` — 15 files, no barrel (`index.ts`) exists; import from the specific file.
+**Config**: `src/config/` — 17 files, no barrel (`index.ts`) exists; import from the specific file.
 
 **Utilities**: `src/utils/` — re-exported via index. Key: `CleanupManager`, `LRUMap` (⚠ NOT in the barrel — import from `./utils/lru-map.js` directly), `StaleExpirationMap`, `BufferAccumulator`, `stripAnsi`, `Debouncer`, `KeyedDebouncer`. Also: `claude-cli-resolver`/`opencode-cli-resolver`/`codex-cli-resolver`/`gemini-cli-resolver` (CLI path resolution), `string-similarity` (fuzzy matching), `regex-patterns` (ANSI/token/spinner patterns), `assertNever` (exhaustive checks), `token-validation` (auth tokens), `nice-wrapper` (process priority).
 
@@ -155,95 +177,113 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
 
 ### Key Patterns
 
-**Input**: `session.writeViaMux()` for programmatic/curl input — tmux `send-keys -l` (literal) + `send-keys Enter`. Single-line only (fire-and-once). Interactive **browser** input goes through a durable **exactly-once** layer: each frame carries a stable `clientId` + monotonic per-session `seq`, persisted to localStorage until the server ACKs (`{t:'ia',seq}` over WS, or HTTP 2xx), so a dropped link/reconnect can't lose or double-deliver a prompt. **WS resilience** (#149): the upgrade URL carries `cid = clientId + ':' + perTabNonce`, and `ws-connection-registry.ts` supersedes only same-TAB reconnects (two tabs on one session coexist; input frames keep the bare `clientId` for seq dedup); reconnects back off exponentially (attempts preserved across `_connectWs`), and the header connection chip renders from a real `_wsState` lifecycle (`connecting`/`connected`/`fallback`/`reconnecting`/`disconnected`).
+**Input**: `session.writeViaMux()` for programmatic/curl input via tmux `send-keys -l` + `send-keys Enter`, single-line only. Interactive **browser** input goes through a durable **exactly-once** layer: a stable `clientId` + monotonic per-session `seq` persisted to localStorage until the server ACKs, so a dropped link cannot lose or double-deliver a prompt. `ws-connection-registry.ts` supersedes only same-TAB reconnects, so two tabs on one session coexist. → [architecture-invariants#input-delivery-and-ws-resilience](docs/architecture-invariants.md#input-delivery-and-ws-resilience)
 
 **Idle detection**: Multi-layer (completion message → AI check → output silence → token stability). See `docs/respawn-state-machine.md`.
 
-**Auto-resume on usage limit** ("token pause" control, opt-in per session, top of the Respawn tab): when Claude halts on a subscription limit ("5-hour limit reached ∙ resets 8pm" and all 1.0.x–2.1.x variants), `usage-limit-patterns.ts` (pure, unit-tested) parses the reset time from cleaned output; `SessionAutoOps` arms a timer for reset+2min, then sends Esc (dismisses the rate-limit dialog) + `continue`. Still-limited responses re-arm the loop (5-min retry on stale times); a `working` transition cancels it. Claude-mode only (detection rides `_processExpensiveParsers`). Persists/recovers via `SessionState.autoResumeEnabled`/`autoResumeAt`; respawn cycles are blocked while paused (`isLimitPaused` guard in `onIdleDetected` — prevents `/clear` from wiping the paused conversation). Endpoint: `POST /api/sessions/:id/auto-resume`; SSE: `session:limitPauseScheduled`/`limitResume`/`limitResumeCancelled`. Tests: `test/usage-limit-patterns.test.ts`, `test/session-auto-resume.test.ts`.
+**Auto-resume on usage limit** (opt-in per session, top of the Respawn tab): when Claude halts on a subscription limit, `usage-limit-patterns.ts` (pure, unit-tested) parses the reset time and `SessionAutoOps` arms a timer for reset+2min, then sends Esc + `continue`. ⚠️ Respawn cycles are blocked while paused (`isLimitPaused` guard in `onIdleDetected`), which is what prevents `/clear` from wiping the paused conversation. Claude-mode only. → [architecture-invariants#auto-resume-on-usage-limit](docs/architecture-invariants.md#auto-resume-on-usage-limit)
 
-**Plan-usage chip** (statusLine telemetry, opt-in `showPlanUsageLimits`, default OFF): Claude Code (v2.1.80+) pipes a JSON blob to a configured `statusLine.command` on each render; on Pro/Max it carries a `rate_limits` object (`five_hour`/`seven_day` windows only — no Opus weekly field — each `{used_percentage 0-100, resets_at epoch-SECONDS}`). Codeman injects its OWN statusLine exporter (`generateStatusLineCommand()` in `hooks-config.ts`, identified by the `/api/status-telemetry` marker — it only ever adds/updates/removes a statusLine that is *ours*, never a user's hand-authored one) that POSTs the blob to `POST /api/status-telemetry`. That route (auth-exempt like `/api/hook-event` — localhost-only, hook-secret-gated whenever auth is active, COD-91) parses via `usage-telemetry.ts` (pure, unit-tested), broadcasts SSE `session:statusTelemetry` (de-duped per session by `telemetrySignature` since the statusline fires on every assistant message), and returns a compact plain-text footer for the exporter to **print-through** (so injecting our statusLine doesn't blank the in-terminal footer). `plan-usage-latest.ts` holds the process-wide last value, replayed in the SSE init snapshot (`getLightState`) so the header chip (`#planUsageChip`, toggled by `showPlanUsageLimits` in settings-ui.js) renders immediately on page load / reconnect without per-browser localStorage. Claude-mode only. **Distinct from auto-resume** (which reacts to the limit *message*; this proactively shows the live %). Design: `docs/usage-limits-display-plan.md`. Tests: `test/usage-telemetry.test.ts`.
+**Plan-usage chip** (statusLine telemetry, `showPlanUsageLimits`, per-device: desktop default **ON**, handhelds OFF via the mobile block in `getDefaultSettings()`): resolve it ONLY through `planUsageChipEnabled()` in settings-ui.js, which backs all three call sites (the App Settings checkbox, the chip's visibility, and the `statusLineTelemetry` flag on session create). A chip shown without telemetry renders `—` forever. Codeman injects its own `statusLine.command` exporter which POSTs Claude's `rate_limits` blob to `POST /api/status-telemetry`. The exporter is identified by a marker, so it only ever adds/updates/removes a statusLine that is **ours**, never a user's hand-authored one, and it prints the footer through so the in-terminal statusline is not blanked. Claude-mode only; distinct from auto-resume, which reacts to the limit *message* rather than showing live %. → [architecture-invariants#plan-usage-chip-statusline-telemetry](docs/architecture-invariants.md#plan-usage-chip-statusline-telemetry), `docs/usage-limits-display-plan.md`
 
 **Orchestrator**: State machine that turns a user goal into a phased plan and drives it to completion: `idle → planning → approval → executing → verifying → (replanning) → completed/failed`. `OrchestratorLoop` (engine) delegates plan generation to `orchestrator-planner` and per-phase verification gates to `orchestrator-verifier`, executing phases via team agents/`task-queue`. State persists under the `orchestrator` key in `state.json`. Distinct from Ralph (single-session autonomous loop) — orchestrator coordinates multi-phase, multi-agent execution. See `docs/orchestrator-loop-architecture.md`.
 
-**Cron (cron-style `CronJob`s)**: saved, named jobs with a recurring schedule (`once`/`interval`/`daily`/`weekly`), enable/disable, Run Now, next-run calc, and per-job run history (`CronJobRun`). ⚠️ **Distinct from the legacy `ScheduledRun`** (`/api/scheduled`, a run-now duration-bounded autonomous loop) — the two never interact; the legacy concept keeps the `Scheduled*` names, the recurring-job feature is `Cron*`. `CronService` (`src/cron/cron-service.ts`) owns CRUD + the 30s background due-tick (`tickDueJobs`, registered via `cleanup.setInterval` in `server.ts`; `init()` recomputes nextRunAt on boot) and **reuses the existing session layer** (create → `addSession` → `setupSessionListeners` → `startInteractive`/`startShell` → prompt via `writeViaMux`/`write`) rather than rebuilding tmux logic. Next-run math is pure/unit-tested in `cron-time.ts` (SERVER-LOCAL timezone for daily/weekly). Dup-launch guard = `lastDueKey` (jobId:fireTime); schedule is advanced BEFORE launch so a slow launch can't re-trigger. `once` jobs self-disable after firing (`completedOnce`). Persisted via `AppState.cronJobs`/`cronJobRuns` (StateStore accessors). Routes `/api/cron/jobs*` + `/api/cron/runs` (`cron-routes.ts`, `CronPort`); schema `CronJobSchema` (cross-field `superRefine`; the `.partial()` update schema does NOT re-run it); SSE `cron:*`. Frontend `cron-ui.js` (#cronModal). Claude/shell/opencode/codex/gemini agent types. Tests: `test/cron-time.test.ts`, `test/cron-service.test.ts`. Design: `docs/cron-discovery.md`.
+**Cron (`CronJob`s)**: saved, named jobs on a recurring schedule (`once`/`interval`/`daily`/`weekly`) with per-job run history. ⚠️ **Distinct from the legacy `ScheduledRun`** (`/api/scheduled`, a run-now duration-bounded loop); the two never interact and keep separate `Scheduled*` / `Cron*` names. `CronService` **reuses the existing session layer** rather than rebuilding tmux logic. Next-run math is pure and unit-tested in `cron-time.ts` (server-local timezone). The schedule is advanced BEFORE launch so a slow launch cannot re-trigger. → [architecture-invariants#cron-jobs](docs/architecture-invariants.md#cron-jobs), `docs/cron-discovery.md`
 
-**External CLI modes (OpenCode, Codex, Gemini)**: `isExternalCliMode()` in `session.ts` (`mode === 'opencode' || 'codex' || 'gemini'`) gates Claude-specific behavior — Ralph tracker, BashToolParser, token/CLI-info parsing, and ❯-prompt readiness detection are all skipped (these CLIs render their own TUIs; readiness = output stabilization instead). All three modes **require tmux — no direct PTY fallback** — because secrets are injected via `tmux setenv` (socket-scoped `${this.tmux()} setenv`, never on the spawn command line): OpenCode gets `OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT` etc., Codex gets `OPENAI_API_KEY`/`CODEX_API_KEY`/`CODEX_HOME` (`setCodexEnvVars`), Gemini gets `GEMINI_API_KEY`/`GOOGLE_API_KEY`/`GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT`/`GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS`/`GOOGLE_GENAI_USE_VERTEXAI` etc. (`setGeminiEnvVars`, all in `tmux-manager.ts`). Codex specifics: command built by `buildCodexCommand()` (`--model`, `resume <id>`, `--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox` from the `codexConfig` payload / `codexDangerouslyBypassApprovals` app setting; `renderMode` is schema-coerced to `'hybrid'`, the only supported mode). Gemini specifics: command built by `buildGeminiCommand()` (`--skip-trust` always, `--approval-mode <default|auto_edit|yolo|plan>` defaulting to `yolo` for parity with Claude's `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, `--model`, `--resume` from the `geminiConfig` payload); availability via `GET /api/gemini/status` — session/quick-start routes fail with `OPERATION_FAILED` + install hint (`npm install -g @google/gemini-cli`) when missing. Codex AND Gemini export `COLORTERM=truecolor` + unset `NO_COLOR` (other modes unset `COLORTERM`); Gemini joins `isAltScreenStripMode()` (Codex/Claude/Gemini are Ink TUIs that repaint inline → strip alt-screen/`3J` so scrollback survives). Codex availability via `GET /api/codex/status`. Frontend: run-mode dropdown → `runCodex()`/`runGemini()` in `session-ui.js` ("Run CX"/"Run GM" labels), App Settings → Codex CLI tab; Respawn/Ralph options are Claude-only, so session options open on the Summary tab for external CLI sessions. ⚠️ `run*()` MUST unwrap the `{success,data}` envelope (`(await res.json()).data.available` / `data.data.sessionId`) — reading the raw shape silently breaks the run. Tests: `test/run-mode-ui.test.ts` + `test/gemini-mode.test.ts` (vm-sandbox harness, no real DOM).
+**Remote sessions + remote SSH cases**: a case can point at a remote host. The agent runs inside a durable remote `tmux -L codeman-remote` (session name `codeman-ssh-<id>`, deliberately failing the remote Codeman's `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN` so an instance on the target host never adopts it), fronted by a LOCAL tmux pane running `ssh`. Attached (`owned:false`) sessions **detach, never kill** on tab close; owned ones propagate `kill-session`. A bounded-backoff watcher auto-reconnects dropped sessions (`remoteAutoReconnect`, default ON). ⚠️ **Command-injection surface: every ssh command line must flow through `buildSshConnectionArgs()`**, which `shellescape`s every user field. Never hand-build an ssh line elsewhere. ⚠️ Run flows must route remote cases through `POST /api/quick-start`, not `POST /api/sessions` (which stat-validates `workingDir` locally and has no `caseName`). → [architecture-invariants#remote-sessions-over-ssh](docs/architecture-invariants.md#remote-sessions-over-ssh), [#remote-ssh-cases](docs/architecture-invariants.md#remote-ssh-cases), `docs/remote-sessions.md`
 
-**Remote SSH cases** (COD-94/#145): cases can point at a **remote host** (`~/.codeman/remote-hosts.json` + `remote-cases.json` via `src/remote-hosts.ts`; CRUD under `/api/cases` — cases route file). A remote session launches a LOCAL tmux pane running `ssh <host>` that creates a durable REMOTE tmux session on a **dedicated socket** `-L codeman-remote` with name `codeman-ssh-<id>` — deliberately failing the remote Codeman's `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN` so a Codeman instance on the target host never adopts it; no `-g` global tmux options are set remotely. `remotePath`/`identityFile` are schema-guarded against shell injection (backticks/`$` rejected — same approach as `extraSshOptions`); remote tmux availability is probed via `checkRemoteTmuxAvailable()` in quick-start (ssh args carry `-o ConnectTimeout=10`). Remote claude defaults to `exec claude --dangerously-skip-permissions`; per-host `commands.*` override. Session kill best-effort kills the remote tmux too. `SessionState.remote`/`MuxSession.remote` round-trip through recovery (`restoreMuxSessions` passes `remote` back into the Session constructor). ⚠️ Run flows must route remote cases through `POST /api/quick-start` (which resolves the remote case and skips LOCAL CLI availability gates) — `POST /api/sessions` stat-validates `workingDir` locally and has no `caseName`. `envOverrides`/`effort`/`modelOverride`/`codexConfig`/`geminiConfig` are rejected for remote quick-starts (not silently dropped). UI: Create Case modal → Remote tab. Tests: `test/remote-hosts.test.ts`, `test/remote-ssh-options.test.ts`.
+**Docker cases**: a case can point at a **container**, with any of the five CLI backends running inside it. Like remote-SSH this is a **LOCATION OVERLAY on cases, never a sixth `SessionMode`**. Exactly one long-lived container **per case**, shared by all its sessions, so killing a session kills only that session's in-container tmux and **never** `docker stop` while siblings remain. The workspace is a real host dir bind-mounted at the **same absolute path**, which is what keeps file-routes/watchers on real host bytes and makes the in-container transcript projHash match the host. Credentials are **seeded** (RO mount, copied into the container once) rather than shared RW, so in-container CLIs never write refreshed tokens back to the host, and bind mounts are excluded from `docker commit` so exports stay secret-free. **NEVER a create-time `-e` for secrets, NEVER `--privileged`, NEVER the docker socket.** Config drift is detected via a label hash and a drifted launch is REFUSED rather than silently launched with stale config. ⚠️ On the loopback-only prod bind a container cannot reach 127.0.0.1, so in-container hooks need `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS=1`; otherwise idle detection falls back to output-based. → [architecture-invariants#docker-cases](docs/architecture-invariants.md#docker-cases), `docs/docker-cases.md` (user guide), `docs/docker-cases-plan.md` (design)
 
-**Unified session list** (COD-160/#139): `GET /api/sessions/unified?limit=&q=` merges live sessions, persisted state, lifecycle-log history, and Claude transcript files into one deduped list (pure core in `src/services/unified-session-service.ts`). Transcript rows are keyed by conversation UUID and folded into their owning session via a `claudeSessionId → Codeman id` alias map (resumed//clear-respawned sessions must not appear twice); lifecycle name/mode resolution is first-seen-wins (the log returns entries NEWEST-first). No terminal buffers in the response (unlike `/api/sessions`). Consumed by the Cmd+K Session Manager (#146).
+**External CLI modes (OpenCode, Codex, Gemini)**: `isExternalCliMode()` in `session.ts` gates Claude-specific behavior off (Ralph tracker, BashToolParser, token/CLI-info parsing, ❯-prompt readiness); these CLIs render their own TUIs, so readiness is output stabilization instead. All three **require tmux with no direct PTY fallback**, because secrets are injected via socket-scoped `tmux setenv` and never on the spawn command line. ⚠️ `run*()` in `session-ui.js` MUST unwrap the `{success,data}` envelope; reading the raw shape silently breaks the run. → [architecture-invariants#external-cli-modes-opencode-codex-gemini](docs/architecture-invariants.md#external-cli-modes-opencode-codex-gemini)
+
+**Run launch synchronization**: the Run entrypoint holds an in-flight lock and disables `#runBtn` for the whole launch (≥500ms), so a double click cannot create duplicate sessions with the same `w<n>-<case>` name. `_ensureCreatedSessionVisible()` runs before `selectSession()`, and `_onSessionCreated()` stays an idempotent upsert, so POST-first and SSE-first ordering both produce exactly one rendered tab. → [architecture-invariants#run-launch-synchronization](docs/architecture-invariants.md#run-launch-synchronization)
+
+**Unified session list**: `GET /api/sessions/unified` merges live sessions, persisted state, lifecycle-log history, and Claude transcript files into one deduped list (pure core in `src/services/unified-session-service.ts`). Transcript rows fold into their owning session via a `claudeSessionId → Codeman id` alias map, so resumed and `/clear`-respawned sessions do not appear twice. No terminal buffers in the response, unlike `/api/sessions`. Backs the Cmd+K Session Manager, plus pinning and cross-device tab order (`PUT /api/session-order`; pure merge helpers in `src/session-order.ts`, pushing device wins and server-only ids are never dropped). → [architecture-invariants#unified-session-list-and-session-manager](docs/architecture-invariants.md#unified-session-list-and-session-manager)
 
 **Hook events**: Claude Code hooks trigger via `/api/hook-event`. Key events: `permission_prompt`, `elicitation_dialog`, `idle_prompt`, `stop`, `teammate_idle`, `task_completed`. See `src/hooks-config.ts`; upstream hook semantics mirrored in `docs/claude-code-hooks-reference.md`.
 
 **Agent Teams**: `TeamWatcher` polls `~/.claude/teams/`, matches to sessions via `leadSessionId`. Teammates are in-process threads appearing as subagents. Enable: `CLAUDE_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL_AGENT_TEAMS=1`. See `docs/agent-teams/`.
 
-**Circuit breaker**: Prevents respawn thrashing. States: `CLOSED` → `HALF_OPEN` → `OPEN`. Reset: `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-circuit-breaker/reset`. **Distinct: PTY-exit breaker** (COD-115/118/#147, `session-pty-exit-breaker.ts`) trips after repeated rapid PTY exits (crash loops on attach), blocks further auto-restarts, broadcasts SSE `session:respawnBreakerTripped` + push (in `PUSH_EVENT_MAP`). Reset ONLY via an explicit `{clearBreaker:true}` body on `POST /api/sessions/:id/interactive` (sent by the user-facing restart control) — the frontend's auto-reattach in `selectSession()` sends no body and must never clear it. Sessions also scrub inherited `TMUX`/`TMUX_PANE` env so Codeman-in-tmux doesn't nest. Tests: `test/respawn-pty-breaker.test.ts`.
+**Circuit breakers**: the Ralph breaker prevents respawn thrashing (`CLOSED` → `HALF_OPEN` → `OPEN`; reset via `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-circuit-breaker/reset`). **Distinct: the PTY-exit breaker** (`session-pty-exit-breaker.ts`) trips after repeated rapid PTY exits and blocks auto-restarts. ⚠️ It resets ONLY via an explicit `{clearBreaker:true}` body on `POST /api/sessions/:id/interactive`; the frontend's auto-reattach in `selectSession()` sends no body and must never clear it. → [architecture-invariants#circuit-breakers-ralph--pty-exit](docs/architecture-invariants.md#circuit-breakers-ralph-and-pty-exit)
 
-**Full-scrollback replay** (COD-164/#148): `GET /api/sessions/:id/terminal?full=1` returns the ENTIRE tmux scrollback (capture-pane `-e -S -<lines>` bounded by the configured history limit, explicit `maxBuffer` from the terminal-history config, early byte-cap before normalization, CRLF-normalized for shell panes). On success the capture is returned ALONE (`source='mux-full-history'` — it supersedes the byte buffer; no duplication). Only the FIRST buffer load after a page load requests `full=1` (one-shot `_initialFullBufferLoad` flag in app.js); tab switches keep the cheap `?tail=` visible-frame path. Tests: `test/tmux-capture-full-history.test.ts`, `test/tmux-scrollback-eol.test.ts`.
+**Full-scrollback replay**: `GET /api/sessions/:id/terminal?full=1` returns the entire tmux scrollback, bounded by the configured history limit. On success the capture is returned ALONE (`source='mux-full-history'`), superseding the byte buffer so nothing duplicates. Only the FIRST buffer load after a page load requests `full=1`; tab switches keep the cheap `?tail=` path. → [architecture-invariants#full-scrollback-replay](docs/architecture-invariants.md#full-scrollback-replay)
 
-**Self-update** (App Settings → Updates): in-app updater for **git-clone installs** supervised by systemd/launchd. Supervisors: `systemd` (user unit), `launchd` (GUI LaunchAgent, gui-domain kickstart), `launchd-daemon` (KeepAlive system LaunchDaemon on headless Macs — restarts rootlessly by killing the server PID and letting launchd respawn it; detected only when the daemon is bootstrapped AND KeepAlive), else `none` → "restart manually" message; on next boot a manual-restart status auto-completes when the running version matches the target. The update restarts the very process running it, so the real work runs in a DETACHED `scripts/self-update.sh` (`git checkout <release tag> && npm install && npm run build && restart`) that outlives the restart; it writes progress to `dataPath('update-status.json')`, which the browser polls across the connection drop. Channel = latest `codeman@X.Y.Z` release tag; dirty trees are auto-stashed. `src/web/self-update.ts` splits PURE helpers (semver/tag parsing, reconcile decision — unit-tested) from IO wrappers (`getInstallInfo`/`checkForUpdate`/`startUpdate`/`reconcileUpdateOnBoot`). Routes: `GET /api/system/update/check`, `POST /api/system/update`, `GET /api/system/update/status`. Types: `src/types/update.ts`. npm installs report as non-updatable.
+**Self-update** (App Settings → Updates): in-app updater for git-clone installs supervised by systemd/launchd (`systemd`, `launchd`, `launchd-daemon`, else `none` → "restart manually"). The update restarts the very process running it, so the real work runs in a DETACHED `scripts/self-update.sh` that outlives the restart and writes progress to `update-status.json`, which the browser polls across the connection drop. `src/web/self-update.ts` splits pure helpers (unit-tested) from IO wrappers. npm installs report as non-updatable. → [architecture-invariants#self-update](docs/architecture-invariants.md#self-update)
 
-**Attachments** (live external document references; COD-37/#119 core, COD-38/#120 previews, COD-39/#121 history): all wiring in `file-routes.ts`. **Registry** (`attachment-registry.ts`): an **in-memory** map of a stable `attachmentId` → an absolute, `realpath`-resolved, extension-allowlisted file path, so browser requests (`GET /api/sessions/:id/attachments/:attachmentId/raw`) never carry arbitrary absolute paths; `POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments` registers one. **Magic links** (`attachment-magic.ts`): parses `codeman://attach?...` out of terminal output — ⚠️ this scanner is prompt-injectable, so the scan path is **force-confined to the session workspace** (a hostile prompt could otherwise make it read arbitrary host files over SSE); emits the `attachment:detected` SSE event. Security gate is an extension **allowlist** (`isSupportedAttachmentExtension`, in the registry/magic modules), not a blocklist; a separate path layer (`config/attachment-guard.ts`) confines reads to the workspace (`attachmentConfineToWorkspace`) and blocks sensitive trees (`/root`, `/etc`). **Previews + thumbnails** (COD-38): `:attachmentId/preview` + `:attachmentId/thumbnail` (and the workspace-file equivalents `file-preview`/`file-thumbnail`) render Office docs/PDFs via external converters (`pdftoppm` / LibreOffice `soffice` / Word-COM `powershell`); `document-preview-cache.ts` is a shared disk cache (de-dups *identical* in-flight inputs), `document-thumbnailer.ts` does best-effort first-page images, and `document-conversion-limiter.ts` is a **global converter-spawn concurrency cap** (`runWithConversionLimit`) — without it, N distinct large docs detected at once fork N multi-minute converter processes = a localhost fork-bomb-shaped resource-exhaustion vector. **History drawer** (COD-39): `session-attachment-history.ts` tracks the last `ATTACHMENT_HISTORY_LIMIT` (100) attachments per session (`Session._attachmentHistory`, persisted via `SessionState.attachmentHistory`, replayed so externals re-register on reconnect); `GET /api/sessions/:id/attachments` is the list endpoint. ⚠️ The history drawer's launcher button is desktop-only — hidden on phones (regression-guarded; see `mobile-header-buttons-policy` test). Session-local files keep using the existing workspace-scoped `file-routes` paths; the registry is only for explicit live externals. **Codex generated artifacts** (COD-166/#150, `generated-artifact-attachments.ts`): codex-mode sessions ALSO scan (ANSI-stripped) output for `Saved to: file:///…` lines and surface those files as attachment cards with a relaxed trust policy — the allow decision runs on the **realpath-resolved** path against `os.homedir()`-anchored `~/.codex` marker dirs (symlink escapes fall back to force-confinement); gated to `mode === 'codex'` only (`source` is a REQUIRED param through the listener-deps chain — a dropped arg here silently kills the feature). Image thumbnails pass through jpg/jpeg/gif/webp.
+**Attachments** (live external document references; all wiring in `file-routes.ts`): a **registry** maps a stable `attachmentId` to a realpath-resolved, extension-allowlisted absolute path, so browser requests never carry arbitrary absolute paths. ⚠️ The **magic-link scanner** (`codeman://attach?...` in terminal output) is **prompt-injectable**, so its scan path is force-confined to the session workspace; a hostile prompt could otherwise exfiltrate arbitrary host files over SSE. The security gate is an extension **allowlist**, not a blocklist. `document-conversion-limiter.ts` caps converter spawns globally: without it, N large docs detected at once fork N multi-minute processes, which is a resource-exhaustion vector. → [architecture-invariants#attachments](docs/architecture-invariants.md#attachments)
 
-**Ultracode / Workflow-run visualization** (opt-in `showUltracodeAgents`, default OFF; released 1.1.2): the Workflow tool ("ultracode") writes a COMPLETION artifact per run at `~/.claude/projects/<projHash>/<sessionUuid>/workflows/wf_*.json` (written only at run end); LIVE in-flight runs exist only as transcript dirs at `…/subagents/workflows/wf_<id>/` (journal.jsonl + agent-*.jsonl). `workflow-run-watcher.ts` (STANDALONE — deliberately never imports/touches `subagent-watcher.ts`; separate singleton, though it independently reads the same `subagents/workflows/` tree) scans BOTH sources via periodic poll + per-directory chokidar watchers with per-source mtime skip (LRU agentStatCache + journalCache), synthesizing ACTIVE runs (live per-agent tokens/tools/state from transcripts, title/phases from the workflow script) until the completion `wf_*.json` appears and supersedes, and broadcasts SSE `workflow:run_discovered`/`run_updated`/`run_removed`. The watcher is started when **either** `showUltracodeAgents` **or** `ultracodeFloatingWindows` is on (`server.ts` `isWorkflowAgentTrackingEnabled()` returns `(showUltracodeAgents ?? false) || (ultracodeFloatingWindows ?? false)`). Served via `GET /api/workflows` (optional `?minutes=` filter) and `GET /api/workflows/:runId`. Frontend `ultracode-panel.js` renders a docked master-detail view (LEFT: runs + phases; RIGHT: per-agent tokens + tool-calls; click an agent card → its live transcript via client-side `agentId` join). **Additionally**, `ultracode-windows.js` auto-pops a draggable **floating window per active run** (gated on a **DEDICATED** `ultracodeFloatingWindows` toggle, default OFF — independent of the dock panel's `showUltracodeAgents`; see `_ultracodeFloatingEnabled()`), connected by a glowing line to the originating session tab (resolved by `session.claudeSessionId === run.sessionUuid`) — same line idiom as subagent windows, drawn into the shared `#connectionLines` SVG from the tail of `_updateConnectionLinesImmediate`. The window auto-closes ~8s after its run finishes; explicit dismissals are remembered. Clicking an agent card opens an **in-page** connected transcript window (not a browser popup); both run and transcript windows minimize **into** the originating session tab as a merged `ULTRA` badge (🧬 runs / 📄 transcripts) with a restore/dismiss dropdown — minimized runs are skipped by auto-pop. Gesture beta: floating subagent/ultracode windows are pinch-draggable (a `window` grab kind in `entry.ts`). Types: `src/types/workflow-run.ts`. Config: `src/config/workflow-config.ts`.
+**Filesystem path picker** (Link Existing "Browse" + the mobile keyboard's `📁 Path` key): lazy one-directory browsing via `GET /api/filesystem/browse`, with `GET /api/filesystem/preview` for the tapped file. Inserts the path **without** Enter, so the prompt is never submitted; the sibling `⌫ All` key clears only the unsent prompt and must never send the agent's `/clear`. ⚠️ This is a **second file-serving surface and inherits neither the attachment confinement nor its ownership scoping** — it allowlists Home, `CASES_DIR`, `/mnt/d` and `CODEMAN_FILE_PICKER_ROOTS`, blocks sensitive trees, and rejects symlink escapes **after** `realpath`. ⚠️ The optional `sessionId` is an ownership boundary that must be `canAccessOwned`-checked by hand (it does not go through `findSessionOrFail`), and in multi-user mode a non-admin gets only their own `userSpacePath` as a root: per-user spaces live INSIDE `homedir()`, so a `Home` root exposes every other user's workspace. Previews go through the same global conversion limiter, and Markdown/TXT/JSON are served as inert `text/plain`. → [architecture-invariants#filesystem-path-picker](docs/architecture-invariants.md#filesystem-path-picker)
 
-**Cross-session search** (COD-113/#133): `GET /api/search?q=&types=&limit=` federates an **in-memory** search across all live sessions — session metadata (name/workingDir/id), run-summary events, and per-session attachment-history file entries (workspace-relative path only; the server-private `externalPath` is never read). Pure core `searchSources()` in `search-service.ts` (substring-matches with hard per-type caps — no regex, so no ReDoS; no filesystem reads, so no traversal); `harvestSources()` in `search-routes.ts` gathers the in-memory sources. `SearchQuerySchema` bounds `q` (1–200), allowlists `types` (`session,event,file`), clamps `limit` (1–60). Returns the `{success,data}` envelope. Frontend: history-panel search box in `terminal-ui.js`. Types: `src/types/search.ts`.
+**Ultracode / workflow-run visualization** (opt-in, default OFF): the Workflow tool writes a completion artifact only at run *end*, so live in-flight runs exist solely as transcript dirs. `workflow-run-watcher.ts` therefore synthesizes ACTIVE runs from transcripts until the completion artifact appears and supersedes them. It is **STANDALONE** and deliberately never imports or touches `subagent-watcher.ts`, despite reading the same tree. Two independent toggles: `showUltracodeAgents` (docked panel) and `ultracodeFloatingWindows` (floating windows); the watcher starts if **either** is on. → [architecture-invariants#ultracode--workflow-run-visualization](docs/architecture-invariants.md#ultracode-and-workflow-run-visualization)
 
-**Away digest** (COD-41/#136): `GET /api/away-digest?range=&since=&until=&lastViewed=` aggregates "what happened while you were away" from the lifecycle log + run-summary events + live sessions + daily token stats + recently-completed subagents into needs-attention/completed/still-running/idle/informational sections. Pure aggregator in `web/away-digest.ts` (`resolveAwayDigestRange()` validates the window — `since-last-visit`/`1h`/`today`/`24h`/`custom`, server-local TZ; `buildAwayDigest()` classifies). Header-button modal in `panels-ui.js` (button hidden on phones — regression-guarded). ⚠️ Returns `{success:true,digest}` (a legacy raw-ish shape, consistent with the other raw GET handlers in `system-routes.ts` — `{entries}`/`{config}`/`{files}`/`getSystemStats()`); frontend + tests read `.digest`. Subagent lookback is a fixed 60-min window regardless of range.
+**Cross-session search**: `GET /api/search` federates an in-memory search over session metadata, run-summary events, and attachment-history entries. The pure core `searchSources()` does substring matching with hard per-type caps: **no regex (so no ReDoS) and no filesystem reads (so no traversal)**. The server-private `externalPath` is never read. → [architecture-invariants#cross-session-search](docs/architecture-invariants.md#cross-session-search)
 
-**Ralph todo-config** (COD-79/#135): per-session `maxTodos` (FIFO-eviction cap, default 500 = `MAX_TODOS_PER_SESSION`) + `todoExpirationMinutes` (auto-expiry, default 60) set via `POST /api/sessions/:id/ralph-config` (`RalphConfigSchema`, both `.int().positive()`). Stored on the tracker (`setMaxTodos`/`setTodoExpirationMinutes`) and **persisted/read-back via `RalphTrackerState`** (surfaced in the `loopState` getter → `toState()` + SSE broadcast → modal `populateRalphForm`), mirroring how `maxIterations` round-trips. Claude-only (skipped by `isExternalCliMode`).
+**Web tabs** (dashboard URLs as tabs): a saved URL renders as a tab beside agent sessions. **NOT a sixth `SessionMode`** (no PTY, no tmux, no respawn), same reasoning that keeps Docker/remote-SSH as case overlays. Dashboards are **proxied through Codeman's own origin** by default, because a direct iframe fails three ways at once: prod is HTTPS so `http://` targets are blocked as mixed content, many dashboards send `X-Frame-Options: DENY`, and our own `default-src 'self'` CSP blocks cross-origin frames. Proxying leaves the prod CSP unchanged (`/webview/...` is `'self'`). ⚠️ The proxy is **NOT an API surface**: it authenticates on an in-memory capability in the path and is correspondingly exempt from the cookie + Origin checks; that exemption is fenced to safe methods and non-`/api` paths and is pinned by `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts`. ⚠️ Iframes omit `allow-same-origin` unless a dashboard is explicitly marked `trusted`, and `Authorization`/`codeman_session` are stripped upstream in **both** modes so `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` cannot leak. ⚠️ A sandboxed frame is **opaque-origin**, which breaks two things `curl` can never reproduce: its runtime-built root-absolute URLs escape `<base>` (fixed by an injected `runtimeUrlShim()`), and its same-host `fetch`/XHR are CORS-checked with `Origin: null` (fixed by `buildProxyCorsHeaders()` plus exempting the proxy from the global `OPTIONS`-204 short-circuit in `registerSecurityHeaders`). Both present as the dashboard's own "Failed to fetch" while the page renders fine. → [architecture-invariants#web-tabs](docs/architecture-invariants.md#web-tabs), `docs/web-tabs.md`
+
+**Multi-user mode** (opt-in `--multiuser` / `CODEMAN_MULTIUSER=1`, OFF by default): named users with scrypt-hashed passwords in `~/.codeman/users.json`. Gated everywhere by `isMultiUserMode()`; when OFF, behavior is byte-identical to single-user because every scoping helper short-circuits. ⚠️ **Not a security boundary at the agent layer**: every session still runs as the SAME OS account. This separates WORKSPACES; it does not sandbox users (Docker cases are the isolation story). Ownership threads through `Session.owner` and is enforced in `findSessionOrFail`, list endpoints, SSE routing (fail-closed), WS, search, and file-preview. → [architecture-invariants#multi-user-mode](docs/architecture-invariants.md#multi-user-mode), `docs/multi-user-plan.md`
+
+**Away digest**: `GET /api/away-digest` aggregates what happened while you were away from the lifecycle log, run-summary events, live sessions, token stats, and recent subagents. Pure aggregator in `web/away-digest.ts`. ⚠️ Returns `{success:true,digest}`, a legacy raw-ish shape consistent with the other raw GET handlers in `system-routes.ts`; frontend and tests read `.digest`. → [architecture-invariants#away-digest](docs/architecture-invariants.md#away-digest)
+
+**Ralph todo-config**: per-session `maxTodos` (FIFO-eviction cap, default 500 = `MAX_TODOS_PER_SESSION`) + `todoExpirationMinutes` (auto-expiry, default 60) set via `POST /api/sessions/:id/ralph-config` (`RalphConfigSchema`, both `.int().positive()`). Stored on the tracker (`setMaxTodos`/`setTodoExpirationMinutes`) and **persisted/read-back via `RalphTrackerState`** (surfaced in the `loopState` getter → `toState()` + SSE broadcast → modal `populateRalphForm`), mirroring how `maxIterations` round-trips. Claude-only (skipped by `isExternalCliMode`).
 
 **Port interfaces**: Routes declare dependencies via port interfaces (`src/web/ports/`). Routes use intersection types (e.g., `SessionPort & EventPort`).
 
 ### Frontend
 
-Frontend JS modules have `@fileoverview` with `@dependency`/`@loadorder` tags. Load order: `constants.js`(1) → `mobile-handlers.js`(2) → `voice-input.js`(3) → `notification-manager.js`(4) → `keyboard-accessory.js`(5) → `input-cjk.js`(5.5) → `sanitize-html.js`(5.6) → `app.js`(6) → `terminal-ui.js`(7) → `respawn-ui.js`(8) → `ralph-panel.js`(9) → `orchestrator-panel.js`(9.5) → `cron-ui.js`(9.7) → `settings-ui.js`(10) → `panels-ui.js`(11) → `ultracode-panel.js`(11.5) → `session-ui.js`(12) → `ralph-wizard.js`(13) → `api-client.js`(14) → `subagent-windows.js`(15) → `ultracode-windows.js`(15.5) → `image-input.js`(16). `input-cjk.js` handles CJK IME composition via an always-visible textarea below the terminal (`window.cjkActive` blocks xterm's onData).
+Frontend JS modules have `@fileoverview` with `@dependency`/`@loadorder` tags. Load order: `constants.js`(1) → `i18n.js`(1.5) → `mobile-handlers.js`(2) → `voice-input.js`(3) → `notification-manager.js`(4) → `keyboard-accessory.js`(5) → `input-cjk.js`(5.5) → `sanitize-html.js`(5.6) → `app.js`(6) → `terminal-ui.js`(7) → `respawn-ui.js`(8) → `ralph-panel.js`(9) → `orchestrator-panel.js`(9.5) → `cron-ui.js`(9.7) → `settings-ui.js`(10) → `panels-ui.js`(11) → `ultracode-panel.js`(11.5) → `admin-ui.js`(11.7) → `session-ui.js`(12) → `webview-tabs.js`(12.5) → `ralph-wizard.js`(13) → `api-client.js`(14) → `subagent-windows.js`(15) → `ultracode-windows.js`(15.5) → `image-input.js`(16). `i18n.js` translates static + newly inserted application DOM while skipping terminal/response/file/user-name surfaces; `input-cjk.js` handles CJK IME composition via an always-visible textarea below the terminal (`window.cjkActive` blocks xterm's onData).
 
-**Command palette + shortcut registry** (COD-151/153/157/192, #146): `Ctrl/Cmd/Alt+K` opens the session palette (fuzzy search over live sessions; "Browse all sessions" → the Session Manager modal backed by `GET /api/sessions/unified`); the quick-start case `<select>` is fronted by a searchable picker (`buildCasePickerOptions`/`formatCasePickerLabel` — remote cases render `name @ hostId`). Shortcuts live in a rebindable registry (`DEFAULT_SHORTCUTS`/`getShortcutRegistry()`/`matchesShortcutEvent()` in app.js; overrides persist under `settings.shortcutOverrides` via `saveAppSettingsToStorage`); App Settings → Shortcuts renders capture/disable rows; `Ctrl+?` opens the registry-driven overlay (footer links to the full `#helpModal` reference). ⚠️ Palette-chord keys must ALSO be swallowed in `attachCustomKeyEventHandler` (terminal-ui.js) or xterm writes the control byte (0x0B) into the PTY. ⚠️ `saveAppSettings()` rebuilds settings from the DOM — keys edited elsewhere (`shortcutOverrides`, `showTokenCount`, `showCost`) need explicit `_prev` carry-over.
+**Command palette + shortcut registry**: `Ctrl/Cmd/Alt+K` opens the session palette; shortcuts live in a rebindable registry (`DEFAULT_SHORTCUTS`/`getShortcutRegistry()`/`matchesShortcutEvent()` in app.js, overrides in `settings.shortcutOverrides`). ⚠️ Palette-chord keys must ALSO be swallowed in `attachCustomKeyEventHandler` (terminal-ui.js) or xterm writes the control byte (0x0B) into the PTY. ⚠️ `saveAppSettings()` rebuilds settings from the DOM, so keys edited elsewhere (`shortcutOverrides`, `showTokenCount`, `showCost`) need explicit `_prev` carry-over. → [architecture-invariants#command-palette-and-shortcut-registry](docs/architecture-invariants.md#command-palette-and-shortcut-registry)
 
-**WebGL renderer toggle** (#140, `webglRendererEnabled`): per-device (`displayKeys` set, stripped from the server payload — NOT in `SettingsUpdateSchema`, which is `.strict()`). The GPU-stall watchdog's sticky `codeman-webgl-disabled` marker survives page loads; it's cleared only by an explicit OFF→ON save transition or `?webgl=force` (`shouldSkipWebGL` in constants.js). `?nowebgl` still forces the DOM renderer per-load.
+**Per-device vs synced settings**: the `displayKeys` set in settings-ui.js is a **client-side merge policy**, not a wire filter. A display key seeds from the server only when localStorage has no value for it, which is what prevents one device overwriting another; `showPlanUsageLimits` is additionally `delete`d from the incoming payload outright. Separately, `SettingsUpdateSchema` is `.strict()` and simply **does not declare** `skin`, `showFileViewerButton`, `showCronButton`, `webglRendererEnabled`, `localEchoEnabled`, `cjkInputEnabled`, or `extendedKeyboardBar`, so sending one of those is a validation error. The rest (`showResponseViewer`, `showPlanUsageLimits`, `language`, and most `show*` keys) ARE in the schema and do persist server-side; they are per-device by client policy only. ⚠️ Adding a new per-device setting means deciding **both** questions: membership in `displayKeys`, and presence in the schema.
 
-**Z-index layers**: subagent windows (1000), plan agents (1100), mobile/tablet fixed header (1200, `mobile.css`), modals on ≤768px (1300 — must beat the fixed header or the modal close button is buried; bug fixed in `b8cb467`), log viewers (2000), image popups (3000), local echo overlay (7).
+**Header button visibility**: most header controls are opt-in and hidden by a marker class (`btn-multimonitor--hidden`, `btn-response-viewer-header--hidden`, `btn-file-viewer--hidden`, `btn-cron--hidden`) that `applyHeaderVisibilitySettings()` (settings-ui.js) toggles after settings load; the multi-monitor button is instead stripped at render by `renderIndexHtml`. ⚠️ Hiding must go through the marker class: the base rules are `display:inline-flex !important`, so an inline style cannot override them. Current desktop default is WS/CPU/MEM + File Viewer + gear, with the token chip and lifecycle-log button OFF. ⚠️ New header controls must not leak onto phones; `test/mobile-header-buttons-policy.test.ts` is the static guard. → [architecture-invariants#header-button-visibility-multi-monitor-response-viewer-file-viewer-cron](docs/architecture-invariants.md#header-button-visibility-multi-monitor-response-viewer-file-viewer-cron)
 
-**Multi-monitor button** (header, top-right; the notification bell it sits beside stays hidden — notifications live in Settings → Notifications). `app.launchMultiMonitor()` (in `panels-ui.js`) POSTs `/api/system/span-displays`, which spawns `scripts/span-codeman.sh` — a fresh, maximized browser `--app` window sized to the union of all displays (macOS; needs "Displays have separate Spaces" OFF). Supports the gesture layer's in-page floating session panels dragging across the physical monitor seam. **Opt-in:** hidden by default; enable under App Settings → Display → **Header Displays** ("Multi-monitor Button", `showMultiMonitorButton`). The button carries a `btn-multimonitor--hidden` class in the template; `renderIndexHtml` strips that class at render when the setting is on (a unique class token, not a brittle match on the aria-label/style copy), and `applyHeaderVisibilitySettings()` toggles the same class live on save. Solo (detached) windows hide it via `body.solo-mode`.
+**Gesture control** (camera hand-tracking overlay, opt-in, default OFF): `CODEMAN_GESTURE=1` makes the feature *available*; `gestureControlEnabled` turns it on. The bundle is injected by `renderIndexHtml` only when enabled, which is why that method is `async` and reads settings with `readSettings(true)` (a fresh read: a post-save reload lands inside the 2s cache TTL and would otherwise render the pre-toggle state). **Source lives in `packages/gesture-control/`; edit there, run `npm run build:gesture`, and commit the regenerated bundle** because dev serves the committed bundle with no runtime bundler. The MediaPipe wasm + model are fetched separately and gitignored. ⚠️ Keep `MP_VERSION` in `fetch-gesture-assets.mjs` in sync with `@mediapipe/tasks-vision`. → [architecture-invariants#gesture-control-the-source-package](docs/architecture-invariants.md#gesture-control-the-source-package)
 
-**Response-viewer (eye) button** (header) is likewise **hidden by default** — enable under App Settings → Display → **Response Viewer** (`showResponseViewer`). Works for Claude AND Codex sessions (#152): Codex last-responses are located via a 4-layer rollout resolution under `CODEX_HOME` (history pin → originator match → resume-UUID → cwd fallback with other-pane exclusion), with injected-context filtering and event/legacy dedup — tests in `test/routes/session-routes-codex-last-response.test.ts`. Purely client-side (no `renderIndexHtml` step): the template ships with `btn-response-viewer-header--hidden` and `applyHeaderVisibilitySettings()` (settings-ui.js) toggles it after settings load. Hiding must go through that marker class — the base rule is `display:inline-flex !important`, so an inline style can't override it. `showResponseViewer` is in the `displayKeys` per-device set (settings-ui.js), so it does NOT sync across devices.
+**Theme skins / branding / i18n**: `skin` selects a palette via `data-skin` on `<html>`, applied by an **inline pre-paint script** in `index.html` reading `localStorage['codeman:skin']` to avoid a flash of wrong theme. ⚠️ A skin is **four things that must stay in sync**, and missing any one degrades silently: the `html[data-skin="…"]` token block in `styles.css`, the xterm ANSI palette in `terminal-ui.js`, the pre-paint allowlist, and the Settings picker (both in `index.html`). `test/skin-themes.test.ts` is the static guard. Light skins additionally need `color-scheme: light` and xterm `minimumContrastRatio: 4.5`, and `applyTerminalSkin()` must call the local-echo overlay's `refreshFont()` because it caches the terminal fg/bg. `displayName` changes user-facing browser branding only and must NEVER rename npm package, CLI, API, storage, CSS, or protocol identifiers. `language` (`en`/`zh-CN`) keeps English as the canonical source so live switching stays reversible. User display names flow through `textContent`/attribute APIs and the server title's HTML escaper, never `innerHTML`. → [architecture-invariants#theme-skins](docs/architecture-invariants.md#theme-skins)
 
-**Gesture control** (the camera hand-tracking overlay) is **opt-in, default OFF**, under App Settings → Display → **Input** (`gestureControlEnabled`). `CODEMAN_GESTURE=1` makes the feature *available* on the instance (CSP widening + `/gesture/` assets) and sets `window.__codemanGestureAvailable` (the Input section only shows when set); the overlay bundle is injected by `renderIndexHtml` **only when the setting is enabled**, so that method is `async` and reads `settings.json` via `readSettings(true)` — the `true` forces a **fresh** read (bypassing the 2s `_settingsCache`), because a post-save reload happens within that TTL and the cached value would otherwise render the pre-toggle state. Toggling the setting reloads the page (the bundle is render-injected).
+**Foldable settings identity**: responsive layout is width-driven via `MobileDetection.getDeviceType()`, but the localStorage namespace uses `MobileDetection.isHandheldDevice()` so an unfolded Android foldable keeps `codeman-app-settings-mobile`. ⚠️ Do not switch per-device settings namespaces from instantaneous viewport width: a posture-triggered WebView reload would lose opt-in UI. Regression profile: `OPPO Find N5 (unfolded)` in `test/mobile/devices.ts`. → [architecture-invariants#foldable-settings-identity](docs/architecture-invariants.md#foldable-settings-identity)
 
-**Gesture-control source lives in-repo** at `packages/gesture-control/` (workspace package `codeman-gesture-control`, was the standalone `Ark0N/codeman-gesture-control` repo). The transport-agnostic core is `src/gesture/*` (MediaPipe GestureRecognizer → One-Euro-filtered cursor → pinch state machine); `src/codeman/entry.ts` is the Codeman *consumer* that maps grab/drag/drop onto real `.session-tab`/toolbar buttons and is the bundle entry. **Edit there, then run `npm run build:gesture`** (`scripts/build-gesture-bundle.mjs` → esbuild bundles `entry.ts`, MediaPipe JS included, into `src/web/public/gesture/gesture-codeman.js`) and **commit the regenerated bundle** — the committed bundle is what dev/`tsx` serves (no bundler at runtime), and `scripts/build.mjs` reruns the same step so prod always reflects current source. The MediaPipe **wasm + model** are NOT bundled — loaded at runtime from same-origin `/gesture/wasm` + `/gesture/gesture_recognizer.task`, fetched by `scripts/fetch-gesture-assets.mjs` (gitignored, see Gotchas). `entry.ts` mounts `window.__codemanGesture = new GestureBridge()` idempotently at module-eval. A standalone vite playground (`npm run dev` in the package — fake tabs, no Codeman) lets you iterate on gesture *feel* in isolation. ⚠️ Keep `MP_VERSION` in `fetch-gesture-assets.mjs` in sync with `@mediapipe/tasks-vision` in `packages/gesture-control/package.json`.
+**WebGL renderer toggle** (`webglRendererEnabled`, per-device): the GPU-stall watchdog's sticky `codeman-webgl-disabled` marker survives page loads and is cleared only by an explicit OFF→ON save or `?webgl=force`. `?nowebgl` forces the DOM renderer per-load. → [architecture-invariants#webgl-renderer-toggle](docs/architecture-invariants.md#webgl-renderer-toggle)
 
-**Theme skins** (App Settings → Display): the `skin` setting selects a palette via a `data-skin` attribute on `<html>`. Values: `daylight-blue` (default), `daylight-green`, `og` (OG Codeman). CSS lives under `[data-skin="…"]` blocks in `styles.css`. To avoid a flash-of-wrong-theme, an **inline pre-paint script** in `index.html` (`<head>`) reads `localStorage['codeman:skin']` and sets `data-skin` before first paint; `settings-ui.js` `applySkin()` applies it live on save (sets `html[data-skin]` + `window.__codemanSkin`, syncs the standalone `codeman:skin` key with the settings blob, and calls terminal-ui.js `applyTerminalSkin()` to re-theme live terminals). `skin` is a **per-device/client-only** setting — it's destructured OUT of the server payload (settings-ui.js, alongside `localEchoEnabled`/`cjkInputEnabled`/`extendedKeyboardBar`), so it does NOT sync across devices.
+**Phone toolbar: Enter replaces Shell** (post-1.8.0): inside `@media (max-width: 430px)` `btn-shell` is `display:none` and `btn-enter` takes its slot (`order: 4`); starting a shell moved into the Run dropdown (`Terminal / Shell` → `setRunMode('shell')` → `run()` → `runShell()`, button label "Run SH"). `runMode` is `z.string().max(20)` server-side, so new modes need no schema change. Desktop and tablet keep the green Run Shell button unchanged.
+
+⚠️ **`sendEnterKey()` MUST go through `terminal._core.coreService.triggerDataEvent('\r', true)`** — not `sendInput()`, and never a raw POST to `/api/sessions/:id/input`. `localEchoEnabled` defaults to `MobileDetection.isTouchDevice()`, so on every phone the characters you type are buffered in the `LocalEchoOverlay` and have **never reached the PTY**; the `onData` Enter branch in terminal-ui.js is what flushes `pendingText` first and only then sends `\r` (after an 80ms delay so text lands first). Sending a bare `\r` submits an empty line and strands the typed text on screen, so the button looks dead. Replaying the keypress reuses the overlay flush, the flushed-offset cleanup and the ordering instead of reimplementing them. `KeyboardAccessory.sendKey()` is for escape sequences (arrows/Esc) and is the WRONG template to copy for input.
+
+⚠️ **Skin overrides outrank plain class rules.** `styles.css` nests its skin block inside `html:not([data-skin="og"]) { … }`, so a bare `.btn-toolbar` rule in there resolves to specificity **(0,2,1)** and beats a `.btn-toolbar.btn-x` rule **(0,2,0)** in `mobile.css` regardless of load order. Toolbar-button colors set from mobile.css therefore need `!important` — that is why mobile.css leans on it so heavily. Symptom: only your `!important` properties land and everything else silently renders in generic toolbar grey.
+
+**Z-index layers**: subagent windows (1000), plan agents (1100), mobile/tablet fixed header (1200, `mobile.css`), modals on ≤768px (1300 — must beat the fixed header or the modal close button is buried), log viewers (2000), image popups (3000), local echo overlay (7).
 
 **Respawn presets**: `solo-work` (3s/60min), `subagent-workflow` (45s/240min), `team-lead` (90s/480min), `ralph-todo` (8s/480min), `overnight-autonomous` (10s/480min).
 
-**Keyboard shortcuts**: Escape (close), Ctrl+? (shortcut overlay), Ctrl/Cmd/Alt+K (session palette), Ctrl+W (kill), Ctrl+Tab (next), Alt+[/] (prev/next tab), Alt+1-9 (switch tab), Ctrl+Shift+{/} (move tab left/right), Shift+Enter or Ctrl+Enter (newline), Ctrl+L (clear), Ctrl+Shift+R (restore size), Ctrl+Shift+V (voice input), Ctrl/Cmd +/- (font), Shift+Wheel (local scrollback when mouse passthrough is active). Rebindable via the registry (see Command palette above).
+**Keyboard shortcuts**: Escape (close), Ctrl+? (shortcut overlay), Ctrl/Cmd/Alt+K (session palette), Ctrl+W (kill), Ctrl+Tab (next), Alt+[/] (prev/next tab), Alt+1-9 (switch tab), Ctrl+Shift+{/} (move tab left/right), Shift+Enter or Ctrl+Enter (newline), Ctrl+L (clear), Ctrl+Shift+R (restore size), Ctrl+Shift+V (voice input), Ctrl/Cmd +/- (font), Shift+Wheel (local scrollback when mouse passthrough is active). Rebindable via the registry.
 
 ### Security
 
-**Full model: [`docs/security-architecture.md`](docs/security-architecture.md)** — network binding, auth pipeline, the tunnel caveat, file-serving hardening, supply-chain, instance isolation, and recommended secure setups.
+**Full model: [`docs/security-architecture.md`](docs/security-architecture.md)** (network binding, auth pipeline, the tunnel caveat, file-serving hardening, supply-chain, instance isolation, recommended setups). **Layer-by-layer detail with the history behind each: [architecture-invariants#security-layers](docs/architecture-invariants.md#security-layers).**
 
-| Layer | Details |
-|-------|---------|
-| **Auth** | Optional HTTP Basic via `CODEMAN_USERNAME` (defaults to `admin`) / `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` env vars. Active only when `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` is set (`middleware/auth.ts`) |
-| **Network bind** | Defaults to `127.0.0.1` (loopback). A non-loopback bind (`--host`/`CODEMAN_HOST`) without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` **starts but warns loudly** (0.9.0; was fail-closed in COD-29/#107). `--allow-unauthenticated-network` / `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1` acknowledges the warning. Classifier: `network-auth-policy.ts` |
-| **Host guard** | Always-on Host-header allowlist blocks DNS rebinding (RCE on the default no-auth loopback install). Allows loopback, any IP literal, the bind host, `*.ts.net`/`*.trycloudflare.com`/`*.cfargotunnel.com`, the active managed tunnel, and `CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS`. ⚠️ **Custom reverse-proxy domains are rejected** unless added via `CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS=host,.suffix`. `registerHostGuard` in `server.ts`; policy in `network-auth-policy.ts` (`buildHostPolicy`/`isAllowedRequestHost`/`isAllowedRequestOrigin`) |
-| **CSRF / Origin** | Always-on cross-site Origin guard rejects state-changing requests from foreign origins (covers self-update, session create/input, settings/tunnel toggles). **A missing Origin is allowed** so curl/CLI and Claude Code hooks keep working. The global body parser keeps `text/plain` RAW (no auto-JSON-parse, which had enabled simple-request CSRF); `/api/crash-diag` self-parses. WebSocket upgrade validates Origin+Host (anti-CSWSH) in `ws-routes.ts`. Added in `c669518` (closes 2026-06-09 review CRITICALs) |
-| **QR Auth** | Single-use 6-char tokens (60s TTL) for tunnel login. See `docs/qr-auth-plan.md` |
-| **Sessions** | 24h cookie (`codeman_session`), auto-extend, device context audit |
-| **Rate limit** | 10 failed auth/IP → 429 (15min decay). QR has separate limiter |
-| **Hook bypass** | `/api/hook-event` (and `/api/status-telemetry`, the statusLine exporter) skip Basic auth (localhost-only, schema-validated). When auth is active (`CODEMAN_PASSWORD` set), the loopback bypass requires the per-instance `X-Codeman-Hook-Secret` header **unconditionally** — COD-54 introduced it tunnel-gated; COD-91 (PR #127) made it always-on because Codeman can't detect a user's own loopback reverse proxy (own cloudflared/`tailscale serve`/nginx → 127.0.0.1), closing that residual plain-bypass gap. Hook curls cat the secret file at exec time via `$CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE` (session env, `config/hook-secret.ts`); a missing/wrong secret gets 401 and rate-limits in a dedicated bucket (never locks out login). Tunnel enable **refuses** without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` unless exposure is acknowledged — via `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1` (env, COD-55) **or** the per-request `acknowledgeUnauthTunnel:true` action field (1.1.9): the welcome/settings tunnel toggle pops a security confirm dialog and, on confirm, resends with that flag (server logs a loud warning on every passwordless tunnel start; curl/API stay refused without password/env/flag). The flag is an action field, never persisted |
-| **Env vars** | `CODEMAN_MUX` (managed session), `CODEMAN_API_URL` (auto-set for hooks), `CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS` (extra Host/Origin allowlist entries for reverse proxies, comma-separated; bare `.suffix` matches subdomains) |
-| **Validation** | Zod schemas, path allowlist regex, env prefix allowlist (`CLAUDE_CODE_*`/`OPENCODE_*`/`CODEX_*`/`GEMINI_*`/`GOOGLE_*`) |
-| **Headers** | CORS localhost-only, CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS if HTTPS |
+| Layer             | The rule                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
+| ----------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **Auth**          | Optional HTTP Basic via `CODEMAN_USERNAME` (default `admin`) / `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`. Active only when `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` is set (`middleware/auth.ts`)                                                        |
+| **Network bind**  | Defaults to loopback. Non-loopback without a password starts but warns loudly. Classifier: `network-auth-policy.ts`                                                                                          |
+| **Host guard**    | Always-on Host-header allowlist blocking DNS rebinding. ⚠️ **Custom reverse-proxy domains are rejected** unless added via `CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS=host,.suffix`                                              |
+| **CSRF / Origin** | Always-on cross-site Origin guard on state-changing requests. **A missing Origin is allowed** so curl/CLI and hooks keep working. ⚠️ The body parser keeps `text/plain` RAW; auto-JSON-parsing it enabled simple-request CSRF |
+| **QR Auth**       | Single-use 6-char tokens (60s TTL) for tunnel login. See `docs/qr-auth-plan.md`                                                                                                                              |
+| **Sessions**      | 24h cookie (`codeman_session`), auto-extend, device context audit                                                                                                                                           |
+| **Rate limit**    | 10 failed auth/IP → 429 (15min decay). QR and hook-secret have separate buckets, so neither can lock out login                                                                                              |
+| **Hook bypass**   | `/api/hook-event` + `/api/status-telemetry` skip Basic auth (localhost-only, schema-validated), but when auth is active the loopback bypass requires `X-Codeman-Hook-Secret` **unconditionally** (Codeman cannot detect a user's own loopback reverse proxy) |
+| **Tunnel**        | Enabling a tunnel **refuses** without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` unless exposure is acknowledged via `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1` or the per-request `acknowledgeUnauthTunnel:true` action field (never persisted) |
+| **Validation**    | Zod schemas, Unicode-aware path allowlist regex, env prefix allowlist (`CLAUDE_CODE_*`/`OPENCODE_*`/`CODEX_*`/`GEMINI_*`/`GOOGLE_*`)                                                                        |
+| **Headers**       | CORS localhost-only, CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS if HTTPS                                                                                                                                                     |
+
+**Security-relevant env vars**: `CODEMAN_MUX` (managed session), `CODEMAN_API_URL` (auto-set for hooks), `CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS` (extra Host/Origin allowlist entries for reverse proxies; bare `.suffix` matches subdomains), `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS=1` (opt-in hooks-only listener on the docker bridge gateway).
 
 ### SSE Event Registry
 
-~133 event types in `src/web/sse-events.ts` (backend) and `SSE_EVENTS` in `constants.js` (frontend). Both must be kept in sync.
+149 event constants in `src/web/sse-events.ts` (backend) and `SSE_EVENTS` in `constants.js` (frontend). **Both must be kept in sync** — they are currently exactly in sync, and the backend file's `@fileoverview` carries the per-category breakdown.
 
 ### API Routes
 
-~166 handlers across 18 route files in `src/web/routes/`: system (45, incl. self-update `check`/`status`/`POST /api/system/update`, `POST /api/system/span-displays` → spawns `scripts/span-codeman.sh`, `GET /api/codex/status`, `GET /api/gemini/status`, and `GET /api/away-digest`), sessions (30, incl. `GET /api/sessions/unified`), orchestrator (10), cases (14, incl. remote hosts CRUD + remote case-link), ralph (9), plan (8), files (14, incl. attachment register + list/history + `:attachmentId/raw`/`preview`/`thumbnail` + workspace `file-preview`/`file-thumbnail`), respawn (7), mux (5), push (4), scheduled (4, legacy `ScheduledRun`), cron (9, cron-style `CronJob` jobs/runs), teams (2), search (1, `GET /api/search`), hooks (1), clipboard (1), status-telemetry (1, `POST /api/status-telemetry` ← statusLine exporter), ws (1 WebSocket). Each file has `@fileoverview` with endpoint details.
+~199 handlers across 21 route files in `src/web/routes/`: system (45), sessions (32), cases (27), files (16), orchestrator (10), ralph (9), cron (9), admin (8), plan (8), respawn (7), webviews (6 + the `/webview/:cap/*` proxy), mux (5), push (4), scheduled (4, legacy `ScheduledRun`), me (2), teams (2), search (1), hooks (1), clipboard (1), status-telemetry (1), ws (1 WebSocket). Each file has `@fileoverview` with endpoint details.
 
 **HTTP contract** (stable since 0.9.x, see `docs/versioning-policy.md`; full envelope/status/error-code/SSE spec in `docs/api-reference.md`): responses use the `ApiResponse<T>` envelope — `{ success: true, data? }` or `{ success: false, error, errorCode }` (`src/types/api.ts`). `/api/v1/*` is a versioned alias of `/api/*` (URL rewrite in `server.ts`).
 
@@ -252,15 +292,16 @@ Frontend JS modules have `@fileoverview` with `@dependency`/`@loadorder` tags. L
 - **API endpoint**: Types in `src/types/` domain file, route in `src/web/routes/*-routes.ts`. Return the `ApiResponse` envelope (`{ success: true, data }`; errors via `createErrorResponse()` with proper status code). Validate with Zod schemas in `schemas.ts`.
 - **SSE event**: Add to `src/web/sse-events.ts` + `SSE_EVENTS` in `constants.js`, emit via `broadcast()`, handle in `app.js` (`addListener(`)
 - **Session setting**: Add to `SessionState`, include in `session.toState()`, call `persistSessionState()`
+- **App setting**: decide per-device vs synced first. Per-device keys go in the `displayKeys` set in settings-ui.js and must NOT be added to `SettingsUpdateSchema` (it is `.strict()`).
 - **Hook event**: Add to `HookEventType`, add hook in `hooks-config.ts:generateHooksConfig()`, update `HookEventSchema`
-- **Mobile feature**: Add to relevant singleton, guard with `MobileDetection.isMobile()`
+- **Mobile feature**: Add to relevant singleton, guard with `MobileDetection.isMobile()`. New header buttons must stay off phones (`test/mobile-header-buttons-policy.test.ts`).
 - **New test**: Pick unique port (search `const PORT =`). Route tests use `app.inject()` (no port needed) — see `test/routes/_route-test-utils.ts`.
 
 **Validation**: Zod v4 (different API from v3). Define schemas in `schemas.ts`, use `.parse()`/`.safeParse()`.
 
 ## State Files
 
-All in `~/.codeman/`: `state.json` (sessions, settings, respawn, orchestrator, `cronJobs`/`cronJobRuns`), `mux-sessions.json` (tmux recovery), `settings.json` (user prefs), `push-keys.json` (VAPID), `push-subscriptions.json`, `session-lifecycle.jsonl` (audit log), `update-status.json` (self-updater progress, polled across the service restart), `linked-cases.json` (linked-case registry used for case-path resolution), `remote-hosts.json` + `remote-cases.json` (remote SSH hosts/cases, COD-94), `subagent-window-states.json` + `subagent-parents.json` (subagent window layout, GET/PUT `/api/subagent-window-states`/`-parents`), `hook-secret` (per-instance hook secret, COD-54), `certs/` (self-signed TLS for `--https`), `.env` (CODEMAN_USERNAME/PASSWORD fallback for the `codeman attach` CLI). Transient: `self-update-runner.sh`.
+All in `~/.codeman/`: `state.json` (sessions, settings, respawn, orchestrator, cron jobs/runs), `mux-sessions.json` (tmux recovery), `settings.json` (user prefs), `push-keys.json` + `push-subscriptions.json`, `session-lifecycle.jsonl` (audit log), `update-status.json` (self-updater progress, polled across the service restart), `linked-cases.json`, `webviews.json` (saved web-tab dashboard URLs), `remote-hosts.json` + `remote-cases.json`, `docker-hosts.json` + `docker-cases.json` + `docker-exports/`, `subagent-window-states.json` + `subagent-parents.json` (subagent window layout, GET/PUT `/api/subagent-window-states`/`-parents`), `hook-secret` (per-instance), `users.json` (multi-user, mode 0600) + `admin-audit.jsonl`, `certs/` (self-signed TLS for `--https`), `.env` (CODEMAN_USERNAME/PASSWORD fallback for the `codeman attach` CLI). Transient: `self-update-runner.sh`. Multi-user case spaces live OUTSIDE the data dir at `~/codeman-users/<username>/cases` (shared across instances like `~/codeman-cases`, override `CODEMAN_USER_SPACES_DIR`).
 
 **Generated top-level dirs** (all gitignored — don't edit or commit): `dist/` (esbuild output), `out/`, `coverage/`, `test-results/`, `tmp/`, `screenshots-echo-diag/`. The committed gesture bundle (`src/web/public/gesture/gesture-codeman.js`) IS tracked, but its runtime wasm/model assets (`src/web/public/gesture/wasm/`, `*.task`) are fetched and gitignored.
 
@@ -279,11 +320,15 @@ Raw `npx vitest` skips `config/vitest.config.ts`; always use `npm test --` or pa
 
 **Config**: Vitest with `globals: true`, `fileParallelism: false`. Timeout 30s, teardown 60s. `config/vitest.ci.config.ts` = same minus the browser/perf excludes — keep the two configs in sync when changing shared options.
 
-**Tmux safety**: under vitest (`VITEST` env var, set automatically), `TmuxManager` no-ops ALL shell commands and becomes a pure in-memory mock — tests physically cannot create/kill/attach real tmux sessions (`IS_TEST_MODE` in `src/tmux-manager.ts`). `test/setup.ts` additionally strips `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`/`CODEMAN_USERNAME` (so auth state from the running instance can't leak into tests) and `CODEMAN_GESTURE` (a shell-exported gesture flag would flip render-injection assertions).
+**Tmux safety**: under vitest (`VITEST` env var, set automatically), `TmuxManager` no-ops ALL shell commands and becomes a pure in-memory mock — tests physically cannot create/kill/attach real tmux sessions (`IS_TEST_MODE` in `src/tmux-manager.ts`). Every docker IO path is no-op'd the same way. `test/setup.ts` additionally strips `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`/`CODEMAN_USERNAME` (so auth state from the running instance can't leak into tests) and `CODEMAN_GESTURE` (a shell-exported gesture flag would flip render-injection assertions).
 
-**Ports**: Pick unique ports manually. Search `const PORT =` before adding new tests.
+**Ports**: Pick unique ports manually, 3150+. Search `const PORT =` before adding new tests. Never 3000 (the live instance).
 
-**Respawn tests**: Use `MockSession` from `test/mocks/index.ts` (defined in `test/mocks/mock-session.ts`). **Route tests**: `app.inject({ method, url, payload })` in `test/routes/` — no live port needed. **Mobile tests**: Playwright suite in `test/mobile/` (135 device profiles). Browser-testing infra and practices: `docs/browser-testing-guide.md`.
+⚠️ **Browser tests can pass vacuously on mobile input paths.** Two traps, both hit on 2026-07-27 while fixing the phone Enter button: **(1)** driving input with `app.sendInput('…')` writes PAST the `LocalEchoOverlay`, so `pendingText` stays empty and any overlay bug is invisible — type with `page.keyboard.type()` instead; **(2)** headless Chromium reports `MobileDetection.isTouchDevice()` **false even with `hasTouch: true`**, so `_localEchoEnabled` is off and the local-echo branch never executes. Force it (`app._localEchoEnabled = true`) or the test proves nothing. Assert on real state (`app._localEchoOverlay.pendingText`, plus `tmux -L codeman capture-pane -p -t <pane>` for what actually reached the PTY), not on HTTP 200.
+
+**Testing against the live instance**: prod is HTTPS-only on :3000 (`curl -sk https://localhost:3000/...`). ⚠️ `w1`/`w2`/`w3` are the user's REAL sessions — never send input to them. Create your own throwaway session (`POST /api/sessions` then `POST /api/sessions/:id/shell`; creation alone leaves `pid: null` and no pane), test against that, and `DELETE` it by exact id when done.
+
+**Respawn tests**: Use `MockSession` from `test/mocks/index.ts` (defined in `test/mocks/mock-session.ts`). **Route tests**: `app.inject({ method, url, payload })` in `test/routes/` — no live port needed. **Mobile tests**: Playwright suite in `test/mobile/` (136 device profiles). Browser-testing infra and practices: `docs/browser-testing-guide.md`.
 
 ## Debugging
 
@@ -299,10 +344,14 @@ Mobile screenshots: `~/.codeman/screenshots/`, accessed via `GET/POST /api/scree
 
 ## Performance & Limits
 
-Target: 20 sessions, 50 agent windows at 60fps. Limits in `src/config/`: terminal 32MB (see below), text 1MB, messages 1000, max agents 500, max sessions 50, max SSE clients 100. **Terminal history** (`src/config/terminal-history.ts`, COD-80): tmux history-limit 100k lines, PTY buffer 32MB max / 24MB trim (env `CODEMAN_MAX_TERMINAL_BUFFER`/`CODEMAN_TRIM_TERMINAL_TO`; the env-derived trim is clamped ≤75% of max — trim ≥ max would disable `BufferAccumulator` trimming entirely = unbounded memory); browser xterm scrollback stays a separate hardcoded 50k (`DEFAULT_SCROLLBACK` in constants.js — 100k/tab is a mobile-memory hazard). Settings keys `terminalScrollbackLines`/`terminalBufferMaxBytes`/`terminalBufferTrimBytes` are schema-validated but inert (only `tmuxHistoryLimit` is wired live); `buffer-limits.ts` re-exports the defaults. Text/message limits are env-overridable too (`CODEMAN_MAX_TEXT_OUTPUT`/`CODEMAN_TRIM_TEXT_TO`/`CODEMAN_MAX_MESSAGES`). **Image upload** (`image-input.js` / `config/buffer-limits.ts`): up to `_maxBatchImages` 20 images/batch (bounded concurrency 3), per-file `MAX_PASTE_IMAGE_BYTES` 50MB (env `CODEMAN_MAX_PASTE_IMAGE_BYTES`); the mobile camera-roll picker auto-downscales to fit before upload. **HEIC paste uploads** (#151): converted server-side to JPEG in a `worker_threads` worker (`web/heic-jpeg-worker.ts`, resourceLimits + 30s timeout) gated by `runWithConversionLimit()`; detection is magic-byte based (covers Android/MIUI HEIFs mislabeled as JPEG); headers declaring > 64MP are rejected 415 BEFORE decode (decompression-bomb guard). Deps: `heic-decode` + `jpeg-js`. Use `LRUMap` for bounded caches, `StaleExpirationMap` for TTL cleanup. Anti-flicker pipeline: `docs/terminal-anti-flicker.md`.
+Target: 20 sessions, 50 agent windows at 60fps. Limits live in `src/config/` (terminal 32MB, text 1MB, messages 1000, max agents 500, max sessions 50, max SSE clients 100), most env-overridable.
 
-**Memory leaks (24+ hour sessions)**: use `CleanupManager`, clear Maps in `stop()`, guard async with `if (this.cleanup.isStopped) return`. Frontend: store handler refs, clean in `close*()`. Verify: `npm test -- test/memory-leak-prevention.test.ts`.
+Two constraints worth knowing before you touch them: the env-derived PTY buffer trim is **clamped to ≤75% of max**, because a trim ≥ max would disable `BufferAccumulator` trimming entirely and make memory unbounded; and browser xterm scrollback is a **separate hardcoded 50k** (`DEFAULT_SCROLLBACK` in constants.js), deliberately lower than tmux's 100k history because 100k per tab is a mobile-memory hazard. The settings keys `terminalScrollbackLines`/`terminalBufferMaxBytes`/`terminalBufferTrimBytes` are schema-validated but **inert**; only `tmuxHistoryLimit` is wired live. → [architecture-invariants#buffers-uploads-and-terminal-history](docs/architecture-invariants.md#buffers-uploads-and-terminal-history), `docs/terminal-anti-flicker.md`
+
+**Memory leaks (24+ hour sessions)**: use `CleanupManager`, clear Maps in `stop()`, guard async with `if (this.cleanup.isStopped) return`. Frontend: store handler refs, clean in `close*()`. Use `LRUMap` for bounded caches, `StaleExpirationMap` for TTL cleanup. Verify: `npm test -- test/memory-leak-prevention.test.ts`.
 
 ## Scripts & Tunnel
 
-Key scripts: `scripts/tmux-manager.sh` (safe tmux mgmt), `scripts/tunnel.sh [quick|named] start|stop|status|url` (quick = random trycloudflare URL, default; `named setup|enable` = fixed-hostname tunnel via `scripts/codeman-tunnel-named.service`; bare `start|stop|url` still means quick). Production services: `scripts/codeman-web.service`, `scripts/codeman-tunnel.service`. **Always set `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`** before exposing via tunnel.
+**`install.sh`** (repo root, 69KB) is the public entry point: `curl -fsSL <raw url> | bash` installs Node/tmux if missing, clones to `~/.codeman/app`, builds, and offers a systemd/launchd service. It prompts for the network binding (LAN default + password prompt) and preserves the existing binding on re-runs via `read_existing_binding()`. `install.sh update` and `install.sh uninstall` also exist; `CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1` approves system changes for automation.
+
+Other key scripts: `scripts/tmux-manager.sh` (safe tmux mgmt), `scripts/tunnel.sh [quick|named] start|stop|status|url` (quick = random trycloudflare URL, default; `named setup|enable` = fixed-hostname tunnel via `scripts/codeman-tunnel-named.service`; bare `start|stop|url` still means quick), `scripts/run-beta.sh` (isolated beta instance), `scripts/build-agent-image.mjs` (docker base image), `scripts/self-update.sh` (detached updater). Production services: `scripts/codeman-web.service`, `scripts/codeman-tunnel.service`. **Always set `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`** before exposing via tunnel.

README.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 <h2 align="center">Mission control for AI coding agents</h2>
 
 <p align="center">
-  <em>Claude Code &bull; OpenCode &bull; Codex &bull; Terminal - One Dashboard &bull; Any Device</em>
+  <em>Claude Code &bull; OpenCode &bull; Codex &bull; Gemini &bull; Terminal - One Dashboard &bull; Any Device</em>
 </p>
 
 <p align="center">
@@ -13,7 +13,10 @@
   <a href="https://nodejs.org/"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Node.js-22%2B-22c55e?style=flat-square&logo=node.js&logoColor=white" alt="Node.js 22+"></a>
   <a href="https://www.typescriptlang.org/"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/TypeScript-5.9-3b82f6?style=flat-square&logo=typescript&logoColor=white" alt="TypeScript 5.9"></a>
   <a href="https://fastify.dev/"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Fastify-5.x-1e3a5f?style=flat-square&logo=fastify&logoColor=white" alt="Fastify"></a>
-  <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Tests-2861%20total-22c55e?style=flat-square" alt="Tests">
+  <a href="https://www.npmjs.com/package/aicodeman"><img src="https://img.shields.io/npm/v/aicodeman?style=flat-square&label=npm&color=22c55e" alt="npm version"></a>
+  <a href="https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/stargazers"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/stars/Ark0N/Codeman?style=flat-square&color=eab308" alt="GitHub stars"></a>
+  <a href="https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/graphs/contributors"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/contributors/Ark0N/Codeman?style=flat-square&color=3b82f6" alt="Contributors"></a>
+  <a href="https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/commits/master"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/commit-activity/t/Ark0N/Codeman?style=flat-square&color=1e3a5f" alt="Total commits"></a>
 </p>
 
 <p align="center">
@@ -21,7 +24,33 @@
 </p>
 
 <p align="center">
-  <img src="docs/images/subagent-demo.gif" alt="Codeman — parallel subagent visualization" width="900">
+  <img src="docs/images/subagent-demo-20260724.gif" alt="Codeman — parallel subagent visualization" width="900">
+</p>
+
+**Codeman** is a self-hosted mission control for AI coding agents. It spawns Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, or Gemini CLI inside persistent tmux sessions, streams the real terminal to any browser, and keeps agents productive after you walk away: it re-prompts on idle, resumes when a usage limit resets, runs scheduled jobs, and shows every background agent working in real time.
+
+Get started in one line (macOS & Linux, Windows via WSL):
+
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://getcodeman.com/install | bash
+```
+
+```bash
+codeman web
+# Open http://localhost:3000 and start your first session
+```
+
+The installer asks before every system change, and re-running the same line updates in place. Full details: [Quick Start - Installation](#quick-start---installation).
+
+- **One dashboard, four CLIs** - run [Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, or Gemini](#more-features) per session (plus plain shell), locally, [in Docker](#isolated-docker-sessions), or [over SSH](#remote-ssh-sessions)
+- **Truly phone-friendly** - a [touch-optimized terminal](#mobile-optimized-web-ui) with instant local echo, QR login, swipe navigation, and push notifications
+- **Runs while you sleep** - [idle detection + respawn cycling](#respawn-controller) and auto-resume when a subscription limit resets, for 24+ hour unattended runs
+- **See your agents think** - [live floating windows](#live-agent-visualization) for every subagent and teammate, with real-time transcripts
+- **Nothing gets lost** - tmux persistence across restarts and network drops, exactly-once input delivery, full-scrollback replay
+- **Self-hosted and private** - loopback-only by default, MIT licensed, no telemetry, runs entirely on your machine
+
+<p align="center">
+  <img src="docs/images/codeman-tour-20260724.png" alt="Codeman dashboard tour: session tabs per case, one-click Run for new agents, live plan usage in the header" width="900">
 </p>
 
 ---
@@ -29,21 +58,37 @@
 ## Quick Start - Installation
 
 ```bash
-curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Ark0N/Codeman/master/install.sh | bash
+curl -fsSL https://getcodeman.com/install | bash
 ```
 
-This installs Node.js and tmux if missing, clones Codeman to `~/.codeman/app`, and builds it.
+This installs Node.js and tmux if missing, clones Codeman to `~/.codeman/app`, and builds it. A few things worth knowing:
 
-You'll need at least one AI coding CLI installed — [Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code), [OpenCode](https://opencode.ai), or [Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli) (any combination works). After install:
+- **It asks first.** Every system change (package installs, AI CLI download) is prompted, and a menu at the end lets you choose: run Codeman in this terminal, install it as a background service (systemd/launchd, auto-start on boot), or don't start yet. Nothing runs in the background unless you pick it.
+- **Network or local-only, your choice.** The installer asks whether the dashboard should be reachable from other devices on your network (`0.0.0.0`, the default, with a strongly recommended password prompt) or from this machine only (`127.0.0.1`, safest). Skipping the password on a network bind requires an explicit confirmation and ends with a loud warning. A bare `codeman web` started by hand still defaults to loopback.
+- **Re-run to update.** The same one-liner updates a finished install in place: local changes in `~/.codeman/app` are stashed (never discarded), and a running service is restarted and verified. If a first install was interrupted, re-running resumes the full setup instead. `install.sh update` and `install.sh uninstall` also exist.
+- **CI / headless:** without a terminal attached, steps that would change your system abort with instructions instead of running silently. Set `CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1` to approve them for automation.
+
+You'll need at least one AI coding CLI installed — [Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code), [OpenCode](https://opencode.ai), [Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli), or [Gemini CLI](https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli) (any combination works). The installer detects whichever of the four is present; if none is found, it offers to install Claude Code or OpenCode, or you can skip and install one yourself later. After install:
 
 ```bash
 codeman web
 # Open http://localhost:3000 and start your first session
 ```
 
+**Sharing with a small team?** Start it in multi-user mode instead: each person gets their own login and workspace.
+
+```bash
+codeman users add alice --admin      # create the first admin account
+codeman web --multiuser              # named logins + per-user case spaces
+```
+
+Details in [Multi-User Mode](#multi-user-mode-opt-in) below.
+
 <details>
 <summary><strong>Run as a background service</strong></summary>
 
+The installer's final menu sets this up for you (option 2) and verifies the service actually comes up before claiming success. To configure it manually instead:
+
 **Linux (systemd):**
 
 ```bash
@@ -103,15 +148,67 @@ launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.codeman.web.plist
 <summary><strong>Windows (WSL)</strong></summary>
 
 ```powershell
-wsl bash -c "curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Ark0N/Codeman/master/install.sh | bash"
+wsl bash -c "curl -fsSL https://getcodeman.com/install | bash"
 ```
 
-Codeman requires tmux, so Windows users need [WSL](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/wsl/install). If you don't have WSL yet: run `wsl --install` in an admin PowerShell, reboot, open Ubuntu, then install your preferred AI coding CLI inside WSL ([Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code), [OpenCode](https://opencode.ai), or [Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli)). After installing, `http://localhost:3000` is accessible from your Windows browser.
+Codeman requires tmux, so Windows users need [WSL](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/wsl/install). If you don't have WSL yet: run `wsl --install` in an admin PowerShell, reboot, open Ubuntu, then install your preferred AI coding CLI inside WSL ([Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code), [OpenCode](https://opencode.ai), [Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli), or [Gemini CLI](https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli)). After installing, `http://localhost:3000` is accessible from your Windows browser.
 
 </details>
 
 ---
 
+## Mobile-Optimized Web UI
+
+The most responsive AI coding agent experience on any phone. Full xterm.js terminal with local echo, swipe navigation, and a touch-optimized interface designed for real remote work — not a desktop UI crammed onto a small screen.
+
+<table>
+<tr>
+<td align="center" width="40%"><img src="docs/screenshots/mobile-session-keyboard-20260727.png" alt="Mobile — answering an agent's plan prompt with the keyboard accessory bar and Enter button" width="300"></td>
+<td align="center" width="60%"><img src="docs/screenshots/mobile-toolbar-enter-20260727.png" alt="Mobile toolbar: accessory bar with /init, /clear, clipboard and Esc above the Run, case, stop, Enter, voice and settings controls" width="440"></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td align="center"><em>Answering prompts by touch</em></td>
+<td align="center"><em>Accessory bar + dedicated Enter button</em></td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<table>
+<tr>
+<th>Terminal Apps</th>
+<th>Codeman Mobile</th>
+</tr>
+<tr><td>200-300ms input lag over remote</td><td><b>Local echo — instant feedback</b></td></tr>
+<tr><td>Tiny text, no context</td><td>Full xterm.js terminal</td></tr>
+<tr><td>No session management</td><td>Swipe between sessions</td></tr>
+<tr><td>No notifications</td><td>Push alerts for approvals and idle</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Manual reconnect</td><td>tmux persistence</td></tr>
+<tr><td>No agent visibility</td><td>Background agents in real-time</td></tr>
+<tr><td>Copy-paste slash commands</td><td>One-tap <code>/init</code>, <code>/clear</code>, <code>/compact</code></td></tr>
+<tr><td>Password typing on phone</td><td><b>QR code scan — instant auth</b></td></tr>
+</table>
+
+- **Keyboard accessory bar** — `/init`, `/clear`, `/compact` quick-action buttons above the virtual keyboard; destructive commands require a double-press to confirm, so you never fire one by accident
+- **Dedicated Enter button** — replays the keypress through the terminal, so text buffered by local echo is flushed first rather than stranded
+- **Swipe navigation & smart keyboard handling** — swipe left/right to switch sessions; toolbar and terminal shift up when the keyboard opens (`visualViewport` API)
+- **Built for phones** — safe-area insets for notch and home indicator, 44px touch targets, bottom-sheet case picker, native momentum scrolling
+
+```bash
+codeman web --https
+# Open on your phone: https://<your-ip>:3000
+```
+
+> `localhost` works over plain HTTP. Use `--https` when accessing from another device, or use [Tailscale](https://tailscale.com/) (recommended) — it provides a private network so you can access `http://<tailscale-ip>:3000` from your phone without TLS certificates.
+
+### Secure QR Code Authentication
+
+Typing passwords on a phone keyboard is miserable. Codeman replaces it with **cryptographically secure single-use QR tokens** — scan the code displayed on your desktop and your phone is authenticated instantly.
+
+Each QR encodes a URL containing a 6-character short code that maps to a 256-bit secret (`crypto.randomBytes(32)`) on the server. Tokens auto-rotate every **60 seconds**, are **atomically consumed on first scan** (replays always fail), and use **hash-based `Map.get()` lookup** that leaks nothing through response timing. The short code is an opaque pointer — the real secret never appears in browser history, `Referer` headers, or Cloudflare edge logs.
+
+The security design addresses all 6 critical QR auth flaws identified in ["Demystifying the (In)Security of QR Code-based Login"](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/zhang-xin) (USENIX Security 2025, which found 47 of the top-100 websites vulnerable): single-use enforcement, short TTL, cryptographic randomness, server-side generation, real-time desktop notification on scan (QRLjacking detection), and IP + User-Agent session binding with manual revocation. Dual-layer rate limiting (per-IP + global) makes brute force infeasible across 62^6 = 56.8 billion possible codes. Full security analysis: [`docs/qr-auth-plan.md`](docs/qr-auth-plan.md)
+
+---
+
 ## Using Codeman — A Human's Guide
 
 A start-to-finish walkthrough for driving Codeman from the browser. If you just installed, this is where to begin.
@@ -142,9 +239,9 @@ Hit start — Codeman spawns the CLI via a real PTY and streams it to your brows
 
 ### 3. Read the dashboard
 
-- **Tabs (top)** — one per session. `Alt+1`-`9` to jump, `Ctrl+Tab` for next, drag to reorder.
+- **Tabs (top)** — one per session. `Alt+1`-`9` to jump, `Ctrl+Tab` for next, drag to reorder (tab order syncs across your devices).
 - **Terminal (center)** — a real `xterm.js` terminal; full TUIs render correctly. Type directly and press **Enter** to send. `Shift+Enter` inserts a newline.
-- **Side panels** — Respawn, Ralph, Orchestrator, Cron, Subagents, Settings (toggled from the toolbar).
+- **Side panels** — Respawn, Orchestrator, Cron, Subagents, Settings (toggled from the toolbar).
 
 ### 4. Talk to the agent
 
@@ -155,13 +252,12 @@ Hit start — Codeman spawns the CLI via a real PTY and streams it to your brows
 
 ### 5. Make it autonomous
 
-| Mode             | Use it for                                                                                                                        | Where              |
-| ---------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------ |
-| **Respawn**      | Long unattended runs — auto-restarts the CLI on idle/limit, with adaptive timing. Presets: `solo-work`, `overnight-autonomous`, … | Respawn tab        |
-| **Ralph / Todo** | A self-driving loop that tracks a todo list and keeps working until done.                                                         | Ralph tab          |
-| **Orchestrator** | Turn one goal into a phased plan and drive it to completion across agents.                                                        | Orchestrator panel |
-| **Cron**         | Saved, named jobs on a schedule (`once`/`interval`/`daily`/`weekly`) that spawn a session and send a prompt when due.             | ⏰ Cron button     |
-| **Auto-resume**  | Automatically continue after a subscription rate-limit resets.                                                                    | Respawn tab (top)  |
+| Mode             | Use it for                                                                                                                        | Where                                                               |
+| ---------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **Respawn**      | Long unattended runs — auto-restarts the CLI on idle/limit, with adaptive timing. Presets: `solo-work`, `overnight-autonomous`, … | Respawn tab                                                         |
+| **Orchestrator** | Turn one goal into a phased plan and drive it to completion across agents.                                                        | Orchestrator panel                                                  |
+| **Cron**         | Saved, named jobs on a schedule (`once`/`interval`/`daily`/`weekly`) that spawn a session and send a prompt when due.             | ⏰ Cron button _(opt-in: App Settings → Display → Header Displays)_ |
+| **Auto-resume**  | Automatically continue after a subscription rate-limit resets.                                                                    | Respawn tab (top)                                                   |
 
 ### 6. Reach it from anywhere
 
@@ -171,7 +267,7 @@ Hit start — Codeman spawns the CLI via a real PTY and streams it to your brows
 
 ### 7. Operate & maintain
 
-- **App Settings** — model, effort, theme/skin, notifications, display toggles, per-CLI options.
+- **App Settings** — model, effort, permission startup mode, theme/skin, notifications, display toggles, per-CLI options, a synced custom display name, and per-device English/Simplified Chinese UI language.
 - **Self-update** — git-clone installs update in place from **Settings → Updates**.
 - **Deploy your own changes** — see [Development](#development).
 
@@ -179,87 +275,10 @@ Hit start — Codeman spawns the CLI via a real PTY and streams it to your brows
 
 ---
 
-## Mobile-Optimized Web UI
-
-The most responsive AI coding agent experience on any phone. Full xterm.js terminal with local echo, swipe navigation, and a touch-optimized interface designed for real remote work — not a desktop UI crammed onto a small screen.
-
-<table>
-<tr>
-<td align="center" width="33%"><img src="docs/screenshots/mobile-landing-qr.png" alt="Mobile — landing page with QR auth" width="260"></td>
-<td align="center" width="33%"><img src="docs/screenshots/mobile-session-idle.png" alt="Mobile — idle session with keyboard accessory" width="260"></td>
-<td align="center" width="33%"><img src="docs/screenshots/mobile-session-active.png" alt="Mobile — active agent session" width="260"></td>
-</tr>
-<tr>
-<td align="center"><em>Landing page with QR auth</em></td>
-<td align="center"><em>Keyboard accessory bar</em></td>
-<td align="center"><em>Agent working in real-time</em></td>
-</tr>
-</table>
-
-<table>
-<tr>
-<th>Terminal Apps</th>
-<th>Codeman Mobile</th>
-</tr>
-<tr><td>200-300ms input lag over remote</td><td><b>Local echo — instant feedback</b></td></tr>
-<tr><td>Tiny text, no context</td><td>Full xterm.js terminal</td></tr>
-<tr><td>No session management</td><td>Swipe between sessions</td></tr>
-<tr><td>No notifications</td><td>Push alerts for approvals and idle</td></tr>
-<tr><td>Manual reconnect</td><td>tmux persistence</td></tr>
-<tr><td>No agent visibility</td><td>Background agents in real-time</td></tr>
-<tr><td>Copy-paste slash commands</td><td>One-tap <code>/init</code>, <code>/clear</code>, <code>/compact</code></td></tr>
-<tr><td>Password typing on phone</td><td><b>QR code scan — instant auth</b></td></tr>
-</table>
-
-### Secure QR Code Authentication
-
-Typing passwords on a phone keyboard is miserable. Codeman replaces it with **cryptographically secure single-use QR tokens** — scan the code displayed on your desktop and your phone is authenticated instantly.
-
-Each QR encodes a URL containing a 6-character short code that maps to a 256-bit secret (`crypto.randomBytes(32)`) on the server. Tokens auto-rotate every **60 seconds**, are **atomically consumed on first scan** (replays always fail), and use **hash-based `Map.get()` lookup** that leaks nothing through response timing. The short code is an opaque pointer — the real secret never appears in browser history, `Referer` headers, or Cloudflare edge logs.
-
-The security design addresses all 6 critical QR auth flaws identified in ["Demystifying the (In)Security of QR Code-based Login"](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/zhang-xin) (USENIX Security 2025, which found 47 of the top-100 websites vulnerable): single-use enforcement, short TTL, cryptographic randomness, server-side generation, real-time desktop notification on scan (QRLjacking detection), and IP + User-Agent session binding with manual revocation. Dual-layer rate limiting (per-IP + global) makes brute force infeasible across 62^6 = 56.8 billion possible codes. Full security analysis: [`docs/qr-auth-plan.md`](docs/qr-auth-plan.md)
-
-### Touch-Optimized Interface
-
-- **Keyboard accessory bar** — `/init`, `/clear`, `/compact` quick-action buttons above the virtual keyboard. Destructive commands (`/clear`, `/compact`) require a double-press to confirm — first tap arms the button, second tap executes — so you never fire one by accident on a bumpy commute
-- **Swipe navigation** — left/right on the terminal to switch sessions (80px threshold, 300ms)
-- **Smart keyboard handling** — toolbar and terminal shift up when keyboard opens (uses `visualViewport` API with 100px threshold for iOS address bar drift)
-- **Safe area support** — respects iPhone notch and home indicator via `env(safe-area-inset-*)`
-- **44px touch targets** — all buttons meet iOS Human Interface Guidelines minimum sizes
-- **Bottom sheet case picker** — slide-up modal replaces the desktop dropdown
-- **Native momentum scrolling** — `-webkit-overflow-scrolling: touch` for buttery scroll
-
-```bash
-codeman web --https
-# Open on your phone: https://<your-ip>:3000
-```
-
-> `localhost` works over plain HTTP. Use `--https` when accessing from another device, or use [Tailscale](https://tailscale.com/) (recommended) — it provides a private network so you can access `http://<tailscale-ip>:3000` from your phone without TLS certificates.
-
----
-
-## Live Agent Visualization
-
-Watch background agents work in real-time. Codeman monitors agent activity and displays each agent in a draggable floating window with animated Matrix-style connection lines back to the parent session.
-
-<p align="center">
-  <img src="docs/images/subagent-spawn.png" alt="Subagent Visualization" width="900">
-</p>
-
-- **Floating terminal windows** — draggable, resizable panels for each agent with a live activity log showing every tool call, file read, and progress update as it happens
-- **Connection lines** — animated green lines linking parent sessions to their child agents, updating in real-time as agents spawn and complete
-- **Status & model badges** — green (active), yellow (idle), blue (completed) indicators with Haiku/Sonnet/Opus model color coding
-- **Auto-behavior** — windows auto-open on spawn, auto-minimize on completion, tab badge shows "AGENT" or "AGENTS (n)" count
-- **Nested agents** — supports 3-level hierarchies (lead session -> teammate agents -> sub-subagents)
-
-**Agent Teams** — first-class support for Claude Code's native multi-agent teams (`CLAUDE_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL_AGENT_TEAMS=1`). `TeamWatcher` polls `~/.claude/teams/`, matches teammates to their lead session, and surfaces them as live subagent windows with **team-aware idle detection** — so the Respawn Controller won't fire while teammates are still working. See [`docs/agent-teams/`](docs/agent-teams/).
-
----
-
 ## Zero-Lag Input Overlay
 
 <p align="center">
-  <img src="docs/images/zerolag-demo.gif" alt="Zerolag Demo — local echo vs server echo side-by-side" width="900">
+  <img src="docs/images/zerolag-demo-20260728.gif" alt="Zerolag demo: instant local echo next to 600ms-2.7s server echo, side by side on two phones" width="900">
 </p>
 
 When accessing your coding agent remotely (VPN, Tailscale, SSH tunnel), every keystroke normally takes 200-300ms to round-trip. Codeman implements a **Mosh-inspired local echo system** that makes typing feel instant regardless of latency.
@@ -276,6 +295,30 @@ A pixel-perfect DOM overlay inside xterm.js renders keystrokes at 0ms. Backgroun
 
 ---
 
+## Live Agent Visualization
+
+Watch background agents work in real-time. Codeman monitors agent activity and displays each agent in a draggable floating window with animated Matrix-style connection lines back to the parent session.
+
+<p align="center">
+  <img src="docs/images/subagent-windows-20260724.png" alt="Subagent Visualization: three parallel Explore agents as floating windows with live tool-call feeds" width="900">
+</p>
+
+- **Floating terminal windows** — draggable, resizable panels for each agent with a live activity log showing every tool call, file read, and progress update as it happens
+- **Connection lines** — animated green lines linking parent sessions to their child agents, updating in real-time as agents spawn and complete
+- **Status & model badges** — green (active), yellow (idle), blue (completed) indicators with Haiku/Sonnet/Opus model color coding
+- **Auto-behavior** — windows auto-open on spawn, auto-minimize on completion, tab badge shows "AGENT" or "AGENTS (n)" count
+- **Nested agents** — supports 3-level hierarchies (lead session -> teammate agents -> sub-subagents)
+
+Multi-agent Workflow runs ("ultracode") get the same treatment: a floating run window tracks the whole workflow live, with phases, per-agent token counts, and the current tool of every agent:
+
+<p align="center">
+  <img src="docs/images/ultracode-window-20260724.png" alt="Ultracode workflow visualization: a live run window with per-agent tokens and phases" width="900">
+</p>
+
+**Agent Teams** — first-class support for Claude Code's native multi-agent teams (`CLAUDE_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL_AGENT_TEAMS=1`). `TeamWatcher` polls `~/.claude/teams/`, matches teammates to their lead session, and surfaces them as live subagent windows with **team-aware idle detection** — so the Respawn Controller won't fire while teammates are still working. See [`docs/agent-teams/`](docs/agent-teams/).
+
+---
+
 ## Respawn Controller
 
 The core of autonomous work. When the agent goes idle, the Respawn Controller detects it, sends a continue prompt, cycles context management commands for fresh context, and resumes — running **24+ hours** completely unattended.
@@ -302,7 +345,7 @@ Beyond single-session respawn, the **Orchestrator** turns a high-level goal into
 - **Crash-safe** — full state persists under the `orchestrator` key in `state.json`, so it survives restarts
 - **Driven from the UI or API** — the Orchestrator panel, or `POST /api/orchestrator/start` → `/approve` → `/status` (10 endpoints)
 
-> Distinct from Ralph (a single-session autonomous loop): the orchestrator coordinates multi-phase, multi-agent execution. Full design: [`docs/orchestrator-loop-architecture.md`](docs/orchestrator-loop-architecture.md).
+> Full design: [`docs/orchestrator-loop-architecture.md`](docs/orchestrator-loop-architecture.md).
 
 ---
 
@@ -310,14 +353,18 @@ Beyond single-session respawn, the **Orchestrator** turns a high-level goal into
 
 Run **20 parallel sessions** with full visibility — real-time xterm.js terminals at 60fps, per-session token and cost tracking, tab-based navigation, and one-click management.
 
-<p align="center">
-  <img src="docs/screenshots/multi-session-dashboard.png" alt="Multi-Session Dashboard" width="800">
-</p>
-
 ### Persistent Sessions
 
 Every session runs inside **tmux** — sessions survive server restarts, network drops, and machine sleep. Auto-recovery on startup with dual redundancy. Ghost session discovery finds orphaned tmux sessions. Managed sessions are environment-tagged so the agent won't kill its own session.
 
+### Session Manager & Command Palette
+
+`Ctrl/Cmd/Alt+K` opens a fuzzy session palette; **Browse all sessions** opens the Session Manager: one deduped list of everything Codeman knows about (live sessions, past sessions from state and lifecycle history, and Claude transcripts), each row showing its first and most recent prompt.
+
+- **Pinning**: pin a session to float it to the top of the list. Pinned sessions even survive kill (they demote to a lightweight stopped entry that stays visible and resumable).
+- **Name retention**: resuming a past session keeps its original name instead of minting a new one.
+- **Cross-device tab order**: drag-reordered tabs persist server-side, so your ordering follows you from desktop to phone.
+
 ### Hostname-Aware Window Title
 
 Running Codeman on multiple hosts (laptop, dev box, NAS)? The browser tab title is `codeman:<hostname>` so you can tell which backend each tab points at without clicking in:
@@ -340,14 +387,6 @@ The title is templated into the served HTML on first byte, so it's correct from
 
 Real-time desktop alerts when sessions need attention — `permission_prompt` and `elicitation_dialog` trigger critical red tab blinks, `idle_prompt` triggers yellow blinks. Click any notification to jump directly to the affected session. Hooks auto-configured per case directory.
 
-### Ralph / Todo Tracking
-
-Auto-detects Ralph Loops, `<promise>` tags, TodoWrite progress (`4/9 complete`), and iteration counters (`[5/50]`) with real-time progress rings and elapsed time tracking.
-
-<p align="center">
-  <img src="docs/images/ralph-tracker-8tasks-44percent.png" alt="Ralph Loop Tracking" width="800">
-</p>
-
 ### Run Summary
 
 Click the chart icon on any session tab to see a timeline of everything that happened — respawn cycles, token milestones, auto-compact triggers, idle/working transitions, hook events, errors, and more.
@@ -365,17 +404,70 @@ PTY Output → 16ms Server Batch → DEC 2026 Wrap → SSE → Client rAF → xt
 ## More Features
 
 - **Self-update** — git-clone installs under systemd/launchd update in place from **App Settings → Updates**: it detects the latest release, auto-stashes a dirty tree, and streams build progress across the service restart (npm installs report as non-updatable)
-- **Multi-CLI** — run **Claude Code**, **OpenCode**, or **Codex** per session; env-var prefixes auto-gate (`CLAUDE_CODE_*` vs `OPENCODE_*` vs `CODEX_*`). See [`docs/opencode-integration.md`](docs/opencode-integration.md)
+- **Multi-CLI** — run **Claude Code**, **OpenCode**, **Codex**, or **Gemini** per session; env-var prefixes auto-gate (`CLAUDE_CODE_*` vs `OPENCODE_*` vs `CODEX_*` vs `GEMINI_*`/`GOOGLE_*`). See [`docs/opencode-integration.md`](docs/opencode-integration.md)
+- **Docker sessions** — run a case inside an isolated, hardened container. One checkbox on **Create New** spins up a container with sensible defaults and starts the agent inside it; multiple sessions share one per-case container; export a container + its workspace to a portable `.tar.gz` to move it to another machine. See [`docs/docker-cases.md`](docs/docker-cases.md)
+- **Remote SSH sessions** — point a case at another machine and run the agent there inside a durable remote tmux: survives SSH drops, auto-reconnects, and can discover + attach sessions already running on the host. See [`docs/remote-sessions.md`](docs/remote-sessions.md)
 - **Effort & Ultracode** — set a per-session default effort (`low`–`max`) or enable **ultracode** (dynamic multi-agent workflows). Soft defaults only — switchable anytime with `/effort` in-session. Extended-thinking budget is configurable too
 - **Voice input** — dictate prompts with Deepgram Nova-3 (Web Speech API fallback): toggle recording, auto-silence stop, live level meter (`Ctrl+Shift+V`)
 - **Image input** — paste or drag-and-drop images straight into a session
 - **Gesture control** _(opt-in)_ — a MediaPipe hand-tracking overlay to grab/drag session windows and pinch buttons, hands-free. Enable with `CODEMAN_GESTURE=1` + App Settings → Display
 - **Multi-monitor span** _(macOS)_ — one click opens a browser window maximized across all displays, so floating agent/gesture panels can cross the physical seam
+- **File Viewer button** _(opt-in)_ — a header button that toggles the built-in file browser panel with one tap; enable under App Settings → Display → Header Displays
 - **CJK / IME input** — full composition support for Chinese / Japanese / Korean
 - **OS notifications & hostname-aware titles** — desktop alerts and tab titles are prefixed `codeman:<host>` so multi-host setups stay unambiguous
 
 ---
 
+## Isolated Docker Sessions
+
+Run a case inside its own hardened Docker container instead of directly on your host — for security isolation, reproducible toolchains, and one-click portability.
+
+- **One click** — on **New Case → Create New**, tick **🐳 Run in an isolated Docker container**. Codeman creates the case folder, spins up a container with default settings, and starts the agent inside it. No host/image/network fields to fill in.
+- **Resource templates** — expand the checkbox for a **Small / Medium / Large / GPU** preset (memory, CPUs, GPU), or set your own. **Disk is elastic** — storage grows as data flows in, no fixed cap.
+- **Shared per-case container** — many sessions can `docker exec` into the same container; killing one session never tears the container out from under the others.
+- **Hardened by default** — non-root, `--cap-drop ALL`, `no-new-privileges`, PID/memory caps, never `--privileged` or the docker socket; a **sealed** profile (no host credentials, network off) is one toggle away.
+- **Seamless auth, isolated credentials** — your host Claude / Codex / Gemini / OpenCode logins work inside the container out of the box: credentials are seeded (copied) in at launch and onboarding/trust prompts are pre-answered, so no login wizard appears. The container keeps its own copies and never writes back to your host credential stores; only conversation transcripts are shared, and exports never capture secrets.
+- **Move it to another machine** — export a container's whole environment (toolchain + workspace) to a portable `.tar.gz`, `docker load` it on the other side, and import it into a fresh case.
+- **Durable** — reconnect after a restart lands back in the same live agent; a container stop/reboot resumes the conversation from the bind-mounted transcript.
+
+Prerequisite: just Docker (or Podman). The agent base image builds itself automatically on first use, with progress streamed to the UI (or pre-build it with `node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs`). Full guide: [`docs/docker-cases.md`](docs/docker-cases.md).
+
+---
+
+## Remote SSH Sessions
+
+Point a case at another machine and run the agent **there**, over SSH, with the same dashboard, mobile UI, and autonomy features. Your laptop is just a window onto a session that lives on the remote host.
+
+- **Durable by design**: the agent runs inside a dedicated tmux session on the remote host, so a dropped SSH connection, network change, or laptop sleep never kills the run. Reconnecting lands back in the same live conversation.
+- **Auto-reconnect**: a bounded-backoff watcher notices a dead SSH pane and silently reattaches to the still-running remote session (kill-switch in settings; intentional kills are never revived).
+- **Discover & attach**: list the `codeman-*` sessions already running on a host (started by that machine's own Codeman, or by another operator) and attach to one. Attached sessions you don't own **detach on tab close, never kill**.
+- **Shared sessions**: several clients can attach the same remote session at different window sizes without clamping each other; discovery shows a "shared" badge with the client count.
+- **Injection-safe**: every ssh command line flows through a single shell-escaping builder, and host/path/identity fields are schema-guarded.
+
+Set it up under **New Case → Remote** (host, user, identity file, optional jump host). Full design: [`docs/remote-sessions.md`](docs/remote-sessions.md).
+
+---
+
+## Multi-User Mode (opt-in)
+
+Share one Codeman with a small trusted team, each person getting their own login and workspace. **Off by default** — without the flag, nothing changes.
+
+Enable with `codeman web --multiuser` (or `CODEMAN_MULTIUSER=1`). Create the first admin, then manage users from the CLI or the **Users** tab in App Settings:
+
+```bash
+codeman users add alice --admin      # prompts for a password (or --password-stdin)
+codeman users add bob                # a regular user
+codeman users list
+```
+
+- **Per-user spaces** — each user's cases live under `~/codeman-users/<name>/cases`; sessions, cases, search, and real-time events are scoped to their owner. Admins see everything.
+- **Individually revocable logins** — named users with scrypt-hashed passwords in `~/.codeman/users.json`; disable, reset (one-time password), or delete an account at any time. Admin actions are audited to `~/.codeman/admin-audit.jsonl`.
+- **Safer defaults for regular users** — non-admins run Claude in `--permission-mode auto` (Anthropic's classifier-guarded mode); raw shell sessions, cron `launchCommand`, and skip-permissions require an explicit per-user grant.
+
+> ⚠️ **This separates workspaces; it does not sandbox users from each other.** Every session runs as the same OS account, so a determined user's agent can still reach another user's files. For real isolation, pair users with **Docker cases** or run separate instances under separate OS accounts. See [`docs/multi-user-plan.md`](docs/multi-user-plan.md) and the multi-user section of [`docs/security-architecture.md`](docs/security-architecture.md).
+
+---
+
 ## Remote Access — Cloudflare Tunnel
 
 Access Codeman from your phone or any device outside your local network using a free [Cloudflare quick tunnel](https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-networks/do-more-with-tunnels/trycloudflare/) — no port forwarding, no DNS, no static IP required.
@@ -499,13 +591,14 @@ When someone authenticates via QR, the desktop shows a notification toast with t
 
 ## Security
 
-Codeman launches sessions with `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, so the web UI is by design a remote-code-execution surface for whoever can reach it — the whole security model exists to control _who_ that is. Recent hardening (v0.9.0 + v0.9.5) closes the browser-driven attack paths that bite self-hosted dev tools. Full model: [`docs/security-architecture.md`](docs/security-architecture.md). **Found a vulnerability?** See [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) for private disclosure and the list of known limitations.
+By default Codeman launches sessions with `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, so the web UI is by design a remote-code-execution surface for whoever can reach it — the whole security model exists to control _who_ that is. (The startup permission mode is configurable; see below.) Recent hardening (v0.9.0 + v0.9.5) closes the browser-driven attack paths that bite self-hosted dev tools. Full model: [`docs/security-architecture.md`](docs/security-architecture.md). **Found a vulnerability?** See [`SECURITY.md`](.github/SECURITY.md) for private disclosure and the list of known limitations.
 
 ### Network & access
 
-- **Loopback by default** — binds `127.0.0.1`, reachable only from the same machine, so the no-password default is safe out of the box. Binding a non-loopback host without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` _starts but prints a loud warning_ with three concrete fixes (set a password, loopback + an authenticated tunnel, or explicitly acknowledge with `--allow-unauthenticated-network`)
+- **Loopback by default** — the server binary binds `127.0.0.1`, reachable only from the same machine, so the no-password default is safe out of the box (the guided installer asks about network access and configures the binding + password for you). Binding a non-loopback host without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` _starts but prints a loud warning_ with three concrete fixes (set a password, loopback + an authenticated tunnel, or explicitly acknowledge with `--allow-unauthenticated-network`)
 - **Optional auth, real sessions** — HTTP Basic via `CODEMAN_USERNAME` (default `admin`) / `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`. Success issues an opaque 256-bit `codeman_session` cookie (`randomBytes(32)`) — validated server-side, not client-signed, so it can't be forged offline (24h TTL, auto-extend, device-context audit log)
 - **Per-IP rate limiting** — 10 failed attempts → `429` with `Retry-After` (15-min decay). A valid cookie or correct password recovers _immediately_ even while an attacker hammers the same IP — important because all tunnel traffic shares one loopback IP. QR auth has its own separate limiter
+- **Configurable permission mode** - `--dangerously-skip-permissions` is only the default. **App Settings → Claude CLI → Startup Mode** can switch new sessions to Anthropic's classifier-guarded `auto` mode (low-prompt, needs Claude Code 2.1.207+), `normal` prompting, or an explicit allowed-tools list. In multi-user mode, non-granted users are forced to `auto`, and shell sessions / skip-permissions require an explicit per-user grant
 
 ### Always-on browser hardening (v0.9.5)
 
@@ -519,7 +612,7 @@ These run for **every** request — before auth, even on the default no-password
 
 ### Input, files & headers
 
-- **Schema-validated inputs** — every API body is checked with Zod v4 schemas; a `CLAUDE_CODE_*` / `OPENCODE_*` / `CODEX_*` env-prefix allowlist gates which settings each CLI can receive
+- **Schema-validated inputs** — every API body is checked with Zod v4 schemas; a `CLAUDE_CODE_*` / `OPENCODE_*` / `CODEX_*` / `GEMINI_*` / `GOOGLE_*` env-prefix allowlist gates which settings each CLI can receive
 - **Path containment** — file routes `realpath` before boundary checks (no TOCTOU); `..`, absolute paths, and symlinks resolving outside the working dir are rejected. Caps: 10 MB text preview / 50 MB raw & download; `/api/download` blocklists sensitive paths (`.env`, `*credentials*`, `~/.ssh/`, `.aws/credentials`). SVG/HTML is served `octet-stream` + `nosniff` + attachment so it downloads rather than executes
 - **Security headers** — `Content-Security-Policy` (`default-src 'self'`, every exception enumerated), `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`, HSTS over HTTPS, and CORS reflected **only** for `localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `::1`
 
@@ -641,7 +734,6 @@ codeman session start -d /path/to/repo   # (s)  start a session
 codeman session list                     #      list sessions
 codeman session logs <id>                #      tail output
 codeman task add "fix the failing test"  # (t)  queue a task
-codeman ralph start --min-hours 8        # (r)  launch the autonomous loop
 codeman attach <path>                     #      attach a Claude hook context
 ```
 
@@ -655,7 +747,7 @@ Codeman registers Claude Code hooks that `POST /api/hook-event` (`permission_pro
 
 ## API
 
-REST over Fastify — **~160 handlers across 18 route modules**, plus an SSE stream and a WebSocket terminal channel. All responses use the `ApiResponse<T>` envelope (`{success, data}` / `{success, error, errorCode}`); `/api/v1/*` is a stable alias. A representative subset:
+REST over Fastify — **~190 handlers across 20 route modules**, plus an SSE stream and a WebSocket terminal channel. All responses use the `ApiResponse<T>` envelope (`{success, data}` / `{success, error, errorCode}`); `/api/v1/*` is a stable alias. A representative subset:
 
 ### Sessions
 
@@ -665,6 +757,9 @@ REST over Fastify — **~160 handlers across 18 route modules**, plus an SSE str
 | `POST`   | `/api/quick-start`         | Create case + start session (`{caseName?, mode?, effort?, envOverrides?}`)         |
 | `POST`   | `/api/sessions/:id/input`  | Send input (`{input, useMux?, clientId?, seq?}` — `clientId`+`seq` = exactly-once) |
 | `GET`    | `/api/sessions/:id/output` | Read terminal output                                                               |
+| `GET`    | `/api/sessions/unified`    | Unified live + history list (Session Manager) — `?q=&limit=`                       |
+| `POST`   | `/api/sessions/:id/pin`    | Pin/unpin in the Session Manager (`{pinned}`)                                      |
+| `PUT`    | `/api/session-order`       | Sync tab order across devices (`{order: [ids]}`)                                   |
 | `DELETE` | `/api/sessions/:id`        | Delete session                                                                     |
 
 ### Respawn
@@ -675,13 +770,6 @@ REST over Fastify — **~160 handlers across 18 route modules**, plus an SSE str
 | `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/stop`   | Stop controller            |
 | `PUT`  | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/config` | Update config              |
 
-### Ralph / Todo
-
-| Method | Endpoint                         | Description            |
-| ------ | -------------------------------- | ---------------------- |
-| `GET`  | `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-state`  | Get loop state + todos |
-| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-config` | Configure tracking     |
-
 ### Orchestrator
 
 | Method | Endpoint                    | Description                     |
@@ -744,7 +832,6 @@ flowchart TB
         end
 
         subgraph Detection["Detection Layer"]
-            RT["Ralph Tracker"]
             SW["Subagent Watcher<br/><small>~/.claude/projects/*/subagents</small>"]
             TW["Team Watcher<br/><small>~/.claude/teams/*</small>"]
         end
@@ -755,7 +842,7 @@ flowchart TB
         end
 
         subgraph External["External"]
-            CLI["AI CLI<br/><small>Claude Code / OpenCode / Codex</small>"]
+            CLI["AI CLI<br/><small>Claude Code / OpenCode / Codex / Gemini</small>"]
             BG["Background Agents<br/><small>(Task tool)</small>"]
         end
     end
@@ -768,7 +855,6 @@ flowchart TB
     SM --> RC
     SM --> ORC
     SM --> SS
-    S1 --> RT
     S1 --> SCR
     S2 --> SCR
     RC --> SCR
@@ -787,7 +873,7 @@ flowchart TB
 npm install
 npx tsx src/index.ts web    # Dev mode
 npm run build               # Production build
-npm test                    # Run tests
+npm run test:ci             # Run tests (the CI suite; browser suites need extra setup)
 ```
 
 See [CLAUDE.md](./CLAUDE.md) for full documentation.
@@ -817,7 +903,7 @@ Full details: [`docs/archive/code-structure-findings.md`](docs/archive/code-stru
 
 [![npm](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/xterm-zerolag-input?style=flat-square&color=22c55e)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/xterm-zerolag-input)
 
-Instant keystroke feedback overlay for xterm.js. Eliminates perceived input latency over high-RTT connections by rendering typed characters immediately as a pixel-perfect DOM overlay. Zero dependencies, configurable prompt detection, full state machine with 78 tests.
+Instant keystroke feedback overlay for xterm.js. Eliminates perceived input latency over high-RTT connections by rendering typed characters immediately as a pixel-perfect DOM overlay. Zero dependencies, 6.1 kB gzipped, configurable prompt detection, CJK/emoji wide-character support, full state machine with 175 tests.
 
 ```bash
 npm install xterm-zerolag-input
@@ -844,3 +930,8 @@ MIT — see [LICENSE](LICENSE)
 <p align="center">
   <strong>Track sessions. Visualize agents. Control respawn. Let it run while you sleep.</strong>
 </p>
+
+<p align="center">
+  If Codeman saves you time, <a href="https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/stargazers">a star</a> helps other people find it.<br>
+  Bug reports and feature ideas are welcome in <a href="https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/issues">Issues</a>.
+</p>

README.zh-CN.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 <h2 align="center">AI 编程智能体的任务控制中心</h2>
 
 <p align="center">
-  <em>Claude Code &bull; OpenCode &bull; Codex —— 统一仪表盘 &bull; 任意设备</em>
+  <em>Claude Code &bull; OpenCode &bull; Codex &bull; Gemini &bull; 终端 —— 统一仪表盘 &bull; 任意设备</em>
 </p>
 
 <p align="center">
@@ -14,39 +14,73 @@
 
 <p align="center">
   <a href="https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-1e3a5f?style=flat-square" alt="License: MIT"></a>
-  <a href="https://nodejs.org/"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Node.js-18%2B-22c55e?style=flat-square&logo=node.js&logoColor=white" alt="Node.js 18+"></a>
+  <a href="https://nodejs.org/"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Node.js-22%2B-22c55e?style=flat-square&logo=node.js&logoColor=white" alt="Node.js 22+"></a>
   <a href="https://www.typescriptlang.org/"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/TypeScript-5.9-3b82f6?style=flat-square&logo=typescript&logoColor=white" alt="TypeScript 5.9"></a>
   <a href="https://fastify.dev/"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Fastify-5.x-1e3a5f?style=flat-square&logo=fastify&logoColor=white" alt="Fastify"></a>
-  <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Tests-2861%20total-22c55e?style=flat-square" alt="Tests">
+  <a href="https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/graphs/contributors"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/contributors/Ark0N/Codeman?style=flat-square&color=3b82f6" alt="Contributors"></a>
+  <a href="https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman/commits/master"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/commit-activity/t/Ark0N/Codeman?style=flat-square&color=1e3a5f" alt="Total commits"></a>
 </p>
 
 <p align="center">
-  <img src="docs/images/subagent-demo.gif" alt="Codeman — 并行子智能体可视化" width="900">
+  <img src="docs/images/subagent-demo-20260724.gif" alt="Codeman — 并行子智能体可视化" width="900">
+</p>
+
+<p align="center">
+  <img src="docs/images/codeman-tour-20260724.png" alt="Codeman 仪表盘导览：按项目分组的会话标签页、一键 Run 启动新智能体、页头实时用量" width="900">
 </p>
 
 > 本文档由英文版 [`README.md`](README.md) 翻译而来。如有出入，以英文版为准。
 
----
-
-## 快速开始 — 安装
+一行命令即可安装（macOS 和 Linux，Windows 通过 WSL）：
 
 ```bash
-curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Ark0N/Codeman/master/install.sh | bash
+curl -fsSL https://getcodeman.com/install | bash
 ```
 
-该脚本会在缺失时自动安装 Node.js 和 tmux，把 Codeman 克隆到 `~/.codeman/app` 并完成构建。
-
-你至少需要安装一个 AI 编程 CLI —— [Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code)、[OpenCode](https://opencode.ai) 或 [Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli)（任意组合均可）。安装完成后：
-
 ```bash
 codeman web
 # 打开 http://localhost:3000，开启你的第一个会话
 ```
 
+安装器在每次系统改动前都会先询问；重跑同一条命令即可原地更新。详见[快速开始 — 安装](#快速开始--安装)。
+
+---
+
+## 快速开始 — 安装
+
+```bash
+curl -fsSL https://getcodeman.com/install | bash
+```
+
+该脚本会在缺失时自动安装 Node.js 和 tmux，把 Codeman 克隆到 `~/.codeman/app` 并完成构建。几点须知：
+
+- **先询问，后改动。** 所有系统级改动（安装软件包、下载 AI CLI）都会先征求确认；结束时的菜单可选择：直接在本终端运行、安装为后台服务（systemd/launchd，开机自启），或暂不启动。不选就不会有任何后台进程。
+- **重跑即更新。** 再次运行同一条命令即可原地更新已完成的安装：`~/.codeman/app` 中的本地改动会被 stash（绝不丢弃），运行中的服务会自动重启并校验。若首次安装中途失败，重跑会继续完成完整的安装流程。也可以使用 `install.sh update` 与 `install.sh uninstall`。
+- **CI / 无终端环境：** 没有终端时，涉及系统改动的步骤会带着说明中止，而不是静默执行；在自动化场景设置 `CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1` 即可批准这些步骤。
+
+你至少需要安装一个 AI 编程 CLI —— [Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code)、[OpenCode](https://opencode.ai)、[Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli) 或 [Gemini CLI](https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli)（任意组合均可）。安装器会自动检测这四个中已安装的任意一个；若一个都没有，会提供安装 Claude Code 或 OpenCode 的选项，也可以选择跳过、稍后自行安装。安装完成后：
+
+```bash
+codeman web
+# 打开 http://localhost:3000，开启你的第一个会话
+```
+
+**想和小团队共用一台？** 改用多用户模式启动：每人拥有自己的登录与工作空间。
+
+```bash
+codeman users add alice --admin      # 创建第一个管理员账号
+codeman web --multiuser              # 命名登录 + 按用户隔离的案例空间
+```
+
+详见下文[多用户模式](#多用户模式可选启用)。
+
 <details>
 <summary><strong>作为后台服务运行</strong></summary>
 
+安装器结尾的菜单（选项 2）可以帮你完成这一步，并在宣告成功前校验服务确实已启动。如需手动配置：
+
 **Linux（systemd）：**
+
 ```bash
 mkdir -p ~/.config/systemd/user
 cat > ~/.config/systemd/user/codeman-web.service << EOF
@@ -69,6 +103,7 @@ loginctl enable-linger $USER
 ```
 
 **macOS（launchd）：**
+
 ```bash
 mkdir -p ~/Library/LaunchAgents
 cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.codeman.web.plist << EOF
@@ -96,16 +131,18 @@ cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.codeman.web.plist << EOF
 EOF
 launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.codeman.web.plist
 ```
+
 </details>
 
 <details>
 <summary><strong>Windows（WSL）</strong></summary>
 
 ```powershell
-wsl bash -c "curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Ark0N/Codeman/master/install.sh | bash"
+wsl bash -c "curl -fsSL https://getcodeman.com/install | bash"
 ```
 
-Codeman 依赖 tmux，因此 Windows 用户需要 [WSL](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/wsl/install)。如果还没装 WSL：在管理员 PowerShell 中运行 `wsl --install`，重启，打开 Ubuntu，然后在 WSL 内安装你偏好的 AI 编程 CLI（[Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code)、[OpenCode](https://opencode.ai) 或 [Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli)）。安装完成后，即可从 Windows 浏览器访问 `http://localhost:3000`。
+Codeman 依赖 tmux，因此 Windows 用户需要 [WSL](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/wsl/install)。如果还没装 WSL：在管理员 PowerShell 中运行 `wsl --install`，重启，打开 Ubuntu，然后在 WSL 内安装你偏好的 AI 编程 CLI（[Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code)、[OpenCode](https://opencode.ai)、[Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli) 或 [Gemini CLI](https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli)）。安装完成后，即可从 Windows 浏览器访问 `http://localhost:3000`。
+
 </details>
 
 ---
@@ -116,14 +153,12 @@ Codeman 依赖 tmux，因此 Windows 用户需要 [WSL](https://learn.microsoft.
 
 <table>
 <tr>
-<td align="center" width="33%"><img src="docs/screenshots/mobile-landing-qr.png" alt="移动端 — 带二维码认证的登录页" width="260"></td>
-<td align="center" width="33%"><img src="docs/screenshots/mobile-session-idle.png" alt="移动端 — 带键盘配件栏的空闲会话" width="260"></td>
-<td align="center" width="33%"><img src="docs/screenshots/mobile-session-active.png" alt="移动端 — 活动中的智能体会话" width="260"></td>
+<td align="center" width="40%"><img src="docs/screenshots/mobile-session-keyboard-20260727.png" alt="移动端 — 通过键盘配件栏与 Enter 按钮回答智能体的方案提示" width="300"></td>
+<td align="center" width="60%"><img src="docs/screenshots/mobile-toolbar-enter-20260727.png" alt="移动端工具栏：配件栏的 /init、/clear、剪贴板与 Esc，下方是 Run、案例、停止、Enter、语音与设置控件" width="440"></td>
 </tr>
 <tr>
-<td align="center"><em>带二维码认证的登录页</em></td>
-<td align="center"><em>键盘配件栏</em></td>
-<td align="center"><em>智能体实时工作中</em></td>
+<td align="center"><em>触控回答提示</em></td>
+<td align="center"><em>配件栏 + 独立 Enter 按钮</em></td>
 </tr>
 </table>
 
@@ -142,23 +177,10 @@ Codeman 依赖 tmux，因此 Windows 用户需要 [WSL](https://learn.microsoft.
 <tr><td>在手机上手打密码</td><td><b>扫二维码 —— 即时认证</b></td></tr>
 </table>
 
-### 安全的二维码认证
-
-在手机键盘上输密码太痛苦了。Codeman 用**密码学安全的一次性二维码令牌**取而代之 —— 扫描桌面上显示的二维码，手机即刻完成认证。
-
-每个二维码编码的是一个包含 6 字符短码的 URL，该短码在服务端映射到一个 256 位密钥（`crypto.randomBytes(32)`）。令牌每 **60 秒**自动轮换，**首次扫描即原子性消费**（重放永远失败），并采用**基于哈希的 `Map.get()` 查找**，不会通过响应时延泄露任何信息。短码只是一个不透明指针 —— 真正的密钥永远不会出现在浏览器历史、`Referer` 头或 Cloudflare 边缘日志中。
-
-该安全设计覆盖了 ["Demystifying the (In)Security of QR Code-based Login"](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/zhang-xin)（USENIX Security 2025，该研究发现 Top-100 网站中有 47 个存在漏洞）所指出的全部 6 个关键二维码认证缺陷：强制一次性使用、短 TTL、密码学随机性、服务端生成、扫描时桌面实时通知（QRLjacking 检测），以及 IP + User-Agent 会话绑定与手动吊销。双层速率限制（按 IP + 全局）使得在 62^6 = 568 亿种可能短码空间内进行暴力破解变得不可行。完整安全分析见：[`docs/qr-auth-plan.md`](docs/qr-auth-plan.md)
-
-### 触控优化界面
-
-- **键盘配件栏** —— 在虚拟键盘上方提供 `/init`、`/clear`、`/compact` 快捷按钮。破坏性命令（`/clear`、`/compact`）需双击确认 —— 第一次点击「上膛」，第二次点击执行 —— 这样在颠簸的通勤路上也不会误触
-- **滑动导航** —— 在终端上左右滑动切换会话（阈值 80px，300ms）
-- **智能键盘处理** —— 键盘弹出时工具栏与终端整体上移（使用 `visualViewport` API，并对 iOS 地址栏漂移设置 100px 阈值）
-- **安全区适配** —— 通过 `env(safe-area-inset-*)` 适配 iPhone 刘海与底部 Home 指示条
-- **44px 触控目标** —— 所有按钮均满足 iOS 人机界面指南的最小尺寸
-- **底部抽屉式 case 选择器** —— 用上滑模态框替代桌面端下拉菜单
-- **原生惯性滚动** —— `-webkit-overflow-scrolling: touch`，丝滑流畅
+- **键盘配件栏** —— 在虚拟键盘上方提供 `/init`、`/clear`、`/compact` 快捷按钮；破坏性命令需双击确认，绝不误触
+- **独立的 Enter 按钮** —— 以按键方式回放，先冲刷本地回显缓冲的文本，不会让内容滞留在屏幕上
+- **滑动导航与智能键盘处理** —— 左右滑动切换会话；键盘弹出时工具栏与终端整体上移（`visualViewport` API）
+- **为手机而生** —— 刘海与 Home 指示条的安全区适配、44px 触控目标、底部抽屉式 case 选择器、原生惯性滚动
 
 ```bash
 codeman web --https
@@ -167,30 +189,86 @@ codeman web --https
 
 > `localhost` 走纯 HTTP 即可。从其他设备访问时请使用 `--https`，或使用 [Tailscale](https://tailscale.com/)（推荐）—— 它提供私有网络，让你无需 TLS 证书即可从手机访问 `http://<tailscale-ip>:3000`。
 
+### 安全的二维码认证
+
+在手机键盘上输密码太痛苦了。Codeman 用**密码学安全的一次性二维码令牌**取而代之 —— 扫描桌面上显示的二维码，手机即刻完成认证。
+
+每个二维码编码的是一个包含 6 字符短码的 URL，该短码在服务端映射到一个 256 位密钥（`crypto.randomBytes(32)`）。令牌每 **60 秒**自动轮换，**首次扫描即原子性消费**（重放永远失败），并采用**基于哈希的 `Map.get()` 查找**，不会通过响应时延泄露任何信息。短码只是一个不透明指针 —— 真正的密钥永远不会出现在浏览器历史、`Referer` 头或 Cloudflare 边缘日志中。
+
+该安全设计覆盖了 ["Demystifying the (In)Security of QR Code-based Login"](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/zhang-xin)（USENIX Security 2025，该研究发现 Top-100 网站中有 47 个存在漏洞）所指出的全部 6 个关键二维码认证缺陷：强制一次性使用、短 TTL、密码学随机性、服务端生成、扫描时桌面实时通知（QRLjacking 检测），以及 IP + User-Agent 会话绑定与手动吊销。双层速率限制（按 IP + 全局）使得在 62^6 = 568 亿种可能短码空间内进行暴力破解变得不可行。完整安全分析见：[`docs/qr-auth-plan.md`](docs/qr-auth-plan.md)
+
 ---
 
-## 实时智能体可视化
+## 使用 Codeman —— 人类操作指南
 
-实时观看后台智能体工作。Codeman 监控智能体活动，将每个智能体显示在一个可拖拽的浮动窗口中，并用「黑客帝国」风格的动态连接线连回父会话。
+从头到尾走一遍如何在浏览器里驾驭 Codeman。如果你刚装好，就从这里开始。
 
-<p align="center">
-  <img src="docs/images/subagent-spawn.png" alt="子智能体可视化" width="900">
-</p>
+### 1. 启动服务器
 
-- **浮动终端窗口** —— 每个智能体一个可拖拽、可调整大小的面板，带实时活动日志，逐条展示每一次工具调用、文件读取与进度更新
-- **连接线** —— 用动态绿色线条连接父会话与其子智能体，随智能体的产生与完成实时更新
-- **状态与模型徽标** —— 绿色（活动）、黄色（空闲）、蓝色（已完成）指示，并以 Haiku/Sonnet/Opus 的颜色编码区分模型
-- **自动行为** —— 窗口在产生时自动打开、完成时自动最小化，标签徽标显示「AGENT」或「AGENTS (n)」计数
-- **嵌套智能体** —— 支持 3 层层级（主会话 → 团队成员智能体 → 子-子智能体）
+```bash
+codeman web                       # localhost:3000（仅环回 —— 安全默认值）
+codeman web --port 8080           # 自定义端口（或设置 CODEMAN_PORT）
+codeman web --https               # 自签名 TLS（仅远程访问时需要）
+codeman web -H 0.0.0.0            # 绑定局域网 —— 必须设置 CODEMAN_PASSWORD（见「安全」）
+```
 
-**智能体团队（Agent Teams）** —— 一等公民式支持 Claude Code 原生的多智能体团队（`CLAUDE_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL_AGENT_TEAMS=1`）。`TeamWatcher` 轮询 `~/.claude/teams/`，将团队成员匹配到其主会话，并以实时子智能体窗口呈现，且具备**团队感知的空闲检测** —— 因此当团队成员仍在工作时，重生控制器不会被触发。详见 [`docs/agent-teams/`](docs/agent-teams/)。
+打开打印出的 URL。整个页面是一个单一仪表盘；下面的一切都在这里完成。
+
+### 2. 创建你的第一个会话
+
+点击 **+ New Session**（或 **Quick Start**）。一个会话就是一个运行在自己 tmux 终端里的 AI CLI。你可以选择：
+
+| 字段                   | 作用                                                                                        |
+| ---------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **工作目录 / case**    | 智能体操作的文件夹。「case」就是一个 Codeman 记住的命名工作目录。                           |
+| **CLI / 运行模式**     | `Claude`（默认）、`OpenCode`、`Codex`、`Gemini` 或 `Terminal`（普通 shell）。               |
+| **模型**               | 每会话模型（App Settings → Claude Model）。软默认值 —— 会话内 `/model` 依然有效。           |
+| **Effort / Ultracode** | 推理力度（`low`–`max`），或用 `ultracode` 开启动态多智能体工作流。随时可用 `/effort` 切换。 |
+
+点击启动 —— Codeman 通过真实 PTY 拉起 CLI，并经 SSE 流式传输到你的浏览器。
+
+### 3. 读懂仪表盘
+
+- **标签（顶部）** —— 每个会话一个。`Alt+1`–`9` 跳转，`Ctrl+Tab` 下一个，拖拽排序（标签顺序会跨设备同步）。
+- **终端（中央）** —— 真实的 `xterm.js` 终端；完整 TUI 正常渲染。直接输入并按 **Enter** 发送。`Shift+Enter` 插入换行。
+- **侧边面板** —— Respawn、Orchestrator、Cron、Subagents、Settings（从工具栏切换）。
+
+### 4. 与智能体对话
+
+- **直接在终端输入提示** —— 即使跨越重连，输入也是精确一次送达（连接中断绝不会丢失或重复发送提示）。
+- **粘贴或拖放图片**，直接进入会话。
+- **语音输入** —— `Ctrl+Shift+V`（Deepgram Nova-3，自动静音停止）。
+- **附件** —— 注册外部文件/文档，并内联预览 Office/PDF。
+
+### 5. 让它自主运行
+
+| 模式             | 用途                                                                                                      | 位置                                                               |
+| ---------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| **Respawn**      | 长时间无人值守运行 —— 空闲/限额时自动重启 CLI，带自适应时序。预设：`solo-work`、`overnight-autonomous` 等 | Respawn 标签页                                                     |
+| **Orchestrator** | 把一个目标变成分阶段计划，并跨多个智能体推动完成。                                                        | 编排器面板                                                         |
+| **Cron**         | 已保存的、命名的定时任务（`once`/`interval`/`daily`/`weekly`），到期时拉起会话并发送提示。                | ⏰ Cron 按钮（可选启用：App Settings → Display → Header Displays） |
+| **Auto-resume**  | 订阅限额重置后自动继续。                                                                                  | Respawn 标签页（顶部）                                             |
+
+### 6. 随时随地访问
+
+- **手机/平板** —— UI 完全触控优化；扫描桌面上的**二维码**即可免密码登录。
+- **网络之外** —— `./scripts/tunnel.sh start` 打开一条 Cloudflare 隧道（先设置 `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`）。
+- **SSH** —— `sc` 选择器可从终端附着任意会话（`sc` 交互式，`sc 2` 快速附着，`sc -l` 列表）。
+
+### 7. 运维与维护
+
+- **App Settings** —— 模型、effort、权限启动模式、主题/皮肤、通知、显示开关、各 CLI 的专属选项，以及跨设备同步的自定义显示名称和按设备保存的英文/简体中文界面语言。
+- **自更新** —— git-clone 安装可在 **Settings → Updates** 中原地更新。
+- **部署你自己的改动** —— 见[开发](#开发)。
+
+> ⚠️ **安全提示：** 如果你正在 Codeman 受管会话*内部*工作（`echo $CODEMAN_MUX` → `1`），绝不要直接运行 `tmux kill-session` / `pkill claude` —— 请使用 Web UI 或 `./scripts/tmux-manager.sh`。
 
 ---
 
 ## 零延迟输入叠加层
 
 <p align="center">
-  <img src="docs/images/zerolag-demo.gif" alt="Zerolag 演示 —— 本地回显与服务端回显并排对比" width="900">
+  <img src="docs/images/zerolag-demo-20260728.gif" alt="Zerolag 演示：两台手机并排对比，即时本地回显与 600ms-2.7s 服务端回显" width="900">
 </p>
 
 远程访问你的编程智能体时（VPN、Tailscale、SSH 隧道），每次按键通常需要 200–300 毫秒往返。Codeman 实现了一套**受 Mosh 启发的本地回显系统**，无论延迟多高，打字都感觉即时。
@@ -207,6 +285,30 @@ xterm.js 内部一个像素级精准的 DOM 叠加层以 0ms 渲染按键。后
 
 ---
 
+## 实时智能体可视化
+
+实时观看后台智能体工作。Codeman 监控智能体活动，将每个智能体显示在一个可拖拽的浮动窗口中，并用「黑客帝国」风格的动态连接线连回父会话。
+
+<p align="center">
+  <img src="docs/images/subagent-windows-20260724.png" alt="子智能体可视化 —— 三个并行 Explore 智能体的浮动窗口与实时工具调用日志" width="900">
+</p>
+
+- **浮动终端窗口** —— 每个智能体一个可拖拽、可调整大小的面板，带实时活动日志，逐条展示每一次工具调用、文件读取与进度更新
+- **连接线** —— 用动态绿色线条连接父会话与其子智能体，随智能体的产生与完成实时更新
+- **状态与模型徽标** —— 绿色（活动）、黄色（空闲）、蓝色（已完成）指示，并以 Haiku/Sonnet/Opus 的颜色编码区分模型
+- **自动行为** —— 窗口在产生时自动打开、完成时自动最小化，标签徽标显示「AGENT」或「AGENTS (n)」计数
+- **嵌套智能体** —— 支持 3 层层级（主会话 → 团队成员智能体 → 子-子智能体）
+
+多智能体 Workflow 运行（「ultracode」）同样可视化：一个浮动运行窗口实时跟踪整个工作流，展示阶段、各智能体的 token 用量与当前工具：
+
+<p align="center">
+  <img src="docs/images/ultracode-window-20260724.png" alt="Ultracode 工作流可视化 —— 实时运行窗口，含各智能体 token 与阶段" width="900">
+</p>
+
+**智能体团队（Agent Teams）** —— 一等公民式支持 Claude Code 原生的多智能体团队（`CLAUDE_CODE_EXPERIMENTAL_AGENT_TEAMS=1`）。`TeamWatcher` 轮询 `~/.claude/teams/`，将团队成员匹配到其主会话，并以实时子智能体窗口呈现，且具备**团队感知的空闲检测** —— 因此当团队成员仍在工作时，重生控制器不会被触发。详见 [`docs/agent-teams/`](docs/agent-teams/)。
+
+---
+
 ## 重生控制器（Respawn Controller）
 
 自主工作的核心。当智能体进入空闲，重生控制器会检测到，发送继续提示，循环执行上下文管理命令以获得全新上下文，然后恢复工作 —— 可完全无人值守运行 **24 小时以上**。
@@ -216,7 +318,7 @@ WATCHING → IDLE DETECTED → SEND UPDATE → /clear → /init → CONTINUE →
 ```
 
 - **多层空闲检测** —— 完成消息、AI 驱动的空闲检查、输出静默、token 稳定性
-- **用量限额自动恢复**（*可选，默认关闭*）—— 当 Claude 因订阅用量限额而停止（"You've hit your limit · resets 3pm"）时，Codeman 会解析重置时间，等到限额刷新（外加 2 分钟安全缓冲）后自动关闭限额对话框并发送 `continue`，让通宵任务平稳跨过 5 小时窗口而不是停摆到早晨。可识别 Claude Code 各版本的全部限额消息格式；若仍受限会自动重试；计划在 Codeman 重启后依然生效；暂停期间会阻止重生循环，避免 `/clear` 清掉等待中的对话。在会话 Respawn 标签页顶部按会话启用
+- **用量限额自动恢复**（_可选，默认关闭_）—— 当 Claude 因订阅用量限额而停止（"You've hit your limit · resets 3pm"）时，Codeman 会解析重置时间，等到限额刷新（外加 2 分钟安全缓冲）后自动关闭限额对话框并发送 `continue`，让通宵任务平稳跨过 5 小时窗口而不是停摆到早晨。可识别 Claude Code 各版本的全部限额消息格式；若仍受限会自动重试；计划在 Codeman 重启后依然生效；暂停期间会阻止重生循环，避免 `/clear` 清掉等待中的对话。在会话 Respawn 标签页顶部按会话启用
 - **熔断器** —— 当 Claude 卡住时防止重生抖动（CLOSED → HALF_OPEN → OPEN 状态，跟踪连续无进展与重复错误）
 - **健康评分** —— 0–100 健康分，分项涵盖循环成功率、熔断器状态、迭代进展与卡死恢复
 - **内置预设** —— `solo-work`（3s 空闲，60min）、`subagent-workflow`（45s，240min）、`team-lead`（90s，480min）、`ralph-todo`（8s，480min）、`overnight-autonomous`（10s，480min）
@@ -233,7 +335,7 @@ WATCHING → IDLE DETECTED → SEND UPDATE → /clear → /init → CONTINUE →
 - **崩溃安全** —— 完整状态持久化在 `state.json` 的 `orchestrator` 键下，可在重启后存续
 - **可从 UI 或 API 驱动** —— 编排器面板，或 `POST /api/orchestrator/start` → `/approve` → `/status`（共 10 个端点）
 
-> 与 Ralph（单会话自主循环）不同：编排器协调多阶段、多智能体执行。完整设计：[`docs/orchestrator-loop-architecture.md`](docs/orchestrator-loop-architecture.md)。
+> 完整设计：[`docs/orchestrator-loop-architecture.md`](docs/orchestrator-loop-architecture.md)。
 
 ---
 
@@ -241,14 +343,18 @@ WATCHING → IDLE DETECTED → SEND UPDATE → /clear → /init → CONTINUE →
 
 运行 **20 个并行会话**且全程可见 —— 60fps 的实时 xterm.js 终端、按会话的 token 与成本跟踪、基于标签的导航，以及一键管理。
 
-<p align="center">
-  <img src="docs/screenshots/multi-session-dashboard.png" alt="多会话仪表盘" width="800">
-</p>
-
 ### 持久化会话
 
 每个会话都运行在 **tmux** 内 —— 会话可在服务器重启、网络中断与机器休眠后存续。启动时自动恢复，具备双重冗余。幽灵会话发现机制能找到孤立的 tmux 会话。受管会话带有环境标签，因此智能体不会杀掉自己的会话。
 
+### 会话管理器与命令面板
+
+`Ctrl/Cmd/Alt+K` 打开模糊搜索的会话面板；**Browse all sessions** 打开会话管理器：一份去重后的完整清单，涵盖 Codeman 所知的一切（活动会话、来自状态与生命周期历史的既往会话，以及 Claude 转录），每一行都显示其第一条与最近一条提示。
+
+- **置顶（Pin）**：把会话固定到列表顶部。被置顶的会话甚至能挺过被杀掉（降级为一条轻量的已停止记录，依然可见、可恢复）。
+- **名称保留**：从会话管理器恢复既往会话时保留其原有名称，而不是生成一个新名称。
+- **跨设备标签顺序**：拖拽排序的标签顺序保存在服务端，你的排列会从桌面跟随到手机。
+
 ### 主机名感知的窗口标题
 
 在多台主机上运行 Codeman（笔记本、开发机、NAS）？浏览器标签标题是 `codeman:<主机名>`，让你无需点进去就能分辨每个标签对应哪个后端：
@@ -262,23 +368,15 @@ codeman web --title-hostname dev-box       # codeman:dev-box（用于覆盖嘈
 
 ### 智能 Token 管理
 
-| 阈值 | 动作 | 结果 |
-|-----------|--------|--------|
+| 阈值            | 动作            | 结果                   |
+| --------------- | --------------- | ---------------------- |
 | **110k tokens** | 自动 `/compact` | 上下文被摘要，工作继续 |
-| **140k tokens** | 自动 `/clear` | 以 `/init` 全新开始 |
+| **140k tokens** | 自动 `/clear`   | 以 `/init` 全新开始    |
 
 ### 通知
 
 当会话需要关注时实时桌面提醒 —— `permission_prompt` 与 `elicitation_dialog` 触发关键的红色标签闪烁，`idle_prompt` 触发黄色闪烁。点击任意通知即可直接跳转到相关会话。Hook 按 case 目录自动配置。
 
-### Ralph / Todo 跟踪
-
-自动检测 Ralph 循环、`<promise>` 标签、TodoWrite 进度（`4/9 complete`）以及迭代计数器（`[5/50]`），并提供实时进度环与已用时间跟踪。
-
-<p align="center">
-  <img src="docs/images/ralph-tracker-8tasks-44percent.png" alt="Ralph 循环跟踪" width="800">
-</p>
-
 ### 运行摘要（Run Summary）
 
 点击任意会话标签上的图表图标，即可看到所发生一切的时间线 —— 重生周期、token 里程碑、自动 compact 触发、空闲/工作切换、hook 事件、错误等等。
@@ -296,17 +394,70 @@ PTY 输出 → 16ms 服务端批处理 → DEC 2026 包裹 → SSE → 客户端
 ## 更多特性
 
 - **自更新** —— systemd/launchd 管理下的 git-clone 安装可在 **App Settings → Updates** 中原地更新：它会检测最新发行版，自动暂存（stash）脏工作树，并在服务重启期间流式展示构建进度（npm 安装会被报告为不可更新）
-- **多 CLI** —— 每个会话可选 **Claude Code**、**OpenCode** 或 **Codex**；环境变量前缀自动隔离（`CLAUDE_CODE_*`、`OPENCODE_*` 与 `CODEX_*`）。详见 [`docs/opencode-integration.md`](docs/opencode-integration.md)
+- **多 CLI** —— 每个会话可选 **Claude Code**、**OpenCode**、**Codex** 或 **Gemini**；环境变量前缀自动隔离（`CLAUDE_CODE_*`、`OPENCODE_*`、`CODEX_*` 与 `GEMINI_*`/`GOOGLE_*`）。详见 [`docs/opencode-integration.md`](docs/opencode-integration.md)
+- **Docker 会话** —— 在隔离且加固的容器中运行案例。**Create New** 上勾选一个复选框即可用合理的默认值启动容器并在其中启动智能体；同一案例的多个会话共享一个容器；可将容器连同工作区导出为可移植的 `.tar.gz`，迁移到另一台机器。详见 [`docs/docker-cases.md`](docs/docker-cases.md)
+- **远程 SSH 会话**：把案例指向另一台机器，让智能体在那里一个持久的远程 tmux 中运行：SSH 断连不中断任务、自动重连，还能发现并附着主机上已在运行的会话。详见 [`docs/remote-sessions.md`](docs/remote-sessions.md)
 - **Effort 与 Ultracode** —— 设置每会话的默认 effort（`low`–`max`），或启用 **ultracode**（动态多智能体工作流）。这些都只是软默认值 —— 会话中可随时用 `/effort` 切换。扩展思考预算也可配置
 - **语音输入** —— 用 Deepgram Nova-3 口述提示（带 Web Speech API 回退）：切换录音、自动静音停止、实时音量表（`Ctrl+Shift+V`）
 - **图像输入** —— 直接把图片粘贴或拖放进会话
-- **手势控制** *(可选)* —— 一个 MediaPipe 手部追踪叠加层，可徒手抓取/拖动会话窗口并捏合按钮。用 `CODEMAN_GESTURE=1` + App Settings → Display 启用
-- **多显示器横跨** *(macOS)* —— 一键打开一个横跨所有显示器最大化的浏览器窗口，让浮动的智能体/手势面板可以跨越物理拼接缝
+- **手势控制** _(可选)_ —— 一个 MediaPipe 手部追踪叠加层，可徒手抓取/拖动会话窗口并捏合按钮。用 `CODEMAN_GESTURE=1` + App Settings → Display 启用
+- **多显示器横跨** _(macOS)_ —— 一键打开一个横跨所有显示器最大化的浏览器窗口，让浮动的智能体/手势面板可以跨越物理拼接缝
+- **文件查看器按钮** _(可选)_ —— 头部新增一个按钮，一键切换内置文件浏览器面板；在 App Settings → Display → Header Displays 中启用
 - **CJK / 输入法支持** —— 完整支持中文 / 日文 / 韩文的组合输入
 - **操作系统通知与主机名感知标题** —— 桌面提醒与标签标题以 `codeman:<host>` 为前缀，使多主机配置不再含糊
 
 ---
 
+## 隔离的 Docker 会话
+
+让案例（case）运行在专属的加固 Docker 容器里，而不是直接跑在主机上：获得安全隔离、可复现的工具链和一键可移植性。
+
+- **一键启动** —— 在 **New Case → Create New** 中勾选 **🐳 Run in an isolated Docker container**。Codeman 会创建案例文件夹、用默认设置启动容器，并在容器内启动智能体。无需填写任何主机/镜像/网络字段。
+- **资源模板** —— 展开复选框可选 **Small / Medium / Large / GPU** 预设（内存、CPU、GPU），也可以完全自定义。**磁盘是弹性的** —— 存储随数据增长，没有固定上限。
+- **按案例共享容器** —— 多个会话可以 `docker exec` 进同一个容器；结束某个会话绝不会影响其他会话所在的容器。
+- **默认加固** —— 非 root、`--cap-drop ALL`、`no-new-privileges`、PID/内存上限，绝不使用 `--privileged` 或 docker socket；**密封（sealed）** 配置（不注入主机凭据、关闭网络）只需一个开关。
+- **无感认证、凭据隔离** —— 主机上的 Claude / Codex / Gemini / OpenCode 登录在容器内开箱即用：凭据在启动时以只读种子方式复制注入，onboarding/信任提示已预先答复，不会弹出登录向导。容器保留自己的副本，绝不回写主机的凭据存储；跨边界共享的只有对话转录，导出文件也绝不包含机密。
+- **迁移到另一台机器** —— 把容器的完整环境（工具链 + 工作区）导出为可移植的 `.tar.gz`，在另一台机器上导入到新案例即可继续。
+- **持久耐用** —— Codeman 重启后重连会回到同一个存活的智能体；容器停止/重启后则从绑定挂载的转录恢复对话。
+
+前置条件：只需 Docker（或 Podman）。智能体基础镜像会在首次使用时自动构建，构建进度实时显示在 UI 中（也可用 `node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs` 预构建）。完整指南：[`docs/docker-cases.md`](docs/docker-cases.md)。
+
+---
+
+## 远程 SSH 会话
+
+把案例（case）指向另一台机器，通过 SSH 让智能体**在那台机器上**运行，同时保留同样的仪表盘、移动端 UI 与自主运行特性。你的笔记本只是一扇窗口，会话本体活在远程主机上。
+
+- **天生持久**：智能体运行在远程主机上一个专用的 tmux 会话里，SSH 断连、网络切换或笔记本休眠都不会中断任务。重新连接后回到同一个活跃对话。
+- **自动重连**：一个带上限退避的监视器发现 SSH 面板断开后，会静默重新附着到仍在运行的远程会话（设置中有总开关；主动杀掉的会话绝不会被复活）。
+- **发现与附着**：列出主机上已在运行的 `codeman-*` 会话（由那台机器自己的 Codeman 或其他操作者启动）并附着其一。非你所有的已附着会话在关闭标签时**只分离，绝不杀掉**。
+- **共享会话**：多个客户端可以以不同窗口尺寸同时附着同一个远程会话而互不挤压；发现列表会显示带客户端计数的「shared」徽标。
+- **注入安全**：所有 ssh 命令行都经由单一的 shell 转义构建器生成，主机/路径/身份文件字段均有模式校验。
+
+在 **New Case → Remote** 中配置（主机、用户、身份文件、可选跳板机）。完整设计：[`docs/remote-sessions.md`](docs/remote-sessions.md)。
+
+---
+
+## 多用户模式（可选启用）
+
+与一个小型互信团队共享同一个 Codeman，每人拥有自己的登录与工作空间。**默认关闭**：不加该开关时，行为与单用户完全一致。
+
+用 `codeman web --multiuser`（或 `CODEMAN_MULTIUSER=1`）启用。创建第一个管理员后，可通过 CLI 或 App Settings 中的 **Users** 标签页管理用户：
+
+```bash
+codeman users add alice --admin      # 提示输入密码（或 --password-stdin）
+codeman users add bob                # 普通用户
+codeman users list
+```
+
+- **按用户的空间**：每个用户的案例位于 `~/codeman-users/<name>/cases`；会话、案例、搜索与实时事件都按属主隔离。管理员可以看到全部。
+- **可单独吊销的登录**：命名用户的密码以 scrypt 哈希保存在 `~/.codeman/users.json`；可随时禁用、重置（一次性密码）或删除账号。管理员操作审计记录在 `~/.codeman/admin-audit.jsonl`。
+- **普通用户的更安全默认值**：非管理员以 `--permission-mode auto` 运行 Claude（Anthropic 的分类器护栏模式）；raw shell 会话、cron `launchCommand` 与跳过权限模式需要按用户显式授权。
+
+> ⚠️ **这只是工作空间的划分，不是用户之间的沙箱。** 所有会话都以同一个操作系统账户运行，因此有心用户的智能体依然能触及他人的文件。若需要真正的隔离，请结合 **Docker 案例**，或在不同的操作系统账户下运行独立实例。参见 [`docs/multi-user-plan.md`](docs/multi-user-plan.md) 与 [`docs/security-architecture.md`](docs/security-architecture.md) 的多用户章节。
+
+---
+
 ## 远程访问 —— Cloudflare 隧道
 
 使用免费的 [Cloudflare 快速隧道](https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-networks/do-more-with-tunnels/trycloudflare/)，从手机或本地网络外的任意设备访问 Codeman —— 无需端口转发、无需 DNS、无需静态 IP。
@@ -374,14 +525,14 @@ loginctl enable-linger $USER
 
 该设计参考了 ["Demystifying the (In)Security of QR Code-based Login"](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/zhang-xin)（USENIX Security 2025），该研究发现 Top-100 网站中有 47 个因横跨 42 个 CVE 的 6 个关键设计缺陷而易受二维码认证攻击。Codeman 全部六个都做了应对：
 
-| USENIX 缺陷 | 缓解措施 |
-|-------------|------------|
-| **缺陷 1**：缺少一次性强制 | 令牌首次扫描即原子性消费 —— 重放永远失败 |
-| **缺陷 2**：长生命周期令牌 | 60s TTL + 90s 宽限，由定时器自动轮换 |
-| **缺陷 3**：可预测的令牌生成 | `crypto.randomBytes(32)` —— 256 位熵。短码采用拒绝采样以消除取模偏差 |
-| **缺陷 4**：客户端令牌生成 | 仅服务端 —— 令牌在嵌入二维码前绝不离开服务器 |
-| **缺陷 5**：缺少状态通知 | 桌面提示：*「设备 [IP] 已通过二维码认证（Safari）。不是你？[吊销]」* —— 实时 QRLjacking 检测 |
-| **缺陷 6**：会话绑定不足 | 存储 IP + User-Agent 以供审计。通过 API 手动吊销会话。HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=lax cookie |
+| USENIX 缺陷                  | 缓解措施                                                                                      |
+| ---------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **缺陷 1**：缺少一次性强制   | 令牌首次扫描即原子性消费 —— 重放永远失败                                                      |
+| **缺陷 2**：长生命周期令牌   | 60s TTL + 90s 宽限，由定时器自动轮换                                                          |
+| **缺陷 3**：可预测的令牌生成 | `crypto.randomBytes(32)` —— 256 位熵。短码采用拒绝采样以消除取模偏差                          |
+| **缺陷 4**：客户端令牌生成   | 仅服务端 —— 令牌在嵌入二维码前绝不离开服务器                                                  |
+| **缺陷 5**：缺少状态通知     | 桌面提示：_「设备 [IP] 已通过二维码认证（Safari）。不是你？[吊销]」_ —— 实时 QRLjacking 检测  |
+| **缺陷 6**：会话绑定不足     | 存储 IP + User-Agent 以供审计。通过 API 手动吊销会话。HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=lax cookie |
 
 #### 时序安全的查找
 
@@ -406,23 +557,23 @@ URL 被刻意保持精简（`/q/` 路径 + 6 字符码 ≈ 53–56 个字符）
 
 #### 威胁覆盖
 
-| 威胁 | 为何无效 |
-|--------|-------------------|
-| **二维码截图被分享** | 一次性：首次扫描即消费。60s TTL：攻击者动手前已过期。桌面通知会立即提醒你。 |
-| **重放攻击** | 原子性一次性消费 + 60s TTL。旧 URL 始终返回 401。 |
+| 威胁                    | 为何无效                                                                             |
+| ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| **二维码截图被分享**    | 一次性：首次扫描即消费。60s TTL：攻击者动手前已过期。桌面通知会立即提醒你。          |
+| **重放攻击**            | 原子性一次性消费 + 60s TTL。旧 URL 始终返回 401。                                    |
 | **Cloudflare 边缘日志** | 短码是不透明的 6 字符查找键，而非真正的 256 位令牌。一次性意味着从日志重放永远失败。 |
-| **暴力破解** | 568 亿种组合、任意时刻约 2 个有效、双层速率限制，早在统计可行性之前就已拦截。 |
-| **QRLjacking** | 60s 轮换迫使实时转发。桌面提示提供即时检测。自托管单用户场景使钓鱼难以成立。 |
-| **时序攻击** | 基于哈希的 Map 查找 —— 无字符串比较时序泄露。 |
-| **会话 cookie 窃取** | HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=lax + 24h TTL。可在 `POST /api/auth/revoke` 手动吊销。 |
+| **暴力破解**            | 568 亿种组合、任意时刻约 2 个有效、双层速率限制，早在统计可行性之前就已拦截。        |
+| **QRLjacking**          | 60s 轮换迫使实时转发。桌面提示提供即时检测。自托管单用户场景使钓鱼难以成立。         |
+| **时序攻击**            | 基于哈希的 Map 查找 —— 无字符串比较时序泄露。                                        |
+| **会话 cookie 窃取**    | HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=lax + 24h TTL。可在 `POST /api/auth/revoke` 手动吊销。  |
 
 #### 横向对比
 
-| 平台 | 模型 | 对比 |
-|----------|-------|------------|
-| **Discord** | 长生命周期令牌、无确认、[屡被利用](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Qrljacking) | Codeman：一次性 + TTL + 通知 |
-| **WhatsApp Web** | 手机确认「关联设备？」，约 60s 轮换 | 轮换相当；WhatsApp 额外加了显式确认（对单用户而言是可接受的取舍） |
-| **Signal** | 临时公钥、端到端加密信道 | 加密更强，但 [2025 年仍被俄罗斯国家级行为者](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger)通过社会工程攻破 |
+| 平台             | 模型                                                                                   | 对比                                                                                                                                                     |
+| ---------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **Discord**      | 长生命周期令牌、无确认、[屡被利用](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Qrljacking) | Codeman：一次性 + TTL + 通知                                                                                                                             |
+| **WhatsApp Web** | 手机确认「关联设备？」，约 60s 轮换                                                    | 轮换相当；WhatsApp 额外加了显式确认（对单用户而言是可接受的取舍）                                                                                        |
+| **Signal**       | 临时公钥、端到端加密信道                                                               | 加密更强，但 [2025 年仍被俄罗斯国家级行为者](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger)通过社会工程攻破 |
 
 > 完整设计理由、安全分析与实现细节：[`docs/qr-auth-plan.md`](docs/qr-auth-plan.md)
 
@@ -430,13 +581,14 @@ URL 被刻意保持精简（`/q/` 路径 + 6 字符码 ≈ 53–56 个字符）
 
 ## 安全
 
-Codeman 用 `--dangerously-skip-permissions` 启动会话，因此 Web UI 在设计上对任何能访问到它的人都是一个远程代码执行面 —— 整套安全模型的存在就是为了控制*谁*能访问。近期加固（v0.9.0 + v0.9.5）封堵了那些常困扰自托管开发工具的浏览器驱动攻击路径。完整模型：[`docs/security-architecture.md`](docs/security-architecture.md)。
+Codeman 默认用 `--dangerously-skip-permissions` 启动会话，因此 Web UI 在设计上对任何能访问到它的人都是一个远程代码执行面 —— 整套安全模型的存在就是为了控制*谁*能访问。（启动权限模式可配置，见下文。）近期加固（v0.9.0 + v0.9.5）封堵了那些常困扰自托管开发工具的浏览器驱动攻击路径。完整模型：[`docs/security-architecture.md`](docs/security-architecture.md)。**发现了漏洞？** 私下披露方式与已知限制清单见 [`SECURITY.md`](.github/SECURITY.md)。
 
 ### 网络与访问
 
 - **默认仅环回** —— 绑定 `127.0.0.1`，仅可从本机访问，因此「无密码」默认配置开箱即安全。在未设置 `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` 的情况下绑定非环回主机会*启动但打印一条醒目警告*，并给出三个具体修复方案（设置密码、环回 + 一个带认证的隧道，或用 `--allow-unauthenticated-network` 显式确认）
 - **可选认证，真实会话** —— 通过 `CODEMAN_USERNAME`（默认 `admin`）/ `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` 的 HTTP Basic 认证。成功后签发一个不透明的 256 位 `codeman_session` cookie（`randomBytes(32)`）—— 服务端校验，而非客户端签名，因此无法离线伪造（24h TTL、自动延长、设备上下文审计日志）
 - **按 IP 速率限制** —— 失败 10 次 → `429` 并带 `Retry-After`（15 分钟衰减）。即便攻击者在同一 IP 上猛攻，有效 cookie 或正确密码也能*立即*恢复 —— 这很重要，因为所有隧道流量共享同一个环回 IP。二维码认证有自己独立的限制器
+- **可配置的权限模式**：`--dangerously-skip-permissions` 只是默认值。**App Settings → Claude CLI → Startup Mode** 可以把新会话切换为 Anthropic 的分类器护栏 `auto` 模式（低打扰，需要 Claude Code 2.1.207+）、`normal` 提示模式，或一份显式的允许工具列表。多用户模式下，未获授权的用户会被强制为 `auto`，shell 会话与跳过权限需要按用户显式授权
 
 ### 始终开启的浏览器加固（v0.9.5）
 
@@ -450,7 +602,7 @@ Codeman 用 `--dangerously-skip-permissions` 启动会话，因此 Web UI 在设
 
 ### 输入、文件与响应头
 
-- **模式校验的输入** —— 每个 API 请求体都用 Zod v4 模式检查；一个 `CLAUDE_CODE_*` / `OPENCODE_*` / `CODEX_*` 环境变量前缀允许列表把控每个 CLI 能接收哪些设置
+- **模式校验的输入** —— 每个 API 请求体都用 Zod v4 模式检查；一个 `CLAUDE_CODE_*` / `OPENCODE_*` / `CODEX_*` / `GEMINI_*` / `GOOGLE_*` 环境变量前缀允许列表把控每个 CLI 能接收哪些设置
 - **路径限定** —— 文件路由在边界检查前先 `realpath`（无 TOCTOU）；`..`、绝对路径、以及解析到工作目录之外的符号链接都会被拒绝。上限：10 MB 文本预览 / 50 MB 原始与下载；`/api/download` 对敏感路径（`.env`、`*credentials*`、`~/.ssh/`、`.aws/credentials`）做黑名单。SVG/HTML 以 `octet-stream` + `nosniff` + attachment 提供，因此会被下载而非执行
 - **安全响应头** —— `Content-Security-Policy`（`default-src 'self'`，每个例外都逐条列举）、`X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`、`X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`、HTTPS 下的 HSTS，以及**仅**对 `localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `::1` 反射的 CORS
 
@@ -481,73 +633,172 @@ sc -l           # 列出会话
 
 > Ctrl 绑定在 macOS 上也接受 Cmd。
 
-| 快捷键 | 动作 |
-|----------|--------|
-| `Ctrl/Cmd+W` | 杀掉当前会话 |
-| `Ctrl/Cmd+Tab` | 下一个会话 |
-| `Alt+1`–`Alt+9` | 切换到第 N 个标签 |
-| `Ctrl+Shift+{` / `Ctrl+Shift+}` | 将当前标签左移 / 右移 |
-| `Ctrl/Cmd+L` | 清屏 |
-| `Ctrl+Shift+R` | 恢复终端尺寸 |
-| `Ctrl+Shift+V` | 切换语音输入 |
-| `Ctrl/Cmd +` / `-` | 字体大小 |
-| `Ctrl/Cmd+?` | 键盘帮助 |
-| `Shift+Enter` | 插入换行（发送到终端） |
-| `Escape` | 关闭面板与模态框 |
+| 快捷键                          | 动作                                                     |
+| ------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `Ctrl/Cmd+W`                    | 杀掉当前会话                                             |
+| `Ctrl/Cmd/Option+K`             | 查找已打开的会话或新建一个                               |
+| `Ctrl/Cmd+Tab`                  | 下一个会话                                               |
+| `Alt/Option+[` / `Alt/Option+]` | 上一个 / 下一个会话                                      |
+| `Alt/Option+1`–`Alt/Option+9`   | 切换到第 N 个标签（按物理键位，macOS Option 布局也适用） |
+| `Ctrl+Shift+{` / `Ctrl+Shift+}` | 将当前标签左移 / 右移                                    |
+| `Ctrl/Cmd+L`                    | 清屏                                                     |
+| `Ctrl+Shift+R`                  | 恢复终端尺寸                                             |
+| `Ctrl+Shift+V`                  | 切换语音输入                                             |
+| `Ctrl/Cmd +` / `-`              | 字体大小                                                 |
+| `Ctrl/Cmd+?`                    | 键盘帮助                                                 |
+| `Shift+Enter`                   | 插入换行（发送到终端）                                   |
+| `Escape`                        | 关闭面板与模态框                                         |
+
+---
+
+## 从智能体驱动 Codeman —— 编程指南
+
+面向不经浏览器控制 Codeman 的 AI 智能体与自动化：一个拉起工作会话的智能体、一个 CI 机器人，或是**运行在 Codeman 会话*内部*、编排其他会话的 Claude Code**。UI 能做的一切都是 HTTP + CLI，因此智能体也能做。
+
+### 检测自己身处 Codeman 内部
+
+当 CLI 运行在 Codeman 受管会话中时，以下环境变量会被设置 —— 读取它们，别硬编码任何东西：
+
+| 变量                       | 含义                                                                                                                 |
+| -------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `CODEMAN_MUX=1`            | 你在一个受管 tmux 会话里。**绝不要** `tmux kill-session` / `pkill claude` / `pkill tmux` —— 你会杀掉自己或兄弟会话。 |
+| `CODEMAN_API_URL`          | API 的基础 URL（例如 `https://127.0.0.1:3000`）。下面每个调用都用它。                                                |
+| `CODEMAN_SESSION_ID`       | *你自己的*会话 id。用它避免对自己下手。                                                                              |
+| `CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE` | hook 密钥文件的路径（受管隧道开启时调用 `/api/hook-event` 必需）。                                                   |
+
+### 行路规则（POST 之前先读）
+
+1. **只发单行输入。** 编程输入会作为字面文本 **+ Enter** 一次性发送。多行字符串会破坏智能体 TUI（Ink）—— 发送一行，或拆成多次调用。
+2. **让输入幂等。** 在 `POST …/input` 上带上稳定的 `clientId` 和按会话单调递增的 `seq`。服务端会去重，因此连接中断后的重试不会重复投递提示。
+3. **认证。** 若设置了 `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`，发送 HTTP Basic 认证（用户 `admin` 或 `CODEMAN_USERNAME`）或 `codeman_session` cookie。默认的环回安装无密码。缺失的 `Origin` 头被允许，因此普通 `curl` 可用；跨站的浏览器 origin 会被拒绝（CSRF 防护）。
+4. **响应信封。** 多数端点返回 `{ "success": true, "data": … }`（错误：`{ "success": false, "error", "errorCode" }`）。少数遗留 GET 返回裸响应体 —— **两种都要处理**（`body.data ?? body`）。
+5. **`/api/v1/*`** 是 `/api/*` 的稳定别名。
+
+### 常用配方
+
+```bash
+API="${CODEMAN_API_URL:-http://127.0.0.1:3000}"
+# （若设置了密码，给每个调用加上  -u admin:"$CODEMAN_PASSWORD"）
+
+# 1. 看看有什么在运行
+curl -s "$API/api/sessions" | jq '.data // .'
+
+# 2. 拉起一个工作会话（「case」= 命名工作目录）
+curl -s -X POST "$API/api/quick-start" \
+  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+  -d '{"caseName":"refactor-auth","mode":"claude","effort":"high"}' | jq
+
+# 3. 向会话发送提示（精确一次：clientId + seq）
+curl -s -X POST "$API/api/sessions/$SID/input" \
+  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+  -d '{"input":"Run the test suite and summarize failures","useMux":true,"clientId":"agent-1","seq":1}'
+
+# 4. 读回终端内容
+curl -s "$API/api/sessions/$SID/output" | jq -r '.data // .'
+
+# 5. 流式接收实时事件（会话输出、智能体活动、状态）
+curl -sN "$API/api/events"          # Server-Sent Events
+
+# 6. 调度周期性工作（cron 风格任务）
+curl -s -X POST "$API/api/cron/jobs" \
+  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+  -d '{"name":"nightly-deps","agentType":"claude","workingDir":"/home/me/proj",
+       "promptMode":"inline_text","promptText":"Update dependencies and open a PR",
+       "inputMode":"typed","scheduleType":"daily","dailyTime":"03:00",
+       "enabled":true,"concurrencyPolicy":"warn_only"}' | jq
+
+# 7. 查看后台子智能体及其活动记录
+curl -s "$API/api/subagents" | jq '.data // .'
+curl -s "$API/api/subagents/$AID/transcript" | jq -r '.data // .'
+
+# 8. 全系统快照（会话、设置、重生、统计）
+curl -s "$API/api/status" | jq
+```
+
+### 或使用内置 CLI
+
+同样的操作也有命令形式（`codeman <cmd>`，括号内为别名）—— 在会话内的 shell 工具里很顺手：
+
+```bash
+codeman session start -d /path/to/repo   # (s)  启动会话
+codeman session list                     #      列出会话
+codeman session logs <id>                #      查看输出
+codeman task add "fix the failing test"  # (t)  排入任务
+codeman attach <path>                    #      附着 Claude hook 上下文
+```
+
+### Hook（事件*回流*到 Codeman）
+
+Codeman 会注册 Claude Code hook，它们 `POST /api/hook-event`（`permission_prompt`、`idle_prompt`、`stop`、`task_completed` 等），让仪表盘实时响应。该端点在环回上免认证，但在受管隧道下需要 `X-Codeman-Hook-Secret` 头（从 `$CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE` 读取）。通常你不需要手动调用它 —— Codeman 会自动接好 —— 但自主层正是靠它「看见」智能体在做什么。
+
+> 完整端点列表与请求/响应形状见下文。
 
 ---
 
 ## API
 
-基于 Fastify 的 REST —— **15 个路由模块中约 140 个处理器**，外加一条 SSE 流和一条 WebSocket 终端通道。以下是一个有代表性的子集：
+基于 Fastify 的 REST —— **20 个路由模块中约 190 个处理器**，外加一条 SSE 流和一条 WebSocket 终端通道。所有响应都使用 `ApiResponse<T>` 信封（`{success, data}` / `{success, error, errorCode}`）；`/api/v1/*` 是稳定别名。以下是一个有代表性的子集：
 
 ### 会话（Sessions）
-| 方法 | 端点 | 说明 |
-|--------|----------|-------------|
-| `GET` | `/api/sessions` | 列出全部 |
-| `POST` | `/api/quick-start` | 创建 case 并启动会话 |
-| `DELETE` | `/api/sessions/:id` | 删除会话 |
-| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/input` | 发送输入 |
+
+| 方法     | 端点                       | 说明                                                                           |
+| -------- | -------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| `GET`    | `/api/sessions`            | 列出全部                                                                       |
+| `POST`   | `/api/quick-start`         | 创建 case + 启动会话（`{caseName?, mode?, effort?, envOverrides?}`）           |
+| `POST`   | `/api/sessions/:id/input`  | 发送输入（`{input, useMux?, clientId?, seq?}` —— `clientId`+`seq` = 精确一次） |
+| `GET`    | `/api/sessions/:id/output` | 读取终端输出                                                                   |
+| `GET`    | `/api/sessions/unified`    | 统一的活动 + 历史清单（会话管理器）：`?q=&limit=`                              |
+| `POST`   | `/api/sessions/:id/pin`    | 在会话管理器中置顶 / 取消置顶（`{pinned}`）                                    |
+| `PUT`    | `/api/session-order`       | 跨设备同步标签顺序（`{order: [ids]}`）                                         |
+| `DELETE` | `/api/sessions/:id`        | 删除会话                                                                       |
 
 ### 重生（Respawn）
-| 方法 | 端点 | 说明 |
-|--------|----------|-------------|
-| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/enable` | 启用，带配置与定时器 |
-| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/stop` | 停止控制器 |
-| `PUT` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/config` | 更新配置 |
 
-### Ralph / Todo
-| 方法 | 端点 | 说明 |
-|--------|----------|-------------|
-| `GET` | `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-state` | 获取循环状态 + todos |
-| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-config` | 配置跟踪 |
+| 方法   | 端点                               | 说明                 |
+| ------ | ---------------------------------- | -------------------- |
+| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/enable` | 启用，带配置与定时器 |
+| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/stop`   | 停止控制器           |
+| `PUT`  | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/config` | 更新配置             |
 
 ### 编排器（Orchestrator）
-| 方法 | 端点 | 说明 |
-|--------|----------|-------------|
-| `POST` | `/api/orchestrator/start` | 从目标启动编排 |
-| `POST` | `/api/orchestrator/approve` | 批准生成的计划 |
-| `GET` | `/api/orchestrator/status` | 当前阶段 + 进度 |
-| `POST` | `/api/orchestrator/stop` | 停止并清理 |
+
+| 方法   | 端点                        | 说明            |
+| ------ | --------------------------- | --------------- |
+| `POST` | `/api/orchestrator/start`   | 从目标启动编排  |
+| `POST` | `/api/orchestrator/approve` | 批准生成的计划  |
+| `GET`  | `/api/orchestrator/status`  | 当前阶段 + 进度 |
+| `POST` | `/api/orchestrator/stop`    | 停止并清理      |
+
+### Cron（定时任务）
+
+| 方法             | 端点                         | 说明                  |
+| ---------------- | ---------------------------- | --------------------- |
+| `GET` / `POST`   | `/api/cron/jobs`             | 列出 / 创建 cron 任务 |
+| `PUT` / `DELETE` | `/api/cron/jobs/:id`         | 更新 / 删除任务       |
+| `PUT`            | `/api/cron/jobs/:id/enabled` | 启用 / 禁用           |
+| `POST`           | `/api/cron/jobs/:id/run`     | 立即运行              |
+| `GET`            | `/api/cron/jobs/:id/runs`    | 运行历史              |
 
 ### 子智能体（Subagents）
-| 方法 | 端点 | 说明 |
-|--------|----------|-------------|
-| `GET` | `/api/subagents` | 列出所有后台智能体 |
-| `GET` | `/api/subagents/:id` | 智能体信息与状态 |
-| `GET` | `/api/subagents/:id/transcript` | 完整活动记录 |
-| `DELETE` | `/api/subagents/:id` | 杀掉智能体进程 |
+
+| 方法     | 端点                            | 说明               |
+| -------- | ------------------------------- | ------------------ |
+| `GET`    | `/api/subagents`                | 列出所有后台智能体 |
+| `GET`    | `/api/subagents/:id`            | 智能体信息与状态   |
+| `GET`    | `/api/subagents/:id/transcript` | 完整活动记录       |
+| `DELETE` | `/api/subagents/:id`            | 杀掉智能体进程     |
 
 ### 系统（System）
-| 方法 | 端点 | 说明 |
-|--------|----------|-------------|
-| `GET` | `/api/events` | SSE 流 |
-| `GET` | `/api/status` | 完整应用状态 |
-| `POST` | `/api/hook-event` | Hook 回调 |
-| `GET` | `/api/system/update/check` | 检查新发行版 |
-| `POST` | `/api/system/update` | 自更新（git-clone 安装） |
-| `POST` | `/api/clipboard` | 把文本推送到所有已连接浏览器（`{text}`） |
-| `GET` | `/api/sessions/:id/run-summary` | 时间线 + 统计 |
+
+| 方法   | 端点                            | 说明                                     |
+| ------ | ------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------- |
+| `GET`  | `/api/events`                   | SSE 流                                   |
+| `GET`  | `/api/status`                   | 完整应用状态                             |
+| `POST` | `/api/hook-event`               | Hook 回调                                |
+| `GET`  | `/api/system/update/check`      | 检查新发行版                             |
+| `POST` | `/api/system/update`            | 自更新（git-clone 安装）                 |
+| `POST` | `/api/clipboard`                | 把文本推送到所有已连接浏览器（`{text}`） |
+| `GET`  | `/api/sessions/:id/run-summary` | 时间线 + 统计                            |
 
 ---
 
@@ -571,7 +822,6 @@ flowchart TB
         end
 
         subgraph Detection["检测层"]
-            RT["Ralph 跟踪器"]
             SW["子智能体监视器<br/><small>~/.claude/projects/*/subagents</small>"]
             TW["团队监视器<br/><small>~/.claude/teams/*</small>"]
         end
@@ -582,7 +832,7 @@ flowchart TB
         end
 
         subgraph External["外部"]
-            CLI["AI CLI<br/><small>Claude Code / OpenCode / Codex</small>"]
+            CLI["AI CLI<br/><small>Claude Code / OpenCode / Codex / Gemini</small>"]
             BG["后台智能体<br/><small>(Task 工具)</small>"]
         end
     end
@@ -595,7 +845,6 @@ flowchart TB
     SM --> RC
     SM --> ORC
     SM --> SS
-    S1 --> RT
     S1 --> SCR
     S2 --> SCR
     RC --> SCR
@@ -614,7 +863,7 @@ flowchart TB
 npm install
 npx tsx src/index.ts web    # 开发模式
 npm run build               # 生产构建
-npm test                    # 运行测试
+npm run test:ci             # 运行测试（CI 套件；浏览器套件需要额外环境）
 ```
 
 完整文档见 [CLAUDE.md](./CLAUDE.md)。
@@ -625,14 +874,14 @@ npm test                    # 运行测试
 
 本代码库经历了一次全面的 7 阶段重构，消除了上帝对象、集中了配置，并建立了模块化架构：
 
-| 阶段 | 改了什么 | 影响 |
-|-------|-------------|--------|
-| **性能** | 缓存端点、SSE 自适应批处理、缓冲区分块 | 终端延迟低于 16ms |
-| **路由抽取** | `server.ts` 拆分为 15 个领域路由模块 + 认证中间件 + 端口接口 | server.ts 代码量 **−67%**（6,736 → 2,254） |
-| **领域拆分** | `types.ts` → 16 个领域文件、`ralph-tracker` → 7 个文件、`respawn-controller` → 5 个文件、`session` → 6 个文件 | 不再有上帝文件 |
-| **前端模块** | `app.js` → 18 个抽取模块，横跨基础设施、领域与特性层 | app.js 核心降至 **约 3.4K 行** |
-| **配置合并** | 约 70 个散落的魔法数字 → 10 个领域聚焦的配置文件 | 零跨文件重复 |
-| **测试基础设施** | 共享 mock 库、12 个路由测试文件、统一的 MockSession | 路由处理器可通过 `app.inject()` 测试 |
+| 阶段             | 改了什么                                                                                                      | 影响                                       |
+| ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------ |
+| **性能**         | 缓存端点、SSE 自适应批处理、缓冲区分块                                                                        | 终端延迟低于 16ms                          |
+| **路由抽取**     | `server.ts` 拆分为 15 个领域路由模块 + 认证中间件 + 端口接口                                                  | server.ts 代码量 **−67%**（6,736 → 2,254） |
+| **领域拆分**     | `types.ts` → 16 个领域文件、`ralph-tracker` → 7 个文件、`respawn-controller` → 5 个文件、`session` → 6 个文件 | 不再有上帝文件                             |
+| **前端模块**     | `app.js` → 18 个抽取模块，横跨基础设施、领域与特性层                                                          | app.js 核心降至 **约 3.4K 行**             |
+| **配置合并**     | 约 70 个散落的魔法数字 → 10 个领域聚焦的配置文件                                                              | 零跨文件重复                               |
+| **测试基础设施** | 共享 mock 库、12 个路由测试文件、统一的 MockSession                                                           | 路由处理器可通过 `app.inject()` 测试       |
 
 完整细节：[`docs/archive/code-structure-findings.md`](docs/archive/code-structure-findings.md)
 
@@ -654,6 +903,10 @@ npm install xterm-zerolag-input
 
 ---
 
+## 版本策略
+
+Codeman 遵循 [SemVer](https://semver.org/)。版本号真正承诺的内容，以及哪些算内部实现（HTTP/SSE API、磁盘上的状态、实验性特性），都写在 [`docs/versioning-policy.md`](docs/versioning-policy.md) 中。如果你的脚本依赖 HTTP API，请锁定到确切版本。
+
 ## 许可证
 
 MIT —— 见 [LICENSE](LICENSE)

docker/agent.Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+# Codeman agent base image (built locally by scripts/build-agent-image.mjs).
+#
+# Contains the agent toolchain (node + the CLIs + git/tmux/ripgrep) but NO
+# secrets: credentials are delivered at RUNTIME via bind mounts (~/.claude etc.)
+# or name-only `docker exec --env`, never baked in, so `docker save` exports stay
+# secret-free. tmux is a HARD prerequisite (the in-container tmux is what makes a
+# reconnect durable), so it is installed here and probed before launch.
+#
+# HOME is made writable by an ARBITRARY host uid via the OpenShift "gid 0,
+# group-writable" convention: on Linux we run `--user <hostUid>:0`, so the agent
+# uid is the host uid (workspace files stay host-owned) while gid 0 keeps $HOME
+# writable even though the uid is not the baked 1000.
+FROM node:22-bookworm-slim
+
+# Base toolchain. `curl` is needed for the hook callbacks (`curl -sk $CODEMAN_API_URL`),
+# `procps` for `ps`, `tmux` for the durable in-container session.
+RUN apt-get update \
+ && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+      git \
+      tmux \
+      ripgrep \
+      curl \
+      ca-certificates \
+      less \
+      procps \
+      openssh-client \
+ && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# The agent CLIs (all four backends Codeman supports). Pinning is left to the
+# rebuild cadence (see docs/docker-cases-plan.md, user-decision 2).
+RUN npm install -g \
+      @anthropic-ai/claude-code \
+      @openai/codex \
+      @google/gemini-cli \
+      opencode-ai \
+ && npm cache clean --force
+
+# `agent` user (gid 0) with an arbitrary-uid-writable HOME. The uid is
+# auto-assigned (node:22-slim already occupies uid 1000 with its `node` user); at
+# runtime Codeman overrides with `--user <hostUid>:0` on Linux, so the baked uid
+# only matters for a hand-run / Docker Desktop container. gid 0 + group-writable
+# HOME (OpenShift arbitrary-uid convention) keeps $HOME writable for any uid.
+# UTF-8 locale so tmux/Ink render Unicode box-drawing instead of VT100 ACS `q`
+# glyphs (C.UTF-8 is built into glibc; no locales package needed). Codeman also
+# sets these at run time so containers built before this line still get UTF-8.
+ENV LANG=C.UTF-8 LC_ALL=C.UTF-8
+ENV HOME=/home/agent
+# `.claude` (+ `.claude/projects` mount point) and `.codex` (+ `.codex/sessions`) are
+# pre-created gid-0 group-writable so the container owns its OWN credential config
+# dirs: tokens/settings/config are seeded in as writable copies and each CLI's runtime
+# state (backups, tasks, refreshed tokens) stays container-local, while ONLY the shared
+# transcript/rollout dirs (`.claude/projects`, `.codex/sessions`) are bind-mounted from
+# the host. (gemini/gcloud/opencode are whole seed-copies and need no pre-created dir.)
+RUN useradd -g 0 -m -d /home/agent -s /bin/bash agent \
+ && mkdir -p /home/agent/.npm /home/agent/.cache /home/agent/.config /home/agent/.codeman \
+      /home/agent/.claude/projects /home/agent/.codex/sessions \
+ && chgrp -R 0 /home/agent \
+ && chmod -R g=u /home/agent
+
+USER agent
+WORKDIR /home/agent
+
+# Codeman overrides the command with `sleep infinity` at create time; this is the
+# fallback so a hand-run container also idles rather than exiting.
+CMD ["sleep", "infinity"]

docs/docker-cases-plan.md

@@ -0,0 +1,433 @@
+<!-- Design doc generated via ultracode multi-agent workflow (wf_e3a7498b-26f): 3 architecture proposals -> judge panel -> synthesis -> completeness critic. -->
+
+# Docker Session Mode, Implementation Plan
+
+## Decisions (locked 2026-07-19, by repo owner)
+
+1. **Isolation posture**: CONVENIENT default (bind-mount host `~/.claude` etc. read-write so the existing login just works; network on; still hardened non-root + cap-drop + resource caps). SEALED profile (`mountCredentials:false` + `network:none`) is a per-case opt-in.
+2. **Export**: offer BOTH full-image (`commit`+`save`+workspace tar) AND workspace-only, side by side, no default (ask each time).
+3. **Base image**: BUILD LOCALLY on first use via `scripts/build-agent-image.mjs` from a repo `docker/agent.Dockerfile`. No registry required. (GHCR pull can be added later.)
+4. **Hooks**: WIRE HOOKS NOW. Codeman scaffolds `.claude/settings.local.json` + CLAUDE.md into the linked host workspace dir (same as local cases), enabling in-container permission prompts, hook-idle detection, and the Claude Model picker.
+
+Adopted defaults for the remaining open items (Section 10): resume-on-restart ON; container is per-CASE and shared by multiple sessions (killing one session only kills its in-container tmux session, never `docker stop` while siblings remain; stop/remove only on explicit teardown or case-delete); rootless caps = ship-with-warning (`capsEnforced` surfaced); remote docker daemon = local-first; podman = docker-first best-effort.
+
+## Implementation status (branch `feat/docker-session-mode`)
+
+DONE and END-TO-END VERIFIED against a real docker daemon (create host, link case, quick-start shell in a real container, workspace bind-mount round-trip, hook scaffolding, session-delete keeps the shared container up, case-delete `docker rm`s it):
+
+- Phase 0-1: types (`DockerHost`/`DockerCase`/`SessionDocker`), `src/docker-hosts.ts` (storage, pure `buildDockerBaseArgs`/`buildDockerCreateArgs`, `containerApiUrl`, `hostGatewayAlias`, config-hash, credential-mount resolution, daemon probes), `DockerHostSchema`/`DockerCaseLinkSchema`. 26 unit tests.
+- Phase 2: `tmux-manager` `buildDockerLaunchCommand` (image-check -> ensure -> start -> exec, resume-aware), `buildDockerKillCommand` (in-container tmux only, multi-session safe), stop/remove; wired into `createSession`/`respawnPane`/`killSession`. 14 unit tests.
+- Phase 3: `Session` threading (`_docker`, toState, option builders, in-container cliVersion probe, `resolveMuxAttachCwd`), `server.ts` recovery round-trip.
+- Phase 4: `case-routes` `/api/docker-hosts` CRUD + `/api/cases/docker-link` + listing + docker-unlink; `session-routes` `/api/quick-start` docker branch (rejects per-session config, probes availability + tmux, scaffolds hooks, seeds resume id).
+- Phase 5 (partial): `docker/agent.Dockerfile` + `scripts/build-agent-image.mjs` (built + verified: node 22, tmux, claude/codex/gemini/opencode, arbitrary-uid HOME). Host-guard allowlists `host.docker.internal`/`host.containers.internal` for in-container hooks.
+- Full CI green (3445 tests).
+
+REMAINING:
+
+- Phase 6: export / import (`docker commit` + `save | gzip` + workspace tar + manifest; `load` + quarantined re-tag), GC / boot reaper, disk-safety prechecks, drift-recreate route, SSE `docker:*` events. THE "move to a new machine" feature.
+- Phase 7: frontend Create Case "Docker" tab + `linkDockerCase` + run wiring + case-picker labels + export/import UI.
+- Phase 8: CLAUDE.md "Docker cases" Key Pattern + `docs/docker-cases.md` + COM.
+- Deferred refinements: in-container model-picker via `settings.local.json`; live mid-run resume-id capture into `DockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId`; rootless/Desktop uid probe (currently a platform heuristic).
+
+## 1. Goal & user stories
+
+Add "Docker cases" to Codeman: a case can point at a container instead of a local or remote-SSH path, and any of the five CLI backends (`claude` / `shell` / `opencode` / `codex` / `gemini`) runs inside that container. It is modeled as a LOCATION OVERLAY on cases, exactly like the remote-SSH feature (COD-94/#145), never as a sixth `SessionMode`.
+
+User stories:
+
+- As the repo owner, I link a case to a per-project container so an autonomous Claude/Ralph run executes in a hardened sandbox (cap-drop, non-root, resource caps) instead of directly on my host, while keeping my existing OAuth login and transcript history working with zero extra setup.
+- I set default, per-case-changeable container settings (image, network mode, memory/cpu/pids caps) at link time and edit them later, and edits actually take effect through a recreate-on-drift path (see Section 4).
+- I reconnect after a Codeman restart and land back in the SAME running agent with the conversation intact. When the CONTAINER itself was stopped/rebooted/OOM-killed (which destroys the in-container tmux), the next launch RESUMES the last conversation from the bind-mounted transcript rather than starting fresh (durability model in Section 2, Key decision 1).
+- I export a finished run's whole environment (toolchain plus workspace) to a portable, secret-free `.tar.gz`, move it to another machine, and import it back into a fresh case in one click.
+- The container never accumulates: killing the session stops it, deleting the case removes it, and an instance-scoped boot reaper reaps containers whose case is gone.
+
+Non-goals for the MVP: multi-tenant untrusted-code isolation guarantees (Codeman is loopback-default and single-operator, and the agent already runs `--dangerously-skip-permissions` on the host today), Kubernetes/compose orchestration, and per-command ephemeral containers.
+
+## 2. Chosen architecture and why
+
+The design grafts the strongest idea from each of the three proposals:
+
+- Overlay-not-a-mode + faithful remote-SSH mirror (from "Docker Cases as a Location Overlay"): lowest churn, rides the existing quick-start / mux-sessions / state / recovery plumbing.
+- Convenient-but-hardened default with an opt-in sealed profile, plus exec-time name-only secret env (from "Sealed Sandbox"): a strict security improvement over today's on-host execution without the UX tax of forcing an in-container re-login.
+- One-artifact export + in-app import route (from "Container-as-Cargo"): the genuinely new, high-value capability Codeman lacks.
+
+### Key decision 1: persistent per-CASE container, durable in-container tmux, AND resume-on-restart (the two-layer durability model)
+
+Exactly one long-lived container per Docker case, named as a pure slug function `codeman-case-<slug>` (Docker charset `^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$`; Codeman already slugs case names for tmux), so create-if-missing and boot recovery are idempotent. PID1 is `sleep infinity` under `--init` (tini reaps zombies and forwards `docker stop`'s SIGTERM); the CLI is NOT the container command. The CLI runs inside a DURABLE in-container tmux on a dedicated socket `-L codeman-docker`, session `codeman-dkr-<id8>`, the direct analog of remote's `-L codeman-remote` / `codeman-ssh-<id8>`.
+
+Two DIFFERENT failure surfaces need two DIFFERENT recovery layers, and conflating them is the central flaw the critic caught:
+
+1. Codeman-PROCESS restart while the container stays up: the in-container tmux is still alive, so `tmux new-session -A` (attach-or-create) reattaches the SAME live agent and the paneCommand is ignored. This is the remote-SSH durability idiom and it works unchanged.
+2. CONTAINER stop / daemon restart / host reboot / OOM-kill: the in-container tmux is GONE (fresh PID1). `new-session -A` will now CREATE a fresh session and run the paneCommand, which would start a brand-new conversation. This is the case the raw plan silently lost. Because the transcript directory is bind-mounted from the host (Key decision 3), the fix is to launch with RESUME: the paneCommand becomes `exec claude --dangerously-skip-permissions --resume <claudeSessionId>` (codex uses `resume <id>`, gemini `--resume <id>`) whenever a captured `claudeSessionId` exists. The `-A` semantics make this self-selecting: the resume flag only ever executes when tmux is actually re-created, which is exactly when the live session was lost. When tmux is still alive (case 1), attach wins and the flag is inert.
+
+Capturing / persisting / reusing the resume id (the missing mechanism the critic flagged): Codeman already learns `Session.claudeSessionId` from transcript correlation (which works here because projHash matches, Key decision 3) and persists it in `SessionState`. We thread that value into `createSessionOptions` / `respawnPaneOptions` for docker so `buildDockerLaunchCommand` can inject the resume flag on any relaunch. To make a NEW Codeman session (new `id8`) re-launched against the same case resume its predecessor's conversation, we ALSO persist `lastClaudeSessionId` on the `DockerCase` record; the quick-start docker branch seeds the new `Session` with it when the `dockerResumeOnStart` setting is on. First-ever launch has no id, so it starts fresh. This is user-decision 7 (default resume behavior).
+
+Reconciling with stop-on-kill and with the `--restart` policy (the internal inconsistency the critic found): the container is created with `--restart no` uniformly (Codeman's idempotent create-if-missing plus boot recovery is the single recovery mechanism; a restart policy would not preserve the conversation anyway because a restarted container gets a fresh PID1/tmux). Boot recovery re-runs `buildDockerLaunchCommand` from the restored `MuxSession.docker` (`docker inspect || docker create; docker start`, then exec with resume), so a host reboot or daemon restart recreates+starts the container and resumes the conversation instead of the session vanishing. `reconcileSessions` (tmux-manager.ts ~1800-1815) must NOT hard-delete a docker session merely because no LOCAL pane exists after the local `-L codeman` server died; docker (like remote) sessions are restored from `mux-sessions.json` and relaunched. This relaunch path is explicitly part of Phase 4/Phase 3 recovery work, not assumed.
+
+Why this over the alternatives: `docker exec` gets SIGHUP and dies when its client TTY closes, so a bare `docker exec claude` restarts the CLI on every reconnect/respawn. The inner tmux plus resume is what makes reconnect idempotent across BOTH failure surfaces. Because this durability is the single most important design point, tmux-in-image is a HARD gated prerequisite (`checkDockerTmuxAvailable`), never a silent fallback to bare exec. Rejected alternatives: ephemeral-per-run or bare-exec containers (no reattach durability); a literal `'docker'` `SessionMode` (touches dozens of switch/enum sites and diverges from the remote overlay precedent, since Docker is a LOCATION orthogonal to the 5 CLI backends).
+
+### Key decision 2: CLI + auth delivery
+
+One prebuilt base image (built once, contains NO secrets): `node:22-bookworm-slim` + `git tmux ripgrep ca-certificates`, `npm i -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code @openai/codex @google/gemini-cli opencode-ai`, an `agent` user, HOME dirs made writable by an arbitrary host uid via the OpenShift "gid 0, group-writable" convention (Key decision 6). Because the toolchain is baked, export is reproducible and needs no network at import time. The image name/namespace/registry and its refresh cadence are user-decision 2 (the `codeman/agent:base` placeholder implies a Docker Hub org the project may not own).
+
+Credentials are delivered ONLY at runtime, two commit-safe channels, default convenient:
+
+- OAuth/config-file CLIs (Claude Max/Pro, gcloud, opencode): bind-mount the host credential dirs read-write (`~/.claude`, `~/.codex`, `~/.gemini` + `~/.config/gcloud`, `~/.config/opencode`) so the common user "just works" with no in-container login. Because these are bind mounts, `docker commit` (which captures only the container's own writable layer, never bind mounts) physically cannot capture them, so exports stay secret-free.
+- API-key CLIs (codex/gemini): exec-time NAME-ONLY `docker exec --env OPENAI_API_KEY --env GEMINI_API_KEY ...` (no `=value`), sourced from Codeman's own process env. Only the key NAME appears in argv (no `ps` leak), and per-exec env is never captured by `docker commit`. This is the technique Codeman already uses via `tmux setenv` for the local Codex/Gemini panes, so it composes with existing machinery.
+
+Per-host `DockerHost.mountCredentials` defaults `true` (convenient); setting it `false` yields a SEALED profile (no host cred mounts, in-container login only) for genuinely untrusted work. CRITICAL sealed-mode export rule (the leak the critic caught): in sealed mode the in-container login writes tokens into the container's OWN writable layer, which `docker commit` DOES capture, so a full-image export of a sealed container would ship credentials. Therefore full-image export is REFUSED for `mountCredentials:false` containers by default; the user may either take a workspace-only export (always safe) or opt into a pre-commit scrub that `docker exec`s `rm -rf ~/.claude ~/.codex ~/.gemini ~/.config/gcloud ~/.config/opencode` inside the container before commit (destructive to the in-container login, which is the point). This is enforced in the export route, not left to a manifest assertion.
+
+Per-session `envOverrides` / `effort` / `codexConfig` / `geminiConfig` / `openCodeConfig` are REJECTED at quick-start exactly like the remote branch (session-routes.ts ~1698-1710). `modelOverride` is the one deliberate difference from remote: because the docker workspace is a REAL bind-mounted host dir that Codeman scaffolds (Key decision 5 and Section 6), `updateCaseModel()` can write the `model` key into `<workspace>/.claude/settings.local.json` and the in-container `claude` reads it, so the App Settings Claude Model picker works for docker cases. `effort` is a `--effort` CLI arg applied only by the local-spawn path we bypass, so it stays rejected (surfaced honestly in the UI, not silently inert). Per-mode command customization goes through `DockerHost.commands.<mode>` (`defaultDockerCommandForMode`, mirror of `defaultRemoteCommandForMode` at remote-hosts.ts:60). NEVER bake secrets into an image layer and NEVER pass a secret via create-time `-e` (both are committed).
+
+Rejected alternative: sealed-by-default. For a single-operator loopback tool where the agent already runs skip-permissions on the host, forcing an in-container OAuth re-login is a UX regression with little real gain. We keep sealed as an opt-in. Rejected alternative: baking a login into the image, which leaks the instant you `docker save`.
+
+### Key decision 3: workspace mount, container CWD, and transcript correlation
+
+Bind-mount the host workspace dir into the container at the SAME absolute path (`dst == src`, mirror the host path), and set both `Session.workingDir` and the container workdir to that host path.
+
+Two problems this solves that the raw proposals got wrong:
+
+- File features: `DockerCase.hostWorkspacePath` is a REAL host directory, so `Session.workingDir = hostWorkspacePath` keeps file-routes, attachments, image-watcher, and previews working on real host bytes (unlike remote, where the path is remote-only and those features no-op). All three proposals wired `casePath = <container path>`; we deliberately diverge and use the host path.
+- Transcript correlation: Claude writes transcripts under `~/.claude/projects/<hash-of-CWD>/`. By mirroring the host path as the container CWD, the projHash computed inside the container equals the host-side hash Codeman's transcript/subagent/workflow watchers expect, so correlation keeps working (and, in turn, feeds the resume-id capture in Key decision 1). A `/workspace`-style fixed dst would break it. Mirror-vs-fixed is user-decision 3.
+
+`resolveMuxAttachCwd` still returns `/tmp` for docker sessions (the LOCAL bash pane only runs `docker exec`; it never needs the workspace as its cwd), mirroring remote.
+
+### Key decision 4: network default and the engine-specific host gateway
+
+Default `bridge` (own netns, NAT egress, no inbound), per-case changeable to `none` (offline shell sandbox; warned because it breaks the API CLIs) or `custom` (a user-defined bridge `codeman-net-<slug>`, the chokepoint for a future egress allowlist). `host` networking and any `-p` inbound publish are structurally unrepresentable in the flag builder and schema. Rationale: every API-backed CLI (Claude, Codex, Gemini) plus npm/git needs egress, so `bridge` is the only sane functional default; `none` is reserved for `shell`.
+
+The host-callback gateway alias is ENGINE-SPECIFIC (the critic's podman finding): Docker uses `host.docker.internal`, Podman uses `host.containers.internal` (Docker's alias only exists on recent podman). A helper `hostGatewayAlias(engine)` returns the right name; Section 2.5, the create args, the `CODEMAN_API_URL` rewrite, and the host-guard allowlist all consume it, and BOTH aliases are added to the allowlist so a mixed fleet keeps working.
+
+### Key decision 5: hooks actually reach the host AND are actually installed
+
+Two independent things must both be true for a hook to fire, and the raw plan wired only the first:
+
+1. Network reachability. Claude Code hooks POST to `$CODEMAN_API_URL` (`curl -sk`). Inside a bridge container `localhost` is the container and prod binds `127.0.0.1`, so we set `--add-host <gatewayAlias>:host-gateway` on create (skipped on Docker Desktop, where the alias is native), add the gateway alias to the host guard, and provide `CODEMAN_API_URL` and the hook secret (below).
+2. Hook INSTALLATION. Hooks live in `<workspace>/.claude/settings.local.json`, written by the quick-start scaffolding block (around session-routes.ts ~1776) that calls `writeHooksConfig()` / `updateCaseModel()`. The raw plan extended the `!remote` guard to `!remote && !docker`, which would SKIP that block and silently disable ALL hooks regardless of networking. For docker the workspace is a REAL bind-mounted host dir, so the scaffolding block MUST run. Precise fix: extend to `!remote && !docker` ONLY the LOCAL-CLI-availability and local-spawn guards (the ones that stat the local binary or build the local spawn command); leave the workspace-scaffolding guard at `!remote` so it runs for docker. This same decision is what makes `modelOverride` work (Key decision 2). Consequence, surfaced as user-decision 4: linking a docker case now WRITES `.claude/settings.local.json` (and the CLAUDE.md scaffold, matching local-case behavior) into the user's real host directory, a behavioral shift from "link a dir" to "link and scaffold a dir."
+
+`CODEMAN_API_URL` derivation (the wrong-scheme bug the critic caught): prod is HTTPS-only on 3000, and `server.ts` (~2000) auto-sets `process.env.CODEMAN_API_URL = ${protocol}://${apiHost}:${port}`. Hardcoding `http://host.docker.internal:3000` fails every hook. Instead a pure helper `containerApiUrl(process.env.CODEMAN_API_URL, engine)` parses the running URL and substitutes ONLY the hostname with `hostGatewayAlias(engine)`, preserving scheme and port (`https://host.docker.internal:3000`). Unit-tested against http, https, non-default ports, and both engines. Passed as create-time `--env CODEMAN_API_URL=<derived>` (case-stable, non-secret).
+
+Hook secret and session attribution:
+- `~/.codeman/hook-secret` is bind-mounted read-only to a container path; `--env CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE=<that path>` is create-time (a path is non-secret; the bytes ride the bind mount and are never committed).
+- `CODEMAN_SESSION_ID` (which the generated hooks reference at hooks-config.ts:78-80 to attribute events) plus `CODEMAN_MUX=1` are SESSION-scoped, so they are passed at EXEC time via `docker exec --env CODEMAN_SESSION_ID=<id> --env CODEMAN_MUX=1` (non-secret, value inline is fine, and exec env is not committed). Because a `tmux` session started fresh only inherits the invoking env when it starts the SERVER, the launch chain ALSO runs `tmux -L codeman-docker setenv -g CODEMAN_SESSION_ID <id>` (and `CODEMAN_MUX`) so reattaches and newly created panes see the same values. This mirrors how Codeman already injects per-session env into tmux for the external CLIs.
+
+Hooks-in-MVP-vs-deferred stays user-decision 4; if deferred, docker ships as explicitly hook-degraded and we lean on output-based idle detection through the docker-exec PTY.
+
+### Key decision 6: uid / HOME / rootless enforcement / macOS Docker Desktop
+
+The raw plan showed `--user 1000:1000` in one place and `--user "$(id -u):$(id -g)"` in another and never resolved HOME writability; this section fixes all of it.
+
+- Linux native (docker rootful or rootless): run `--user <hostUid>:0` (host uid, GID 0). The image follows the OpenShift arbitrary-uid convention: `HOME=/home/agent`, and `/home/agent` plus the tool cache dirs (`~/.npm`, `~/.cache`, `~/.config`) are owned `root:0` and group-writable (`chmod -R g+w`, `g+s` on dirs) so a process with GID 0 can write HOME even though its UID is not 1000. This keeps workspace files host-owned (the agent's UID is the host UID) AND keeps HOME writable, so the CLIs actually start.
+- Podman rootless: use `--userns=keep-id` (maps the host uid to the image's `agent` uid inside the container) instead of `--user`, so `/home/agent` is owned by the running user and workspace files are host-owned. This is a real per-engine branch in `buildDockerCreateArgs`.
+- macOS Docker Desktop: `--user <macUid>` (e.g. 501) does not own the image's `/home/agent`, so non-bind HOME writes fail EACCES and the CLIs may not start; Desktop also does its own bind-mount uid translation, provides `host.docker.internal` natively (no `--add-host`), and its VM memory ceiling can cap `--memory`. Detect Desktop via `docker info` (Server OS `linuxkit` / `OperatingString` contains "Docker Desktop") and take a dedicated path: do NOT pass `--user` (run as the image's baked `agent` uid and rely on Desktop's translation for workspace access), skip `--add-host`, and note in the UI that memory caps are subject to the VM ceiling.
+
+Rootless resource-cap enforcement (the silently-inert risk): rootless Docker without cgroup-v2 systemd delegation (`Delegate=yes`) silently IGNORES `--memory`/`--cpus`/`--pids-limit`. The probe checks `docker info` for `CgroupVersion=2` plus rootless plus delegation; if caps cannot be enforced, `checkDockerAvailable` returns `capsEnforced:false` and the link/probe surfaces "resource caps are advisory on this engine." Whether to REQUIRE delegation or ship-with-warning is user-decision 6.
+
+## 3. Data model
+
+New TypeScript types in `src/types/session.ts`, added right after the remote types (lines 46-99). SessionMode (line 44) is UNCHANGED.
+
+```ts
+export type DockerCommandMode = Extract<SessionMode, 'shell' | 'claude' | 'opencode' | 'codex' | 'gemini'>;
+export type DockerEngine = 'docker' | 'podman';
+export type DockerNetworkMode = 'bridge' | 'none' | 'custom'; // never 'host'
+
+export interface DockerResourceLimits {
+  memory?: string;    // '4g'  -> --memory 4g --memory-swap 4g (swap==memory: real OOM cap)
+  cpus?: string;      // '2'
+  pidsLimit?: number; // 512   (fork-bomb guard)
+  nofile?: string;    // '4096:8192'
+  shmSize?: string;   // optional; only when a tool needs /dev/shm
+}
+
+export interface DockerHost {
+  id: string;
+  label: string;
+  engine?: DockerEngine;             // default resolved by probe (docker, else podman)
+  image: string;                     // default resolved image ref (see user-decision 2)
+  daemonHost?: string;               // advanced: -H ssh://user@host / DOCKER_HOST
+  context?: string;                  // advanced: --context <ctx>
+  network?: DockerNetworkMode;       // default 'bridge'
+  networkName?: string;              // when network === 'custom'
+  resources?: DockerResourceLimits;
+  mountCredentials?: boolean;        // default true (false = sealed; blocks full-image export)
+  hooksEnabled?: boolean;            // default true (host-gateway callback wiring)
+  resumeOnStart?: boolean;           // default true (see Key decision 1 / user-decision 7)
+  commands?: Partial<Record<DockerCommandMode, string>>;
+  extraCreateArgs?: string[];        // validated like extraSshOptions
+  extraExecArgs?: string[];
+}
+
+export interface DockerCase {
+  name: string;
+  type: 'docker';
+  hostId: string;
+  hostWorkspacePath: string;         // absolute HOST dir: bind src + Session.workingDir
+  containerWorkdir?: string;         // container path; default = hostWorkspacePath (mirror -> projHash match)
+  container?: string;                // default codeman-case-<slug>
+  lastClaudeSessionId?: string;      // captured resume id (Key decision 1)
+}
+
+export interface SessionDocker {     // flattened, round-trips through mux/state (mirror SessionRemote at 91)
+  hostId: string;
+  label: string;
+  engine: DockerEngine;
+  image: string;
+  containerName: string;
+  hostWorkspacePath: string;
+  containerWorkdir: string;
+  network: DockerNetworkMode;
+  networkName?: string;
+  resources?: DockerResourceLimits;
+  mountCredentials: boolean;
+  hooksEnabled: boolean;
+  resumeOnStart: boolean;
+  daemonHost?: string;
+  context?: string;
+  commands?: Partial<Record<DockerCommandMode, string>>;
+  extraCreateArgs?: string[];
+  extraExecArgs?: string[];
+  configHash?: string;               // drift detection (Key decision, Section 4)
+}
+```
+
+- `SessionState` gains `docker?: SessionDocker` immediately after `remote?` (line 219). It persists automatically because `SessionState` is structural and `state-store.ts` stores `toState()` verbatim.
+- `src/mux-interface.ts`: add `docker?: SessionDocker` to `MuxSession` (after line 38), `CreateSessionOptions` (after 81), `RespawnPaneOptions` (after 105). `MuxSession.docker` round-trips through `mux-sessions.json` automatically.
+- `src/types/api.ts` `CaseInfo`: add `'docker'` to the `location` union and a `docker?: { hostId; container; image?; path; network }` display block.
+- `src/services/unified-session-service.ts`: add a boolean `docker?` flag on `UnifiedSessionItem` and source rows, set from `MuxSession.docker` presence (mirror the `remote` flag at ~line 200 and the harvest at session-routes.ts:2313).
+
+New state files (all via `dataPath()`, mirroring `remote-hosts.json` / `remote-cases.json`):
+
+- `~/.codeman/docker-hosts.json` (reusable engine/image/network/resource profiles).
+- `~/.codeman/docker-cases.json` (`name -> DockerCase`, including `lastClaudeSessionId`).
+- `~/.codeman/docker-exports/` (dedicated dir for `.image.tar.gz` + `.workspace.tar.gz` + `manifest.json`; never inline in state.json; retention/pruning per Section 5).
+
+No new `state.json` / `mux-sessions.json` files: `SessionState.docker` and `MuxSession.docker` ride the existing serialization.
+
+## 4. Container lifecycle (exact command shapes)
+
+All builders are PURE string functions (directly unit-testable). Host values interpolated into the outer `bash -c "..."` layer (container name, image, workdir, host paths) are `shellescape()`'d and, for user-supplied fields, schema-rejected for `$`/backtick via `NO_SHELL_META`. The escaping chain here is DEEPER than remote's single `ssh '<tmux ...>'`: the whole `docker inspect || docker create <dozens of --mount/--env/shellescaped host paths>` is interpolated into `bash -c "..."` then `JSON.stringify`'d into respawn-pane. This is a known place to get stuck, so it is covered by concrete escaping tests (Section 9), including host workspace paths containing spaces, not just a "we call shellescape" claim.
+
+New in `src/tmux-manager.ts`:
+
+```ts
+const DOCKER_TMUX_SOCKET = 'codeman-docker';
+// 'dkr' letters deliberately FAIL SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN (^codeman-[a-f0-9-]+$),
+// so a Codeman running INSIDE the container never adopts/resizes/respawns our session.
+export function dockerTmuxSessionName(id: string): string { return `codeman-dkr-${id.slice(0, 8)}`; }
+```
+
+`buildDockerBaseArgs(docker)` (pure, in `docker-hosts.ts`, mirror of `buildSshConnectionArgs`) emits the engine prefix tokens: `docker` (or `podman`) + optional `--context <ctx>` or `-H <daemonHost>`. `buildDockerCreateArgs(docker, sessionId)` emits the `docker create` flag array (with the per-engine uid/userns branch from Key decision 6).
+
+IMAGE PRESENCE (before any create, the auto-pull footgun the critic caught): the launch chain runs `docker image inspect <image> >/dev/null 2>&1` first; on miss it exits with a distinct message ("base image <ref> not present: build with scripts/build-agent-image.mjs or pull it") rather than triggering a blocking multi-GB auto-pull inside the tmux pane. `docker create` carries `--pull=never`. The tmux-availability probe likewise uses `docker run --rm --pull=never <image> sh -lc 'command -v tmux'` and reports the same build/pull hint if the image is absent, so the 15s-bounded probe never hangs on a pull.
+
+CREATE (the ensure step, embedded in the launch string):
+
+```
+docker create \
+  --name codeman-case-myproj --hostname myproj \
+  --label codeman.managed=1 --label codeman.instance=<CODEMAN_INSTANCE> \
+  --label codeman.case=myproj --label codeman.session=<id8> \
+  --label codeman.confighash=<hash> \
+  --pull=never --init --restart no \
+  --user 1000:0 \
+  --workdir '/home/arkon/cases/myproj' \
+  --mount type=bind,src='/home/arkon/cases/myproj',dst='/home/arkon/cases/myproj' \
+  --mount type=bind,src='/home/arkon/.claude',dst='/home/agent/.claude' \
+  --mount type=bind,src='/home/arkon/.codeman/hook-secret',dst='/home/agent/.codeman/hook-secret',readonly \
+  --add-host host.docker.internal:host-gateway \
+  --memory 4g --memory-swap 4g --cpus 2 --pids-limit 512 --ulimit nofile=4096:8192 \
+  --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges \
+  --network bridge \
+  --env HOME=/home/agent --env TERM=xterm-256color --env COLORTERM=truecolor \
+  --env CODEMAN_API_URL=https://host.docker.internal:3000 \
+  --env CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE=/home/agent/.codeman/hook-secret \
+  codeman/agent:base \
+  sleep infinity
+```
+
+- `--user 1000:0` shown is the Linux-native form with GID 0 (Key decision 6); it is actually `--user <hostUid>:0`, or `--userns=keep-id` for podman rootless, or omitted on Docker Desktop. The literal is illustrative only.
+- Create-time `--env` carries only NON-SESSION, non-secret, case-stable values (safe to be committed): the DERIVED `CODEMAN_API_URL` (https-preserving, Key decision 5) and the hook-secret FILE PATH. `CODEMAN_SESSION_ID`/`CODEMAN_MUX` and the codex/gemini key NAMES are exec-time only.
+- `codeman.instance=<CODEMAN_INSTANCE>` is REQUIRED on the label set so the boot reaper is instance-scoped (a beta/second instance must never reap prod's containers).
+- `codeman.confighash` is a stable hash of the drift-relevant create args (image, resources, network, mounts, non-session env). Drift detection (user story 2, the config-never-takes-effect gap): on launch the ensure block compares the desired hash to the existing container's label; on mismatch the launch does NOT silently reuse the stale container. Instead the docker route returns a "container config changed, recreate?" action (SSE + UI confirm), and on confirm Codeman `docker rm`'s and recreates. rm destroys in-image (non-bind) state, but the workspace and transcripts survive on their bind mounts and the conversation is restored via `--resume`, so the recreate is safe. Auto-recreate-vs-prompt is a UI choice; the MVP prompts.
+- `--restart no` (resolved consistently with Key decision 1; recovery is Codeman's idempotent create-if-missing, not an engine restart policy, which also matters for Podman which has no daemon).
+
+EXEC (`buildDockerLaunchCommand`, the docker analog of `buildRemoteLaunchCommand`, TTY-correct, resume-aware). The whole thing is ONE `bash -c` string that image-checks, ensures, starts, primes tmux env, then execs:
+
+```
+docker image inspect codeman/agent:base >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo 'Codeman: base image codeman/agent:base not present (build or pull it)'; exit 1; } ; \
+docker inspect codeman-case-myproj >/dev/null 2>&1 || docker create <all create args above> ; \
+docker start codeman-case-myproj >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo 'Codeman: container codeman-case-myproj failed to start (daemon down?)'; exit 1; } ; \
+exec docker exec -it \
+  --workdir '/home/arkon/cases/myproj' \
+  --env TERM=xterm-256color --env COLORTERM=truecolor \
+  --env CODEMAN_SESSION_ID=1a2b3c4d --env CODEMAN_MUX=1 \
+  --env OPENAI_API_KEY --env GEMINI_API_KEY \
+  codeman-case-myproj \
+  sh -lc 'tmux -L codeman-docker setenv -g CODEMAN_SESSION_ID 1a2b3c4d \; setenv -g CODEMAN_MUX 1 \; new-session -A -s codeman-dkr-1a2b3c4d -c '\''/home/arkon/cases/myproj'\'' '\''cd /home/arkon/cases/myproj && exec claude --dangerously-skip-permissions --resume <claudeSessionId>'\'' \; set -t codeman-dkr-1a2b3c4d status off \; set -t codeman-dkr-1a2b3c4d mouse off \; set -t codeman-dkr-1a2b3c4d prefix C-q \; set -s escape-time 0'
+```
+
+- `docker exec -it`: `-t` allocates a PTY and forwards SIGWINCH into the container so the Ink TUI re-lays-out on pane resize; `TERM`/`COLORTERM` prevent degraded rendering. `--env OPENAI_API_KEY` (name only) is present only for codex/gemini and is exec-time (never committed). `CODEMAN_SESSION_ID`/`CODEMAN_MUX` are exec-time values plus a `tmux setenv -g` prime so reattaches and new panes inherit them (Key decision 5).
+- `--resume <claudeSessionId>` (codex `resume <id>`, gemini `--resume <id>`) is appended to `modeCommand` ONLY when a captured id exists; on first launch it is omitted. `new-session -A` makes the flag inert on a live-tmux reattach and effective only when tmux is re-created (Key decision 1).
+- `modeCommand = docker.commands?.[mode] || defaultDockerCommandForMode(mode)` (`exec claude --dangerously-skip-permissions`, `exec bash -l`, etc.), with the resume suffix injected by the builder.
+- Escaping survives every layer identically to remote in shape but deeper in nesting: `paneCommand` (`cd ... && exec ...`) is one shellescaped tmux arg, the whole `tmuxInvocation` is one shellescaped `sh -lc` arg, and the outer string is `JSON.stringify()`'d into `bash -c` by respawn-pane (tmux-manager.ts:1329).
+
+Wire-up (extend the two existing seams to 3-way):
+
+- createSession (tmux-manager.ts:1276): `const fullCmd = docker ? buildDockerLaunchCommand({ mode, docker, sessionId, resumeSessionId }) : remote ? buildRemoteLaunchCommand({ mode, remote, sessionId }) : localFullCmd;`
+- launchCmd cd-skip (tmux-manager.ts:1327): `const launchCmd = (remote || docker) ? fullCmd : \`cd ${JSON.stringify(workingDir)} && ${fullCmd}\`;`
+- respawnPane: same two edits at lines 1524 and 1542.
+
+START / reattach-after-reboot: the ensure block (image-check, `docker inspect || docker create`, `docker start`) is fully idempotent, so boot recovery just re-runs `buildDockerLaunchCommand` from the restored `MuxSession.docker` with the persisted resume id. A rebooted host recreates the container and resumes the conversation.
+
+DOCKER-DOWN surfacing (the PTY-exit-breaker false-trip risk): if `docker start` or `docker exec` cannot attach (daemon down, container missing), the launch prints a docker-specific message and exits, which alone would still count toward `session-pty-exit-breaker` and show a generic "respawn breaker tripped" push. To avoid masking the cause, the docker reattach path runs a fast `checkDockerAvailable` pre-flight: if the daemon/container is unreachable, Codeman broadcasts a docker-specific error (SSE + push, "container <name> is not running / daemon down") and SKIPS the auto-reattach that would trip the breaker, rather than fast-looping `docker exec`.
+
+STOP / KILL (`killSession` Strategy 3c, right after remote's Strategy 3b at tmux-manager.ts:1719, guarded by `IS_TEST_MODE`):
+
+```ts
+if (session.docker) {
+  // best-effort, fire-and-forget, timeout-bounded so it never blocks the local kill
+  execAsync(buildDockerKillCommand({ docker: session.docker, sessionId }), { timeout: EXEC_TIMEOUT_MS }).catch(() => {});
+}
+```
+
+`buildDockerKillCommand` emits: `docker exec codeman-case-<slug> tmux -L codeman-docker kill-session -t codeman-dkr-<id8> ; docker stop -t 10 codeman-case-<slug>`. Stopping frees CPU/RAM and, per Key decision 1, is safe for conversation continuity because the NEXT launch resumes from the bind-mounted transcript via `--resume`. Whether to stop at all (RAM vs instant live-agent reattach) is user-decision 6/1 (reframed honestly). The bind-mounted workspace and transcripts always survive on the host.
+
+REMOVE: only on explicit case delete (`docker rm -f codeman-case-<slug>`), gated behind an "export first?" UI prompt because rm destroys any in-image (non-bind) state. Instance-scoped boot reaper (fixing the racy/cross-instance reaper): after `docker-cases.json` is loaded AND after `restoreMuxSessions` has run, enumerate `docker ps -a --filter label=codeman.managed=1 --filter label=codeman.instance=<CODEMAN_INSTANCE> --format '{{.Names}}\t{{index .Labels "codeman.case"}}'` and `docker rm -f` only containers whose case is gone from THIS instance's `docker-cases.json`. The instance filter is what stops a beta reaping prod's containers (the exact cross-instance hazard the project memory warns about).
+
+AVAILABILITY PROBE (`docker-hosts.ts`, timeout-bounded like `checkRemoteTmuxAvailable`'s 15s, `IS_TEST_MODE` no-op):
+
+```
+docker info --format '{{json .}}'                                  # server up, CgroupVersion, rootless, OS (Desktop detect), cap-delegation
+docker image inspect <image> --format '{{.Id}}'                    # image PRESENT (no auto-pull)
+docker run --rm --pull=never <image> sh -lc 'command -v tmux'      # tmux-in-image gate (hard prerequisite), only if image present
+```
+
+`checkDockerAvailable()` returns `{ ok, engine, rootless, isDesktop, cgroupV2, capsEnforced }` (parse `SecurityOptions` for `name=rootless`, `CgroupVersion`, delegation, and Server OS for Desktop). `checkDockerTmuxAvailable(host)` returns a structured result with a user-facing error and correct install hint (NOT `npm install -g`; the hint is "build/pull the base image" for a missing image and "install docker or podman" for a missing engine).
+
+IN-CONTAINER CLI VERSION (fixing the #154 wheel-forwarding regression): the raw plan skipped the LOCAL `cliVersion` probe for docker (correct, since it reports the HOST claude) but left `cliVersion` undefined, which disables trackpad wheel-forwarding. Instead, for docker sessions Codeman runs an IN-CONTAINER probe `docker exec <container> claude --version` (bounded, `IS_TEST_MODE` no-op) and feeds THAT into `cliVersion`. This also means a stale baked CLI is visible; combined with the rebuild-cadence in user-decision 2, agents are not silently pinned to an old claude.
+
+## 5. Export / Import
+
+EXPORT is a concurrency-bounded job (reuse `runWithConversionLimit` from `document-conversion-limiter.ts` so N simultaneous exports cannot fork-bomb the host). Route `POST /api/docker-cases/:name/export`.
+
+Preconditions (the consistency and leak risks the critic caught):
+- Sealed guard: if `mountCredentials:false`, full-image export is REFUSED unless the caller explicitly opts into the pre-commit scrub (Key decision 2). Workspace-only export is always allowed.
+- Quiesce + free-space: require the session idle, then `docker pause` the container spanning BOTH the workspace tar AND the commit so the two artifacts are mutually consistent (the raw plan paused only the commit, leaving the bind-mount tar to run against a mid-write agent). Before any heavy step, precheck free space in the exports dir and in `/var/lib/docker`; if below `DOCKER_EXPORT_MIN_FREE_BYTES`, refuse with a clear error (a full `/var/lib/docker` wedges the daemon and breaks EVERY session on the host).
+
+Steps (all cleanup in try/finally so a mid-way failure never orphans an intermediate image or leaves the container paused):
+
+1. `docker commit -c 'LABEL codeman.exported=1' codeman-case-<slug> codeman/export-<slug>:<ts>` (unique tag per export defeats the stale-image trap). Optional pre-commit scrub in sealed mode as above; also blank instance-specific committed env (`-c 'ENV CODEMAN_API_URL='` etc.) so the image carries no stale host references.
+2. `docker save codeman/export-<slug>:<ts> | gzip` streamed in fixed 8192-byte chunks to `~/.codeman/docker-exports/<slug>-<ts>.image.tar.gz`. Uses `docker save` (layers + repo:tag + CMD), never `docker export` (flat rootfs), so restore is a trivial `docker load`.
+3. `tar --numeric-owner -C <hostWorkspacePath> -czf <slug>-<ts>.workspace.tar.gz .` while paused (the bind-mounted workspace is NOT in the image, so it travels separately and consistently).
+4. Write `manifest.json`: schema version, caseName, image tag, engine, containerWorkdir, resource/network config, codeman version, base-image digest, createdAt, per-member sha256, `mountCredentials`, and `secretFree` (true only for convenient-mode or scrubbed-sealed exports).
+5. `docker rmi codeman/export-<slug>:<ts>` in the `finally` (delete the intermediate committed image regardless of success), then `docker unpause`.
+
+The three files are wrapped in one bundle `<slug>-<ts>.codeman-container.tgz` and offered as a downloadable artifact through the existing file-routes streaming + attachment-registry handoff.
+
+Retention / disk budget (user-decision 3): `docker-exports/` is capped at `DOCKER_EXPORT_KEEP` most-recent bundles with an auto-prune on each new export, plus the free-space precheck above. Workspace scrub: the WORKSPACE tar gets a scan/warn pass for agent-created `.env` / `.git/credentials` (a distinct leak channel from container creds). A lighter "workspace-only" export (just the workspace tar, no commit/save) is the fast default for 24h+ runs; full-image is the explicit heavier option (user-decision 7 in the original list, now decision on the default button below).
+
+What travels: the baked toolchain image plus any in-image writes, and the workspace tar. What does NOT travel: bind-mounted credentials (physically excluded from commit) and anything that lived only in a bind mount. Secret-free by construction in convenient mode, and enforced (refuse-or-scrub) in sealed mode.
+
+IMPORT `POST /api/docker-cases/import` (untrusted-bundle containment, the traversal/overwrite risk): stream the uploaded bundle, validate every manifest checksum BEFORE any extraction or load. Extract the workspace tar with `tar --no-absolute-names -C <fresh dir>` PLUS per-entry validation rejecting any member whose normalized path escapes the destination (leading `/` or `..` components). `gunzip | docker load` the image, then RE-TAG the loaded image id into a quarantined namespace `codeman/imported-<slug>:<ts>` and NEVER allow the load to overwrite `codeman/agent:base` or any pre-existing tag (capture the loaded id, ignore the bundle's repo:tag). Create a NEW `DockerCase` pointing at the quarantined image with THIS host's mounts/creds and the manifest's resource/network config, and recreate the container hardened (cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, non-root, `--pull=never`, CMD overridden to `sleep infinity`). The destination supplies its own login, so credentials never cross machines. Plus `GET /api/docker-exports` (list) and `DELETE /api/docker-exports/:filename`, all behind Codeman's existing auth / loopback-default / host-guard / Origin-CSRF stack.
+
+## 6. Codeman integration (file-by-file, mirroring the remote-SSH feature)
+
+- `src/types/session.ts`: add `DockerCommandMode`, `DockerEngine`, `DockerNetworkMode`, `DockerResourceLimits`, `DockerHost`, `DockerCase`, `SessionDocker` (Section 3). Add `docker?: SessionDocker` to `SessionState` after line 219. SessionMode (line 44) UNCHANGED.
+- `src/mux-interface.ts`: add `docker?: SessionDocker` to `MuxSession` (38), `CreateSessionOptions` (81), `RespawnPaneOptions` (105).
+- `src/docker-hosts.ts` (NEW, direct mirror of `src/remote-hosts.ts`): `readDockerHosts`/`writeDockerHosts`/`readDockerCases`/`writeDockerCases` (via `dataPath`, including `lastClaudeSessionId` read/write), `defaultDockerCommandForMode` (mirror line 60), `dockerDisplayPath` (`container:/path`, mirror `remoteDisplayPath` at 205), `toSessionDocker(host, case)` (mirror `toSessionRemote` at 212), `buildDockerBaseArgs`/`buildDockerCreateArgs` (per-engine uid/userns branch), `hostGatewayAlias(engine)`, `containerApiUrl(processApiUrl, engine)` (scheme+port-preserving, unit-tested), `checkDockerAvailable`/`checkDockerTmuxAvailable`/`probeDockerCliVersion` (15s-bounded, `IS_TEST_MODE` no-op), a config-hash helper for drift, its own POSIX `shellescape` copy (mirror line 83). `const IS_TEST_MODE = !!process.env.VITEST;` gates every real `docker` invocation.
+- `src/tmux-manager.ts`: add `DOCKER_TMUX_SOCKET`, `dockerTmuxSessionName`, `buildDockerLaunchCommand` (resume-aware, image-check, env-prime), `buildDockerKillCommand` (Section 4). Extend the two `fullCmd` ternaries (1276, 1524) and the two `launchCmd` cd-skips (1327, 1542). Add `killSession` Strategy 3c after 1719. Ensure `reconcileSessions` (~1800-1815) does NOT hard-delete docker sessions on local-tmux death (recovery relaunch path).
+- `src/session.ts`: add `_docker?: SessionDocker` field (mirror `_remote` at 403), constructor arg (477), assignment (550). Thread `docker: this._docker` and `resumeSessionId: this._claudeSessionId` into BOTH `createSessionOptions` and `respawnPaneOptions` in `startInteractive` (1352/1370) and the second path (1740/1750). Emit `docker: this._docker` in `toState()` (1010). Replace the LOCAL cliVersion probe at 1320 for docker with the IN-CONTAINER `probeDockerCliVersion` (do not merely skip it). Extend `resolveMuxAttachCwd(workingDir, remote, docker)` (215) to return `/tmp` when `docker` is set. On claudeSessionId capture, persist it to the owning `DockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId`.
+- `src/web/server.ts`: in `restoreMuxSessions` (2160), add `docker: muxSession.docker ?? savedState?.docker` to the `new Session({...})` call (2195-2216), and skip docker in the same `isExternalCliMode`/Ralph recovery guards as remote. Register the instance-scoped boot reaper to run AFTER docker-cases load and AFTER `restoreMuxSessions`. Ensure `CODEMAN_API_URL` derivation reads the SAME `process.env.CODEMAN_API_URL` the server sets at ~2000.
+- `src/web/schemas.ts`: add `DockerHostSchema` and `DockerCaseLinkSchema` (below). The three mode enums (177/373/705) and `QuickStartSchema` (368) UNCHANGED (docker resolves by `caseName` lookup like remote).
+- `src/web/routes/session-routes.ts`: import the docker helpers from `../../docker-hosts.js`. Add a docker branch in `/api/quick-start` parallel to the remote branch (1686-1720): `readDockerCases` -> find by `caseName` -> `readDockerHosts` -> find by `hostId`; reject `envOverrides`/`effort`/`codexConfig`/`geminiConfig`/`openCodeConfig` (but ACCEPT `modelOverride`, which flows via scaffolded `settings.local.json`); run `checkDockerAvailable` + `checkDockerTmuxAvailable` (image-present, engine, caps-enforced); surface `capsEnforced:false` and Desktop notes; set `casePath = dockerCase.hostWorkspacePath` (REAL host dir), `docker = toSessionDocker(host, dockerCase)`, and seed `resumeSessionId` from `dockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId` when `resumeOnStart`. Extend the LOCAL-availability and local-spawn guards (around 1796/1810) to `!remote && !docker`, but DO NOT extend the workspace-scaffolding guard (~1776, `writeHooksConfig`/`updateCaseModel`), which MUST run for docker. Pass `docker` into `new Session` (1847); `autoConfigureRalph` (1853) gated on `!docker`. Add `docker: m.docker !== undefined ? true : undefined` to the unified harvest (2313).
+- `src/web/routes/case-routes.ts`: import the docker read/write/check helpers + schemas. Add a docker listing loop in `GET /api/cases` (mirror 94-119, `location: 'docker'`, `docker: {...}` via `dockerDisplayPath`). Add `/api/docker-hosts` GET/POST/PUT/DELETE (mirror 168-204) and `POST /api/cases/docker-link` (mirror 206-232; run `checkDockerAvailable`/`checkDockerTmuxAvailable` at link time; broadcast `CaseLinked` with `type: 'docker'`). Add a docker-unlink branch to `DELETE /api/cases/:name` (mirror 288-296; `docker rm -f`; broadcast `CaseDeleted` `type: 'docker-unlinked'`). Add the docker branch to single-case `GET` (mirror 358-368). Add `POST /api/docker-cases/:name/export`, `/import`, `GET/DELETE /api/docker-exports`, and a `POST /api/docker-cases/:name/recreate` (drift confirm) per Sections 4 and 5.
+- `src/web/sse-events.ts` + `src/web/public/constants.js`: reuse `CaseLinked`/`CaseDeleted` for CRUD. Add `docker:exportProgress`, `docker:exportComplete`, `docker:importComplete`, `docker:configDrift`, and `docker:containerError` to BOTH registries (kept in sync per CLAUDE.md).
+- Frontend `src/web/public/index.html` (~1831): add a Docker `modal-tab-btn` next to Remote; add a `#case-docker` panel mirroring `#case-remote` with `dockerCaseName`, `dockerHostWorkspacePath`, `dockerContainer`, `dockerImage`, `dockerHostId`, and an Advanced `<details>` for network mode, resource caps, `mountCredentials`, `resumeOnStart`, and remote daemon. Surface a "scaffolds .claude into this host dir" note (user-decision 4) and a "resource caps advisory on this engine" warning when `capsEnforced:false`.
+- Frontend `src/web/public/session-ui.js`: `formatCasePickerLabel` (48) + `buildCasePickerOptions` (71-73) handle `location === 'docker'` (`name @ container`, add container/image to the search haystack); `resetCaseModalFields` (~1514) add a `dockerFields` array; `switchCaseModalTab` (1573/1580/1597) handle `'case-docker'`; `submitCaseModal` add the docker branch; new `linkDockerCase()` (mirror `linkRemoteCase` at 1689) POSTing `/api/docker-hosts` then `/api/cases/docker-link`, sending omitted optionals as `undefined` (spread `...(x ? {x} : {})`, never `null`, per the Zod `.optional()`-rejects-null gotcha); `runClaude` (520) / `runShell` (702) extend the `location === 'remote'` routing to also match `'docker'`; `runOpenCode`/`runCodex`/`runGemini` (792/846/900) make the `isRemote` checks `isRemoteOrDocker` so local status probes are skipped. In the session-options Summary tab, note that `effort` is inert for docker (rejected) while `model` IS honored via `settings.local.json`.
+- Frontend `src/web/public/panels-ui.js` (425-426): add `caseItem?.docker?.path`/`container` to the case-search fields.
+
+Schemas (`src/web/schemas.ts`), mirroring `RemoteHostSchema` (299) / `RemoteCaseLinkSchema` (351):
+
+```ts
+export const DockerHostSchema = z.object({
+  id: z.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/, 'Invalid docker host id'),
+  label: z.string().min(1).max(100),
+  engine: z.enum(['docker', 'podman']).optional(),
+  image: z.string().min(1).max(512).regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9][\w./:@-]*$/, 'Invalid image ref').regex(NO_SHELL_META),
+  daemonHost: z.string().max(512).regex(NO_SHELL_META, 'Invalid daemon host').optional(),
+  context: z.string().max(128).regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$/, 'Invalid context').optional(),
+  network: z.enum(['bridge', 'none', 'custom']).optional(),
+  networkName: z.string().max(128).regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$/).optional(),
+  resources: z.object({
+    memory: z.string().regex(/^\d+[bkmg]?$/i).optional(),
+    cpus: z.string().regex(/^\d+(\.\d+)?$/).optional(),
+    pidsLimit: z.number().int().positive().max(100000).optional(),
+    nofile: z.string().regex(/^\d+:\d+$/).optional(),
+    shmSize: z.string().regex(/^\d+[bkmg]?$/i).optional(),
+  }).strict().optional(),
+  mountCredentials: z.boolean().optional(),
+  hooksEnabled: z.boolean().optional(),
+  resumeOnStart: z.boolean().optional(),
+  commands: RemoteCommandOverridesSchema, // reuse the shared shape
+  extraCreateArgs: z.array(z.string().min(1).max(1024).regex(NO_SHELL_INJECTION).refine(noCommandSubstitution)).max(32).optional(),
+  extraExecArgs: z.array(z.string().min(1).max(1024).regex(NO_SHELL_INJECTION).refine(noCommandSubstitution)).max(32).optional(),
+});
+
+export const DockerCaseLinkSchema = z.object({
+  name: z.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/, 'Invalid case name format'),
+  hostId: z.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/, 'Invalid docker host id'),
+  hostWorkspacePath: z.string().min(1).max(2000).regex(/^\//, 'Path must be absolute').regex(NO_SHELL_META, 'Invalid characters in workspace path'),
+  containerWorkdir: z.string().min(1).max(2000).regex(/^\//).regex(NO_SHELL_META).optional(),
+  container: z.string().min(2).max(128).regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$/, 'Invalid container name').optional(),
+});
+```
+
+`NO_SHELL_META` (rejects `$`/backtick, schemas.ts:297) is REQUIRED on `image`, `hostWorkspacePath`, `containerWorkdir`, and `container`, because all four reach the outer `bash -c "..."` double-quote layer where `$(...)`/backtick re-expose, exactly the reason `remotePath`/`identityFile` use it. `--privileged` and any `-v /var/run/docker.sock` are structurally unrepresentable (never emitted by the builder, never accepted by the schema).
+
+## 7. Security model
+
+- Hardening flags on every create: `--cap-drop ALL`, `--security-opt no-new-privileges` (NOT auto-set by rootless Docker or Podman, so always explicit), the uid/userns branch of Key decision 6 (never container-root; workspace files stay host-owned and HOME stays writable via GID 0), `--pids-limit` (fork-bomb guard), `--memory` with `--memory-swap == --memory` (real OOM cap), `--ulimit nofile`, `--init`, `--pull=never`. NEVER `--privileged`, NEVER mount the docker socket into the agent container. `--storage-opt size=` is emitted ONLY after the probe confirms overlay2-on-xfs-pquota or btrfs (the AICE-class silently-ignored trap); otherwise it is omitted and the UI does not advertise a size cap. Resource caps are advertised as ENFORCED only when the probe reports `capsEnforced:true`; under non-delegated rootless they are labeled advisory (user-decision 6).
+- Engine: prefer whichever the probe finds, Podman-rootless first for security (a container-root breakout lands as an unprivileged host user). Rootless bind-mount ownership uses `--userns=keep-id` (Podman) vs `--user <hostUid>:0` (Docker), so real per-engine branching lives in `buildDockerCreateArgs`. Docker Desktop takes its own uid path (Key decision 6).
+- Blast radius (the combined-posture the critic asked to surface, user-decision 5): the default convenient profile mounts an arbitrary host workspace dir RW (host-owned, mirrored path) AND host `~/.claude`/`~/.codex`/`~/.gemini`/`~/.config/gcloud`/`~/.config/opencode` RW into a NETWORK-ENABLED container. Container-run agent code can therefore read/modify those host trees and reach the network simultaneously. This is still a strict improvement over today's on-host skip-permissions execution, but the user must accept the combined posture explicitly; the sealed profile plus `network:none` is the mitigation for genuinely untrusted work.
+- Secret handling: creds arrive ONLY as bind-mounted files (default) or exec-time NAME-ONLY `--env` (codex/gemini keys), NEVER as create-time `-e` and NEVER as an image layer. Sealed-mode export is refuse-or-scrub (Section 5), closing the sealed-leak inversion.
+- CLAUDE.md "Multi-CLI prefix discipline": the exec-time name-only env is restricted to the CLI-specific keys per mode (Claude: none with OAuth mount; Codex: `OPENAI_API_KEY`/`CODEX_API_KEY`; Gemini: `GEMINI_API_KEY`/`GOOGLE_*`), never a blanket forward. `envOverrides` is rejected for docker, so the `ALLOWED_ENV_PREFIXES` allowlist is not widened.
+- hook-secret: bind-mounted read-only, referenced via `CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE` (a path, non-secret); the secret bytes never enter env or the image. Both `host.docker.internal` and `host.containers.internal` are added to the host-guard allowlist so the in-container hook curl's Host header passes on either engine.
+- Host guard / instance isolation: the in-container tmux socket (`codeman-docker`) and name (`codeman-dkr-<id8>`) deliberately FAIL a container-internal Codeman's `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN`, so a nested Codeman never adopts our session (unit-asserted). The boot reaper is instance-scoped by the `codeman.instance` label so a beta never reaps prod. Any remote-daemon (`-H`/`--context`) mode is host-root-equivalent and stays strictly behind the existing auth/loopback/host-guard/Origin-CSRF stack.
+- Import containment: untrusted bundles are checksum-validated, extracted with traversal guards, and loaded into a quarantined image namespace (never overwriting the base image), then run with the same hardening.
+
+## 8. Phased implementation (branch: `feat/docker-session-mode`)
+
+Each phase is independently testable; per CLAUDE.md, end-to-end test in the real env before COM. All new docker IO paths carry `const IS_TEST_MODE = !!process.env.VITEST;` and no-op under it; the pure command builders are tested directly.
+
+- Phase 0: base image + engine probe. Author `docker/agent.Dockerfile` (OpenShift arbitrary-uid HOME) and `scripts/build-agent-image.mjs` (build or pull the base image; digest recorded). Add `checkDockerAvailable`/`checkDockerTmuxAvailable`/`containerApiUrl`/`hostGatewayAlias` (IS_TEST_MODE no-op) and `GET /api/docker/status`. Test: probe stub returns available/caps/Desktop flags under VITEST; `containerApiUrl` preserves scheme+port and swaps host per engine; status route returns the envelope.
+- Phase 1: types + storage + schemas. Add all types (Section 3), `src/docker-hosts.ts`, `DockerHostSchema`/`DockerCaseLinkSchema`. Test: `docker-hosts.test.ts` (round-trip incl. `lastClaudeSessionId`, display path, config-hash stability); `docker-exec-options.test.ts` (schema rejects `$`/backtick in image/workdir/container).
+- Phase 2: tmux-manager builders. Add `DOCKER_TMUX_SOCKET`, `dockerTmuxSessionName`, `buildDockerLaunchCommand` (resume-aware, image-check, env-prime), `buildDockerKillCommand`; wire the two ternaries + two cd-skips + Strategy 3c; harden `reconcileSessions` against docker hard-delete. Test (pure strings): adopt-proof name fails `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN`; image-check precedes create; `new-session -A` idempotent; resume flag present only when a resume id is passed; `--pull=never` present; instance label present; escaping survives `bash -c` -> `docker exec` -> `sh -lc` -> tmux WITH a host workspace path containing spaces.
+- Phase 3: session.ts + mux + recovery. Add `_docker` + `resumeSessionId` threading, in-container cliVersion probe, `resolveMuxAttachCwd`, mux-interface fields, `restoreMuxSessions` passthrough, instance-scoped reaper wiring, claudeSessionId -> `DockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId` persistence, unified flag. Test: `toState()` emits docker; a persisted docker session round-trips through mux/state; a relaunch injects the persisted resume id (mock mux); reaper only targets this instance's orphaned containers.
+- Phase 4: routes + first real e2e. case-routes CRUD + listing + drift-recreate; session-routes quick-start branch (scaffolding RUNS, local-availability guards skip, model accepted, effort/config rejected). Manual e2e on a real docker host: docker-host create -> docker-link -> quick-start; confirm the pane runs `claude` in the container, files land host-owned, a Codeman restart reattaches the SAME live agent, and a `docker stop` followed by relaunch RESUMES the conversation.
+- Phase 5: hooks connectivity + installation. host-gateway (per engine), derived `CODEMAN_API_URL`, hook-secret mount, `CODEMAN_SESSION_ID`/`CODEMAN_MUX` exec-env + tmux setenv, host-guard allowlist, and the scaffolding write into the real workspace. Manual e2e: trigger a permission prompt from inside the container and confirm it surfaces; verify hook payloads carry the right session id. If deferred, ship docker as explicitly hook-degraded and verify output-based idle detection through the docker-exec PTY.
+- Phase 6: export/import + GC + disk safety. quiesce+pause span, free-space precheck, commit+save+gzip + workspace tar + manifest + streaming download; sealed-mode refuse-or-scrub; retention/auto-prune; import with checksum validation + traversal guard + quarantined re-tag; drift-recreate; boot reaper; `runWithConversionLimit` cap; `docker rmi` in finally. Manual e2e: export, `docker load` on a second machine (or fresh case), import, confirm toolchain + workspace restored and NO creds present; attempt a sealed full-image export and confirm it is refused-or-scrubbed; attempt a `../` bundle and confirm it is rejected.
+- Phase 7: frontend. Docker tab, `linkDockerCase`, run wiring, case-picker labels, panels search, caps-advisory + scaffold-warning + effort-inert notes. Verify with Playwright (`waitUntil: 'domcontentloaded'`, 3-4s settle) that the Docker tab renders and a linked docker case appears in the picker.
+- Phase 8: docs + COM. Update CLAUDE.md (a "Docker cases" Key Pattern paragraph mirroring remote-SSH, plus the new state files, routes counts, and the resume/durability model), `docs/docker-cases.md`, then COM per the standard flow.
+
+## 9. Test plan
+
+- Unit (pure, CI-safe, mirror `test/remote-hosts.test.ts` / `test/remote-ssh-options.test.ts`):
+  - `test/docker-hosts.test.ts`: storage round-trip (incl. `lastClaudeSessionId`), `dockerDisplayPath`, `defaultDockerCommandForMode`, `toSessionDocker`, `containerApiUrl` (http/https, custom port, docker vs podman gateway), config-hash stability/drift, `buildDockerCreateArgs` flag ordering (cap-drop/no-new-privileges/memory==memory-swap/instance-label/`--pull=never` present; host/privileged/socket absent; per-engine uid vs `--userns=keep-id`).
+  - `test/docker-exec-options.test.ts`: `buildDockerLaunchCommand`/`buildDockerKillCommand` string shape and escaping through `bash -c` -> `docker exec` -> `sh -lc` -> tmux, including a workspace path with spaces; resume flag present only with a resume id; image-presence check precedes create; `dockerTmuxSessionName` fails `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN`; schema rejects `$`/backtick in image/workdir/container/name; `linkDockerCase`-shaped bodies with omitted optionals validate (no `null` on the wire).
+  - Probe no-op: `checkDockerAvailable`/`checkDockerTmuxAvailable`/`probeDockerCliVersion` return canned values under VITEST and never spawn.
+- Integration (route tests via `app.inject()`, docker no-op'd): `/api/docker-hosts` CRUD; `/api/cases/docker-link` dup-check + broadcast; `GET /api/cases` includes the docker case with `location: 'docker'`; `/api/quick-start` docker branch rejects `envOverrides`/`effort`/config but ACCEPTS `modelOverride`, runs the workspace-scaffolding path, and constructs a session with `docker` set + seeded resume id; `DELETE /api/cases/:name` docker-unlink; export refuse-or-scrub for sealed; import traversal rejection; reaper instance-scoping (label filter). Pick a unique port only if a live-server test is added (search `const PORT =`; 3150+).
+- Manual end-to-end (real docker daemon, the mandatory "always end-to-end test" gate): build the base image; link a docker case; quick-start `claude`; verify OAuth via the mounted `~/.claude`, transcript correlation (subagent/workflow watchers show the session), host-owned files, and a working permission-prompt hook; reattach after a Codeman PROCESS restart (SAME live agent); `docker stop` then relaunch and confirm conversation RESUME; reboot-equivalent (daemon restart) and confirm boot recovery recreates+resumes; change the host's memory/image and confirm the drift-recreate prompt fires; export (convenient) and confirm the tar `docker load`s with no creds; attempt a sealed full-image export and confirm refuse-or-scrub; import into a fresh case; delete the case and confirm `docker rm -f` plus instance-scoped reaper GC; confirm a docker-down state surfaces a docker-specific error and does NOT trip the generic PTY-exit breaker.
+
+## 10. Open decisions for the user
+
+1. Credential + blast-radius posture (combined). Convenient default bind-mounts host `~/.claude` etc. RW AND an arbitrary host workspace RW into a network-enabled container, so container-run agent code can read/modify those host trees and reach the network at the same time. Recommended: convenient default plus a per-host SEALED opt-in (`mountCredentials:false` + `network:none`) for untrusted work. Please confirm you accept the combined arbitrary-workspace-plus-egress-plus-host-creds posture for the default profile (it is still a net improvement over today's on-host skip-permissions execution).
+2. Base image ownership, registry, and freshness. The `codeman/agent:base` placeholder implies a Docker Hub org the project may not own. Pick the real registry/namespace (GHCR under the repo is the natural fit), decide digest pinning, and set a REBUILD CADENCE so agents are not stuck on a stale baked `claude` (the in-container version probe surfaces staleness, but something must trigger rebuilds). Choose: pull a pinned published image, build locally on first use via `scripts/build-agent-image.mjs`, or both.
+3. Container CWD strategy. Mirror the host workspace path inside the container (recommended: makes transcript projHash correlate, file features and resume capture work) vs a fixed `/workspace` (simpler mount, breaks watcher correlation). Please confirm the mirror approach.
+4. Hooks in the MVP AND workspace scaffolding. Making docker hooks fire requires WRITING `.claude/settings.local.json` (and the CLAUDE.md scaffold) into the user's REAL linked host directory, a behavioral shift from "link a dir" to "link and scaffold a dir." Choose: wire hooks + scaffolding now (Phase 5, recommended, and it also enables the model picker), or ship docker as explicitly hook-degraded (no permission prompts / hook-idle) for v1 and add later. Confirm you are OK with Codeman mutating the linked host workspace.
+5. Session-kill teardown and RESUME (reframed honestly). `docker stop` on session kill is not merely "free RAM vs instant reattach": it destroys the in-container live agent, and the conversation survives ONLY because the next launch runs `--resume` from the bind-mounted transcript. Choose: keep the container running (costs RAM, preserves the exact live in-flight agent) vs stop and rely on `--resume` (frees RAM, may lose uncommitted in-flight tool state). Case-delete always `docker rm -f`.
+6. Rootless enforcement posture. Under rootless without cgroup-v2 systemd delegation, `--memory`/`--cpus`/`--pids-limit` are SILENTLY ignored. Choose: REQUIRE delegation (refuse to link a host that cannot enforce caps) or ship-with-warning ("resource caps are advisory on your engine"). The probe reports `capsEnforced` either way.
+7. Default resume behavior. Should a re-linked or re-run docker case default to resuming its last conversation (`resumeOnStart:true`, using `DockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId`) rather than starting clean? This is the crux of making the durability story real and is the recommended default, but it changes user-visible behavior (a new session in an existing case continues the prior conversation).
+8. Export defaults and disk budget. Default export button: workspace-only (fast, small, files-only, recommended for 24h+ runs) vs full-image (reproducible env, multi-GB). Also set the retention cap (max retained exports), the auto-prune policy, and the free-space threshold below which export is refused (a full `/var/lib/docker` breaks EVERY session on the host, not just docker ones).
+9. Remote docker daemon (`-H ssh://...` / `--context`). Support in the MVP (composes with remote hosts, adds host-root trust surface) or local-daemon-only first.
+10. Podman parity depth. Full `--userns=keep-id` plus Quadlet boot-persistence, or Docker-first with Podman as best-effort and boot-persistence via Codeman's idempotent create-if-missing only. Note the podman host alias is `host.containers.internal`, already handled per engine.

docs/docker-cases.md

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+# Docker cases
+
+Run a case inside an **isolated Docker container** instead of directly on the host. Any number of Codeman sessions can share one container (it is scoped to the case, not the session), so a whole project lives in a sandbox with its own network, resource caps, and filesystem, and you can **export the container to move it to another machine**.
+
+Docker mode is a **location overlay on cases**, the direct analog of [remote SSH cases](./remote-hosts.md): where a remote case runs a local tmux pane doing `ssh host` into a durable remote tmux server, a docker case runs a local tmux pane doing `docker exec -it` into a durable **in-container** tmux server. It is not a separate `SessionMode`, so `claude` / `shell` / `opencode` / `codex` / `gemini` all work inside the container.
+
+## One-time setup: build the base image
+
+The container needs a base image with the agent toolchain (node, the CLIs, git, tmux). Build it locally once:
+
+```bash
+node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs          # builds codeman/agent:base
+# options: --engine docker|podman  --image <ref>  --no-cache
+```
+
+The image is **secret-free**: credentials are delivered at runtime (bind mounts or `docker exec --env`), never baked in, so exports never leak them.
+
+## Quickest path: one-click "Run in Docker"
+
+On the **New case → Create New** tab there's a **🐳 Run in an isolated Docker container** checkbox. Checking it alone is enough: Codeman creates the case folder in `~/codeman-cases/<name>`, spins up a hardened container with sensible defaults (auto-provisioning a shared `default` host), and starts the session inside it. No host/image/network fields to fill in.
+
+Click the checkbox's **Container settings** to optionally tweak the predefined defaults, including a **Template** picker:
+
+| Template | Memory | CPUs | GPUs |
+|----------|--------|------|------|
+| Small | 2 GB | 1 | none |
+| Medium (default) | 4 GB | 2 | none |
+| Large | 8 GB | 4 | none |
+| GPU | 8 GB | 4 | all (needs the NVIDIA container toolkit) |
+
+**Disk is elastic** — the container's storage grows automatically as data flows in; there is no fixed cap (bounded only by host disk). Any tweaked setting creates a dedicated per-case host so it never changes the shared `default`.
+
+## Create a docker case (full control)
+
+App → **New case → Docker** tab:
+
+- **Case Name** / **Workspace Path**: the workspace is a real HOST directory bind-mounted into the container at the same path. Codeman scaffolds `CLAUDE.md` + `.claude/settings.local.json` (hooks) into it, and file previews / attachments work on the real bytes.
+- **Host ID**: a reusable docker host profile (image, network, resources). Reuse the same ID across cases to share settings.
+- **Network**: `bridge` (internet on, default), `none` (fully isolated), or a `custom` bridge.
+- **Advanced**: memory / CPU caps, **Mount host credentials** (on = your existing `~/.claude` login just works; off = a sealed sandbox you log into inside the container), **Resume last conversation on relaunch**.
+
+Then run it like any case (Run Claude / Run Shell / …). The first launch creates the container (`codeman-case-<name>`); subsequent sessions attach to the same one.
+
+Equivalent API:
+
+```bash
+curl -X POST localhost:3000/api/docker-hosts -d '{"id":"local","label":"Local","image":"codeman/agent:base"}'
+curl -X POST localhost:3000/api/cases/docker-link -d '{"name":"sandbox","hostId":"local","hostWorkspacePath":"/home/you/projects/sandbox"}'
+curl -X POST localhost:3000/api/quick-start -d '{"caseName":"sandbox","mode":"claude"}'
+```
+
+## Lifecycle
+
+- **Reconnect after a Codeman restart** lands back in the same live agent (the in-container tmux survives).
+- **Container stop / host reboot** restarts the container and **resumes** the last conversation from the bind-mounted transcript. Claude sessions launch with a pinned conversation id (`--session-id <sessionId>`, with a `--resume` fallback when the transcript already exists), and the case remembers its last conversation (`lastClaudeSessionId`), so a relaunch after the container was stopped, rebooted, or recreated continues where it left off.
+- **Killing one session** only kills that session's in-container tmux session; the shared container stays up for sibling sessions.
+- **Editing the docker host config** (image, memory, network, ...) is detected on the next launch: the desired config hash is compared against the container's `codeman.confighash` label, and a mismatch refuses the launch with a "config changed, recreate?" confirm. Confirming calls `POST /api/docker-cases/:name/recreate` (refused while sessions of the case are live), which removes the container so the next launch recreates it with the new config; the workspace and the conversation survive.
+- **Deleting the case** `docker rm -f`s the container (the bind-mounted workspace on the host survives). An instance-scoped boot reaper removes containers whose case is gone.
+
+## Isolation & security
+
+Every container runs hardened: `--cap-drop ALL`, `--security-opt no-new-privileges`, non-root (`--user <hostUid>:0` so workspace files stay host-owned), `--pids-limit`, `--memory` == `--memory-swap`, `--init`. Never `--privileged`, never the docker socket. The default **convenient** profile bind-mounts host credential dirs read-write so the common login just works (creds stay on the host, never captured by `docker commit`); the **sealed** profile (`mountCredentials:false` + `network:none`) is the opt-in for genuinely untrusted work.
+
+Rootless engines without cgroup-v2 systemd delegation cannot enforce resource caps; linking such a host warns that caps are advisory.
+
+## Export / Import (move to another machine)
+
+**Export** (from the Docker tab, or `POST /api/docker-cases/:name/export`): choose
+
+- **Full image + workspace**: `docker commit` the container to an image, `docker save` it, tar the workspace, and a manifest, all into one portable `<case>-<ts>.codeman-container.tgz` (the whole toolchain, installed packages, and files). Runs in the background; you are notified when the bundle is ready.
+- **Workspace only**: just the project files (fast, small).
+
+The container is paused across the capture so the image and workspace are consistent; a full `/var/lib/docker` is guarded against with a free-space precheck; the intermediate image is always cleaned up.
+
+**Import** (`POST /api/docker-cases/import`, or the Manage tab): copy the `.tgz` onto the new machine's `~/.codeman/docker-exports/`, then import it into a new case. The manifest and per-member SHA-256 checksums are validated, the workspace tar is extracted with a path-traversal guard, and the image is `docker load`ed and **re-tagged into a quarantined namespace** (`codeman/imported-<case>:<ts>`) so it never overwrites a local tag. The destination supplies its own credentials, so nothing secret crosses machines.
+
+`GET /api/docker-exports` lists bundles; `GET /api/docker-exports/:filename` downloads one; `DELETE` removes one.
+
+## Hooks require the server to be reachable from the container
+
+In-container hooks (permission events, hook-based idle/stop/task notifications) POST to `CODEMAN_API_URL`, which is derived as `https://host.docker.internal:<port>` (`host.docker.internal` → the docker bridge gateway, e.g. `172.17.0.1`, via `--add-host …:host-gateway`). For that callback to succeed, the Codeman server must be **listening on an interface the container can reach**.
+
+- If Codeman binds **loopback-only** (`127.0.0.1`, the default and the production systemd config), a container reaching `172.17.0.1:<port>` cannot connect, so by default **in-container hooks do not fire**. The session still works fully: idle/stop detection falls back to **output-based** detection through the `docker exec` PTY (which always works), and claude runs with `--dangerously-skip-permissions` so there are no permission prompts to forward anyway.
+- **To enable in-container hooks on a loopback-only server, set `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS=1`** (env). Codeman then starts a SECOND listener bound to the docker bridge gateway (`172.17.0.1`, auto-detected; override with `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOST`) that serves **only the hook endpoints** (`/api/hook-event`, `/api/status-telemetry`) and delegates them into the same secret-gated pipeline. The bridge is host-internal (containers + host, not the LAN), and every other path returns `403`, so this does not widen your network exposure. Add `Environment=CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS=1` to the systemd unit and restart.
+- Alternatively, bind `0.0.0.0` **with `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` set** (exposes on the LAN too).
+
+The host-gateway mapping, `CODEMAN_API_URL` derivation, host-guard allowlist, and hook-secret mount are all wired correctly; `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS` closes the last gap for loopback-only servers.
+
+## Notes & limits
+
+- Requires Docker (or Podman) with a reachable daemon; tmux must be present in the base image (a hard prerequisite, probed at link time).
+- Per-session `envOverrides` / `effort` / per-CLI config are rejected for docker cases (they do not cross into the container); configure the container via the docker host's per-mode command override instead.
+- macOS Docker Desktop takes a dedicated uid path (the baked image uid; memory caps are subject to the VM ceiling).
+
+Design + rationale: [`docker-cases-plan.md`](./docker-cases-plan.md).

docs/multi-user-plan.md

@@ -0,0 +1,282 @@
+# Multi-User Mode: Design Plan
+
+Status: **IMPLEMENTED on `feat/multiuser-mode`** (phases 1-5; opt-in, off by default). Target: opt-in multi-user support behind a `--multiuser` flag, with per-user case spaces and an admin panel for user management.
+
+Shipped by phase:
+
+- **Phase 1** (user store + mode plumbing + CLI): `src/user-store.ts` (scrypt, atomic 0600 writes, last-admin invariants, serialized read-modify-write), `src/config/multiuser.ts`, `codeman users add|passwd|list|rm`, `--multiuser` flag, bootstrap-on-first-boot. Tests: `test/user-store.test.ts`.
+- **Phase 2** (multi-user auth): parallel async auth branch (`src/web/middleware/auth.ts`), `req.authUser`, per-username rate bucket, `mustChangePassword` lockbox, `GET /api/me` + `POST /api/me/password`, QR identity-bound minting, network-bind + tunnel exemptions, new error codes. Tests: `test/multiuser-auth.test.ts`.
+- **Phase 3** (ownership threading): `Session.owner` at every create path + recovery mirror; `findSessionOrFail` owner check + list filtering; §6.3 permission policy (`resolveClaudeModeForUser` at all spawn sites incl. one-shots via `buildPromptArgs`; shell/launchCommand grant); per-user case spaces (`resolveCasesDir`) + owner-scoped case list + admin-only host CRUD; `workingDir` confinement; `sessionCapacityState` per-user cap. Tests: `test/ownership-scoping.test.ts`.
+- **Phase 4** (event fan-out): WS owner gate; SSE per-client identity + `broadcast`/terminal-batch routing (`deriveSseHint`, fail-closed); `getLightState` per-identity filtering; file-route preview/thumbnail/history + `GET /api/search` scoping.
+- **Phase 5** (admin API + frontend): `src/web/routes/admin-routes.ts` (user CRUD, one-time passwords, last-admin guards, session revoke/kill) + `src/web/admin-audit.ts`; `public/admin-ui.js` (identity boot, change-password modal + interceptor, admin Users tab). Tests: `test/admin-routes.test.ts`, `test/admin-ui.test.ts`.
+
+Deferred follow-ups (documented, non-blocking): away-digest + subagent/workflow REST-list scoping, push-subscription identity/routing, per-user screenshot subdirs, `linked-cases.json` v2 owner field, `ScheduledRun.owner`, plan-orchestrator internal one-shot mode resolution, and a Playwright browser pass. Phase 6 (login form replacing Basic) remains out of scope.
+
+## 1. Summary
+
+Today Codeman is strictly single-user: one optional credential pair (`CODEMAN_USERNAME`/`CODEMAN_PASSWORD`), one shared `~/codeman-cases` folder, one global session list, and a global SSE/WS fan-out. This plan adds an opt-in **multi-user mode**:
+
+- **Off by default.** Without the flag, behavior stays byte-identical to today (same auth path, same paths, same payloads). All new code is gated behind `isMultiUserMode()`.
+- **`codeman web --multiuser`** (or `CODEMAN_MULTIUSER=1`) enables named users with individually hashed passwords stored in `~/.codeman/users.json`.
+- **Each user gets their own space**: `~/codeman-users/<username>/cases/<case>` replaces the shared `~/codeman-cases` for that user. Sessions, cases, attachments, search, digests, and SSE events are scoped to their owner.
+- **Admin panel** (App Settings, admin-only "Users" tab): create/delete users, change/reset passwords, enable/disable accounts, delete a user's space, see per-user live sessions and disk usage, force logout.
+
+## 2. Threat Model (read first, be honest about this)
+
+Multi-user mode is **workspace separation for a trusted team, NOT security isolation between mutually distrusting users**:
+
+- Every session still runs as the **same OS account** with `claude --dangerously-skip-permissions`. Any user can ask their agent to `cat /home/<host>/codeman-users/otheruser/...`. The web layer enforces scoping; the agent layer cannot.
+- **Shell sessions and custom launch commands are the bluntest holes**: `SessionMode = 'shell'` hands out a raw shell as the host account, and a cron job's `launchCommand` runs an arbitrary command; no Claude permission classifier is involved in either. These must be gated behind the same grant as bypass (section 6.3), otherwise the `auto`-mode mitigation below is theater.
+- All sessions share one tmux socket (`-L codeman`), one `~/.claude` (transcripts, credentials, plan usage), one Claude subscription.
+- Mitigation for stronger isolation: pair a user's cases with **Docker cases** (container per case, `docs/docker-cases.md`), or run separate Codeman instances per user (`CODEMAN_INSTANCE`, separate OS accounts). True per-user OS isolation is explicitly **out of scope** for this feature.
+- Partial mitigation at the agent layer: non-admin users default to Claude's `auto` permission mode (section 6.3), whose safety classifier blocks destructive actions and credential exfiltration. That reduces, but does not eliminate, cross-user snooping; the `canBypassPermissions` grant reopens it and should be given deliberately.
+
+This must be stated loudly in `docs/security-architecture.md`, the README section, and the admin panel UI ("Users share the host account; this separates workspaces, it does not sandbox users from each other").
+
+Also note the flip side: multi-user mode strictly _improves_ today's network posture, because it removes the single shared password and gives every person their own revocable credential.
+
+## 3. Activation and Mode Rules
+
+| Condition                                                     | Behavior                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
+| ------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| No flag (default)                                             | Exactly today's behavior. `users.json` is never read. Single-user auth via `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` if set.                                                                                                                                                                      |
+| `--multiuser` / `CODEMAN_MULTIUSER=1`, `users.json` has users | Multi-user auth active. `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` is ignored for login (warn if set).                                                                                                                                                                                             |
+| `--multiuser`, no `users.json` (first boot)                   | Bootstrap: if `CODEMAN_USERNAME`/`CODEMAN_PASSWORD` are set, create that user as the initial admin and continue. Otherwise refuse to start with instructions to run `codeman users add <name> --admin`. Never start multi-user with zero users (there would be no way in). |
+| `--multiuser` on a non-loopback bind                          | Allowed without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`: `server.ts start()` treats "multi-user with >= 1 enabled user" as satisfying the auth requirement in the loud-warning check (wire into the existing `isLoopbackBindHost()` branch).                                                    |
+| Flag later removed                                            | Single-user mode again. Sessions/state that carry `owner` fields keep working (owner is simply ignored); user spaces remain on disk untouched.                                                                                                                             |
+
+Plumbing: flag in `src/cli.ts` (web command), env in a new `src/config/multiuser.ts` exporting `isMultiUserMode()`. Per-instance like everything else: a beta instance (`CODEMAN_INSTANCE=beta`) has its own `users.json` via `dataPath()`.
+
+## 4. Data Model and Disk Layout
+
+### 4.1 `~/.codeman/users.json` (via `dataPath('users.json')`, mode 0600, atomic write: tmp + rename)
+
+```jsonc
+{
+  "version": 1,
+  "users": [
+    {
+      "username": "alice", // canonical lowercase slug
+      "role": "admin", // "admin" | "user"
+      "password": {
+        "algo": "scrypt", // node:crypto scrypt, no new deps
+        "N": 16384,
+        "r": 8,
+        "p": 1,
+        "salt": "<hex 32B>",
+        "hash": "<hex 64B>",
+      },
+      "disabled": false,
+      "mustChangePassword": false, // set by admin reset; gates all API access until changed
+      "canBypassPermissions": false, // permission-mode grant, see section 6.3; false for new users
+      "createdAt": 1752900000000,
+      "lastLoginAt": 1752900000000,
+    },
+  ],
+}
+```
+
+- **Username rules**: `^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{1,31}$` (it becomes a folder name), stored lowercase, unique case-insensitively. Reserve `admin`? No: any name can be admin; role is a field, not a name.
+- **Hashing**: `scrypt` from `node:crypto` with per-user salt, compared via `timingSafeEqual`. Params stored per record so they can be raised later; verify tolerates old params and rehashes on next successful login.
+- New module `src/user-store.ts` (mirrors the `remote-hosts.ts` / `docker-hosts.ts` pattern): `readUsers()`, `writeUsers()`, `verifyPassword()`, `createUser()`, `setPassword()`, `deleteUser()`, plus pure helpers (`isValidUsername`, `hashPassword`) that are unit-testable without IO. In-process cache with short TTL like `readSettings`, invalidated on every write; the short TTL also covers the CLI (section 10) editing `users.json` while the server runs (cross-process changes picked up within the TTL).
+
+### 4.2 User spaces
+
+```
+~/codeman-users/
+  alice/
+    cases/
+      my-project/          <- same layout as today's ~/codeman-cases/<case>
+  bob/
+    cases/
+```
+
+- New helper in `route-helpers.ts`:
+  `resolveCasesDir(user?: AuthUser): string`
+  single-user mode: returns `CASES_DIR` (today's `~/codeman-cases`); multi-user: returns `join(USER_SPACES_DIR, user.username, 'cases')`, creating it lazily on first use.
+- `CASES_DIR` stays exported for single-user code paths, but every route usage (see 6) switches to the resolver.
+- The **user folder** (`~/codeman-users/<username>/`) is the deletion unit for "delete user + space" and leaves room for future per-user extras (uploads, exports) beside `cases/`.
+- Legacy `~/codeman-cases` in multi-user mode: surfaces to admins only, as a read-only "Unassigned (legacy)" group in the case list, with an admin action `POST /api/admin/cases/assign { case, username }` that `fs.rename`s the folder into a user's space (same-filesystem move, cheap). No automatic migration.
+
+## 5. Auth Pipeline Changes (`src/web/middleware/auth.ts`)
+
+Keep the existing single-user branch untouched. Add a parallel multi-user branch selected once at registration time:
+
+1. **Credential check**: Basic header parsed into `username:password`, verified against the user store (scrypt + `timingSafeEqual`). Disabled users fail closed.
+2. **Cookie sessions**: same `codeman_session` cookie and `StaleExpirationMap`, but `AuthSessionRecord` gains `username` and `role`. All existing TTL/sliding/eviction logic reused. Eviction cap becomes per-user aware (evict oldest _of that user_ first) so one user cannot flush everyone's sessions by logging in 100 times.
+3. **Request identity**: decorate `req.authUser = { username, role }` (Fastify decorateRequest). In single-user mode `req.authUser` is `{ username: 'admin', role: 'admin' }` when auth is on, and a synthetic admin when auth is off, so downstream code has ONE code path.
+4. **Rate limiting**: keep the per-IP bucket; add a per-username failure bucket (same `StaleExpirationMap` pattern) so a botnet cannot brute-force one account across IPs, and one flaky user behind a NAT cannot lock out the rest.
+5. **`mustChangePassword` gate**: when set, every API request except `GET /api/me`, `POST /api/me/password`, and static assets returns 403 with `errorCode: 'PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED'`; the frontend intercepts that code and shows the change-password modal.
+6. **Password change vs Basic-auth caching**: browsers cache Basic credentials. After a password change we revoke all of that user's cookie sessions; the next request falls to Basic with stale creds, gets 401, and the browser re-prompts. Acceptable for v1; a proper login form is Phase 6 (see 15).
+7. **Unchanged**: hook-secret loopback bypass (hooks authenticate the _instance_, not a user; the event maps to a session which has an owner), host guard, Origin/CSRF guard, security headers.
+8. **WS upgrade identity** (`ws-routes.ts`): the global auth `onRequest` hook does run on the upgrade request (`@fastify/websocket` v11 runs hooks before the handshake; browsers send the session cookie), but the route handler itself only checks Host/Origin and never learns WHO authenticated. Multi-user: the handler reads the decorated `req.authUser` and closes 4003 unless owner or admin (section 6.4; identity plumbing lands in Phase 2, the owner check in Phase 4 once sessions have owners). Add a regression test that an upgrade with no credentials is rejected while auth is active: the handler-level Host/Origin gate alone must never be mistaken for auth.
+9. **QR auth** (`/q/:code` redemption in `system-routes.ts`, minting in `tunnel-manager.ts`): today there is ONE global token, auto-rotated every 60s with a 90s grace window. A globally-rotating token cannot carry an identity (every logged-in user sees the same code), so multi-user mode replaces rotation with **on-demand minting**: an authenticated `POST /api/tunnel/qr` mints a single-use, short-TTL token bound to `req.authUser.username` (field on `QrTokenRecord`); redemption creates a cookie session for that user. Existing rate-limit buckets (`qrAuthFailures`, global `QR_RATE_LIMIT_MAX`) apply unchanged. Single-user mode keeps the rotating token.
+
+New error codes in `src/types/api.ts`: `FORBIDDEN`, `PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED`, `USER_EXISTS`, `USER_NOT_FOUND`, `LAST_ADMIN`.
+
+Role guard helper in `route-helpers.ts`: `requireAdmin(req, reply): boolean` used as the first line of every admin handler (403 `FORBIDDEN`), plus `requireOwnerOrAdmin(req, session)`.
+
+## 6. Ownership Threading (the big refactor)
+
+### 6.1 Sessions
+
+- `Session` gains `owner?: string` (constructor option), persisted in `SessionState.owner`, included in `toState()`, round-tripped through recovery (`mux-sessions.json` entries carry it, `restoreMuxSessions` passes it back, exactly like `remote`/`docker`).
+- Every session-creating path stamps the owner from `req.authUser`. Verified inventory of `new Session(...)` call sites: `POST /api/sessions` (session-routes.ts:444), `POST /api/quick-start` (:1956), `POST /api/run` one-shot (:1652), Ralph start (ralph-routes.ts:327), **cron** (cron-service.ts:352; `CronJob` gains `owner`, stamped at job create, launched as the job's owner), legacy `ScheduledRun` loop (server.ts:1603), plan generation + plan-orchestrator agents (plan-routes.ts:128, plan-orchestrator.ts:422/578; owner = requesting user), and recovery (server.ts:2225, next bullet). Two non-paths, also verified: **respawn never constructs a new Session** (it re-spawns the PTY on the same object, so `owner` survives automatically; no inheritance logic needed), and **orchestrator-loop creates no sessions** (it schedules work onto existing idle sessions via the task queue; its scoping requirement is different: it must only pick idle sessions owned by the goal's creator).
+- Recovery: `owner` must ALSO be mirrored on `MuxSession` (mux-sessions.json) and read back mux-first like `remote`/`docker` (`muxSession.owner ?? savedState?.owner`, the server.ts:2246-2250 pattern), or a reboot erases ownership on the next persist.
+- Every session-reading/mutating route filters: non-admin users only see and act on `session.owner === req.authUser.username`. Centralize in `findSessionOrFail` (route-helpers.ts:87; the owner check there covers the 6 route files that use it: system/session/respawn/ralph/file/plan-routes) and in the list endpoints (`GET /api/sessions`, `GET /api/sessions/unified`, `GET /api/status`). The Phase 3 audit must grep for BOTH `sessionManager.getSession` AND direct map access (`ctx.sessions.get(` / `.has(`): ws-routes and hook-event-routes reach sessions that way and bypass `findSessionOrFail`.
+- Admins see everything; every session row carries `owner` so the UI can badge it.
+
+### 6.2 Cases
+
+- All `CASES_DIR` call sites switch to `resolveCasesDir(req.authUser)`: `case-routes.ts` (list/create/delete/CLAUDE.md scaffolding, name-collision checks, docker quickcreate), `session-routes.ts` (quick-start case resolution, the workingDir-inside-cases env-strip check), `ralph-routes.ts` (case path resolution), and `plan-routes.ts:231` (easy to miss). Case-name-to-path resolution is currently DUPLICATED (`resolveCasePath` in case-routes.ts:82 and an inline copy in quick-start, session-routes.ts:1846-1863); consolidate into one owner-aware resolver as part of this refactor instead of patching both copies.
+- Registries that map case names to metadata become owner-scoped. `remote-cases.json`/`docker-cases.json` are arrays of objects, so entries simply gain `owner?: string` (absent = legacy: admin-only). `linked-cases.json` is a flat `Record<caseName, path>` with no room for a field: it needs a v2 shape (`{ "version": 2, "cases": { "<name>": { "path": "...", "owner": "..." } } }`) with read-time migration of the v1 form; it is read in two places (case-routes AND inline in quick-start), both must move to the new reader. Case names only need to be unique per user.
+- **Remote hosts and Docker hosts are machine-level resources**: CRUD on `/api/docker-hosts` and remote-host endpoints becomes admin-only in multi-user mode; regular users can _use_ hosts on their own cases but not define them. (Docker containers exec as the host account; letting any user define arbitrary `docker run` args is admin-equivalent.)
+- Case deletion, exports (`docker-exports/`), and imports check ownership; export filenames get an owner prefix to avoid collisions (fits the existing `^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+\.tgz$` download guard).
+- **Workspace confinement for non-admins (the linchpin, do not skip)**: today `POST /api/sessions` accepts ANY host directory as `workingDir` (the only check is `statSync().isDirectory()`, session-routes.ts:305-318), and file-routes/attachments confine reads to `session.workingDir`. Without a new rule the whole scoping story is circular: a user points a session at `~/codeman-users/bob` (or `/home`) and the web layer itself serves that subtree, no agent needed. Rule: in multi-user mode a non-admin's `workingDir` must realpath-resolve inside their own space, enforced at `POST /api/sessions`, `POST /api/run`, cron job create AND fire time (the dir can change owners between the two), and Ralph auto-configure. Admins are unrestricted. This one rule is what makes the section 6.4 file-route line ("own space or own sessions' workingDirs") meaningful.
+
+### 6.3 Per-user Claude permission-mode policy
+
+Codeman now ships a global **Startup Mode** picker (App Settings, Claude CLI tab: `settings.claudeMode`, values `dangerously-skip-permissions` (default) | `auto` | `normal` | `allowedTools`; `auto` emits `--permission-mode auto`, Anthropic's classifier-guarded low-prompt mode). Multi-user mode layers a per-user policy on top of it:
+
+- **Default for regular users: `auto` only.** A non-admin's Claude sessions are forced to `--permission-mode auto` regardless of the global `claudeMode` setting. `normal` and `allowedTools` are also permitted (they are strictly more restrictive than auto), but `dangerously-skip-permissions` is NOT.
+- **Bypass is an explicit admin grant**: `canBypassPermissions: true` on the user record (default `false`, section 4.1). Only with that grant does the global skip-permissions default (or a future per-user choice) apply to their sessions.
+- **Admins** are unrestricted; the global setting applies to them as-is.
+- **Single enforcement point**: a pure `resolveClaudeModeForUser(globalMode, user)` in `user-store.ts`, applied server-side at option-resolution time, BEFORE the Session constructor, so both downstream arg builders inherit it for free (`buildPermissionArgs` in session-cli-builder.ts for the direct-PTY path AND `buildClaudePermissionFlags` in tmux-manager.ts for tmux panes; there are two builders, not one). Call sites where `getClaudeModeConfig()` feeds a spawn: session-routes.ts:452/1964, ralph-routes.ts:334, cron-service.ts:360, and recovery (server.ts:2214/2233). Recovery re-reads the GLOBAL setting on reboot, so the resolver must run there with the RECOVERED owner, or a restart silently un-downgrades every restored session. Never resolved in the frontend, so it cannot be bypassed via payload.
+- **Downgrade, don't error**: a non-granted user whose effective mode would be bypass gets `auto` silently (logged + surfaced as a badge on the session), so shared presets keep working.
+- **Other CLIs' bypass equivalents** follow the same grant: Codex `--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox` (`codexDangerouslyBypassApprovals`) and Gemini `--approval-mode yolo` are refused for non-granted users (Gemini falls back to `auto_edit`, Codex to its default sandbox). Whether this stays one grant or splits per-CLI is an open question (section 15).
+- **Shell mode and custom launch commands follow the grant too**: `mode: 'shell'` sessions and cron `launchCommand` are arbitrary command execution as the host account, strictly stronger than any bypass flag, and no permission-mode downgrade applies to them. Non-granted users get 403 `FORBIDDEN` on shell session/quick-start creation and on cron jobs carrying `launchCommand` (checked at create AND at fire time). Folding them under `canBypassPermissions` keeps the model one-bit; section 15 asks whether it should split.
+- **Admin UI**: a "Can skip permissions" toggle per user in the Users tab (PATCH field, section 8), with a warning echoing the section 2 threat model.
+- Revoking the grant takes effect on the user's NEXT session start; live sessions are listed so the admin can restart them.
+
+### 6.4 Everything else that lists or streams
+
+| Surface                                                                    | Scoping rule                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
+| -------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| SSE `/api/events`                                                          | Per-connection filter (see 7)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
+| WS terminal (`ws-routes.ts`)                                               | Handler reads `req.authUser` (section 5.8) and closes 4003 unless owner or admin; today it checks Host/Origin only and has no identity                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
+| `GET /api/search`                                                          | `harvestSources()` only over owned sessions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
+| `GET /api/away-digest`                                                     | Aggregate only owned sessions/events                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
+| `GET /api/subagents`, workflow runs                                        | Filter by owning session (`claudeSessionId -> session -> owner`); agents not attributable to any session: admin-only                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
+| Push (`push-routes.ts`)                                                    | Subscription records currently carry NO identity (keyed by endpoint only): `subscribe` stamps `username`. All 8 `PUSH_EVENT_MAP` events are session-scoped, so routing = resolve owner from `data.sessionId`, deliver to that owner's (plus admins') subscriptions. Legacy identity-less subscriptions: admin-only delivery                                                                                                                               |
+| Screenshots `/api/screenshots`                                             | Per-user subdir `~/.codeman/screenshots/<username>/` in multi-user mode. Note: `GET /:name` deliberately rejects `/` in names as traversal, so derive the subdir server-side from `req.authUser` and keep client-visible names flat                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
+| Attachments                                                                | Already session-scoped; inherits the session owner check. `attachmentConfineToWorkspace` is a global, default-OFF setting today: in multi-user mode it is FORCED ON for non-admins regardless of the setting (their attachments must resolve inside their own space); the setting keeps meaning what it means for admins                                                                                                                                  |
+| File routes (browse/preview)                                               | Path allowlist adds: non-admin paths must resolve (realpath) inside their own space or their own sessions' workingDirs                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
+| Settings (`settings.json`)                                                 | Global, admin-only writes in multi-user mode; reads allowed (per-device display keys stay in localStorage as today). Per-user server settings: out of scope v1                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
+| System ops (self-update, tunnel toggle, span-displays, docker image build) | Admin-only                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
+| `getLightState` init snapshot                                              | Filtered per connection. Actual contents to filter (verified): `sessions`, `scheduledRuns`, `respawnStatus`, `subagents`, `workflowRuns`, `planUsage` (host-plan telemetry: admin-only); `globalStats` stays coarse-global. Cron jobs are NOT in the snapshot (they have their own REST route; filter there). The snapshot is cached process-wide (`LIGHT_STATE_CACHE_TTL_MS`): either key the cache per role/user or filter AFTER the cache on each send |
+
+## 7. SSE Event Filtering
+
+`/api/events` currently broadcasts everything to everyone. Ground truth first (verified): `broadcast()` lives in `SseStreamManager` (`sse-stream-manager.ts`), not server.ts; clients are keyed by the raw Fastify reply (`sseClients: Map<FastifyReply, Set<string> | null>`, plus `sseClientsById` for live filter updates); the existing `?sessions=` filter is a bandwidth optimization applied ONLY to `session:terminal` batches in `flushSessionTerminalBatch()`, while `broadcast()` itself loops ALL clients unconditionally. The single-client delivery primitive already exists (`sendSSE`, used for the per-connection init snapshot). Plan:
+
+- At connection time, resolve `req.authUser` and store `{ username, role }` with the client. Concretely: extend `addClient(reply, sessionFilter, isRemote, clientId)` to take the identity and change the `sseClients` map value to `{ filter, identity }` (or add a parallel `Map<reply, identity>`); there is no per-client record object today to hang it on.
+- `broadcast()` gains an optional routing hint: `broadcast(event, data, { sessionId?, adminOnly?, username? })`. Resolution order per client: admin sees all; `username` targets one user; `sessionId` resolves owner via SessionManager; `adminOnly` for machine-level events (docker image builds, tunnel, self-update); no hint = broadcast to all (connection status etc.).
+- **Enforce the identity check in BOTH `broadcast()` AND `flushSessionTerminalBatch()`**: the terminal batch path does not go through `broadcast()`, and it carries the highest-value payload (raw terminal bytes).
+- Sweep of the ~120 backend event constants in `sse-events.ts`: mechanically, everything `session:*`, `ralph:*`, `respawn:*`, `subagent:*`, `workflow:*`, `attachment:*`, `cron:*` (job owner) carries or can resolve a sessionId/owner; `docker:*`, `system:*`, tunnel and update events are adminOnly; a short tail needs case-by-case decisions during implementation.
+- The existing `?sessions=` filter and `/api/events/subscribe` compose with (never override) the ownership filter: the subscription filter can only narrow within what the identity allows.
+
+## 8. Admin API (`src/web/routes/admin-routes.ts`, new module + `AdminPort`)
+
+All handlers: multi-user mode only (404 otherwise), `requireAdmin`, Zod schemas in `schemas.ts`, `ApiResponse` envelope, audit-logged.
+
+| Endpoint                                         | Behavior                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
+| ------------------------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| `GET /api/admin/users`                           | List users + stats: role, disabled, createdAt, lastLoginAt, live session count, case count, space disk usage (best-effort async walk, cached 60s), active cookie-session count                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
+| `POST /api/admin/users`                          | Create: `{ username, role, password? }`. No password given: generate a one-time password, return it ONCE in the response, set `mustChangePassword`                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |
+| `PATCH /api/admin/users/:username`               | `{ role?, disabled?, canBypassPermissions? }`. Demoting/disabling the last enabled admin: 409 `LAST_ADMIN`. Disable also revokes cookie sessions. `canBypassPermissions` is the section 6.3 grant (default false)                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
+| `POST /api/admin/users/:username/reset-password` | Generates one-time password (returned once), sets `mustChangePassword`, revokes cookie sessions                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
+| `POST /api/admin/users/:username/logout`         | Revoke all cookie sessions for that user. Honest limit under Basic auth: the browser silently re-sends cached credentials and gets a fresh cookie on the next request, so logout only truly ends QR-issued sessions; to actually lock someone out, disable the account or reset the password. Say so in the panel tooltip until Phase 6                                                                                 |
+| `DELETE /api/admin/users/:username`              | `{ deleteSpace?: boolean }` (default false). Refuses last admin. Kills the user's live sessions first (normal kill flow, incl. docker/remote teardown per case), revokes cookies, removes from store. With `deleteSpace`: guarded recursive delete of `~/codeman-users/<username>` (realpath must be inside `USER_SPACES_DIR`, top-level dir must not be a symlink), plus their registry entries and push subscriptions |
+| `POST /api/admin/cases/assign`                   | Move a legacy `~/codeman-cases/<case>` into a user's space (`fs.rename`)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
+| Self-service `GET /api/me`                       | `{ username, role, mustChangePassword }` (works in single-user mode too: synthetic admin; the frontend uses it to decide whether to render admin UI)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
+| Self-service `POST /api/me/password`             | `{ currentPassword, newPassword }`, verifies current, min length 8, revokes other sessions, clears `mustChangePassword`                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
+
+**Audit log**: append-only `~/.codeman/admin-audit.jsonl` (same idiom as `session-lifecycle.jsonl`): timestamp, acting admin, action, target, request IP. User management without an audit trail is not acceptable even for a homelab tool.
+
+SSE additions (both `sse-events.ts` and `constants.js`): `admin:usersChanged` (adminOnly; the panel re-fetches) and `auth:passwordChangeRequired` (targeted to the user).
+
+## 9. Frontend
+
+- **`GET /api/me` on boot** (app.js init): stores `window.__codemanUser`; everything below keys off it. Single-user mode returns the synthetic admin, so the UI needs no mode awareness beyond "am I admin".
+- **Admin panel**: new tab "Users" in the App Settings modal (settings-ui.js), rendered only for admins in multi-user mode. Table of users with actions (create, reset password showing the one-time password in a copy-to-clipboard reveal, enable/disable, role toggle, logout, delete with a typed-username confirm for the delete-space variant). No new header button (mobile header policy test stays green; the settings modal is already reachable everywhere).
+- **Change-password modal**: shown on `PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED` (fetch interceptor in api-client.js) and reachable from settings for self-service.
+- **Owner badges**: admin's session tabs and the session palette/manager show `owner` on foreign sessions; regular users see no change.
+- New module `admin-ui.js` if the settings-ui.js addition gets large (load order after settings-ui, before session-ui), else keep inside settings-ui.js. Follow the `@fileoverview` + `@loadorder` convention either way.
+
+## 10. CLI Additions (`src/cli.ts`)
+
+Headless bootstrap and recovery must not require the web UI:
+
+```
+codeman users add <name> [--admin]     # prompts for password (hidden input), or --password-stdin
+codeman users passwd <name>            # reset password
+codeman users list
+codeman users rm <name> [--delete-space]
+```
+
+These operate directly on `users.json` via `user-store.ts` (no server needed), honoring `CODEMAN_INSTANCE`. This is also the answer to "locked out: last admin forgot password".
+
+## 11. Limits and Config
+
+- New `src/config/multiuser.ts`: `isMultiUserMode()`, `USER_SPACES_DIR` (`~/codeman-users`, overridable via `CODEMAN_USER_SPACES_DIR` for tests), `MAX_USERS` (default 25), per-user session cap (default: global cap / 2, env `CODEMAN_MAX_SESSIONS_PER_USER`).
+- Cap enforcement is currently COPY-PASTED: the global `MAX_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS` (50, `config/map-limits.ts:25`) check appears at 6 independent sites (session-routes.ts:298/1622/1683, ralph-routes.ts:275, cron-service.ts:340, server.ts:1595). Do not add a 7th copy per site: extract one `assertSessionCapacity(ctx, owner?)` helper doing the global + per-user checks and use it everywhere, or the per-user cap WILL miss a path.
+- Global limits (50 sessions, SSE clients 100, terminal buffers) are unchanged and shared; the per-user session cap is the fairness lever.
+
+## 12. Compatibility Matrix
+
+| Concern            | Guarantee                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
+| ------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| Default (no flag)  | No behavior change. No new file reads on the hot path. All new fields optional in state                                                                                                                     |
+| State round-trip   | `SessionState.owner`, `MuxSession.owner`, `CronJob.owner`, registry `owner` fields are optional; old state loads clean; new state loaded by an old build ignores unknown fields (existing tolerant parsing) |
+| Instance isolation | `users.json`, audit log, screenshots subdirs all via `dataPath()`; user spaces dir is shared across instances like `~/codeman-cases` is today (documented)                                                  |
+| API versioning     | HTTP API is internal per `docs/versioning-policy.md`; still, all changes are additive. Ship as a **minor** version                                                                                          |
+| Hooks              | Unchanged (instance-level hook secret; owner resolved from the session)                                                                                                                                     |
+
+## 13. Implementation Phases
+
+Each phase is independently shippable behind the flag and ends with its tests green.
+
+**Phase 1: user store + mode plumbing** (no behavior change yet)
+`src/user-store.ts`, `src/config/multiuser.ts`, CLI `users` subcommands, bootstrap-on-first-boot logic, `users.json` schema + atomic writes.
+Tests: `test/user-store.test.ts` (hashing, verify, params upgrade, username validation, atomic write, last-admin invariants; pure, no server).
+
+**Phase 2: multi-user auth**
+Auth middleware branch, `req.authUser` decoration, cookie records with username/role, per-username rate bucket, `mustChangePassword` gate, WS upgrade identity plumbing + unauthenticated-upgrade regression test (section 5.8), QR on-demand minting + identity binding (section 5.9), `GET /api/me`, `POST /api/me/password`, error codes, network-bind check integration.
+Tests: `test/multiuser-auth.test.ts` (live server, unique port 3170+; wrong password, disabled user, cookie carries identity, per-user rate limit isolation, mustChangePassword lockbox, QR redemption identity). Reuse the `delete process.env.CODEMAN_PASSWORD` idiom from `test/setup.ts`.
+
+**Phase 3: ownership threading**
+Session `owner` + persistence + `MuxSession` mirror + recovery; `resolveCasesDir()` refactor across case/session/ralph/plan routes (consolidating the duplicated case-path resolution); registry owner fields incl. the linked-cases v2 shape; `findSessionOrFail` owner check + the direct-`sessions.get` audit; list filtering; owner stamping across ALL create paths from 6.1; **non-admin workingDir confinement** (6.2); permission-mode/shell/launchCommand policy (6.3); `assertSessionCapacity` helper + per-user cap.
+Tests: `test/routes/ownership-scoping.test.ts` (inject-based: user A cannot read/kill/input user B's session, case lists are disjoint, admin sees both), extend `test/cron-service.test.ts` for owner stamping, recovery round-trip in the existing mux-recovery tests.
+
+**Phase 4: event fan-out + remaining surfaces**
+SSE routing hints + client identity (enforced in BOTH `broadcast()` and the terminal-batch flush), WS owner gate (identity landed in Phase 2), search/digest/subagent/workflow scoping, push subscription identity + owner routing, screenshot subdirs, file-route scoping, `getLightState` filtering + per-identity caching, admin-only system ops.
+Tests: `test/sse-ownership.test.ts` (two SSE clients, event for A's session reaches only A + admin), WS upgrade rejection test, search/digest scoping tests.
+
+**Phase 5: admin API + frontend**
+`admin-routes.ts` + `AdminPort` + schemas + audit log + `admin:usersChanged`; settings-ui Users tab, change-password modal, owner badges, api-client interceptor.
+Tests: `test/routes/admin-routes.test.ts` (CRUD, last-admin 409, one-time password flow, delete-space guard rails incl. symlink refusal), frontend vm-sandbox test following `test/run-mode-ui.test.ts` pattern, Playwright pass per the always-end-to-end rule before calling it done.
+
+**Phase 6 (optional, later): login page**
+Replace Basic with a form + `POST /api/login` in multi-user mode only (fixes browser credential caching UX, enables logout button). Explicitly deferred; Basic works for v1.
+
+**Docs**: update `docs/security-architecture.md` (new section: multi-user model + threat model from section 2), `README.md` (short opt-in section), `CLAUDE.md` (Key Patterns entry + State Files + route/SSE counts), this file gets a "shipped" status stamp per phase.
+
+## 14. Key Risks / Decisions Made
+
+1. **Not a security boundary at the agent layer** (section 2). Decided: ship with loud documentation; Docker cases are the isolation story.
+2. **`findSessionOrFail` as the single enforcement point** for ~30 session routes: any route that fetches sessions another way must be audited in Phase 3 (grep for `sessionManager.getSession` outside route-helpers).
+3. **SSE sweep is the riskiest surface**: a missed event leaks metadata (not terminal content, which is session-scoped, but names/paths). Phase 4 includes a checklist pass over all ~138 events with the default flipped to "owner-scoped unless explicitly global": fail closed.
+4. **Basic-auth password-change UX** is mediocre (browser re-prompt). Accepted for v1; Phase 6 fixes it properly.
+5. **Legacy case migration** is manual (admin assigns). No silent moves of user data.
+6. **Case-name uniqueness becomes per-user**; tmux session names already include the session id so no collision, but the `w<n>-<case>` tab naming and lifecycle-log rows should include the owner for disambiguation in admin views.
+7. **`workingDir` confinement (6.2) is the single most load-bearing rule**: every file-serving and agent-spawning surface downstream trusts `session.workingDir`. Review and test it as carefully as the auth branch (foreign-space path, symlink into a foreign space, `..` traversal, cron fire-time re-check).
+8. **The WS handler never sees identity today** (auth happens only in the global hook): the 5.8 wiring is new code on a security-sensitive path; cover unauthenticated, foreign-user, and admin upgrades with tests.
+
+## 15. Open Questions (answer before Phase 3)
+
+1. Should admins' own cases live in `~/codeman-users/<admin>/cases` (symmetric, proposed) or keep using legacy `~/codeman-cases`? Proposed: symmetric; legacy dir is a migration source only.
+2. Per-user settings (respawn presets, notification prefs): global-only in v1. Worth a `users/<name>/settings.json` overlay later?
+3. Should regular users be allowed to create Docker cases on admin-defined hosts (proposed: yes) or is Docker entirely admin-only?
+4. Session handoff: does an admin need "reassign session/case to another user"? (Cheap to add next to `cases/assign`; not in v1 scope.)
+5. Permission-mode grants (section 6.3): one `canBypassPermissions` flag covering Claude/Codex/Gemini bypass equivalents PLUS shell mode and cron `launchCommand` (proposed: one flag, keep it one-bit), or split into `canBypassPermissions` + `canRunArbitraryCommands`? And should admins be able to set a per-user DEFAULT mode (for example force `normal` for an intern) rather than just gating bypass?
+6. OpenCode has no single bypass flag (its permission config rides `OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT`): decide what the grant means there before Phase 3, or exclude OpenCode mode for non-granted users in v1.

docs/remote-sessions.md

@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+# Remote Sessions (SSH)
+
+Codeman can run a session's agent on a **remote host over SSH** instead of the
+local machine. The agent (Claude, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, or a plain shell)
+runs inside a `tmux` server **on the remote host**, so it survives the SSH
+connection dropping; Codeman attaches to it the same way it attaches to a local
+managed session.
+
+This document covers the data model, the shell-safe SSH command construction
+(COD-107), the durable-launch design (COD-104), and the operational caveats.
+For the local session/mux machinery this builds on, see the **Mux** and
+**Session** entries in `CLAUDE.md` → Architecture.
+
+## Why it exists
+
+A developer box (`AA-DESKTOP`) often needs to drive an agent on another machine —
+a NAS, a build server, a host reachable only through a jump box or a
+cloudflared SOCKS5 proxy. Rather than wrap `ssh` by hand per host, Codeman
+stores reusable **remote hosts** + **remote cases** and reproduces the exact
+connection the operator already uses (`ssh-aa-desktop`-style configs:
+custom port, identity file, `-J` jump host, `-o ProxyCommand`).
+
+## Data model
+
+Types live in `src/types/session.ts`; persistence in `src/remote-hosts.ts`.
+
+| Type | Role |
+|------|------|
+| `RemoteSshOptions` | The **HOW-to-reach** fields, shared by host + session: `identityFile`, `socksProxy` (`host:port`), `jumpHost` (`[user@]host[:port]`), `extraSshOptions` (`KEY=VALUE[]`). Every field optional — all-absent reproduces port-22, default-identity, directly-SSH-able behavior. |
+| `RemoteHost` (extends `RemoteSshOptions`) | A saved host: `id`, `label`, `host`, `username`, `port?`, `commands?` (per-mode launch command override). |
+| `RemoteCase` | A working directory on a host: `name`, `type: 'remote'`, `hostId`, `remotePath`. |
+| `SessionRemote` (extends `RemoteSshOptions`) | The resolved bundle stamped onto a live session: host coordinates + `remotePath` + `commands`, plus **`owned?`** and **`remoteSessionName?`** (COD-105 — see [Ownership](#ownership-launched-vs-discovered-and-attached-cod-105)). Built by `toSessionRemote(host, case)` (sets `owned: true`) for the launch path, or `toAttachedSessionRemote(host, name, path)` (sets `owned: false`) for the attach path. Both copy the advanced SSH options through so every connection is identical. |
+| `RemoteCommandMode` | `Extract<SessionMode, 'shell' \| 'claude' \| 'opencode' \| 'codex' \| 'gemini'>` — the modes that can run remotely. |
+| `RemoteSessionInfo` (COD-105) | One discovered remote tmux session: `name` (always `codeman-*`), `attached` (a client is connected), `created` (epoch s), `windows`. Returned by `listRemoteCodemanSessions()`. |
+
+Persistence is two flat JSON arrays in the instance data dir:
+
+- `~/.codeman/remote-hosts.json` — `readRemoteHosts()` / `writeRemoteHosts()`
+- `~/.codeman/remote-cases.json` — `readRemoteCases()` / `writeRemoteCases()`
+
+(Paths via `remoteHostsPath()` / `remoteCasesPath()`; both honor `CODEMAN_INSTANCE`
+because the config dir is the instance data dir.)
+
+On the live `Session`, the remote rides as `_remote?: SessionRemote`. When
+attaching, `resolveMuxAttachCwd()` forces the cwd to `/tmp` for remote sessions —
+the local working directory is meaningless on the remote box.
+
+## SSH command construction (COD-107 — the injection surface)
+
+**All** SSH command lines flow through one function so user-controlled fields are
+escaped once and the launch + prereq probe can never drift apart:
+
+```ts
+// src/remote-hosts.ts
+buildSshConnectionArgs(remote: RemoteSshOptions & Pick<RemoteHost, 'port'>): string[]
+```
+
+It returns the **ordered leading tokens** of an ssh command line (no `-t`, no
+target, no remote command):
+
+```
+ssh -o BatchMode=yes
+    [-p <port>]
+    [-i <abs-identity>]            # ~ / $HOME expanded, then shellescaped
+    [-J <jumpHost>]                # shellescaped, single token
+    [-o ProxyCommand=nc -X 5 -x <socks> %h %p]   # ONE shellescaped -o token
+    [-o <KEY=VALUE>] …             # each extra option, shellescaped
+```
+
+Rules that keep this safe — **do not bypass them by hand-building an ssh line elsewhere:**
+
+- **Every** user-controlled value (`-i`, `-J`, `-o`, ProxyCommand) is POSIX
+  single-quote `shellescape`d (`'…'` with embedded `'\''`). The helper mirrors
+  the one in `tmux-manager.ts`.
+- **`~`/`$HOME` in `identityFile` is expanded at build time** (`expandIdentityPath`),
+  *before* escaping — ssh does not expand `~` inside `-i`, and the escaped value
+  never reaches a shell that would.
+- **The ProxyCommand is one shellescaped `-o KEY=VALUE` token**, so its spaces and
+  the `%h`/`%p` placeholders reach ssh as a single argument. `%h %p` survive
+  verbatim — **ssh** expands them to the real host/port, not the shell.
+- **Empty options ⇒ `['ssh', '-o BatchMode=yes']`** (+ `-p` only when set) —
+  byte-identical to the historical behavior.
+
+Token construction is unit-tested independently of any live connection (see
+`test/` for `buildSshConnectionArgs` / `buildRemoteTmuxCheckCommand` cases).
+
+## Durable launch (COD-104)
+
+`buildRemoteLaunchCommand({ mode, remote, sessionId })` in `tmux-manager.ts`
+builds the command that launches (or **reattaches** to) the remote session:
+
+```
+ssh -o BatchMode=yes -t <connection-args> user@host \
+  'tmux -L codeman-remote new-session -A -s codeman-ssh-<id8> -c <remotePath> "cd <remotePath> && exec <cli>" \; \
+     set -t codeman-ssh-<id8> status off \; set -t codeman-ssh-<id8> mouse off \; \
+     set -t codeman-ssh-<id8> prefix C-q \; set -s escape-time 0 \; \
+     set -t codeman-ssh-<id8> window-size latest'
+```
+
+Key points:
+
+- **`new-session -A -s codeman-ssh-<id8>`** = attach-if-exists-else-create, so a
+  reconnect (same deterministic `remoteTmuxSessionName(sessionId)` — `codeman-ssh-` +
+  the first 8 chars of the session id) lands back in
+  the **same** remote session rather than spawning a duplicate. This is what makes
+  the remote agent survive an SSH drop. The name deliberately fails
+  `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN` so a Codeman running ON the remote host never adopts it.
+- **`-L codeman-remote`** = a DEDICATED socket for sessions launched by remote
+  Codemans, NOT the canonical `-L codeman` socket the remote host's own Codeman
+  uses. Options are set per-session (`set -t`), never `-g`, so a shared remote
+  tmux server's other sessions are untouched (#145 hardening). Note the
+  asymmetry: **discovery/attach (COD-105) target the canonical `-L codeman`
+  socket** — they join sessions the remote's own Codeman manages, while owned
+  durable launches live on `-L codeman-remote`.
+- **`exec <cli>`** replaces the pane shell with the agent, so the pane PID *is*
+  the agent. The per-mode command comes from `remote.commands?.[mode]` or
+  `defaultRemoteCommandForMode(mode)` (`exec claude` / `exec opencode` /
+  `exec codex` / `exec gemini` / `exec bash -l`).
+- The **whole tmux invocation is a single shell-quoted ssh argument**, and the
+  pane command is independently quoted, so a `remotePath` with spaces is safe.
+- Connection options come from the **same `buildSshConnectionArgs(remote)`** as
+  the prereq probe; `-t` is inserted right after `ssh -o BatchMode=yes`,
+  preserving historical token order.
+
+### tmux prerequisite probe
+
+Because durable remote sessions require tmux on the remote host,
+`checkRemoteTmuxAvailable(host)` runs `command -v tmux` over SSH **before**
+creating a remote case/session and returns a structured, never-throwing result:
+
+- empty stdout / non-zero exit → *"remote host `<host>` needs tmux installed for
+  durable remote sessions"*
+- stderr present → *"could not verify tmux on remote host `<host>`: `<stderr>`"*
+  (a real connection failure, surfaced to the operator)
+- success → `{ ok: true, tmuxPath }`
+
+It connects with the **identical** options as the launch
+(`buildRemoteTmuxCheckCommand` reuses `buildSshConnectionArgs` and inserts
+`-o ConnectTimeout=10`), so a proxied/custom-port/identity host that the launch
+can reach also passes the probe (and vice-versa).
+
+**Test-mode short-circuit:** under `VITEST` the probe returns
+`{ ok: true, tmuxPath: '(test-mode)' }` without opening a socket — mirroring
+`TmuxManager`'s no-op-shell-under-VITEST (`IS_TEST_MODE`). Without it, remote-case
+create-path tests would hit a real ~10s ssh timeout. Only the live probe is
+skipped; command construction is still asserted by unit tests.
+
+## Ownership: launched vs. discovered-and-attached (COD-105)
+
+COD-104 (above) was Phase 1 — Codeman *launches* a remote session and owns it.
+COD-105 is Phase 2 — Codeman can also **discover** `codeman-*` tmux sessions
+already running on a remote host (created by the remote's own Codeman or another
+instance) and **attach** to one it didn't launch. Ownership decides what happens
+when the tab closes.
+
+`SessionRemote.owned` carries this:
+
+- **`owned: true`** (or absent — legacy/COD-104 sessions persisted before this
+  field) — we launched it via `buildRemoteLaunchCommand` and may explicitly kill it.
+- **`owned: false`** — discovered + attached; another Codeman owns the remote
+  session. `remoteSessionName` holds its existing tmux name. Closing the tab
+  **detaches**, never kills.
+
+### Discovery
+
+`listRemoteCodemanSessions(host)` lists the remote's `codeman-*` sessions:
+
+- `buildRemoteListSessionsCommand()` runs `tmux -L codeman list-sessions -F "…"`
+  over SSH (connection args from the shared `buildSshConnectionArgs`, so discovery
+  connects identically to launch/probe). `2>/dev/null` swallows tmux's "no server
+  running" stderr.
+- `parseRemoteSessionList()` is a **pure, unit-tested** parser. ⚠️ Quirk: the
+  remote tmux's `-F "…\t…"` format emits the **literal two-character `\t`**, not a
+  real tab (verified on tmux next-3.7), so the parser splits on `/\\t|\t/` (literal
+  backslash-t **or** a real tab, for builds that do expand it). It keeps only
+  `codeman-*` names, coerces types, and skips malformed lines.
+- `listRemoteCodemanSessions()` **never throws** — unreachable host / no tmux / no
+  sessions all map to `[]`. Like the prereq probe, it **no-ops to `[]` under
+  `VITEST`** so a request path never opens a real ssh connection.
+
+Discovery is **explicit** — the UI has a "Discover existing sessions" button per
+host; Codeman never auto-discovers on host select.
+
+### Attach vs. launch selection
+
+`buildRemoteSessionCommand(mode, remote, sessionId)` in `tmux-manager.ts` picks the
+remote command line by ownership:
+
+- **`owned === false`** → `buildRemoteAttachCommand(remote, name)` — emits
+  `ssh … -t … 'tmux -L codeman attach -t <remoteSessionName>'`. It uses **`attach`,
+  NOT `new-session -A`**, so it only *joins* an existing session and never creates
+  one.
+- **owned (default)** → `buildRemoteLaunchCommand` (the COD-104 path above).
+
+### Detach-not-kill
+
+`TmuxManager.killSession()` has an **early return for non-owned remote sessions**:
+it tears down **only the LOCAL pane** holding the ssh client (`tmux -L codeman
+kill-session` on *this* host's socket). Killing the local ssh sends SIGHUP to the
+remote `tmux attach`, which **detaches** — the durable remote session survives.
+The early return is a structural guarantee that **no code path can ever issue a
+remote `kill-session` for a session we don't own** — the only `kill-session` run is
+on the local socket, which never reaches the remote socket.
+
+## API
+
+Routes are registered in `src/web/routes/case-routes.ts`:
+
+| Method | Path | Purpose |
+|--------|------|---------|
+| `GET` | `/api/remote-hosts` | List saved hosts |
+| `POST` | `/api/remote-hosts` | Create a host |
+| `PUT` | `/api/remote-hosts/:id` | Update a host |
+| `DELETE` | `/api/remote-hosts/:id` | Delete a host |
+| `GET` | `/api/remote-hosts/:hostId/sessions` | Discover `codeman-*` sessions on the host (COD-105; `listRemoteCodemanSessions`, never errors) |
+| `POST` | `/api/cases/remote-link` | Link a case to a remote host (creates the `RemoteCase`) |
+
+Attaching to a discovered session is a **session-create** path, not a host route:
+`POST /api/sessions` accepts `attachRemoteSession: { hostId, remoteSessionName }`
+(schema in `schemas.ts`; `remoteSessionName` must match `^codeman-[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$`),
+which `session-routes.ts` turns into a non-owned (`owned: false`) session.
+
+Frontend touchpoints: the remote-host management UI is in `session-ui.js` /
+`panels-ui.js`; a remote session is created by picking a remote host/case in the
+session-create flow, or via the per-host **"Discover existing sessions"** button →
+**Attach** action (creates an `owned: false` session).
+
+## Security notes
+
+- **`identityFile` is a path only — never key bytes.** Codeman stores the path and
+  passes it to `ssh -i`; the key never enters Codeman's state or the wire.
+- The injection surface is the SSH option fields. The single-source
+  `buildSshConnectionArgs` + `shellescape` discipline (COD-107) is the control —
+  audit any new code path that constructs an ssh command to route through it
+  rather than concatenating options inline.
+- `BatchMode=yes` means **no interactive password/passphrase prompts** — remote
+  hosts must be reachable with key-based or agent auth (or an unencrypted key the
+  agent has loaded). A host needing a passphrase will fail the probe with an ssh
+  diagnostic rather than hang.
+
+## Related
+
+- `CLAUDE.md` → Architecture → **Remote** row, and the **Remote sessions (SSH)**
+  Key Pattern.
+- `docs/security-architecture.md` — overall network/auth model.
+- COD-104 (tmux prereq + durable launch), COD-105 (discover + attach, detach-not-kill ownership), COD-107 (shell-safe connection args).

docs/security-architecture.md

@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ an explicit, guided opt‑in.
 7. [Supply‑chain & build‑asset hardening](#7-supplychain--buildasset-hardening-cod28)
 8. [Multi‑instance isolation](#8-multiinstance-isolation)
 9. [Transport security headers](#9-transport-security-headers)
-10. [Quick reference](#10-quick-reference)
+10. [Docker container isolation](#10-docker-container-isolation)
+11. [Quick reference](#11-quick-reference)
 
 ---
 
@@ -471,7 +472,45 @@ production layout (`~/.codeman`, `-L codeman`, port 3000).
 
 ---
 
-## 10. Quick reference
+## 10. Docker container isolation
+
+Docker cases (1.4.0) run a session inside a per‑case container instead of on the host. The security posture:
+
+- **Hardened create flags, always** — `--cap-drop ALL`, `--security-opt no-new-privileges`, `--pids-limit` (fork‑bomb guard), `--memory` == `--memory-swap` (a real OOM cap), `--init`, and non‑root: `--user <hostUid>:0` on Linux (host uid → workspace files stay host‑owned; GID 0 keeps `$HOME` writable), `--userns=keep-id` on rootless Podman. **Never** `--privileged`, and **never** the docker socket — the pure builder in `docker-hosts.ts` cannot emit them and the schema cannot represent them.
+- **Credentials never enter an image** — the convenient default bind‑mounts host cred dirs (`~/.claude`, `~/.codex`, `~/.gemini`, `~/.config/{gcloud,opencode}`) read‑write. Bind mounts are physically excluded from `docker commit`, so exported images are secret‑free. API‑key CLIs get their key as an exec‑time NAME‑ONLY `--env OPENAI_API_KEY` (no `=value`, no `ps` leak, never committed); a create‑time `-e` for a secret is never used. The **sealed** profile (`mountCredentials:false` + `network:none`) drops the host mounts; full‑image export is then refused (an in‑container login would ride the committed layer) unless a pre‑commit scrub is opted into.
+- **Blast radius — accept it explicitly** — the convenient profile mounts an arbitrary host workspace RW plus the host credential dirs RW into a network‑enabled container, so container‑run agent code can read/modify those host trees and reach the network at once. Still a net improvement over today's on‑host `--dangerously-skip-permissions` execution; use the sealed profile for genuinely untrusted work.
+- **Import is untrusted‑bundle‑safe** — `/api/docker-cases/import` validates the manifest + per‑member SHA‑256 before extraction, rejects absolute / `..` tar members (traversal guard), and re‑tags the loaded image into a quarantined namespace so it can never overwrite `codeman/agent:base` or a pre‑existing tag.
+- **Host guard & the bridge‑hooks listener** — in‑container hook callbacks carry `Host: host.docker.internal` / `host.containers.internal`; both are on the always‑on host‑header allowlist (`DOCKER_HOST_GATEWAY_ALIASES`) and resolve to the host only from inside a container netns, so they are not a browser DNS‑rebinding surface. On a loopback‑only server, in‑container hooks are opt‑in via `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS=1`, which binds a SECOND listener on the docker bridge gateway serving **only** the hook endpoints (every other path → `403`) into the same hook‑secret‑gated pipeline. The bridge is host‑internal (containers + host), not the LAN, so it does not widen network exposure; the hook secret is bind‑mounted read‑only and referenced by path.
+- **Instance isolation** — every managed container is labeled `codeman.instance=<CODEMAN_INSTANCE>`; the boot reaper reaps orphans of its OWN instance only, so a beta never removes a prod container. The in‑container tmux socket (`-L codeman-docker`) + session name (`codeman-dkr-*`) deliberately fail a nested Codeman's discovery pattern.
+
+Full feature guide: [`docker-cases.md`](docker-cases.md).
+
+---
+
+## 10a. Multi‑user mode (opt‑in)
+
+`codeman web --multiuser` (or `CODEMAN_MULTIUSER=1`) turns on named users with individually scrypt‑hashed passwords in `~/.codeman/users.json` (mode 0600). OFF by default; when off, nothing here applies and behavior is byte‑identical to single‑user. Design + phase status: [`multi-user-plan.md`](multi-user-plan.md).
+
+- **It is workspace separation, NOT a security boundary between users.** Every session still runs as the SAME OS account with agent code that can read the whole host. Any user can ask their agent to `cat` another user's files; the WEB layer enforces scoping, the AGENT layer cannot. Mitigations: give non‑admins the default `auto` permission mode (classifier‑guarded), pair users with **Docker cases** (container per case) for real isolation, or run separate Codeman instances under separate OS accounts. Stated loudly in the admin panel and the plan's threat model (section 2).
+- **It strictly improves network posture.** It removes the single shared `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` and gives each person a revocable credential; a non‑loopback bind and the tunnel‑enable guard are satisfied by "multi‑user with ≥1 enabled user" without a shared password.
+- **Auth is a parallel branch** (`middleware/auth.ts`) that leaves the single‑user path untouched: per‑user scrypt verify (`timingSafeEqual`, timing‑equalized against user enumeration), identity‑carrying cookies, a per‑username failure bucket (a botnet can't brute one account across IPs; one NATed user can't lock out the rest), and a `mustChangePassword` lockbox. The hook‑secret loopback bypass, host guard, and Origin/CSRF guard are unchanged (hooks authenticate the INSTANCE, not a user).
+- **Ownership is enforced server‑side only** and fails closed: `req.authUser` (a synthetic admin in single‑user), `findSessionOrFail` returns NOT_FOUND (never 403) for a foreign session, list/SSE/WS/file‑preview/search all filter by `session.owner`, and SSE routing defaults session‑scoped events to their owner (unresolved owner → withheld). The load‑bearing rule is **non‑admin `workingDir` confinement**: a non‑admin's session/one‑shot working dir must realpath‑resolve inside `~/codeman-users/<name>/cases`, checked BEFORE any disk write.
+- **Privileged actions are a one‑bit grant** (`canBypassPermissions`, default off): only granted users (and admins) get `--dangerously-skip-permissions` (others are silently downgraded to `--permission-mode auto`), shell‑mode sessions, cron `launchCommand`, and other CLIs' bypass flags. Machine‑level resources (remote/Docker host definitions, tunnel, self‑update, settings writes) are admin‑only.
+- **Admin actions are audited** append‑only to `~/.codeman/admin-audit.jsonl` (acting admin, action, target, IP). Passwords set by an admin create/reset are one‑time (returned once, force change). Under Basic auth, `logout` only truly ends QR‑issued sessions — to lock someone out, disable the account or reset the password (a proper login form is a deferred Phase 6).
+
+---
+
+## 10b. Web tabs (dashboard proxy)
+
+A saved dashboard URL renders as a tab, served through Codeman's own origin at `/webview/<capability>/`. User guide: [`web-tabs.md`](web-tabs.md). Three properties carry the security weight:
+
+- **The proxy is exempt from cookie auth and the Origin/CSRF guard, and that is deliberate.** The iframe is sandboxed without `allow-same-origin`, so it is opaque‑origin: its requests are cross‑site, meaning the `SameSite=lax` session cookie is never attached and its writes and WS upgrades arrive with `Origin: null`. The credential is instead a 192‑bit capability in the path, minted only by an authenticated `POST /api/webviews/:id/open`, held in memory (a restart invalidates every one), rolling TTL, bound to the minting user, and granting nothing but "relay bytes to this one saved URL". ⚠️ **The Host allowlist is NOT bypassed**, so DNS‑rebinding protection is unaffected. A second `Referer`‑keyed form exists for root‑absolute assets and is the only exemption decided by a request‑supplied header, so it is fenced to safe methods on non‑`/api`, non‑`/ws`, non‑`/q` paths. Edges pinned by `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts`.
+- **Sandboxed by default; `allow-same-origin` is an explicit per‑dashboard opt‑in.** A proxied page is same‑origin with Codeman, so without the sandbox its JavaScript could read the Codeman document and call the agent‑spawning API. ⚠️ In BOTH modes the `Authorization` header and the `codeman_session` cookie are stripped before the upstream request, because a trusted (same‑origin) frame makes the browser attach Codeman's own Basic‑auth credentials to every proxied request; forwarding them would hand `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` to the dashboard.
+- **Not an open relay, and not a privilege boundary.** `resolveUpstreamUrl()` refuses anything leaving the saved origin, and cross‑origin redirects are handed back unchanged rather than followed. The proxy does reach whatever the SERVER can reach, which is not an escalation for someone who already commands `--dangerously-skip-permissions` agents, but in multi‑user mode it means a non‑admin's dashboard is fetched from the server's network position. Saved URLs are validated to plain http(s) with no embedded credentials, and there is deliberately **no magic‑link path**: terminal output can never create a webview (the mistake the attachment scanner had to be walled off from).
+
+---
+
+## 11. Quick reference
 
 | Env / flag | Effect |
 |------------|--------|
@@ -482,6 +521,8 @@ production layout (`~/.codeman`, `-L codeman`, port 3000).
 | `--https` | Enable TLS (adds HSTS) |
 | `CODEMAN_INSTANCE` | Scope tmux socket + data dir for isolation |
 | `CODEMAN_GESTURE=1` | Make the gesture overlay available (widens CSP) |
+| `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS=1` | Serve the hook endpoints on the docker bridge gateway (host‑internal, hooks‑only, `403` elsewhere) so in‑container hooks reach a loopback‑bound server — see §10 |
+| `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOST` | Override the bridge gateway IP the hooks listener binds (default: auto‑detect) |
 
 **Audit log:** session lifecycle and server start are recorded in
 `~/.codeman/session-lifecycle.jsonl`.

docs/usage-limits-display-plan.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Plan Usage Limits Display — Design & As-Built
 
-> **Status: SHIPPED — deployed to prod + pushed to master, not yet released (2026-06-14).** Opt-in via App Settings → Display → **Plan Usage Limits** (`showPlanUsageLimits`, default OFF). Commits `c82f6c8` (feature) → `4d9d93d` (end-to-end fixes) → `eae225b` (per-user reconcile) → `95fb5fc` (init-snapshot replay). Full suite green (2869), CI green. No changeset/version bump yet.
+> **Status: SHIPPED — deployed to prod + pushed to master, not yet released (2026-06-14).** App Settings → Display → **Plan Usage Limits** (`showPlanUsageLimits`). **Default changed in 1.9.3: desktop now defaults ON, handhelds stay OFF, resolved via `planUsageChipEnabled()`.** The per-device notes further down describing it as opt-in/synced record the original 2026-06-14 shape, not current behavior. Commits `c82f6c8` (feature) → `4d9d93d` (end-to-end fixes) → `eae225b` (per-user reconcile) → `95fb5fc` (init-snapshot replay). Full suite green (2869), CI green. No changeset/version bump yet.
 >
 > Two surfaces from one `statusLine` callback:
 > - **Header chip** (top-right) — account-wide **plan limits**: `5h 35% · 7d 38%`, per-window green/yellow/red.

docs/versioning-policy.md

@@ -75,5 +75,5 @@ allowance. The commitments above take effect at `1.0.0`.
 ## See also
 
 - `CLAUDE.md` — the COM release workflow (changesets, version bump, deploy)
-- `SECURITY.md` — security reporting and the supported-version policy
+- `.github/SECURITY.md` — security reporting and the supported-version policy
 - `docs/security-architecture.md` — the full trust model

docs/web-tabs-fixes-plan.md

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+# Web tabs: two fixes (planned + implemented 2026-07-28)
+
+Both found against the saved dashboard
+`https://macminis-mac-mini.tailf80371.ts.net:4000` (Bio-Hacking-Dashboard).
+Kept because the root-cause analysis of the second one is not obvious from the
+resulting diff.
+
+Status: **both implemented and verified end-to-end.** The one deliberate
+non-change is recorded at the bottom.
+
+---
+
+## Bug 1: saved URLs could not be deleted from the Run dropdown
+
+### What happened
+
+The "Web / URL" section of the Run dropdown listed every saved dashboard as a
+single clickable row whose only action was "open". Deleting required opening the
+dashboard as a tab, clicking the tab's gear, then Delete in the modal, so a URL
+you no longer wanted open at all could not be removed without first opening it.
+
+### What shipped
+
+- `renderWebviewMenuItems()` (`src/web/public/webview-tabs.js`) now renders each
+  saved URL as a `.run-mode-row--web` flex row: the open button, a gear
+  (`showWebviewModal`), and an `x` (`deleteWebviewById`). Nested buttons are
+  invalid HTML, hence the wrapper rather than a button inside a button.
+- `deleteWebview()` split into the modal entry point, the new row entry point
+  `deleteWebviewById(id)`, and the shared `_confirmAndDeleteWebview(id)`.
+- Both side buttons call `event.stopPropagation()` so the click does not also
+  open the dashboard.
+- The dropdown's outside-click handler (`session-ui.js`) closes when the click
+  target is not inside `#runModeMenu`, and the row is gone by the time the delete
+  resolves, so `deleteWebviewById` re-asserts `.active` on the menu. Verified in a
+  browser: deleting one of several URLs leaves you looking at the rest of the list.
+- CSS in `styles.css` (`.run-mode-row--web`, `.run-mode-row-btn`) plus a larger
+  touch target in `mobile.css`. The side buttons are permanently visible rather
+  than hover-revealed, because this menu is used on touch.
+
+No server change: `DELETE /api/webviews/:id` already existed, owner-scoped, and
+already revoked the capability and broadcast `WebviewChanged`.
+
+---
+
+## Bug 2: images did not load in a proxied dashboard
+
+### Reproduction (before the fix)
+
+```
+CAP=<from POST /api/webviews/<id>/open>
+# A) upstream direct                       -> 200 image/jpeg 118150
+curl -sk "https://macminis-mac-mini.tailf80371.ts.net:4000/api/hero?slug=120-minutes-in-nature"
+# B) through the proxy prefix              -> 200 image/jpeg 118150
+curl -sk "https://localhost:3000/webview/$CAP/api/hero?slug=120-minutes-in-nature"
+# C) what the browser ACTUALLY requested   -> 404 {"errorCode":"NOT_FOUND"}
+curl -sk -H "Referer: https://localhost:3000/webview/$CAP/" \
+     "https://localhost:3000/api/hero?slug=120-minutes-in-nature"
+# D) same shape but NOT under /api         -> 200 (referer fallback rescues it)
+curl -sk -H "Referer: https://localhost:3000/webview/$CAP/" "https://localhost:3000/styles.css"
+```
+
+The proxy itself was fine (B). The failure was entirely about which URL the
+browser ended up requesting (C).
+
+### Root cause
+
+The dashboard builds its image markup at runtime with root-absolute URLs:
+`c.innerHTML = '<img class="thumb" src="/api/hero?slug=...">'`, `img.src =
+slideSrc(...)` returning `/api/slide?owner=...`, `/api/story`, `/api/video`, and a
+nested `<iframe src="/api/preview?slug=...">`.
+
+All three rewrite layers missed that shape:
+
+1. `<base href="/webview/<cap>/">` only affects **relative** URLs. A root-absolute
+   `/api/hero` ignores the base path and resolves against Codeman's origin.
+2. `rewriteHtml()` only runs over the **initial HTML document**. This markup is
+   created later by page script. (The static header `<img src="/api/logo">` DID
+   work, having been rewritten at proxy time, which is why only the
+   runtime-injected images were broken.)
+3. `runtimeUrlShim()` patched only `fetch`, `XMLHttpRequest.open`, `WebSocket` and
+   `EventSource`, so the dashboard's **data** loaded while its **pictures** did
+   not.
+
+The safety net was fenced off from `/api` in two places, both deliberate:
+`server.ts`'s not-found handler returns the API-envelope 404 before reaching
+`tryWebviewRefererFallback`, and `middleware/auth.ts` refuses the Referer-form
+auth exemption for `/api/`, `/ws/`, `/q/`.
+
+### What shipped
+
+`runtimeUrlShim()` in `src/web/webview-proxy.ts` now also covers the DOM sinks, so
+a root-absolute `/api/...` request is never emitted in the first place and neither
+security fence had to move:
+
+- `innerHTML` / `outerHTML` / `insertAdjacentHTML` (and `ShadowRoot.innerHTML`),
+- `setAttribute` / `setAttributeNS`,
+- the `src`/`srcset`/`href`/`poster`/`data`/`action` property setters on img,
+  source, media, video poster, script, iframe, embed, track, link, anchor, area,
+  object and form,
+- a `MutationObserver` as a last net for any sink not patched above (it costs one
+  wasted 404 per node, since the browser starts fetching on insert, so it is a net
+  and not the mechanism).
+
+Two details that mattered:
+
+- Every rewrite routes through the existing idempotent `rw()` rather than a blind
+  prefix concat. The first draft used the server-side regex shape and
+  double-prefixed markup that was already proxied (a page re-injecting its own
+  `outerHTML`); the jsdom test caught it.
+- Everything stays inside `try`/`catch` and is marked `__cmrw`, so a double
+  injection cannot wrap an already-wrapped setter, and nothing can throw into a
+  page we do not control.
+
+### Verification
+
+- `test/webview-proxy.test.ts` gained a jsdom `runtimeUrlShim DOM sinks` block:
+  innerHTML, insertAdjacentHTML, property setters, setAttribute, srcset candidate
+  lists, the MutationObserver net via an unpatched sink
+  (`createContextualFragment`), idempotence, re-injected markup, empty `src`, and
+  the pass-throughs (relative, cross-origin, `#hash`, `data:`). 73 tests pass.
+- End-to-end in a real browser against an isolated instance
+  (`CODEMAN_INSTANCE=wvtest`, port 3151), with prod's old build as the negative
+  control:
+
+  | | before (prod, old build) | after (fixed) |
+  | --- | --- | --- |
+  | images found | 693 | 693 |
+  | src under the proxy prefix | 0 | 693 |
+  | in-viewport images decoded | 0 / 23 | 23 / 23 |
+  | sample src | `/api/hero?slug=...` | `/webview/<cap>/api/hero?slug=...` |
+
+  (The dashboard marks thumbs `loading="lazy"`, so only in-viewport images are
+  ever fetched. All 27 proxied image responses returned 200.)
+
+---
+
+## Follow-up (same day): the `/api` referer fallback, done safely
+
+Originally deferred, then implemented on request. Both gates had to move, and the
+auth one is the security-sensitive half: auth runs in `onRequest`, before routing,
+so it cannot tell a real Codeman API route from a 404, and simply dropping the
+`/api` fence would let a page holding a capability forge a `Referer` and reach
+Codeman's **real** API unauthenticated.
+
+What shipped:
+
+- `server.ts`: `tryWebviewRefererFallback` is tried **before** the API-shaped 404.
+  Reaching that handler already proves no route matched, and the relay declines
+  unless the `Referer` carries a live capability, so unknown `/api` paths still
+  get the envelope.
+- `middleware/auth.ts`: the `/api/` prefix refusal is replaced by
+  `matchesRegisteredRoute()`, which refuses the exemption for any path that
+  resolves to a real route. `/ws/` and `/q/` stay refused by prefix.
+
+Two findings that decided the implementation, both established by probing Fastify
+rather than by reading its docs:
+
+- **`hasRoute()` is the wrong tool and would have been a hole.** It matches the
+  registered PATTERN literally, so `hasRoute({url: '/api/sessions/abc'})` returns
+  false against a registered `/api/sessions/:id` and would have handed out an
+  exemption on a live, session-scoped API route. `findRoute()` performs the real
+  radix-tree lookup and is what the fence uses.
+- **`@fastify/static` is mounted at `/`, so it registers a root catch-all that
+  matches every path.** A match on it means "heading for the 404 handler", not
+  "real route", and it is distinguishable because a root catch-all is the only
+  route whose `*` param comes back equal to the whole request path. Without that
+  carve-out the fence would have refused every referer-form request and broken the
+  rescue that already worked.
+
+The fence fails closed, and `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts` pins both edges
+(a concrete URL onto a parametric API route stays 401; the dashboard's own
+`/api/...` namespace is served).
+
+### And the CSS gap, which the fallback could NOT close
+
+Testing the fallback against a purpose-built upstream showed the runtime-injected
+stylesheet case is unreachable by any relay: a `<style>` element has no URL of its
+own, so Chromium sends an **empty `Referer`** with the image request it triggers
+and there is nothing to key on. Measured directly:
+
+| sink | Referer the browser sends | fixed by |
+| --- | --- | --- |
+| `url()` in a proxied `.css` | the stylesheet's proxied URL | the referer relay |
+| `url()` in a runtime `<style>` | *empty* | `rwCss()` in the shim |
+
+So the shim also rewrites `url()` inside `<style>` blocks, both when they arrive as
+markup and when a `<style>` node is inserted (via the existing MutationObserver).
+
+The only gap left is self-navigation via `location.href = '/x'`, which cannot be
+patched because `Location.href` is unforgeable.

docs/web-tabs.md

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+# Web Tabs (dashboards as Codeman tabs)
+
+Open any dashboard you run, Grafana, Uptime Kuma, Portainer, a status page on port
+4000, as a tab beside your Claude/Codex/Gemini sessions. Codeman becomes one mission
+control instead of Codeman plus a pile of browser tabs.
+
+## Using it
+
+1. Click the chevron next to **Run** to expand the dropdown.
+2. Under **Web / URL**, pick **Add dashboard...**
+3. Give it a name and a URL, optionally hit **Test**, then **Save**.
+
+The dashboard opens as a tab immediately, and appears in the Run dropdown from then
+on. Web tabs sit in the same strip as session tabs, continue the same `Alt+1..9`
+numbering, and carry a globe icon so they never read as a running agent.
+
+Closing a tab (the `x`) only closes it. The saved dashboard stays in the dropdown.
+To delete it for good, use the `x` on its **dropdown row** (the tab's own `x` is
+close, not delete). Each dropdown row also has a gear for editing, so a saved URL
+can be changed or removed without opening it first.
+
+Switching tabs does **not** reload a dashboard. Frames stay alive in the background,
+so a dashboard that took a while to authenticate is still there when you come back.
+Past six live frames the least-recently-viewed one is dropped to bound memory
+(`CODEMAN_MAX_LIVE_WEBVIEW_FRAMES`).
+
+## Why dashboards are proxied
+
+A plain `<iframe src="http://your-box:4000">` does not work in the setup Codeman
+actually ships in, for three separate reasons:
+
+| Blocker             | What happens                                                                                   |
+| ------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
+| **Mixed content**   | Production serves HTTPS (behind `tailscale serve`). Browsers hard-block `http://` iframes on an HTTPS page, with no override, and none at all on iOS Safari. |
+| **Framing refusal** | Grafana, Portainer, Home Assistant and many others send `X-Frame-Options: DENY` or `frame-ancestors 'none'`. |
+| **Codeman's CSP**   | `default-src 'self'` means `frame-src` falls back to `'self'`, so a cross-origin iframe is blocked before it starts. |
+
+Serving the dashboard **through Codeman's own origin** dissolves all three. So by
+default a web tab loads `/webview/<capability>/` on Codeman, and Codeman relays to
+the dashboard: stripping the framing refusal, rewriting redirects, cookies and
+root-absolute URLs, and relaying WebSockets so live panels actually update.
+
+A useful consequence: the dashboard is fetched **from the Codeman server**, so a
+tailnet-only or `localhost`-only dashboard works from any device that can reach
+Codeman, including a phone that is not on the tailnet.
+
+`direct` mode (a plain cross-origin iframe) still exists and is cheaper, but it only
+works for an HTTPS dashboard that permits framing. The **Test** button probes from
+the server and tells you which mode applies.
+
+## The sandbox, and when to turn it off
+
+Because a proxied dashboard is served from Codeman's own address, it is
+*same-origin with Codeman* as far as the browser is concerned. Left unchecked, its
+JavaScript could read the Codeman page and call the API that spawns agents.
+
+So the iframe is sandboxed **without** `allow-same-origin` by default. The page runs
+in an opaque origin: it cannot touch Codeman, and it gets no cookies or
+`localStorage` of its own.
+
+Unchecking **Open sandboxed** grants `allow-same-origin`. Do that only for a
+dashboard you fully trust, and only if you need it, which in practice means a
+dashboard with its own login that stores a session in a cookie or `localStorage`.
+
+Even in trusted mode, Codeman never forwards its own credentials upstream: the
+`Authorization` header and the `codeman_session` cookie are stripped on the way out,
+so `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` cannot leak into a dashboard.
+
+## How the proxy authenticates
+
+A sandboxed iframe is opaque-origin, so every request it makes is cross-site: the
+`SameSite=lax` session cookie is not sent, and writes and WebSocket upgrades arrive
+with `Origin: null`. Cookie auth cannot work.
+
+Instead, opening a dashboard mints a **capability**: 192 bits of entropy in the URL
+path, held in memory only, with a rolling 12-hour TTL, bound to the user who minted
+it, and granting exactly one thing, relaying bytes to that one saved URL. Editing or
+deleting a dashboard revokes it, and a server restart invalidates every outstanding
+capability (tabs re-mint transparently on next click).
+
+## Limits and env vars
+
+| Variable                             | Default | Meaning                                    |
+| ------------------------------------ | ------- | ------------------------------------------ |
+| `CODEMAN_MAX_WEBVIEWS`               | 50      | Saved dashboards per owner                 |
+| `CODEMAN_MAX_LIVE_WEBVIEW_FRAMES`    | 6       | Iframes kept mounted at once               |
+| `CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_CAPABILITY_TTL_MS`  | 12h     | Rolling capability lifetime                |
+| `CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_TIMEOUT_MS`         | 30000   | Upstream request timeout                   |
+| `CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS`   | 8000    | Timeout for the Test button                |
+| `CODEMAN_MAX_WEBVIEW_HTML_BYTES`     | 8MB     | Largest HTML document rewritten            |
+| `CODEMAN_MAX_WEBVIEW_SOCKETS`        | 8       | Concurrent proxied WebSockets per dashboard |
+
+Saved dashboards live in `~/.codeman/webviews.json`. Which tabs you have open is
+per-device (`localStorage`), since that is workspace layout rather than config.
+
+## How a dashboard's own API calls keep working
+
+Worth knowing, because it is where this feature does its least obvious work. Three
+layers cooperate so a dashboard talking to its own backend just works:
+
+1. `<base href>` handles relative URLs in the markup.
+2. Attribute rewriting handles root-absolute `src`/`href`/`action` in the page the
+   proxy serves.
+3. A small injected script rebases URLs built at **runtime**, which the first two
+   cannot see: `fetch('/api/data')` and `new WebSocket('/live')`, but equally
+   `card.innerHTML = '<img src="/api/hero">'`, `img.src = '/api/slide'`, and
+   `url(/img.png)` inside a `<style>` the page injects. That second group is why
+   images are covered too. A dashboard that renders its thumbnails from script
+   would otherwise show all its data and none of its pictures, because `<base>`
+   does not apply to root-absolute URLs and the attribute rewriting only ever saw
+   the initial document.
+4. As a last resort, a request that still lands on Codeman's own root is relayed
+   using its `Referer` to identify the dashboard. This only fires for a request
+   that already missed every Codeman route, and never for one that resolves to a
+   real route, which is what keeps it from being an authentication bypass.
+
+On top of that, the proxy answers those requests with CORS headers. That sounds
+wrong for same-host requests, but a sandboxed iframe has an *opaque* origin, so the
+browser treats every one of its `fetch`/XHR calls as cross-origin even though the
+URL is on Codeman itself. Without those headers, a dashboard renders perfectly and
+then every API call fails, which looks like the dashboard being broken.
+
+## Known limits
+
+- **Exotic loaders.** The layers above cover normal `fetch`/XHR/WebSocket/
+  EventSource, normal markup, the DOM sinks a page uses to build markup at runtime,
+  and `url()` inside stylesheets. Something that constructs requests by an unusual
+  route can still slip through. Symptom: the page renders but a panel stays empty.
+- **Root-absolute `location` navigation.** A dashboard that navigates itself with
+  `location.href = '/login'` escapes the prefix, because `Location.href` is
+  unforgeable and cannot be patched the way the other sinks are. A relative
+  `location.href = 'login'` is fine (`<base>` covers it).
+- **Cross-origin redirects are not followed.** If a dashboard bounces to a different
+  host (an external SSO provider, say), the proxy hands the redirect back unchanged
+  rather than relaying it, because relaying would make this an open proxy. Use
+  **Open in new tab** for those.
+- **Login-protected dashboards need trusted mode**, since a sandboxed frame has no
+  cookie jar. A server-side per-dashboard cookie jar would lift this and is the
+  natural next step if it becomes annoying.
+- **Not a security boundary.** The proxy reaches whatever the Codeman server can
+  reach. That is not an escalation for someone who already commands
+  `--dangerously-skip-permissions` agents, but in multi-user mode it does mean a
+  non-admin user's dashboard is fetched from the server's network position.
+
+## Where the code lives
+
+| Concern                  | File                                    |
+| ------------------------ | --------------------------------------- |
+| Pure rewrite helpers     | `src/web/webview-proxy.ts`              |
+| Routes + proxy + sockets | `src/web/routes/webview-routes.ts`      |
+| Capability tokens        | `src/webview-capabilities.ts`           |
+| Persistence              | `src/webview-store.ts`                  |
+| Limits                   | `src/config/webview-limits.ts`          |
+| Frontend                 | `src/web/public/webview-tabs.js`        |
+| Auth exemption           | `src/web/middleware/auth.ts`             |

install.sh

@@ -5,12 +5,22 @@
 # Usage: curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Ark0N/Codeman/master/install.sh | bash
 #
 # Environment variables:
-#   CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1  - Skip all prompts (for CI/automation)
+#   CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1  - Skip all prompts and accept their defaults
+#                               (CI/automation). Required for headless runs
+#                               that need system changes (sudo package
+#                               installs, AI CLI download); without it those
+#                               steps abort instead of running silently.
 #   CODEMAN_INSTALL_DIR       - Custom install directory (default: ~/.codeman/app)
 #   CODEMAN_SKIP_SYSTEMD=1    - Skip systemd/launchd service setup prompt
 #   CODEMAN_NODE_VERSION      - Node.js major version to install (default: 22)
 #   CODEMAN_REPO_URL          - Custom git repository URL (default: upstream Codeman)
 #   CODEMAN_BRANCH            - Git branch to install (default: master)
+#   CODEMAN_HOST              - Preset the network binding and skip the prompt
+#                               (e.g. 0.0.0.0 for LAN access, 127.0.0.1 for
+#                               local-only; interactive default is 0.0.0.0,
+#                               non-interactive default is 127.0.0.1)
+#   CODEMAN_PASSWORD          - Preset the dashboard password (skips the
+#                               password prompt when binding to the network)
 
 set -euo pipefail
 
@@ -26,6 +36,21 @@ TARGET_NODE_VERSION="${CODEMAN_NODE_VERSION:-22}"
 NONINTERACTIVE="${CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE:-0}"
 SKIP_SYSTEMD="${CODEMAN_SKIP_SYSTEMD:-0}"
 
+# Network binding chosen during install (choose_network_binding). Empty
+# BIND_HOST means "not chosen" (e.g. the update path) and falls back to the
+# server's own loopback default.
+BIND_HOST=""
+BIND_PASSWORD=""
+BIND_ACK="0"
+
+# Binding found in an already-installed service (read_existing_binding), used
+# so updates and re-installs preserve the user's previous choice instead of
+# silently loosening it to the new network-access default.
+EXISTING_FOUND="0"
+EXISTING_HOST=""
+EXISTING_PASSWORD=""
+EXISTING_ACK="0"
+
 # puppeteer is a devDependency used only by scripts/browser-comparison.mjs — its
 # ~150MB chrome-headless-shell download is never needed to build or run Codeman.
 # Skipping it avoids a slow download and a fatal install failure when a prior
@@ -53,6 +78,26 @@ OPENCODE_SEARCH_PATHS=(
     "$HOME/bin/opencode"
 )
 
+# Codex CLI search paths (from src/utils/codex-cli-resolver.ts)
+CODEX_SEARCH_PATHS=(
+    "$HOME/.codex/bin/codex"
+    "$HOME/.local/bin/codex"
+    "/usr/local/bin/codex"
+    "$HOME/.bun/bin/codex"
+    "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/codex"
+    "$HOME/bin/codex"
+)
+
+# Gemini CLI search paths (from src/utils/gemini-cli-resolver.ts)
+GEMINI_SEARCH_PATHS=(
+    "$HOME/.gemini/bin/gemini"
+    "$HOME/.local/bin/gemini"
+    "/usr/local/bin/gemini"
+    "$HOME/.bun/bin/gemini"
+    "$HOME/.npm-global/bin/gemini"
+    "$HOME/bin/gemini"
+)
+
 # ============================================================================
 # Color Output
 # ============================================================================
@@ -107,16 +152,39 @@ die() {
 }
 
 # Security notice — printed at the very end of install/update so it is the last
-# thing the user sees (the default loopback bind + how to expose it safely).
+# thing the user sees. Adapts to the binding chosen during install; the update
+# path (BIND_HOST empty) gets the generic text.
 print_security_notice() {
     echo ""
-    echo -e "  ${YELLOW}${BOLD}Security:${NC}"
-    echo -e "    Codeman binds ${BOLD}127.0.0.1${NC} (this machine only) — no password needed by default."
-    echo -e "    To reach it from another device, do ONE of:"
-    echo -e "      ${CYAN}•${NC} tailscale serve / cloudflared tunnel   ${DIM}(recommended)${NC}, or"
-    echo -e "      ${CYAN}•${NC} ${CYAN}codeman web --host 0.0.0.0${NC}  AND set ${CYAN}CODEMAN_PASSWORD${NC}"
-    echo -e "    A non-loopback bind without a password still starts, but warns loudly."
-    echo -e "    ${DIM}Details: docs/security-architecture.md${NC}"
+    if [[ "$BIND_HOST" == "0.0.0.0" && -z "$BIND_PASSWORD" ]]; then
+        echo -e "  ${RED}${BOLD}============================================================${NC}"
+        echo -e "  ${RED}${BOLD}  WARNING: NETWORK ACCESS WITHOUT A PASSWORD${NC}"
+        echo -e "  ${RED}${BOLD}============================================================${NC}"
+        echo -e "  ${RED}The dashboard is reachable by EVERY device on your network,${NC}"
+        echo -e "  ${RED}and whoever opens it can run commands as ${BOLD}$USER${NC}${RED} through${NC}"
+        echo -e "  ${RED}your AI agents. Anyone on your Wi-Fi owns this machine.${NC}"
+        echo ""
+        echo -e "  Fix it by setting a password (takes 30 seconds):"
+        echo -e "    ${CYAN}•${NC} re-run the installer and choose a password, or"
+        echo -e "    ${CYAN}•${NC} add ${CYAN}Environment=CODEMAN_PASSWORD=<yours>${NC} to the service"
+        echo -e "  Or switch back to local-only: ${CYAN}CODEMAN_HOST=127.0.0.1${NC}"
+        echo -e "  ${DIM}Details: docs/security-architecture.md${NC}"
+    elif [[ "$BIND_HOST" == "0.0.0.0" ]]; then
+        echo -e "  ${YELLOW}${BOLD}Security:${NC}"
+        echo -e "    The dashboard is reachable from your network at port 3000 and is"
+        echo -e "    password-protected (user ${BOLD}admin${NC}). Keep that password strong:"
+        echo -e "    whoever logs in can run commands through your agents."
+        echo -e "    For access from OUTSIDE your network, prefer Tailscale or a tunnel."
+        echo -e "    ${DIM}Details: docs/security-architecture.md${NC}"
+    else
+        echo -e "  ${YELLOW}${BOLD}Security:${NC}"
+        echo -e "    Codeman binds ${BOLD}127.0.0.1${NC} (this machine only) — no password needed by default."
+        echo -e "    To reach it from another device, do ONE of:"
+        echo -e "      ${CYAN}•${NC} tailscale serve / cloudflared tunnel   ${DIM}(recommended)${NC}, or"
+        echo -e "      ${CYAN}•${NC} ${CYAN}codeman web --host 0.0.0.0${NC}  AND set ${CYAN}CODEMAN_PASSWORD${NC}"
+        echo -e "    A non-loopback bind without a password still starts, but warns loudly."
+        echo -e "    ${DIM}Details: docs/security-architecture.md${NC}"
+    fi
     echo ""
 }
 
@@ -336,6 +404,62 @@ get_opencode_path() {
     done
 }
 
+check_codex() {
+    if command -v codex &>/dev/null; then
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    for path in "${CODEX_SEARCH_PATHS[@]}"; do
+        if [[ -x "$path" ]]; then
+            return 0
+        fi
+    done
+
+    return 1
+}
+
+get_codex_path() {
+    if command -v codex &>/dev/null; then
+        command -v codex
+        return
+    fi
+
+    for path in "${CODEX_SEARCH_PATHS[@]}"; do
+        if [[ -x "$path" ]]; then
+            echo "$path"
+            return
+        fi
+    done
+}
+
+check_gemini() {
+    if command -v gemini &>/dev/null; then
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    for path in "${GEMINI_SEARCH_PATHS[@]}"; do
+        if [[ -x "$path" ]]; then
+            return 0
+        fi
+    done
+
+    return 1
+}
+
+get_gemini_path() {
+    if command -v gemini &>/dev/null; then
+        command -v gemini
+        return
+    fi
+
+    for path in "${GEMINI_SEARCH_PATHS[@]}"; do
+        if [[ -x "$path" ]]; then
+            echo "$path"
+            return
+        fi
+    done
+}
+
 check_cloudflared() {
     # Check ~/.local/bin first (matches tunnel-manager.ts resolution order)
     if [[ -x "$HOME/.local/bin/cloudflared" ]]; then
@@ -683,17 +807,54 @@ install_cloudflared_suse() {
 # Interactive Prompts
 # ============================================================================
 
+# `curl | bash` leaves stdin attached to the pipe, so a plain `read` never sees
+# the keyboard even though the user is sitting at a terminal. These helpers
+# prompt via /dev/tty whenever a real terminal is available, and only fall back
+# to defaults when there is genuinely none (CI, truly headless pipes).
+has_tty() {
+    [[ -t 0 ]] && return 0
+    { : < /dev/tty; } 2>/dev/null
+}
+
+read_reply() {
+    # read_reply <varname>: read one line from the user's real terminal
+    if [[ -t 0 ]]; then
+        read -r "$1"
+    else
+        read -r "$1" < /dev/tty
+    fi
+}
+
+read_secret() {
+    # read_secret <varname>: like read_reply but without echoing (passwords)
+    if [[ -t 0 ]]; then
+        read -rs "$1"
+    else
+        read -rs "$1" < /dev/tty
+    fi
+    echo "" >&2
+}
+
+# headless_guard <action>: refuse consequential system changes (sudo package
+# installs, third-party curl | bash installers) when nobody can consent, i.e.
+# no terminal AND no explicit CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1 opt-in. Interactive
+# runs fall through to their normal prompt; opted-in automation proceeds with
+# the prompt defaults as before.
+headless_guard() {
+    local action="$1"
+    if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]] || has_tty; then
+        return 0
+    fi
+    error "No interactive terminal, but the installer would need to: $action."
+    error "Re-run from a terminal to be prompted, or set CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1 to approve such steps in automation."
+    exit 1
+}
+
 prompt_yes_no() {
     local prompt="$1"
     local default="${2:-y}"
 
-    if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]]; then
-        [[ "$default" == "y" ]]
-        return
-    fi
-
-    # Check if stdin is a terminal
-    if [[ ! -t 0 ]]; then
+    if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]] || ! has_tty; then
         # Non-interactive, use default
         [[ "$default" == "y" ]]
         return
@@ -708,7 +869,7 @@ prompt_yes_no() {
 
     while true; do
         echo -en "${CYAN}$prompt${NC} $yn_hint " >&2
-        read -r answer
+        read_reply answer || answer="$default"
         answer="${answer:-$default}"
         case "$answer" in
             [Yy]|[Yy][Ee][Ss]) return 0 ;;
@@ -819,10 +980,206 @@ setup_sc_alias() {
     info "Added 'sc' alias for tmux-chooser"
 }
 
+# ============================================================================
+# Network Binding
+# ============================================================================
+
+# Best-effort LAN IP for "open this URL from your phone" hints.
+detect_lan_ip() {
+    local ip=""
+    if [[ "$(uname -s)" == "Darwin" ]]; then
+        ip=$(ipconfig getifaddr en0 2>/dev/null || ipconfig getifaddr en1 2>/dev/null || true)
+    else
+        ip=$(hostname -I 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}')
+    fi
+    echo "${ip:-<your-ip>}"
+}
+
+# Escape a value for a quoted systemd Environment="KEY=value" assignment.
+systemd_env_escape() {
+    printf '%s' "$1" | sed 's/[\\"]/\\&/g'
+}
+
+# Escape a value for embedding in a launchd plist <string>.
+xml_escape() {
+    printf '%s' "$1" | sed -e 's/&/\&amp;/g' -e 's/</\&lt;/g' -e 's/>/\&gt;/g'
+}
+
+systemd_env_unescape() {
+    printf '%s' "$1" | sed 's/\\\(["\\]\)/\1/g'
+}
+
+xml_unescape() {
+    printf '%s' "$1" | sed -e 's/&lt;/</g' -e 's/&gt;/>/g' -e 's/&amp;/\&/g'
+}
+
+# Read the binding out of an already-installed service file, if any. A service
+# file WITHOUT our CODEMAN_HOST line is a pre-1.8 install, which effectively
+# ran loopback (the server default), so it reports 127.0.0.1.
+read_existing_binding() {
+    EXISTING_FOUND="0"; EXISTING_HOST=""; EXISTING_PASSWORD=""; EXISTING_ACK="0"
+    local unit="$HOME/.config/systemd/user/codeman-web.service"
+    local plist="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.codeman.web.plist"
+
+    if [[ -f "$unit" ]]; then
+        EXISTING_FOUND="1"
+        EXISTING_HOST=$(sed -n 's/^Environment=CODEMAN_HOST=//p' "$unit" | head -1)
+        local pwline
+        pwline=$(sed -n 's/^Environment="CODEMAN_PASSWORD=\(.*\)"$/\1/p' "$unit" | head -1)
+        [[ -n "$pwline" ]] && EXISTING_PASSWORD=$(systemd_env_unescape "$pwline")
+        grep -q '^Environment=CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1' "$unit" && EXISTING_ACK="1"
+    elif [[ -f "$plist" ]]; then
+        EXISTING_FOUND="1"
+        EXISTING_HOST=$(awk '/<key>CODEMAN_HOST<\/key>/{getline; print}' "$plist" | sed -n 's/.*<string>\(.*\)<\/string>.*/\1/p')
+        local pwraw
+        pwraw=$(awk '/<key>CODEMAN_PASSWORD<\/key>/{getline; print}' "$plist" | sed -n 's/.*<string>\(.*\)<\/string>.*/\1/p')
+        [[ -n "$pwraw" ]] && EXISTING_PASSWORD=$(xml_unescape "$pwraw")
+        grep -q '<key>CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK</key>' "$plist" && EXISTING_ACK="1"
+    fi
+
+    if [[ "$EXISTING_FOUND" == "1" && -z "$EXISTING_HOST" ]]; then
+        EXISTING_HOST="127.0.0.1"
+    fi
+    return 0
+}
+
+# Ask how the dashboard should be reachable and set BIND_HOST/BIND_PASSWORD/
+# BIND_ACK. Interactive default is network access (0.0.0.0) because that is
+# what most installs need; loopback is offered as the safer alternative.
+# Non-interactive runs keep the safe loopback default unless CODEMAN_HOST is
+# preset. The server binary itself still defaults to 127.0.0.1 either way.
+choose_network_binding() {
+    # Preset via environment: honor it and skip the prompt entirely.
+    if [[ -n "${CODEMAN_HOST:-}" ]]; then
+        BIND_HOST="$CODEMAN_HOST"
+        BIND_PASSWORD="${CODEMAN_PASSWORD:-}"
+        if [[ "$BIND_HOST" != "127.0.0.1" && -z "$BIND_PASSWORD" ]]; then
+            BIND_ACK="1"
+        fi
+        info "Network binding preset via CODEMAN_HOST: $BIND_HOST"
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    # A previous install's choice is the baseline: re-installing must never
+    # silently loosen it.
+    read_existing_binding
+
+    if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]] || ! has_tty; then
+        if [[ "$EXISTING_FOUND" == "1" ]]; then
+            BIND_HOST="$EXISTING_HOST"
+            BIND_PASSWORD="$EXISTING_PASSWORD"
+            BIND_ACK="$EXISTING_ACK"
+            info "Non-interactive install: preserving existing binding ($BIND_HOST)"
+        else
+            BIND_HOST="127.0.0.1"
+            info "Non-interactive install: binding 127.0.0.1 (preset CODEMAN_HOST=0.0.0.0 to override)"
+        fi
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    # Default follows the existing setup when there is one, else network.
+    local default_choice="1"
+    if [[ "$EXISTING_FOUND" == "1" && "$EXISTING_HOST" == "127.0.0.1" ]]; then
+        default_choice="2"
+    fi
+
+    echo -e "  ${BOLD}Network access${NC}"
+    echo ""
+    echo -e "  How should the Codeman dashboard be reachable?"
+    echo ""
+    echo -e "    ${CYAN}1)${NC} ${BOLD}Any device on your network${NC} ${DIM}(0.0.0.0)${NC}"
+    echo -e "       Open it straight from your phone or laptop."
+    echo -e "       ${YELLOW}Less safe: set a password so only you control your agents.${NC}"
+    echo -e "    ${CYAN}2)${NC} ${BOLD}This machine only${NC} ${DIM}(127.0.0.1)${NC}"
+    echo -e "       Safest. Reach it remotely via Tailscale or a tunnel."
+    echo ""
+    if [[ "$EXISTING_FOUND" == "1" ]]; then
+        echo -e "  ${DIM}Current setup: $EXISTING_HOST$([[ -n "$EXISTING_PASSWORD" ]] && echo ", password set"). Enter keeps it.${NC}"
+        echo ""
+    fi
+
+    local bind_choice=""
+    while true; do
+        echo -en "${CYAN}Choose [1/2] (default $default_choice):${NC} " >&2
+        read_reply bind_choice || bind_choice="$default_choice"
+        bind_choice="${bind_choice:-$default_choice}"
+        case "$bind_choice" in
+            1|2) break ;;
+            *) echo "Please enter 1 or 2." >&2 ;;
+        esac
+    done
+
+    if [[ "$bind_choice" == "2" ]]; then
+        BIND_HOST="127.0.0.1"
+        success "Binding 127.0.0.1 (this machine only)"
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    # Keep a custom non-loopback host from a previous install (e.g. a specific
+    # interface IP); otherwise bind all interfaces.
+    if [[ "$EXISTING_FOUND" == "1" && -n "$EXISTING_HOST" && "$EXISTING_HOST" != "127.0.0.1" ]]; then
+        BIND_HOST="$EXISTING_HOST"
+    else
+        BIND_HOST="0.0.0.0"
+    fi
+
+    if [[ -n "${CODEMAN_PASSWORD:-}" ]]; then
+        BIND_PASSWORD="$CODEMAN_PASSWORD"
+        info "Using CODEMAN_PASSWORD from the environment"
+        return 0
+    fi
+
+    echo ""
+    local pw="" pw2="" keep_hint=""
+    [[ -n "$EXISTING_PASSWORD" ]] && keep_hint="Enter to keep the current one" || keep_hint="Enter to skip"
+    while true; do
+        echo -en "${CYAN}Set a dashboard password (recommended; $keep_hint):${NC} " >&2
+        read_secret pw || pw=""
+        if [[ -z "$pw" ]]; then
+            if [[ -n "$EXISTING_PASSWORD" ]]; then
+                BIND_PASSWORD="$EXISTING_PASSWORD"
+                success "Keeping the existing password"
+                break
+            fi
+            echo ""
+            warn "Without a password, EVERY device on your network gets full access"
+            warn "to your agents (they run commands as $USER)."
+            if prompt_yes_no "Continue WITHOUT a password?" "n"; then
+                BIND_ACK="1"
+                break
+            fi
+            continue
+        fi
+        echo -en "${CYAN}Confirm password:${NC} " >&2
+        read_secret pw2 || pw2=""
+        if [[ "$pw" == "$pw2" ]]; then
+            BIND_PASSWORD="$pw"
+            success "Password set (login user: admin)"
+            break
+        fi
+        echo "Passwords do not match, try again." >&2
+    done
+    return 0
+}
+
 # ============================================================================
 # Service Setup (Linux systemd / macOS launchd)
 # ============================================================================
 
+# Wait briefly for codeman-web.service to report active. A bad node path or a
+# busy port makes the unit crash within the first seconds (then sit in
+# activating/auto-restart), so a blind "started!" message would be a lie.
+verify_systemd_active() {
+    local attempt
+    for attempt in 1 2 3; do
+        sleep 2
+        if systemctl --user is-active --quiet codeman-web.service 2>/dev/null; then
+            return 0
+        fi
+    done
+    return 1
+}
+
 setup_launchd_service() {
     local plist_label="com.codeman.web"
     local agent_dir="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents"
@@ -855,6 +1212,21 @@ setup_launchd_service() {
     local node_path
     node_path=$(command -v node)
 
+    # Binding chosen during install (empty on paths that never asked)
+    local bind_plist=""
+    if [[ -n "$BIND_HOST" ]]; then
+        bind_plist="    <key>CODEMAN_HOST</key>
+    <string>$BIND_HOST</string>"
+        if [[ -n "$BIND_PASSWORD" ]]; then
+            bind_plist+=$'\n'"    <key>CODEMAN_PASSWORD</key>
+    <string>$(xml_escape "$BIND_PASSWORD")</string>"
+        fi
+        if [[ "$BIND_ACK" == "1" ]]; then
+            bind_plist+=$'\n'"    <key>CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK</key>
+    <string>1</string>"
+        fi
+    fi
+
     cat > "$agent_plist" << EOF
 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
@@ -876,6 +1248,7 @@ setup_launchd_service() {
     <string>$HOME</string>
     <key>LANG</key>
     <string>en_US.UTF-8</string>
+$bind_plist
   </dict>
   <key>WorkingDirectory</key>
   <string>$HOME</string>
@@ -895,7 +1268,15 @@ EOF
 
     launchctl load "$agent_plist" 2>/dev/null || true
 
-    success "LaunchAgent installed and started"
+    # launchctl load is silent about many failures: confirm the agent is loaded
+    sleep 2
+    if launchctl list "$plist_label" &>/dev/null; then
+        success "LaunchAgent installed and started"
+        return 0
+    fi
+    warn "LaunchAgent did not load."
+    warn "Inspect: launchctl list | grep codeman ; tail -20 /tmp/codeman.log"
+    return 1
 }
 
 setup_systemd_service() {
@@ -910,6 +1291,18 @@ setup_systemd_service() {
     local node_path
     node_path=$(command -v node)
 
+    # Binding chosen during install (empty on paths that never asked)
+    local bind_env=""
+    if [[ -n "$BIND_HOST" ]]; then
+        bind_env="Environment=CODEMAN_HOST=$BIND_HOST"
+        if [[ -n "$BIND_PASSWORD" ]]; then
+            bind_env+=$'\n'"Environment=\"CODEMAN_PASSWORD=$(systemd_env_escape "$BIND_PASSWORD")\""
+        fi
+        if [[ "$BIND_ACK" == "1" ]]; then
+            bind_env+=$'\n'"Environment=CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1"
+        fi
+    fi
+
     # Create service file
     cat > "$service_file" << EOF
 [Unit]
@@ -924,13 +1317,21 @@ Restart=always
 RestartSec=10
 Environment=NODE_ENV=production
 Environment=PATH=$PATH
+$bind_env
 
 [Install]
 WantedBy=default.target
 EOF
 
-    # Reload systemd
-    systemctl --user daemon-reload
+    # Reload systemd. A user D-Bus session is required for systemctl --user
+    # (missing under bare `ssh host 'curl | bash'` provisioning), so detect
+    # that up front instead of dying mid-setup with a cryptic trap message.
+    if ! systemctl --user daemon-reload 2>/dev/null; then
+        warn "systemctl --user is unavailable (no user D-Bus session?); cannot manage user services here."
+        warn "Unit written to $service_file. From a normal login shell, enable it with:"
+        warn "  systemctl --user daemon-reload && systemctl --user enable --now codeman-web"
+        return 1
+    fi
 
     # Enable service
     systemctl --user enable codeman-web.service 2>/dev/null || true
@@ -940,10 +1341,17 @@ EOF
         loginctl enable-linger "$USER" 2>/dev/null || true
     fi
 
-    # Start the service immediately
-    systemctl --user start codeman-web.service 2>/dev/null || true
+    # (Re)start the service. restart, not start: on a re-run over an existing
+    # running service, start would be a no-op and leave the OLD build running.
+    systemctl --user restart codeman-web.service 2>/dev/null || true
 
-    success "Systemd service installed and started"
+    if verify_systemd_active; then
+        success "Systemd service installed and started"
+        return 0
+    fi
+    warn "codeman-web.service did not become active."
+    warn "Inspect: systemctl --user status codeman-web ; journalctl --user -u codeman-web -e"
+    return 1
 }
 
 setup_tunnel_service() {
@@ -1027,6 +1435,7 @@ main() {
     # Git
     info "Checking Git..."
     if ! check_git; then
+        headless_guard "install Git (system package via sudo)"
         if prompt_yes_no "Git is not installed. Install it now?"; then
             install_dependency "git" "$os" "$distro"
         else
@@ -1045,6 +1454,7 @@ main() {
             warn "Node.js $node_version is installed but version $MIN_NODE_VERSION+ is required."
         fi
 
+        headless_guard "install Node.js v$TARGET_NODE_VERSION (system package via sudo)"
         if prompt_yes_no "Install Node.js v$TARGET_NODE_VERSION?"; then
             install_dependency "node" "$os" "$distro"
 
@@ -1069,6 +1479,7 @@ main() {
     if check_tmux; then
         success "tmux is installed"
     else
+        headless_guard "install tmux (system package via sudo)"
         if prompt_yes_no "tmux is not installed. Install it now?"; then
             install_dependency "tmux" "$os" "$distro"
         else
@@ -1076,9 +1487,11 @@ main() {
         fi
     fi
 
-    # AI CLI (at least one required: Claude Code or OpenCode)
+    # AI CLI (Codeman drives one of: Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini)
     local has_claude=false
     local has_opencode=false
+    local has_codex=false
+    local has_gemini=false
 
     info "Checking AI CLI tools..."
     if check_claude; then
@@ -1089,28 +1502,39 @@ main() {
         has_opencode=true
         success "OpenCode found at $(get_opencode_path)"
     fi
+    if check_codex; then
+        has_codex=true
+        success "Codex found at $(get_codex_path)"
+    fi
+    if check_gemini; then
+        has_gemini=true
+        success "Gemini CLI found at $(get_gemini_path)"
+    fi
 
-    if [[ "$has_claude" == "false" ]] && [[ "$has_opencode" == "false" ]]; then
+    if [[ "$has_claude" == "false" && "$has_opencode" == "false" && "$has_codex" == "false" && "$has_gemini" == "false" ]]; then
         echo ""
-        warn "No AI CLI found. Codeman requires at least one: Claude Code or OpenCode."
+        warn "No AI CLI found. Codeman needs at least one: Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, or Gemini."
+        headless_guard "install an AI CLI (curl | bash from its vendor)"
         echo ""
         echo -e "  ${BOLD}Which AI CLI would you like to install?${NC}"
         echo -e "    ${CYAN}1)${NC} Claude Code  (Anthropic)"
         echo -e "    ${CYAN}2)${NC} OpenCode     (open-source)"
         echo -e "    ${CYAN}3)${NC} Both"
+        echo -e "    ${CYAN}4)${NC} Skip         (I'll install one myself, e.g. Codex or Gemini)"
         echo ""
 
         local cli_choice=""
-        if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]] || [[ ! -t 0 ]]; then
-            # Non-interactive: default to Claude Code
+        if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]] || ! has_tty; then
+            # Explicit automation opt-in: default to Claude Code
             cli_choice="1"
+            info "CODEMAN_NONINTERACTIVE=1: defaulting to Claude Code"
         else
             while true; do
-                echo -en "${CYAN}Choose [1/2/3]:${NC} " >&2
-                read -r cli_choice
+                echo -en "${CYAN}Choose [1/2/3/4]:${NC} " >&2
+                read_reply cli_choice || { cli_choice="1"; break; }
                 case "$cli_choice" in
-                    1|2|3) break ;;
-                    *) echo "Please enter 1, 2, or 3." >&2 ;;
+                    1|2|3|4) break ;;
+                    *) echo "Please enter 1, 2, 3, or 4." >&2 ;;
                 esac
             done
         fi
@@ -1139,8 +1563,12 @@ main() {
             fi
         fi
 
-        if [[ "$has_claude" == "false" ]] && [[ "$has_opencode" == "false" ]]; then
-            die "At least one AI CLI is required. Install manually and re-run the installer."
+        if [[ "$cli_choice" == "4" ]]; then
+            warn "Skipping AI CLI install. Codeman will run, but sessions need a CLI to drive."
+            info "Install one later, e.g.: npm install -g @openai/codex        (Codex)"
+            info "                    or: npm install -g @google/gemini-cli   (Gemini)"
+        elif [[ "$has_claude" == "false" ]] && [[ "$has_opencode" == "false" ]]; then
+            die "The selected AI CLI failed to install. Install one manually and re-run the installer."
         fi
     fi
 
@@ -1236,6 +1664,16 @@ main() {
         fi
     fi
 
+    # ========================================================================
+    # Mark install complete
+    # ========================================================================
+
+    # The dispatcher at the bottom only routes a bare re-run to the quiet
+    # update path when this marker exists, so an aborted first install
+    # (failed npm install/build, Ctrl+C) re-runs the full setup flow
+    # (symlinks, PATH, launch menu) instead of silently "updating".
+    date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > "$INSTALL_DIR/.install-complete"
+
     # ========================================================================
     # Launch Options
     # ========================================================================
@@ -1246,6 +1684,11 @@ main() {
     echo -e "${GREEN}${BOLD}============================================================${NC}"
     echo ""
 
+    # Ask how the dashboard should be reachable BEFORE the launch menu, so the
+    # service files and the run-now path all inherit the choice.
+    choose_network_binding
+    echo ""
+
     local launch_choice=""
     local has_service=false
     local service_type=""
@@ -1269,12 +1712,13 @@ main() {
         echo -e "    ${CYAN}3)${NC} Don't start — I'll run it later"
         echo ""
 
-        if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]] || [[ ! -t 0 ]]; then
+        if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]] || ! has_tty; then
             launch_choice="3"
+            info "No interactive terminal detected: not starting (run 'codeman web' when ready)"
         else
             while true; do
                 echo -en "${CYAN}Choose [1/2/3]:${NC} " >&2
-                read -r launch_choice
+                read_reply launch_choice || { launch_choice="3"; break; }
                 case "$launch_choice" in
                     1|2|3) break ;;
                     *) echo "Please enter 1, 2, or 3." >&2 ;;
@@ -1289,12 +1733,13 @@ main() {
         echo -e "    ${CYAN}2)${NC} Don't start — I'll run it later"
         echo ""
 
-        if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]] || [[ ! -t 0 ]]; then
+        if [[ "$NONINTERACTIVE" == "1" ]] || ! has_tty; then
             launch_choice="2"
+            info "No interactive terminal detected: not starting (run 'codeman web' when ready)"
         else
             while true; do
                 echo -en "${CYAN}Choose [1/2]:${NC} " >&2
-                read -r launch_choice
+                read_reply launch_choice || { launch_choice="2"; break; }
                 case "$launch_choice" in
                     1) break ;;
                     2) break ;;
@@ -1310,14 +1755,16 @@ main() {
 
     # Handle service setup
     if [[ "$launch_choice" == "2" ]]; then
+        local service_ok=true
         if [[ "$service_type" == "launchd" ]]; then
-            setup_launchd_service
+            setup_launchd_service || service_ok=false
         else
-            setup_systemd_service
+            setup_systemd_service || service_ok=false
         fi
 
-        # Offer tunnel service if cloudflared is available (Linux only — systemd tunnel service)
-        if [[ "$service_type" == "systemd" ]] && check_cloudflared && [[ -f "$INSTALL_DIR/scripts/codeman-tunnel.service" ]]; then
+        # Offer tunnel service if cloudflared is available (Linux only: systemd tunnel service).
+        # Skipped when service setup failed: it needs the same systemctl --user access.
+        if [[ "$service_ok" == "true" ]] && [[ "$service_type" == "systemd" ]] && check_cloudflared && [[ -f "$INSTALL_DIR/scripts/codeman-tunnel.service" ]]; then
             echo ""
             if prompt_yes_no "Also set up Cloudflare tunnel service? (requires CODEMAN_PASSWORD)" "n"; then
                 setup_tunnel_service
@@ -1325,10 +1772,20 @@ main() {
         fi
 
         echo ""
-        echo -e "  ${GREEN}${BOLD}Codeman is running now!${NC}"
-        echo ""
-        echo -e "    ${CYAN}# Open in browser${NC}"
-        echo -e "    http://localhost:3000"
+        if [[ "$service_ok" == "true" ]]; then
+            echo -e "  ${GREEN}${BOLD}Codeman is running now!${NC}"
+            echo ""
+            echo -e "    ${CYAN}# Open in browser${NC}"
+            if [[ "$BIND_HOST" == "0.0.0.0" ]]; then
+                echo -e "    http://$(detect_lan_ip):3000   ${DIM}(any device on your network)${NC}"
+                echo -e "    http://localhost:3000       ${DIM}(this machine)${NC}"
+            else
+                echo -e "    http://localhost:3000"
+            fi
+        else
+            echo -e "  ${YELLOW}${BOLD}The service was set up but is not running yet${NC} (see warnings above)."
+            echo -e "  ${DIM}You can always run it directly:${NC} ${CYAN}codeman web${NC}"
+        fi
         echo ""
         echo -e "  ${BOLD}Manage the service:${NC}"
         echo ""
@@ -1349,11 +1806,23 @@ main() {
     if [[ "$launch_choice" != "2" ]]; then
         echo -e "  ${BOLD}Quick Start:${NC}"
         echo ""
-        echo -e "    ${CYAN}codeman web${NC}            # Start the web server"
-        echo -e "    ${CYAN}codeman web --https${NC}    # With HTTPS (for remote access)"
-        echo ""
-        echo -e "    ${CYAN}# Open in browser${NC}"
-        echo -e "    http://localhost:3000"
+        if [[ "$BIND_HOST" == "0.0.0.0" ]]; then
+            if [[ -n "$BIND_PASSWORD" ]]; then
+                echo -e "    ${CYAN}CODEMAN_HOST=0.0.0.0 CODEMAN_PASSWORD='<your-password>' codeman web${NC}"
+            else
+                echo -e "    ${CYAN}CODEMAN_HOST=0.0.0.0 codeman web${NC}"
+            fi
+            echo -e "    ${DIM}(a bare 'codeman web' binds 127.0.0.1, this machine only)${NC}"
+            echo ""
+            echo -e "    ${CYAN}# Open in browser${NC}"
+            echo -e "    http://$(detect_lan_ip):3000   ${DIM}(any device on your network)${NC}"
+        else
+            echo -e "    ${CYAN}codeman web${NC}            # Start the web server"
+            echo -e "    ${CYAN}codeman web --https${NC}    # With HTTPS (for remote access)"
+            echo ""
+            echo -e "    ${CYAN}# Open in browser${NC}"
+            echo -e "    http://localhost:3000"
+        fi
         echo ""
     fi
 
@@ -1377,10 +1846,12 @@ main() {
     echo -e "    https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman"
     echo ""
 
-    if ! check_claude && ! check_opencode; then
+    if ! check_claude && ! check_opencode && ! check_codex && ! check_gemini; then
         echo -e "  ${YELLOW}${BOLD}Reminder:${NC} Install at least one AI CLI to start using Codeman:"
         echo -e "    ${CYAN}curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash${NC}  # Claude Code"
         echo -e "    ${CYAN}curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/install | bash${NC}   # OpenCode"
+        echo -e "    ${CYAN}npm install -g @openai/codex${NC}                    # Codex"
+        echo -e "    ${CYAN}npm install -g @google/gemini-cli${NC}               # Gemini"
         echo ""
     fi
 
@@ -1400,6 +1871,11 @@ main() {
         # Source profile to pick up PATH changes, then exec codeman
         # shellcheck disable=SC1090
         source "$profile" 2>/dev/null || true
+        if [[ -n "$BIND_HOST" ]]; then
+            export CODEMAN_HOST="$BIND_HOST"
+            [[ -n "$BIND_PASSWORD" ]] && export CODEMAN_PASSWORD="$BIND_PASSWORD"
+            [[ "$BIND_ACK" == "1" ]] && export CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1
+        fi
         exec node "$INSTALL_DIR/dist/index.js" web
     fi
 }
@@ -1412,10 +1888,26 @@ update() {
     info "Updating Codeman..."
     cd "$INSTALL_DIR"
     git remote set-url origin "$REPO_URL" 2>/dev/null || true
+
+    # Never blow away local changes silently (this used to be an unconditional
+    # reset --hard). Interactive users get a choice; headless runs auto-stash
+    # so the changes stay recoverable, the same policy as scripts/self-update.sh.
+    if ! git diff --quiet 2>/dev/null || ! git diff --staged --quiet 2>/dev/null; then
+        warn "Local changes detected in $INSTALL_DIR"
+        if prompt_yes_no "Stash local changes and update? (recover with: git stash pop)"; then
+            git stash push --quiet -m "codeman-installer auto-stash $(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)"
+            info "Local changes stashed (see 'git stash list' in $INSTALL_DIR)"
+        else
+            info "Keeping local changes; update skipped."
+            return 0
+        fi
+    fi
+
     git fetch --quiet origin
     git reset --hard "origin/$BRANCH" --quiet
     npm install --quiet --no-fund --no-audit 2>/dev/null || npm install --no-fund --no-audit
     npm run build --quiet 2>/dev/null || npm run build
+    date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ > "$INSTALL_DIR/.install-complete"
     success "Updated to $(node -e "console.log(require('./package.json').version)")"
     echo ""
 
@@ -1423,8 +1915,13 @@ update() {
     local agent_plist="$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.codeman.web.plist"
     if systemctl --user is-active codeman-web.service &>/dev/null 2>&1; then
         info "Restarting codeman-web service..."
-        systemctl --user restart codeman-web.service
-        success "codeman-web service restarted"
+        systemctl --user restart codeman-web.service 2>/dev/null || true
+        if verify_systemd_active; then
+            success "codeman-web service restarted"
+        else
+            warn "codeman-web.service did not come back up."
+            warn "Inspect: systemctl --user status codeman-web ; journalctl --user -u codeman-web -e"
+        fi
     elif [[ -f "$agent_plist" ]]; then
         info "Restarting LaunchAgent..."
         launchctl unload "$agent_plist" 2>/dev/null || true
@@ -1436,6 +1933,15 @@ update() {
     fi
     echo ""
 
+    # Reflect the service's actual binding in the closing notice. Updates
+    # never rewrite the service files, so the existing choice is authoritative.
+    read_existing_binding
+    if [[ "$EXISTING_FOUND" == "1" ]]; then
+        BIND_HOST="$EXISTING_HOST"
+        BIND_PASSWORD="$EXISTING_PASSWORD"
+        BIND_ACK="$EXISTING_ACK"
+    fi
+
     print_security_notice
 }
 
@@ -1493,6 +1999,9 @@ uninstall() {
             rm -rf "$INSTALL_DIR"
             success "Removed $INSTALL_DIR"
         else
+            # Clear the marker so a future installer run does full setup again
+            # (the symlinks and services being removed here need recreating).
+            rm -f "$INSTALL_DIR/.install-complete"
             info "Kept $INSTALL_DIR"
         fi
     fi
@@ -1522,7 +2031,10 @@ case "${1:-}" in
     update)    update ;;
     uninstall) uninstall ;;
     *)
-        if [[ -z "${1:-}" && -d "$INSTALL_DIR/.git" ]]; then
+        # Only a COMPLETED install re-runs as a quiet update. A partial one
+        # (clone succeeded but build/menu never finished) lacks the marker and
+        # re-runs the full flow, so a failed first attempt can actually finish.
+        if [[ -z "${1:-}" && -d "$INSTALL_DIR/.git" && -f "$INSTALL_DIR/.install-complete" ]]; then
             print_banner
             update
         else

package-lock.json

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
   "name": "aicodeman",
-  "version": "1.3.5",
+  "version": "1.9.3",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "aicodeman",
-      "version": "1.3.5",
+      "version": "1.9.3",
       "hasInstallScript": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "workspaces": [
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
         "qrcode": "^1.5.4",
         "uuid": "^14.0.0",
         "web-push": "^3.6.7",
+        "ws": "^8.21.0",
         "zod": "^4.3.6"
       },
       "bin": {
@@ -12332,7 +12333,7 @@
       }
     },
     "packages/xterm-zerolag-input": {
-      "version": "0.1.4",
+      "version": "0.1.6",
       "license": "MIT",
       "devDependencies": {
         "jsdom": "^24.1.3",

package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "aicodeman",
-  "version": "1.3.5",
+  "version": "1.9.3",
   "description": "Mission control for AI coding agents - run 20 autonomous agents with real-time monitoring and session persistence",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "dist/index.js",
@@ -32,25 +32,44 @@
     "changeset": "changeset",
     "version-packages": "changeset version && npm install --package-lock-only && node scripts/check-lockfile-sync.mjs",
     "check:lockfile": "node scripts/check-lockfile-sync.mjs",
-    "knip": "npx --yes knip@latest",
+    "knip": "npx --yes knip@latest --config config/knip.json",
     "release": "changeset publish"
   },
+  "prettier": {
+    "singleQuote": true,
+    "semi": true,
+    "tabWidth": 2,
+    "printWidth": 120,
+    "trailingComma": "es5",
+    "endOfLine": "lf"
+  },
   "workspaces": [
     ".",
     "packages/*"
   ],
   "keywords": [
-    "claude",
     "claude-code",
+    "claude-ai",
+    "claude",
     "anthropic",
-    "ai-agent",
-    "automation",
+    "opencode",
+    "codex",
+    "gemini-cli",
+    "ai-agents",
+    "agent",
     "session-manager",
+    "self-hosted",
+    "developer-tools",
+    "tmux",
     "terminal",
+    "xterm",
+    "docker",
+    "mosh",
+    "local-echo",
+    "web-dashboard",
     "cli",
     "llm",
-    "autonomous-agent",
-    "ralph-loop"
+    "automation"
   ],
   "author": "arkon",
   "license": "MIT",
@@ -75,6 +94,7 @@
     "qrcode": "^1.5.4",
     "uuid": "^14.0.0",
     "web-push": "^3.6.7",
+    "ws": "^8.21.0",
     "zod": "^4.3.6"
   },
   "devDependencies": {

packages/xterm-zerolag-input/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,30 @@
 # xterm-zerolag-input
 
+## 0.1.6
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- Plan-usage chip now defaults ON on desktop, plus the reworked `xterm-zerolag-input` README.
+  - **Plan-usage chip defaults ON (desktop).** The `showPlanUsageLimits` chip (live 5-hour and weekly plan usage from the Claude statusline) used to be opt-in and default OFF, so most users never saw it. Desktop now defaults ON; handhelds still default OFF so the phone header stays minimal and the `mobile-header-buttons-policy` guard keeps passing. Devices with an explicitly stored preference keep whatever they chose, so nobody's OFF gets overridden.
+  - **One resolver behind the chip.** Added `planUsageChipEnabled()` in settings-ui.js and routed all three call sites through it: the App Settings checkbox, the chip's visibility, and the create-time `statusLineTelemetry` flag in session-ui.js. Those three had independent `?? false` / `=== true` defaults, and a chip revealed without the telemetry flag renders `—` forever, so a default flip on one site alone would have shipped a permanently empty chip.
+  - **Cron button comment corrected.** The App Settings comment claimed "Cron button defaults ON" while the code, the template (`btn-cron--hidden`) and the CSS all default it OFF. Verified against a fresh browser profile: the button is hidden and its checkbox unchecked out of the box. Comment now matches, and states why the two halves stay consistent.
+  - **Docs.** CLAUDE.md, `docs/architecture-invariants.md` and `docs/usage-limits-display-plan.md` updated for the new default and the single-resolver rule; the stale `styles.css` comment claiming the server strips the chip's hidden class at render was corrected (display is per-device, so the client reveals it).
+  - **`xterm-zerolag-input` README rework** (0.1.5 shipped the content; this republishes with the graphic and promo changes): replaced the misaligned 8-line keystroke-flow diagram with a two-line stock-vs-zerolag contrast, added a Codeman callout above the demo GIF with links to getcodeman.com and the repo, and rewrote the Origin section so it argues the extraction story instead of repeating the promo.
+
+## 0.1.5
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- Rewrite the `xterm-zerolag-input` package README as a value-first document and correct the drift that had accumulated against the source.
+  - Added the side-by-side phone demo GIF (`docs/images/zerolag-demo-20260728.gif`) as the hero image, referenced by absolute raw URL so it renders on npmjs.com as well as GitHub. The two-phone comparison shows 0ms local echo next to a 600ms-2.7s server echo on the same session.
+  - New "Why this one" comparison table, an explicit list of target use cases (SSH web clients, cloud IDEs, mobile terminals, container consoles), and a bundle-size badge (6.1 kB gzipped, measured from the ESM build).
+  - Corrected the test-count badge from 78 to the actual 175 tests across 5 files, in both the package README and the Published Packages section of the root README.
+  - Removed the stale "Unicode/emoji rendered at single-cell width" limitation. CJK, fullwidth forms and emoji have had double-width rendering and visual-column positioning since the wide-character fix; the honest remaining caveat (per-code-point width summing over-counts ZWJ grapheme clusters) replaces it.
+  - Documented the previously undocumented public `setPrompt()` method for switching prompt strategies at runtime, and the new "Wide characters (CJK, emoji)" integration section covering the optional `Unicode11Addon` path and the built-in range-table fallback.
+  - Documented `backgroundColor: 'transparent'`, corrected the `foregroundColor` default, and updated the grid-alignment math to reflect visual-column positioning rather than character index.
+
+  No source changes, docs only.
+
 ## 0.1.4
 
 ### Patch Changes

packages/xterm-zerolag-input/README.md

@@ -1,45 +1,66 @@
 <p align="center">
   <h1 align="center">xterm-zerolag-input</h1>
   <p align="center">
-    Instant keystroke feedback overlay for <a href="https://xtermjs.org/">xterm.js</a><br>
-    <em>Eliminates perceived input latency over high-RTT connections</em>
+    <strong>Make typing feel instant in <a href="https://xtermjs.org/">xterm.js</a>, no matter how far away the server is.</strong><br>
+    <em>A pixel-perfect local echo overlay. Client-side only. Zero dependencies.</em>
   </p>
   <p align="center">
     <a href="https://www.npmjs.com/package/xterm-zerolag-input"><img src="https://img.shields.io/npm/v/xterm-zerolag-input?style=flat-square&color=22c55e" alt="npm"></a>
     <a href="https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-1e3a5f?style=flat-square" alt="MIT"></a>
-    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Dependencies-0-22c55e?style=flat-square" alt="Zero deps">
-    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Tests-78-22c55e?style=flat-square" alt="78 tests">
-    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/xterm.js-v5%20%7C%20v7+-3b82f6?style=flat-square" alt="xterm.js">
+    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Dependencies-0-22c55e?style=flat-square" alt="Zero dependencies">
+    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Size-6.1%20kB%20gzip-22c55e?style=flat-square" alt="6.1 kB gzipped">
+    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Tests-175-22c55e?style=flat-square" alt="175 tests">
+    <img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/xterm.js-v5%20%7C%20v7+-3b82f6?style=flat-square" alt="xterm.js v5 and v7+">
   </p>
 </p>
 
+> ### Made for [**Codeman**](https://getcodeman.com)
+>
+> This overlay is the local echo engine of [**Codeman**](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman), mission control for AI coding agents: run and monitor a dozen Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode and Gemini sessions at once, watch their subagents work in live floating windows, let them run autonomously overnight, and drive all of it from your phone.
+>
+> That last part is why this library exists. The demo below is a real Codeman session on two phones.
+>
+> **[getcodeman.com](https://getcodeman.com)** · install with `curl -fsSL https://getcodeman.com/install | bash` · [star it on GitHub](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman)
+
+<p align="center">
+  <img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Ark0N/Codeman/master/docs/images/zerolag-demo-20260728.gif" alt="Side-by-side phones typing into the same remote session: with zerolag the text appears at 0ms, without it every keystroke waits 600ms to 2.7s for the server echo" width="900">
+</p>
+
+<p align="center">
+  <em>Two phones, the same remote session, the same slow link.<br>
+  Left: the zerolag overlay paints every keystroke at <strong>0ms</strong>. Right: stock xterm.js waits <strong>600ms to 2.7s</strong> for the server to echo it back.</em>
+</p>
+
 ---
 
-## The Problem
+## The 30-second version
 
-When using xterm.js over a remote connection (SSH web clients, cloud IDEs, mobile terminals), every keystroke takes a full round-trip to the server before appearing on screen. At 100-500ms RTT, typing feels sluggish and unresponsive. Users type blind, make mistakes they can't see, and the experience feels broken.
-
-## The Solution
-
-`xterm-zerolag-input` renders typed characters **immediately** as a pixel-perfect DOM overlay positioned on the terminal's character grid. The overlay covers the terminal canvas at the prompt location, showing characters instantly while the server echo travels back. Once the server responds, the overlay seamlessly disappears and the real terminal text takes over.
+Over a remote connection, xterm.js shows you a character only after it has flown to the server and back. At 100-500ms RTT that reads as broken: you type ahead of the screen, you cannot see your typos, and you start pecking one key at a time to stay in sync.
 
 ```
-Keystroke Flow:
-                                    ┌─── DOM overlay (instant, 0ms)
-User types 'h' ─── onData('h') ───┤
-                                    └─── Your app sends to PTY ──→ Server
-                                                                      │
-Server echoes 'h' ←──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
-         │                                                  (200-500ms RTT)
-         └──→ terminal.write('h') ──→ overlay.clear()
-              (server output replaces overlay — seamless transition)
+  stock xterm.js   keypress ─────── 300 ms ───────→ character appears
+  with zerolag     keypress → character appears  ·  echo lands later, unseen
 ```
 
-**No changes to your backend needed.** The addon is purely client-side.
+Same keystroke, same link. The only difference is who you wait for: the server, or nobody.
 
-## Origin
+`xterm-zerolag-input` paints your keystrokes **immediately**, as an absolutely-positioned DOM overlay locked to the terminal's character grid. The byte still goes to the PTY exactly as before, so nothing about your shell changes. When the server echo lands 300ms later, the overlay clears and the real terminal text takes over on the same pixels. The handoff is invisible.
 
-This library was extracted from [Codeman](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman), mission control for AI coding agents — multi-session management, real-time agent visualization, autonomous respawn loops, and a mobile-first web UI for Claude Code, OpenCode, and Codex. The local echo system was built to make mobile and remote access feel instant, then battle-tested across thousands of hours of real usage. After 3 deep code audits, it was extracted into this standalone library with 78 tests covering every state transition.
+**No backend changes. No protocol. No server support.** It is a client-side addon that never touches the wire.
+
+## Why this one
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| **Survives full-screen TUIs** | Ink, blessed, and friends repaint the whole screen constantly. The overlay is a separate DOM layer they cannot reach, so it does not get clobbered. |
+| **Pixel-matched to the canvas** | Each character is its own absolutely-positioned `<span>` at exact cell coordinates, so it does not drift out of the grid like normal DOM text flow. |
+| **Wide characters included** | CJK, fullwidth forms and emoji render double-width and position by visual column, using the terminal's Unicode addon when one is loaded. |
+| **Backspace that actually works** | A three-layer cascade (unsent, in-flight, already on screen) tells you exactly what to forward to the PTY, so editing works through any mix of typed, flushed and tab-completed text. |
+| **You keep control of input** | The addon never hooks `onData` for you. You decide what gets echoed and what gets forwarded, which is what makes char-at-a-time, buffered, and multi-session tab switching all possible. |
+| **Small and self-contained** | 6.1 kB gzipped, zero runtime dependencies, dual CJS/ESM with full type declarations. |
+| **Proven under load** | Extracted from [Codeman](https://getcodeman.com), hardened over thousands of hours of real remote and mobile usage, 175 tests over every state transition. |
+
+Built for anything that puts a terminal behind a network hop: SSH web clients, cloud IDEs, mobile terminals, Kubernetes and container consoles, remote agent dashboards, browser-based dev environments.
 
 ## Install
 
@@ -47,12 +68,9 @@ This library was extracted from [Codeman](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman), mis
 npm install xterm-zerolag-input
 ```
 
-- **Zero runtime dependencies**
-- Compatible with both `xterm` (pre-5.4) and `@xterm/xterm` (5.4+)
-- Dual CJS/ESM build with full TypeScript declarations
-- Works with canvas, WebGL, and DOM renderers
+Works with both `xterm` (pre-5.4) and `@xterm/xterm` (5.4+), and with the canvas, WebGL and DOM renderers.
 
-## Quick Start
+## Quick start
 
 ```typescript
 import { Terminal } from '@xterm/xterm';
@@ -61,7 +79,7 @@ import { ZerolagInputAddon } from 'xterm-zerolag-input';
 const terminal = new Terminal();
 terminal.open(document.getElementById('terminal')!);
 
-// 1. Create addon with your prompt character
+// 1. Create the addon with your prompt character
 const zerolag = new ZerolagInputAddon({
   prompt: { type: 'character', char: '$', offset: 2 },
 });
@@ -75,7 +93,7 @@ terminal.onData((data) => {
     ws.send(text + '\r');
   } else if (data === '\x7f') {
     const source = zerolag.removeChar();
-    if (source === 'flushed') ws.send(data); // only backspace text already in PTY
+    if (source === 'flushed') ws.send(data); // only backspace text already in the PTY
   } else if (data.length === 1 && data.charCodeAt(0) >= 32) {
     zerolag.addChar(data);
   }
@@ -87,26 +105,29 @@ terminal.onWriteParsed(() => {
 });
 ```
 
-## Why This Is Hard
+That is the whole integration. Everything below is for tuning it.
 
-Most terminal UIs can't do local echo because:
+## Why this is hard
 
-1. **Buffer writes corrupt**: Frameworks like [Ink](https://github.com/vadimdemedes/ink) (React for terminals) redraw the entire screen on every state change. Writing directly to the terminal buffer gets immediately overwritten.
+Most terminal UIs cannot do local echo, for three reasons:
 
-2. **Cursor position lies**: In Ink, `buffer.cursorY` reflects internal state (near the status bar), not the visible prompt. You can't trust it.
+1. **Buffer writes get corrupted.** Frameworks like [Ink](https://github.com/vadimdemedes/ink) (React for terminals) redraw the entire screen on every state change. Anything written straight into the terminal buffer is overwritten immediately.
 
-3. **Font matching**: Canvas/WebGL renderers use their own text shaping. A DOM overlay must pixel-match the canvas grid — normal DOM text flow drifts due to sub-pixel glyph width differences.
+2. **Cursor position lies.** In Ink, `buffer.cursorY` reflects internal render state (often near a status bar), not the visible prompt. You cannot trust it.
 
-This library solves all three by:
-- Using a **DOM overlay** that Ink can't touch (separate z-index layer)
-- **Scanning the buffer** bottom-up for the prompt character instead of trusting cursor position
-- Rendering each character as an **absolutely-positioned `<span>`** at exact cell-grid coordinates
+3. **Fonts do not line up.** Canvas and WebGL renderers do their own text shaping. A DOM overlay has to pixel-match that grid, and normal DOM text flow drifts as sub-pixel glyph widths accumulate.
+
+This library answers all three:
+
+- a **DOM overlay** on its own z-index layer, which Ink cannot touch
+- **bottom-up buffer scanning** for the prompt instead of trusting the cursor
+- **one absolutely-positioned `<span>` per character** at exact cell-grid coordinates
 
 ---
 
-## Prompt Detection
+## Prompt detection
 
-The addon needs to know where user input starts. It scans the terminal buffer bottom-up for the prompt. Three strategies:
+The addon needs to know where user input starts. It scans the terminal buffer bottom-up. Three strategies:
 
 ### Character (default)
 
@@ -118,17 +139,17 @@ The addon needs to know where user input starts. It scans the terminal buffer bo
 { type: 'character', char: '%', offset: 2 }
 
 // Fish / Starship: ❯
-{ type: 'character', char: '\u276f', offset: 2 }
+{ type: 'character', char: '❯', offset: 2 }
 
 // Simple arrow: >
 { type: 'character', char: '>', offset: 2 }
 ```
 
-`offset` = characters between the prompt marker and where user input begins (e.g., `"$ "` = 2).
+`offset` = characters between the prompt marker and where user input begins (`"$ "` = 2).
 
 ### Regex
 
-For complex prompts. The `g` flag is safely stripped to prevent `lastIndex` mutation.
+For complex prompts. The `g` flag is stripped safely, so there is no `lastIndex` mutation.
 
 ```typescript
 { type: 'regex', pattern: /\$\s*$/, offset: 2 }
@@ -150,77 +171,88 @@ Full control:
 }
 ```
 
+### Switching prompts at runtime
+
+If one terminal hosts several CLIs with different prompts, swap the strategy in place:
+
+```typescript
+zerolag.setPrompt({ type: 'character', char: '❯', offset: 2 });
+```
+
+`setPrompt()` clears the cached prompt position and re-renders if anything is pending, so a mode switch cannot leave the overlay pinned to the old column.
+
 ---
 
-## API Reference
+## API reference
 
 ### `ZerolagInputAddon`
 
-Implements xterm.js `ITerminalAddon`. The addon does **not** hook `terminal.onData()` — you wire your own input handler and call these methods. This gives you full control over which keystrokes are echoed vs forwarded.
+Implements the xterm.js `ITerminalAddon` interface. It deliberately does **not** hook `terminal.onData()`: you wire your own handler and call these methods, which is what gives you control over which keystrokes are echoed and which are forwarded.
 
 ### Input
 
 | Method | Returns | Description |
 |--------|---------|-------------|
-| `addChar(char)` | `void` | Add a single printable character. Auto-detects existing buffer text on first keystroke. |
+| `addChar(char)` | `void` | Add a single printable character. Auto-detects existing buffer text on the first keystroke. |
 | `appendText(text)` | `void` | Append multiple characters (paste). |
-| `removeChar()` | `'pending'` \| `'flushed'` \| `false` | Remove last char. See [backspace handling](#backspace-handling). |
-| `clear()` | `void` | Clear all state, hide overlay. Call on Enter/Ctrl+C/Escape. |
+| `removeChar()` | `'pending'` \| `'flushed'` \| `false` | Remove the last character. See [backspace handling](#backspace-handling). |
+| `clear()` | `void` | Clear all state and hide the overlay. Call on Enter, Ctrl+C, Escape. |
 
-### Backspace Handling
+### Backspace handling
 
 `removeChar()` cascades through three layers and tells you what it removed:
 
 | Return | Source | Your action |
 |--------|--------|-------------|
-| `'pending'` | Unsent text (never transmitted to PTY) | Do nothing |
-| `'flushed'` | Text already sent to PTY | Send `\x7f` backspace to PTY |
+| `'pending'` | Unsent text (never transmitted to the PTY) | Do nothing |
+| `'flushed'` | Text already sent to the PTY | Send `\x7f` to the PTY |
 | `false` | Nothing to remove | Do nothing |
 
-The cascade: pending text first, then flushed text, then auto-detect buffer text (handles tab completion). This means backspace "just works" through any combination of typed, flushed, and tab-completed text.
+The cascade order is pending text, then flushed text, then auto-detected buffer text (which is what makes backspace work after tab completion). Backspace "just works" across any combination of typed, in-flight and completed text.
 
-### Flushed Text
+### Flushed text
 
-"Flushed" = sent to PTY but echo hasn't arrived yet. Happens during tab switches and tab completion.
+"Flushed" means sent to the PTY but the echo has not arrived yet. This happens during tab switches and tab completion.
 
 | Method | Description |
 |--------|-------------|
-| `setFlushed(count, text, render?)` | Mark text as flushed. Pass `render=false` during tab-switch restore (buffer not loaded yet). |
+| `setFlushed(count, text, render?)` | Mark text as flushed. Pass `render=false` during tab-switch restore, when the buffer is not loaded yet. |
 | `getFlushed()` | Returns `{ count, text }`. |
-| `clearFlushed()` | Clear flushed state when server echo arrives. |
+| `clearFlushed()` | Clear flushed state once the server echo arrives. |
 
-### Buffer Detection
+### Buffer detection
 
-Scan the terminal for text that exists after the prompt but wasn't typed through the overlay.
+Finds text that exists after the prompt but was never typed through the overlay.
 
 | Method | Description |
 |--------|-------------|
-| `detectBufferText()` | Scan and return detected text (or `null`). Sets it as flushed. Guarded: runs once per `clear()` cycle. |
+| `detectBufferText()` | Scan and return the detected text (or `null`), marking it flushed. Guarded: runs once per `clear()` cycle. |
 | `resetBufferDetection()` | Re-enable detection. |
-| `suppressBufferDetection()` | Block detection until next `clear()`. Use for sessions with UI framework text after the prompt. |
-| `undoDetection()` | Undo last detection — clears flushed state, re-enables detection. For tab completion retry. |
+| `suppressBufferDetection()` | Block detection until the next `clear()`. Use for sessions that render UI framework text after the prompt. |
+| `undoDetection()` | Undo the last detection: clears flushed state and re-enables detection. For tab-completion retries. |
 
 ### Rendering
 
 | Method | Description |
 |--------|-------------|
-| `rerender()` | Force re-render. Call after buffer reloads, screen redraws, resizes, reconnects. |
-| `refreshFont()` | Re-cache font properties from terminal. Call after font size or theme changes. |
+| `rerender()` | Force a re-render. Call after buffer reloads, screen redraws, resizes and reconnects. |
+| `refreshFont()` | Re-cache font and color properties from the terminal. Call after a font size or theme change. |
 
-### Prompt Utilities
+### Prompt
 
 | Method | Description |
 |--------|-------------|
-| `findPrompt()` | Find prompt position. Returns `{ row, col }` or `null`. |
-| `readPromptText()` | Read text after prompt marker. Returns string or `null`. |
+| `setPrompt(finder)` | Replace the prompt detection strategy at runtime. |
+| `findPrompt()` | Find the prompt position. Returns `{ row, col }` or `null`. |
+| `readPromptText()` | Read the text after the prompt marker. Returns a string or `null`. |
 
 ### State
 
 | Property | Type | Description |
 |----------|------|-------------|
 | `pendingText` | `string` | Unacknowledged text (read-only) |
-| `hasPending` | `boolean` | `true` if overlay has any content |
-| `state` | `ZerolagInputState` | Full snapshot: pendingText, flushedLength, flushedText, visible, promptPosition |
+| `hasPending` | `boolean` | `true` if the overlay has any content |
+| `state` | `ZerolagInputState` | Full snapshot: `pendingText`, `flushedLength`, `flushedText`, `visible`, `promptPosition` |
 
 ### Options
 
@@ -228,23 +260,23 @@ Scan the terminal for text that exists after the prompt but wasn't typed through
 {
   prompt?: PromptFinder,       // Default: { type: 'character', char: '>', offset: 2 }
   zIndex?: number,             // Default: 7
-  backgroundColor?: string,    // Default: from terminal theme
-  foregroundColor?: string,    // Default: from computed .xterm-rows style
+  backgroundColor?: string,    // Default: terminal theme background ('transparent' to disable)
+  foregroundColor?: string,    // Default: terminal theme / computed .xterm-rows style
   showCursor?: boolean,        // Default: true
-  cursorColor?: string,        // Default: from terminal theme
+  cursorColor?: string,        // Default: terminal theme cursor
   scrollDebounceMs?: number,   // Default: 50
 }
 ```
 
 ---
 
-## Integration Patterns
+## Integration patterns
 
-### Buffered Input (hold until Enter)
+### Buffered input (hold until Enter)
 
-The quick start example above. Characters accumulate in the overlay and are sent on Enter. Best for remote shells where you want to batch input.
+The quick start above. Characters accumulate in the overlay and go out on Enter. Best for remote shells where you want to batch input.
 
-### Char-at-a-Time (send immediately)
+### Char-at-a-time (send immediately)
 
 ```typescript
 terminal.onData((data) => {
@@ -256,12 +288,14 @@ terminal.onData((data) => {
     ws.send(data);
   } else if (data.length === 1 && data.charCodeAt(0) >= 32) {
     zerolag.addChar(data);
-    ws.send(data); // send immediately — overlay shows while echo travels back
+    ws.send(data); // overlay shows the char while the echo travels back
   }
 });
 ```
 
-### Tab Switching (multi-session)
+This is the mode that keeps shell features intact: tab completion, `Ctrl+R` history search, and readline bindings all still work, because every byte still reaches the PTY.
+
+### Tab switching (multi-session)
 
 ```typescript
 function switchToSession(newId: string) {
@@ -280,19 +314,19 @@ function switchToSession(newId: string) {
   const saved = savedState.get(newId);
   if (saved) zerolag.setFlushed(saved.count, saved.text, false); // silent
 
-  // Render after buffer loads
+  // Render after the buffer loads
   terminal.write('', () => zerolag.rerender());
 }
 ```
 
-### Tab Completion
+### Tab completion
 
 ```typescript
 const baseline = zerolag.readPromptText();
 zerolag.clear();
 sendToPty('\t');
 
-// After response:
+// After the response:
 zerolag.resetBufferDetection();
 const detected = zerolag.detectBufferText();
 if (detected && detected !== baseline) {
@@ -302,7 +336,7 @@ if (detected && detected !== baseline) {
 }
 ```
 
-### Resize / Font / Reconnect
+### Resize, font, reconnect
 
 ```typescript
 fitAddon.fit();
@@ -311,14 +345,31 @@ zerolag.rerender();
 terminal.options.fontSize = 18;
 zerolag.refreshFont();
 
-function onReconnect() { zerolag.rerender(); }
+function onReconnect() {
+  zerolag.rerender();
+}
 ```
 
+### Wide characters (CJK, emoji)
+
+Wide characters work out of the box: the overlay measures each character's cell width, renders double-width spans for wide ones, and positions later characters by visual column instead of character index. Line wrapping is computed in columns too, so a wrapped Japanese or Chinese line lands on the same cells the server will use.
+
+For exact Unicode 11+ widths, load xterm's Unicode addon and the overlay will defer to it:
+
+```typescript
+import { Unicode11Addon } from '@xterm/addon-unicode11';
+
+terminal.loadAddon(new Unicode11Addon());
+terminal.unicode.activeVersion = '11';
+```
+
+Without it, a built-in range table covers Hangul, Kana, CJK Unified (including Ext A through G), fullwidth forms and the emoji planes.
+
 ---
 
-## How It Works
+## How it works
 
-### DOM Structure
+### DOM structure
 
 ```
 div.xterm-screen (position: relative)
@@ -326,53 +377,61 @@ div.xterm-screen (position: relative)
   ├── div.xterm-selection (z-index: 1)
   ├── div.xterm-helpers (z-index: 5)
   ├── div.xterm-decoration-container (z-index: 6-7)
-  └── div[zerolag overlay] (z-index: 7)  ← our overlay (invisible to Ink)
+  └── div[zerolag overlay] (z-index: 7)  ← our overlay, invisible to Ink
 ```
 
-### Per-Character Grid Alignment
+### Per-character grid alignment
 
 Each character is an absolutely-positioned `<span>`:
 
 ```
-left  = charIndex * cellWidth   (CSS pixels)
-top   = lineIndex * cellHeight  (CSS pixels)
-width = cellWidth               (exact cell width)
+left  = visualColumn * cellWidth   (CSS pixels)
+top   = lineIndex    * cellHeight  (CSS pixels)
+width = cellWidth * charCellWidth  (1 cell, or 2 for wide characters)
 ```
 
-This avoids sub-pixel drift from normal DOM text flow.
+Positioning by visual column instead of letting the browser lay out text is what removes sub-pixel drift.
 
-### Font Matching
+### Font matching
 
 1. `fontFamily`, `fontSize`, `fontWeight` from `terminal.options`
-2. `letterSpacing` from computed style of `.xterm-rows`
-3. `-webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased` (matches canvas grayscale)
+2. `letterSpacing` from the computed style of `.xterm-rows`
+3. `-webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased` (matches canvas grayscale AA)
 4. `font-feature-settings: 'liga' 0, 'calt' 0` (no ligatures)
 5. `text-rendering: geometricPrecision`
 
-### Cell Dimensions
+### Cell dimensions
 
 - **xterm.js v5.x**: `terminal._core._renderService.dimensions.css.cell` (private API)
 - **xterm.js v7+**: `terminal.dimensions.css.cell` (public API, auto-detected)
 
-### Prompt Column Locking
+### Prompt column locking
 
-When flushed text exists, the prompt column is locked to prevent jitter from full-screen redraws. Row changes are allowed (output can scroll the prompt).
+While flushed text exists the prompt column is locked, so a full-screen redraw cannot make the overlay jitter sideways. Row changes are still allowed, because output legitimately scrolls the prompt.
 
-### Scroll Awareness
+### Scroll awareness
 
-Overlay hides when scrolled up (`viewportY !== baseY`). Debounced re-render when scrolling back to bottom.
+The overlay hides when the viewport is scrolled up (`viewportY !== baseY`) and re-renders, debounced, when you scroll back to the bottom.
 
 ---
 
-## Known Limitations
+## Known limitations
 
-- **Canvas/WebGL font mismatch**: Minor sub-pixel differences possible. Per-character absolute positioning minimizes this.
-- **Unicode/emoji**: Multi-byte characters occupy variable cell widths — rendered at single-cell width, causing misalignment.
-- **Password prompts**: Overlay shows characters that aren't echoed. Call `clear()` when you detect no-echo mode.
-- **Prompt in output**: If `$` appears in command output, prompt detection may find the wrong position. Use regex or custom finder.
+- **Canvas and WebGL font mismatch**: minor sub-pixel differences are still possible. Per-character absolute positioning keeps them small.
+- **Grapheme clusters**: widths are summed per code point, so ZWJ emoji sequences (for example 👨‍👩‍👧) and combining marks can be over-counted. Single-code-point emoji and CJK are correct.
+- **Password prompts**: the overlay will happily show characters the server is not echoing. Call `clear()` when you detect a no-echo prompt.
+- **Prompt characters in output**: if your prompt marker also appears in command output, detection can latch onto the wrong line. Use a regex or a custom finder.
 
 ---
 
+## Origin
+
+[Codeman](https://getcodeman.com) needed this before anyone else did. A coding agent you drive from your phone over a tunnel is unusable if every keystroke costs a round trip.
+
+So the overlay was built there, ran in production for thousands of hours, and survived three deep code audits before being pulled out into this standalone library with its tests intact. Nothing was reimplemented for the extraction: the engine here is the one Codeman ships.
+
+Want the whole thing? [**getcodeman.com**](https://getcodeman.com) · [github.com/Ark0N/Codeman](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman)
+
 ## License
 
-MIT — [Codeman](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman) Contributors
+MIT, [Codeman](https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman) Contributors

packages/xterm-zerolag-input/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "xterm-zerolag-input",
-  "version": "0.1.4",
+  "version": "0.1.6",
   "description": "Instant keystroke feedback overlay for xterm.js — eliminates perceived input latency over high-RTT connections",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "dist/index.cjs",

scripts/build-agent-image.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+/**
+ * Build the Codeman agent base image locally (decision: "build locally on first
+ * use", see docs/docker-cases-plan.md). No registry account required.
+ *
+ * Usage:
+ *   node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs [--engine docker|podman] [--image <ref>] [--no-cache]
+ *
+ * Defaults: engine=docker (falls back to podman if docker is absent),
+ *           image=codeman/agent:base
+ */
+import { spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
+
+const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
+const REPO_ROOT = join(__dirname, '..');
+const DOCKERFILE = join(REPO_ROOT, 'docker', 'agent.Dockerfile');
+const DEFAULT_IMAGE = 'codeman/agent:base';
+
+function parseArgs(argv) {
+  const args = { image: DEFAULT_IMAGE, engine: undefined, noCache: false };
+  for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) {
+    const a = argv[i];
+    if (a === '--image') args.image = argv[++i];
+    else if (a === '--engine') args.engine = argv[++i];
+    else if (a === '--no-cache') args.noCache = true;
+    else if (a === '-h' || a === '--help') args.help = true;
+  }
+  return args;
+}
+
+function engineAvailable(engine) {
+  const r = spawnSync(engine, ['--version'], { stdio: 'ignore' });
+  return r.status === 0;
+}
+
+function resolveEngine(preferred) {
+  if (preferred) {
+    if (!engineAvailable(preferred)) {
+      console.error(`[build-agent-image] engine "${preferred}" not found on PATH`);
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+    return preferred;
+  }
+  if (engineAvailable('docker')) return 'docker';
+  if (engineAvailable('podman')) return 'podman';
+  console.error('[build-agent-image] neither docker nor podman found on PATH. Install one and retry.');
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
+const args = parseArgs(process.argv.slice(2));
+if (args.help) {
+  console.log('Usage: node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs [--engine docker|podman] [--image <ref>] [--no-cache]');
+  process.exit(0);
+}
+
+const engine = resolveEngine(args.engine);
+const buildArgs = ['build', '-f', DOCKERFILE, '-t', args.image];
+if (args.noCache) buildArgs.push('--no-cache');
+buildArgs.push(REPO_ROOT);
+
+console.log(`[build-agent-image] ${engine} ${buildArgs.join(' ')}`);
+const child = spawn(engine, buildArgs, { stdio: 'inherit' });
+child.on('exit', (code) => {
+  if (code === 0) {
+    console.log(`\n[build-agent-image] built ${args.image}. Docker cases can now launch.`);
+  } else {
+    console.error(`\n[build-agent-image] build failed (exit ${code}).`);
+  }
+  process.exit(code ?? 1);
+});

scripts/build.mjs

@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ appendFileSync(
 
 // 4. Minify frontend assets
 run('minify input-cjk.js', 'npx esbuild dist/web/public/input-cjk.js --minify --outfile=dist/web/public/input-cjk.js --allow-overwrite');
+run('minify i18n.js', 'npx esbuild dist/web/public/i18n.js --minify --outfile=dist/web/public/i18n.js --allow-overwrite');
 run('minify sanitize-html.js', 'npx esbuild dist/web/public/sanitize-html.js --minify --outfile=dist/web/public/sanitize-html.js --allow-overwrite');
 run('minify app.js', 'npx esbuild dist/web/public/app.js --minify --outfile=dist/web/public/app.js --allow-overwrite');
 run('minify terminal-ui.js', 'npx esbuild dist/web/public/terminal-ui.js --minify --outfile=dist/web/public/terminal-ui.js --allow-overwrite');
@@ -86,6 +87,7 @@ console.log('\n[build] content-hash cache busting');
     'styles.css',
     'mobile.css',
     'constants.js',
+    'i18n.js',
     'mobile-handlers.js',
     'voice-input.js',
     'notification-manager.js',

scripts/capture-readme-gifs.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+
+/**
+ * capture-readme-gifs.mjs
+ *
+ * Deterministic README GIFs — no real server, Claude CLI, or tmux. Reuses the
+ * mock-injection pipeline from capture-readme-screenshots.mjs (static file
+ * server + page.route mocks), drives a scripted timeline in the page, records
+ * it with Playwright video, and converts to GIF via ffmpeg palette encoding.
+ *
+ * Scenes:
+ *   1. subagent-demo.gif  — terminal spawns 3 parallel agents; floating agent
+ *      windows open one by one and stream tool-call activity live (driven
+ *      through the real _onSubagentDiscovered/_onSubagentToolCall handlers).
+ *   2. zerolag-demo.gif   — side-by-side typing: instant local echo (zerolag)
+ *      vs bursty ~350 ms server echo, rendered with the vendored xterm.
+ *
+ * Usage:  node scripts/capture-readme-gifs.mjs
+ *         SCREENSHOT_OUT_DIR=/path/to/review node scripts/capture-readme-gifs.mjs
+ * Output: docs/images/ (or flat into SCREENSHOT_OUT_DIR)
+ * Requires: ffmpeg
+ */
+
+import { chromium } from 'playwright';
+import { execSync } from 'child_process';
+import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'os';
+import { join } from 'path';
+import {
+  PORT,
+  SESSION_IDS,
+  STANDARD_SESSIONS,
+  buildInitPayload,
+  startStaticServer,
+  setupRoutes,
+  injectState,
+  outPath,
+  RST, GRN, YEL, MAG, CYN, GRY, BOLD,
+} from './capture-readme-screenshots.mjs';
+
+const sleep = (ms) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
+
+const GIF_COLORS = 192;
+
+// ─── ffmpeg conversion (palette recipe from capture-subagent-gif.mjs) ────────
+
+function webmToGif(videoPath, gifPath, { ss, duration, width, fps }) {
+  // One GLOBAL palette (default stats_mode=full) + ordered dither: per-frame
+  // palettes (stats_mode=single:new=1) make dirty rectangles visibly mismatch
+  // on flat dark UI, and error-diffusion dither shimmers between frames.
+  const filters = `fps=${fps},scale=${width}:-1:flags=lanczos`;
+  execSync(
+    `ffmpeg -y -loglevel error -ss ${ss.toFixed(2)} -t ${duration} -i "${videoPath}" ` +
+      `-vf "${filters},split[s0][s1];[s0]palettegen=max_colors=${GIF_COLORS}:reserve_transparent=0[p];` +
+      `[s1][p]paletteuse=dither=bayer:bayer_scale=5:diff_mode=rectangle" "${gifPath}"`,
+    { stdio: 'inherit' }
+  );
+}
+
+// ─── Scene 1: subagent demo ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+const SUBAGENT_VIEWPORT = { width: 1440, height: 810 };
+
+// Terminal content visible before the agents spawn
+const TERMINAL_PRESPAWN = [
+  '',
+  `${GRN}●${RST} Working on ${CYN}/home/arkon/codeman-cases/testcase${RST} - I'll use the ${BOLD}Task tool${RST} to spawn parallel agents.`,
+  '',
+  `${GRN}●${RST} ${BOLD}Read${RST}(/home/arkon/codeman-cases/testcase/CLAUDE.md)`,
+  `  ${GRY}░${RST} Read ${BOLD}127${RST} lines ${GRY}│${RST} ${CYN}1.2KB${RST}`,
+  '',
+  `${GRN}●${RST} ${BOLD}Bash${RST}(find . -name "*.ts" -not -path "*/node_modules/*" | head -20)`,
+  `  ${GRY}░${RST} ./src/index.ts`,
+  `  ${GRY}░${RST} ./src/session.ts`,
+  `  ${GRY}░${RST} ./src/web/server.ts`,
+  `  ${GRY}░${RST} ${GRY}... (17 more)${RST}`,
+  '',
+  `${GRN}●${RST} I'll spawn 3 parallel research agents to analyze different parts of the codebase simultaneously.`,
+  '',
+].join('\r\n');
+
+function makeAgent(agentId, description, startedOffsetMs) {
+  return {
+    agentId,
+    sessionId: 'claude-sess-w1-0001',
+    projectHash: 'abc123',
+    filePath: `/tmp/${agentId}.jsonl`,
+    startedAt: new Date(Date.now() - startedOffsetMs).toISOString(),
+    lastActivityAt: Date.now(),
+    status: 'active',
+    toolCallCount: 0,
+    entryCount: 0,
+    fileSize: 4000,
+    description,
+    model: 'claude-haiku-4-5-20251001',
+    modelShort: 'haiku',
+    totalInputTokens: 0,
+    totalOutputTokens: 0,
+    parentSessionId: SESSION_IDS.w1,
+  };
+}
+
+// Timeline events: t (ms from scene start) + kind
+//   term     — write raw data to the session terminal
+//   discover — register subagent + open + position its floating window
+//   tool     — stream a tool call into an agent window
+//   msg      — stream an assistant message into an agent window
+//   complete — flip an agent to completed
+function buildSubagentTimeline() {
+  const T = (lines) => lines.join('\r\n') + '\r\n';
+  const tool = (t, agentId, name, input) => ({ t, kind: 'tool', agentId, tool: name, input });
+  const msg = (t, agentId, text) => ({ t, kind: 'msg', agentId, text });
+
+  return [
+    {
+      t: 600,
+      kind: 'term',
+      data: T([
+        `${GRN}●${RST} ${BOLD}Task${RST}(Find and document all API endpoints in src/)`,
+        `  ${GRY}░${RST} Spawned ${CYN}agent-001${RST} ${GRY}(haiku)${RST}`,
+        '',
+      ]),
+    },
+    {
+      t: 1000,
+      kind: 'discover',
+      agent: makeAgent('agent-001', 'Find and document all API endpoints in src/', 2000),
+      x: 440, y: 45,
+    },
+    tool(1500, 'agent-001', 'Glob', { pattern: 'src/**/*.ts' }),
+    {
+      t: 2000,
+      kind: 'term',
+      data: T([
+        `${GRN}●${RST} ${BOLD}Task${RST}(Explore and understand test structure in test/)`,
+        `  ${GRY}░${RST} Spawned ${CYN}agent-002${RST} ${GRY}(haiku)${RST}`,
+        '',
+      ]),
+    },
+    tool(2200, 'agent-001', 'Read', { file_path: '/home/arkon/codeman/src/web/server.ts' }),
+    {
+      t: 2500,
+      kind: 'discover',
+      agent: makeAgent('agent-002', 'Explore and understand test structure in test/', 1200),
+      x: 880, y: 45,
+    },
+    tool(3000, 'agent-002', 'Glob', { pattern: 'test/**/*.test.ts' }),
+    {
+      t: 3300,
+      kind: 'term',
+      data: T([
+        `${GRN}●${RST} ${BOLD}Task${RST}(Analyze TypeScript type definitions in src/types.ts)`,
+        `  ${GRY}░${RST} Spawned ${CYN}agent-003${RST} ${GRY}(haiku)${RST}`,
+        '',
+      ]),
+    },
+    tool(3500, 'agent-001', 'Grep', { pattern: 'app\\.get|app\\.post|app\\.delete', path: 'src/' }),
+    {
+      t: 3800,
+      kind: 'discover',
+      agent: makeAgent('agent-003', 'Analyze TypeScript type definitions in src/types.ts', 400),
+      x: 660, y: 400,
+    },
+    tool(4100, 'agent-002', 'Read', { file_path: '/home/arkon/codeman/test/respawn-test-utils.ts' }),
+    {
+      t: 4500,
+      kind: 'term',
+      data: T([
+        `${MAG}✻${RST} ${YEL}Waiting for agents...${RST} ${GRY}(${BOLD}esc${RST}${GRY} to interrupt · 32s · ↓ 1.7k tokens · thinking)${RST}`,
+        '',
+      ]),
+    },
+    tool(4700, 'agent-003', 'Read', { file_path: '/home/arkon/codeman/src/types.ts' }),
+    tool(5200, 'agent-001', 'Read', { file_path: '/home/arkon/codeman/src/web/schemas.ts' }),
+    tool(5600, 'agent-002', 'Read', { file_path: '/home/arkon/codeman/config/vitest.config.ts' }),
+    tool(6100, 'agent-003', 'Grep', { pattern: 'export (interface|type)', path: 'src/types/' }),
+    msg(6700, 'agent-001', 'Found 47 API endpoints across server.ts. Documenting REST paths...'),
+    tool(7100, 'agent-002', 'Grep', { pattern: 'const PORT =', path: 'test/' }),
+    msg(7700, 'agent-002', 'Analyzing test patterns: MockSession, unique ports, fileParallelism: false...'),
+    tool(8100, 'agent-003', 'Read', { file_path: '/home/arkon/codeman/src/types/index.ts' }),
+    msg(8700, 'agent-003', 'Mapped 38 exported interfaces across 15 domain files. Building summary...'),
+    {
+      t: 9300,
+      kind: 'term',
+      data: T([
+        `${GRN}●${RST} ${CYN}agent-001${RST}: ${GRY}12 tool calls — Glob, Read(server.ts), Grep(endpoints)...${RST}`,
+        `${GRN}●${RST} ${CYN}agent-002${RST}: ${GRY}8 tool calls — Glob, Read(test-utils), Read(vitest.config)...${RST}`,
+        `${GRN}●${RST} ${CYN}agent-003${RST}: ${GRY}7 tool calls — Read(types.ts), Grep(interface)...${RST}`,
+        '',
+      ]),
+    },
+    tool(10100, 'agent-001', 'Glob', { pattern: 'src/web/routes/*.ts' }),
+    tool(10600, 'agent-002', 'Read', { file_path: '/home/arkon/codeman/test/setup.ts' }),
+    tool(11100, 'agent-003', 'Grep', { pattern: 'assertNever', path: 'src/' }),
+    {
+      t: 11600,
+      kind: 'term',
+      data: T([`${GRN}●${RST} ${GRY}171.8k, 13s${RST} ${GRY}│${RST} ${GRY}1.7k tokens${RST} ${GRY}│${RST} ${GRY}thinking${RST}`, '']),
+    },
+  ];
+}
+
+const SUBAGENT_TAIL_HOLD = 2500; // hold the final frame
+
+async function recordSubagentScene(browser, videoDir) {
+  console.log('\n1/2 Recording subagent-demo...');
+
+  const context = await browser.newContext({
+    viewport: SUBAGENT_VIEWPORT,
+    deviceScaleFactor: 1,
+    recordVideo: { dir: videoDir, size: SUBAGENT_VIEWPORT },
+  });
+  const recStart = Date.now();
+  const page = await context.newPage();
+  page.setDefaultTimeout(30000);
+
+  // Start with NO subagents — they appear during the recording
+  const initPayload = buildInitPayload(STANDARD_SESSIONS);
+  await setupRoutes(page, initPayload, TERMINAL_PRESPAWN);
+  await page.goto(`http://localhost:${PORT}`, { waitUntil: 'domcontentloaded' });
+  await injectState(page, initPayload, TERMINAL_PRESPAWN, SESSION_IDS.w1);
+
+  await page.evaluate(() => {
+    try { window.app?.fitAddon?.fit(); } catch {}
+    window.app?.terminal?.scrollToBottom();
+  });
+  await sleep(500);
+
+  const timeline = buildSubagentTimeline();
+  const totalMs = Math.max(...timeline.map((e) => e.t)) + SUBAGENT_TAIL_HOLD;
+  const sceneStart = Date.now();
+
+  // Run the whole timeline inside the page so events interleave naturally
+  await page.evaluate((events) => {
+    const app = window.app;
+    for (const ev of events) {
+      setTimeout(() => {
+        try {
+          if (ev.kind === 'term') {
+            app.terminal.write(ev.data);
+            app.terminal.scrollToBottom();
+          } else if (ev.kind === 'discover') {
+            app._onSubagentDiscovered(ev.agent);
+            app.openSubagentWindow(ev.agent.agentId);
+            // The spawn animation (400ms) lands on the auto-grid; glide to our tile after it
+            setTimeout(() => {
+              const win = app.subagentWindows.get(ev.agent.agentId);
+              if (win?.element) {
+                win.element.style.transition = 'left 0.25s ease, top 0.25s ease';
+                win.element.style.left = `${ev.x}px`;
+                win.element.style.top = `${ev.y}px`;
+              }
+            }, 520);
+            setTimeout(() => {
+              const win = app.subagentWindows.get(ev.agent.agentId);
+              if (win?.element) win.element.style.transition = '';
+              app.updateConnectionLines();
+            }, 850);
+          } else if (ev.kind === 'tool') {
+            app._onSubagentToolCall({
+              agentId: ev.agentId,
+              tool: ev.tool,
+              input: ev.input,
+              timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
+            });
+          } else if (ev.kind === 'msg') {
+            app._onSubagentMessage({
+              agentId: ev.agentId,
+              role: 'assistant',
+              text: ev.text,
+              timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
+            });
+          } else if (ev.kind === 'complete') {
+            app._onSubagentCompleted({ agentId: ev.agentId, timestamp: new Date().toISOString() });
+          }
+        } catch (err) {
+          console.error('timeline event failed', ev, err);
+        }
+      }, ev.t);
+    }
+  }, timeline);
+
+  await sleep(totalMs + 500);
+
+  await page.close();
+  const videoPath = await page.video().path();
+  await context.close();
+
+  return {
+    videoPath,
+    ss: (sceneStart - recStart) / 1000 - 0.4,
+    duration: (totalMs + 400) / 1000,
+  };
+}
+
+// ─── Scene 2: zerolag typing comparison ──────────────────────────────────────
+
+const ZEROLAG_VIEWPORT = { width: 1280, height: 470 };
+const TYPED_TEXT = 'echo "zero lag typing from anywhere"';
+const TYPE_INTERVAL_MS = 110;
+const REMOTE_FLUSH_MS = 350; // server-echo pane flushes queued chars in bursts
+const ZEROLAG_TAIL_HOLD = 1800;
+
+const ZEROLAG_HTML = `<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+<link rel="stylesheet" href="http://localhost:${PORT}/vendor/xterm.css">
+<script src="http://localhost:${PORT}/vendor/xterm.min.js"></script>
+<style>
+  * { margin: 0; box-sizing: border-box; }
+  body {
+    width: 1280px; height: 470px; background: #0a0a0c;
+    display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center; gap: 48px;
+    font-family: -apple-system, 'Segoe UI', Roboto, sans-serif;
+  }
+  .pane { width: 560px; }
+  .card {
+    background: #131316; border: 1px solid rgba(255,255,255,0.08);
+    border-radius: 10px; overflow: hidden;
+    box-shadow: 0 8px 32px rgba(0,0,0,0.45);
+  }
+  .card-head {
+    display: flex; align-items: baseline; gap: 10px;
+    padding: 12px 16px; border-bottom: 1px solid rgba(255,255,255,0.06);
+  }
+  .dot { width: 9px; height: 9px; border-radius: 50%; align-self: center; }
+  .title { font-size: 15px; font-weight: 600; color: #e8e8ea; }
+  .sub { font-size: 12.5px; color: #8b8b92; }
+  .term { padding: 16px 8px 12px 16px; height: 165px; }
+  .good .dot { background: #22c55e; box-shadow: 0 0 8px rgba(34,197,94,0.7); }
+  .bad  .dot { background: #ef4444; box-shadow: 0 0 8px rgba(239,68,68,0.7); }
+  .tag {
+    margin-top: 14px; text-align: center; font-size: 14.5px; color: #7e7e86;
+  }
+  .tag b { color: #22c55e; font-weight: 600; }
+  .bad-tag b { color: #ef4444; }
+</style>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <div class="pane">
+    <div class="card good">
+      <div class="card-head">
+        <span class="dot"></span>
+        <span class="title">With zerolag-input</span>
+        <span class="sub">instant local echo</span>
+      </div>
+      <div class="term" id="termLeft"></div>
+    </div>
+    <div class="tag">keystrokes echo in <b>0 ms</b></div>
+  </div>
+  <div class="pane">
+    <div class="card bad">
+      <div class="card-head">
+        <span class="dot"></span>
+        <span class="title">Without</span>
+        <span class="sub">server round-trip echo</span>
+      </div>
+      <div class="term" id="termRight"></div>
+    </div>
+    <div class="tag bad-tag">keystrokes echo after <b>~350 ms</b></div>
+  </div>
+</body>
+</html>`;
+
+async function recordZerolagScene(browser, videoDir) {
+  console.log('\n2/2 Recording zerolag-demo...');
+
+  const context = await browser.newContext({
+    viewport: ZEROLAG_VIEWPORT,
+    deviceScaleFactor: 1,
+    recordVideo: { dir: videoDir, size: ZEROLAG_VIEWPORT },
+  });
+  const recStart = Date.now();
+  const page = await context.newPage();
+  page.setDefaultTimeout(30000);
+
+  await page.setContent(ZEROLAG_HTML, { waitUntil: 'load' });
+  await page.waitForFunction(() => typeof Terminal !== 'undefined');
+
+  await page.evaluate(() => {
+    const theme = {
+      background: '#131316',
+      foreground: '#e8e8ea',
+      cursor: '#22c55e',
+      cursorAccent: '#131316',
+    };
+    const mk = (id) => {
+      const term = new Terminal({
+        cols: 44,
+        rows: 5,
+        fontSize: 20,
+        fontFamily: "'SF Mono', 'Cascadia Code', Menlo, monospace",
+        cursorBlink: true,
+        cursorStyle: 'block',
+        theme,
+      });
+      term.open(document.getElementById(id));
+      term.write('\x1b[32m❯\x1b[0m ');
+      return term;
+    };
+    window.termLeft = mk('termLeft');
+    window.termRight = mk('termRight');
+  });
+  await sleep(600);
+
+  const sceneStart = Date.now();
+  const typingMs = TYPED_TEXT.length * TYPE_INTERVAL_MS;
+  const totalMs = typingMs + REMOTE_FLUSH_MS + ZEROLAG_TAIL_HOLD;
+
+  await page.evaluate(
+    ({ text, interval, flushEvery }) => {
+      let i = 0;
+      const remoteQueue = [];
+      const typer = setInterval(() => {
+        if (i >= text.length) { clearInterval(typer); return; }
+        const ch = text[i++];
+        window.termLeft.write(ch); // local echo: instant
+        remoteQueue.push(ch); // server echo: waits for the round-trip
+      }, interval);
+      const flusher = setInterval(() => {
+        if (remoteQueue.length) window.termRight.write(remoteQueue.splice(0).join(''));
+        if (i >= text.length && remoteQueue.length === 0) clearInterval(flusher);
+      }, flushEvery);
+    },
+    { text: TYPED_TEXT, interval: TYPE_INTERVAL_MS, flushEvery: REMOTE_FLUSH_MS }
+  );
+
+  await sleep(totalMs + 400);
+
+  await page.close();
+  const videoPath = await page.video().path();
+  await context.close();
+
+  return {
+    videoPath,
+    ss: (sceneStart - recStart) / 1000 - 0.6, // small lead-in with idle cursors
+    duration: (totalMs + 600) / 1000,
+  };
+}
+
+// ─── Main ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+async function main() {
+  console.log('='.repeat(60));
+  console.log('Codeman README GIF Capture');
+  console.log('='.repeat(60));
+
+  const server = await startStaticServer();
+  const videoDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'codeman-gifs-'));
+  let browser;
+
+  try {
+    browser = await chromium.launch({
+      headless: true,
+      args: ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox', '--disable-dev-shm-usage', '--disable-gpu'],
+    });
+
+    const sub = await recordSubagentScene(browser, videoDir);
+    const subGif = outPath('images', 'subagent-demo.gif');
+    webmToGif(sub.videoPath, subGif, { ss: Math.max(0, sub.ss), duration: sub.duration, width: 960, fps: 8 });
+    console.log(`  Saved: ${subGif}`);
+
+    const zl = await recordZerolagScene(browser, videoDir);
+    const zlGif = outPath('images', 'zerolag-demo.gif');
+    webmToGif(zl.videoPath, zlGif, { ss: Math.max(0, zl.ss), duration: zl.duration, width: 900, fps: 10 });
+    console.log(`  Saved: ${zlGif}`);
+
+    console.log('\nDone.');
+  } catch (err) {
+    console.error('\nFatal error:', err.message);
+    console.error(err.stack);
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+  } finally {
+    if (browser) await browser.close().catch(() => {});
+    server.close();
+    rmSync(videoDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+  }
+}
+
+process.on('SIGINT', () => process.exit(1));
+
+main();

scripts/capture-readme-real.mjs

@@ -50,7 +50,10 @@ async function newCtx(browser) {
       try {
         localStorage.setItem('codeman:skin', skin);
         localStorage.setItem('codeman-font-size', String(font));
-        const blob = { skin, showFileBrowser: false, showProjectInsights: false };
+        const blob = { skin, showFileBrowser: false, showProjectInsights: false, showTokenCount: false };
+        // Don't auto-hide subagent windows that belong to a non-active tab — the
+        // subagent scene re-homes agents and needs both windows visible at once.
+        blob.subagentActiveTabOnly = false;
         if (planUsage) blob.showPlanUsageLimits = true;
         localStorage.setItem('codeman-app-settings', JSON.stringify(blob));
       } catch {
@@ -136,9 +139,9 @@ async function sceneSubagent(browser) {
   const sessions = await listSessions(page);
   const targetId = process.env.SUBAGENT_SID || (sessions.find((s) => s.mode === 'claude') || sessions[0])?.id;
   if (targetId) await page.evaluate((id) => window.app.selectSession(id), targetId);
-  // Wait (up to ~25s) for live subagents to arrive via SSE into app.subagents.
+  // Wait (up to ~45s) for live subagents to arrive via SSE into app.subagents.
   let agents = [];
-  for (let i = 0; i < 25; i++) {
+  for (let i = 0; i < 45; i++) {
     agents = await page.evaluate(() =>
       Array.from(window.app.subagents?.entries?.() || []).map(([id, a]) => ({ id, name: a.name ?? a.agentType ?? '' }))
     );
@@ -151,6 +154,44 @@ async function sceneSubagent(browser) {
     await context.close();
     return;
   }
+  // The window body renders from app.subagentActivity, which fills ONLY from live
+  // SSE tool-call/progress events — a fresh client never gets past activity replayed.
+  // So sit connected and wait for live activity to accumulate, then open the two
+  // agents that actually have content (otherwise the windows read "No activity yet").
+  let active = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
+    active = await page.evaluate(() =>
+      Array.from(window.app.subagentActivity?.entries?.() || [])
+        .filter(([, arr]) => Array.isArray(arr) && arr.length >= 1)
+        .map(([id, arr]) => ({ id, n: arr.length }))
+        .sort((a, b) => b.n - a.n)
+    );
+    if (active.length >= 2) break;
+    // xhigh-effort agents churn in bursts between long thinking pauses, so be
+    // patient (~150s); accept a single populated window after ~45s if that's all.
+    if (i >= 30 && active.length >= 1) break;
+    await sleep(1500);
+  }
+  console.log('  agents with live activity:', JSON.stringify(active));
+  const openIds = (active.length ? active : agents).map((a) => a.id);
+  // Capture-only DOM nudge: on fresh dev sessions, a tab's claudeSessionId stays the
+  // Codeman id and never becomes the real Claude conversation UUID, so the window
+  // open-gate (claudeSessionId === agent.sessionId) + the activeTabOnly hide rule both
+  // fail. Re-home the chosen agents onto the active tab and align its claudeSessionId
+  // to the agents' (shared) sessionId so the windows open AND show their live activity.
+  await page.evaluate(
+    (ids) => {
+      const activeId = window.app.activeSessionId;
+      const tab = window.app.sessions.get(activeId);
+      ids.slice(0, 2).forEach((id) => {
+        const a = window.app.subagents.get(id);
+        if (!a) return;
+        a.parentSessionId = activeId;
+        if (tab && a.sessionId) tab.claudeSessionId = a.sessionId;
+      });
+    },
+    openIds
+  );
   await page.evaluate(
     (ids) => {
       ids.slice(0, 2).forEach((id) => {
@@ -159,22 +200,33 @@ async function sceneSubagent(browser) {
         } catch {}
       });
     },
-    agents.map((a) => a.id)
+    openIds
   );
   await sleep(2000);
   await page.evaluate(() => {
+    // Viewport-relative tiling: center two subagent windows over the terminal so
+    // the layout adapts to whatever VW/VH the capture uses (e.g. the HQ 1100×650
+    // recipe) instead of overflowing at narrower widths.
     const wins = Array.from(window.app.subagentWindows.values());
-    const place = [
-      { left: 360, top: 60, w: 430, h: 330 },
-      { left: 810, top: 60, w: 430, h: 330 },
-    ];
+    const W = window.innerWidth;
+    const H = window.innerHeight;
+    const winW = Math.min(440, Math.floor((W - 60) / 2 - 10));
+    const winH = Math.min(360, Math.floor(H * 0.56));
+    const top = Math.floor(H * 0.16);
+    const gap = 16;
+    const totalW = winW * 2 + gap;
+    const startLeft = Math.max(16, Math.floor((W - totalW) / 2));
     wins.slice(0, 2).forEach((win, i) => {
       const el = win.element;
-      const p = place[i];
-      el.style.left = p.left + 'px';
-      el.style.top = p.top + 'px';
-      el.style.width = p.w + 'px';
-      el.style.height = p.h + 'px';
+      // Force visible: a freshly opened window may be hidden by the activeTabOnly
+      // rule before we override it (we also seed subagentActiveTabOnly:false).
+      win.hidden = false;
+      win.minimized = false;
+      el.style.display = 'flex';
+      el.style.left = startLeft + i * (winW + gap) + 'px';
+      el.style.top = top + 'px';
+      el.style.width = winW + 'px';
+      el.style.height = winH + 'px';
     });
   });
   await sleep(1500);

scripts/capture-real-overview.mjs

@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ const main = async () => {
           showMonitor: false,
           showSubagents: false,
           showProjectInsights: false,
+          showTokenCount: false,
         };
         if (planUsage) blob.showPlanUsageLimits = true;
         localStorage.setItem('codeman-app-settings', JSON.stringify(blob));

scripts/capture-subagent-gif.mjs

@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ async function capture() {
         showMonitor: false,
         showProjectInsights: false,
         showFileBrowser: false,
+        showTokenCount: false,
       });
       localStorage.setItem('codeman-app-settings', JSON.stringify(existing));
     });
@@ -230,6 +231,7 @@ async function capture() {
         showMonitor: false,
         showProjectInsights: false,
         showFileBrowser: false,
+        showTokenCount: false,
       });
       localStorage.setItem('codeman-app-settings', JSON.stringify(existing));
     });

scripts/capture-subagent-screenshots.mjs

@@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ async function configureSettings(page) {
       subagentTrackingEnabled: true,
       subagentActiveTabOnly: false, // Show all subagents regardless of active tab
       showMonitor: true,
+      showTokenCount: false,
     };
     localStorage.setItem('codeman-app-settings', JSON.stringify(settings));
   });

src/cli.ts

@@ -584,7 +584,11 @@ program
     '--allow-unauthenticated-network',
     'Allow non-loopback web access without CODEMAN_PASSWORD (dangerous; terminal control is exposed)'
   )
+  .option('--multiuser', 'Enable opt-in multi-user mode (named users in ~/.codeman/users.json; env: CODEMAN_MULTIUSER)')
   .action(async (options) => {
+    // The flag is surfaced to the rest of the process via the env var so
+    // isMultiUserMode() has a single source of truth (see config/multiuser.ts).
+    if (options.multiuser) process.env.CODEMAN_MULTIUSER = '1';
     const { startWebServer } = await import('./web/server.js');
     const host = options.host;
     const port = parseInt(options.port, 10);
@@ -626,6 +630,168 @@ program
     }
   });
 
+// ============ Multi-user Commands ============
+//
+// Operate directly on ~/.codeman/users.json (via user-store) with NO running
+// server, honoring CODEMAN_INSTANCE. This is the headless bootstrap path and the
+// recovery answer to "locked out: last admin forgot password".
+
+/** Read a password from stdin without echoing. Falls back to plain read on non-TTY. */
+function promptHiddenPassword(question: string): Promise<string> {
+  const stdin = process.stdin;
+  if (!stdin.isTTY || typeof stdin.setRawMode !== 'function') {
+    // Non-interactive: read a single line from stdin.
+    return new Promise((resolve) => {
+      let buf = '';
+      stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
+      stdin.on('data', (d) => (buf += d));
+      stdin.on('end', () => resolve(buf.replace(/\r?\n$/, '')));
+    });
+  }
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+    process.stdout.write(question);
+    let input = '';
+    stdin.setRawMode(true);
+    stdin.resume();
+    stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
+    const onData = (chunk: string) => {
+      for (const c of chunk) {
+        if (c === '\n' || c === '\r' || c === '\u0004') {
+          stdin.setRawMode!(false);
+          stdin.pause();
+          stdin.removeListener('data', onData);
+          process.stdout.write('\n');
+          resolve(input);
+          return;
+        } else if (c === '\u0003') {
+          process.stdout.write('\n');
+          process.exit(1);
+        } else if (c === '\u007f' || c === '\b') {
+          input = input.slice(0, -1);
+        } else {
+          input += c;
+        }
+      }
+    };
+    stdin.on('data', onData);
+  });
+}
+
+function readAllStdin(): Promise<string> {
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+    let buf = '';
+    process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
+    process.stdin.on('data', (d) => (buf += d));
+    process.stdin.on('end', () => resolve(buf.replace(/\r?\n$/, '')));
+  });
+}
+
+const usersCmd = program.command('users').description('Manage multi-user accounts (~/.codeman/users.json)');
+
+usersCmd
+  .command('add <name>')
+  .description('Create a user (prompts for password; use --password-stdin for scripts)')
+  .option('--admin', 'Create as an admin')
+  .option('--password-stdin', 'Read the password from stdin instead of prompting')
+  .action(async (name, options) => {
+    const { createUser, isValidUsername } = await import('./user-store.js');
+    if (!isValidUsername(name)) {
+      console.error(chalk.red('✗ Username must be lowercase, start alphanumeric, 2-32 chars ([a-z0-9_-])'));
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+    try {
+      let password: string;
+      if (options.passwordStdin) {
+        password = await readAllStdin();
+      } else {
+        password = await promptHiddenPassword('New password: ');
+        const confirm = await promptHiddenPassword('Confirm password: ');
+        if (password !== confirm) {
+          console.error(chalk.red('✗ Passwords do not match'));
+          process.exit(1);
+        }
+      }
+      if (!password || password.length < 8) {
+        console.error(chalk.red('✗ Password must be at least 8 characters'));
+        process.exit(1);
+      }
+      const user = await createUser({ username: name, role: options.admin ? 'admin' : 'user', password });
+      console.log(chalk.green(`✓ Created ${user.role} "${user.username}"`));
+    } catch (err) {
+      console.error(chalk.red(`✗ ${getErrorMessage(err)}`));
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+  });
+
+usersCmd
+  .command('passwd <name>')
+  .description('Reset a user password')
+  .option('--password-stdin', 'Read the new password from stdin instead of prompting')
+  .action(async (name, options) => {
+    const { setPassword } = await import('./user-store.js');
+    try {
+      let password: string;
+      if (options.passwordStdin) {
+        password = await readAllStdin();
+      } else {
+        password = await promptHiddenPassword('New password: ');
+        const confirm = await promptHiddenPassword('Confirm password: ');
+        if (password !== confirm) {
+          console.error(chalk.red('✗ Passwords do not match'));
+          process.exit(1);
+        }
+      }
+      await setPassword(name, password, { mustChangePassword: false });
+      console.log(chalk.green(`✓ Password updated for "${name}"`));
+    } catch (err) {
+      console.error(chalk.red(`✗ ${getErrorMessage(err)}`));
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+  });
+
+usersCmd
+  .command('list')
+  .alias('ls')
+  .description('List all users')
+  .action(async () => {
+    const { readUsers } = await import('./user-store.js');
+    const users = await readUsers(true);
+    if (users.length === 0) {
+      console.log(chalk.yellow('No users defined (run: codeman users add <name> --admin)'));
+      return;
+    }
+    console.log(chalk.bold('\nUsers:'));
+    for (const u of users) {
+      const role = u.role === 'admin' ? chalk.magenta('admin') : chalk.cyan('user ');
+      const state = u.disabled ? chalk.red('disabled') : chalk.green('enabled ');
+      const flags = [u.mustChangePassword ? 'must-change-pw' : '', u.canBypassPermissions ? 'can-bypass' : '']
+        .filter(Boolean)
+        .join(' ');
+      console.log(`  ${role} ${state} ${u.username}${flags ? chalk.gray(`  [${flags}]`) : ''}`);
+    }
+    console.log('');
+  });
+
+usersCmd
+  .command('rm <name>')
+  .description('Delete a user')
+  .option('--delete-space', "Also delete the user's ~/codeman-users/<name> space")
+  .action(async (name, options) => {
+    const { deleteUser, deleteUserSpace } = await import('./user-store.js');
+    try {
+      await deleteUser(name);
+      if (options.deleteSpace) {
+        await deleteUserSpace(name);
+        console.log(chalk.green(`✓ Deleted user "${name}" and their space`));
+      } else {
+        console.log(chalk.green(`✓ Deleted user "${name}" (space left on disk)`));
+      }
+    } catch (err) {
+      console.error(chalk.red(`✗ ${getErrorMessage(err)}`));
+      process.exit(1);
+    }
+  });
+
 program
   .command('doctor')
   .alias('check-deps')

src/config/multiuser.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Multi-user mode gating + limits (opt-in, off by default).
+ *
+ * Multi-user mode is enabled by `codeman web --multiuser` (which sets
+ * `CODEMAN_MULTIUSER=1`) or the env var directly. When OFF, behavior is
+ * byte-identical to today: `users.json` is never read and all ownership scoping
+ * is bypassed. Everything here is per-instance like the rest of Codeman: a beta
+ * instance (`CODEMAN_INSTANCE=beta`) has its own `users.json` via `dataPath()`,
+ * and its user spaces live under the same shared `~/codeman-users` as prod (like
+ * `~/codeman-cases`), unless `CODEMAN_USER_SPACES_DIR` overrides it.
+ *
+ * See `docs/multi-user-plan.md` sections 3, 4.2, and 11.
+ */
+
+import { homedir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { MAX_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS } from './map-limits.js';
+
+/**
+ * Whether multi-user mode is active. Read from the environment each call so it is
+ * stable for the process lifetime (env does not change after boot) and trivially
+ * overridable in tests. Accepts `1` or `true`.
+ */
+export function isMultiUserMode(): boolean {
+  const v = process.env.CODEMAN_MULTIUSER;
+  return v === '1' || v === 'true';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Root of per-user spaces: `~/codeman-users` (sibling of `~/codeman-cases`).
+ * Overridable via `CODEMAN_USER_SPACES_DIR` (used by tests). Resolved lazily so a
+ * test can point it at a temp dir before the first call.
+ */
+export function getUserSpacesDir(): string {
+  return process.env.CODEMAN_USER_SPACES_DIR || join(homedir(), 'codeman-users');
+}
+
+/** Absolute path to a user's top-level space: `<USER_SPACES_DIR>/<username>[/segments]`. */
+export function userSpacePath(username: string, ...segments: string[]): string {
+  return join(getUserSpacesDir(), username, ...segments);
+}
+
+/** Absolute path to a user's cases dir: `<USER_SPACES_DIR>/<username>/cases`. */
+export function userCasesDir(username: string): string {
+  return join(getUserSpacesDir(), username, 'cases');
+}
+
+/** Maximum number of user accounts (default 25, env `CODEMAN_MAX_USERS`). */
+export function maxUsers(): number {
+  const n = Number(process.env.CODEMAN_MAX_USERS);
+  return Number.isInteger(n) && n > 0 ? n : 25;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Per-user concurrent-session cap (the fairness lever). Defaults to half the
+ * global cap; overridable via `CODEMAN_MAX_SESSIONS_PER_USER`. The global cap
+ * (MAX_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS) still applies on top and is shared across users.
+ */
+export function maxSessionsPerUser(): number {
+  const n = Number(process.env.CODEMAN_MAX_SESSIONS_PER_USER);
+  if (Number.isInteger(n) && n > 0) return n;
+  return Math.max(1, Math.floor(MAX_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS / 2));
+}

src/config/webview-limits.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/**
+ * Limits and timeouts for web tabs (dashboards embedded as Codeman tabs).
+ *
+ * Every value here bounds something an untrusted-ish upstream controls: how many
+ * dashboards can be saved, how long the server will wait on one, how much of a
+ * response it will buffer before rewriting HTML, and how many sockets a single
+ * dashboard may hold open. Env-overridable in the same style as the other config
+ * modules.
+ */
+
+function envInt(name: string, fallback: number): number {
+  const parsed = parseInt(process.env[name] || '', 10);
+  return Number.isFinite(parsed) && parsed > 0 ? parsed : fallback;
+}
+
+/** Max saved webviews (per owner in multi-user mode). */
+export const MAX_WEBVIEWS = envInt('CODEMAN_MAX_WEBVIEWS', 50);
+
+/**
+ * Max iframes kept mounted at once. Switching tabs must not reload a dashboard,
+ * so frames stay alive while hidden; past this many, the least-recently-viewed
+ * frame is evicted. Consumed by the frontend via `GET /api/webviews`.
+ */
+export const MAX_LIVE_WEBVIEW_FRAMES = envInt('CODEMAN_MAX_LIVE_WEBVIEW_FRAMES', 6);
+
+/** How long a minted proxy capability stays valid (rolling, refreshed on use). */
+export const WEBVIEW_CAPABILITY_TTL_MS = envInt('CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_CAPABILITY_TTL_MS', 12 * 60 * 60 * 1000);
+
+/** Max concurrent capabilities held in memory before the oldest are dropped. */
+export const MAX_WEBVIEW_CAPABILITIES = 200;
+
+/** Upstream request timeout for a proxied HTTP request. */
+export const WEBVIEW_UPSTREAM_TIMEOUT_MS = envInt('CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_TIMEOUT_MS', 30_000);
+
+/** Shorter timeout for the editor's "Test" probe, which a human is waiting on. */
+export const WEBVIEW_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS = envInt('CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS', 8_000);
+
+/**
+ * Max bytes of an HTML response buffered for `<base>` injection and link
+ * rewriting. Larger HTML documents stream through untouched: the rewrite is a
+ * convenience, and buffering an unbounded upstream body is a memory hazard.
+ */
+export const MAX_WEBVIEW_HTML_REWRITE_BYTES = envInt('CODEMAN_MAX_WEBVIEW_HTML_BYTES', 8 * 1024 * 1024);
+
+/** Max concurrent proxied WebSockets per webview (mirrors MAX_WS_PER_SESSION). */
+export const MAX_WEBVIEW_SOCKETS = envInt('CODEMAN_MAX_WEBVIEW_SOCKETS', 8);
+
+/** URL path prefix the proxy is mounted at. Single source of truth. */
+export const WEBVIEW_PROXY_PREFIX = '/webview';

src/cron/cron-service.ts

@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ import { SseEvent } from '../web/sse-events.js';
 import { CronJobSchema } from '../web/schemas.js';
 import { getErrorMessage, createErrorResponse, ApiErrorCode } from '../types/api.js';
 import { MAX_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS, MAX_CRON_JOBS, MAX_CRON_RUN_HISTORY } from '../config/map-limits.js';
+import { canUsernameRunPrivilegedCommands, resolveClaudeModeForUsername } from '../user-store.js';
+import { sessionCapacityState, isWorkingDirAllowedForUsername } from '../web/route-helpers.js';
 import { CRON_READY_MAX_ATTEMPTS, CRON_READY_SETTLE_MS } from '../config/server-timing.js';
 import {
   DEFAULT_BLOCKED_TREES,
@@ -25,6 +27,7 @@ import { validateSessionFilePath } from '../web/route-helpers.js';
 import { computeNextRunAt, dueKeyFor } from './cron-time.js';
 import type { SessionPort, EventPort, ConfigPort, InfraPort } from '../web/ports/index.js';
 import type { CronJob, CronJobRun, CronJobRunStatus, TriggerType } from '../types/cron.js';
+import type { GeminiConfig } from '../types/session.js';
 import type { CronJobInput } from './cron-input.js';
 
 /** The subset of the route context the cron depends on. */
@@ -108,7 +111,7 @@ export class CronService {
 
   // ──────────────────────────── Mutations ───────────────────────────
 
-  createJob(input: CronJobInput): CronJob {
+  createJob(input: CronJobInput, owner?: string): CronJob {
     if (Object.keys(this.store.getCronJobs()).length >= MAX_CRON_JOBS) {
       throw this.badRequest(`Maximum number of cron jobs (${MAX_CRON_JOBS}) reached`);
     }
@@ -117,6 +120,7 @@ export class CronService {
     const job: CronJob = {
       id: uuidv4(),
       name: input.name,
+      owner,
       agentType: input.agentType,
       workingDir: input.workingDir,
       launchCommand: input.launchCommand,
@@ -328,6 +332,12 @@ export class CronService {
       return this.failRun(job, run, 'workingDir does not exist');
     }
 
+    // Section 6.3: defense-in-depth workingDir confinement re-check at FIRE time against the
+    // owner's CURRENT space (complements the create/update gate). No-op in single-user / unset owner.
+    if (!(await isWorkingDirAllowedForUsername(job.owner, job.workingDir))) {
+      return this.failRun(job, run, 'workingDir is outside the owner workspace');
+    }
+
     // Recurring jobs: close the still-open session created by this job's
     // previous run before launching the next (default ON, opt-out via
     // autoClosePreviousSession:false) — otherwise an unattended interval/daily
@@ -336,10 +346,21 @@ export class CronService {
       await this.closePreviousRunSessions(job, run.id);
     }
 
-    // Respect the global session cap.
-    if (this.deps.sessions.size >= MAX_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS) {
+    // Respect the global cap AND the owner's per-user cap (multi-user).
+    const cap = sessionCapacityState(this.deps.sessions, job.owner);
+    if (cap.atGlobalCap) {
       return this.failRun(job, run, `Maximum concurrent sessions (${MAX_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS}) reached`);
     }
+    if (cap.atUserCap) {
+      return this.failRun(job, run, `Owner's per-user session limit reached`);
+    }
+
+    // Section 6.3: re-resolve the owner's grant at FIRE time (it may have been revoked
+    // since create). Gates shell/launchCommand AND clamps the external-CLI bypass below.
+    const ownerGranted = await canUsernameRunPrivilegedCommands(job.owner);
+    if ((job.agentType === 'shell' || job.launchCommand) && !ownerGranted) {
+      return this.failRun(job, run, 'Owner lacks the can-bypass-permissions grant for shell/launchCommand jobs');
+    }
 
     // Create + start the session (mirrors the quick-start route flow).
     let session: Session;
@@ -348,7 +369,15 @@ export class CronService {
       const globalNice = await this.deps.getGlobalNiceConfig();
       const modelConfig = await this.deps.getModelConfig();
       const claudeModeConfig = await this.deps.getClaudeModeConfig();
+      const effectiveClaudeMode = await resolveClaudeModeForUsername(claudeModeConfig.claudeMode, job.owner);
       const model = mode !== 'shell' ? modelConfig?.defaultModel || undefined : undefined;
+      // Section 6.3: cron carries no per-CLI config, so buildGeminiCommand(undefined)
+      // would default a non-granted owner to `--approval-mode yolo` (classifier-free) —
+      // materialize auto_edit for a non-granted gemini owner, mirroring the route clamp
+      // (#15). Granted/admin/single-user leave it undefined → yolo parity. Codex's absent
+      // config already defaults to the safe sandbox, so no clamp is needed there.
+      const geminiConfig: GeminiConfig | undefined =
+        mode === 'gemini' && !ownerGranted ? { approvalMode: 'auto_edit' } : undefined;
       session = new Session({
         workingDir: job.workingDir,
         mode,
@@ -357,8 +386,10 @@ export class CronService {
         useMux: true,
         niceConfig: globalNice,
         model,
-        claudeMode: claudeModeConfig.claudeMode,
+        claudeMode: effectiveClaudeMode,
         allowedTools: claudeModeConfig.allowedTools,
+        geminiConfig,
+        owner: job.owner,
       });
       this.deps.addSession(session);
       this.store.incrementSessionsCreated();

src/docker-export.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,465 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Docker case export / import: move a container (toolchain + any
+ * in-image changes) PLUS its workspace to another machine as one portable
+ * `.codeman-container.tgz`, and restore it.
+ *
+ * A full-image export = `docker commit` the running container to an image ->
+ * `docker save` that image -> tar the bind-mounted workspace -> a manifest, all
+ * bundled into one gzip tarball. A workspace-only export skips the image (fast,
+ * files-only). Import validates the manifest + per-member checksums, extracts the
+ * workspace with a path-traversal guard, `docker load`s the image and RE-TAGS it
+ * into a quarantined namespace (never overwriting a local tag), and hands the
+ * caller enough to recreate a hardened case on the destination.
+ *
+ * Safety (all from the design critic): pause the container spanning the workspace
+ * tar AND the commit so the two artifacts are mutually consistent; a free-space
+ * precheck (a full docker graph wedges EVERY session on the host); `docker rmi`
+ * the intermediate image in a finally; sealed containers refuse a full-image
+ * export (an in-container login would ride the committed layer); import rejects
+ * absolute / `..` tar members and checksum mismatches. Bounded by
+ * runWithConversionLimit so N exports cannot fork-bomb the host.
+ *
+ * @module docker-export
+ */
+
+import { createReadStream, createWriteStream, existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
+import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { join, basename } from 'node:path';
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
+import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
+import { pipeline } from 'node:stream/promises';
+import type { DockerEngine, SessionDocker } from './types.js';
+import { runWithConversionLimit } from './document-conversion-limiter.js';
+
+const IS_TEST_MODE = !!process.env.VITEST;
+
+/** Refuse to export when the target filesystem has less than this free (a full graph wedges the daemon). */
+export const DOCKER_EXPORT_MIN_FREE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024; // 2 GiB
+
+/** Manifest schema version (bump on any breaking field change). */
+export const DOCKER_EXPORT_SCHEMA = 1;
+
+export type DockerExportMode = 'full' | 'workspace';
+
+export interface DockerExportManifest {
+  schemaVersion: number;
+  caseName: string;
+  mode: DockerExportMode;
+  engine: DockerEngine;
+  image: string;
+  containerWorkdir: string;
+  network: string;
+  createdAt: number;
+  codemanVersion: string;
+  mountCredentials: boolean;
+  /** True when the bundle provably carries no credentials (convenient-mode workspace, or a full image whose creds were bind-mounted and thus never committed). */
+  secretFree: boolean;
+  /** sha256 of each bundle member that is present. */
+  checksums: { image?: string; workspace?: string };
+}
+
+// ========== Pure helpers (unit-tested) ==========
+
+/** Raw argv prefix for the engine (NO shell escaping — used with spawn). */
+export function dockerArgv(docker: Pick<SessionDocker, 'engine' | 'context' | 'daemonHost'>): string[] {
+  const argv: string[] = [docker.engine === 'podman' ? 'podman' : 'docker'];
+  if (docker.context) argv.push('--context', docker.context);
+  if (docker.daemonHost) argv.push('-H', docker.daemonHost);
+  return argv;
+}
+
+/** Portable bundle filename for a case export. */
+export function exportBundleName(caseName: string, timestamp: number, mode: DockerExportMode): string {
+  const suffix = mode === 'workspace' ? 'workspace' : 'container';
+  return `${caseName}-${timestamp}.codeman-${suffix}.tgz`;
+}
+
+/** Quarantined image tag for an imported bundle (never overwrites a local tag). */
+export function importedImageTag(caseName: string, timestamp: number): string {
+  return `codeman/imported-${caseName}:${timestamp}`;
+}
+
+/** Intermediate commit tag for a full-image export (unique per export, rmi'd in finally). */
+export function exportImageTag(caseName: string, timestamp: number): string {
+  return `codeman/export-${caseName}:${timestamp}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reject a tar member path that would escape the extraction root (absolute path
+ * or a `..` component). The import-side traversal guard.
+ */
+export function isSafeTarMember(member: string): boolean {
+  const trimmed = member.trim();
+  if (!trimmed || trimmed === './') return true;
+  if (trimmed.startsWith('/')) return false;
+  // Normalize separators and check each component.
+  return !trimmed.split('/').some((part) => part === '..');
+}
+
+/** Parse the image id/ref from `docker load` output ("Loaded image: x" / "Loaded image ID: sha256:..."). */
+export function parseLoadedImageRef(loadOutput: string): string | null {
+  const idMatch = loadOutput.match(/Loaded image ID:\s*(sha256:[0-9a-f]+)/i);
+  if (idMatch) return idMatch[1];
+  const refMatch = loadOutput.match(/Loaded image:\s*(\S+)/i);
+  if (refMatch) return refMatch[1];
+  return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate an imported bundle's manifest BEFORE any of its fields are trusted.
+ * A bundle is cross-machine input (potentially authored by someone else), and its
+ * fields flow into stored host/case config that the schema layer never sees:
+ * `engine` becomes the probe/launch binary selector, `image`/`containerWorkdir`
+ * reach the shellescaped launch string, `network` is a create arg. Mirror the
+ * DockerHostSchema/DockerCaseLinkSchema constraints here (throwing, since this is
+ * not a web-layer module). Exported for unit tests.
+ */
+export function validateImportManifest(manifest: DockerExportManifest): void {
+  const fail = (msg: string): never => {
+    throw new Error(`invalid bundle manifest: ${msg}`);
+  };
+  if (manifest.schemaVersion !== DOCKER_EXPORT_SCHEMA) {
+    fail(`unsupported export schema version ${manifest.schemaVersion} (expected ${DOCKER_EXPORT_SCHEMA})`);
+  }
+  if (manifest.mode !== 'full' && manifest.mode !== 'workspace') fail(`unknown mode ${String(manifest.mode)}`);
+  if (manifest.engine !== 'docker' && manifest.engine !== 'podman') fail(`unknown engine ${String(manifest.engine)}`);
+  if (typeof manifest.caseName !== 'string' || !/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(manifest.caseName)) fail('bad caseName');
+  if (
+    typeof manifest.image !== 'string' ||
+    manifest.image.length > 512 ||
+    !/^[a-zA-Z0-9][\w./:@-]*$/.test(manifest.image)
+  ) {
+    fail('bad image reference');
+  }
+  if (
+    typeof manifest.containerWorkdir !== 'string' ||
+    manifest.containerWorkdir.length > 2000 ||
+    !manifest.containerWorkdir.startsWith('/') ||
+    // comma: --mount specs are comma-delimited CSV; shell escaping cannot protect it
+    /[`$\\"'\n\r;&|<>,]/.test(manifest.containerWorkdir)
+  ) {
+    fail('bad containerWorkdir');
+  }
+  if (!['bridge', 'none', 'custom'].includes(manifest.network)) fail(`unknown network ${String(manifest.network)}`);
+  if (typeof manifest.checksums !== 'object' || manifest.checksums === null) fail('missing checksums');
+}
+
+// ========== IO helpers ==========
+
+function run(
+  cmd: string,
+  args: string[],
+  opts: { timeout?: number } = {}
+): Promise<{ stdout: string; stderr: string }> {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const child = spawn(cmd, args, { stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] });
+    let stdout = '';
+    let stderr = '';
+    let timer: NodeJS.Timeout | undefined;
+    if (opts.timeout) {
+      timer = setTimeout(() => {
+        child.kill('SIGKILL');
+        reject(new Error(`${cmd} timed out after ${opts.timeout}ms`));
+      }, opts.timeout);
+    }
+    child.stdout.on('data', (d) => (stdout += d));
+    child.stderr.on('data', (d) => (stderr += d));
+    child.on('error', (err) => {
+      if (timer) clearTimeout(timer);
+      reject(err);
+    });
+    child.on('close', (code) => {
+      if (timer) clearTimeout(timer);
+      if (code === 0) resolve({ stdout, stderr });
+      else reject(new Error(`${cmd} ${args.join(' ')} exited ${code}: ${stderr.trim()}`));
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Stream `docker save <tag>` stdout to a raw tar file (no shell, no double-gzip).
+ * Uses stream `pipeline` so completion means the write stream is FULLY flushed to
+ * disk (a naive child 'close' resolves before the last chunks land, truncating the
+ * file — a real bug caught in end-to-end testing), AND waits for a clean exit code.
+ */
+async function saveImageToTar(argv: string[], tag: string, outPath: string): Promise<void> {
+  const child = spawn(argv[0], [...argv.slice(1), 'save', tag], { stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] });
+  let stderr = '';
+  child.stderr.on('data', (d) => (stderr += d));
+  const exited = new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
+    child.on('error', reject);
+    child.on('close', (code) =>
+      code === 0 ? resolve() : reject(new Error(`docker save exited ${code}: ${stderr.trim()}`))
+    );
+  });
+  // pipeline resolves only after the destination has fully flushed.
+  await Promise.all([pipeline(child.stdout, createWriteStream(outPath)), exited]);
+}
+
+async function sha256File(path: string): Promise<string> {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    const hash = createHash('sha256');
+    const stream = createReadStream(path);
+    stream.on('data', (d) => hash.update(d));
+    stream.on('error', reject);
+    stream.on('end', () => resolve(hash.digest('hex')));
+  });
+}
+
+async function freeBytes(path: string): Promise<number> {
+  try {
+    const stat = await fs.statfs(path);
+    return Number(stat.bavail) * Number(stat.bsize);
+  } catch {
+    return Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY; // statfs unsupported — don't block
+  }
+}
+
+async function isContainerRunning(argv: string[], container: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  try {
+    const { stdout } = await run(argv[0], [...argv.slice(1), 'inspect', '-f', '{{.State.Running}}', container], {
+      timeout: 15_000,
+    });
+    return stdout.trim() === 'true';
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+export interface ExportResult {
+  bundlePath: string;
+  manifest: DockerExportManifest;
+  sizeBytes: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Export a docker case to a portable bundle. Bounded by runWithConversionLimit.
+ * `full` mode commits + saves the image AND tars the workspace; `workspace` mode
+ * tars just the workspace. The container is paused across the artifact capture so
+ * image and workspace are mutually consistent.
+ */
+export async function exportDockerCase(params: {
+  docker: SessionDocker;
+  caseName: string;
+  timestamp: number;
+  exportsDir: string;
+  mode: DockerExportMode;
+  codemanVersion: string;
+}): Promise<ExportResult> {
+  const { docker, caseName, timestamp, exportsDir, mode, codemanVersion } = params;
+
+  if (mode === 'full' && !docker.mountCredentials) {
+    throw new Error(
+      'full-image export is refused for a sealed (mountCredentials:false) container: an in-container login would ride the committed image layer. Use a workspace-only export.'
+    );
+  }
+
+  if (IS_TEST_MODE) {
+    // No real docker/tar under vitest — return a deterministic stub.
+    const manifest: DockerExportManifest = {
+      schemaVersion: DOCKER_EXPORT_SCHEMA,
+      caseName,
+      mode,
+      engine: docker.engine,
+      image: docker.image,
+      containerWorkdir: docker.containerWorkdir,
+      network: docker.network,
+      createdAt: timestamp,
+      codemanVersion,
+      mountCredentials: docker.mountCredentials,
+      secretFree: true,
+      checksums: {},
+    };
+    return { bundlePath: join(exportsDir, exportBundleName(caseName, timestamp, mode)), manifest, sizeBytes: 0 };
+  }
+
+  return runWithConversionLimit(async () => {
+    if (!existsSync(exportsDir)) mkdirSync(exportsDir, { recursive: true });
+
+    const free = await freeBytes(exportsDir);
+    if (free < DOCKER_EXPORT_MIN_FREE_BYTES) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `not enough free space to export (need >= ${Math.round(DOCKER_EXPORT_MIN_FREE_BYTES / 1e9)}GB, have ${Math.round(free / 1e9)}GB). A full docker graph wedges every session on the host.`
+      );
+    }
+
+    const argv = dockerArgv(docker);
+    const bundlePath = join(exportsDir, exportBundleName(caseName, timestamp, mode));
+    const stageDir = join(exportsDir, `.stage-${caseName}-${timestamp}`);
+    mkdirSync(stageDir, { recursive: true });
+    const wasRunning = await isContainerRunning(argv, docker.containerName);
+    let commitTag: string | undefined;
+
+    try {
+      if (wasRunning) {
+        await run(argv[0], [...argv.slice(1), 'pause', docker.containerName], { timeout: 30_000 }).catch(() => {});
+      }
+
+      const checksums: DockerExportManifest['checksums'] = {};
+
+      if (mode === 'full') {
+        commitTag = exportImageTag(caseName, timestamp);
+        // Blank instance-specific committed env so the image carries no stale host refs.
+        await run(
+          argv[0],
+          [
+            ...argv.slice(1),
+            'commit',
+            '-c',
+            'ENV CODEMAN_API_URL=',
+            '-c',
+            'ENV CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE=',
+            docker.containerName,
+            commitTag,
+          ],
+          { timeout: 300_000 }
+        );
+        const imageTar = join(stageDir, 'image.tar');
+        await saveImageToTar(argv, commitTag, imageTar);
+        checksums.image = await sha256File(imageTar);
+      }
+
+      const workspaceTar = join(stageDir, 'workspace.tar');
+      await run('tar', ['-cf', workspaceTar, '-C', docker.hostWorkspacePath, '.'], { timeout: 300_000 });
+      checksums.workspace = await sha256File(workspaceTar);
+
+      const manifest: DockerExportManifest = {
+        schemaVersion: DOCKER_EXPORT_SCHEMA,
+        caseName,
+        mode,
+        engine: docker.engine,
+        image: docker.image,
+        containerWorkdir: docker.containerWorkdir,
+        network: docker.network,
+        createdAt: timestamp,
+        codemanVersion,
+        mountCredentials: docker.mountCredentials,
+        // Convenient mode keeps creds on bind mounts (never committed), so the bundle is secret-free.
+        secretFree: docker.mountCredentials,
+        checksums,
+      };
+      await fs.writeFile(join(stageDir, 'manifest.json'), JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 2));
+
+      const members =
+        mode === 'full' ? ['manifest.json', 'image.tar', 'workspace.tar'] : ['manifest.json', 'workspace.tar'];
+      await run('tar', ['-czf', bundlePath, '-C', stageDir, ...members], { timeout: 300_000 });
+
+      const stat = await fs.stat(bundlePath);
+      return { bundlePath, manifest, sizeBytes: stat.size };
+    } finally {
+      // Always remove the intermediate image + stage dir, and unpause.
+      if (commitTag) {
+        await run(argv[0], [...argv.slice(1), 'rmi', commitTag], { timeout: 60_000 }).catch(() => {});
+      }
+      await fs.rm(stageDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+      if (wasRunning) {
+        await run(argv[0], [...argv.slice(1), 'unpause', docker.containerName], { timeout: 30_000 }).catch(() => {});
+      }
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+export interface ImportResult {
+  manifest: DockerExportManifest;
+  /** Quarantined image ref the destination case should use (full mode only). */
+  importedImage?: string;
+  /** Directory the workspace was extracted into. */
+  workspacePath: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Import a bundle produced by exportDockerCase: validate the manifest + per-member
+ * checksums, extract the workspace (traversal-guarded) into destWorkspace, and, in
+ * full mode, `docker load` the image and re-tag it into a quarantined namespace.
+ */
+export async function importDockerBundle(params: {
+  bundlePath: string;
+  destWorkspace: string;
+  engine: DockerEngine;
+  timestamp: number;
+  /** Schema-validated destination case name; the quarantine tag derives from THIS,
+   *  never from the (attacker-authored) manifest.caseName. */
+  newCaseName: string;
+}): Promise<ImportResult> {
+  const { bundlePath, destWorkspace, engine, timestamp, newCaseName } = params;
+  const argv: string[] = [engine === 'podman' ? 'podman' : 'docker'];
+
+  if (IS_TEST_MODE) {
+    const raw = await fs.readFile(bundlePath, 'utf-8').catch(() => '{}');
+    const manifest = JSON.parse(raw) as DockerExportManifest;
+    validateImportManifest(manifest);
+    return { manifest, workspacePath: destWorkspace };
+  }
+
+  const stageDir = `${destWorkspace}.import-stage-${timestamp}`;
+  mkdirSync(stageDir, { recursive: true });
+  try {
+    // Outer-bundle traversal guard (defense in depth: GNU/bsd tar already refuse
+    // `..`/absolute members by default, but the bundle is cross-machine input).
+    const { stdout: bundleMembers } = await run('tar', ['-tzf', bundlePath], { timeout: 60_000 });
+    for (const member of bundleMembers.split('\n').filter(Boolean)) {
+      if (!isSafeTarMember(member)) throw new Error(`unsafe path in bundle archive: ${member}`);
+    }
+    await run('tar', ['--no-same-owner', '-xzf', bundlePath, '-C', stageDir], { timeout: 300_000 });
+
+    const manifestRaw = await fs.readFile(join(stageDir, 'manifest.json'), 'utf-8');
+    const manifest = JSON.parse(manifestRaw) as DockerExportManifest;
+    validateImportManifest(manifest);
+
+    // Integrity: verify checksums before trusting any member.
+    const workspaceTar = join(stageDir, 'workspace.tar');
+    if (manifest.checksums.workspace) {
+      const actual = await sha256File(workspaceTar);
+      if (actual !== manifest.checksums.workspace)
+        throw new Error('workspace checksum mismatch (corrupt or tampered bundle)');
+    }
+
+    // Traversal guard: reject absolute / `..` members before extraction.
+    const { stdout: memberList } = await run('tar', ['-tf', workspaceTar], { timeout: 60_000 });
+    for (const member of memberList.split('\n').filter(Boolean)) {
+      if (!isSafeTarMember(member)) throw new Error(`unsafe path in workspace archive: ${member}`);
+    }
+    mkdirSync(destWorkspace, { recursive: true });
+    await run('tar', ['--no-same-owner', '-xf', workspaceTar, '-C', destWorkspace], { timeout: 300_000 });
+
+    let importedImage: string | undefined;
+    if (manifest.mode === 'full') {
+      const imageTar = join(stageDir, 'image.tar');
+      if (manifest.checksums.image) {
+        const actual = await sha256File(imageTar);
+        if (actual !== manifest.checksums.image)
+          throw new Error('image checksum mismatch (corrupt or tampered bundle)');
+      }
+      const { stdout } = await run(argv[0], [...argv.slice(1), 'load', '-i', imageTar], { timeout: 300_000 });
+      const loadedRef = parseLoadedImageRef(stdout);
+      if (!loadedRef) throw new Error('could not determine loaded image ref');
+      // Quarantine: re-tag by the loaded ref/id, never trusting the bundle's original
+      // tag; the tag name derives from the caller's schema-validated newCaseName.
+      importedImage = importedImageTag(newCaseName, timestamp);
+      await run(argv[0], [...argv.slice(1), 'tag', loadedRef, importedImage], { timeout: 60_000 });
+    }
+
+    return { manifest, importedImage, workspacePath: destWorkspace };
+  } finally {
+    await fs.rm(stageDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
+  }
+}
+
+/** List export bundles in the exports dir (newest first), with size + mtime. */
+export async function listDockerExports(
+  exportsDir: string
+): Promise<Array<{ name: string; sizeBytes: number; mtimeMs: number }>> {
+  if (!existsSync(exportsDir)) return [];
+  const entries = await fs.readdir(exportsDir).catch(() => [] as string[]);
+  const out: Array<{ name: string; sizeBytes: number; mtimeMs: number }> = [];
+  for (const name of entries) {
+    if (!name.endsWith('.tgz')) continue;
+    try {
+      const stat = await fs.stat(join(exportsDir, name));
+      out.push({ name: basename(name), sizeBytes: stat.size, mtimeMs: stat.mtimeMs });
+    } catch {
+      /* skip */
+    }
+  }
+  return out.sort((a, b) => b.mtimeMs - a.mtimeMs);
+}

src/mux-interface.ts

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import type {
   EffortLevel,
   GeminiConfig,
   SessionRemote,
+  SessionDocker,
 } from './types.js';
 
 /**
@@ -36,6 +37,10 @@ export interface MuxSession {
   workingDir: string;
   /** Remote execution metadata for local tmux sessions wrapping SSH */
   remote?: SessionRemote;
+  /** Docker execution metadata for local tmux sessions wrapping `docker exec` */
+  docker?: SessionDocker;
+  /** Owning username in multi-user mode (round-tripped through recovery like remote/docker) */
+  owner?: string;
   /** Session mode */
   mode: SessionMode;
   /** Whether webserver is attached to this session */
@@ -79,6 +84,10 @@ export interface CreateSessionOptions {
   historyLimit?: number;
   /** Remote execution metadata for local tmux sessions wrapping SSH */
   remote?: SessionRemote;
+  /** Docker execution metadata for local tmux sessions wrapping `docker exec` */
+  docker?: SessionDocker;
+  /** Owning username in multi-user mode; persisted for recovery. */
+  owner?: string;
 }
 
 /** Options for respawning a dead pane. */
@@ -103,6 +112,10 @@ export interface RespawnPaneOptions {
   historyLimit?: number;
   /** Remote execution metadata for local tmux sessions wrapping SSH */
   remote?: SessionRemote;
+  /** Docker execution metadata for local tmux sessions wrapping `docker exec` */
+  docker?: SessionDocker;
+  /** Owning username (multi-user); redundant on respawn since the Session object survives, kept for shape parity. */
+  owner?: string;
 }
 
 /** Options for pane buffer capture (COD-47 full-history mode). */

src/plan-orchestrator.ts

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ import type { TerminalMultiplexer } from './mux-interface.js';
 import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { join } from 'node:path';
 import { RESEARCH_AGENT_PROMPT, PLANNER_PROMPT } from './prompts/index.js';
-import { getErrorMessage, type PlanItem } from './types.js';
+import { getErrorMessage, type PlanItem, type ClaudeMode } from './types.js';
 
 // Re-export for backward compatibility
 export type { PlanItem };
@@ -130,18 +130,28 @@ export class PlanOrchestrator {
   private taskDescription = '';
   private researchModel: string;
   private plannerModel: string;
+  // Multi-user permission threading: the resolved claudeMode/owner/allowedTools for the
+  // internal research/planner one-shots. Left undefined = today's single-user behavior
+  // (the caller threads the resolved global mode, byte-identical when !isMultiUserMode()).
+  private claudeMode?: ClaudeMode;
+  private owner?: string;
+  private allowedTools?: string;
 
   constructor(
     mux: TerminalMultiplexer,
     workingDir: string = process.cwd(),
     outputDir?: string,
-    modelConfig?: { defaultModel?: string; agentTypeOverrides?: Record<string, string> }
+    modelConfig?: { defaultModel?: string; agentTypeOverrides?: Record<string, string> },
+    security?: { claudeMode?: ClaudeMode; owner?: string; allowedTools?: string }
   ) {
     this.mux = mux;
     this.workingDir = workingDir;
     this.outputDir = outputDir;
     this.researchModel = modelConfig?.agentTypeOverrides?.explore || modelConfig?.defaultModel || DEFAULT_MODEL;
     this.plannerModel = modelConfig?.agentTypeOverrides?.review || modelConfig?.defaultModel || DEFAULT_MODEL;
+    this.claudeMode = security?.claudeMode;
+    this.owner = security?.owner;
+    this.allowedTools = security?.allowedTools;
   }
 
   private saveAgentOutput(agentType: string, prompt: string, result: unknown, durationMs: number): void {
@@ -424,6 +434,12 @@ export class PlanOrchestrator {
       mux: this.mux,
       useMux: false,
       mode: 'claude',
+      // Section 6.3: run this one-shot under the caller-resolved permission mode/owner so a
+      // non-granted multi-user user cannot regain --dangerously-skip-permissions. Undefined
+      // (single-user, not threaded) is byte-identical to today (Session keeps its default).
+      claudeMode: this.claudeMode,
+      allowedTools: this.allowedTools,
+      owner: this.owner,
     });
 
     this.runningSessions.add(session);
@@ -580,6 +596,10 @@ export class PlanOrchestrator {
       mux: this.mux,
       useMux: false,
       mode: 'claude',
+      // Section 6.3: same permission-mode/owner threading as the research one-shot above.
+      claudeMode: this.claudeMode,
+      allowedTools: this.allowedTools,
+      owner: this.owner,
     });
 
     this.runningSessions.add(session);

src/push-store.ts

@@ -9,10 +9,23 @@
 import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { join } from 'node:path';
 import webpush from 'web-push';
-import type { VapidKeys, PushSubscriptionRecord } from './types.js';
+import type { VapidKeys, PushSubscriptionRecord, UserRole } from './types.js';
 import { Debouncer } from './utils/index.js';
 import { getDataDir } from './config/instance.js';
 
+/**
+ * A push subscription plus the multi-user owner identity stamped at subscribe time.
+ * `username`/`role` are undefined in single-user mode (and for legacy records saved
+ * before this field existed). sendPushNotifications uses them to scope a
+ * session-notification to its owner's devices (+ admins) instead of fanning out to
+ * every user. Kept as a store-local widening of PushSubscriptionRecord so the shared
+ * type stays untouched; the extra keys serialize/persist transparently.
+ */
+export type OwnedPushSubscriptionRecord = PushSubscriptionRecord & {
+  username?: string;
+  role?: UserRole;
+};
+
 const DATA_DIR = getDataDir();
 const KEYS_FILE = join(DATA_DIR, 'push-keys.json');
 const SUBS_FILE = join(DATA_DIR, 'push-subscriptions.json');
@@ -20,7 +33,7 @@ const SAVE_DEBOUNCE_MS = 500;
 
 export class PushSubscriptionStore {
   private vapidKeys: VapidKeys | null = null;
-  private subscriptions: Map<string, PushSubscriptionRecord> = new Map();
+  private subscriptions: Map<string, OwnedPushSubscriptionRecord> = new Map();
   private saveDeb = new Debouncer(SAVE_DEBOUNCE_MS);
   private _disposed = false;
 
@@ -67,17 +80,19 @@ export class PushSubscriptionStore {
   }
 
   /** Register or update a push subscription (deduplicates by endpoint) */
-  addSubscription(sub: Omit<PushSubscriptionRecord, 'lastUsedAt'>): PushSubscriptionRecord {
+  addSubscription(sub: Omit<OwnedPushSubscriptionRecord, 'lastUsedAt'>): OwnedPushSubscriptionRecord {
     // Check for existing subscription with same endpoint
     for (const [existingId, existing] of this.subscriptions) {
       if (existing.endpoint === sub.endpoint) {
-        // Update existing
-        const updated: PushSubscriptionRecord = {
+        // Update existing (re-stamp owner identity so it tracks the current caller)
+        const updated: OwnedPushSubscriptionRecord = {
           ...existing,
           keys: sub.keys,
           userAgent: sub.userAgent,
           lastUsedAt: Date.now(),
           pushPreferences: sub.pushPreferences,
+          username: sub.username,
+          role: sub.role,
         };
         this.subscriptions.set(existingId, updated);
         this.scheduleSave();
@@ -86,7 +101,7 @@ export class PushSubscriptionStore {
     }
 
     // New subscription
-    const record: PushSubscriptionRecord = {
+    const record: OwnedPushSubscriptionRecord = {
       ...sub,
       lastUsedAt: Date.now(),
     };
@@ -96,7 +111,7 @@ export class PushSubscriptionStore {
   }
 
   /** Update push preferences for a subscription */
-  updatePreferences(id: string, preferences: Record<string, boolean>): PushSubscriptionRecord | null {
+  updatePreferences(id: string, preferences: Record<string, boolean>): OwnedPushSubscriptionRecord | null {
     const sub = this.subscriptions.get(id);
     if (!sub) return null;
     sub.pushPreferences = preferences;
@@ -124,12 +139,12 @@ export class PushSubscriptionStore {
   }
 
   /** Get all subscriptions */
-  getAll(): PushSubscriptionRecord[] {
+  getAll(): OwnedPushSubscriptionRecord[] {
     return Array.from(this.subscriptions.values());
   }
 
   /** Get a single subscription by ID */
-  get(id: string): PushSubscriptionRecord | null {
+  get(id: string): OwnedPushSubscriptionRecord | null {
     return this.subscriptions.get(id) ?? null;
   }
 
@@ -138,7 +153,7 @@ export class PushSubscriptionStore {
     if (!existsSync(SUBS_FILE)) return;
     try {
       const raw = readFileSync(SUBS_FILE, 'utf-8');
-      const arr = JSON.parse(raw) as PushSubscriptionRecord[];
+      const arr = JSON.parse(raw) as OwnedPushSubscriptionRecord[];
       for (const sub of arr) {
         this.subscriptions.set(sub.id, sub);
       }

src/remote-hosts.ts

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import type {
   RemoteCase,
   RemoteCommandMode,
   RemoteHost,
+  RemoteSessionInfo,
   RemoteSshOptions,
   SessionMode,
   SessionRemote,
@@ -173,6 +174,14 @@ export interface RemoteTmuxCheckResult {
 export async function checkRemoteTmuxAvailable(
   host: Pick<RemoteHost, 'username' | 'host' | 'port'> & RemoteSshOptions
 ): Promise<RemoteTmuxCheckResult> {
+  // Under vitest, never open a real ssh connection — mirrors TmuxManager's
+  // no-op-shell-under-VITEST (IS_TEST_MODE). Without this, remote-case
+  // create-path tests hit a real ~10s ssh timeout. The command construction is
+  // covered by buildRemoteTmuxCheckCommand unit tests; only the live probe is
+  // short-circuited here.
+  if (process.env.VITEST) {
+    return { ok: true, tmuxPath: '(test-mode)' };
+  }
   const command = buildRemoteTmuxCheckCommand(host);
   try {
     const { stdout } = await execAsync(command, { timeout: 15_000 });
@@ -202,6 +211,109 @@ export async function checkRemoteTmuxAvailable(
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * COD-105 — build the SSH command that lists `codeman-*` tmux sessions on a
+ * remote host's canonical `-L codeman` socket.
+ *
+ * `list-sessions` exits NON-ZERO with empty output when no sessions exist (and
+ * the server isn't running), so `2>/dev/null` swallows tmux's "no server
+ * running" stderr; the caller treats a non-zero exit / empty output as "no
+ * sessions" rather than an error.
+ *
+ * COD-107 — connection options come from the shared `buildSshConnectionArgs`, so
+ * discovery connects with the SAME port/identity/proxy/jump-host as the launch
+ * and the tmux prereq probe.
+ */
+export function buildRemoteListSessionsCommand(
+  host: Pick<RemoteHost, 'username' | 'host' | 'port'> & RemoteSshOptions
+): string {
+  const [ssh, ...connectionArgs] = buildSshConnectionArgs(host);
+  const parts = [ssh, connectionArgs[0], '-o ConnectTimeout=10', ...connectionArgs.slice(1)];
+  // The tmux list-sessions invocation is passed as ONE shell-quoted argument so
+  // the remote login shell runs it verbatim. The `-F` format uses literal `\t`
+  // separators (tmux expands them); `2>/dev/null` is inside the quoted command.
+  const remoteCmd =
+    'tmux -L codeman list-sessions -F "#{session_name}\\t#{session_attached}\\t#{session_created}\\t#{session_windows}" 2>/dev/null';
+  parts.push(remoteSshTarget(host), shellescape(remoteCmd));
+  return parts.join(' ');
+}
+
+/**
+ * COD-105 — pure parser for the `tmux list-sessions -F` output emitted by
+ * `buildRemoteListSessionsCommand`. Factored out so the parse is unit-testable
+ * without opening a real ssh connection.
+ *
+ * - Splits each non-empty line into [name, attached, created, windows] on the
+ *   field separator. IMPORTANT: the remote tmux's `-F "…\t…"` format does NOT
+ *   expand `\t` to a real tab — it emits the LITERAL two-character sequence
+ *   `\t` (verified on aa-desktop / tmux next-3.7). So we split on the literal
+ *   backslash-t sequence; we also tolerate a real tab in case a tmux build
+ *   does expand it. (A real TAB is the regex `\t`; a literal backslash-t is the
+ *   regex `\\t`.)
+ * - Keeps ONLY sessions whose name starts with `codeman-` (ignores foreign tmux
+ *   sessions that happen to share the socket).
+ * - Coerces: `attached` → boolean (`'1'`), `created`/`windows` → finite ints.
+ * - Skips malformed lines (wrong column count or non-numeric created/windows)
+ *   rather than emitting garbage.
+ */
+export function parseRemoteSessionList(stdout: string): RemoteSessionInfo[] {
+  const out: RemoteSessionInfo[] = [];
+  for (const rawLine of stdout.split('\n')) {
+    const line = rawLine.trim();
+    if (!line) continue;
+    // Split on a literal `\t` (backslash + t, what the remote tmux emits) OR a
+    // real tab character. `/\\t|\t/` = the two-char sequence, or a TAB.
+    const cols = line.split(/\\t|\t/);
+    if (cols.length !== 4) continue;
+    const [name, attachedStr, createdStr, windowsStr] = cols;
+    if (!name.startsWith('codeman-')) continue;
+    const created = Number(createdStr);
+    const windows = Number(windowsStr);
+    if (!Number.isFinite(created) || !Number.isFinite(windows)) continue;
+    // COD-106 — `session_attached` is the CLIENT COUNT (not a 0/1 flag); >1 = shared.
+    const attachedNum = Number(attachedStr.trim());
+    const attachedClients = Number.isFinite(attachedNum) ? Math.max(0, Math.trunc(attachedNum)) : 0;
+    out.push({
+      name,
+      attached: attachedClients > 0,
+      attachedClients,
+      created: Math.trunc(created),
+      windows: Math.trunc(windows),
+    });
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * COD-105 — discover `codeman-*` tmux sessions already running on a remote host
+ * (created by the remote's own Codeman, another instance, or this one), so the
+ * operator can attach to one this Codeman didn't launch.
+ *
+ * NEVER throws: returns `[]` on unreachable host / no tmux / no sessions
+ * (`list-sessions` exits non-zero with empty output when there are none).
+ *
+ * VITEST guard — like `checkRemoteTmuxAvailable`, returns `[]` under test so a
+ * real ssh never runs in a request path (which would make route tests hit a
+ * ~10s timeout). The command construction is covered by
+ * `buildRemoteListSessionsCommand` and the parse by `parseRemoteSessionList`.
+ */
+export async function listRemoteCodemanSessions(
+  remote: Pick<RemoteHost, 'username' | 'host' | 'port'> & RemoteSshOptions
+): Promise<RemoteSessionInfo[]> {
+  if (process.env.VITEST) {
+    return [];
+  }
+  const command = buildRemoteListSessionsCommand(remote);
+  try {
+    const { stdout } = await execAsync(command, { timeout: 15_000 });
+    return parseRemoteSessionList(stdout);
+  } catch {
+    // Unreachable host, no tmux server, or no sessions (non-zero exit). All map
+    // to "nothing to attach to" — never surface as an error to the caller.
+    return [];
+  }
+}
+
 export function remoteDisplayPath(
   remote: Pick<SessionRemote, 'username' | 'host' | 'remotePath'> | { username: string; host: string; path: string }
 ): string {
@@ -218,6 +330,10 @@ export function toSessionRemote(host: RemoteHost, remoteCase: RemoteCase): Sessi
     port: host.port,
     remotePath: remoteCase.remotePath,
     commands: host.commands,
+    // COD-105 — the COD-104 launch path creates the remote session, so we own it
+    // (an explicit kill may propagate a remote kill-session). Discovered+attached
+    // sessions go through `toAttachedSessionRemote` with `owned: false`.
+    owned: true,
     // COD-107 — carry the advanced SSH options from host config into the session
     // so the launch/prereq commands connect the same way the operator configured.
     identityFile: host.identityFile,
@@ -226,3 +342,38 @@ export function toSessionRemote(host: RemoteHost, remoteCase: RemoteCase): Sessi
     extraSshOptions: host.extraSshOptions,
   };
 }
+
+/**
+ * COD-105 — build a NON-owned `SessionRemote` for ATTACHING to a `codeman-*`
+ * session already running on a remote host (discovered via
+ * `listRemoteCodemanSessions`). The resulting session's pane runs
+ * `tmux -L codeman attach -t <remoteSessionName>` (see
+ * `buildRemoteAttachCommand`), and because we did NOT create the remote session,
+ * `owned: false` means closing the tab DETACHES rather than killing it.
+ *
+ * `remotePath` is informational here (the attached remote session keeps its own
+ * cwd); we record the host's nominal path so display helpers still show
+ * `user@host:path`.
+ */
+export function toAttachedSessionRemote(
+  host: RemoteHost,
+  remoteSessionName: string,
+  remotePath: string
+): SessionRemote {
+  return {
+    hostId: host.id,
+    label: host.label,
+    host: host.host,
+    username: host.username,
+    port: host.port,
+    remotePath,
+    commands: host.commands,
+    // Discovered + attached — another Codeman created it. Detach-not-kill.
+    owned: false,
+    remoteSessionName,
+    identityFile: host.identityFile,
+    socksProxy: host.socksProxy,
+    jumpHost: host.jumpHost,
+    extraSshOptions: host.extraSshOptions,
+  };
+}

src/remote-reconnect.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Pure logic for the remote-session auto-reconnect watcher (COD-108).
+ *
+ * COD-104 made remote tmux sessions durable + idempotently reattachable, but a
+ * reconnect only fired at explicit trigger points. COD-108 adds a continuous
+ * watcher (in `TmuxManager`) that detects a dead remote pane and emits
+ * `remoteSessionDropped`; `SessionManager`/server then reassembles the respawn
+ * options and reattaches (re-running the idempotent remote command).
+ *
+ * This module holds the SIDE-EFFECT-FREE pieces so they can be unit-tested
+ * without real tmux:
+ *  - the bounded exponential **backoff schedule** (attempt → delay, capped),
+ *  - the per-session **reconnect state** shape,
+ *  - the **eligibility decision** (`decideReconnect`) given a session + its
+ *    reconnect state + the current time + the guard set.
+ *
+ * The watcher in `tmux-manager.ts` owns the live `isPaneDead` probe and the
+ * timers; everything here is pure and deterministic (time is injected).
+ *
+ * @module remote-reconnect
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Bounded exponential backoff delays (ms) between reconnect attempts.
+ * Attempt N (1-based) waits `BACKOFF_SCHEDULE_MS[N-1]` from the previous emit
+ * before the next emit is eligible. After the last entry the session is
+ * considered `reconnect-exhausted` and the watcher stops emitting for it.
+ *
+ * 5s, 15s, 45s, 2m, 5m, 5m → ~6 attempts spanning ~13 minutes.
+ */
+export const BACKOFF_SCHEDULE_MS: readonly number[] = [5_000, 15_000, 45_000, 120_000, 300_000, 300_000];
+
+/** Maximum number of reconnect attempts before exhaustion. */
+export const MAX_RECONNECT_ATTEMPTS = BACKOFF_SCHEDULE_MS.length;
+
+/**
+ * Delay (ms) to wait AFTER emitting attempt `attempt` (1-based) before the next
+ * attempt is eligible. `attempt <= 0` returns the first delay; an attempt at or
+ * beyond the cap returns the last delay (callers should check exhaustion via
+ * {@link isExhausted} rather than relying on this for the stop decision).
+ *
+ * Pure — no clock, no I/O.
+ */
+export function reconnectDelayForAttempt(attempt: number): number {
+  if (!Number.isFinite(attempt) || attempt <= 1) return BACKOFF_SCHEDULE_MS[0];
+  const idx = Math.min(Math.floor(attempt) - 1, BACKOFF_SCHEDULE_MS.length - 1);
+  return BACKOFF_SCHEDULE_MS[idx];
+}
+
+/** Whether `attempts` reconnect emits have reached/exceeded the cap. Pure. */
+export function isExhausted(attempts: number): boolean {
+  return attempts >= MAX_RECONNECT_ATTEMPTS;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Per-session reconnect bookkeeping held by the watcher. All time values are
+ * epoch ms. `inFlight` guards against stacking respawns when a tick fires while
+ * a previous reattach is still running. `exhaustedEmitted` ensures the
+ * `remoteReconnectExhausted` event fires at most once per session.
+ */
+export interface RemoteReconnectState {
+  /** Number of `remoteSessionDropped` emits so far (advances per emit). */
+  attempts: number;
+  /** Earliest time (epoch ms) the next emit is eligible. 0 = eligible now. */
+  nextEligibleAt: number;
+  /** A reattach triggered by a prior emit is currently running. */
+  inFlight: boolean;
+  /** Cap reached — stop auto-retrying for this session. */
+  exhausted: boolean;
+  /** The `remoteReconnectExhausted` SSE event has already been emitted. */
+  exhaustedEmitted: boolean;
+}
+
+/** A fresh reconnect state (no attempts, immediately eligible). Pure. */
+export function freshReconnectState(): RemoteReconnectState {
+  return { attempts: 0, nextEligibleAt: 0, inFlight: false, exhausted: false, exhaustedEmitted: false };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Advance the backoff after an emit at time `now`. Increments `attempts` and
+ * schedules `nextEligibleAt = now + delay`. Returns a NEW state object (does
+ * not mutate the input). Pure.
+ *
+ * NOTE: this does NOT set `exhausted`. Exhaustion is a decision the watcher
+ * makes on the FOLLOWING tick (via {@link decideReconnect} → `exhaust`), so the
+ * `remoteReconnectExhausted` event fires exactly once after the final attempt's
+ * backoff window elapses — not pre-emptively on the last emit.
+ */
+export function advanceBackoff(state: RemoteReconnectState, now: number): RemoteReconnectState {
+  const attempts = state.attempts + 1;
+  const delay = reconnectDelayForAttempt(attempts);
+  return {
+    ...state,
+    attempts,
+    nextEligibleAt: now + delay,
+  };
+}
+
+/** Reset after a successful reattach — back to a fresh, eligible state. Pure. */
+export function resetReconnectState(): RemoteReconnectState {
+  return freshReconnectState();
+}
+
+/** Minimal session view the decision needs (avoids importing MuxSession here). */
+export interface ReconnectSessionView {
+  sessionId: string;
+  /** Truthy when this is a remote (SSH-wrapped) session. */
+  isRemote: boolean;
+  /** Result of `isPaneDead(muxName)` for this session. */
+  paneDead: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decision outcomes for a single watcher tick on one session.
+ *  - `emit`     → emit `remoteSessionDropped { sessionId, attempt }`, then
+ *                 advance backoff (attempt = the returned `attempt`).
+ *  - `exhaust`  → cap reached this tick; emit `remoteReconnectExhausted` once.
+ *  - `skip`     → do nothing (not remote / pane alive / guarded / in-flight /
+ *                 not yet due / already exhausted).
+ */
+export type ReconnectAction =
+  | { kind: 'emit'; attempt: number }
+  | { kind: 'exhaust' }
+  | { kind: 'skip'; reason: ReconnectSkipReason };
+
+export type ReconnectSkipReason =
+  | 'not-remote'
+  | 'pane-alive'
+  | 'guarded'
+  | 'in-flight'
+  | 'not-due'
+  | 'exhausted'
+  | 'disabled';
+
+export interface DecideReconnectInput {
+  session: ReconnectSessionView;
+  state: RemoteReconnectState | undefined;
+  /** Session is in the intentional-teardown guard set (killed/detached/stopping). */
+  guarded: boolean;
+  /** Kill-switch: `remoteAutoReconnect` setting. When false, never reconnect. */
+  enabled: boolean;
+  now: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * PURE eligibility decision for one session on one tick. No clock, no I/O — all
+ * inputs are passed in. The watcher translates the result into emits + state
+ * transitions.
+ *
+ * Order of guards (most-decisive first):
+ *  1. kill-switch off            → skip:disabled
+ *  2. not a remote session       → skip:not-remote
+ *  3. pane is alive              → skip:pane-alive
+ *  4. intentional teardown guard → skip:guarded   (NEVER revive a killed tab)
+ *  5. a reattach already running → skip:in-flight (no stacked respawns)
+ *  6. already exhausted          → skip:exhausted (one exhaust emit, then quiet)
+ *  7. cap reached this tick      → exhaust
+ *  8. not yet due (backoff)      → skip:not-due
+ *  9. otherwise                  → emit (attempt = attempts + 1)
+ */
+export function decideReconnect(input: DecideReconnectInput): ReconnectAction {
+  const { session, state, guarded, enabled, now } = input;
+
+  if (!enabled) return { kind: 'skip', reason: 'disabled' };
+  if (!session.isRemote) return { kind: 'skip', reason: 'not-remote' };
+  if (!session.paneDead) return { kind: 'skip', reason: 'pane-alive' };
+  // Intentional kill / detach must NEVER be auto-revived.
+  if (guarded) return { kind: 'skip', reason: 'guarded' };
+
+  const s = state ?? freshReconnectState();
+
+  // Only one reconnect in flight per session — don't stack respawns.
+  if (s.inFlight) return { kind: 'skip', reason: 'in-flight' };
+
+  if (s.exhausted) return { kind: 'skip', reason: 'exhausted' };
+
+  // Cap reached: surface exhaustion once, then go quiet.
+  if (isExhausted(s.attempts)) return { kind: 'exhaust' };
+
+  // Backoff gate — only emit when due.
+  if (now < s.nextEligibleAt) return { kind: 'skip', reason: 'not-due' };
+
+  return { kind: 'emit', attempt: s.attempts + 1 };
+}

src/services/unified-session-service.ts

@@ -28,9 +28,15 @@ export type UnifiedSessionItem = {
   lastActivityAt?: number;
   claudeSessionId?: string;
   firstPrompt?: string;
+  /** Most recent user prompt from the transcript (COD-145), parallel to firstPrompt. */
+  lastPrompt?: string;
   sizeBytes?: number;
   projectKey?: string;
   remote?: boolean;
+  /** Pinned to the top of the session manager list (COD-139). */
+  pinned?: boolean;
+  /** When the session was pinned (epoch ms) — orders the pinned group desc. */
+  pinnedAt?: number;
   sources: string[];
   stats?: { memoryMB: number; cpuPercent: number };
 };
@@ -46,6 +52,8 @@ export type LiveSessionInput = {
   createdAt?: number;
   lastActivityAt?: number;
   claudeSessionId?: string;
+  pinned?: boolean;
+  pinnedAt?: number;
 };
 
 /** Persisted session view (subset of `SessionState`). */
@@ -59,6 +67,8 @@ export type PersistedSessionInput = {
   lastActivityAt?: number;
   /** Claude conversation ID this session resumes (`SessionState.resumeSessionId`). */
   claudeSessionId?: string;
+  pinned?: boolean;
+  pinnedAt?: number;
 };
 
 /** Lifecycle audit-log view. Entries are expected NEWEST-first (the order `SessionLifecycleLog.query()` returns). */
@@ -77,6 +87,8 @@ export type HistoryInput = {
   sizeBytes: number;
   lastModified: string;
   firstPrompt?: string;
+  /** Most recent user prompt from the transcript (COD-145). */
+  lastPrompt?: string;
   projectKey?: string;
 };
 
@@ -149,6 +161,7 @@ export function mergeUnifiedSessions(sources: UnifiedSources): UnifiedSessionIte
     overwrite(item, 'workingDir', h.workingDir);
     overwrite(item, 'sizeBytes', h.sizeBytes);
     overwrite(item, 'firstPrompt', h.firstPrompt);
+    overwrite(item, 'lastPrompt', h.lastPrompt);
     overwrite(item, 'projectKey', h.projectKey);
     const ms = Date.parse(h.lastModified);
     if (!Number.isNaN(ms) && item.lastActivityAt === undefined) item.lastActivityAt = ms;
@@ -175,6 +188,8 @@ export function mergeUnifiedSessions(sources: UnifiedSources): UnifiedSessionIte
     overwrite(item, 'workingDir', p.workingDir);
     overwrite(item, 'createdAt', p.createdAt);
     overwrite(item, 'lastActivityAt', p.lastActivityAt);
+    overwrite(item, 'pinned', p.pinned);
+    overwrite(item, 'pinnedAt', p.pinnedAt);
   }
 
   // 4) live (highest precedence)
@@ -189,6 +204,8 @@ export function mergeUnifiedSessions(sources: UnifiedSources): UnifiedSessionIte
     overwrite(item, 'createdAt', v.createdAt);
     overwrite(item, 'lastActivityAt', v.lastActivityAt);
     overwrite(item, 'claudeSessionId', v.claudeSessionId);
+    overwrite(item, 'pinned', v.pinned);
+    overwrite(item, 'pinnedAt', v.pinnedAt);
   }
 
   // 5) mux stats + remote flag (create item if mux-only)
@@ -200,6 +217,64 @@ export function mergeUnifiedSessions(sources: UnifiedSources): UnifiedSessionIte
     if (m.remote !== undefined) item.remote = m.remote;
   }
 
+  // firstPrompt backfill (COD-140): the only source that sets firstPrompt is the
+  // transcript-history view, keyed by the Claude transcript file's UUID. A live/persisted
+  // row keyed by its Codeman id only inherits firstPrompt when that id happens to equal an
+  // on-disk transcript UUID. When it doesn't (stale/wrong claudeSessionId, post-/clear new
+  // uuid, resumed/attached/worktree session, transcript not yet flushed), the row shows
+  // "(no prompt captured)" even though a real transcript for that working dir exists under a
+  // different UUID. Backfill from the already-passed history: first try the claudeSessionId
+  // join, then the newest transcript in the same workingDir. Never overwrite a non-empty
+  // firstPrompt (so rows keyed to their own transcript are untouched).
+  const firstPromptByUuid = new Map<string, string>();
+  const firstPromptByWorkingDir = new Map<string, { prompt: string; ms: number }>();
+  // COD-145: lastPrompt rides the same backfill (build parallel indexes; never overwrite).
+  const lastPromptByUuid = new Map<string, string>();
+  const lastPromptByWorkingDir = new Map<string, { prompt: string; ms: number }>();
+  for (const h of sources.history ?? []) {
+    const ms = Date.parse(h.lastModified);
+    const ts = Number.isNaN(ms) ? -Infinity : ms;
+    if (h.firstPrompt) {
+      firstPromptByUuid.set(h.sessionId, h.firstPrompt);
+      if (h.workingDir) {
+        const existing = firstPromptByWorkingDir.get(h.workingDir);
+        if (!existing || ts > existing.ms) {
+          firstPromptByWorkingDir.set(h.workingDir, { prompt: h.firstPrompt, ms: ts });
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    if (h.lastPrompt) {
+      lastPromptByUuid.set(h.sessionId, h.lastPrompt);
+      if (h.workingDir) {
+        const existing = lastPromptByWorkingDir.get(h.workingDir);
+        if (!existing || ts > existing.ms) {
+          lastPromptByWorkingDir.set(h.workingDir, { prompt: h.lastPrompt, ms: ts });
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  for (const item of map.values()) {
+    if (!item.firstPrompt) {
+      // never overwrite an existing non-empty prompt
+      const byUuid = item.claudeSessionId ? firstPromptByUuid.get(item.claudeSessionId) : undefined;
+      if (byUuid) {
+        item.firstPrompt = byUuid;
+      } else if (item.workingDir) {
+        const byDir = firstPromptByWorkingDir.get(item.workingDir);
+        if (byDir) item.firstPrompt = byDir.prompt;
+      }
+    }
+    if (!item.lastPrompt) {
+      const byUuid = item.claudeSessionId ? lastPromptByUuid.get(item.claudeSessionId) : undefined;
+      if (byUuid) {
+        item.lastPrompt = byUuid;
+      } else if (item.workingDir) {
+        const byDir = lastPromptByWorkingDir.get(item.workingDir);
+        if (byDir) item.lastPrompt = byDir.prompt;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
   // Meaningfulness floor: keep real rows, drop bare lifecycle/mux-only noise.
   const kept: UnifiedSessionItem[] = [];
   for (const item of map.values()) {
@@ -211,8 +286,24 @@ export function mergeUnifiedSessions(sources: UnifiedSources): UnifiedSessionIte
     if (isReal) kept.push(item);
   }
 
-  // Stable sort: lastActivityAt desc (undefined last), createdAt desc, sessionId asc.
+  // Stable sort (COD-139): pinned group first (pinnedAt desc, most-recently-pinned
+  // first), then unpinned by lastActivityAt desc (undefined last), createdAt desc,
+  // sessionId asc.
   kept.sort((a, b) => {
+    const pa = a.pinned === true;
+    const pb = b.pinned === true;
+    if (pa !== pb) return pa ? -1 : 1; // pinned floats above unpinned
+    if (pa && pb) {
+      // Both pinned: most-recently-pinned first (undefined pinnedAt sorts last).
+      const ta = a.pinnedAt;
+      const tb = b.pinnedAt;
+      if (ta !== tb) {
+        if (ta === undefined) return 1;
+        if (tb === undefined) return -1;
+        return tb - ta;
+      }
+      // tie-break falls through to the activity/createdAt/id rules below.
+    }
     const la = a.lastActivityAt;
     const lb = b.lastActivityAt;
     if (la !== lb) {
@@ -234,7 +325,7 @@ export function mergeUnifiedSessions(sources: UnifiedSources): UnifiedSessionIte
 }
 
 /**
- * Case-insensitive substring filter (name + firstPrompt + workingDir + sessionId)
+ * Case-insensitive substring filter (name + firstPrompt + lastPrompt + workingDir + sessionId)
  * with offset/limit paging. `total` is the filtered count BEFORE paging.
  */
 export function filterAndPaginate(
@@ -244,7 +335,7 @@ export function filterAndPaginate(
   const q = (opts.q ?? '').trim().toLowerCase();
   const filtered = q
     ? items.filter((it) => {
-        const hay = [it.name, it.firstPrompt, it.workingDir, it.sessionId]
+        const hay = [it.name, it.firstPrompt, it.lastPrompt, it.workingDir, it.sessionId]
           .filter((v): v is string => typeof v === 'string')
           .join(' ')
           .toLowerCase();

src/session-cli-builder.ts

@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ function buildPermissionArgs(claudeMode: ClaudeMode, allowedTools?: string): str
   switch (claudeMode) {
     case 'dangerously-skip-permissions':
       return ['--dangerously-skip-permissions'];
+    case 'auto':
+      return ['--permission-mode', 'auto'];
     case 'allowedTools':
       if (allowedTools) {
         return ['--allowedTools', allowedTools];
@@ -80,8 +82,16 @@ export function buildInteractiveArgs(
  * @param model - Optional model override
  * @returns Array of CLI arguments
  */
-export function buildPromptArgs(prompt: string, model?: string): string[] {
-  const args = ['-p', '--verbose', '--dangerously-skip-permissions', '--output-format', 'stream-json'];
+export function buildPromptArgs(
+  prompt: string,
+  model?: string,
+  claudeMode: ClaudeMode = 'dangerously-skip-permissions',
+  allowedTools?: string
+): string[] {
+  // Respect the session's permission mode instead of always skipping, so a
+  // multi-user non-granted user's one-shot runs classifier-guarded (auto) rather
+  // than with full bypass. Defaults to skip-permissions (unchanged single-user).
+  const args = ['-p', '--verbose', ...buildPermissionArgs(claudeMode, allowedTools), '--output-format', 'stream-json'];
   if (model) {
     args.push('--model', model);
   }

src/session-order.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Pure helpers for the global session tab-order (COD-131).
+ *
+ * Tab order (drag-and-drop reorder + Ctrl+Shift+{/}) is persisted server-side
+ * so it follows the user across devices. The server is authoritative; the
+ * browser's localStorage (`codeman-session-order`) is the offline fallback.
+ *
+ * These helpers are pure (no IO) so they can be unit-tested in isolation and
+ * reused by both the PUT /api/session-order route and the StateStore accessor.
+ *
+ * - `normalizeSessionOrder` coerces arbitrary input into a clean string[]
+ *   (non-empty strings only, deduped with first occurrence winning).
+ * - `mergeSessionOrder` lets the pushing device's order win, while preserving
+ *   any server-only ids the pushing device didn't know about — they fall to the
+ *   END in their existing relative order, never dropped.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Coerce arbitrary input into a clean ordered list of session ids:
+ * keep only non-empty strings and dedup (first occurrence wins).
+ *
+ * @param order - unknown input (expected to be a string[], but defensive)
+ * @returns a normalized string[] (empty array for non-array / all-junk input)
+ */
+export function normalizeSessionOrder(order: unknown): string[] {
+  if (!Array.isArray(order)) {
+    return [];
+  }
+  const seen = new Set<string>();
+  const result: string[] = [];
+  for (const entry of order) {
+    if (typeof entry !== 'string' || entry.length === 0) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (seen.has(entry)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+    seen.add(entry);
+    result.push(entry);
+  }
+  return result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Merge an incoming order from a pushing device with the existing server order.
+ *
+ * The incoming order wins; any ids present in `existing` but NOT in `incoming`
+ * are appended at the END, preserving their relative order. This is the
+ * "server-only ids the pushing device didn't know about fall to the end, never
+ * dropped" rule.
+ *
+ * Both arguments are normalized first, so callers may pass raw input safely.
+ *
+ * @param incoming - the order the pushing device wants
+ * @param existing - the current server-side order
+ * @returns the merged, normalized order
+ */
+export function mergeSessionOrder(incoming: string[], existing: string[]): string[] {
+  const normalizedIncoming = normalizeSessionOrder(incoming);
+  const incomingSet = new Set(normalizedIncoming);
+  const merged = [...normalizedIncoming];
+  for (const id of normalizeSessionOrder(existing)) {
+    if (!incomingSet.has(id)) {
+      merged.push(id);
+    }
+  }
+  return merged;
+}

src/session.ts

@@ -50,7 +50,9 @@ import {
   type EffortLevel,
   type GeminiConfig,
   type SessionRemote,
+  type SessionDocker,
 } from './types.js';
+import { probeDockerCliVersion } from './docker-hosts.js';
 import type { TerminalMultiplexer, MuxSession } from './mux-interface.js';
 import { TaskTracker, type BackgroundTask } from './task-tracker.js';
 import { RalphTracker } from './ralph-tracker.js';
@@ -178,6 +180,8 @@ export function isAltScreenStripMode(mode: SessionMode): boolean {
 const DEFAULT_PTY_COLS = 120;
 const DEFAULT_PTY_ROWS = 40;
 const TMUX_DISPLAY_TIMEOUT_MS = 2000;
+/** Delay before the in-container Claude CLI version probe (lets the container start). */
+const DOCKER_CLI_VERSION_PROBE_DELAY_MS = 3000;
 
 /**
  * Ask tmux for the current window geometry of `muxName` so a re-attaching PTY
@@ -212,8 +216,10 @@ export function queryTmuxWindowSize(muxName: string, socket: string): { cols: nu
   return { cols: DEFAULT_PTY_COLS, rows: DEFAULT_PTY_ROWS };
 }
 
-export function resolveMuxAttachCwd(workingDir: string, remote?: SessionRemote): string {
-  return remote ? '/tmp' : workingDir;
+export function resolveMuxAttachCwd(workingDir: string, remote?: SessionRemote, docker?: SessionDocker): string {
+  // Remote and docker sessions run the CLI elsewhere (ssh / docker exec); the LOCAL
+  // wrapper pane never needs the workspace as its cwd, so launch it in /tmp.
+  return remote || docker ? '/tmp' : workingDir;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -336,6 +342,11 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
   // Image watcher setting (per-session toggle)
   private _imageWatcherEnabled: boolean = false;
 
+  // Pin state (COD-139) — pinned sessions float to the top of the session
+  // manager list, ordered by pinnedAt descending (most-recently-pinned first).
+  private _pinned: boolean = false;
+  private _pinnedAt: number | null = null;
+
   // Flicker filter setting (per-session toggle, applied on frontend)
   private _flickerFilterEnabled: boolean = false;
 
@@ -402,6 +413,14 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
   // Remote execution metadata, present when this session runs over SSH through local tmux.
   private readonly _remote?: SessionRemote;
 
+  // Docker execution metadata, present when this session runs inside a container via
+  // local tmux + `docker exec`. The container is per-CASE (shared by sibling sessions).
+  private readonly _docker?: SessionDocker;
+
+  // Owning username in multi-user mode (undefined in single-user). Stamped at create
+  // from req.authUser and round-tripped through recovery like _remote/_docker.
+  private _owner?: string;
+
   // Session color for visual differentiation
   private _color: import('./types.js').SessionColor = 'default';
 
@@ -475,6 +494,10 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
       attachmentHistory?: SessionAttachmentHistoryItem[];
       /** Remote execution metadata for sessions launched through SSH inside local tmux. */
       remote?: SessionRemote;
+      /** Docker execution metadata for sessions launched inside a container via local tmux. */
+      docker?: SessionDocker;
+      /** Owning username (multi-user mode); undefined in single-user. */
+      owner?: string;
     }
   ) {
     super();
@@ -548,6 +571,8 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
     }
     this._tmuxHistoryLimit = config.tmuxHistoryLimit ?? DEFAULT_TMUX_HISTORY_LIMIT;
     this._remote = config.remote;
+    this._docker = config.docker;
+    this._owner = config.owner;
     if (config.attachmentHistory && config.attachmentHistory.length > 0) {
       this.restoreAttachmentHistory(config.attachmentHistory);
     }
@@ -649,6 +674,21 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
     return this._claudeSessionId;
   }
 
+  /** Docker execution metadata when this session runs inside a container, else undefined. */
+  get docker(): SessionDocker | undefined {
+    return this._docker;
+  }
+
+  /** Owning username in multi-user mode, else undefined. */
+  get owner(): string | undefined {
+    return this._owner;
+  }
+
+  /** Set the owning username (used by recovery to restore ownership). */
+  set owner(username: string | undefined) {
+    this._owner = username;
+  }
+
   // Adopt a Claude conversation ID observed from an external source (e.g. hook
   // payload). In interactive PTY mode Claude CLI emits no JSON to stdout, so
   // `_handleJsonMessage` never sees `session_id`; hooks are the only signal
@@ -957,6 +997,26 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
     this._imageWatcherEnabled = enabled;
   }
 
+  /** Whether this session is pinned to the top of the session manager (COD-139). */
+  get pinned(): boolean {
+    return this._pinned;
+  }
+
+  /** When the session was pinned (epoch ms), or null when unpinned. */
+  get pinnedAt(): number | null {
+    return this._pinnedAt;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Set pin state (COD-139). Pinning stamps pinnedAt with now so the pinned
+   * group orders most-recently-pinned first; unpinning clears it. Idempotent:
+   * re-pinning an already-pinned session refreshes its pinnedAt.
+   */
+  setPinned(pinned: boolean): void {
+    this._pinned = pinned;
+    this._pinnedAt = pinned ? Date.now() : null;
+  }
+
   get flickerFilterEnabled(): boolean {
     return this._flickerFilterEnabled;
   }
@@ -1008,6 +1068,8 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
       status: this._status,
       workingDir: this.workingDir,
       remote: this._remote,
+      docker: this._docker,
+      owner: this._owner,
       currentTaskId: this._currentTaskId,
       createdAt: this.createdAt,
       lastActivityAt: this._lastActivityAt,
@@ -1021,6 +1083,8 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
       autoResumeEnabled: this._autoOps.autoResumeEnabled,
       autoResumeAt: this._autoOps.autoResumeAt ?? undefined,
       imageWatcherEnabled: this._imageWatcherEnabled,
+      pinned: this._pinned || undefined,
+      pinnedAt: this._pinned ? (this._pinnedAt ?? undefined) : undefined,
       totalCost: this._totalCost,
       inputTokens: this._totalInputTokens,
       outputTokens: this._totalOutputTokens,
@@ -1197,7 +1261,7 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
         name: 'xterm-256color',
         cols: ptyCols,
         rows: ptyRows,
-        cwd: resolveMuxAttachCwd(this.workingDir, this._remote),
+        cwd: resolveMuxAttachCwd(this.workingDir, this._remote, this._docker),
         // COD-75: codex/gemini get COLORTERM=truecolor — mirrors buildEnvExports()
         // in tmux-manager.ts so the attach client and the tmux session agree.
         env: buildMuxAttachEnv(this.mode === 'codex' || this.mode === 'gemini'),
@@ -1211,6 +1275,70 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
     return { isRestored };
   }
 
+  /**
+   * COD-108 — re-establish a dropped REMOTE session. Triggered by the
+   * `TmuxManager` remote-reconnect watcher (via `remoteSessionDropped`): the
+   * watcher detects a dead remote pane, the session owner reassembles the SAME
+   * `RespawnPaneOptions` used for Claude-idle respawns and calls
+   * `respawnPane()` directly. For a remote session that re-runs
+   * `buildRemoteSessionCommand` (owned → `new-session -A`, non-owned →
+   * `attach`), which idempotently REATTACHES the still-running durable remote
+   * tmux session — scrollback + agent intact (proven COD-104/105).
+   *
+   * Deliberately does NOT route through the Claude-idle respawn-controller —
+   * this is a transport re-establish, not a `/clear`/`/compact` cycle.
+   *
+   * @returns true if the pane was respawned (reattach issued), false otherwise.
+   */
+  async reattachRemote(): Promise<boolean> {
+    if (!this._remote) return false; // not a remote session
+    if (!this._useMux || !this._mux || !this._muxSession) return false;
+    const mux = this._mux;
+
+    // If tmux lost the whole session (not just a dead pane), there is nothing to
+    // respawn into — a genuine death, leave it for normal recovery/reconcile.
+    if (!mux.muxSessionExists(this._muxSession.muxName)) {
+      console.log('[Session] reattachRemote: mux session gone, skipping:', this._muxSession.muxName);
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    const newPid = await mux.respawnPane(this._buildRespawnPaneOptions());
+    if (!newPid) {
+      console.error('[Session] reattachRemote: respawnPane failed for', this._muxSession.muxName);
+      return false;
+    }
+    console.log('[Session] reattachRemote: reattached remote session', this._muxSession.muxName, 'pid', newPid);
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Assemble the {@link RespawnPaneOptions} for this session. Single source of
+   * truth shared by interactive start, shell start (via their inline copies),
+   * and {@link reattachRemote} so the remote reattach path can never drift from
+   * the spawn path.
+   */
+  private _buildRespawnPaneOptions(): import('./mux-interface.js').RespawnPaneOptions {
+    return {
+      sessionId: this.id,
+      workingDir: this.workingDir,
+      mode: this.mode,
+      niceConfig: this._niceConfig,
+      model: this._model,
+      claudeMode: this._claudeMode,
+      allowedTools: this._allowedTools,
+      openCodeConfig: this._openCodeConfig,
+      codexConfig: this._codexConfig,
+      geminiConfig: this._geminiConfig,
+      resumeSessionId: this._resumeSessionId,
+      envOverrides: this._envOverrides,
+      effort: this._effort,
+      historyLimit: this._tmuxHistoryLimit,
+      remote: this._remote,
+      docker: this._docker,
+      owner: this._owner,
+    };
+  }
+
   private _handleTerminalOutput(data: string): void {
     // Codex AND Claude Code emit sequences that wipe xterm.js scrollback, plus
     // mouse-tracking enables that hijack the scroll wheel so the user can't reach
@@ -1317,7 +1445,7 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
     // repaint/alt-screen mode; issue #154). Remote sessions run claude on
     // another host, so a local probe wouldn't reflect their version — skip them
     // and let the banner scrape handle those. Cached process-wide, best-effort.
-    if (this.mode === 'claude' && !this._remote && !this._cliVersion) {
+    if (this.mode === 'claude' && !this._remote && !this._docker && !this._cliVersion) {
       const probedVersion = getClaudeCliVersion();
       if (probedVersion) {
         this._cliVersion = probedVersion;
@@ -1330,27 +1458,37 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
       }
     }
 
+    // Docker sessions run claude INSIDE the container, so the local probe above
+    // reports the HOST claude (wrong version, and leaving cliVersion undefined
+    // silently disables wheel-forwarding, #154). Probe the IN-CONTAINER version
+    // instead — deferred so the container is up after the mux attach below.
+    if (this.mode === 'claude' && this._docker && !this._cliVersion) {
+      const dockerMeta = this._docker;
+      setTimeout(() => {
+        if (this._isStopped || this._cliVersion) return;
+        void probeDockerCliVersion(dockerMeta, this.mode)
+          .then((version) => {
+            if (!version || this._isStopped || this._cliVersion) return;
+            this._cliVersion = version;
+            this.emit('cliInfoUpdated', {
+              version: this._cliVersion,
+              model: this._cliModel,
+              accountType: this._cliAccountType,
+              latestVersion: this._cliLatestVersion,
+            });
+          })
+          .catch(() => {
+            /* best-effort */
+          });
+      }, DOCKER_CLI_VERSION_PROBE_DELAY_MS);
+    }
+
     // If mux wrapping is enabled, create or attach to a mux session
     if (this._useMux && this._mux) {
       try {
         const { isRestored } = await this._setupOrAttachMuxSession({
-          respawnPaneOptions: {
-            sessionId: this.id,
-            workingDir: this.workingDir,
-            mode: this.mode,
-            niceConfig: this._niceConfig,
-            model: this._model,
-            claudeMode: this._claudeMode,
-            allowedTools: this._allowedTools,
-            openCodeConfig: this._openCodeConfig,
-            codexConfig: this._codexConfig,
-            geminiConfig: this._geminiConfig,
-            resumeSessionId: this._resumeSessionId,
-            envOverrides: this._envOverrides,
-            effort: this._effort,
-            historyLimit: this._tmuxHistoryLimit,
-            remote: this._remote,
-          },
+          // Single source of truth shared with reattachRemote() (COD-108).
+          respawnPaneOptions: this._buildRespawnPaneOptions(),
           createSessionOptions: {
             sessionId: this.id,
             workingDir: this.workingDir,
@@ -1368,6 +1506,8 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
             effort: this._effort,
             historyLimit: this._tmuxHistoryLimit,
             remote: this._remote,
+            docker: this._docker,
+            owner: this._owner,
           },
           spawnErrLabel: 'mux attachment',
         });
@@ -1477,7 +1617,7 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
 
       // === Auto-accept workspace trust dialog ===
       // Claude CLI 2.x shows "Yes, I trust this folder" prompt on first launch per directory.
-      // Codeman sessions always use --dangerously-skip-permissions, so auto-accept.
+      // Codeman sessions run permission-skipping or classifier-guarded (auto) modes, so auto-accept.
       if (!this._trustDialogAccepted && data.includes('trust this folder')) {
         this._trustDialogAccepted = true;
         console.log(`[Session] Auto-accepting workspace trust dialog for: ${this.id}`);
@@ -1738,6 +1878,8 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
             envOverrides: this._envOverrides,
             historyLimit: this._tmuxHistoryLimit,
             remote: this._remote,
+            docker: this._docker,
+            owner: this._owner,
           },
           createSessionOptions: {
             sessionId: this.id,
@@ -1748,6 +1890,8 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
             envOverrides: this._envOverrides,
             historyLimit: this._tmuxHistoryLimit,
             remote: this._remote,
+            docker: this._docker,
+            owner: this._owner,
           },
           spawnErrLabel: 'shell mux attachment',
         });
@@ -1875,7 +2019,7 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
           model ? `(model: ${model})` : ''
         );
 
-        const args = buildPromptArgs(prompt, model);
+        const args = buildPromptArgs(prompt, model, this._claudeMode, this._allowedTools);
 
         try {
           this.ptyProcess = pty.spawn('claude', args, {

src/state-store.ts

@@ -278,6 +278,9 @@ export class StateStore {
     if (this.state.cronJobRuns) {
       parts.push(`"cronJobRuns":${JSON.stringify(this.state.cronJobRuns)}`);
     }
+    if (this.state.sessionOrder) {
+      parts.push(`"sessionOrder":${JSON.stringify(this.state.sessionOrder)}`);
+    }
 
     return `{${parts.join(',')}}`;
   }
@@ -485,6 +488,25 @@ export class StateStore {
     this.save();
   }
 
+  /**
+   * COD-142: Remove a session's persisted record on kill UNLESS it is pinned.
+   * A pinned session is demoted to a lightweight `stopped` record (pin retained)
+   * so it stays visible in the session-manager pinned group and survives restart.
+   * Unpinned sessions are fully removed (unchanged behavior).
+   * @returns 'preserved' if demoted to stopped+pinned, 'removed' if deleted, 'absent' if no record existed.
+   */
+  demoteOrRemoveSession(id: string): 'preserved' | 'removed' | 'absent' {
+    const existing = this.state.sessions[id];
+    if (!existing) return 'absent';
+    if (existing.pinned === true) {
+      // Demote in place: keep identity/resume fields + pin, mark stopped, clear live runtime.
+      this.setSession(id, { ...existing, status: 'stopped', pid: null });
+      return 'preserved';
+    }
+    this.removeSession(id);
+    return 'removed';
+  }
+
   /**
    * Cleans up stale sessions from state that don't have corresponding active sessions.
    * @param activeSessionIds - Set of currently active session IDs
@@ -499,6 +521,7 @@ export class StateStore {
 
     for (const sessionId of allSessionIds) {
       if (!activeSessionIds.has(sessionId)) {
+        if (this.state.sessions[sessionId]?.pinned === true) continue; // COD-142: pinned records persist even with no live session
         const name = this.state.sessions[sessionId]?.name;
         cleaned.push({ id: sessionId, name });
         delete this.state.sessions[sessionId];
@@ -630,6 +653,17 @@ export class StateStore {
     this.save();
   }
 
+  /** Returns the global tab order (ordered sessionIds), [] if unset. COD-131. */
+  getSessionOrder(): string[] {
+    return this.state.sessionOrder ?? [];
+  }
+
+  /** Persists the global tab order (ordered sessionIds) and triggers a debounced save. COD-131. */
+  setSessionOrder(order: string[]): void {
+    this.state.sessionOrder = order;
+    this.save();
+  }
+
   /** Resets all state to initial values and saves immediately. */
   reset(): void {
     this.state = createInitialState();

src/tmux-manager.ts

@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ const execAsync = promisify(exec);
 import { existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
 import { writeFile, rename } from 'node:fs/promises';
 import { dirname } from 'node:path';
-import { dataPath, DEFAULT_TMUX_SOCKET } from './config/instance.js';
+import { homedir } from 'node:os';
+import { dataPath, DEFAULT_TMUX_SOCKET, CODEMAN_INSTANCE } from './config/instance.js';
 import {
   ProcessStats,
   PersistedRespawnConfig,
@@ -43,9 +44,24 @@ import {
   type EffortLevel,
   type GeminiConfig,
   type SessionRemote,
+  type SessionDocker,
+  type DockerCommandMode,
 } from './types.js';
 import { buildEffortCliArgs } from './session-cli-builder.js';
 import { buildSshConnectionArgs, defaultRemoteCommandForMode, remoteSshTarget } from './remote-hosts.js';
+import {
+  buildDockerBaseArgs,
+  buildDockerCreateArgs,
+  containerApiUrl,
+  CONTAINER_HOME,
+  defaultDockerCommandForMode,
+  hostGatewayAlias,
+  resolveDockerClaudeArtifacts,
+  resolveDockerCredentialArtifacts,
+  type DockerCreateContext,
+  type DockerMount,
+  type DockerSeedCopy,
+} from './docker-hosts.js';
 import {
   wrapWithNice,
   SAFE_PATH_PATTERN,
@@ -62,6 +78,13 @@ import type {
   RespawnPaneOptions,
   PaneCaptureOptions,
 } from './mux-interface.js';
+import {
+  decideReconnect,
+  advanceBackoff,
+  freshReconnectState,
+  resetReconnectState,
+  type RemoteReconnectState,
+} from './remote-reconnect.js';
 
 // ============================================================================
 // Timing Constants
@@ -94,6 +117,9 @@ const GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN_WAIT_MS = 100;
 /** Default stats collection interval (2 seconds) */
 const DEFAULT_STATS_INTERVAL_MS = 2000;
 
+/** Default remote-reconnect watcher poll interval (5 seconds) — COD-108 */
+const DEFAULT_REMOTE_RECONNECT_INTERVAL_MS = 5000;
+
 /** Stable cwd for tmux server/pane launch; actual session cwd is reached inside the pane. */
 const TMUX_LAUNCH_CWD = '/tmp';
 
@@ -118,6 +144,20 @@ const IS_TEST_MODE = !!process.env.VITEST;
 /** Path to persisted mux session metadata */
 const MUX_SESSIONS_FILE = dataPath('mux-sessions.json');
 
+/**
+ * COD-108 kill-switch: `remoteAutoReconnect` app setting (default ON). Read at
+ * call time (like headroom routing) so a settings change takes effect without a
+ * restart. Absent/non-boolean ⇒ true (feature on).
+ */
+function isRemoteAutoReconnectEnabled(): boolean {
+  try {
+    const s = JSON.parse(readFileSync(dataPath('settings.json'), 'utf8')) as Record<string, unknown>;
+    return typeof s.remoteAutoReconnect === 'boolean' ? s.remoteAutoReconnect : true;
+  } catch {
+    return true;
+  }
+}
+
 /** Regex to validate tmux session names (only allow safe characters) */
 const SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN = /^codeman-[a-f0-9-]+$/;
 
@@ -547,6 +587,8 @@ function buildClaudePermissionFlags(claudeMode?: ClaudeMode, allowedTools?: stri
   switch (mode) {
     case 'dangerously-skip-permissions':
       return ' --dangerously-skip-permissions';
+    case 'auto':
+      return ' --permission-mode auto';
     case 'allowedTools':
       if (allowedTools) {
         // Sanitize: allow tool names with patterns like Bash(git:*), space/comma-separated
@@ -658,7 +700,7 @@ function buildEffortSettingsFlag(effort?: EffortLevel): string {
   return flag && value ? ` ${flag} '${value}'` : '';
 }
 
-function buildSpawnCommand(options: {
+export function buildSpawnCommand(options: {
   mode: SessionMode;
   sessionId: string;
   model?: string;
@@ -761,9 +803,22 @@ export function buildRemoteLaunchCommand(options: {
   mode: SessionMode;
   remote: SessionRemote;
   sessionId: string;
+  claudeMode?: ClaudeMode;
+  allowedTools?: string;
 }): string {
-  const { mode, remote, sessionId } = options;
-  const modeCommand = remote.commands?.[mode] || defaultRemoteCommandForMode(mode);
+  const { mode, remote, sessionId, claudeMode, allowedTools } = options;
+  // §6.3: honor the session's EFFECTIVE claude permission mode on remote instead of
+  // hardcoding --dangerously-skip-permissions, so a non-granted multi-user user's
+  // downgraded 'auto' actually reaches the remote agent (the default command otherwise
+  // ignored claudeMode). A per-host `commands.claude` override stays authoritative
+  // (admin's explicit choice). For the DEFAULT single-user config (skip), the emitted
+  // command is byte-identical to before. Non-claude modes are unchanged.
+  const override = remote.commands?.[mode];
+  const modeCommand = override
+    ? override
+    : mode === 'claude'
+      ? `exec claude${buildClaudePermissionFlags(claudeMode, allowedTools)}`
+      : defaultRemoteCommandForMode(mode);
   const remoteName = remoteTmuxSessionName(sessionId);
 
   // Innermost: the command tmux runs in the new pane. Run via `/bin/sh -c` by
@@ -781,6 +836,13 @@ export function buildRemoteLaunchCommand(options: {
     `set -t ${remoteName} mouse off`,
     `set -t ${remoteName} prefix C-q`,
     'set -s escape-time 0',
+    // COD-106 — shared/collaborative sessions: tmux defaults to sizing a window
+    // to the SMALLEST attached client, so two Codemans at different viewports
+    // would fight (clamp to the smaller). `window-size latest` sizes to the
+    // most-recently-active client instead, so concurrent clients coexist.
+    // Per-session scoped (`set -t <name>`, matching #145's hardening) so a shared
+    // remote tmux server's other sessions keep their own sizing behavior.
+    `set -t ${remoteName} window-size latest`,
   ].join(' \\; ');
 
   // ssh runs its trailing args through the remote login shell, so the entire
@@ -812,6 +874,345 @@ export function buildRemoteKillCommand(options: { remote: SessionRemote; session
   return [ssh, ...connectionArgs, remoteSshTarget(remote), shellescape(killCmd)].join(' ');
 }
 
+// ========== Docker cases (COD-Docker) ==========
+//
+// The docker analog of the remote-SSH launch above. Instead of a local tmux pane
+// running `ssh -t host 'tmux new-session …'`, it runs `docker exec -it <container>
+// sh -lc 'tmux new-session …'` into a DURABLE in-container tmux server. The
+// container is per-CASE, so many sessions `docker exec` into the same one. See
+// docs/docker-cases-plan.md.
+
+/**
+ * DEDICATED in-container tmux socket. A Codeman running INSIDE the container uses
+ * `-L codeman`; ours is `-L codeman-docker` with a `codeman-dkr-*` session name
+ * that deliberately FAILS SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN, so an in-container Codeman never
+ * adopts/resizes/respawns our session (same defence as the remote socket).
+ */
+const DOCKER_TMUX_SOCKET = 'codeman-docker';
+
+/**
+ * Deterministic, reattach-stable in-container tmux session name. Derived from the
+ * same stable field the local muxName uses (first 8 chars of the sessionId), so a
+ * reconnect re-issues the exact same `new-session -A` and lands back in the SAME
+ * in-container session. The `dkr` letters make it fail SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN.
+ */
+export function dockerTmuxSessionName(sessionId: string): string {
+  return `codeman-dkr-${sessionId.slice(0, 8)}`;
+}
+
+/** Resume ids are UUID-ish; reject anything with shell metacharacters (defensive). */
+const RESUME_ID_SAFE = /^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/;
+
+/**
+ * Append the CLI-specific resume flag to a pane command (codex/gemini). Only fires
+ * when the in-container tmux is RE-CREATED (`new-session -A` makes the flag inert
+ * on a live reattach), i.e. exactly when the previous live agent was lost and we
+ * want to resume the conversation from the bind-mounted transcript. Claude mode
+ * uses claudeDockerPaneCommand instead.
+ */
+function appendResumeFlag(modeCommand: string, mode: SessionMode, resumeId: string): string {
+  if (!RESUME_ID_SAFE.test(resumeId)) return modeCommand;
+  switch (mode) {
+    case 'gemini':
+      return `${modeCommand} --resume ${resumeId}`;
+    case 'codex':
+      return `${modeCommand} resume ${resumeId}`;
+    default:
+      return modeCommand; // shell / opencode: no resume
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Claude-mode pane command with a DETERMINISTIC conversation id (the docker analog
+ * of buildSpawnCommand's --resume/--session-id logic). A fresh launch passes
+ * `--session-id <sessionId>`, so the in-container conversation id is knowable
+ * host-side (resume-id capture + subagent/workflow correlation) WITHOUT relying on
+ * hook reachability. When the in-container tmux was re-created after a container
+ * stop/reboot, the same command re-runs against the surviving transcript:
+ * `--session-id` exits 1 ("already in use") and the `||` fallback RESUMES that
+ * conversation (verified CLI behavior). An explicit resumeId gets the local
+ * builder's shape — resume first, session-id fallback — so a stale id never
+ * dead-panes. The leading `exec ` is stripped: an exec'd first branch could never
+ * fall back.
+ */
+function claudeDockerPaneCommand(modeCommand: string, sessionId: string, resumeId?: string): string {
+  if (!RESUME_ID_SAFE.test(sessionId)) return modeCommand; // defensive — ids are server-minted uuids
+  const cmd = modeCommand.replace(/^exec\s+/, '');
+  const rid = resumeId && RESUME_ID_SAFE.test(resumeId) ? resumeId : undefined;
+  if (rid && rid !== sessionId) {
+    return `${cmd} --resume ${rid} || ${cmd} --session-id ${sessionId}`;
+  }
+  const cid = rid ?? sessionId;
+  return `${cmd} --session-id ${cid} || ${cmd} --resume ${cid}`;
+}
+
+/** Fully-resolved inputs for buildDockerLaunchCommand (pure). */
+export interface DockerLaunchOptions {
+  mode: SessionMode;
+  docker: SessionDocker;
+  sessionId: string;
+  resumeSessionId?: string;
+  createContext: DockerCreateContext;
+  /** exec-time inline env (non-secret): TERM, COLORTERM, CODEMAN_SESSION_ID, CODEMAN_MUX */
+  execEnv: Record<string, string>;
+  /** exec-time NAME-ONLY env forwarded from Codeman's process env (codex/gemini keys) */
+  execEnvNames: string[];
+  /**
+   * Files to copy from read-only seed mounts into the container's writable HOME once
+   * before launch (guarded so reconnects never clobber). Isolates Claude state: the
+   * merged `~/.claude.json`, plus `~/.claude/.credentials.json` + `settings.json`,
+   * are writable copies (not host mounts), so the container never re-auths and never
+   * writes its runtime state back into the host `~/.claude`.
+   */
+  seedCopies?: DockerSeedCopy[];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build the ONE `bash -c` launch string for a docker session: image-check ->
+ * ensure (inspect-or-create) -> start -> `exec docker exec -it` into the durable
+ * in-container tmux (resume-aware). PURE and unit-testable. The escaping survives
+ * four layers: outer `bash -c "…"` (JSON.stringify at respawn-pane) -> the joined
+ * command -> `docker exec … sh -lc '<tmux>'` -> tmux `'<paneCommand>'`.
+ */
+export function buildDockerLaunchCommand(opts: DockerLaunchOptions): string {
+  const { mode, docker, sessionId, resumeSessionId, createContext, execEnv, execEnvNames, seedCopies } = opts;
+  const base = buildDockerBaseArgs(docker).join(' ');
+  const createArgs = buildDockerCreateArgs(createContext).join(' ');
+  const name = shellescape(docker.containerName);
+  const workdir = shellescape(docker.containerWorkdir);
+  const image = shellescape(docker.image);
+  const dkrName = dockerTmuxSessionName(sessionId);
+  const sid = sessionId.slice(0, 8);
+
+  let modeCommand = docker.commands?.[mode as DockerCommandMode] || defaultDockerCommandForMode(mode);
+  if (mode === 'claude') {
+    modeCommand = claudeDockerPaneCommand(modeCommand, sessionId, resumeSessionId);
+  } else if (resumeSessionId) {
+    modeCommand = appendResumeFlag(modeCommand, mode, resumeSessionId);
+  }
+  // Run by tmux via /bin/sh -c, so the path is shell-quoted here. `exec` makes the
+  // pane PID the agent itself.
+  const paneCommand = `cd ${workdir} && ${modeCommand}`;
+
+  // `setenv -g` primes the session id so reattaches / newly-created panes inherit
+  // it. `new-session -A` = attach-or-create (idempotent + resume-aware). Options
+  // are scoped per-session (`set -t`) or server (`set -s`), never `-g`, so a shared
+  // in-container tmux server's other sessions keep their own prefix/mouse.
+  const tmuxInvocation = [
+    `tmux -L ${DOCKER_TMUX_SOCKET} setenv -g CODEMAN_SESSION_ID ${shellescape(sid)}`,
+    'setenv -g CODEMAN_MUX 1',
+    `new-session -A -s ${dkrName} -c ${workdir} ${shellescape(paneCommand)}`,
+    `set -t ${dkrName} status off`,
+    `set -t ${dkrName} mouse off`,
+    `set -t ${dkrName} prefix C-q`,
+    'set -s escape-time 0',
+  ].join(' \\; ');
+
+  const execEnvFlags: string[] = [];
+  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(execEnv)) execEnvFlags.push('--env', shellescape(`${k}=${v}`));
+  // NAME-ONLY forwards: docker reads the VALUE from Codeman's own process env, so
+  // the secret never appears in argv (no `ps` leak) and is not committed.
+  for (const n of execEnvNames) execEnvFlags.push('--env', n);
+  for (const extra of docker.extraExecArgs ?? []) execEnvFlags.push(shellescape(extra));
+
+  const imageMissingMsg = shellescape(
+    `Codeman: base image ${docker.image} not present (it is normally auto-built on first use)`
+  );
+  const startFailMsg = shellescape(`Codeman: container ${docker.containerName} failed to start (docker daemon down?)`);
+
+  const imageCheck = `${base} image inspect ${image} >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo ${imageMissingMsg}; exit 1; }`;
+  // create-if-missing (idempotent): reconnect / boot recovery re-runs this exact chain.
+  const ensure = `${base} inspect ${name} >/dev/null 2>&1 || ${base} ${createArgs}`;
+  const start = `${base} start ${name} >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo ${startFailMsg}; exit 1; }`;
+  // Seed writable credential config from read-only host mounts ONCE per container
+  // (guarded by [ -e ] so reconnects never clobber in-container config; `cp -a` for
+  // whole-dir credential seeds). mkdir -p the parent so a file seed works even when
+  // no sibling share-mount pre-created the dir. Paths are fixed CONTAINER_HOME
+  // constants (no shell metachars), so the whole inner command is shell-quoted once.
+  const seedSteps = (seedCopies ?? []).map((s) => {
+    const cp = s.recursive ? 'cp -a' : 'cp';
+    const parent = s.to.slice(0, s.to.lastIndexOf('/'));
+    return `mkdir -p ${parent} 2>/dev/null; [ -e ${s.to} ] || ${cp} ${s.from} ${s.to} 2>/dev/null || true`;
+  });
+  const innerCmd = seedSteps.length ? `${seedSteps.join(' ; ')} ; ${tmuxInvocation}` : tmuxInvocation;
+  const execCmd = `exec ${base} exec -it --workdir ${workdir} ${execEnvFlags.join(' ')} ${name} sh -lc ${shellescape(innerCmd)}`;
+
+  return [imageCheck, ensure, start, execCmd].join(' ; ');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Kill ONLY this session's in-container tmux session. The container is shared by
+ * the case's other sessions, so this NEVER `docker stop`s it — stopping/removing
+ * the container is an explicit teardown (buildDockerStopCommand) or case-delete
+ * (buildDockerRemoveCommand). Fired best-effort on session kill.
+ */
+export function buildDockerKillCommand(options: { docker: SessionDocker; sessionId: string }): string {
+  const { docker, sessionId } = options;
+  const base = buildDockerBaseArgs(docker).join(' ');
+  const dkrName = dockerTmuxSessionName(sessionId);
+  return `${base} exec ${shellescape(docker.containerName)} tmux -L ${DOCKER_TMUX_SOCKET} kill-session -t ${shellescape(dkrName)}`;
+}
+
+/** Explicit container stop (frees RAM/CPU; conversation resumes on next launch via --resume). */
+export function buildDockerStopCommand(docker: SessionDocker): string {
+  return `${buildDockerBaseArgs(docker).join(' ')} stop -t 10 ${shellescape(docker.containerName)}`;
+}
+
+/** Explicit container removal (case-delete). Destroys in-image state; bind mounts survive. */
+export function buildDockerRemoveCommand(docker: SessionDocker): string {
+  return `${buildDockerBaseArgs(docker).join(' ')} rm -f ${shellescape(docker.containerName)}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve the environment-dependent bits of a docker launch (host uid, existing
+ * credential mounts, derived api url, hook-secret mount, Desktop detection) into
+ * the pure buildDockerLaunchCommand inputs. IO; only ever called from the real
+ * launch path (createSession/respawnPane no-op under VITEST).
+ */
+export function resolveDockerLaunchOptions(
+  mode: SessionMode,
+  docker: SessionDocker,
+  sessionId: string,
+  resumeSessionId?: string
+): DockerLaunchOptions {
+  const home = homedir();
+  const isDesktop = process.platform === 'darwin'; // Docker Desktop translates uids + native host.docker.internal
+  const uid = typeof process.getuid === 'function' ? process.getuid() : 1000;
+  const userArgs: string[] =
+    docker.engine === 'podman'
+      ? ['--userns=keep-id'] // rootless podman: map host uid to the image `agent` uid
+      : isDesktop
+        ? [] // Desktop: run as the image's baked uid (a mac uid wouldn't own /home/agent)
+        : ['--user', `${uid}:0`]; // Linux: host uid + GID 0 (OpenShift arbitrary-uid writable HOME)
+  const gatewayAlias = hostGatewayAlias(docker.engine);
+
+  const credentialMounts: DockerMount[] = [];
+  const extraMounts: DockerMount[] = [];
+  // Isolated credential state (Claude + codex/gemini/gcloud/opencode): each store
+  // shares ONLY what a host feature / --resume needs (Claude projects/, codex
+  // sessions/+history) and seeds everything else (tokens, settings, configs) as
+  // writable copies, so the container is authed WITHOUT re-auth and WITHOUT writing
+  // its runtime state back into the host dirs. Only when credentials are mounted.
+  let seedCopies: DockerSeedCopy[] = [];
+  if (docker.mountCredentials) {
+    const claudeArtifacts = resolveDockerClaudeArtifacts(home, docker.containerName, docker.containerWorkdir);
+    const credArtifacts = resolveDockerCredentialArtifacts(home);
+    extraMounts.push(...claudeArtifacts.mounts, ...credArtifacts.mounts);
+    seedCopies = [...claudeArtifacts.seedCopies, ...credArtifacts.seedCopies];
+  }
+  const envCreate: Record<string, string> = {
+    HOME: CONTAINER_HOME,
+    TERM: 'xterm-256color',
+    COLORTERM: 'truecolor',
+    // Force a UTF-8 locale (the base image defaults to POSIX/C). Without this, tmux
+    // runs in non-UTF-8 mode and renders Claude's Unicode box-drawing (─│┌┐) as raw
+    // VT100 ACS glyphs (`qqqq…`). `C.UTF-8` is built into glibc (no locale-gen).
+    LANG: 'C.UTF-8',
+    LC_ALL: 'C.UTF-8',
+    // Give claude a temp dir it will own inside HOME. Its default `/tmp/claude-<uid>`
+    // is refused when that path pre-exists root-owned — which happens when the
+    // workspace bind-mount path traverses it (e.g. a workspace under /tmp/claude-<uid>).
+    // A nonexistent HOME subpath is created+owned by the running uid, so this is robust
+    // to any workspace location. Non-secret path, safe to be committed on export.
+    CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR: `${CONTAINER_HOME}/.cache/codeman-claude-tmp`,
+  };
+  if (docker.hooksEnabled) {
+    // Derive a container-reachable API url (scheme + port preserved; host swapped
+    // for the engine gateway alias). Prod is HTTPS on 3000.
+    envCreate.CODEMAN_API_URL = containerApiUrl(process.env.CODEMAN_API_URL, docker.engine);
+    const hookSecretPath = dataPath('hook-secret');
+    if (existsSync(hookSecretPath)) {
+      const dst = `${CONTAINER_HOME}/.codeman/hook-secret`;
+      extraMounts.push({ src: hookSecretPath, dst, readonly: true });
+      envCreate.CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE = dst; // a path is non-secret; the bytes ride the bind mount
+    }
+  }
+
+  const createContext: DockerCreateContext = {
+    docker,
+    sessionId,
+    instance: CODEMAN_INSTANCE,
+    userArgs,
+    credentialMounts,
+    extraMounts,
+    envCreate,
+    addHostGateway: !isDesktop,
+    gatewayAlias,
+  };
+
+  const execEnv: Record<string, string> = {
+    TERM: 'xterm-256color',
+    COLORTERM: 'truecolor',
+    // UTF-8 at exec time too, so the tmux CLIENT this exec launches is UTF-8 and
+    // renders box-drawing correctly even when reattaching to a container created
+    // before this fix (client_utf8 is per-client, resolved from the exec's locale).
+    LANG: 'C.UTF-8',
+    LC_ALL: 'C.UTF-8',
+    CODEMAN_SESSION_ID: sessionId.slice(0, 8),
+    CODEMAN_MUX: '1',
+  };
+  // NAME-ONLY exec env forwarded from Codeman's process env (the docker client
+  // inherits it), so API-key CLIs get their key without it appearing in argv.
+  const execEnvNames =
+    mode === 'codex'
+      ? ['OPENAI_API_KEY', 'CODEX_API_KEY']
+      : mode === 'gemini'
+        ? ['GEMINI_API_KEY', 'GOOGLE_API_KEY']
+        : [];
+
+  return { mode, docker, sessionId, resumeSessionId, createContext, execEnv, execEnvNames, seedCopies };
+}
+
+/**
+ * COD-105 — build the SSH command that ATTACHES to an EXISTING `codeman-*` tmux
+ * session on the remote host (one this Codeman didn't create — discovered via
+ * `listRemoteCodemanSessions`). Sibling of `buildRemoteLaunchCommand`.
+ *
+ * Emits:
+ *   ssh -o BatchMode=yes -t [<COD-107 connection opts>] user@host \
+ *     'tmux -L codeman attach -t <session>'
+ *
+ * - `attach` (NOT `new-session -A`) so we only join an existing session; the
+ *   remote session keeps running independent of us, which is exactly why the
+ *   resulting Codeman session is NON-OWNED (see `SessionRemote.owned`): closing
+ *   the local tab must detach, never `kill-session` the remote.
+ * - The remote session name is shell-escaped so a value with metachars stays a
+ *   single token inside the quoted tmux invocation.
+ * - COD-107 — connection options (`-p`, `-i`, `-J`, SOCKS `-o ProxyCommand`,
+ *   arbitrary `-o`) come from the shared `buildSshConnectionArgs`, so attach
+ *   connects identically to launch / discovery / the prereq probe. `-t` sits
+ *   right after `ssh -o BatchMode=yes` (a PTY is required for interactive tmux).
+ */
+export function buildRemoteAttachCommand(remote: SessionRemote, remoteSessionName: string): string {
+  const tmuxInvocation = `tmux -L codeman attach -t ${shellescape(remoteSessionName)}`;
+  const [ssh, batchMode, ...connectionArgs] = buildSshConnectionArgs(remote);
+  const sshParts = [ssh, batchMode, '-t', ...connectionArgs, remoteSshTarget(remote), shellescape(tmuxInvocation)];
+  return sshParts.join(' ');
+}
+
+/**
+ * COD-105 — choose the right remote ssh command for a session's ownership:
+ *   - NON-owned (`remote.owned === false`): ATTACH to a discovered remote tmux
+ *     session by its EXISTING name (`remote.remoteSessionName`, falling back to
+ *     this session's deterministic name). We only join — never create.
+ *   - owned (default): LAUNCH/attach-or-create via `buildRemoteLaunchCommand`
+ *     (COD-104), which we then own and may explicitly kill.
+ */
+function buildRemoteSessionCommand(options: {
+  mode: SessionMode;
+  remote: SessionRemote;
+  sessionId: string;
+  claudeMode?: ClaudeMode;
+  allowedTools?: string;
+}): string {
+  const { remote, sessionId } = options;
+  if (remote.owned === false) {
+    const target = remote.remoteSessionName || remoteTmuxSessionName(sessionId);
+    return buildRemoteAttachCommand(remote, target);
+  }
+  return buildRemoteLaunchCommand(options);
+}
+
 /**
  * Set sensitive environment variables on a tmux session via setenv.
  * These are inherited by panes but not visible in ps output or tmux history.
@@ -965,6 +1366,17 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
   /** Track last-known pane count per session to avoid unnecessary tmux set-option calls */
   private lastPaneCount: Map<string, number> = new Map();
 
+  // ── COD-108 remote-reconnect watcher state ────────────────────────────────
+  /** Periodic watcher that re-establishes dropped remote sessions. */
+  private remoteReconnectInterval: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;
+  /** Per-session backoff/attempt bookkeeping (sessionId → state). */
+  private reconnectState: Map<string, RemoteReconnectState> = new Map();
+  /**
+   * Sessions excluded from auto-reconnect because they are being intentionally
+   * torn down (killed/detached/stopping). A guarded session is NEVER revived.
+   */
+  private reconnectGuard: Set<string> = new Set();
+
   private trueColorConfigured = false;
 
   constructor() {
@@ -1209,6 +1621,8 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
       effort,
       historyLimit = DEFAULT_TMUX_HISTORY_LIMIT,
       remote,
+      docker,
+      owner,
     } = options;
     const muxName = `codeman-${sessionId.slice(0, 8)}`;
 
@@ -1228,6 +1642,8 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
         createdAt: Date.now(),
         workingDir,
         remote,
+        docker,
+        owner,
         mode,
         attached: false,
         name,
@@ -1273,7 +1689,11 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
     try {
       // Build the full command to run inside tmux
       const localFullCmd = `${buildNofileLimitCommand()} && ${pathExport}${envExportsStr} && ${cmd}`;
-      const fullCmd = remote ? buildRemoteLaunchCommand({ mode, remote, sessionId }) : localFullCmd;
+      const fullCmd = docker
+        ? buildDockerLaunchCommand(resolveDockerLaunchOptions(mode, docker, sessionId, resumeSessionId))
+        : remote
+          ? buildRemoteSessionCommand({ mode, remote, sessionId, claudeMode, allowedTools })
+          : localFullCmd;
 
       // Create tmux session in three steps to handle cold-start (no server running)
       // and avoid the race where the command exits before remain-on-exit is set:
@@ -1324,7 +1744,7 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
 
       // Replace the shell with the actual command (no echo in terminal). Keep
       // pane launch in /tmp, then cd inside bash against the current mount table.
-      const launchCmd = remote ? fullCmd : `cd ${JSON.stringify(workingDir)} && ${fullCmd}`;
+      const launchCmd = remote || docker ? fullCmd : `cd ${JSON.stringify(workingDir)} && ${fullCmd}`;
       execSync(
         `${this.tmux()} respawn-pane -k -c ${TMUX_LAUNCH_CWD} -t "${muxName}" bash -c ${JSON.stringify(launchCmd)}`,
         {
@@ -1399,6 +1819,8 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
         createdAt: Date.now(),
         workingDir,
         remote,
+        docker,
+        owner,
         mode,
         attached: false,
         name,
@@ -1484,6 +1906,7 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
       effort,
       historyLimit = DEFAULT_TMUX_HISTORY_LIMIT,
       remote,
+      docker,
     } = options;
     const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
     if (!session) return null;
@@ -1521,7 +1944,11 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
     const config = niceConfig || DEFAULT_NICE_CONFIG;
     const cmd = wrapWithNice(baseCmd, config);
     const localFullCmd = `${buildNofileLimitCommand()} && ${pathExport}${envExportsStr} && ${cmd}`;
-    const fullCmd = remote ? buildRemoteLaunchCommand({ mode, remote, sessionId }) : localFullCmd;
+    const fullCmd = docker
+      ? buildDockerLaunchCommand(resolveDockerLaunchOptions(mode, docker, sessionId, resumeSessionId))
+      : remote
+        ? buildRemoteSessionCommand({ mode, remote, sessionId, claudeMode, allowedTools })
+        : localFullCmd;
 
     try {
       // For OpenCode: set sensitive env vars via tmux setenv before respawn
@@ -1539,7 +1966,7 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
       this.applyEnvOverrides(muxName, envOverrides);
 
       // -c /tmp + cd bounce — see createSession() for rationale (stale FUSE state).
-      const launchCmd = remote ? fullCmd : `cd ${JSON.stringify(workingDir)} && ${fullCmd}`;
+      const launchCmd = remote || docker ? fullCmd : `cd ${JSON.stringify(workingDir)} && ${fullCmd}`;
       await execAsync(
         `${this.tmux()} respawn-pane -k -c ${TMUX_LAUNCH_CWD} -t "${muxName}" bash -c ${JSON.stringify(launchCmd)}`,
         {
@@ -1636,9 +2063,16 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
       return false;
     }
 
+    // COD-108: an intentional kill/detach must NEVER be auto-revived by the
+    // remote-reconnect watcher. Guard BEFORE any teardown so a tick that fires
+    // mid-kill (especially the non-owned DETACH early-return below, where the
+    // dead local pane would otherwise look reconnectable) sees the guard.
+    this.guardRemoteReconnect(sessionId);
+
     // TEST MODE: Remove from memory only — NEVER touch real tmux sessions
     if (IS_TEST_MODE) {
       this.sessions.delete(sessionId);
+      this.clearRemoteReconnectState(sessionId);
       this.emit('sessionKilled', { sessionId });
       return true;
     }
@@ -1650,6 +2084,40 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
       return false;
     }
 
+    // COD-105 — DETACH-NOT-KILL for NON-owned remote sessions.
+    //
+    // When this session was created by ATTACHING a remote tmux session another
+    // Codeman owns (`remote.owned === false`), closing the tab must NOT propagate
+    // a remote `tmux kill-session` — that would nuke work the remote's own
+    // Codeman (or another instance) still relies on. We tear down ONLY the LOCAL
+    // pane that holds the ssh client: killing the local ssh sends SIGHUP to its
+    // remote `tmux attach`, which DETACHES (the durable remote session survives).
+    //
+    // This early return is the structural guarantee: no code below this point
+    // (now or in future for owned sessions) can ever issue a remote kill-session
+    // for a non-owned session. The only `kill-session` we run is on OUR LOCAL
+    // socket (`this.tmux()` = `tmux -L codeman` on THIS host), which kills the
+    // local pane — it does NOT reach the REMOTE socket.
+    if (session.remote && session.remote.owned === false) {
+      console.log(`[TmuxManager] DETACH (non-owned remote): tearing down local pane only for ${session.muxName}`);
+      if (isValidMuxName(session.muxName)) {
+        try {
+          // Local socket only — detaches the remote session by killing the local ssh pane.
+          execSync(`${this.tmux()} kill-session -t "${session.muxName}" 2>/dev/null`, {
+            timeout: EXEC_TIMEOUT_MS,
+          });
+        } catch {
+          // Local pane may already be gone.
+        }
+      }
+      this.lastPaneCount.delete(session.muxName);
+      this.sessions.delete(sessionId);
+      this.clearRemoteReconnectState(sessionId);
+      this.saveSessions();
+      this.emit('sessionKilled', { sessionId });
+      return true;
+    }
+
     // Get current PID (may have changed)
     const currentPid = this.getPanePid(session.muxName) || session.pid;
 
@@ -1725,6 +2193,18 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
       }
     }
 
+    // Strategy 3c: Docker sessions run a DURABLE in-container tmux session. Kill
+    // ONLY this session's in-container tmux session (best-effort). The container is
+    // PER-CASE and shared by the case's other sessions, so we deliberately do NOT
+    // `docker stop` it here — stopping/removing is an explicit teardown/case-delete.
+    if (session.docker && !IS_TEST_MODE) {
+      try {
+        exec(buildDockerKillCommand({ docker: session.docker, sessionId }), { timeout: EXEC_TIMEOUT_MS }, () => {});
+      } catch {
+        // Best-effort — never affects the local kill result.
+      }
+    }
+
     // Strategy 4: Direct kill by PID as final fallback
     if (this.isProcessAlive(currentPid)) {
       try {
@@ -1742,6 +2222,7 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
 
     this.lastPaneCount.delete(session.muxName);
     this.sessions.delete(sessionId);
+    this.clearRemoteReconnectState(sessionId);
     this.saveSessions();
     this.emit('sessionKilled', { sessionId });
 
@@ -1808,6 +2289,7 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
       } else {
         dead.push(sessionId);
         this.sessions.delete(sessionId);
+        this.clearRemoteReconnectState(sessionId);
         this.emit('sessionDied', { sessionId });
       }
     }
@@ -2079,9 +2561,118 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
     this.lastPaneCount.clear();
   }
 
+  // ── COD-108 remote-session auto-reconnect watcher ─────────────────────────
+
+  /**
+   * Start the remote-reconnect watcher (COD-108). Each tick, for every tracked
+   * session with `session.remote` whose local pane is DEAD, not intentionally
+   * guarded, and within its backoff budget, emit `remoteSessionDropped` so the
+   * session owner reattaches (re-running the idempotent remote command rejoins
+   * the durable remote tmux session). After the attempt cap, emit
+   * `remoteReconnectExhausted` once and go quiet.
+   *
+   * No-op tick body under `IS_TEST_MODE` (mirrors `startMouseModeSync`): tests
+   * drive the logic deterministically via {@link runRemoteReconnectTick}.
+   */
+  startRemoteReconnectWatcher(intervalMs: number = DEFAULT_REMOTE_RECONNECT_INTERVAL_MS): void {
+    if (this.remoteReconnectInterval) {
+      clearInterval(this.remoteReconnectInterval);
+    }
+    this.remoteReconnectInterval = setInterval(() => {
+      if (IS_TEST_MODE) return;
+      try {
+        this.runRemoteReconnectTick(Date.now(), isRemoteAutoReconnectEnabled());
+      } catch (err) {
+        console.error('[TmuxManager] Remote reconnect watcher error:', err);
+      }
+    }, intervalMs);
+  }
+
+  stopRemoteReconnectWatcher(): void {
+    if (this.remoteReconnectInterval) {
+      clearInterval(this.remoteReconnectInterval);
+      this.remoteReconnectInterval = null;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Run ONE watcher tick. Extracted (and given an injected `now`/`enabled`) so
+   * the reconnect logic is deterministically testable even though the live
+   * `setInterval` body no-ops under test mode. For each remote session it
+   * applies the pure {@link decideReconnect} decision and translates the result
+   * into events + backoff/state transitions. Public for tests + the watcher.
+   */
+  runRemoteReconnectTick(now: number, enabled: boolean): void {
+    for (const session of this.sessions.values()) {
+      if (!session.remote) continue;
+      const sessionId = session.sessionId;
+      const state = this.reconnectState.get(sessionId);
+      const action = decideReconnect({
+        session: {
+          sessionId,
+          isRemote: true,
+          paneDead: this.isPaneDead(session.muxName),
+        },
+        state,
+        guarded: this.reconnectGuard.has(sessionId),
+        enabled,
+        now,
+      });
+
+      if (action.kind === 'emit') {
+        const base = state ?? freshReconnectState();
+        // Mark in-flight + advance backoff BEFORE emitting so a re-entrant tick
+        // (or a synchronous listener) can never stack a second reconnect.
+        this.reconnectState.set(sessionId, { ...advanceBackoff(base, now), inFlight: true });
+        this.emit('remoteSessionDropped', { sessionId, attempt: action.attempt });
+      } else if (action.kind === 'exhaust') {
+        const base = state ?? freshReconnectState();
+        if (!base.exhaustedEmitted) {
+          this.reconnectState.set(sessionId, { ...base, exhausted: true, exhaustedEmitted: true });
+          this.emit('remoteReconnectExhausted', { sessionId });
+        }
+      }
+      // 'skip' → nothing to do.
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Tell the watcher a reattach attempt for `sessionId` finished. On success,
+   * reset the backoff so the session is healthy again; on failure, just clear
+   * the in-flight flag so the next due tick can retry under the existing
+   * backoff schedule. Called by the session owner after `respawnPane`.
+   */
+  noteRemoteReconnect(sessionId: string, success: boolean): void {
+    if (success) {
+      this.reconnectState.set(sessionId, resetReconnectState());
+      return;
+    }
+    const state = this.reconnectState.get(sessionId);
+    if (state) this.reconnectState.set(sessionId, { ...state, inFlight: false });
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Exclude a session from auto-reconnect (intentional teardown). Adds it to the
+   * guard set and drops any backoff state so a closed/killed tab — especially a
+   * non-owned remote DETACH — is never auto-revived. Idempotent.
+   */
+  guardRemoteReconnect(sessionId: string): void {
+    this.reconnectGuard.add(sessionId);
+    this.reconnectState.delete(sessionId);
+  }
+
+  /** Clear all per-session reconnect + guard state (e.g. when a session is removed). */
+  clearRemoteReconnectState(sessionId: string): void {
+    this.reconnectState.delete(sessionId);
+    this.reconnectGuard.delete(sessionId);
+  }
+
   destroy(): void {
     this.stopStatsCollection();
     this.stopMouseModeSync();
+    this.stopRemoteReconnectWatcher();
+    this.reconnectState.clear();
+    this.reconnectGuard.clear();
   }
 
   registerSession(session: MuxSession): void {

src/tunnel-manager.ts

@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ interface QrTokenRecord {
   shortCode: string; // 6 chars base62 (for URL path)
   createdAt: number; // Date.now()
   consumed: boolean; // single-use flag
+  /** Multi-user: the user this token logs in when redeemed (absent = rotating global token). */
+  username?: string;
 }
 
 /** Rejection-sampled base62 short code — no modulo bias */
@@ -378,23 +380,64 @@ export class TunnelManager extends EventEmitter {
    * Map.get() is hash-based — no timing side-channel from string comparison.
    */
   consumeToken(shortCode: string): boolean {
+    return this.consumeTokenWithIdentity(shortCode).ok;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Like consumeToken, but also returns the bound username for multi-user tokens
+   * (undefined for the rotating global token). Only the identity-less rotating
+   * token triggers an immediate re-rotation (desktop gets a fresh QR); per-user
+   * tokens are on-demand and self-expire.
+   */
+  consumeTokenWithIdentity(shortCode: string): { ok: boolean; username?: string } {
     // Global rate limit (across all IPs)
-    if (this.qrAttemptCount >= QR_RATE_LIMIT_MAX) return false;
+    if (this.qrAttemptCount >= QR_RATE_LIMIT_MAX) return { ok: false };
     this.qrAttemptCount++;
 
     const record = this.qrTokensByCode.get(shortCode);
-    if (!record) return false;
-    if (record.consumed) return false;
+    if (!record) return { ok: false };
+    if (record.consumed) return { ok: false };
 
     const now = Date.now();
-    if (now - record.createdAt > QR_TOKEN_GRACE_MS) return false;
+    if (now - record.createdAt > QR_TOKEN_GRACE_MS) return { ok: false };
 
     // Atomic consume (single-threaded JS = no race)
     record.consumed = true;
-    // Immediately rotate so desktop gets a fresh QR
-    this.rotateToken();
-    this.emit('qrTokenRegenerated');
-    return true;
+    const username = record.username;
+    if (!username) {
+      // Rotating global token — immediately rotate so desktop gets a fresh QR.
+      this.rotateToken();
+      this.emit('qrTokenRegenerated');
+    } else {
+      this.qrTokensByCode.delete(shortCode);
+    }
+    return { ok: true, username };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Multi-user: mint a single-use token bound to a specific user (on-demand, no
+   * rotation). Evicts expired/consumed tokens first. Returns the short code.
+   */
+  mintUserToken(username: string): string {
+    const now = Date.now();
+    for (const [code, rec] of this.qrTokensByCode) {
+      if (now - rec.createdAt > QR_TOKEN_GRACE_MS || rec.consumed) this.qrTokensByCode.delete(code);
+    }
+    const record: QrTokenRecord = {
+      token: randomBytes(32).toString('hex'),
+      shortCode: generateShortCode(),
+      createdAt: Date.now(),
+      consumed: false,
+      username,
+    };
+    this.qrTokensByCode.set(record.shortCode, record);
+    return record.shortCode;
+  }
+
+  /** Render a QR SVG for an arbitrary short code (used by per-user minting). */
+  async getQrSvgForCode(tunnelUrl: string, code: string): Promise<string> {
+    const QRCode = await import('qrcode');
+    return QRCode.toString(`${tunnelUrl}/q/${code}`, { type: 'svg', margin: 2, width: 256 });
   }
 
   /** Force-regenerate (manual revocation via API) */

src/types/api.ts

@@ -37,6 +37,16 @@ export enum ApiErrorCode {
   RATE_LIMITED = 'RATE_LIMITED',
   /** Operation could not be completed (well-formed but unprocessable) */
   OPERATION_FAILED = 'OPERATION_FAILED',
+  /** Authenticated but not permitted (e.g. non-admin hitting an admin route) */
+  FORBIDDEN = 'FORBIDDEN',
+  /** User must change their password before any other action (multi-user) */
+  PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED = 'PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED',
+  /** A user with this name already exists (multi-user) */
+  USER_EXISTS = 'USER_EXISTS',
+  /** No user with this name (multi-user) */
+  USER_NOT_FOUND = 'USER_NOT_FOUND',
+  /** Refusing to demote/disable/delete the last enabled admin (multi-user) */
+  LAST_ADMIN = 'LAST_ADMIN',
   /** Internal server error */
   INTERNAL_ERROR = 'INTERNAL_ERROR',
 }
@@ -53,6 +63,11 @@ const ErrorMessages: Record<ApiErrorCode, string> = {
   [ApiErrorCode.ALREADY_EXISTS]: 'Resource already exists',
   [ApiErrorCode.RATE_LIMITED]: 'Too many requests',
   [ApiErrorCode.OPERATION_FAILED]: 'The operation failed',
+  [ApiErrorCode.FORBIDDEN]: 'You do not have permission to perform this action',
+  [ApiErrorCode.PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED]: 'You must change your password before continuing',
+  [ApiErrorCode.USER_EXISTS]: 'A user with that name already exists',
+  [ApiErrorCode.USER_NOT_FOUND]: 'No such user',
+  [ApiErrorCode.LAST_ADMIN]: 'Cannot remove the last enabled admin',
   [ApiErrorCode.INTERNAL_ERROR]: 'An internal error occurred',
 };
 
@@ -69,6 +84,11 @@ const ErrorStatus: Record<ApiErrorCode, number> = {
   [ApiErrorCode.CONFLICT]: 409,
   [ApiErrorCode.ALREADY_EXISTS]: 409,
   [ApiErrorCode.OPERATION_FAILED]: 422,
+  [ApiErrorCode.FORBIDDEN]: 403,
+  [ApiErrorCode.PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED]: 403,
+  [ApiErrorCode.USER_EXISTS]: 409,
+  [ApiErrorCode.USER_NOT_FOUND]: 404,
+  [ApiErrorCode.LAST_ADMIN]: 409,
   [ApiErrorCode.RATE_LIMITED]: 429,
   [ApiErrorCode.INTERNAL_ERROR]: 500,
 };
@@ -124,7 +144,7 @@ export interface CaseInfo {
   /** Whether CLAUDE.md exists */
   hasClaudeMd?: boolean;
   /** Case storage/execution location */
-  location?: 'local' | 'linked-local' | 'remote';
+  location?: 'local' | 'linked-local' | 'remote' | 'docker';
   /** Whether this is a linked local folder */
   linked?: boolean;
   /** Remote case metadata for display and session creation */
@@ -134,6 +154,14 @@ export interface CaseInfo {
     username: string;
     path: string;
   };
+  /** Docker case metadata for display and session creation */
+  docker?: {
+    hostId: string;
+    container: string;
+    image?: string;
+    path: string;
+    network?: string;
+  };
 }
 
 // ========== Error Handling Utilities ==========

src/types/app-state.ts

@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@ export interface AppState {
   cronJobs?: Record<string, CronJob>;
   /** Scheduled job run history, keyed by run ID. */
   cronJobRuns?: Record<string, CronJobRun>;
+  /** Global tab order shared across devices (ordered list of sessionIds) — COD-131 */
+  sessionOrder?: string[];
 }
 
 // ========== Default Configuration ==========

src/types/common.ts

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  * - CleanupRegistration / CleanupResourceType — entries for the centralized CleanupManager
  * - NiceConfig / DEFAULT_NICE_CONFIG — process priority settings for `nice`/`ionice`
  * - ProcessStats — memory/CPU/child-count snapshot for resource monitoring
+ * - FilesystemBrowseData — bounded path-picker directory listing returned to the web UI
  */
 
 /**
@@ -68,6 +69,34 @@ export interface ProcessStats {
   updatedAt: number;
 }
 
+/** A selectable entry returned by the filesystem path-picker API. */
+export type FilesystemPreviewKind = 'image' | 'text' | 'document';
+
+export interface FilesystemBrowseEntry {
+  name: string;
+  path: string;
+  type: 'file' | 'directory';
+  size?: number;
+  symlink?: boolean;
+  previewKind?: FilesystemPreviewKind;
+}
+
+/** A named root the path picker may browse without escaping its allowlist. */
+export interface FilesystemBrowseRoot {
+  label: string;
+  path: string;
+}
+
+/** Response payload for `GET /api/filesystem/browse`. */
+export interface FilesystemBrowseData {
+  path: string;
+  parent: string | null;
+  root: string;
+  roots: FilesystemBrowseRoot[];
+  entries: FilesystemBrowseEntry[];
+  truncated: boolean;
+}
+
 export type CleanupResourceType = 'timer' | 'interval' | 'watcher' | 'listener' | 'stream';
 
 /**

src/types/cron.ts

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ export type ConcurrencyPolicy = 'warn_only' | 'skip_if_same_agent_running';
 export interface CronJob {
   id: string;
   name: string;
+  /** Owning username in multi-user mode; the job launches as this user. Undefined in single-user. */
+  owner?: string;
   /** Reuses Codeman's existing session modes; 'shell' covers Terminal/custom. */
   agentType: SessionMode;
   workingDir: string;

src/types/index.ts

@@ -69,3 +69,5 @@ export * from './orchestrator.js';
 export * from './update.js';
 export * from './workflow-run.js';
 export * from './search.js';
+export * from './user.js';
+export * from './webview.js';

src/types/session.ts

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
  * - SessionOutput — captured stdout/stderr/exitCode
  * - SessionStatus — 'idle' | 'busy' | 'stopped' | 'error'
  * - SessionMode — 'claude' | 'shell' | 'opencode' | 'codex' | 'gemini' (which CLI backend)
- * - ClaudeMode — CLI permission mode ('dangerously-skip-permissions' | 'normal' | 'allowedTools')
+ * - ClaudeMode — CLI permission mode ('dangerously-skip-permissions' | 'auto' | 'normal' | 'allowedTools')
  * - SessionColor — visual differentiation color
  * - OpenCodeConfig — OpenCode-specific settings (model, autoAllowTools, continueSession)
  * - CodexConfig — Codex (OpenAI CLI)-specific settings (model, resumeSessionId)
@@ -35,10 +35,11 @@ export type SessionStatus = 'idle' | 'busy' | 'stopped' | 'error';
 /**
  * Claude CLI startup permission mode.
  * - `'dangerously-skip-permissions'`: Bypass all permission prompts (default)
+ * - `'auto'`: Anthropic's classifier-guarded low-prompt mode (`--permission-mode auto`)
  * - `'normal'`: Standard mode with permission prompts
  * - `'allowedTools'`: Only allow specific tools (requires allowedTools list)
  */
-export type ClaudeMode = 'dangerously-skip-permissions' | 'normal' | 'allowedTools';
+export type ClaudeMode = 'dangerously-skip-permissions' | 'auto' | 'normal' | 'allowedTools';
 
 /** Session mode: which CLI backend a session runs */
 export type SessionMode = 'claude' | 'shell' | 'opencode' | 'codex' | 'gemini';
@@ -84,6 +85,8 @@ export interface RemoteHost extends RemoteSshOptions {
 export interface RemoteCase {
   name: string;
   type: 'remote';
+  /** Owning username in multi-user mode; absent = legacy/unassigned (admin-only). */
+  owner?: string;
   hostId: string;
   remotePath: string;
 }
@@ -96,6 +99,163 @@ export interface SessionRemote extends RemoteSshOptions {
   port?: number;
   remotePath: string;
   commands?: Partial<Record<RemoteCommandMode, string>>;
+  /**
+   * COD-105 — whether THIS Codeman created the remote tmux session.
+   *
+   * - `true` (default for COD-104 launched sessions): we own the remote session;
+   *   an explicit "kill" may propagate a remote `tmux kill-session`.
+   * - `false` (discovered + attached an existing remote session another Codeman
+   *   created): closing the local tab must DETACH only — we must NEVER issue a
+   *   remote `kill-session`, or we'd nuke work the remote's own Codeman (or
+   *   another instance) still relies on. See `killSession()` gate.
+   *
+   * Absent is treated as owned (legacy/COD-104 sessions persisted before this
+   * field existed were all launched by us).
+   */
+  owned?: boolean;
+  /**
+   * COD-105 — for a NON-owned (discovered + attached) session, the EXISTING
+   * remote tmux session name to `attach -t` (e.g. `codeman-disco1`). It differs
+   * from this Codeman's deterministic `codeman-<id>` name because the remote
+   * session was created elsewhere. Only meaningful when `owned === false`.
+   */
+  remoteSessionName?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * COD-105 — a `codeman-*` tmux session discovered on a remote host's
+ * `tmux -L codeman` socket (may have been created by the remote's own Codeman,
+ * another instance, or this one). Returned by `listRemoteCodemanSessions`.
+ */
+export interface RemoteSessionInfo {
+  /** tmux session name (always starts `codeman-`). */
+  name: string;
+  /** Whether at least one client is currently attached to the remote session. */
+  attached: boolean;
+  /** COD-106 — number of clients attached (tmux `session_attached`); >1 = shared. */
+  attachedClients: number;
+  /** tmux `session_created` epoch seconds. */
+  created: number;
+  /** Number of windows in the remote session. */
+  windows: number;
+}
+
+// ========== Docker cases (COD-Docker) ==========
+//
+// Docker mode is a LOCATION OVERLAY on cases (never a 6th SessionMode), the exact
+// analog of the remote-SSH feature above: instead of a local tmux pane running
+// `ssh host` into a durable remote tmux server, a local tmux pane runs
+// `docker exec -it` into a durable in-container tmux server. The container is
+// scoped to the CASE (not the session), so multiple sessions can `docker exec`
+// into the same long-lived container. See `docs/docker-cases-plan.md`.
+
+/** Which CLI backends a Docker case can run (same set as remote). */
+export type DockerCommandMode = Extract<SessionMode, 'shell' | 'claude' | 'opencode' | 'codex' | 'gemini'>;
+
+/** Container engine. Docker and Podman differ in the uid/userns + host-gateway alias. */
+export type DockerEngine = 'docker' | 'podman';
+
+/**
+ * Container network mode. `host` and any inbound `-p` publish are deliberately
+ * unrepresentable (never in this union, never emitted by the flag builder).
+ * - `bridge`: own netns, NAT egress, no inbound (default — every API CLI needs egress)
+ * - `none`: fully offline sandbox (breaks API CLIs; reserved for `shell`)
+ * - `custom`: a user-defined bridge `codeman-net-<slug>` (future egress-allowlist chokepoint)
+ */
+export type DockerNetworkMode = 'bridge' | 'none' | 'custom';
+
+/** Per-container resource caps. Advisory under non-delegated rootless (see `capsEnforced`). */
+export interface DockerResourceLimits {
+  /** e.g. '4g' -> --memory 4g --memory-swap 4g (swap==memory: a real OOM cap) */
+  memory?: string;
+  /** e.g. '2' -> --cpus 2 */
+  cpus?: string;
+  /** e.g. 512 -> --pids-limit 512 (fork-bomb guard) */
+  pidsLimit?: number;
+  /** e.g. '4096:8192' -> --ulimit nofile=4096:8192 */
+  nofile?: string;
+  /** e.g. '256m' -> --shm-size (only when a tool needs /dev/shm) */
+  shmSize?: string;
+}
+
+/** A reusable Docker engine/image/network/resource profile (mirror of RemoteHost). */
+export interface DockerHost {
+  id: string;
+  label: string;
+  /** Engine; when absent the availability probe resolves it (docker, else podman). */
+  engine?: DockerEngine;
+  /** Base image ref (built locally by scripts/build-agent-image.mjs, e.g. codeman/agent:base). */
+  image: string;
+  /** Advanced: remote daemon (-H ssh://user@host or a DOCKER_HOST value). */
+  daemonHost?: string;
+  /** Advanced: docker `--context` name. */
+  context?: string;
+  /** Network mode (default 'bridge'). */
+  network?: DockerNetworkMode;
+  /** Custom bridge name when network === 'custom'. */
+  networkName?: string;
+  resources?: DockerResourceLimits;
+  /** GPU allocation, e.g. 'all' / '1' / 'device=0,1' -> `--gpus <value>` (needs the NVIDIA container toolkit). */
+  gpus?: string;
+  /** true (default) = convenient: bind-mount host cred dirs RW. false = sealed (blocks full-image export). */
+  mountCredentials?: boolean;
+  /** true (default) = wire in-container hooks (host-gateway callback + workspace scaffold). */
+  hooksEnabled?: boolean;
+  /** true (default) = a relaunch resumes the last conversation from the bind-mounted transcript. */
+  resumeOnStart?: boolean;
+  /** Per-mode command overrides (mirror RemoteHost.commands). */
+  commands?: Partial<Record<DockerCommandMode, string>>;
+  /** Escape hatch: extra `docker create` args (validated like extraSshOptions). */
+  extraCreateArgs?: string[];
+  /** Escape hatch: extra `docker exec` args. */
+  extraExecArgs?: string[];
+}
+
+/** A case linked to a Docker container (mirror of RemoteCase). */
+export interface DockerCase {
+  name: string;
+  type: 'docker';
+  /** Owning username in multi-user mode; absent = legacy/unassigned (admin-only). */
+  owner?: string;
+  hostId: string;
+  /** Absolute HOST directory: the bind-mount source AND Session.workingDir (real host bytes). */
+  hostWorkspacePath: string;
+  /** Container path (default = hostWorkspacePath: mirror -> transcript projHash correlates). */
+  containerWorkdir?: string;
+  /** Container name (default codeman-case-<slug>). */
+  container?: string;
+  /** Last captured Claude conversation id, replayed via --resume on a fresh launch. */
+  lastClaudeSessionId?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Flattened Docker execution metadata carried on a live session (mirror of
+ * SessionRemote). Round-trips through MuxSession/SessionState/mux-sessions.json.
+ */
+export interface SessionDocker {
+  hostId: string;
+  label: string;
+  engine: DockerEngine;
+  image: string;
+  /** Per-CASE container name (shared by all sessions of the case). */
+  containerName: string;
+  hostWorkspacePath: string;
+  containerWorkdir: string;
+  network: DockerNetworkMode;
+  networkName?: string;
+  resources?: DockerResourceLimits;
+  /** GPU allocation ('all' / '1' / 'device=0,1'). */
+  gpus?: string;
+  mountCredentials: boolean;
+  hooksEnabled: boolean;
+  resumeOnStart: boolean;
+  daemonHost?: string;
+  context?: string;
+  commands?: Partial<Record<DockerCommandMode, string>>;
+  extraCreateArgs?: string[];
+  extraExecArgs?: string[];
+  /** Stable hash of the drift-relevant create args (recreate-on-drift detection). */
+  configHash?: string;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -217,6 +377,10 @@ export interface SessionState {
   workingDir: string;
   /** Remote execution metadata, present when this session runs over SSH through local tmux */
   remote?: SessionRemote;
+  /** Docker execution metadata, present when this session runs inside a container via local tmux + docker exec */
+  docker?: SessionDocker;
+  /** Owning username in multi-user mode; undefined in single-user (ignored when the flag is off) */
+  owner?: string;
   /** ID of currently assigned task, null if none */
   currentTaskId: string | null;
   /** Timestamp when session was created */
@@ -241,6 +405,10 @@ export interface SessionState {
   autoResumeEnabled?: boolean;
   /** Pending usage-limit auto-resume fire time (epoch ms), if armed */
   autoResumeAt?: number;
+  /** Pinned to the top of the session manager list (COD-139) */
+  pinned?: boolean;
+  /** When the session was pinned (epoch ms) — orders the pinned group, most-recent-first */
+  pinnedAt?: number;
   /** Image watcher enabled for this session */
   imageWatcherEnabled?: boolean;
   /** Total cost in USD */

src/types/user.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Multi-user mode types (opt-in `--multiuser`).
+ *
+ * Users live in `~/.codeman/users.json` (via `dataPath`, mode 0600). Each record
+ * carries a scrypt password hash with its own parameters so hashing cost can be
+ * raised later and old records rehashed on next login. `AuthUser` is the
+ * request-scoped identity decorated onto Fastify requests; in SINGLE-user mode a
+ * synthetic `{ username: 'admin', role: 'admin' }` is used so downstream code has
+ * one code path. See `src/user-store.ts` and `docs/multi-user-plan.md`.
+ */
+
+export type UserRole = 'admin' | 'user';
+
+/** Per-record scrypt parameters + salt/hash (all hex). */
+export interface PasswordHash {
+  algo: 'scrypt';
+  N: number;
+  r: number;
+  p: number;
+  salt: string;
+  hash: string;
+}
+
+export interface UserRecord {
+  /** Canonical lowercase slug; also the user's folder name under USER_SPACES_DIR. */
+  username: string;
+  role: UserRole;
+  password: PasswordHash;
+  /** Disabled accounts fail auth closed but keep their space on disk. */
+  disabled?: boolean;
+  /** Set by an admin reset; gates all API access until the user changes it. */
+  mustChangePassword?: boolean;
+  /**
+   * Permission-mode grant (section 6.3). When false (the default for new users),
+   * the user's Claude sessions are forced to `--permission-mode auto`, shell mode
+   * and cron `launchCommand` are refused, and other CLIs' bypass flags are dropped.
+   */
+  canBypassPermissions?: boolean;
+  createdAt: number;
+  lastLoginAt?: number;
+}
+
+/** On-disk shape of `users.json`. */
+export interface UsersFile {
+  version: 1;
+  users: UserRecord[];
+}
+
+/** Request-scoped identity (decorated as `req.authUser`). */
+export interface AuthUser {
+  username: string;
+  role: UserRole;
+}
+
+/** Admin-facing projection of a user: never carries the password hash. */
+export interface PublicUser {
+  username: string;
+  role: UserRole;
+  disabled: boolean;
+  mustChangePassword: boolean;
+  canBypassPermissions: boolean;
+  createdAt: number;
+  lastLoginAt?: number;
+}

src/types/webview.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Web tab (dashboard) types.
+ *
+ * A "webview" is a saved URL that Codeman renders as a tab alongside agent
+ * sessions: Grafana on :3000, a Uptime-Kuma on :4000, an internal status page.
+ * It is deliberately NOT a sixth `SessionMode`, it has no PTY, no tmux, no
+ * respawn and no idle detection. Same reasoning that keeps Docker and remote-SSH
+ * as case overlays rather than modes.
+ *
+ * Key exports:
+ * - Webview, the persisted record (`~/.codeman/webviews.json`).
+ * - WebviewEmbedMode, 'proxy' (served through Codeman's origin) or 'direct'
+ *   (a plain cross-origin iframe, only viable for HTTPS targets that allow framing).
+ * - WebviewProbe, the result of the server-side reachability/framing probe.
+ * - WebviewOpenData, what `POST /api/webviews/:id/open` hands the browser.
+ *
+ * No I/O here. Persistence lives in `src/webview-store.ts`, capability minting in
+ * `src/webview-capabilities.ts`, the proxy helpers in `src/web/webview-proxy.ts`.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * How the browser should embed a webview.
+ *
+ * - `proxy`: the iframe points at `/webview/<capability>/` on Codeman's own
+ *   origin and the server relays to the target. Required whenever the target is
+ *   plain HTTP (an HTTPS Codeman page cannot embed it: mixed content) or refuses
+ *   framing via `X-Frame-Options` / `frame-ancestors`.
+ * - `direct`: the iframe points at the target URL itself. Cheaper, but only works
+ *   for HTTPS targets that permit framing, and needs the target origin added to
+ *   the page CSP's `frame-src`.
+ */
+export type WebviewEmbedMode = 'proxy' | 'direct';
+
+/** A saved dashboard, persisted to `~/.codeman/webviews.json`. */
+export interface Webview {
+  id: string;
+  /** Display name shown on the tab. */
+  name: string;
+  /** Absolute target URL. `http:` / `https:` only, never with embedded credentials. */
+  url: string;
+  /** Optional single-glyph tab icon (emoji or letter). */
+  icon?: string;
+  /** Default embed strategy for this dashboard. */
+  embedMode: WebviewEmbedMode;
+  /**
+   * When false (the default) the iframe is sandboxed WITHOUT `allow-same-origin`,
+   * so a proxied page runs in an opaque origin and cannot read the Codeman page or
+   * call its API. Setting this to true trades that isolation for the page's own
+   * cookies/localStorage, only for dashboards the user fully trusts.
+   */
+  trusted: boolean;
+  /** Multi-user owner (username). Undefined in single-user mode. */
+  owner?: string;
+  createdAt: number;
+  lastOpenedAt?: number;
+}
+
+/** Result of the server-side probe used by the "Test" button in the editor. */
+export interface WebviewProbe {
+  /** True when the server could complete an HTTP request to the target. */
+  reachable: boolean;
+  /** Upstream status code, when a response came back. */
+  status?: number;
+  /** Raw `X-Frame-Options` value, if the target sent one. */
+  xFrameOptions?: string;
+  /** The `frame-ancestors` directive extracted from the target's CSP, if any. */
+  frameAncestors?: string;
+  /** True when the target permits being framed cross-origin by this Codeman. */
+  framable: boolean;
+  /** Strategy the UI should default to for this URL. */
+  recommendedMode: WebviewEmbedMode;
+  /** Human-readable explanation of the recommendation (or the failure). */
+  reason: string;
+}
+
+/** Payload of `POST /api/webviews/:id/open`. */
+export interface WebviewOpenData {
+  /** The webview being opened (echoed so the client can refresh its copy). */
+  webview: Webview;
+  /**
+   * Same-origin path the iframe should load. Present for `proxy` mode only;
+   * `direct` mode uses `webview.url` instead.
+   */
+  embedUrl?: string;
+  /** Epoch ms at which the capability behind `embedUrl` stops working. */
+  expiresAt?: number;
+}

src/user-store.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,488 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Multi-user store: `~/.codeman/users.json` (via `dataPath`, 0600).
+ *
+ * Mirrors the storage-module pattern of `remote-hosts.ts` / `docker-hosts.ts`, but
+ * because it holds password hashes it writes atomically (tmp + rename) at mode
+ * 0600 and keeps only a SHORT in-process cache so the CLI (`codeman users …`) can
+ * edit the file while the server runs and have changes picked up within the TTL.
+ *
+ * Pure, IO-free helpers (`isValidUsername`, `hashPassword`, `verifyPasswordHash`,
+ * `needsRehash`, `resolveClaudeModeForUser`, the last-admin invariants) are split
+ * out so they are unit-testable without a server. Hashing is `scrypt` from
+ * `node:crypto` (no new deps), compared via `timingSafeEqual`; parameters are
+ * stored per record so cost can be raised later and old records rehashed on their
+ * next successful login.
+ *
+ * See `docs/multi-user-plan.md` sections 4.1, 5, 6.3.
+ */
+
+import { existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
+import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { isAbsolute, join, relative } from 'node:path';
+import { randomBytes, scrypt as scryptCb, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
+import { promisify } from 'node:util';
+import { dataPath, getDataDir } from './config/instance.js';
+import { getUserSpacesDir, isMultiUserMode, maxUsers } from './config/multiuser.js';
+import type { AuthUser, ClaudeMode, PasswordHash, PublicUser, UserRecord, UserRole, UsersFile } from './types.js';
+
+const scrypt = promisify(scryptCb) as (
+  password: string | Buffer,
+  salt: string | Buffer,
+  keylen: number,
+  options: { N: number; r: number; p: number; maxmem: number }
+) => Promise<Buffer>;
+
+const USERS_FILE = 'users.json';
+const CACHE_TTL_MS = 1000;
+const KEYLEN = 64;
+const SALT_BYTES = 32;
+/** Generous ceiling so raising N/r later does not trip scrypt's memory guard. */
+const SCRYPT_MAXMEM = 256 * 1024 * 1024;
+
+/** Current hashing parameters. Stored per record; raise these to increase cost. */
+export const DEFAULT_SCRYPT_PARAMS = { N: 16384, r: 8, p: 1 } as const;
+
+/** Username: lowercase, first char alphanumeric, 2-32 chars total. Becomes a folder name. */
+const USERNAME_RE = /^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{1,31}$/;
+
+/** Typed error whose `.code` maps to an API errorCode at the route layer. */
+export class UserStoreError extends Error {
+  constructor(
+    message: string,
+    public readonly code: 'USER_EXISTS' | 'USER_NOT_FOUND' | 'LAST_ADMIN' | 'INVALID_INPUT'
+  ) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'UserStoreError';
+  }
+}
+
+// ─────────────────────────────── pure helpers ───────────────────────────────
+
+export function normalizeUsername(name: string): string {
+  return String(name ?? '')
+    .trim()
+    .toLowerCase();
+}
+
+export function isValidUsername(name: string): boolean {
+  return USERNAME_RE.test(normalizeUsername(name));
+}
+
+/** Hash a password with the given (or current) scrypt params + a fresh random salt. */
+export async function hashPassword(
+  password: string,
+  params: { N: number; r: number; p: number } = DEFAULT_SCRYPT_PARAMS
+): Promise<PasswordHash> {
+  const salt = randomBytes(SALT_BYTES);
+  const derived = await scrypt(password, salt, KEYLEN, { ...params, maxmem: SCRYPT_MAXMEM });
+  return {
+    algo: 'scrypt',
+    N: params.N,
+    r: params.r,
+    p: params.p,
+    salt: salt.toString('hex'),
+    hash: derived.toString('hex'),
+  };
+}
+
+/** Constant-time verify of a password against a stored hash record. Never throws. */
+export async function verifyPasswordHash(password: string, record: PasswordHash): Promise<boolean> {
+  if (!record || record.algo !== 'scrypt') return false;
+  let salt: Buffer;
+  let expected: Buffer;
+  try {
+    salt = Buffer.from(record.salt, 'hex');
+    expected = Buffer.from(record.hash, 'hex');
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (expected.length === 0) return false;
+  let derived: Buffer;
+  try {
+    derived = await scrypt(password, salt, expected.length, {
+      N: record.N,
+      r: record.r,
+      p: record.p,
+      maxmem: SCRYPT_MAXMEM,
+    });
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (derived.length !== expected.length) return false;
+  return timingSafeEqual(derived, expected);
+}
+
+/** True when a stored hash uses weaker params than current and should be rehashed. */
+export function needsRehash(record: PasswordHash, params = DEFAULT_SCRYPT_PARAMS): boolean {
+  return record.algo !== 'scrypt' || record.N !== params.N || record.r !== params.r || record.p !== params.p;
+}
+
+/** URL-safe one-time password (16 chars) for admin create/reset flows. */
+export function generateOneTimePassword(): string {
+  return randomBytes(12).toString('base64url');
+}
+
+export function toPublicUser(u: UserRecord): PublicUser {
+  return {
+    username: u.username,
+    role: u.role,
+    disabled: !!u.disabled,
+    mustChangePassword: !!u.mustChangePassword,
+    canBypassPermissions: !!u.canBypassPermissions,
+    createdAt: u.createdAt,
+    lastLoginAt: u.lastLoginAt,
+  };
+}
+
+export function countEnabledAdmins(users: UserRecord[]): number {
+  return users.filter((u) => u.role === 'admin' && !u.disabled).length;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Section 6.3: resolve the effective Claude permission mode for a user. Admins and
+ * granted users get the global mode as-is; a non-granted regular user whose mode
+ * would be `dangerously-skip-permissions` is silently downgraded to `auto` (all
+ * other modes are already <= auto and pass through). Pure.
+ */
+export function resolveClaudeModeForUser(
+  globalMode: ClaudeMode | undefined,
+  grant: { role: UserRole; canBypassPermissions?: boolean }
+): ClaudeMode {
+  const mode: ClaudeMode = globalMode ?? 'dangerously-skip-permissions';
+  if (grant.role === 'admin' || grant.canBypassPermissions) return mode;
+  return mode === 'dangerously-skip-permissions' ? 'auto' : mode;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Section 6.3: whether a user may run arbitrary commands as the host account
+ * (shell-mode sessions, cron `launchCommand`, other CLIs' bypass flags). Same
+ * one-bit grant as bypass. Admins always may.
+ */
+export function canRunPrivilegedCommands(grant: { role: UserRole; canBypassPermissions?: boolean }): boolean {
+  return grant.role === 'admin' || !!grant.canBypassPermissions;
+}
+
+// ─────────────────────────────── IO layer ───────────────────────────────
+
+let cache: { users: UserRecord[]; ts: number } | null = null;
+
+/** Drop the in-process cache (called after every write; exported for tests). */
+export function invalidateUsersCache(): void {
+  cache = null;
+}
+
+export async function readUsers(force = false): Promise<UserRecord[]> {
+  const now = Date.now();
+  if (!force && cache && now - cache.ts < CACHE_TTL_MS) return cache.users;
+  let raw: string;
+  try {
+    raw = await fs.readFile(dataPath(USERS_FILE), 'utf-8');
+  } catch (err) {
+    // ENOENT is the ONLY legitimately-empty store (first boot). Any other read
+    // error (EIO/EACCES/EMFILE/EBUSY) is a transient/permission failure, NOT an
+    // empty store — do NOT cache [] and do NOT let it look empty, or a following
+    // createUser/bootstrap would overwrite users.json and destroy every account.
+    if ((err as NodeJS.ErrnoException).code === 'ENOENT') {
+      cache = { users: [], ts: now };
+      return [];
+    }
+    throw err;
+  }
+  // A present-but-corrupt file (invalid JSON) must also fail loud rather than
+  // read as empty, so mutators/bootstrap abort instead of clobbering it.
+  const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as Partial<UsersFile>;
+  const users = Array.isArray(parsed.users) ? parsed.users : [];
+  cache = { users, ts: now };
+  return users;
+}
+
+async function writeUsers(users: UserRecord[]): Promise<void> {
+  const dir = getDataDir();
+  if (!existsSync(dir)) mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true });
+  const finalPath = dataPath(USERS_FILE);
+  // Unique per-writer tmp name (pid + random) so the CLI (`codeman users …`) and
+  // the live server — designed to write this file concurrently across processes —
+  // never share a single `users.json.tmp` inode and tear each other's payload.
+  // Matches the state-store.ts / self-update.ts convention.
+  const tmpPath = `${finalPath}.${process.pid}.${randomBytes(6).toString('hex')}.tmp`;
+  const payload: UsersFile = { version: 1, users };
+  try {
+    await fs.writeFile(tmpPath, JSON.stringify(payload, null, 2), { mode: 0o600 });
+    await fs.chmod(tmpPath, 0o600).catch(() => {});
+    await fs.rename(tmpPath, finalPath);
+  } catch (err) {
+    await fs.unlink(tmpPath).catch(() => {});
+    throw err;
+  }
+  cache = { users, ts: Date.now() };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Serialize every read-modify-write on users.json. Without this a fire-and-forget
+ * touchLastLogin (fired on each Basic auth) can interleave with a route's
+ * create/update and clobber records, since both do readUsers(true) → mutate →
+ * writeUsers against a single shared file + tmp path.
+ */
+let mutateChain: Promise<unknown> = Promise.resolve();
+function withUsersLock<T>(fn: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
+  const run = mutateChain.then(fn, fn);
+  mutateChain = run.then(
+    () => undefined,
+    () => undefined
+  );
+  return run;
+}
+
+export async function hasUsers(): Promise<boolean> {
+  return (await readUsers()).length > 0;
+}
+
+// A precomputed dummy hash so an unknown/disabled user costs the same scrypt work
+// as a real verify (defeats username-enumeration by timing). Created once, lazily.
+let dummyHashPromise: Promise<PasswordHash> | null = null;
+function getDummyHash(): Promise<PasswordHash> {
+  if (!dummyHashPromise) dummyHashPromise = hashPassword('codeman-timing-equalization-placeholder');
+  return dummyHashPromise;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify a username/password against the store. Returns the record (plus whether it
+ * should be rehashed) on success, or null for wrong password / unknown / disabled
+ * user. Runs a dummy scrypt on the miss path so timing does not reveal which users
+ * exist. Never writes (the caller decides when to persist lastLogin / rehash).
+ */
+export async function verifyPassword(
+  username: string,
+  password: string
+): Promise<{ user: UserRecord; needsRehash: boolean } | null> {
+  const user = await findUser(username);
+  if (!user || user.disabled) {
+    await verifyPasswordHash(password, await getDummyHash());
+    return null;
+  }
+  const ok = await verifyPasswordHash(password, user.password);
+  if (!ok) return null;
+  return { user, needsRehash: needsRehash(user.password) };
+}
+
+export async function findUser(username: string): Promise<UserRecord | undefined> {
+  const norm = normalizeUsername(username);
+  if (!norm) return undefined;
+  const users = await readUsers();
+  return users.find((u) => u.username === norm);
+}
+
+export interface CreateUserOptions {
+  username: string;
+  role: UserRole;
+  password: string;
+  mustChangePassword?: boolean;
+  canBypassPermissions?: boolean;
+}
+
+export async function createUser(opts: CreateUserOptions): Promise<UserRecord> {
+  const username = normalizeUsername(opts.username);
+  if (!isValidUsername(username)) {
+    throw new UserStoreError(
+      'Username must be lowercase, start alphanumeric, 2-32 chars ([a-z0-9_-])',
+      'INVALID_INPUT'
+    );
+  }
+  if (opts.role !== 'admin' && opts.role !== 'user') {
+    throw new UserStoreError('Role must be "admin" or "user"', 'INVALID_INPUT');
+  }
+  if (!opts.password || opts.password.length < 8) {
+    throw new UserStoreError('Password must be at least 8 characters', 'INVALID_INPUT');
+  }
+  return withUsersLock(async () => {
+    const users = await readUsers(true);
+    if (users.some((u) => u.username === username)) {
+      throw new UserStoreError(`User "${username}" already exists`, 'USER_EXISTS');
+    }
+    if (users.length >= maxUsers()) {
+      throw new UserStoreError(`Maximum number of users (${maxUsers()}) reached`, 'INVALID_INPUT');
+    }
+    const record: UserRecord = {
+      username,
+      role: opts.role,
+      password: await hashPassword(opts.password),
+      disabled: false,
+      mustChangePassword: !!opts.mustChangePassword,
+      canBypassPermissions: !!opts.canBypassPermissions,
+      createdAt: Date.now(),
+    };
+    users.push(record);
+    await writeUsers(users);
+    return record;
+  });
+}
+
+/** Set a user's password. `mustChangePassword` is left unchanged unless specified. */
+export async function setPassword(
+  username: string,
+  password: string,
+  opts: { mustChangePassword?: boolean } = {}
+): Promise<UserRecord> {
+  if (!password || password.length < 8) {
+    throw new UserStoreError('Password must be at least 8 characters', 'INVALID_INPUT');
+  }
+  const norm = normalizeUsername(username);
+  return withUsersLock(async () => {
+    const users = await readUsers(true);
+    const record = users.find((u) => u.username === norm);
+    if (!record) throw new UserStoreError(`User "${norm}" not found`, 'USER_NOT_FOUND');
+    record.password = await hashPassword(password);
+    if (opts.mustChangePassword !== undefined) record.mustChangePassword = opts.mustChangePassword;
+    await writeUsers(users);
+    return record;
+  });
+}
+
+export interface UpdateUserPatch {
+  role?: UserRole;
+  disabled?: boolean;
+  canBypassPermissions?: boolean;
+  mustChangePassword?: boolean;
+}
+
+export async function updateUser(username: string, patch: UpdateUserPatch): Promise<UserRecord> {
+  const norm = normalizeUsername(username);
+  return withUsersLock(async () => {
+    const users = await readUsers(true);
+    const record = users.find((u) => u.username === norm);
+    if (!record) throw new UserStoreError(`User "${norm}" not found`, 'USER_NOT_FOUND');
+
+    // Guard the last-enabled-admin invariant against demote/disable.
+    const before = countEnabledAdmins(users);
+    const projected: UserRecord = {
+      ...record,
+      role: patch.role ?? record.role,
+      disabled: patch.disabled ?? record.disabled,
+    };
+    const after = countEnabledAdmins(users.map((u) => (u.username === norm ? projected : u)));
+    if (before > 0 && after === 0) {
+      throw new UserStoreError('Cannot demote or disable the last enabled admin', 'LAST_ADMIN');
+    }
+
+    if (patch.role !== undefined) record.role = patch.role;
+    if (patch.disabled !== undefined) record.disabled = patch.disabled;
+    if (patch.canBypassPermissions !== undefined) record.canBypassPermissions = patch.canBypassPermissions;
+    if (patch.mustChangePassword !== undefined) record.mustChangePassword = patch.mustChangePassword;
+    await writeUsers(users);
+    return record;
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Record a successful login timestamp. Best-effort + throttled: skips the write if
+ * the last login was within the last minute (Basic clients re-send credentials on
+ * every request, so this fires often — the throttle keeps disk churn bounded).
+ */
+export async function touchLastLogin(username: string): Promise<void> {
+  const norm = normalizeUsername(username);
+  try {
+    await withUsersLock(async () => {
+      const users = await readUsers(true);
+      const record = users.find((u) => u.username === norm);
+      if (!record) return;
+      if (record.lastLoginAt && Date.now() - record.lastLoginAt < 60_000) return;
+      record.lastLoginAt = Date.now();
+      await writeUsers(users);
+    });
+  } catch {
+    /* best-effort */
+  }
+}
+
+export async function deleteUser(username: string): Promise<void> {
+  const norm = normalizeUsername(username);
+  await withUsersLock(async () => {
+    const users = await readUsers(true);
+    const record = users.find((u) => u.username === norm);
+    if (!record) throw new UserStoreError(`User "${norm}" not found`, 'USER_NOT_FOUND');
+    const before = countEnabledAdmins(users);
+    const remaining = users.filter((u) => u.username !== norm);
+    const after = countEnabledAdmins(remaining);
+    if (before > 0 && after === 0) {
+      throw new UserStoreError('Cannot delete the last enabled admin', 'LAST_ADMIN');
+    }
+    await writeUsers(remaining);
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * First-boot bootstrap: in multi-user mode with no users yet, create the initial
+ * admin from `CODEMAN_USERNAME`/`CODEMAN_PASSWORD` if both are set. Returns a
+ * status the caller (server start / CLI) uses to decide whether to refuse boot.
+ */
+export async function bootstrapInitialAdmin(): Promise<{
+  status: 'created' | 'exists' | 'missing-env';
+  username?: string;
+}> {
+  if (await hasUsers()) return { status: 'exists' };
+  const username = process.env.CODEMAN_USERNAME;
+  const password = process.env.CODEMAN_PASSWORD;
+  if (!username || !password) return { status: 'missing-env' };
+  const created = await createUser({ username, role: 'admin', password });
+  return { status: 'created', username: created.username };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Delete a user's on-disk space (`<USER_SPACES_DIR>/<username>`) with the section 8
+ * guard rails: the top-level dir must not be a symlink, and its realpath must
+ * resolve strictly inside USER_SPACES_DIR (so a symlinked or `..`-escaping target
+ * can never be used to rm an arbitrary tree). No-op if the space does not exist.
+ */
+export async function deleteUserSpace(username: string): Promise<void> {
+  const norm = normalizeUsername(username);
+  if (!isValidUsername(norm)) throw new UserStoreError('Invalid username', 'INVALID_INPUT');
+  const root = getUserSpacesDir();
+  const target = join(root, norm);
+  let lst;
+  try {
+    lst = await fs.lstat(target);
+  } catch {
+    return; // nothing to delete
+  }
+  if (lst.isSymbolicLink()) {
+    throw new UserStoreError('Refusing to delete a symlinked user space', 'INVALID_INPUT');
+  }
+  const realRoot = await fs.realpath(root).catch(() => root);
+  const realTarget = await fs.realpath(target);
+  const rel = relative(realRoot, realTarget);
+  if (rel === '' || rel.startsWith('..') || isAbsolute(rel)) {
+    throw new UserStoreError('User space escapes USER_SPACES_DIR', 'INVALID_INPUT');
+  }
+  await fs.rm(realTarget, { recursive: true, force: true });
+}
+
+/** The synthetic admin used in single-user mode so downstream has one code path. */
+export const SYNTHETIC_ADMIN: AuthUser = { username: 'admin', role: 'admin' };
+
+/**
+ * Whether a username may run arbitrary commands (shell mode, cron launchCommand,
+ * other CLIs' bypass). Single-user or an unset owner: allowed. In multi-user a
+ * MISSING user (e.g. deleted) fails closed (non-privileged). Used at cron fire time.
+ */
+export async function canUsernameRunPrivilegedCommands(username: string | undefined): Promise<boolean> {
+  if (!isMultiUserMode() || !username) return true;
+  const user = await findUser(username);
+  return canRunPrivilegedCommands(user ?? { role: 'user' });
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve the effective Claude mode for a username by looking up the grant. In
+ * single-user mode (or for an unknown owner) the global mode passes through.
+ */
+export async function resolveClaudeModeForUsername(
+  globalMode: ClaudeMode | undefined,
+  username: string | undefined
+): Promise<ClaudeMode> {
+  const fallback: ClaudeMode = globalMode ?? 'dangerously-skip-permissions';
+  if (!isMultiUserMode() || !username) return fallback;
+  // Fail closed: an unknown/deleted owner in multi-user mode is treated as a
+  // non-granted regular user so a stale-owned spawn (e.g. an orphaned cron job)
+  // is downgraded to `auto` rather than inheriting the global bypass.
+  const user = await findUser(username);
+  return resolveClaudeModeForUser(globalMode, user ?? { role: 'user' });
+}

src/utils/regex-patterns.ts

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ export function stripAnsi(text: string): string {
  */
 export const SPINNER_PATTERN = /[⠋⠙⠹⠸⠼⠴⠦⠧]/;
 
-export const SAFE_PATH_PATTERN = /^[a-zA-Z0-9_/\-. ~]+$/;
+export const SAFE_PATH_PATTERN = /^[\p{L}\p{N}_/\-. ~]+$/u;
 
 /**
  * Execute a global regex pattern against data, calling the callback for each match.

src/web/admin-audit.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Append-only admin audit log (~/.codeman/admin-audit.jsonl).
+ *
+ * Every user-management action (create/patch/reset/delete/logout/assign) writes one
+ * JSON line: timestamp, acting admin, action, target, request IP. Same idiom as
+ * session-lifecycle.jsonl. Best-effort: a write failure never blocks the action.
+ */
+
+import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { dataPath } from '../config/instance.js';
+
+export interface AdminAuditEntry {
+  ts: number;
+  admin: string;
+  action: string;
+  target?: string;
+  ip?: string;
+  detail?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+export async function appendAdminAudit(entry: Omit<AdminAuditEntry, 'ts'>): Promise<void> {
+  try {
+    const line = JSON.stringify({ ts: Date.now(), ...entry }) + '\n';
+    await fs.appendFile(dataPath('admin-audit.jsonl'), line, { mode: 0o600 });
+  } catch {
+    /* best-effort audit; never block the action */
+  }
+}

src/web/middleware/auth.ts

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
  * - CORS (localhost only)
  */
 
-import type { FastifyInstance, FastifyReply } from 'fastify';
+import type { FastifyInstance, FastifyReply, FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
 import { randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
 import { StaleExpirationMap } from '../../utils/index.js';
 import type { AuthSessionRecord } from '../ports/auth-port.js';
@@ -20,6 +20,19 @@ import {
   AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS,
 } from '../../config/auth-config.js';
 import { getHookSecret, HOOK_SECRET_HEADER } from '../../config/hook-secret.js';
+import { isMultiUserMode } from '../../config/multiuser.js';
+import { findUser, setPassword, touchLastLogin, verifyPassword } from '../../user-store.js';
+import { webviewCapabilities } from '../../webview-capabilities.js';
+import { capabilityFromProxyPath, capabilityFromReferer } from '../webview-proxy.js';
+import { ApiErrorCode, createErrorResponse, type AuthUser } from '../../types.js';
+
+// Request-scoped identity (multi-user). Single-user leaves it undefined and the
+// ownership helpers default to a synthetic admin (see route-helpers).
+declare module 'fastify' {
+  interface FastifyRequest {
+    authUser?: AuthUser;
+  }
+}
 
 // Auth session cookie name
 export const AUTH_COOKIE_NAME = 'codeman_session';
@@ -30,6 +43,162 @@ interface AuthState {
   authFailures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number> | null;
   qrAuthFailures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number> | null;
   hookSecretFailures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number> | null;
+  /** Per-username Basic-auth failure bucket (multi-user only). */
+  userFailures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number> | null;
+}
+
+/** Rate-limit response for a client that exceeded the failure cap. */
+function sendAuthRateLimit(reply: FastifyReply, failures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number>, key: string): void {
+  const remainingMs = failures.getRemainingTtl(key) ?? AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS;
+  const retryAfterSeconds = Math.max(1, Math.ceil(remainingMs / 1000));
+  reply.header('Retry-After', String(retryAfterSeconds));
+  reply.code(429).send('Too Many Requests — try again later');
+}
+
+/** Parse a `Basic base64(user:pass)` header into its parts, or null if malformed. */
+function parseBasicAuth(header?: string): { username: string; password: string } | null {
+  if (!header || !header.startsWith('Basic ')) return null;
+  try {
+    const decoded = Buffer.from(header.slice(6), 'base64').toString('utf-8');
+    const idx = decoded.indexOf(':');
+    if (idx < 0) return null;
+    return { username: decoded.slice(0, idx), password: decoded.slice(idx + 1) };
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * The `/api/hook-event` + `/api/status-telemetry` localhost bypass, shared by the
+ * single-user and multi-user auth hooks so the security-critical logic has ONE
+ * source of truth. Returns:
+ *  - 'bypass'   : loopback + valid hook secret; the caller should allow the request
+ *  - 'rejected' : a reply was already sent (wrong secret rate-limited / 401)
+ *  - 'continue' : not a hook request (or non-loopback); fall through to normal auth
+ *
+ * COD-91: the shared hook secret is required UNCONDITIONALLY on the loopback bypass
+ * (a user's own loopback reverse proxy is indistinguishable from a real local hook).
+ */
+function checkHookSecretBypass(
+  req: FastifyRequest,
+  reply: FastifyReply,
+  hookSecretFailures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number>
+): 'bypass' | 'rejected' | 'continue' {
+  if ((req.url === '/api/hook-event' || req.url === '/api/status-telemetry') && req.method === 'POST') {
+    const ip = req.ip;
+    const isLoopback = ip === '127.0.0.1' || ip === '::1' || ip === '::ffff:127.0.0.1';
+    if (isLoopback) {
+      const presented = Buffer.from(req.headers[HOOK_SECRET_HEADER.toLowerCase()]?.toString() ?? '');
+      const expected = Buffer.from(getHookSecret());
+      if (presented.length === expected.length && timingSafeEqual(presented, expected)) {
+        return 'bypass';
+      }
+      const hookIp = req.ip;
+      const hookFailures = hookSecretFailures.get(hookIp) ?? 0;
+      if (hookFailures >= AUTH_FAILURE_MAX) {
+        sendAuthRateLimit(reply, hookSecretFailures, hookIp);
+        return 'rejected';
+      }
+      hookSecretFailures.set(hookIp, hookFailures + 1);
+      reply.code(401).send('Unauthorized: hook secret required');
+      return 'rejected';
+    }
+    // Non-localhost hook requests fall through to normal auth
+  }
+  return 'continue';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Requests that a `mustChangePassword` user may still reach: the identity probe,
+ * the password-change endpoint, and any non-API path (static assets / index.html,
+ * so the browser can load the app and render the change-password modal).
+ */
+function isPasswordChangeExempt(req: FastifyRequest): boolean {
+  const url = (req.url ?? '').split('?')[0];
+  if (url === '/api/me' || url === '/api/me/password') return true;
+  // Security: the WebSocket terminal (/ws/...) is a functional channel, not a static
+  // asset, so it must NOT be exempt, or a locked user keeps a working terminal.
+  if (url.startsWith('/ws/')) return false;
+  return !url.startsWith('/api/');
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether this request carries a VALID web-tab proxy capability.
+ *
+ * Requests under `/webview/<cap>/` cannot authenticate the normal way. The iframe
+ * rendering a dashboard is sandboxed without `allow-same-origin`, so it runs in an
+ * opaque origin: every request it makes is cross-site, meaning the `SameSite=lax`
+ * `codeman_session` cookie is never attached, and non-GET requests and WebSocket
+ * upgrades arrive with `Origin: null`. Both the cookie check and the CSRF Origin
+ * guard would therefore reject a perfectly legitimate dashboard asset load.
+ *
+ * The capability in the path is the credential instead: 192 bits of entropy, held
+ * in memory only (a restart invalidates it), rolling TTL, bound to the user who
+ * minted it through an already-authenticated `POST /api/webviews/:id/open`, and
+ * granting nothing but "relay bytes to this one saved URL".
+ *
+ * The exemption is deliberately narrow: it requires the capability to RESOLVE, so
+ * a bare `/webview/anything` reaches nothing, and a `/webviewfoo` path does not
+ * match the prefix at all. The Host allowlist is NOT bypassed, so DNS-rebinding
+ * protection still applies to these requests.
+ */
+function hasValidWebviewCapability(req: FastifyRequest): boolean {
+  const url = (req.url ?? '').split('?')[0];
+
+  const fromPath = capabilityFromProxyPath(url);
+  if (fromPath) return webviewCapabilities.resolve(fromPath) !== undefined;
+
+  // Referer form: a dashboard subresource requested with a ROOT-ABSOLUTE URL, which
+  // lands on Codeman's root and is relayed by the 404 fallback. Without this the
+  // asset would be rejected here, before the fallback ever runs.
+  //
+  // This is the only exemption decided by a header the request itself supplies, so
+  // it is fenced in hard: safe methods only, and never for Codeman's own functional
+  // surfaces. Without those fences a page could present a webview Referer and skip
+  // auth on /api. It is not a privilege escalation even so, holding a live
+  // capability already implies an authenticated `POST /api/webviews/:id/open`, but
+  // the exemption should stay no wider than the problem it solves.
+  if (req.method !== 'GET' && req.method !== 'HEAD') return false;
+  if (url.startsWith('/ws/') || url.startsWith('/q/')) return false;
+  // Anything that resolves to a REAL Codeman route is refused, which is the fence
+  // that keeps this from being an auth bypass. `/api/` used to be refused by prefix
+  // instead, but dashboards legitimately serve assets from their own `/api/...`
+  // namespace (`<img src="/api/hero?slug=x">`), and those requests were the one
+  // class the 404 relay could never rescue. See matchesRegisteredRoute.
+  if (matchesRegisteredRoute(req, url)) return false;
+
+  const fromReferer = capabilityFromReferer(typeof req.headers.referer === 'string' ? req.headers.referer : undefined);
+  return !!fromReferer && webviewCapabilities.resolve(fromReferer) !== undefined;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Whether `url` resolves to a route Codeman actually registered.
+ *
+ * `hasRoute()` is the wrong tool: it matches the registered PATTERN literally, so
+ * `/api/sessions/abc` reports false against a registered `/api/sessions/:id` and
+ * would hand out an exemption on a live API route. `findRoute()` performs the real
+ * radix-tree lookup and fills in `params`, which is what this needs.
+ *
+ * The one complication is `@fastify/static`, mounted at `/`, which registers a
+ * root-level catch-all that matches EVERY path. A match on that means "no real
+ * route, this is heading for the 404 handler", and it is distinguishable because a
+ * root catch-all is the only route whose `*` param comes back equal to the entire
+ * request path. `test/webview-auth-exemption.test.ts` pins both halves of that.
+ *
+ * Fails CLOSED: anything unexpected counts as a real route, which merely denies the
+ * exemption and restores the previous behavior.
+ */
+function matchesRegisteredRoute(req: FastifyRequest, url: string): boolean {
+  try {
+    const found = req.server.findRoute({ method: req.method as 'GET' | 'HEAD', url });
+    if (!found) return false;
+    const params = found.params ?? {};
+    const keys = Object.keys(params);
+    const isRootCatchAll = keys.length === 1 && keys[0] === '*' && `/${params['*']}` === url;
+    return !isRootCatchAll;
+  } catch {
+    return true;
+  }
 }
 
 /**
@@ -47,13 +216,20 @@ export function registerAuthMiddleware(app: FastifyInstance, https: boolean): Au
     authFailures: null,
     qrAuthFailures: null,
     hookSecretFailures: null,
+    userFailures: null,
   };
 
-  const authPassword = process.env.CODEMAN_PASSWORD;
-  if (!authPassword) return state;
+  // Always declare req.authUser so downstream reads are safe (single-user leaves it
+  // undefined; the ownership helpers then default to a synthetic admin).
+  if (!app.hasRequestDecorator('authUser')) app.decorateRequest('authUser', undefined);
 
-  const authUsername = process.env.CODEMAN_USERNAME || 'admin';
-  const expectedHeader = 'Basic ' + Buffer.from(`${authUsername}:${authPassword}`).toString('base64');
+  const multiUser = isMultiUserMode();
+  const authPassword = process.env.CODEMAN_PASSWORD;
+
+  // No auth at all: single-user with no password (byte-identical to legacy). In
+  // multi-user mode auth is ALWAYS active (users authenticate individually), even
+  // without CODEMAN_PASSWORD.
+  if (!multiUser && !authPassword) return state;
 
   // Session token store — active sessions extend TTL on access
   state.authSessions = new StaleExpirationMap<string, AuthSessionRecord>({
@@ -87,57 +263,28 @@ export function registerAuthMiddleware(app: FastifyInstance, https: boolean): Au
   const authFailures = state.authFailures;
   const hookSecretFailures = state.hookSecretFailures;
 
-  function sendAuthRateLimit(
-    reply: FastifyReply,
-    clientIp: string,
-    failures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number> = authFailures
-  ): void {
-    const remainingMs = failures.getRemainingTtl(clientIp) ?? AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS;
-    const retryAfterSeconds = Math.max(1, Math.ceil(remainingMs / 1000));
-    reply.header('Retry-After', String(retryAfterSeconds));
-    reply.code(429).send('Too Many Requests — try again later');
+  if (multiUser) {
+    // Per-username failure bucket: a botnet can't brute-force one account across
+    // many IPs, and one user behind a NAT can't lock out everyone else.
+    state.userFailures = new StaleExpirationMap<string, number>({
+      ttlMs: AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS,
+      refreshOnGet: false,
+    });
+    registerMultiUserAuthHook(app, https, authSessions, authFailures, hookSecretFailures, state.userFailures);
+    return state;
   }
 
+  // ── Single-user Basic Auth (unchanged behavior; CODEMAN_PASSWORD required) ──
+  const authUsername = process.env.CODEMAN_USERNAME || 'admin';
+  const expectedHeader = 'Basic ' + Buffer.from(`${authUsername}:${authPassword}`).toString('base64');
+
   app.addHook('onRequest', (req, reply, done) => {
-    // Hook events + statusline telemetry come from local Claude Code (curl from
-    // localhost) — no Basic-Auth credentials available. Validated downstream by
-    // HookEventSchema / StatusTelemetrySchema. Same loopback+hook-secret gate.
-    //
-    // COD-54: the bare localhost bypass is unsafe while a tunnel is running, because
-    // `cloudflared --url http://127.0.0.1:port` proxies internet traffic INTO the
-    // loopback origin, so a tunneled request arrives with req.ip === 127.0.0.1 and
-    // would pass. COD-91: require the shared hook secret on the loopback bypass
-    // UNCONDITIONALLY (not just while the managed tunnel is up). Codeman can't detect
-    // a user's own loopback reverse proxy (their own `cloudflared --url`, `tailscale
-    // serve`, nginx → 127.0.0.1), so tunnel-gating left that path with the unsafe plain
-    // bypass. Managed-session hooks always present the secret (X-Codeman-Hook-Secret,
-    // from $CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE — generated for every instance), so requiring it
-    // always closes the gap without breaking the legitimate hook channel.
-    if ((req.url === '/api/hook-event' || req.url === '/api/status-telemetry') && req.method === 'POST') {
-      const ip = req.ip;
-      const isLoopback = ip === '127.0.0.1' || ip === '::1' || ip === '::ffff:127.0.0.1';
-      if (isLoopback) {
-        // Always require the shared secret (constant-time compare).
-        const presented = Buffer.from(req.headers[HOOK_SECRET_HEADER.toLowerCase()]?.toString() ?? '');
-        const expected = Buffer.from(getHookSecret());
-        if (presented.length === expected.length && timingSafeEqual(presented, expected)) {
-          done();
-          return;
-        }
-        // Wrong/absent secret — rate-limit per IP in the DEDICATED hook bucket
-        // (never authFailures, which would lock out the login path).
-        const hookIp = req.ip;
-        const hookFailures = hookSecretFailures.get(hookIp) ?? 0;
-        if (hookFailures >= AUTH_FAILURE_MAX) {
-          sendAuthRateLimit(reply, hookIp, hookSecretFailures);
-          return;
-        }
-        hookSecretFailures.set(hookIp, hookFailures + 1);
-        reply.code(401).send('Unauthorized: hook secret required');
-        return;
-      }
-      // Non-localhost hook requests fall through to normal auth
+    const bypass = checkHookSecretBypass(req, reply, hookSecretFailures);
+    if (bypass === 'bypass') {
+      done();
+      return;
     }
+    if (bypass === 'rejected') return;
 
     // QR auth path — handled by the route itself (token validation + rate limiting)
     if (req.url?.startsWith('/q/')) {
@@ -145,6 +292,12 @@ export function registerAuthMiddleware(app: FastifyInstance, https: boolean): Au
       return;
     }
 
+    // Web-tab proxy, authenticated by the capability in the path, not the cookie.
+    if (hasValidWebviewCapability(req)) {
+      done();
+      return;
+    }
+
     const clientIp = req.ip;
 
     // Check session cookie first (avoids re-sending credentials on every request)
@@ -153,10 +306,6 @@ export function registerAuthMiddleware(app: FastifyInstance, https: boolean): Au
     if (sessionToken && authSessions.get(sessionToken) !== undefined) {
       // Sliding cookie: re-issue on every authenticated request so the browser
       // cookie lifetime tracks the server-side sliding TTL (refreshOnGet above).
-      // Without this the cookie has a fixed lifetime from login; the browser
-      // drops it mid-use, the next request arrives cookie-less and falls through
-      // to Basic Auth — popping the native username/password dialog, which reads
-      // as a random logout while actively working.
       reply.setCookie(AUTH_COOKIE_NAME, sessionToken, {
         httpOnly: true,
         secure: https,
@@ -206,7 +355,7 @@ export function registerAuthMiddleware(app: FastifyInstance, https: boolean): Au
     // Rate limit only requests that failed to authenticate on this attempt.
     const failures = authFailures.get(clientIp) ?? 0;
     if (failures >= AUTH_FAILURE_MAX) {
-      sendAuthRateLimit(reply, clientIp);
+      sendAuthRateLimit(reply, authFailures, clientIp);
       return;
     }
 
@@ -220,6 +369,170 @@ export function registerAuthMiddleware(app: FastifyInstance, https: boolean): Au
   return state;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Multi-user auth hook (async, because password verification runs scrypt). Verifies
+ * `username:password` against the user store, mints an identity-carrying cookie,
+ * decorates `req.authUser`, enforces the per-IP + per-username rate limits, and the
+ * `mustChangePassword` lockbox. The single-user hook above is left untouched.
+ */
+function registerMultiUserAuthHook(
+  app: FastifyInstance,
+  https: boolean,
+  authSessions: StaleExpirationMap<string, AuthSessionRecord>,
+  authFailures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number>,
+  hookSecretFailures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number>,
+  userFailures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number>
+): void {
+  const setSessionCookie = (reply: FastifyReply, token: string) =>
+    reply.setCookie(AUTH_COOKIE_NAME, token, {
+      httpOnly: true,
+      secure: https,
+      sameSite: 'lax',
+      maxAge: AUTH_SESSION_TTL_MS / 1000,
+      path: '/',
+    });
+
+  // Evict the oldest cookie session of the SAME user first (so one user logging in
+  // 100 times cannot flush everyone else's sessions), falling back to global-oldest.
+  const evictForCapacity = (username: string) => {
+    let userKey: string | undefined;
+    let userTs = Infinity;
+    let globalKey: string | undefined;
+    let globalTs = Infinity;
+    for (const [k, v] of authSessions) {
+      if (v.createdAt < globalTs) {
+        globalTs = v.createdAt;
+        globalKey = k;
+      }
+      if (v.username === username && v.createdAt < userTs) {
+        userTs = v.createdAt;
+        userKey = k;
+      }
+    }
+    const key = userKey ?? globalKey;
+    if (key !== undefined) authSessions.delete(key);
+  };
+
+  const enforcePasswordChange = (req: FastifyRequest, reply: FastifyReply, mustChange: boolean): boolean => {
+    if (mustChange && !isPasswordChangeExempt(req)) {
+      reply.code(403).send(createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED));
+      return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+  };
+
+  app.addHook('onRequest', async (req, reply) => {
+    const bypass = checkHookSecretBypass(req, reply, hookSecretFailures);
+    if (bypass === 'bypass' || bypass === 'rejected') return;
+
+    // QR redemption path — handled by the route itself.
+    if (req.url?.startsWith('/q/')) return;
+
+    // Web-tab proxy, authenticated by the capability in the path, not the cookie.
+    // `req.authUser` stays undefined here on purpose: the proxy handler enforces
+    // ownership against the identity BOUND TO THE CAPABILITY, which is stricter
+    // than re-deriving it from a request that carries no credentials.
+    if (hasValidWebviewCapability(req)) return;
+
+    const clientIp = req.ip;
+
+    // 1. Cookie session (carries identity + mustChangePassword snapshot).
+    const sessionToken = req.cookies[AUTH_COOKIE_NAME];
+    const record = sessionToken ? authSessions.get(sessionToken) : undefined;
+    if (record && record.username) {
+      // Security: re-validate the cookie identity against the store on every request so
+      // an out-of-band mutation the in-memory map can't see (the `codeman users` CLI,
+      // a separate process, deleting/disabling/demoting a user) takes effect promptly
+      // instead of riding the 24h cookie. findUser is cached ~1s, so this is cheap.
+      let live: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof findUser>>;
+      try {
+        live = await findUser(record.username);
+      } catch {
+        // The store is transiently unreadable/corrupt (readUsers throws on a non-ENOENT
+        // read, #23). Fall back to the cookie's snapshot for THIS request rather than
+        // 500-ing an already-authenticated client (pre-#24 behaviour); a persistently
+        // corrupt store still fails all WRITES loudly at the mutator/bootstrap layer.
+        req.authUser = { username: record.username, role: record.role ?? 'user' };
+        setSessionCookie(reply, sessionToken!);
+        enforcePasswordChange(req, reply, !!record.mustChangePassword);
+        return;
+      }
+      if (!live || live.disabled) {
+        authSessions.delete(sessionToken!);
+        reply.clearCookie(AUTH_COOKIE_NAME, { path: '/' });
+        reply.code(401).send('Unauthorized');
+        return;
+      }
+      // Trust the LIVE role/mustChangePassword, not the (possibly stale) cookie snapshot
+      // (also defends #9/#13: a CLI demotion is reflected without a revoke).
+      req.authUser = { username: live.username, role: live.role };
+      setSessionCookie(reply, sessionToken!); // sliding re-issue
+      enforcePasswordChange(req, reply, !!live.mustChangePassword);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // 2. Basic Auth against the user store (scrypt verify).
+    // Per-IP pre-gate bounds scrypt CPU cost from one source (does NOT gate on the
+    // per-username bucket here; see below).
+    const ipFail = authFailures.get(clientIp) ?? 0;
+    if (ipFail >= AUTH_FAILURE_MAX) {
+      sendAuthRateLimit(reply, authFailures, clientIp);
+      return;
+    }
+    const creds = parseBasicAuth(req.headers.authorization);
+    if (creds) {
+      const normUser = creds.username.trim().toLowerCase();
+      // Security: VERIFY FIRST, then throttle only FAILED attempts. Consulting the
+      // per-username bucket before verifying let throwaway IPs lock out a known account
+      // (incl. admin) even with the correct password. A correct password must always
+      // win and self-heal both buckets, regardless of the username-failure count.
+      const result = await verifyPassword(creds.username, creds.password);
+      if (result) {
+        const { user, needsRehash: rehash } = result;
+        if (rehash) void setPassword(user.username, creds.password).catch(() => {});
+        void touchLastLogin(user.username).catch(() => {});
+        authFailures.delete(clientIp);
+        userFailures.delete(normUser);
+
+        const token = randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
+        if (authSessions.size >= MAX_AUTH_SESSIONS) evictForCapacity(user.username);
+        authSessions.set(token, {
+          ip: clientIp,
+          ua: req.headers['user-agent'] ?? '',
+          createdAt: Date.now(),
+          method: 'basic',
+          username: user.username,
+          role: user.role,
+          mustChangePassword: !!user.mustChangePassword,
+        });
+        req.authUser = { username: user.username, role: user.role };
+        setSessionCookie(reply, token);
+        enforcePasswordChange(req, reply, !!user.mustChangePassword);
+        return;
+      }
+      // Failed guess: count it against BOTH buckets. Once the per-username bucket
+      // reaches the cap, further FAILED attempts get 429 (throttles distributed
+      // brute-force), but this path is only reached on a wrong password, so it can
+      // never deny a correct one.
+      const uFail = (userFailures.get(normUser) ?? 0) + 1;
+      userFailures.set(normUser, uFail);
+      authFailures.set(clientIp, ipFail + 1);
+      if (uFail >= AUTH_FAILURE_MAX) {
+        sendAuthRateLimit(reply, userFailures, normUser);
+        return;
+      }
+      reply.header('WWW-Authenticate', 'Basic realm="Codeman"');
+      reply.code(401).send('Unauthorized');
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // No credentials presented: count against the per-IP bucket and challenge.
+    authFailures.set(clientIp, ipFail + 1);
+    reply.header('WWW-Authenticate', 'Basic realm="Codeman"');
+    reply.code(401).send('Unauthorized');
+  });
+}
+
 /** Methods that don't change server state and so skip the cross-site Origin check. */
 const SAFE_HTTP_METHODS = new Set(['GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS']);
 
@@ -246,7 +559,17 @@ export function registerHostGuard(app: FastifyInstance, getPolicy: () => HostPol
       reply.code(403).send('Forbidden: host not allowed');
       return;
     }
-    if (!SAFE_HTTP_METHODS.has(req.method) && !isAllowedRequestOrigin(req.headers.origin, policy)) {
+    // The Host allowlist above is NEVER bypassed. The Origin (CSRF) check is,
+    // but only for a request carrying a valid web-tab capability: a sandboxed
+    // dashboard is opaque-origin, so its form posts and uploads arrive with
+    // `Origin: null`, which this guard rejects by design. The capability is the
+    // credential in that case, and it is unguessable, see
+    // hasValidWebviewCapability.
+    if (
+      !SAFE_HTTP_METHODS.has(req.method) &&
+      !isAllowedRequestOrigin(req.headers.origin, policy) &&
+      !hasValidWebviewCapability(req)
+    ) {
       reply.code(403).send('Forbidden: cross-site request blocked');
       return;
     }
@@ -301,8 +624,17 @@ export function registerSecurityHeaders(app: FastifyInstance, https: boolean): v
       }
     }
 
-    // Handle CORS preflight
-    if (req.method === 'OPTIONS') {
+    // Handle CORS preflight.
+    //
+    // EXCEPT for the web-tab proxy, which must answer its own preflight. A
+    // sandboxed dashboard iframe is opaque-origin, so it sends `Origin: null`;
+    // the CORS block above only emits headers for localhost origins, so a bare
+    // 204 from here carries no `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` and the browser
+    // rejects the preflight. Every dashboard fetch then fails with an opaque
+    // net::ERR_FAILED while the page itself renders fine (script/css/img loads
+    // are not CORS-checked). Falling through lets the proxy route reply with the
+    // right headers.
+    if (req.method === 'OPTIONS' && !hasValidWebviewCapability(req)) {
       reply.code(204).send();
       done();
       return;

src/web/network-auth-policy.ts

@@ -39,6 +39,16 @@ export function isLoopbackBindHost(host: string): boolean {
  */
 export const DEFAULT_TRUSTED_HOST_SUFFIXES = ['.ts.net', '.trycloudflare.com', '.cfargotunnel.com'];
 
+/**
+ * Container-to-host gateway aliases (Docker / Podman). A hook `curl` from INSIDE a
+ * docker case carries `Host: host.docker.internal:<port>` (the derived
+ * CODEMAN_API_URL), so the always-on host guard must allow it or every in-container
+ * hook is blocked 403. These names only resolve to the host from within a
+ * container's network namespace, so they are not a DNS-rebinding surface for a
+ * normal browser. Both engines' aliases are allowed so a mixed fleet keeps working.
+ */
+export const DOCKER_HOST_GATEWAY_ALIASES = ['host.docker.internal', 'host.containers.internal'];
+
 /** Policy inputs for the anti-DNS-rebinding Host allowlist + cross-site Origin guard. */
 export interface HostPolicy {
   /** The host the server is bound to (e.g. '127.0.0.1', '0.0.0.0', or a hostname). */
@@ -98,6 +108,8 @@ function matchesHost(hostname: string, policy: HostPolicy): boolean {
   const bind = parseAuthorityHostname(policy.bindHost);
   if (bind && hostname === bind) return true;
   if (policy.tunnelHost && hostname === policy.tunnelHost) return true;
+  // Docker/Podman container-to-host gateway aliases (for in-container hook curls).
+  if (DOCKER_HOST_GATEWAY_ALIASES.includes(hostname)) return true;
   for (const suffix of DEFAULT_TRUSTED_HOST_SUFFIXES) {
     if (hostname === suffix.slice(1) || hostname.endsWith(suffix)) return true;
   }

src/web/ports/auth-port.ts

@@ -11,6 +11,19 @@ export interface AuthSessionRecord {
   ua: string;
   createdAt: number;
   method: 'qr' | 'basic';
+  /**
+   * Multi-user identity carried by the cookie (single-user leaves these unset).
+   * Snapshotted at mint time. Authorization-relevant admin changes (password reset,
+   * disable, delete, role change, bypass-grant change) revoke the user's sessions so
+   * a stale snapshot can't outlive the change; additionally the cookie fast-path
+   * re-reads role/disabled/mustChangePassword live from the store each request, so an
+   * out-of-band CLI mutation also takes effect promptly. See docs/multi-user-plan.md
+   * section 5.
+   */
+  username?: string;
+  role?: 'admin' | 'user';
+  /** Whether this user must change their password before other actions are allowed. */
+  mustChangePassword?: boolean;
 }
 
 export interface AuthPort {

src/web/ports/config-port.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ export interface ConfigPort {
   getClaudeModeConfig(): Promise<{ claudeMode?: ClaudeMode; allowedTools?: string }>;
   getTerminalHistoryConfig(): Promise<TerminalHistoryConfig>;
   getDefaultClaudeMdPath(): Promise<string | undefined>;
-  getLightState(): unknown;
+  getLightState(identity?: { username: string; role: 'admin' | 'user' }): unknown;
   getLightSessionsState(): unknown[];
   startTranscriptWatcher(sessionId: string, transcriptPath: string): void;
   stopTranscriptWatcher(sessionId: string): void;

src/web/ports/infra-port.ts

@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ export interface ScheduledRun {
   completedTasks: number;
   totalCost: number;
   logs: string[];
+  /** Multi-user owner (username) — undefined in single-user mode. Used to scope
+   * list/delete and to downgrade the spawned Session's permission mode. */
+  owner?: string;
 }
 
 export interface InfraPort {
@@ -33,6 +36,6 @@ export interface InfraPort {
   readonly teamWatcher: TeamWatcher;
   readonly tunnelManager: TunnelManager;
   readonly pushStore: PushSubscriptionStore;
-  startScheduledRun(prompt: string, workingDir: string, durationMinutes: number): Promise<ScheduledRun>;
+  startScheduledRun(prompt: string, workingDir: string, durationMinutes: number, owner?: string): Promise<ScheduledRun>;
   stopScheduledRun(id: string): Promise<void>;
 }

src/web/public/admin-ui.js

@@ -0,0 +1,557 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Multi-user frontend: identity boot, admin Users panel, the
+ * change-password flow, and the full Admin Panel modal (user CRUD, per-user
+ * permissions, case-folder management) opened by the header Admin Panel button
+ * (#adminPanelBtn, revealed for admins in multi-user mode). Self-contained
+ * (builds its own DOM) so it needs no index.html surgery beyond the script tag
+ * and button; integrates with the existing App Settings modal by injecting a
+ * "Users" tab (admins in multi-user mode only). Live-refreshes on the SSE
+ * admin:usersChanged event (wired in app.js → window.codemanAdmin.onUsersChanged).
+ *
+ * @dependency app.js (window.app), settings-ui.js (App Settings modal + tab switch)
+ * @loadorder after settings-ui.js / ultracode-panel.js, before session-ui.js
+ *
+ * In single-user mode GET /api/me returns a synthetic admin with multiUser:false,
+ * so none of the admin UI is shown and behavior is unchanged.
+ */
+(function () {
+  'use strict';
+
+  const unwrap = (body) => (body && typeof body === 'object' && 'data' in body ? body.data : body);
+
+  async function apiGet(path) {
+    const res = await window.fetch(path, { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } });
+    return unwrap(await res.json());
+  }
+  async function apiSend(method, path, body) {
+    const res = await window.fetch(path, {
+      method,
+      headers: body ? { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } : {},
+      body: body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,
+    });
+    let json = null;
+    try {
+      json = await res.json();
+    } catch {
+      /* empty body */
+    }
+    return { ok: res.ok, status: res.status, body: json, data: unwrap(json) };
+  }
+
+  // ── Change-password modal ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  let cpModal = null;
+  function buildChangePasswordModal() {
+    if (cpModal) return cpModal;
+    const el = document.createElement('div');
+    el.className = 'modal';
+    el.id = 'changePasswordModal';
+    el.style.zIndex = '3100';
+    el.innerHTML = `
+      <div class="modal-content" style="max-width:420px">
+        <div class="modal-header"><h2>Change Password</h2></div>
+        <div class="modal-body">
+          <p id="cpMustNote" class="form-hint" style="display:none;color:var(--warning,#c80)">
+            You must change your password before continuing.</p>
+          <div class="form-row"><label>Current password</label>
+            <input type="password" id="cpCurrent" class="form-input" autocomplete="current-password"></div>
+          <div class="form-row"><label>New password (min 8)</label>
+            <input type="password" id="cpNew" class="form-input" autocomplete="new-password"></div>
+          <div class="form-row"><label>Confirm new password</label>
+            <input type="password" id="cpConfirm" class="form-input" autocomplete="new-password"></div>
+          <p id="cpError" style="color:var(--error,#c33);min-height:1.2em"></p>
+        </div>
+        <div class="modal-footer">
+          <button class="btn" id="cpCancel">Cancel</button>
+          <button class="btn btn-primary" id="cpSubmit">Change password</button>
+        </div>
+      </div>`;
+    document.body.appendChild(el);
+    el.querySelector('#cpCancel').onclick = () => (el.style.display = 'none');
+    el.querySelector('#cpSubmit').onclick = async () => {
+      const current = el.querySelector('#cpCurrent').value;
+      const nw = el.querySelector('#cpNew').value;
+      const confirm = el.querySelector('#cpConfirm').value;
+      const err = el.querySelector('#cpError');
+      err.textContent = '';
+      if (nw.length < 8) return (err.textContent = 'New password must be at least 8 characters.');
+      if (nw !== confirm) return (err.textContent = 'Passwords do not match.');
+      const r = await apiSend('POST', '/api/me/password', { currentPassword: current, newPassword: nw });
+      if (!r.ok) return (err.textContent = (r.body && r.body.error) || 'Change failed.');
+      el.style.display = 'none';
+      if (window.app && window.app.showToast) window.app.showToast('Password changed');
+    };
+    cpModal = el;
+    return el;
+  }
+  function openChangePassword(forced) {
+    const el = buildChangePasswordModal();
+    el.querySelector('#cpMustNote').style.display = forced ? '' : 'none';
+    el.querySelector('#cpCancel').style.display = forced ? 'none' : '';
+    el.querySelector('#cpError').textContent = '';
+    el.style.display = 'flex';
+  }
+
+  // ── Fetch interceptor: surface PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED ───────────────────
+  function installInterceptor() {
+    const orig = window.fetch;
+    window.fetch = async function (...args) {
+      const res = await orig.apply(this, args);
+      if (res.status === 403) {
+        try {
+          const clone = res.clone();
+          const j = await clone.json();
+          if (j && j.errorCode === 'PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED') openChangePassword(true);
+        } catch {
+          /* not JSON */
+        }
+      }
+      return res;
+    };
+  }
+
+  // ── Admin Users panel (injected into the App Settings modal) ──────────────
+  function injectUsersTab() {
+    const modal = document.getElementById('appSettingsModal');
+    if (!modal || modal.querySelector('[data-tab="settings-users"]')) return;
+    const tabs = modal.querySelector('.modal-tabs');
+    const body = modal.querySelector('.modal-body');
+    if (!tabs || !body) return;
+    const btn = document.createElement('button');
+    btn.className = 'modal-tab-btn';
+    btn.dataset.tab = 'settings-users';
+    btn.textContent = 'Users';
+    tabs.appendChild(btn);
+    const content = document.createElement('div');
+    content.className = 'modal-tab-content hidden';
+    content.id = 'settings-users';
+    content.innerHTML = `
+      <div style="display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center;margin-bottom:8px">
+        <strong>Users</strong>
+        <span>
+          <button class="btn btn-sm" id="adminOpenPanel">Open Admin Panel</button>
+          <button class="btn btn-sm" id="adminAddUser">+ Add user</button>
+        </span>
+      </div>
+      <p class="form-hint">Users share the host account; this separates workspaces, it does not sandbox
+        users from each other. Pair with Docker cases for isolation.</p>
+      <div id="adminUsersTable"></div>
+      <p id="adminUsersMsg" style="min-height:1.2em;color:var(--muted,#888)"></p>`;
+    body.appendChild(content);
+    // Render whenever the tab is shown (the shared switchSettingsTab toggles it).
+    btn.addEventListener('click', renderUsers);
+    content.querySelector('#adminAddUser').onclick = addUserFlow;
+    content.querySelector('#adminOpenPanel').onclick = openAdminPanel;
+  }
+
+  function esc(s) {
+    return String(s).replace(/[&<>"]/g, (c) => ({ '&': '&amp;', '<': '&lt;', '>': '&gt;', '"': '&quot;' })[c]);
+  }
+
+  async function renderUsers() {
+    const table = document.getElementById('adminUsersTable');
+    if (!table) return;
+    table.innerHTML = 'Loading…';
+    let users;
+    try {
+      users = await apiGet('/api/admin/users');
+    } catch {
+      table.innerHTML = 'Failed to load users.';
+      return;
+    }
+    const rows = users
+      .map((u) => {
+        const flags = [
+          u.role === 'admin' ? 'admin' : 'user',
+          u.disabled ? 'disabled' : 'enabled',
+          u.canBypassPermissions ? 'can-bypass' : '',
+          u.mustChangePassword ? 'must-change-pw' : '',
+        ]
+          .filter(Boolean)
+          .join(', ');
+        const st = u.stats || {};
+        return `<tr data-u="${esc(u.username)}">
+          <td>${esc(u.username)}</td>
+          <td style="font-size:.85em;color:var(--muted,#888)">${esc(flags)}</td>
+          <td style="font-size:.85em">${st.liveSessions ?? 0} live · ${st.caseCount ?? 0} cases</td>
+          <td style="white-space:nowrap">
+            <button class="btn btn-xs" data-act="role">${u.role === 'admin' ? 'Demote' : 'Promote'}</button>
+            <button class="btn btn-xs" data-act="disabled">${u.disabled ? 'Enable' : 'Disable'}</button>
+            <button class="btn btn-xs" data-act="bypass">${u.canBypassPermissions ? 'Revoke bypass' : 'Grant bypass'}</button>
+            <button class="btn btn-xs" data-act="reset">Reset pw</button>
+            <button class="btn btn-xs" data-act="delete">Delete</button>
+          </td></tr>`;
+      })
+      .join('');
+    table.innerHTML = `<table style="width:100%;border-collapse:collapse" class="admin-users">
+      <thead><tr><th align="left">User</th><th align="left">Flags</th><th align="left">Usage</th><th></th></tr></thead>
+      <tbody>${rows}</tbody></table>`;
+    table.querySelectorAll('button[data-act]').forEach((b) => {
+      b.onclick = () =>
+        userAction(
+          b.closest('tr').dataset.u,
+          b.dataset.act,
+          users.find((x) => x.username === b.closest('tr').dataset.u)
+        );
+    });
+  }
+
+  function setMsg(t) {
+    const m = document.getElementById('adminUsersMsg');
+    if (m) m.textContent = t || '';
+  }
+
+  async function userAction(username, act, u) {
+    if (act === 'role') {
+      const r = await apiSend('PATCH', `/api/admin/users/${encodeURIComponent(username)}`, {
+        role: u.role === 'admin' ? 'user' : 'admin',
+      });
+      setMsg(r.ok ? `Updated ${username}.` : (r.body && r.body.error) || 'Failed.');
+    } else if (act === 'disabled') {
+      const r = await apiSend('PATCH', `/api/admin/users/${encodeURIComponent(username)}`, { disabled: !u.disabled });
+      setMsg(r.ok ? `Updated ${username}.` : (r.body && r.body.error) || 'Failed.');
+    } else if (act === 'bypass') {
+      const r = await apiSend('PATCH', `/api/admin/users/${encodeURIComponent(username)}`, {
+        canBypassPermissions: !u.canBypassPermissions,
+      });
+      setMsg(r.ok ? `Updated ${username}.` : (r.body && r.body.error) || 'Failed.');
+    } else if (act === 'reset') {
+      if (!window.confirm(`Reset ${username}'s password? They must set a new one on next login.`)) return;
+      const r = await apiSend('POST', `/api/admin/users/${encodeURIComponent(username)}/reset-password`);
+      if (r.ok && r.data && r.data.oneTimePassword) {
+        window.prompt(`One-time password for ${username} (copy it now — shown once):`, r.data.oneTimePassword);
+      } else setMsg((r.body && r.body.error) || 'Reset failed.');
+    } else if (act === 'delete') {
+      const typed = window.prompt(`Type "${username}" to delete this user. Add " +space" to also delete their files.`);
+      if (typed !== username && typed !== `${username} +space`) return setMsg('Delete cancelled.');
+      const deleteSpace = typed.endsWith(' +space');
+      const r = await apiSend('DELETE', `/api/admin/users/${encodeURIComponent(username)}`, { deleteSpace });
+      setMsg(r.ok ? `Deleted ${username}.` : (r.body && r.body.error) || 'Delete failed.');
+    }
+    renderUsers();
+  }
+
+  async function addUserFlow() {
+    const username = window.prompt('New username (lowercase, 2-32 chars, [a-z0-9_-]):');
+    if (!username) return;
+    const admin = window.confirm('Make this user an admin? (OK = admin, Cancel = regular user)');
+    const r = await apiSend('POST', '/api/admin/users', { username: username.trim(), role: admin ? 'admin' : 'user' });
+    if (r.ok && r.data && r.data.oneTimePassword) {
+      window.prompt(`Created ${username}. One-time password (copy it now — shown once):`, r.data.oneTimePassword);
+    } else setMsg((r.body && r.body.error) || 'Create failed.');
+    renderUsers();
+  }
+
+  // ── Admin Panel (big header-button modal) ─────────────────────────────────
+  let apModal = null;
+  let apUsersCache = [];
+  const apOpenDrawers = new Set(); // usernames with an expanded case-folder drawer
+
+  function fmtDate(ts) {
+    return ts ? new Date(ts).toLocaleString() : 'never';
+  }
+  function cssEsc(s) {
+    return window.CSS && window.CSS.escape ? window.CSS.escape(s) : String(s).replace(/"/g, '\\"');
+  }
+  function apSetMsg(t) {
+    const m = document.getElementById('apMsg');
+    if (m) m.textContent = t || '';
+  }
+
+  function buildAdminPanel() {
+    if (apModal) return apModal;
+    const el = document.createElement('div');
+    el.className = 'modal';
+    el.id = 'adminPanelModal';
+    el.style.zIndex = '3000';
+    el.innerHTML = `
+      <div class="modal-content" style="max-width:940px;width:min(96vw,940px)">
+        <div class="modal-header" style="display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center;gap:12px">
+          <h2 style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:8px;margin:0">
+            <svg width="18" height="18" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2"
+              stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true">
+              <path d="M12 22s8-4 8-10V5l-8-3-8 3v7c0 6 8 10 8 10z"/></svg>
+            Admin Panel</h2>
+          <span id="apIdentity" style="color:var(--text-muted,#888);font-size:.85em"></span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="modal-body" style="max-height:70vh;overflow-y:auto">
+          <div style="display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center;margin-bottom:8px">
+            <strong>Users</strong>
+            <button class="btn btn-sm btn-primary" id="apAddToggle">+ Add user</button>
+          </div>
+          <div id="apAddForm" style="display:none;border:1px solid var(--border,#333);border-radius:8px;padding:10px;margin-bottom:10px">
+            <div style="display:flex;gap:10px;flex-wrap:wrap;align-items:flex-end">
+              <div class="form-row" style="margin:0"><label>Username</label>
+                <input id="apNewName" class="form-input" placeholder="lowercase a-z 0-9 _ -" style="width:170px"></div>
+              <div class="form-row" style="margin:0"><label>Role</label>
+                <select id="apNewRole" class="form-input" style="width:110px">
+                  <option value="user">user</option>
+                  <option value="admin">admin</option>
+                </select></div>
+              <div class="form-row" style="margin:0"><label>Password (optional)</label>
+                <input id="apNewPw" type="password" class="form-input" placeholder="blank = one-time pw"
+                  style="width:170px" autocomplete="new-password"></div>
+              <label style="display:flex;align-items:center;gap:5px;white-space:nowrap;margin-bottom:6px">
+                <input type="checkbox" id="apNewBypass"> allow bypass permissions</label>
+              <button class="btn btn-sm btn-primary" id="apCreateUser" style="margin-bottom:2px">Create</button>
+            </div>
+            <p class="form-hint" style="margin:6px 0 0">Without a password a one-time password is generated and shown
+              once; the user must change it on first login. "Bypass" allows shell sessions, cron launch commands, and
+              skip-permissions agents.</p>
+          </div>
+          <div id="apOtp" style="display:none;border:1px solid var(--accent,#38b6f0);border-radius:8px;padding:10px;margin-bottom:10px"></div>
+          <div id="apTable">Loading…</div>
+          <p class="form-hint" style="margin-top:10px">Users share the host OS account: this separates workspaces, it
+            does not sandbox users from each other. Pair with Docker cases for isolation.</p>
+          <p id="apMsg" style="min-height:1.2em;color:var(--text-muted,#888)"></p>
+        </div>
+        <div class="modal-footer">
+          <button class="btn" id="apClose">Close</button>
+        </div>
+      </div>`;
+    document.body.appendChild(el);
+    el.querySelector('#apClose').onclick = () => (el.style.display = 'none');
+    el.addEventListener('click', (e) => {
+      if (e.target === el) el.style.display = 'none';
+    });
+    el.querySelector('#apAddToggle').onclick = () => {
+      const f = el.querySelector('#apAddForm');
+      f.style.display = f.style.display === 'none' ? '' : 'none';
+      if (f.style.display === '') f.querySelector('#apNewName').focus();
+    };
+    el.querySelector('#apCreateUser').onclick = createUserFromForm;
+    apModal = el;
+    return el;
+  }
+
+  function showOneTimePassword(username, otp) {
+    const box = document.getElementById('apOtp');
+    if (!box) return;
+    box.style.display = '';
+    box.innerHTML = `One-time password for <strong>${esc(username)}</strong> (shown once, copy it now):
+      <code style="user-select:all;font-size:1.05em;margin:0 8px">${esc(otp)}</code>
+      <button class="btn btn-xs" id="apOtpCopy">Copy</button>
+      <button class="btn btn-xs" id="apOtpDismiss">Dismiss</button>`;
+    box.querySelector('#apOtpCopy').onclick = () => {
+      if (navigator.clipboard) {
+        navigator.clipboard.writeText(otp).then(() => apSetMsg('Password copied to clipboard.'));
+      }
+    };
+    box.querySelector('#apOtpDismiss').onclick = () => {
+      box.style.display = 'none';
+      box.innerHTML = '';
+    };
+  }
+
+  async function createUserFromForm() {
+    const name = (document.getElementById('apNewName').value || '').trim().toLowerCase();
+    const role = document.getElementById('apNewRole').value;
+    const pw = document.getElementById('apNewPw').value;
+    const bypass = document.getElementById('apNewBypass').checked;
+    if (!name) return apSetMsg('Enter a username.');
+    const body = { username: name, role };
+    if (pw) body.password = pw;
+    if (bypass) body.canBypassPermissions = true;
+    const r = await apiSend('POST', '/api/admin/users', body);
+    if (!r.ok) return apSetMsg((r.body && r.body.error) || 'Create failed.');
+    document.getElementById('apNewName').value = '';
+    document.getElementById('apNewPw').value = '';
+    document.getElementById('apNewBypass').checked = false;
+    apSetMsg(`Created ${name}.`);
+    if (r.data && r.data.oneTimePassword) showOneTimePassword(name, r.data.oneTimePassword);
+    renderPanel();
+  }
+
+  async function renderPanel() {
+    const table = document.getElementById('apTable');
+    if (!table) return;
+    let users;
+    try {
+      users = await apiGet('/api/admin/users');
+    } catch {
+      table.innerHTML = 'Failed to load users.';
+      return;
+    }
+    apUsersCache = users;
+    const meName = (window.__codemanUser || {}).username;
+    const rows = users
+      .map((u) => {
+        const st = u.stats || {};
+        const you = u.username === meName ? ' <span style="color:var(--accent,#38b6f0)">(you)</span>' : '';
+        const role = `<span style="font-weight:600;color:${
+          u.role === 'admin' ? 'var(--accent,#38b6f0)' : 'var(--text-muted,#888)'
+        }">${u.role}</span>`;
+        const status = u.disabled
+          ? '<span style="color:var(--red,#c33)">disabled</span>'
+          : '<span style="color:var(--accent-soft,#4b9)">enabled</span>';
+        const pwFlag = u.mustChangePassword ? ' · must-change-pw' : '';
+        return `<tr data-u="${esc(u.username)}">
+          <td><strong>${esc(u.username)}</strong>${you}</td>
+          <td>${role}</td>
+          <td>${status}${pwFlag}</td>
+          <td>${u.canBypassPermissions ? 'yes' : 'no'}</td>
+          <td style="white-space:nowrap">${st.liveSessions ?? 0} live · ${st.activeSessions ?? 0} logins ·
+            <button class="btn btn-xs" data-act="cases">${st.caseCount ?? 0} cases</button></td>
+          <td style="font-size:.85em;color:var(--text-muted,#888)">${fmtDate(u.lastLoginAt)}</td>
+          <td style="white-space:nowrap">
+            <button class="btn btn-xs" data-act="role">${u.role === 'admin' ? 'Demote' : 'Promote'}</button>
+            <button class="btn btn-xs" data-act="disabled">${u.disabled ? 'Enable' : 'Disable'}</button>
+            <button class="btn btn-xs" data-act="bypass">${u.canBypassPermissions ? 'Revoke bypass' : 'Grant bypass'}</button>
+            <button class="btn btn-xs" data-act="reset">Reset pw</button>
+            <button class="btn btn-xs" data-act="logout">Logout</button>
+            <button class="btn btn-xs" data-act="delete" style="color:var(--red,#c33)">Delete</button>
+          </td></tr>
+          <tr data-drawer="${esc(u.username)}" style="display:none"><td colspan="7"></td></tr>`;
+      })
+      .join('');
+    table.innerHTML = `<table style="width:100%;border-collapse:collapse" class="admin-users">
+      <thead><tr>
+        <th align="left">User</th><th align="left">Role</th><th align="left">Status</th>
+        <th align="left">Bypass</th><th align="left">Activity</th><th align="left">Last login</th><th></th>
+      </tr></thead><tbody>${rows}</tbody></table>`;
+    table.querySelectorAll('button[data-act]').forEach((b) => {
+      const username = b.closest('tr').dataset.u;
+      b.onclick = () => {
+        if (b.dataset.act === 'cases') return toggleCaseDrawer(username);
+        return panelAction(
+          username,
+          b.dataset.act,
+          apUsersCache.find((x) => x.username === username)
+        );
+      };
+    });
+    // Re-open drawers that were expanded before this refresh.
+    for (const name of [...apOpenDrawers]) {
+      if (users.some((u) => u.username === name)) void renderCaseDrawer(name);
+      else apOpenDrawers.delete(name);
+    }
+  }
+
+  async function panelAction(username, act, u) {
+    const path = `/api/admin/users/${encodeURIComponent(username)}`;
+    if (act === 'role') {
+      const r = await apiSend('PATCH', path, { role: u.role === 'admin' ? 'user' : 'admin' });
+      apSetMsg(r.ok ? `Updated ${username}.` : (r.body && r.body.error) || 'Failed.');
+    } else if (act === 'disabled') {
+      const r = await apiSend('PATCH', path, { disabled: !u.disabled });
+      apSetMsg(r.ok ? `Updated ${username}.` : (r.body && r.body.error) || 'Failed.');
+    } else if (act === 'bypass') {
+      const r = await apiSend('PATCH', path, { canBypassPermissions: !u.canBypassPermissions });
+      apSetMsg(r.ok ? `Updated ${username}.` : (r.body && r.body.error) || 'Failed.');
+    } else if (act === 'reset') {
+      if (!window.confirm(`Reset ${username}'s password? They must set a new one on next login.`)) return;
+      const r = await apiSend('POST', `${path}/reset-password`);
+      if (r.ok && r.data && r.data.oneTimePassword) showOneTimePassword(username, r.data.oneTimePassword);
+      else if (!r.ok) apSetMsg((r.body && r.body.error) || 'Reset failed.');
+    } else if (act === 'logout') {
+      const r = await apiSend('POST', `${path}/logout`);
+      apSetMsg(r.ok ? `Revoked ${(r.data && r.data.revoked) || 0} login session(s) for ${username}.` : 'Failed.');
+    } else if (act === 'delete') {
+      if (!window.confirm(`Delete user "${username}"? Their live sessions are killed and logins revoked.`)) return;
+      const deleteSpace = window.confirm(
+        `Also delete ${username}'s files (their cases/workspace folder)?\nOK = delete files too, Cancel = keep files on disk.`
+      );
+      const r = await apiSend('DELETE', path, { deleteSpace });
+      apSetMsg(r.ok ? `Deleted ${username}.` : (r.body && r.body.error) || 'Delete failed.');
+    }
+    renderPanel();
+  }
+
+  async function toggleCaseDrawer(username) {
+    if (apOpenDrawers.has(username)) {
+      apOpenDrawers.delete(username);
+      const row = apModal && apModal.querySelector(`tr[data-drawer="${cssEsc(username)}"]`);
+      if (row) row.style.display = 'none';
+      return;
+    }
+    apOpenDrawers.add(username);
+    await renderCaseDrawer(username);
+  }
+
+  async function renderCaseDrawer(username) {
+    const row = apModal && apModal.querySelector(`tr[data-drawer="${cssEsc(username)}"]`);
+    if (!row) return;
+    row.style.display = '';
+    const cell = row.firstElementChild;
+    cell.innerHTML = 'Loading folders…';
+    let data;
+    try {
+      data = await apiGet(`/api/admin/users/${encodeURIComponent(username)}/cases`);
+    } catch {
+      cell.innerHTML = 'Failed to load case folders.';
+      return;
+    }
+    const items = (data.cases || [])
+      .map(
+        (c) => `
+      <li style="display:flex;gap:10px;align-items:center;padding:2px 0">
+        <code>${esc(c.name)}</code>
+        <span style="color:var(--text-muted,#888);font-size:.85em">${fmtDate(c.modifiedAt)}</span>
+        ${c.liveSessions ? `<span style="color:var(--yellow,#ca0)">${c.liveSessions} live session(s)</span>` : ''}
+        <button class="btn btn-xs" data-case="${esc(c.name)}"
+          ${c.liveSessions ? 'disabled title="In use by a live session"' : ''}>Delete</button>
+      </li>`
+      )
+      .join('');
+    cell.innerHTML = `<div style="padding:6px 4px 6px 16px">
+      <div style="color:var(--text-muted,#888);font-size:.85em;margin-bottom:4px">${esc(data.dir || '')}</div>
+      ${items ? `<ul style="list-style:none;margin:0;padding:0">${items}</ul>` : 'No case folders yet.'}
+    </div>`;
+    cell.querySelectorAll('button[data-case]').forEach((b) => {
+      b.onclick = async () => {
+        const name = b.dataset.case;
+        if (!window.confirm(`Permanently delete ${username}'s case folder "${name}" and ALL files in it?`)) return;
+        const r = await apiSend(
+          'DELETE',
+          `/api/admin/users/${encodeURIComponent(username)}/cases/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`
+        );
+        apSetMsg(r.ok ? `Deleted folder ${name}.` : (r.body && r.body.error) || 'Delete failed.');
+        renderPanel();
+      };
+    });
+  }
+
+  function openAdminPanel() {
+    const me = window.__codemanUser || {};
+    if (!me.multiUser || me.role !== 'admin') return;
+    const el = buildAdminPanel();
+    el.querySelector('#apIdentity').textContent = `signed in as ${me.username} (admin)`;
+    apSetMsg('');
+    el.style.display = 'flex';
+    renderPanel();
+  }
+
+  /** SSE admin:usersChanged: live-refresh whichever admin views are visible. */
+  function onUsersChanged() {
+    if (apModal && apModal.style.display === 'flex') renderPanel();
+    const tab = document.getElementById('settings-users');
+    if (tab && !tab.classList.contains('hidden')) renderUsers();
+  }
+
+  // ── Boot ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  async function boot() {
+    installInterceptor();
+    let me = null;
+    try {
+      me = await apiGet('/api/me');
+    } catch {
+      /* server may be pre-auth */
+    }
+    window.__codemanUser = me || { username: 'admin', role: 'admin', multiUser: false };
+    document.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent('codeman:me', { detail: window.__codemanUser }));
+    if (window.__codemanUser.mustChangePassword) openChangePassword(true);
+    if (window.__codemanUser.multiUser && window.__codemanUser.role === 'admin') {
+      injectUsersTab();
+      // Reveal the big header Admin Panel button (template ships it hidden).
+      const btn = document.getElementById('adminPanelBtn');
+      if (btn) btn.classList.remove('btn-admin-panel--hidden');
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (document.readyState === 'loading') {
+    document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', boot);
+  } else {
+    boot();
+  }
+
+  window.codemanAdmin = { openChangePassword, renderUsers, openAdminPanel, onUsersChanged };
+})();

src/web/public/app.js

@@ -216,6 +216,10 @@ const _SSE_HANDLER_MAP = [
   [SSE_EVENTS.MUX_DIED, '_onMuxDied'],
   [SSE_EVENTS.MUX_STATS_UPDATED, '_onMuxStatsUpdated'],
 
+  // Remote auto-reconnect (COD-108)
+  [SSE_EVENTS.REMOTE_SESSION_RECONNECTED, '_onRemoteSessionReconnected'],
+  [SSE_EVENTS.REMOTE_RECONNECT_EXHAUSTED, '_onRemoteReconnectExhausted'],
+
   // Ralph
   [SSE_EVENTS.SESSION_RALPH_LOOP_UPDATE, '_onRalphLoopUpdate'],
   [SSE_EVENTS.SESSION_RALPH_TODO_UPDATE, '_onRalphTodoUpdate'],
@@ -287,6 +291,12 @@ const _SSE_HANDLER_MAP = [
 
   // Clipboard
   [SSE_EVENTS.CLIPBOARD_WRITE, '_onClipboardWrite'],
+
+  // Session order (global tab order sync, COD-131)
+  [SSE_EVENTS.SESSION_ORDER_CHANGED, '_onSessionOrderChanged'],
+
+  // Web tabs (dashboard URLs)
+  [SSE_EVENTS.WEBVIEW_CHANGED, '_onWebviewChanged'],
 ];
 
 
@@ -787,6 +797,7 @@ class CodemanApp {
     this.applyHeaderVisibilitySettings();
     this.restorePlanUsageChip();
     this.applySkin();
+    this.applyLocalization();
     this.applyTabWrapSettings();
     this.applyMonitorVisibility();
     // Remove mobile-init class now that JS has applied visibility settings.
@@ -813,6 +824,7 @@ class CodemanApp {
     const settingsPromise = fetch('/api/settings').then(r => r.ok ? r.json() : null).then(env => env?.data ?? null).catch(() => null);
     this.loadQuickStartCases(null, settingsPromise);
     this._initRunMode();
+    this.initWebviews?.();
     this.setupEventListeners();
     // Mobile: ensure button taps register even when keyboard is visible.
     // On mobile, tapping a button while the soft keyboard is up causes the
@@ -845,6 +857,7 @@ class CodemanApp {
     this.loadAppSettingsFromServer(settingsPromise).then(() => {
       this.applyHeaderVisibilitySettings();
       this.applySkin();
+      this.applyLocalization();
       this.applyTabWrapSettings();
       this.applyMonitorVisibility();
       // ultracodeFloatingWindows syncs from the server (non-display key), but on a
@@ -998,9 +1011,18 @@ class CodemanApp {
         const digitMatch = code.match(/^Digit([1-9])$/);
         if (digitMatch) {
           const idx = parseInt(digitMatch[1], 10) - 1;
+          // Sessions occupy 1..N and web tabs continue from N+1, matching the
+          // numbers actually painted on the tabs.
           if (idx < this.sessionOrder.length) {
             e.preventDefault();
             this.selectSession(this.sessionOrder[idx]);
+          } else {
+            const webIdx = idx - this.sessionOrder.length;
+            const webId = (this.webviewOrder || [])[webIdx];
+            if (webId) {
+              e.preventDefault();
+              this.openWebview(webId);
+            }
           }
           return;
         }
@@ -1300,7 +1322,7 @@ class CodemanApp {
     if (titleEl) { titleEl.textContent = name; titleEl.style.display = ''; }
     const redock = document.getElementById('soloRedockBtn');
     if (redock) redock.style.display = '';
-    document.title = name + ' — Codeman';
+    document.title = name + ' — ' + (window.CodemanI18n?.displayName || 'Codeman');
     if (this.notificationManager) this.notificationManager.originalTitle = document.title;
     // Neutralize the dashboard-only brand click in a solo window.
     const logo = document.querySelector('.header-brand .logo');
@@ -1318,7 +1340,8 @@ class CodemanApp {
       + '<p>This session has ended or is no longer available.</p>'
       + '<button class="btn-primary" onclick="window.close()">Close window</button>';
     document.body.appendChild(el);
-    document.title = 'Session ended — Codeman';
+    document.title = (window.codemanT?.('Session ended') || 'Session ended')
+      + ' — ' + (window.CodemanI18n?.displayName || 'Codeman');
   }
 
   connectSSE() {
@@ -1433,6 +1456,93 @@ class CodemanApp {
     for (const event of [SSE_EVENTS.SESSION_CREATED, SSE_EVENTS.SESSION_DELETED]) {
       addListener(event, () => this._onSessionListMaybeChanged());
     }
+
+    // Docker export/import: toast + refresh the Manage-tab exports list on completion.
+    addListener(SSE_EVENTS.DOCKER_EXPORT_COMPLETE, (e) => {
+      try {
+        const d = e.data ? JSON.parse(e.data) : {};
+        this.showToast(`Docker export ready: ${d.bundle} (${Math.round((d.sizeBytes || 0) / 1e6)} MB)`, 'success');
+        this.refreshDockerExports?.();
+      } catch (err) {
+        console.error('[SSE] docker export complete:', err);
+      }
+    });
+    addListener(SSE_EVENTS.DOCKER_EXPORT_FAILED, (e) => {
+      try {
+        const d = e.data ? JSON.parse(e.data) : {};
+        this.showToast(`Docker export failed: ${d.error || 'unknown error'}`, 'error');
+      } catch (err) {
+        console.error('[SSE] docker export failed:', err);
+      }
+    });
+    // Import + drift-recreate completions: refresh case lists in EVERY open tab
+    // (the initiating tab already refreshes via its own fetch response).
+    addListener(SSE_EVENTS.DOCKER_IMPORT_COMPLETE, (e) => {
+      try {
+        const d = e.data ? JSON.parse(e.data) : {};
+        this.showToast(`Docker bundle imported as case "${d.name}"`, 'success');
+        this.loadQuickStartCases?.();
+        this.refreshDockerExports?.();
+      } catch (err) {
+        console.error('[SSE] docker import complete:', err);
+      }
+    });
+    addListener(SSE_EVENTS.DOCKER_CONTAINER_RECREATED, (e) => {
+      try {
+        const d = e.data ? JSON.parse(e.data) : {};
+        this.showToast(`Container for "${d.name}" removed — next launch recreates it with the new config`, 'info');
+      } catch (err) {
+        console.error('[SSE] docker container recreated:', err);
+      }
+    });
+    // Multi-user admin: live-refresh whichever admin views (panel/Users tab) are open.
+    addListener(SSE_EVENTS.ADMIN_USERS_CHANGED, () => {
+      window.codemanAdmin?.onUsersChanged?.();
+    });
+    // Base image auto-build on first Docker case (build-on-first-use). A single
+    // multi-minute event; surface start/finish so the Run spinner is explained.
+    addListener(SSE_EVENTS.DOCKER_IMAGE_BUILD_STARTED, () => {
+      this.showToast('Building the Codeman agent image (first Docker case, a few minutes)...', 'info', {
+        duration: 8000,
+      });
+    });
+    addListener(SSE_EVENTS.DOCKER_IMAGE_BUILD_COMPLETE, (e) => {
+      try {
+        const d = e.data ? JSON.parse(e.data) : {};
+        if (d.error) this.showToast(`Agent image build failed: ${d.error}`, 'error');
+        else this.showToast('Agent image ready. Starting the container...', 'success');
+      } catch (err) {
+        console.error('[SSE] docker image build complete:', err);
+      }
+    });
+    addListener(SSE_EVENTS.DOCKER_IMAGE_BUILD_FAILED, (e) => {
+      try {
+        const d = e.data ? JSON.parse(e.data) : {};
+        this.showToast(`Agent image build failed: ${d.error || 'unknown error'}`, 'error');
+      } catch (err) {
+        console.error('[SSE] docker image build failed:', err);
+      }
+    });
+
+    // COD-139: a session:pinned event updates the local live-session pin flag (so
+    // a subsequent render is consistent) and re-sorts the open session manager /
+    // welcome list so pinned sessions float to the top.
+    addListener(SSE_EVENTS.SESSION_PINNED, (e) => {
+      let data = null;
+      try {
+        data = JSON.parse(e.data);
+      } catch {
+        /* ignore malformed payload */
+      }
+      if (data && data.id) {
+        const live = this.sessions.get(data.id);
+        if (live) {
+          live.pinned = data.pinned === true;
+          live.pinnedAt = data.pinned ? data.pinnedAt : undefined;
+        }
+      }
+      this._onSessionListMaybeChanged();
+    });
   }
 
   // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@@ -1825,7 +1935,9 @@ class CodemanApp {
         body.innerHTML = this._renderMarkdown(lastResponse);
         this._bindResponseViewerInteractions(body);
       } else {
-        body.textContent = 'No response yet — send a message in this session first.';
+        body.textContent =
+          window.codemanT?.('No response yet — send a message in this session first.') ||
+          'No response yet — send a message in this session first.';
       }
 
       // Reset state for fresh open
@@ -2956,6 +3068,13 @@ class CodemanApp {
     // on another device).
     try { localStorage.removeItem('codeman-tab-meta'); } catch {}
 
+    // COD-131: server is authoritative for global tab order. Seed localStorage
+    // from the server snapshot (if present) so syncSessionOrder() reconciles
+    // against the cross-device order rather than this device's stale local copy.
+    if (Array.isArray(data.sessionOrder) && data.sessionOrder.length) {
+      try { localStorage.setItem('codeman-session-order', JSON.stringify(data.sessionOrder)); } catch {}
+    }
+
     // Sync sessionOrder with current sessions (preserve order, add new, remove stale)
     this.syncSessionOrder();
 
@@ -3166,9 +3285,21 @@ class CodemanApp {
     const existingIds = new Set([...existingTabs].map(t => t.dataset.id));
     const currentIds = new Set(this.sessions.keys());
 
-    // Check if we can do incremental update (same session IDs)
+    // Web tabs live in the same strip but are not in this.sessions, so they need
+    // their own change check. Without it, the session-only comparison below is
+    // vacuously "unchanged" whenever session count is stable — most visibly with
+    // ZERO sessions (0 === 0), where opening a dashboard would never draw its tab.
+    const existingWebIds = [...container.querySelectorAll('.session-tab[data-webview-id]')].map(
+      t => t.dataset.webviewId
+    );
+    const wantedWebIds = (this.webviewOrder || []).filter(id => this.webviews?.has(id));
+    const webTabsUnchanged =
+      existingWebIds.length === wantedWebIds.length && existingWebIds.every((id, i) => id === wantedWebIds[i]);
+
+    // Check if we can do incremental update (same session IDs and same web tabs)
     const canIncremental = existingIds.size === currentIds.size &&
-      [...existingIds].every(id => currentIds.has(id));
+      [...existingIds].every(id => currentIds.has(id)) &&
+      webTabsUnchanged;
 
     if (canIncremental) {
       // Incremental update - only modify changed properties
@@ -3176,7 +3307,12 @@ class CodemanApp {
         const tab = container.querySelector(`.session-tab[data-id="${id}"]`);
         if (!tab) continue;
 
-        const isActive = id === this.activeSessionId;
+        // A web tab owns the active state while one is open. activeSessionId stays
+        // set (the terminal keeps streaming underneath, and switching back is
+        // instant): only the highlight moves. Without this the debounced render
+        // re-marks the session tab active moments after a web tab was selected,
+        // leaving two tabs lit at once.
+        const isActive = id === this.activeSessionId && !this.activeWebviewId;
         const status = session.status || 'idle';
         const name = this.getSessionName(session);
         const taskStats = session.taskStats || { running: 0, total: 0 };
@@ -3363,7 +3499,9 @@ class CodemanApp {
       const session = this.sessions.get(id);
       if (!session) continue; // Skip if session was removed
 
-      const isActive = id === this.activeSessionId;
+      // See the note in the incremental path: a web tab owns the active highlight
+      // while one is open, even though activeSessionId stays set.
+      const isActive = id === this.activeSessionId && !this.activeWebviewId;
       const status = session.status || 'idle';
       const name = this.getSessionName(session);
       const mode = session.mode || 'claude';
@@ -3410,6 +3548,11 @@ class CodemanApp {
       _tabIdx++;
     }
 
+    // Web tabs (dashboard URLs) render after the session tabs, continuing the
+    // Alt+N numbering. They carry data-webview-id instead of data-id, so every
+    // session-tab code path above (drag-and-drop, alerts, badges) skips them.
+    parts.push(this.renderWebviewTabs ? this.renderWebviewTabs(_tabIdx) : '');
+
     container.innerHTML = parts.join('');
 
     // Set up drag-and-drop handlers for tab reordering
@@ -3520,13 +3663,42 @@ class CodemanApp {
     }
   }
 
-  // Save session order to localStorage
+  // Save session order to localStorage and (debounced) sync to the server so it
+  // follows the user across devices (COD-131). localStorage stays the offline
+  // fallback; the server is authoritative and echoes back via SSE.
   saveSessionOrder() {
     try {
       localStorage.setItem('codeman-session-order', JSON.stringify(this.sessionOrder));
     } catch {
       // Ignore storage errors
     }
+    const order = [...this.sessionOrder];
+    this._debouncedCall('saveSessionOrderServer', () => {
+      fetch('/api/session-order', {
+        method: 'PUT',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ order }),
+      }).catch(() => {});
+    }, 400);
+  }
+
+  // COD-131: another device (or our own debounced push) reordered tabs. Adopt the
+  // server order as the new base and reconcile to our currently-open sessions.
+  // Guard against no-op churn so an echo of our own push doesn't flicker the tabs.
+  _onSessionOrderChanged(data) {
+    if (!data || !Array.isArray(data.order)) return;
+    try {
+      localStorage.setItem('codeman-session-order', JSON.stringify(data.order));
+    } catch {
+      // Ignore storage errors
+    }
+    const before = JSON.stringify(this.sessionOrder);
+    this.syncSessionOrder();
+    // Only re-render when the reconciled order actually changed (avoids flicker
+    // when the broadcast is just an echo of the order we already have).
+    if (JSON.stringify(this.sessionOrder) !== before) {
+      this._fullRenderSessionTabs();
+    }
   }
 
   // Set up drag-and-drop handlers on tab elements
@@ -3915,6 +4087,9 @@ class CodemanApp {
       return; // newer tab switch won
     }
 
+    // A session tab takes the stage back from any active web tab.
+    this._hideWebviewLayer?.();
+
     this._cleanupPreviousSession(sessionId);
     this.activeSessionId = sessionId;
     try { localStorage.setItem('codeman-active-session', sessionId); } catch {}

src/web/public/constants.js

@@ -322,6 +322,7 @@ const SSE_EVENTS = {
   SESSION_LIMIT_RESUME_CANCELLED: 'session:limitResumeCancelled',
   SESSION_RESPAWN_BREAKER_TRIPPED: 'session:respawnBreakerTripped',
   SESSION_CLI_INFO: 'session:cliInfo',
+  SESSION_PINNED: 'session:pinned',
   SESSION_MESSAGE: 'session:message',
   SESSION_INTERACTIVE: 'session:interactive',
   SESSION_RUNNING: 'session:running',
@@ -379,6 +380,11 @@ const SSE_EVENTS = {
   MUX_DIED: 'mux:died',
   MUX_STATS_UPDATED: 'mux:statsUpdated',
 
+  // Remote auto-reconnect (COD-108)
+  REMOTE_SESSION_DROPPED: 'remote:sessionDropped',
+  REMOTE_SESSION_RECONNECTED: 'remote:sessionReconnected',
+  REMOTE_RECONNECT_EXHAUSTED: 'remote:reconnectExhausted',
+
   // Ralph
   SESSION_RALPH_LOOP_UPDATE: 'session:ralphLoopUpdate',
   SESSION_RALPH_TODO_UPDATE: 'session:ralphTodoUpdate',
@@ -474,6 +480,23 @@ const SSE_EVENTS = {
   CASE_LINKED: 'case:linked',
   CASE_DELETED: 'case:deleted',
   CASE_ORDER_CHANGED: 'case:order-changed',
+  DOCKER_EXPORT_COMPLETE: 'docker:exportComplete',
+  DOCKER_EXPORT_FAILED: 'docker:exportFailed',
+  DOCKER_IMPORT_COMPLETE: 'docker:importComplete',
+  DOCKER_IMAGE_BUILD_STARTED: 'docker:imageBuildStarted',
+  DOCKER_IMAGE_BUILD_PROGRESS: 'docker:imageBuildProgress',
+  DOCKER_IMAGE_BUILD_COMPLETE: 'docker:imageBuildComplete',
+  DOCKER_IMAGE_BUILD_FAILED: 'docker:imageBuildFailed',
+  // Multi-user (admin-only / targeted)
+  ADMIN_USERS_CHANGED: 'admin:usersChanged',
+  AUTH_PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED: 'auth:passwordChangeRequired',
+  DOCKER_CONTAINER_RECREATED: 'docker:containerRecreated',
+
+  // Session order (global tab order sync)
+  SESSION_ORDER_CHANGED: 'session:orderChanged',
+
+  // Web tabs (dashboard URLs)
+  WEBVIEW_CHANGED: 'webview:changed',
 };
 
 // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

src/web/public/i18n.js

@@ -0,0 +1,957 @@
+/**
+ * @fileoverview Dependency-free browser localization and user-facing branding.
+ *
+ * English remains the canonical source language. The translator covers the static
+ * application shell plus DOM content inserted later by the plain-JS UI modules.
+ * It deliberately skips terminal/file/response/user-name surfaces so user content
+ * is never mistaken for application copy. Missing entries fall back to English.
+ *
+ * @dependency none (loads after constants.js, before all UI modules)
+ * @loadorder 1.5 of 16
+ */
+
+(function initCodemanI18n(global) {
+  'use strict';
+
+  const DEFAULT_NAME = 'Codeman';
+  const SUPPORTED_LANGUAGES = new Set(['en', 'zh-CN']);
+  const TRANSLATABLE_ATTRIBUTES = ['title', 'aria-label', 'placeholder'];
+  const SKIP_SELECTOR = [
+    '[data-i18n-skip]',
+    '.xterm',
+    '.terminal-container',
+    '.terminal-output',
+    '.response-content',
+    '.response-viewer-content',
+    '.file-preview-content',
+    '.session-tab-name',
+    '.session-name',
+    '.case-name',
+    '.notif-item-message',
+    'pre',
+    'code',
+    'script',
+    'style',
+    'textarea',
+  ].join(',');
+  const USER_TEXT_SELECTOR = [
+    '.history-item-title',
+    '.history-item-subtitle',
+    '.history-detail-prompt',
+    '.history-detail-path',
+    '.folder-history-subtitle',
+  ].join(',');
+
+  // Exact English-source translations. Technical names, command examples, model
+  // names, keyboard chords, and user-authored content intentionally stay unchanged.
+  const ZH_CN = Object.freeze({
+    'Skip to terminal': '跳转到终端',
+    'Go to main page': '返回主页',
+    'Session tabs': '会话标签页',
+    'Admin Panel': '管理面板',
+    'Open admin panel': '打开管理面板',
+    'Re-dock to dashboard (close window)': '重新停靠到主界面（关闭窗口）',
+    'Tunnel status': '隧道状态',
+    'Decrease font size': '减小字体',
+    'Increase font size': '增大字体',
+    'Current font size': '当前字体大小',
+    'System resource usage': '系统资源使用情况',
+    'Redraw terminal': '重绘终端',
+    'Redraw terminal to fit current screen (Ctrl+Shift+R)': '重绘终端以适应当前屏幕（Ctrl+Shift+R）',
+    'View last response': '查看最近一次回复',
+    'Away Digest': '离开期间摘要',
+    'Open away digest': '打开离开期间摘要',
+    'Session Manager': '会话管理器',
+    'Session actions': '会话操作',
+    'Open session manager': '打开会话管理器',
+    Attachments: '附件',
+    'Open attachment history': '打开附件历史',
+    'File Viewer': '文件查看器',
+    'Open file viewer': '打开文件查看器',
+    'Open Codeman across all displays': '在所有显示器上打开 {name}',
+    'Ultracode / Workflow agents': 'Ultracode / Workflow 智能体',
+    'Open ultracode workflow agents': '打开 Ultracode 工作流智能体',
+    Notifications: '通知',
+    'Toggle notifications': '切换通知面板',
+    'Session Lifecycle Log': '会话生命周期日志',
+    'Open session lifecycle log': '打开会话生命周期日志',
+    'App Settings': '应用设置',
+    'Open app settings': '打开应用设置',
+    'Total tokens across all sessions': '所有会话的 Token 总数',
+    'Token usage across active sessions': '活动会话的 Token 使用量',
+    'Instance count': '实例数量',
+    'No response yet': '暂无回复',
+    'No response yet — send a message in this session first.': '暂无回复，请先在此会话中发送一条消息。',
+    'Last Response': '最近一次回复',
+    More: '更多',
+    'Codeman version': '{name}版本',
+    Stop: '停止',
+    Watching: '监视中',
+    Orchestrator: '编排器',
+    Close: '关闭',
+    'Close window': '关闭窗口',
+    'Session unavailable': '会话不可用',
+    'This session has ended or is no longer available.': '此会话已结束或不再可用。',
+
+    // Welcome / quick start / common actions
+    'Manage AI Coding tools in persistent tmux sessions.': '在持久化 tmux 会话中管理 AI 编程工具。',
+    'Select case': '选择案例',
+    'Select Case': '选择案例',
+    'All cases': '全部案例',
+    'No directory': '未选择目录',
+    Run: '运行',
+    'Run Claude Code': '运行 Claude Code',
+    'Run OpenCode': '运行 OpenCode',
+    'Run Gemini': '运行 Gemini',
+    'Run Shell': '运行 Shell',
+    'Select AI backend': '选择 AI 后端',
+    'Create New Case': '新建案例',
+    'Create new case': '新建案例',
+    'Link Existing': '关联现有目录',
+    'Add Case': '添加案例',
+    'Open sessions': '打开会话',
+    'Recent Sessions': '最近会话',
+    'Search sessions by name, prompt, or path…': '按名称、提示词或路径搜索会话…',
+    'Search open sessions or start a new one': '搜索已打开会话或启动新会话',
+    'Find Open Session': '查找已打开会话',
+    'No background agents': '没有后台智能体',
+    'No background agents detected': '未检测到后台智能体',
+    'No notifications': '没有通知',
+    'No mux sessions': '没有 mux 会话',
+    'No lifecycle entries found': '未找到生命周期记录',
+    'No ultracode runs detected': '未检测到 Ultracode 运行',
+
+    // Global/common controls
+    Display: '显示',
+    'Claude CLI': 'Claude CLI',
+    'Codex CLI': 'Codex CLI',
+    Models: '模型',
+    Shortcuts: '快捷键',
+    Voice: '语音',
+    Save: '保存',
+    Cancel: '取消',
+    Apply: '应用',
+    Create: '创建',
+    Add: '添加',
+    Delete: '删除',
+    Remove: '移除',
+    Edit: '编辑',
+    Refresh: '刷新',
+    Back: '返回',
+    Next: '下一步',
+    Previous: '上一步',
+    Clear: '清除',
+    'Clear all': '全部清除',
+    'Clear All': '全部清除',
+    Search: '搜索',
+    Filter: '筛选',
+    Enable: '启用',
+    Enabled: '已启用',
+    Disabled: '已禁用',
+    Active: '活动',
+    'Not active': '未活动',
+    On: '开',
+    Off: '关',
+    Yes: '是',
+    No: '否',
+    Optional: '可选',
+    Default: '默认',
+    Custom: '自定义',
+    Name: '名称',
+    Description: '描述',
+    Status: '状态',
+    Reason: '原因',
+    Time: '时间',
+    Event: '事件',
+    Events: '事件',
+    Session: '会话',
+    Sessions: '会话',
+    Files: '文件',
+    History: '历史',
+    Summary: '摘要',
+    Details: '详情',
+    Options: '选项',
+    Settings: '设置',
+    Help: '帮助',
+    Loading: '正在加载',
+    Error: '错误',
+    Errors: '错误',
+    Warning: '警告',
+    Warnings: '警告',
+    Info: '信息',
+    Complete: '完成',
+    Completed: '已完成',
+    Stopped: '已停止',
+    Running: '运行中',
+    Idle: '空闲',
+    Working: '工作中',
+    Today: '今天',
+    Home: '主页',
+    Local: '本地',
+    Remote: '远程',
+    Docker: 'Docker',
+    Terminal: '终端',
+    Prompt: '提示词',
+    Source: '来源',
+    Type: '类型',
+    Language: '语言',
+
+    // Display settings
+    'Branding & Language': '品牌与语言',
+    'Display Name': '显示名称',
+    'Interface Language': '界面语言',
+    'Name shown in the browser UI and window title. Supports Unicode, including Chinese.':
+      '显示在浏览器界面和窗口标题中的名称。支持 Unicode，包括中文。',
+    'Language for this device. Dynamic status messages and dialogs use the same language.':
+      '此设备使用的界面语言。动态状态消息与对话框也会使用同一语言。',
+    English: 'English',
+    Appearance: '外观',
+    Skin: '皮肤',
+    'Visual theme for this device (not synced)': '此设备的视觉主题（不同步）',
+    'Daylight Blue': '日光蓝',
+    'Daylight Green': '日光绿',
+    'OG Codeman': '经典 {name}',
+    Performance: '性能',
+    'WebGL Renderer': 'WebGL 渲染器',
+    'Header Displays': '顶部栏显示',
+    'Font Controls': '字体控制',
+    'System Stats': '系统状态',
+    'Lifecycle Log': '生命周期日志',
+    'Response Viewer': '回复查看器',
+    'Attachments Button': '附件按钮',
+    'Multi-monitor Button': '多显示器按钮',
+    'Session Manager Button': '会话管理器按钮',
+    'Away Digest Button': '离开期间摘要按钮',
+    'Cron Button': '定时任务按钮',
+    'Redraw Terminal Button': '重绘终端按钮',
+    'Tab Bar': '标签栏',
+    'Tall Tabs (Name + Folder)': '双行标签（名称 + 文件夹）',
+    Panels: '面板',
+    Monitor: '监视器',
+    'Project Insights': '项目洞察',
+    'File Browser': '文件浏览器',
+    Subagents: '子智能体',
+    'Ultracode Agents': 'Ultracode 智能体',
+    'Ultracode Floating Windows': 'Ultracode 浮动窗口',
+    'Subagent Options': '子智能体选项',
+    'Enable Tracking': '启用跟踪',
+    'Active Tab Only': '仅活动标签页',
+    'Image Watcher': '图像监视器',
+    'Enable Globally': '全局启用',
+    'Remote Access': '远程访问',
+    'Cloudflare Tunnel': 'Cloudflare 隧道',
+    'Tunnel URL': '隧道地址',
+    'Upload URL': '上传地址',
+    Updates: '更新',
+    'Current Version': '当前版本',
+    'Check for Updates': '检查更新',
+    'Check now': '立即检查',
+    'Update available': '有可用更新',
+    'Update now': '立即更新',
+    'Show CPU and memory usage in header': '在顶部栏显示 CPU 与内存使用情况',
+    'Show session lifecycle log button in header': '在顶部栏显示会话生命周期日志按钮',
+    'Show the response viewer (eye) button in header': '在顶部栏显示回复查看器（眼睛）按钮',
+    'Show the file viewer button in header (opens the file browser panel for the active session)':
+      '在顶部栏显示文件查看器按钮（打开当前会话的文件浏览器面板）',
+    'Show the attachments button in header (opens the attachment history drawer)':
+      '在顶部栏显示附件按钮（打开附件历史抽屉）',
+    'Show the multi-monitor button in the header (opens Codeman spanned across all displays)':
+      '在顶部栏显示多显示器按钮（跨所有显示器打开 {name}）',
+    'Show the session manager button in the header (opens the session manager — sessions also stay reachable via the Ctrl+K palette)':
+      '在顶部栏显示会话管理器按钮（也可通过 Ctrl+K 面板访问会话）',
+    "Show the away digest button in the header (opens the 'what happened while you were away' summary)":
+      '在顶部栏显示离开期间摘要按钮',
+    'Show the Cron button in the footer toolbar (opens the cron jobs manager)': '在底部工具栏显示定时任务按钮',
+    'Show a terminal redraw button in the header — refit the terminal to the current screen size (useful when switching between devices)':
+      '在顶部栏显示终端重绘按钮，以重新适配当前屏幕大小',
+    'Show folder path below tab name and allow tab bar to wrap into multiple rows':
+      '在标签名称下显示文件夹路径，并允许标签栏换行',
+    'Show Monitor panel at bottom right': '在右下角显示监视器面板',
+    'Show active tools and file viewers in a floating panel': '在浮动面板中显示活动工具与文件查看器',
+    'Show file browser panel on the right side': '在右侧显示文件浏览器面板',
+    'Show the Subagents panel (independent from Monitor)': '显示子智能体面板（独立于监视器）',
+    'Monitor Claude Code background agents in real-time': '实时监视 Claude Code 后台智能体',
+    'Only show subagent windows when their parent tab is selected': '仅在选中父标签页时显示子智能体窗口',
+    'Automatically detect and popup new images in session directories': '自动检测并弹出会话目录中的新图像',
+    'Expose Codeman via Cloudflare Tunnel for remote access': '通过 Cloudflare 隧道远程访问 {name}',
+    'Codeman version currently running': '当前运行的{name}版本',
+    'Check GitHub for a newer Codeman release': '检查 GitHub 上是否有新版 {name}',
+
+    // Input settings
+    Input: '输入',
+    'Local Echo': '本地回显',
+    'CJK Input': '中日韩输入',
+    'Extended Keyboard Bar': '扩展键盘栏',
+    'Gesture Control (beta)': '手势控制（测试版）',
+    'Wheel Scrolls Local History': '滚轮滚动本地历史',
+    'Instant typing feedback with local echo': '通过本地回显即时显示输入',
+    'Dedicated IME input field for CJK languages': '为中日韩语言提供专用输入法文本框',
+    'Extra keys: Tab, Esc, arrows, Ctrl+O': '附加按键：Tab、Esc、方向键、Ctrl+O',
+
+    // CLI / model settings
+    'Startup Mode': '启动模式',
+    'Skip Permissions (default)': '跳过权限确认（默认）',
+    'Auto (classifier-guarded, low prompts)': '自动（分类器保护，较少提示）',
+    'Normal (with prompts)': '普通（显示提示）',
+    'Allowed Tools Only': '仅允许指定工具',
+    'Allowed Tools': '允许的工具',
+    'Comma-separated list of tools to allow': '以逗号分隔允许使用的工具',
+    'Enable Ralph / Todo Tracker': '启用 Ralph / 待办跟踪器',
+    'Claude Permissions': 'Claude 权限',
+    'Agent Teams': '智能体团队',
+    'Claude Model': 'Claude 模型',
+    '1M Opus Context': 'Opus 100 万上下文',
+    'Remote auto-reconnect': '远程自动重连',
+    'Thinking Effort': '思考强度',
+    Low: '低',
+    Medium: '中',
+    High: '高',
+    Max: '最高',
+    'Nice Priority': 'Nice 优先级',
+    'Enable Nice Priority Reduction': '启用 Nice 优先级调整',
+    'Nice Value': 'Nice 值',
+    'Bypass Approvals and Sandbox': '绕过审批与沙箱',
+    'Default Model': '默认模型',
+    'Show Optimizer Recommendations': '显示优化器建议',
+    'Agent Type Overrides': '按智能体类型覆盖',
+    'Use Default': '使用默认值',
+
+    // Notifications / voice / shortcuts
+    'Enable Notifications': '启用通知',
+    'Master toggle for all notification layers': '所有通知层的总开关',
+    'Browser Notifications': '浏览器通知',
+    'Audio Alerts': '声音提醒',
+    'Push Notifications': '推送通知',
+    'Notification Levels': '通知级别',
+    Critical: '严重',
+    'Per-Event Settings': '按事件设置',
+    'Permission prompts': '权限提示',
+    'Questions from Claude': 'Claude 提问',
+    'Session idle': '会话空闲',
+    'Response complete': '回复完成',
+    'Respawn cycles': '重生循环',
+    'Task complete': '任务完成',
+    'Subagent activity': '子智能体活动',
+    Browser: '浏览器',
+    Audio: '声音',
+    Push: '推送',
+    'Voice Input': '语音输入',
+    Provider: '服务商',
+    'Active Provider': '当前服务商',
+    'API Key': 'API 密钥',
+    'Domain Keywords': '领域关键词',
+    'Input Mode': '输入模式',
+    'Direct to input': '直接输入',
+    'Compose dialog': '编辑对话框',
+    'Keyboard Shortcuts': '键盘快捷键',
+    'Customize keyboard shortcuts. Click the binding to capture a new key combination.':
+      '自定义键盘快捷键。点击按键组合即可录入新的组合。',
+    'Show Shortcuts': '显示快捷键',
+    'Full shortcut reference': '完整快捷键参考',
+
+    // Session/case dialogs
+    'Session Options': '会话选项',
+    'Session Name': '会话名称',
+    'Session Color': '会话颜色',
+    'Working Directory': '工作目录',
+    'Set working directory': '设置工作目录',
+    'Resume Conversation': '继续对话',
+    'Close Session': '关闭会话',
+    'Choose how to close': '选择关闭方式',
+    'Tmux session keeps running in background': 'Tmux 会话继续在后台运行',
+    'Terminate the session completely': '彻底终止会话',
+    'Cancel close session': '取消关闭会话',
+    'Case Name': '案例名称',
+    'Folder Path': '文件夹路径',
+    'Default Working Directory': '默认工作目录',
+    'Default directory for new sessions.': '新会话的默认目录。',
+    'Default CLAUDE.md Template': '默认 CLAUDE.md 模板',
+    'Used when creating new cases. Leave empty for built-in template.': '创建新案例时使用；留空则使用内置模板。',
+    'Remote Path': '远程路径',
+    'SSH Host/IP': 'SSH 主机/IP',
+    'SSH Username': 'SSH 用户名',
+    'SSH Port': 'SSH 端口',
+    'Identity File': '身份文件',
+    'Jump Host': '跳板主机',
+    'Advanced SSH': '高级 SSH',
+    'Discover existing sessions': '发现现有会话',
+    'Workspace Path': '工作区路径',
+    'Container settings (optional, sensible defaults)': '容器设置（可选，默认值合理）',
+    Template: '模板',
+    Network: '网络',
+    CPUs: 'CPU 数',
+    Memory: '内存',
+    GPUs: 'GPU',
+
+    // Cron / lifecycle / panels
+    'Cron Jobs': '定时任务',
+    '+ New Job': '+ 新建任务',
+    'New Cron Job': '新建定时任务',
+    Schedule: '计划',
+    'Schedule Type': '计划类型',
+    Once: '一次',
+    Interval: '间隔',
+    Daily: '每天',
+    Weekly: '每周',
+    'Run At': '运行时间',
+    'Every (minutes)': '每隔（分钟）',
+    Weekdays: '工作日',
+    "Times use the server's local timezone.": '时间使用服务器本地时区。',
+    'All Events': '全部事件',
+    Created: '已创建',
+    Started: '已启动',
+    Exit: '退出',
+    Deleted: '已删除',
+    Recovered: '已恢复',
+    'Stale Cleaned': '已清理过期项',
+    'Mux Died': 'Mux 已终止',
+    'Server Started': '服务器已启动',
+    'Server Stopped': '服务器已停止',
+    Extra: '附加信息',
+    'Token Usage Statistics': 'Token 使用统计',
+    'Daily Breakdown': '每日明细',
+    'Export JSON': '导出 JSON',
+    'Export MD': '导出 Markdown',
+
+    // Dynamic common status / toasts
+    'Settings saved': '设置已保存',
+    'Settings saved locally': '设置已保存到本机',
+    'Tunnel active': '隧道已启用',
+    'Tunnel starting — QR code will appear when ready...': '隧道正在启动，准备好后将显示二维码…',
+    'Push notifications enabled': '推送通知已启用',
+    'Push notifications disabled': '推送通知已禁用',
+    'Permission Required': '需要授权',
+    'Waiting for Input': '等待输入',
+    'Question Asked': 'Claude 正在提问',
+    'Response Complete': '回复完成',
+    'Task Completed': '任务已完成',
+    'Teammate Idle': '队友空闲',
+    'Session Error': '会话错误',
+    'Respawn Blocked': '重生已阻止',
+    'Task Complete': '任务完成',
+    'Copied to clipboard': '已复制到剪贴板',
+    'Checking…': '正在检查…',
+    'Starting…': '正在启动…',
+    'Starting update…': '正在开始更新…',
+    'Queued…': '已排队…',
+    'Preparing…': '正在准备…',
+    'Stashing local changes…': '正在暂存本地更改…',
+    'Fetching release…': '正在获取发行版…',
+    'Checking out release…': '正在检出发行版…',
+    'Installing dependencies…': '正在安装依赖…',
+    'Building…': '正在构建…',
+    'Restarting Codeman…': '正在重启 {name}…',
+    'Try again': '重试',
+    'Could not check for updates. Try again later.': '无法检查更新，请稍后重试。',
+    'The previous version is still running.': '先前版本仍在运行。',
+
+    // Remaining settings, wizard, case and management surfaces
+    'Advanced Options': '高级选项',
+    'Advanced container settings': '高级容器设置',
+    Basics: '基本设置',
+    Behavior: '行为',
+    Alerts: '提醒',
+    Limits: '限制',
+    Paths: '路径',
+    Notes: '备注',
+    Context: '上下文',
+    Duration: '持续时间',
+    Iterations: '迭代次数',
+    Elapsed: '已用时间',
+    Launch: '启动',
+    'Launch Command': '启动命令',
+    'Background Agents': '后台智能体',
+    'Background Tasks': '后台任务',
+    Tasks: '任务',
+    'Explore Tasks': '探索任务',
+    'Implement Tasks': '实现任务',
+    'Test Tasks': '测试任务',
+    'Review Tasks': '审查任务',
+    'Agent Type': '智能体类型',
+    'Implementation Plan': '实施计划',
+    Plan: '计划',
+    'Plan:': '计划：',
+    'Plan Usage Limits': '套餐使用限制',
+    'Plan Wizard Agents': '计划向导智能体',
+    'Fix Plan Menu': '修复计划菜单',
+    'View Fix Plan': '查看修复计划',
+    'Regenerate Plan': '重新生成计划',
+    'Cancel plan generation': '取消生成计划',
+    'Describe your task below. Claude will generate an implementation plan with testing steps.':
+      '请在下方描述任务，Claude 将生成包含测试步骤的实施计划。',
+    'What do you want to build?': '你想构建什么？',
+    'A brief description...': '简要描述…',
+    Describe: '描述',
+    Enhanced: '增强',
+    'Enhanced: parallel subagents + verification (slower but more thorough)':
+      '增强：并行子智能体 + 验证（速度较慢，但更全面）',
+    Standard: '标准',
+    'Single-pass generation with Opus 4.5': '使用 Opus 4.5 单轮生成',
+    'Initializing deep reasoning model': '正在初始化深度推理模型',
+    'Starting Opus 4.5...': '正在启动 Opus 4.5…',
+    'Auto-launch when plan completes': '计划完成后自动启动',
+    'Auto-accept prompts': '自动接受提示',
+    'Presses Enter for plan approvals and default question options': '对计划审批和默认问题选项自动按 Enter',
+    'Auto-accepts, auto-clears, agent completions': '自动接受、自动清理和智能体完成提醒',
+    'Or click Run to start': '或点击“运行”开始',
+    'to edit your task, or': '以编辑任务，或',
+    'to continue without a plan': '以不使用计划直接继续',
+
+    // Ralph / respawn
+    Respawn: '重生',
+    'Respawn loop': '重生循环',
+    'Enable Respawn': '启用重生',
+    'Stop Respawn': '停止重生',
+    'Auto-resume when usage limit resets': '使用限制重置后自动继续',
+    'Auto-restart sessions when context fills up (usually not needed)': '上下文已满时自动重启会话（通常不需要）',
+    'Auto-Compact': '自动压缩',
+    'Auto-Clear': '自动清空',
+    'Token Management': 'Token 管理',
+    'Use 1M token context window': '使用 100 万 Token 上下文窗口',
+    'Use 1M token context window for new sessions': '新会话使用 100 万 Token 上下文窗口',
+    'Full context reset at threshold (use higher than compact)': '达到阈值时完全重置上下文（阈值应高于压缩阈值）',
+    'Idle Threshold': '空闲阈值',
+    'Max Iterations': '最大迭代次数',
+    'Max Iterations:': '最大迭代次数：',
+    'Max Todos': '最大待办数',
+    'Todo Expiration': '待办过期时间',
+    'Completion Phrase': '完成短语',
+    'Completion Phrase:': '完成短语：',
+    'Phrase Claude outputs when loop is complete (without <promise> tags)':
+      '循环完成时 Claude 输出的短语（不含 <promise> 标签）',
+    'Prompt to send when idle': '空闲时发送的提示词',
+    'Prompt to send into the session': '发送到会话的提示词',
+    'Prompt Source': '提示词来源',
+    'Prompt File Path': '提示词文件路径',
+    'Prompt file path': '提示词文件路径',
+    'Prompt Preview': '提示词预览',
+    'Load Preset': '加载预设',
+    Presets: '预设',
+    'Apply preset': '应用预设',
+    'Save Preset': '保存预设',
+    'Save Respawn Preset': '保存重生预设',
+    'Save current config as preset': '将当前配置保存为预设',
+    'Preset Name': '预设名称',
+    'Description (optional)': '描述（可选）',
+    'When to use this preset': '此预设的适用场景',
+    'Start Loop': '启动循环',
+    'Start Ralph Loop': '启动 Ralph 循环',
+    'Start Ralph Loop →': '启动 Ralph 循环 →',
+    'Enable Tracker': '启用跟踪器',
+    'Ralph / Todo': 'Ralph / 待办',
+    'Ralph / Todo Tracker': 'Ralph / 待办跟踪器',
+    'Cycle Steps': '循环步骤',
+    '1. Update Prompt': '1. 更新提示词',
+    '2. Send /clear': '2. 发送 /clear',
+    '3. Send /init': '3. 发送 /init',
+    '4. Kickstart Prompt': '4. 启动提示词',
+    'Sent only when /init completes but Claude stays idle · Auto-accept presses Enter for plan approvals and default options':
+      '仅在 /init 完成后 Claude 仍空闲时发送；自动接受会对计划审批和默认选项按 Enter',
+    'One autonomous work cycle: whenever Claude goes idle, Codeman sends the update prompt, optionally runs /clear + /init, and kickstarts the next round — repeating for the chosen duration. All settings below belong to this loop; configure them, then press Enable.':
+      '一个自主工作循环：Claude 每次空闲时，{name}都会发送更新提示词，可选执行 /clear + /init，并启动下一轮，持续到设定时长。下方设置均属于此循环；配置后点击“启用”。',
+    'If Claude pauses on a usage limit ("limit reached · resets 3pm"), Codeman waits for the reset time and automatically continues the work. Independent of the respawn loop below.':
+      '如果 Claude 因使用限制暂停（“limit reached · resets 3pm”），{name}会等待限制重置并自动继续工作。此功能独立于下方的重生循环。',
+
+    // Search, session and panel surfaces
+    'Search sessions, events, files…': '搜索会话、事件和文件…',
+    'Search across sessions': '跨会话搜索',
+    'Filter by case': '按案例筛选',
+    'Filter by date range': '按日期范围筛选',
+    'Filter by session status': '按会话状态筛选',
+    'Filter files...': '筛选文件…',
+    'Any status': '任意状态',
+    'Any time': '任意时间',
+    'Last hour': '最近一小时',
+    'Last 7 Days': '最近 7 天',
+    'Past 24h': '过去 24 小时',
+    'Past 7 days': '过去 7 天',
+    'Past 30 days': '过去 30 天',
+    'Since last visit': '自上次访问以来',
+    Since: '开始时间',
+    Until: '结束时间',
+    'Away digest range': '离开期间摘要范围',
+    'Open the digest to load recent activity': '打开摘要以加载最近活动',
+    'Refresh away digest': '刷新离开期间摘要',
+    'Refresh summary': '刷新摘要',
+    'Select a session to view files': '选择会话以查看文件',
+    'Select a session to view summary': '选择会话以查看摘要',
+    'Select an agent to view details': '选择智能体以查看详情',
+    'Select a run to view its agents': '选择一次运行以查看其智能体',
+    'Source type filter': '来源类型筛选',
+    'Copy content': '复制内容',
+    'Export as JSON': '导出为 JSON',
+    'Export as Markdown': '导出为 Markdown',
+    'Mark all read': '全部标为已读',
+    'Clear search': '清除搜索',
+    'Clear all tracked subagents': '清除所有已跟踪的子智能体',
+    'Kill All Sessions': '终止所有会话',
+    'Kill all sessions and their tmux processes': '终止所有会话及其 tmux 进程',
+    'Kill All Claude + Tmux': '终止全部 Claude + Tmux',
+    'Kill Tmux & Claude Code': '终止 Tmux 与 Claude Code',
+    'Terminate everything completely': '彻底终止所有内容',
+    'Tmux Sessions': 'Tmux 会话',
+    'Tmux sessions keep running in background': 'Tmux 会话继续在后台运行',
+    'Refresh tmux sessions': '刷新 Tmux 会话',
+    'Restore Terminal Size': '恢复终端大小',
+    'Clear Terminal': '清空终端',
+    'Stop current run': '停止当前运行',
+    'Stop respawn': '停止重生',
+    'Stop (Ctrl+C)': '停止（Ctrl+C）',
+
+    // Case, remote and Docker details
+    Case: '案例',
+    'Case:': '案例：',
+    'Case settings': '案例设置',
+    'Create New': '新建',
+    'Auto (directory name)': '自动（目录名）',
+    'Custom name shown in the tab (right-click tab to rename inline)':
+      '标签页中显示的自定义名称（右键标签可直接重命名）',
+    'Name to identify this case in Codeman': '用于在{name}中标识此案例的名称',
+    'Name to identify this remote case in Codeman': '用于在{name}中标识此远程案例的名称',
+    'Absolute path on the remote host. Codeman will not create or delete it.':
+      '远程主机上的绝对路径；{name}不会创建或删除该目录。',
+    'Absolute path to an existing project folder, e.g. /home/you/my-project':
+      '现有项目文件夹的绝对路径，例如 /home/you/my-project',
+    'Letters, numbers, hyphens, underscores only. Created in ~/codeman-cases/':
+      '仅允许字母、数字、连字符和下划线；将在 ~/codeman-cases/ 中创建。',
+    'Docker exports': 'Docker 导出',
+    'No exports yet. Export a docker case from its tab.': '暂无导出；请从 Docker 案例标签页导出。',
+    'Runs inside an isolated container. Multiple sessions can share the same container.':
+      '在隔离容器内运行；多个会话可以共享同一容器。',
+    'Runs this case in a hardened, isolated container. The base image is built automatically on first use. Docker/Podman must be installed.':
+      '在加固的隔离容器中运行此案例。首次使用时会自动构建基础镜像；必须安装 Docker/Podman。',
+    'Run in an isolated Docker container': '在隔离的 Docker 容器中运行',
+    'Absolute HOST directory, bind-mounted into the container. Codeman scaffolds CLAUDE.md + hooks into it.':
+      '绑定挂载到容器中的主机绝对目录；{name}会在其中生成 CLAUDE.md 和 hooks。',
+    'A reusable docker host profile. Reuse the same ID across cases to share settings.':
+      '可复用的 Docker 主机配置；多个案例使用同一 ID 可共享设置。',
+    'Mount host credentials (~/.claude etc.)': '挂载主机凭据（~/.claude 等）',
+    'On: your existing login just works (creds stay on the host, never in exports). Off: sealed sandbox, log in inside the container.':
+      '开启：直接使用现有登录（凭据保留在主机且不会进入导出）；关闭：使用密封沙箱，需要在容器内登录。',
+    'Disk is elastic: storage grows automatically as data flows in (no fixed cap).':
+      '磁盘为弹性容量：会随数据自动增长（无固定上限）。',
+    'Needs the NVIDIA container toolkit on the host.': '主机需要安装 NVIDIA Container Toolkit。',
+    'GPU — 8 GB RAM, 4 CPU, all GPUs': 'GPU — 8 GB 内存、4 CPU、全部 GPU',
+    'Large — 8 GB RAM, 4 CPU': '大型 — 8 GB 内存、4 CPU',
+    'Medium — 4 GB RAM, 2 CPU (default)': '中型 — 4 GB 内存、2 CPU（默认）',
+    'Small — 2 GB RAM, 1 CPU': '小型 — 2 GB 内存、1 CPU',
+    'bridge (internet on, default)': '桥接（可联网，默认）',
+    'bridge (internet on)': '桥接（可联网）',
+    'none (fully isolated, no network)': '无（完全隔离，不联网）',
+    'none (fully isolated)': '无（完全隔离）',
+    'Resume last conversation on relaunch': '重新启动时继续最近一次对话',
+    'Extra -o Options': '附加 -o 选项',
+    'SOCKS Proxy': 'SOCKS 代理',
+    'Host ID': '主机 ID',
+    'Optional. Leave blank for the default port 22.': '可选；留空使用默认端口 22。',
+    'Optional. Path to a private key on this machine (passed to ssh -i). Never the key contents.':
+      '可选；本机私钥文件路径（传给 ssh -i），请勿填写密钥内容。',
+    'Optional. [user@]host[:port] for ssh -J (jump/bastion host).':
+      '可选；ssh -J 使用的 [user@]host[:port]（跳板机）。',
+    'Optional. One KEY=VALUE per line; each becomes an ssh -o option.':
+      '可选；每行一个 KEY=VALUE，每项都会成为 ssh -o 选项。',
+
+    // Settings descriptions and remaining common controls
+    'Use the GPU-accelerated WebGL terminal renderer (desktop only). Turn off to force the DOM renderer if you hit GPU glitches. Codeman also auto-falls-back to the DOM renderer after repeated GPU stalls.':
+      '使用 GPU 加速的 WebGL 终端渲染器（仅桌面端）。如遇 GPU 显示问题，可关闭以强制使用 DOM 渲染器；多次 GPU 卡顿后{name}也会自动回退。',
+    'Show A-/A+ font size buttons in header': '在顶部栏显示 A-/A+ 字体大小按钮',
+    'Show Claude plan usage limits (5-hour & weekly) in the header. Applies to newly created sessions.':
+      '在顶部栏显示 Claude 套餐使用限制（5 小时和每周）；适用于新建会话。',
+    'Show ultracode / Workflow runs as a master-detail tab (tasks on the left, agents with tokens + tool calls on the right)':
+      '以主从标签页显示 Ultracode / Workflow 运行（左侧任务，右侧智能体 Token 与工具调用）',
+    'Pop a floating window for each active ultracode / Workflow run, connected by a line to its session tab (additional to the Ultracode Agents panel)':
+      '为每个活动的 Ultracode / Workflow 运行弹出浮动窗口，并用连线连接到其会话标签页',
+    'Shows typed characters instantly via overlay while forwarding keystrokes to the server in the background. Enables Tab completion, preserves input across tab switches, and protects against session crashes. Recommended for mobile and high-latency connections.':
+      '通过覆盖层即时显示输入，同时在后台把按键转发到服务器。支持 Tab 补全、切换标签时保留输入并防止会话崩溃丢字；推荐移动端和高延迟连接使用。',
+    "Show a dedicated input field below the terminal for CJK (Chinese/Japanese/Korean) IME composition. Recommended for mobile devices with Chinese input methods where xterm's native input handling may drop characters.":
+      '在终端下方显示中日韩输入法专用文本框。推荐在可能因 xterm 原生输入而丢字的移动端中文输入法中使用。',
+    'Show additional buttons (Tab, Shift+Tab, Ctrl+O, Esc, Alt+Enter, left/right arrows) in the mobile keyboard accessory bar.':
+      '在移动端键盘工具栏显示附加按键（Tab、Shift+Tab、Ctrl+O、Esc、Alt+Enter、左右方向键）。',
+    'Scroll local history (when mouse passthrough is active)': '滚动本地历史（鼠标直通启用时）',
+    'Plain wheel/trackpad pages the terminal scrollback': '使用普通滚轮/触控板翻阅终端历史',
+    'Camera hand-tracking overlay (applied on reload)': '摄像头手势跟踪覆盖层（重新加载后生效）',
+    'Enable the camera hand-tracking gesture overlay (applied on reload). The instance must run with CODEMAN_GESTURE=1.':
+      '启用摄像头手势跟踪覆盖层（重新加载后生效）；实例必须以 CODEMAN_GESTURE=1 运行。',
+    'How Claude CLI is started in screen sessions. Auto Mode runs without routine prompts behind a background safety classifier (needs Claude Code 2.1.207+ and Opus 4.6+/Sonnet 4.6+/Fable 5)':
+      '设置 Claude CLI 在会话中的启动方式。自动模式由后台安全分类器保护，无需常规确认（需要 Claude Code 2.1.207+ 和 Opus 4.6+/Sonnet 4.6+/Fable 5）。',
+    'Auto-enable for new sessions (otherwise auto-enables on Ralph pattern detection)':
+      '为新会话自动启用（否则检测到 Ralph 模式时自动启用）',
+    'Enable experimental Agent Teams for all new Claude sessions (disabled by default)':
+      '为所有新 Claude 会话启用实验性智能体团队（默认关闭）',
+    'Automatically re-establish remote (SSH) sessions when the connection drops, reattaching to the durable remote tmux session (on by default; bounded backoff)':
+      '连接断开时自动重建远程 SSH 会话，并重新附加到持久化远程 tmux 会话（默认开启，有限退避）',
+    'Default effort for new Claude sessions — soft default, switchable anytime in-session via /effort (e.g. /effort ultracode)':
+      '新 Claude 会话的默认思考强度；这是软默认值，可随时在会话中通过 /effort 切换。',
+    'Lower priority of Claude sessions (reduces system impact, only affects new sessions)':
+      '降低 Claude 会话的进程优先级（减少系统影响，仅影响新会话）',
+    'Process priority (-20 to 19, higher = lower priority, default: 10)':
+      '进程优先级（-20 到 19；数值越大优先级越低；默认 10）',
+    'Start new Codex sessions with --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox':
+      '使用 --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox 启动新的 Codex 会话',
+    'Model used for execution tasks. Optimizer suggestions are advisory only.':
+      '执行任务使用的模型；优化器建议仅供参考。',
+    "Show what the optimizer recommends (doesn't override your choice)": '显示优化器建议（不会覆盖你的选择）',
+    'Optionally set specific models for each task type. Leave as "Use Default" to use your default model.':
+      '可为每种任务类型指定模型；保留“使用默认值”即可使用默认模型。',
+    'Request browser notification permission': '请求浏览器通知权限',
+    'Show OS-level notifications when tab is hidden': '标签页隐藏时显示系统级通知',
+    'OS-level push notifications — works even when tab is closed': '系统级推送通知，即使标签页关闭也可接收',
+    'Play a short beep for critical events': '严重事件发生时播放短提示音',
+    'Completions, budget warnings, stuck sessions': '完成提醒、预算警告和会话卡住提醒',
+    'Errors, crashes, agent failures': '错误、崩溃和智能体失败',
+    'Notify when a session is idle longer than this': '会话空闲超过此时长时通知',
+    'Stored locally only, never sent to server. Get a key at': '仅存储在本机，绝不会发送到服务器。可在此获取密钥：',
+    'Comma-separated terms to boost recognition accuracy': '以逗号分隔可提高识别准确率的术语',
+    'Start voice input': '开始语音输入',
+    'Voice input': '语音输入',
+    'Voice input (Ctrl+Shift+V)': '语音输入（Ctrl+Shift+V）',
+    'Insert Newline': '插入换行',
+    'Close Panels': '关闭面板',
+    'Previous / Next Session': '上一个 / 下一个会话',
+    'Next Session': '下一个会话',
+    'Switch to Tab N': '切换到第 N 个标签页',
+    'Move Active Tab Left': '向左移动当前标签页',
+    'Move Active Tab Right': '向右移动当前标签页',
+    'Focus First Tab': '聚焦第一个标签页',
+    'Focus Last Tab': '聚焦最后一个标签页',
+    'Focus Next Tab': '聚焦下一个标签页',
+    'Focus Previous Tab': '聚焦上一个标签页',
+    'Activate Focused Tab': '激活聚焦的标签页',
+    'Remove Tab': '移除标签页',
+    'Remove All Tabs': '移除所有标签页',
+    'Use arrows to reorder. Changes are saved automatically.': '使用方向键重新排序；更改会自动保存。',
+  });
+
+  const ZH_CN_LOWER = new Map(Object.entries(ZH_CN).map(([key, value]) => [key.toLocaleLowerCase('en'), value]));
+
+  const textState = new WeakMap();
+  const attributeState = new WeakMap();
+  let language = normalizeLanguage(global.__codemanLanguage);
+  let displayName = DEFAULT_NAME;
+  let observer = null;
+  let applying = false;
+
+  function normalizeLanguage(value) {
+    return SUPPORTED_LANGUAGES.has(value) ? value : 'en';
+  }
+
+  function normalizeDisplayName(value) {
+    if (typeof value !== 'string') return DEFAULT_NAME;
+    const normalized = value
+      .normalize('NFC')
+      .replace(/[\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/g, '')
+      .trim();
+    return normalized ? Array.from(normalized).slice(0, 40).join('') : DEFAULT_NAME;
+  }
+
+  function interpolate(value, variables) {
+    return value.replace(/\{([a-zA-Z][\w]*)\}/g, (_match, key) => String(variables[key] ?? ''));
+  }
+
+  function translateDynamic(source) {
+    const patterns = [
+      [/^(\d+) tokens?$/, (_m, count) => `${count} 个 Token`],
+      [/^(\d+) sessions?$/, (_m, count) => `${count} 个会话`],
+      [/^(\d+) tasks?$/, (_m, count) => `${count} 个任务`],
+      [/^(\d+) running$/, (_m, count) => `${count} 个运行中`],
+      [/^(\d+) active$/, (_m, count) => `${count} 个活动`],
+      [/^Show (\d+) more$/, (_m, count) => `再显示 ${count} 项`],
+      [/^Show (\d+) more \((\d+) remaining\)$/, (_m, count, remaining) => `再显示 ${count} 项（剩余 ${remaining} 项）`],
+      [/^Lifetime: (\d+) sessions created$/, (_m, count) => `累计已创建 ${count} 个会话`],
+      [/^Tunnel active: (.+)$/, (_m, url) => `隧道已启用：${url}`],
+      [/^Tunnel error: (.+)$/, (_m, error) => `隧道错误：${error}`],
+      [/^Update to v(.+)$/, (_m, version) => `更新到 v${version}`],
+      [/^You're up to date \(v(.+)\)\.$/, (_m, version) => `已是最新版本（v${version}）。`],
+      [/^Update available: v(.+)$/, (_m, version) => `有可用更新：v${version}`],
+      [/^Selected: (.+)$/, (_m, value) => `已选择：${value}`],
+      [/^Failed to (.+)$/, (_m, action) => `操作失败：${action}`],
+    ];
+    for (const [pattern, replacement] of patterns) {
+      const match = source.match(pattern);
+      if (match) return replacement(...match);
+    }
+    const actionMatch = source.match(
+      /^(Open|Close|Show|Hide|Enable|Disable|Start|Stop|Refresh|Save|Cancel|Clear|Select|View|Export|Import|Remove|Kill|Toggle|Increase|Decrease) (.+)$/i
+    );
+    if (actionMatch) {
+      const action = {
+        open: '打开',
+        close: '关闭',
+        show: '显示',
+        hide: '隐藏',
+        enable: '启用',
+        disable: '禁用',
+        start: '启动',
+        stop: '停止',
+        refresh: '刷新',
+        save: '保存',
+        cancel: '取消',
+        clear: '清除',
+        select: '选择',
+        view: '查看',
+        export: '导出',
+        import: '导入',
+        remove: '移除',
+        kill: '终止',
+        toggle: '切换',
+        increase: '增大',
+        decrease: '减小',
+      }[actionMatch[1].toLowerCase()];
+      const object = ZH_CN[actionMatch[2]] || ZH_CN_LOWER.get(actionMatch[2].toLocaleLowerCase('en'));
+      if (action && object) return `${action}${object}`;
+    }
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  function brand(source) {
+    if (!source || displayName === DEFAULT_NAME) return source;
+    return source.replace(/Codeman/g, displayName).replace(/codeman(?=:)/g, displayName);
+  }
+
+  function t(source, variables = {}) {
+    if (typeof source !== 'string' || !source) return source;
+    const vars = { name: displayName, ...variables };
+    if (language === 'zh-CN') {
+      const translated = ZH_CN[source] || ZH_CN_LOWER.get(source.toLocaleLowerCase('en')) || translateDynamic(source);
+      if (translated) return brand(interpolate(translated, vars));
+    }
+    return brand(interpolate(source, vars));
+  }
+
+  function shouldSkip(node) {
+    const element = node.nodeType === Node.ELEMENT_NODE ? node : node.parentElement;
+    return !element || Boolean(element.closest(SKIP_SELECTOR));
+  }
+
+  function shouldSkipText(node) {
+    const element = node.nodeType === Node.ELEMENT_NODE ? node : node.parentElement;
+    return shouldSkip(node) || Boolean(element?.closest(USER_TEXT_SELECTOR));
+  }
+
+  function preserveWhitespace(source, translated) {
+    const leading = source.match(/^\s*/)?.[0] || '';
+    const trailing = source.match(/\s*$/)?.[0] || '';
+    return leading + translated + trailing;
+  }
+
+  function translateTextNode(node) {
+    let state = textState.get(node);
+    if (shouldSkipText(node) || (!state && !/[A-Za-z]/.test(node.nodeValue || ''))) return;
+    if (!state || node.nodeValue !== state.applied) {
+      state = { source: node.nodeValue, applied: node.nodeValue };
+    }
+    const trimmed = state.source.trim();
+    if (!trimmed) return;
+    const next = preserveWhitespace(state.source, t(trimmed));
+    state.applied = next;
+    textState.set(node, state);
+    if (node.nodeValue !== next) node.nodeValue = next;
+  }
+
+  function translateAttributes(element) {
+    if (shouldSkip(element) || element.matches('.history-item[title]')) return;
+    let states = attributeState.get(element);
+    if (!states) states = new Map();
+    for (const attribute of TRANSLATABLE_ATTRIBUTES) {
+      if (!element.hasAttribute(attribute)) continue;
+      const current = element.getAttribute(attribute) || '';
+      let state = states.get(attribute);
+      if (!state || current !== state.applied) state = { source: current, applied: current };
+      const next = t(state.source);
+      state.applied = next;
+      states.set(attribute, state);
+      if (current !== next) element.setAttribute(attribute, next);
+    }
+    attributeState.set(element, states);
+  }
+
+  function translateNode(root) {
+    if (!root || applying) return;
+    applying = true;
+    try {
+      if (root.nodeType === Node.TEXT_NODE) {
+        translateTextNode(root);
+        return;
+      }
+      if (root.nodeType !== Node.ELEMENT_NODE && root.nodeType !== Node.DOCUMENT_NODE) return;
+      if (root.nodeType === Node.ELEMENT_NODE) translateAttributes(root);
+      const walker = document.createTreeWalker(root, NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT);
+      for (let node = walker.nextNode(); node; node = walker.nextNode()) {
+        if (node.nodeType === Node.TEXT_NODE) translateTextNode(node);
+        else translateAttributes(node);
+      }
+    } finally {
+      applying = false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  function refreshDocumentTitle() {
+    const current = document.title || '';
+    const titleState = document.documentElement.dataset.i18nTitleSource || current;
+    document.documentElement.dataset.i18nTitleSource = titleState;
+    document.title = brand(titleState);
+  }
+
+  function configure(options = {}) {
+    const previousDisplayName = displayName;
+    language = normalizeLanguage(options.language ?? language);
+    displayName = normalizeDisplayName(options.displayName ?? displayName);
+    global.__codemanLanguage = language;
+    global.__codemanDisplayName = displayName;
+    document.documentElement.lang = language;
+    document.documentElement.dataset.language = language;
+    if (previousDisplayName !== displayName) {
+      const source = document.documentElement.dataset.i18nTitleSource || document.title || '';
+      if (previousDisplayName !== DEFAULT_NAME && source.includes(previousDisplayName)) {
+        document.documentElement.dataset.i18nTitleSource = source.replaceAll(previousDisplayName, displayName);
+      }
+    }
+    translateNode(document.body);
+    refreshDocumentTitle();
+    return { language, displayName };
+  }
+
+  function start() {
+    translateNode(document.body);
+    refreshDocumentTitle();
+    if (observer) return;
+    observer = new MutationObserver((mutations) => {
+      if (applying) return;
+      for (const mutation of mutations) {
+        if (mutation.type === 'characterData') translateNode(mutation.target);
+        if (mutation.type === 'attributes') translateAttributes(mutation.target);
+        for (const added of mutation.addedNodes) translateNode(added);
+      }
+    });
+    observer.observe(document.body, {
+      subtree: true,
+      childList: true,
+      characterData: true,
+      attributes: true,
+      attributeFilter: TRANSLATABLE_ATTRIBUTES,
+    });
+  }
+
+  const api = Object.freeze({
+    t,
+    configure,
+    start,
+    translateNode,
+    normalizeDisplayName,
+    normalizeLanguage,
+    get language() {
+      return language;
+    },
+    get displayName() {
+      return displayName;
+    },
+  });
+
+  global.CodemanI18n = api;
+  global.codemanT = t;
+  const nativeConfirm = typeof global.confirm === 'function' ? global.confirm.bind(global) : null;
+  const nativeAlert = typeof global.alert === 'function' ? global.alert.bind(global) : null;
+  if (nativeConfirm) global.confirm = (message) => nativeConfirm(t(String(message)));
+  if (nativeAlert) global.alert = (message) => nativeAlert(t(String(message)));
+  document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', start, { once: true });
+})(window);

src/web/public/index.html

@@ -45,16 +45,20 @@
   <!-- Synchronous mobile detection — runs before first paint to prevent panel flash -->
   <script>if(window.innerWidth<768||(('ontouchstart' in window||navigator.maxTouchPoints>0)&&window.innerWidth<1024))document.documentElement.classList.add('mobile-init');</script>
   <!-- Synchronous skin selection — runs before first paint to prevent theme flash -->
-  <script>try{var s=localStorage.getItem('codeman:skin');if(s!=='og'&&s!=='daylight-green'&&s!=='daylight-blue')s='daylight-blue';document.documentElement.dataset.skin=s;window.__codemanSkin=s;}catch(e){document.documentElement.dataset.skin='daylight-blue';window.__codemanSkin='daylight-blue';}</script>
+  <script>try{var s=localStorage.getItem('codeman:skin'),a=['og','daylight-green','daylight-blue','paper-gray','solarized-light','catppuccin-latte','rose-pine-dawn'];if(a.indexOf(s)<0)s='daylight-blue';document.documentElement.dataset.skin=s;window.__codemanSkin=s;}catch(e){document.documentElement.dataset.skin='daylight-blue';window.__codemanSkin='daylight-blue';}</script>
+  <!-- Apply the saved per-device language before first paint. The full translation
+       layer loads below; setting lang/dir here prevents an English accessibility
+       tree from flashing while the deferred scripts start. -->
+  <script>try{var m=window.innerWidth<768||(('ontouchstart' in window||navigator.maxTouchPoints>0)&&window.innerWidth<1024);var k=m?'codeman-app-settings-mobile':'codeman-app-settings';var l=JSON.parse(localStorage.getItem(k)||'{}').language;l=l==='zh-CN'?'zh-CN':'en';document.documentElement.lang=l;window.__codemanLanguage=l;}catch(e){document.documentElement.lang='en';window.__codemanLanguage='en';}</script>
   <!-- Inline critical CSS for instant skeleton paint (before styles.css loads) -->
   <style>
-    .loading-skeleton{display:flex;flex-direction:column;height:100vh;height:100dvh;background:#11151c}
-    .skeleton-header{height:40px;background:rgba(31,38,48,0.85);border-bottom:1px solid rgba(255,255,255,0.08);display:flex;align-items:center;padding:0 12px}
-    .skeleton-brand{color:#38b6f0;font-size:14px;font-weight:700;font-family:'Manrope',-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,'Segoe UI',sans-serif;opacity:.85}
+    .loading-skeleton{display:flex;flex-direction:column;height:100vh;height:100dvh;background:var(--bg-dark,#11151c)}
+    .skeleton-header{height:40px;background:var(--glass-bg,rgba(31,38,48,0.85));border-bottom:1px solid var(--glass-border,rgba(255,255,255,0.08));display:flex;align-items:center;padding:0 12px}
+    .skeleton-brand{color:var(--accent,#38b6f0);font-size:14px;font-weight:700;font-family:'Manrope',-apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,'Segoe UI',sans-serif;opacity:.85}
     .skeleton-tabs{display:flex;gap:4px;margin-left:16px}
-    .skeleton-tab{width:80px;height:24px;background:rgba(255,255,255,0.04);border-radius:6px}
-    .skeleton-terminal{flex:1;background:#161b23}
-    .skeleton-toolbar{height:42px;background:rgba(31,38,48,0.85);border-top:1px solid rgba(255,255,255,0.08)}
+    .skeleton-tab{width:80px;height:24px;background:var(--control-bg,rgba(255,255,255,0.04));border-radius:6px}
+    .skeleton-terminal{flex:1;background:var(--term-bg,#161b23)}
+    .skeleton-toolbar{height:42px;background:var(--glass-bg,rgba(31,38,48,0.85));border-top:1px solid var(--glass-border,rgba(255,255,255,0.08))}
     .app-loaded .loading-skeleton{display:none}
   </style>
 </head>
@@ -76,7 +80,9 @@
     <!-- Compact Header with Session Tabs -->
     <header class="header">
       <div class="header-brand">
-        <span class="logo" onclick="app.goHome()" title="Go to main page">Codeman</span>
+        <span class="logo" onclick="app.goHome()" title="Go to main page"
+          ><span class="logo-text">Codeman</span><span class="logo-compact" aria-hidden="true">C</span></span
+        >
       </div>
 
       <!-- Session Tabs -->
@@ -87,6 +93,10 @@
       <div class="solo-session-title" id="soloSessionTitle" style="display: none;" aria-live="polite"></div>
 
       <div class="header-right" id="headerRight">
+        <button class="btn-admin-panel btn-admin-panel--hidden" id="adminPanelBtn" onclick="window.codemanAdmin.openAdminPanel()" title="Admin Panel (multi-user administration)" aria-label="Open admin panel">
+          <svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M12 22s8-4 8-10V5l-8-3-8 3v7c0 6 8 10 8 10z"/></svg>
+          <span>Admin Panel</span>
+        </button>
         <button class="btn-icon-header btn-solo-redock" id="soloRedockBtn" style="display: none;" onclick="window.close()" title="Re-dock to dashboard (close window)" aria-label="Re-dock session to dashboard">&#x229E;</button>
         <button class="tunnel-indicator" id="tunnelIndicator" style="display: none;" onclick="app.toggleTunnelPanel()" title="Cloudflare Tunnel" aria-label="Tunnel status">
           <span class="tunnel-dot"></span>
@@ -118,12 +128,13 @@
         </div>
         <button class="btn-icon-header btn-redraw-terminal btn-redraw-terminal--hidden" onclick="app.restoreTerminalSize()" title="Redraw terminal to fit current screen (Ctrl+Shift+R)" aria-label="Redraw terminal"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><polyline points="1 4 1 10 7 10"/><polyline points="23 20 23 14 17 14"/><path d="M20.49 9A9 9 0 0 0 5.64 5.64L1 10m22 4l-4.64 4.36A9 9 0 0 1 3.51 15"/></svg></button>
         <button class="btn-icon-header btn-response-viewer-header btn-response-viewer-header--hidden" onclick="app.toggleResponseViewer()" title="View last response" aria-label="View last response"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2"><path d="M1 12s4-8 11-8 11 8 11 8-4 8-11 8-11-8-11-8z"/><circle cx="12" cy="12" r="3"/></svg></button>
-        <button class="btn-icon-header btn-away-digest" onclick="app.openAwayDigest()" title="Away Digest" aria-label="Open away digest"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M8 6h13"/><path d="M8 12h13"/><path d="M8 18h13"/><path d="M3 6h.01"/><path d="M3 12h.01"/><path d="M3 18h.01"/></svg></button>
-        <button class="btn-icon-header btn-session-manager" onclick="app.openSessionManager()" title="Session Manager" aria-label="Open session manager"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><polyline points="12 2 2 7 12 12 22 7 12 2"/><polyline points="2 17 12 22 22 17"/><polyline points="2 12 12 17 22 12"/></svg></button>
+        <button class="btn-icon-header btn-away-digest btn-away-digest--hidden" onclick="app.openAwayDigest()" title="Away Digest" aria-label="Open away digest"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M8 6h13"/><path d="M8 12h13"/><path d="M8 18h13"/><path d="M3 6h.01"/><path d="M3 12h.01"/><path d="M3 18h.01"/></svg></button>
+        <button class="btn-icon-header btn-session-manager btn-session-manager--hidden" onclick="app.openSessionManager()" title="Session Manager" aria-label="Open session manager"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><polyline points="12 2 2 7 12 12 22 7 12 2"/><polyline points="2 17 12 22 22 17"/><polyline points="2 12 12 17 22 12"/></svg></button>
         <button class="btn-icon-header btn-attachments-history btn-attachments-history--hidden" id="attachmentsHistoryBtn" onclick="app.toggleAttachmentHistory()" title="Attachments" aria-label="Open attachment history" aria-expanded="false">
           <svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><path d="m21.44 11.05-9.19 9.19a6 6 0 0 1-8.49-8.49l9.19-9.19a4 4 0 0 1 5.66 5.66l-9.2 9.19a2 2 0 0 1-2.83-2.83l8.49-8.48"/></svg>
           <span class="attachment-history-badge" id="attachmentHistoryBadge" style="display:none;">0</span>
         </button>
+        <button class="btn-icon-header btn-file-viewer" onclick="app.toggleFileBrowserButton()" title="File Viewer" aria-label="Open file viewer" aria-expanded="false"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M3 7a2 2 0 0 1 2-2h4l2 2h8a2 2 0 0 1 2 2v8a2 2 0 0 1-2 2H5a2 2 0 0 1-2-2z"/></svg></button>
         <button class="btn-icon-header btn-multimonitor btn-multimonitor--hidden" onclick="app.launchMultiMonitor()" title="Open Codeman across all displays" aria-label="Open Codeman across all displays"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><rect x="2" y="4" width="13" height="9" rx="1.5"/><rect x="11" y="9" width="11" height="8" rx="1.5"/></svg></button>
         <button class="btn-icon-header btn-ultracode-agents btn-ultracode-agents--hidden" onclick="app.toggleUltracodeAgentsPanel()" title="Ultracode / Workflow agents" aria-label="Open ultracode workflow agents"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><circle cx="6" cy="6" r="2.5"/><circle cx="6" cy="18" r="2.5"/><circle cx="18" cy="12" r="2.5"/><path d="M8.2 7.2 15.6 11M8.2 16.8 15.6 13"/></svg></button>
         <div class="header-plan-usage header-plan-usage--hidden" id="planUsageChip" title="Claude plan usage limits">—</div>
@@ -131,9 +142,9 @@
           <svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M18 8A6 6 0 0 0 6 8c0 7-3 9-3 9h18s-3-2-3-9"/><path d="M13.73 21a2 2 0 0 1-3.46 0"/></svg>
           <span class="notification-badge" id="notifBadge" style="display:none;">0</span>
         </button>
-        <button class="btn-icon-header btn-lifecycle-log" onclick="app.openLifecycleLog()" title="Session Lifecycle Log" aria-label="Open session lifecycle log"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M14 2H6a2 2 0 0 0-2 2v16a2 2 0 0 0 2 2h12a2 2 0 0 0 2-2V8z"/><polyline points="14 2 14 8 20 8"/><line x1="16" y1="13" x2="8" y2="13"/><line x1="16" y1="17" x2="8" y2="17"/><polyline points="10 9 9 9 8 9"/></svg></button>
+        <button class="btn-icon-header btn-lifecycle-log" style="display: none" onclick="app.openLifecycleLog()" title="Session Lifecycle Log" aria-label="Open session lifecycle log"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M14 2H6a2 2 0 0 0-2 2v16a2 2 0 0 0 2 2h12a2 2 0 0 0 2-2V8z"/><polyline points="14 2 14 8 20 8"/><line x1="16" y1="13" x2="8" y2="13"/><line x1="16" y1="17" x2="8" y2="17"/><polyline points="10 9 9 9 8 9"/></svg></button>
         <button class="btn-icon-header btn-settings" onclick="app.openAppSettings()" title="App Settings" aria-label="Open app settings"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><circle cx="12" cy="12" r="3"/><path d="M19.4 15a1.65 1.65 0 0 0 .33 1.82l.06.06a2 2 0 0 1-2.83 2.83l-.06-.06a1.65 1.65 0 0 0-1.82-.33 1.65 1.65 0 0 0-1 1.51V21a2 2 0 0 1-4 0v-.09A1.65 1.65 0 0 0 9 19.4a1.65 1.65 0 0 0-1.82.33l-.06.06a2 2 0 0 1-2.83-2.83l.06-.06A1.65 1.65 0 0 0 4.68 15a1.65 1.65 0 0 0-1.51-1H3a2 2 0 0 1 0-4h.09A1.65 1.65 0 0 0 4.6 9a1.65 1.65 0 0 0-.33-1.82l-.06-.06a2 2 0 0 1 2.83-2.83l.06.06A1.65 1.65 0 0 0 9 4.68a1.65 1.65 0 0 0 1-1.51V3a2 2 0 0 1 4 0v.09a1.65 1.65 0 0 0 1 1.51 1.65 1.65 0 0 0 1.82-.33l.06-.06a2 2 0 0 1 2.83 2.83l-.06.06A1.65 1.65 0 0 0 19.4 9a1.65 1.65 0 0 0 1.51 1H21a2 2 0 0 1 0 4h-.09a1.65 1.65 0 0 0-1.51 1z"/></svg></button>
-        <div class="header-tokens" id="headerTokens" title="Total tokens across all sessions">0 tokens</div>
+        <div class="header-tokens" id="headerTokens" style="display: none" title="Total tokens across all sessions">0 tokens</div>
       </div>
     </header>
 
@@ -289,6 +300,11 @@
           autocomplete="off" autocorrect="off" autocapitalize="off" spellcheck="false"></textarea>
       </div>
 
+      <!-- Web tab layer: one iframe per open dashboard, shown in place of the
+           terminal while a web tab is active. Frames stay mounted while hidden so
+           switching tabs does not reload (and re-authenticate) a dashboard. -->
+      <div class="webview-layer" id="webviewLayer"></div>
+
       <!-- Welcome Overlay (shown when no session active) -->
       <div class="welcome-overlay" id="welcomeOverlay">
         <div class="welcome-content">
@@ -449,6 +465,18 @@
                 <span class="run-mode-dot gemini"></span>Gemini
               </button>
               <div class="run-mode-sep"></div>
+              <button class="run-mode-option" data-mode="shell" onclick="app.setRunMode('shell')">
+                <span class="run-mode-dot shell"></span>Terminal / Shell
+              </button>
+              <div class="run-mode-sep"></div>
+              <!-- Web tabs: dashboards open as tabs beside agent sessions. These do NOT
+                   set runMode: the Run button always means "start an agent". -->
+              <div class="run-mode-header">Web / URL</div>
+              <div class="run-mode-webviews" id="runModeWebviews"></div>
+              <button class="run-mode-option run-mode-option--add" onclick="app.showWebviewModal()">
+                <span class="run-mode-dot web"></span>Add URL&hellip;
+              </button>
+              <div class="run-mode-sep"></div>
               <div class="run-mode-header">Recent Sessions</div>
               <div class="run-mode-history" id="runModeHistory"></div>
             </div>
@@ -464,6 +492,12 @@
           <button class="btn-toolbar btn-shell" onclick="app.runShell()" title="Run Shell">
             Run Shell
           </button>
+          <!-- Phone-only: replaces the Shell button on ≤430px (Shell moves into the Run
+               dropdown there). Sends a bare Enter to the active session, the complement
+               to the accessory bar's Esc. Hidden everywhere else — see styles.css. -->
+          <button class="btn-toolbar btn-enter" onclick="app.sendEnterKey()" title="Send Enter">
+            Enter
+          </button>
           <div class="tab-count-group" title="Instance count">
             <button class="tab-count-btn" onclick="app.decrementShellCount()">−</button>
             <input type="number" id="shellCount" class="tab-count-input" value="1" min="1" max="20" readonly>
@@ -557,7 +591,7 @@
       <div class="toolbar-right">
         <!-- Orchestrator button hidden until feature is ready -->
         <!-- <button class="btn-toolbar btn-sm" onclick="app.toggleOrchestratorPanel()" title="Orchestrator Loop">&#x2699; Orchestrator</button> -->
-        <button class="btn-toolbar btn-sm" onclick="app.openCron()" title="Cron Jobs">&#x23F0; Cron</button>
+        <button class="btn-toolbar btn-sm btn-cron btn-cron--hidden" onclick="app.openCron()" title="Cron Jobs">&#x23F0; Cron</button>
         <span class="version-display" id="versionDisplay" title="Codeman version">v0.0.0</span>
       </div>
     </footer>
@@ -618,6 +652,56 @@
       </div>
     </div>
 
+    <!-- Web Tab (dashboard URL) editor -->
+    <div class="modal" id="webviewModal">
+      <div class="modal-backdrop" onclick="app.closeWebviewModal()"></div>
+      <div class="modal-content">
+        <div class="modal-header">
+          <h3 id="webviewModalTitle">Add URL</h3>
+          <button class="modal-close" onclick="app.closeWebviewModal()" aria-label="Close URL editor">&times;</button>
+        </div>
+        <div class="modal-body">
+          <div class="form-row">
+            <label for="webviewName">Name</label>
+            <input type="text" id="webviewName" placeholder="Grafana" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false">
+          </div>
+          <div class="form-row">
+            <label for="webviewUrl">URL</label>
+            <input type="text" id="webviewUrl" placeholder="http://100.70.56.18:4000/" autocomplete="off"
+                   autocapitalize="off" spellcheck="false">
+            <span class="form-hint">
+              Reached from the Codeman server, so a tailnet or localhost address works even when
+              this browser cannot see it. Plain HTTP is fine: the dashboard is proxied through
+              Codeman, which is also what gets past dashboards that refuse to be embedded.
+            </span>
+          </div>
+          <div class="form-row">
+            <label for="webviewIcon">Icon</label>
+            <!-- Click to pick; the field stays editable so any emoji still works. -->
+            <div class="webview-icon-picker" id="webviewIconPicker" role="group" aria-label="Choose an icon"></div>
+            <input type="text" id="webviewIcon" placeholder="Or paste any emoji" maxlength="8" autocomplete="off">
+          </div>
+          <div class="form-row">
+            <label class="checkbox-row"><input type="checkbox" id="webviewSandboxed" checked> Open sandboxed</label>
+            <span class="form-hint">
+              Recommended. A proxied dashboard is served from Codeman's own address, so unchecking
+              this lets its JavaScript read this page and call the API that starts agents. Uncheck
+              only for a dashboard you fully trust, or one whose own login needs cookies.
+            </span>
+          </div>
+          <div class="form-row">
+            <button class="btn-secondary" onclick="app.testWebviewUrl()">Test</button>
+            <span class="form-hint webview-probe-result" id="webviewProbeResult"></span>
+          </div>
+        </div>
+        <div class="form-actions webview-modal-actions">
+          <button class="btn-danger" id="webviewDeleteBtn" onclick="app.deleteWebview()">Delete</button>
+          <button class="btn-secondary" onclick="app.closeWebviewModal()">Cancel</button>
+          <button class="btn-primary" onclick="app.saveWebview()">Save</button>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+
     <!-- Cron Jobs Modal -->
     <div class="modal" id="cronModal">
       <div class="modal-backdrop" onclick="app.closeCron()"></div>
@@ -1160,14 +1244,36 @@
           <!-- Display Tab -->
           <div class="modal-tab-content" id="settings-display">
             <div class="settings-grid">
+              <!-- Branding & Language Section -->
+              <div class="settings-section-header">Branding &amp; Language</div>
+              <div class="settings-item" title="Name shown in the browser UI and window title. Supports Unicode, including Chinese.">
+                <span class="settings-item-label">Display Name</span>
+                <input type="text" id="appSettingsDisplayName" class="settings-inline-input" maxlength="40" placeholder="Codeman" autocomplete="off">
+              </div>
+              <div class="settings-item" title="Language for this device. Dynamic status messages and dialogs use the same language.">
+                <span class="settings-item-label">Interface Language</span>
+                <select id="appSettingsLanguage" class="form-select settings-inline-select">
+                  <option value="en">English</option>
+                  <option value="zh-CN">简体中文</option>
+                </select>
+              </div>
+
               <!-- Appearance Section -->
               <div class="settings-section-header">Appearance</div>
               <div class="settings-item settings-item-skin" title="Visual theme for this device (not synced)">
                 <span class="settings-item-label">Skin</span>
                 <select id="appSettingsSkin" class="form-select">
-                  <option value="daylight-blue">Daylight Blue</option>
-                  <option value="daylight-green">Daylight Green</option>
-                  <option value="og">OG Codeman</option>
+                  <optgroup label="Light">
+                    <option value="paper-gray">Paper Gray</option>
+                    <option value="solarized-light">Solarized Light</option>
+                    <option value="catppuccin-latte">Catppuccin Latte</option>
+                    <option value="rose-pine-dawn">Rosé Pine Dawn</option>
+                  </optgroup>
+                  <optgroup label="Dark">
+                    <option value="daylight-blue">Daylight Blue</option>
+                    <option value="daylight-green">Daylight Green</option>
+                    <option value="og">OG Codeman</option>
+                  </optgroup>
                 </select>
               </div>
               <div class="settings-item" id="appSettingsWebglRendererItem" title="Use the GPU-accelerated WebGL terminal renderer (desktop only). Turn off to force the DOM renderer if you hit GPU glitches. Codeman also auto-falls-back to the DOM renderer after repeated GPU stalls.">
@@ -1268,6 +1374,13 @@
                   <span class="slider"></span>
                 </label>
               </div>
+              <div class="settings-item" title="Show the file viewer button in header (opens the file browser panel for the active session)">
+                <span class="settings-item-label">File Viewer</span>
+                <label class="switch switch-sm">
+                  <input type="checkbox" id="appSettingsShowFileViewerButton">
+                  <span class="slider"></span>
+                </label>
+              </div>
               <div class="settings-item" title="Show the attachments button in header (opens the attachment history drawer)">
                 <span class="settings-item-label">Attachments Button</span>
                 <label class="switch switch-sm">
@@ -1282,6 +1395,27 @@
                   <span class="slider"></span>
                 </label>
               </div>
+              <div class="settings-item" title="Show the session manager button in the header (opens the session manager — sessions also stay reachable via the Ctrl+K palette)">
+                <span class="settings-item-label">Session Manager Button</span>
+                <label class="switch switch-sm">
+                  <input type="checkbox" id="appSettingsShowSessionButton">
+                  <span class="slider"></span>
+                </label>
+              </div>
+              <div class="settings-item" title="Show the away digest button in the header (opens the 'what happened while you were away' summary)">
+                <span class="settings-item-label">Away Digest Button</span>
+                <label class="switch switch-sm">
+                  <input type="checkbox" id="appSettingsShowAwayDigestButton">
+                  <span class="slider"></span>
+                </label>
+              </div>
+              <div class="settings-item" title="Show the Cron button in the footer toolbar (opens the cron jobs manager)">
+                <span class="settings-item-label">Cron Button</span>
+                <label class="switch switch-sm">
+                  <input type="checkbox" id="appSettingsShowCronButton">
+                  <span class="slider"></span>
+                </label>
+              </div>
               <div class="settings-item" title="Show a terminal redraw button in the header — refit the terminal to the current screen size (useful when switching between devices)">
                 <span class="settings-item-label">Redraw Terminal Button</span>
                 <label class="switch switch-sm">
@@ -1420,10 +1554,11 @@
               <label>Startup Mode</label>
               <select id="appSettingsClaudeMode" class="form-select">
                 <option value="dangerously-skip-permissions">Skip Permissions (default)</option>
+                <option value="auto">Auto (classifier-guarded, low prompts)</option>
                 <option value="normal">Normal (with prompts)</option>
                 <option value="allowedTools">Allowed Tools Only</option>
               </select>
-              <span class="form-hint">How Claude CLI is started in screen sessions</span>
+              <span class="form-hint">How Claude CLI is started in screen sessions. Auto Mode runs without routine prompts behind a background safety classifier (needs Claude Code 2.1.207+ and Opus 4.6+/Sonnet 4.6+/Fable 5)</span>
             </div>
             <div class="form-row" id="allowedToolsRow" style="display: none;">
               <label>Allowed Tools</label>
@@ -1471,6 +1606,14 @@
               </label>
               <span class="form-hint">Use 1M token context window (model: opus[1m]) for all new sessions — ignored when a Claude Model is selected above</span>
             </div>
+            <div class="form-row form-row-switch">
+              <label>Remote auto-reconnect</label>
+              <label class="switch">
+                <input type="checkbox" id="appSettingsRemoteAutoReconnect">
+                <span class="slider"></span>
+              </label>
+              <span class="form-hint">Automatically re-establish remote (SSH) sessions when the connection drops, reattaching to the durable remote tmux session (on by default; bounded backoff)</span>
+            </div>
             <div class="form-row">
               <label>Thinking Effort</label>
               <select id="appSettingsThinkingEffort" class="form-select">
@@ -1828,6 +1971,7 @@
           <button class="modal-tab-btn active" data-tab="case-create">Create New</button>
           <button class="modal-tab-btn" data-tab="case-link">Link Existing</button>
           <button class="modal-tab-btn" data-tab="case-remote">Remote</button>
+          <button class="modal-tab-btn" data-tab="case-docker">Docker</button>
           <button class="modal-tab-btn" data-tab="case-manage">Manage</button>
         </div>
         <div class="modal-body">
@@ -1842,6 +1986,53 @@
               <label>Description (optional)</label>
               <input type="text" id="newCaseDescription" placeholder="A brief description..." autocomplete="off">
             </div>
+            <div class="form-row docker-quick-row">
+              <label class="checkbox-row"><input type="checkbox" id="newCaseDocker"> 🐳 Run in an isolated Docker container</label>
+              <span class="form-hint">Runs this case in a hardened, isolated container. The base image is built automatically on first use. Docker/Podman must be installed.</span>
+            </div>
+            <details class="advanced-options docker-quick-settings" id="dockerQuickSettings">
+              <summary>Container settings (optional, sensible defaults)</summary>
+              <div class="advanced-options-content">
+                <div class="form-row">
+                  <label>Template</label>
+                  <select id="quickDockerTemplate" onchange="app.applyDockerTemplate()">
+                    <option value="small">Small — 2 GB RAM, 1 CPU</option>
+                    <option value="medium" selected>Medium — 4 GB RAM, 2 CPU (default)</option>
+                    <option value="large">Large — 8 GB RAM, 4 CPU</option>
+                    <option value="gpu">GPU — 8 GB RAM, 4 CPU, all GPUs</option>
+                    <option value="custom">Custom</option>
+                  </select>
+                  <span class="form-hint">Disk is elastic: storage grows automatically as data flows in (no fixed cap).</span>
+                </div>
+                <div class="form-row">
+                  <label>Memory</label>
+                  <input type="text" id="quickDockerMemory" placeholder="4g" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false">
+                </div>
+                <div class="form-row">
+                  <label>CPUs</label>
+                  <input type="text" id="quickDockerCpus" placeholder="2" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false">
+                </div>
+                <div class="form-row">
+                  <label>GPUs</label>
+                  <input type="text" id="quickDockerGpus" placeholder="none (e.g. all, or 1)" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false">
+                  <span class="form-hint">Needs the NVIDIA container toolkit on the host.</span>
+                </div>
+                <div class="form-row">
+                  <label>Network</label>
+                  <select id="quickDockerNetwork">
+                    <option value="bridge">bridge (internet on)</option>
+                    <option value="none">none (fully isolated)</option>
+                  </select>
+                </div>
+                <div class="form-row">
+                  <label>Image</label>
+                  <input type="text" id="quickDockerImage" placeholder="codeman/agent:base" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false">
+                </div>
+                <div class="form-row">
+                  <label class="checkbox-row"><input type="checkbox" id="quickDockerMountCreds" checked> Mount host credentials (~/.claude etc.)</label>
+                </div>
+              </div>
+            </details>
           </div>
           <!-- Link Existing Tab -->
           <div class="modal-tab-content hidden" id="case-link">
@@ -1852,8 +2043,11 @@
             </div>
             <div class="form-row">
               <label>Folder Path</label>
-              <input type="text" id="linkCasePath" placeholder="/home/user/projects/my-project" autocomplete="off" autocapitalize="off" autocorrect="off" spellcheck="false">
-              <span class="form-hint">Absolute path to an existing project folder, e.g. /home/you/my-project</span>
+              <div class="path-input-group">
+                <input type="text" id="linkCasePath" placeholder="/mnt/d/AI/my-project" autocomplete="off" autocapitalize="off" autocorrect="off" spellcheck="false">
+                <button type="button" class="btn path-input-browse" onclick="app.openLinkCasePathPicker()">Browse&hellip;</button>
+              </div>
+              <span class="form-hint">Choose an existing folder from this computer or enter its absolute path</span>
             </div>
           </div>
           <!-- Remote Tab -->
@@ -1915,6 +2109,70 @@
                 </div>
               </div>
             </details>
+            <!-- COD-105 — discover + attach existing remote tmux sessions this Codeman didn't create. -->
+            <details class="advanced-options" id="remoteDiscoverSection">
+              <summary>Discover existing sessions</summary>
+              <div class="advanced-options-content">
+                <span class="form-hint">Find <code>codeman-*</code> tmux sessions already running on this host (started by the remote's own Codeman or another instance) and attach to one. Attaching shares the session; closing the tab detaches it — it is never killed.</span>
+                <div class="form-row" style="margin-top: 8px;">
+                  <button type="button" class="btn-toolbar" id="remoteDiscoverBtn" onclick="app.discoverRemoteSessions()">Discover existing sessions</button>
+                </div>
+                <div id="remoteDiscoverResults" class="remote-discover-results"></div>
+              </div>
+            </details>
+          </div>
+          <!-- Docker Tab -->
+          <div class="modal-tab-content hidden" id="case-docker">
+            <div class="form-row">
+              <label>Case Name</label>
+              <input type="text" id="dockerCaseName" placeholder="sandbox" pattern="[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+" autocomplete="off" autocapitalize="off" spellcheck="false">
+              <span class="form-hint">Runs inside an isolated container. Multiple sessions can share the same container.</span>
+            </div>
+            <div class="form-row">
+              <label>Workspace Path</label>
+              <input type="text" id="dockerWorkspacePath" placeholder="/home/user/projects/sandbox" autocomplete="off" autocapitalize="off" autocorrect="off" spellcheck="false">
+              <span class="form-hint">Absolute HOST directory, bind-mounted into the container. Codeman scaffolds CLAUDE.md + hooks into it.</span>
+            </div>
+            <div class="form-row">
+              <label>Host ID</label>
+              <input type="text" id="dockerHostId" placeholder="local" pattern="[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+" autocomplete="off" autocapitalize="off" spellcheck="false">
+              <span class="form-hint">A reusable docker host profile. Reuse the same ID across cases to share settings.</span>
+            </div>
+            <div class="form-row">
+              <label>Image</label>
+              <input type="text" id="dockerImage" placeholder="codeman/agent:base" autocomplete="off" autocapitalize="off" spellcheck="false">
+              <span class="form-hint">Build it once with <code>node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs</code>. Contains node + claude/codex/gemini + tmux.</span>
+            </div>
+            <div class="form-row">
+              <label>Network</label>
+              <select id="dockerNetwork">
+                <option value="bridge">bridge (internet on, default)</option>
+                <option value="none">none (fully isolated, no network)</option>
+                <option value="custom">custom bridge</option>
+              </select>
+            </div>
+            <details class="advanced-options">
+              <summary>Advanced container settings</summary>
+              <div class="advanced-options-content">
+                <div class="form-row">
+                  <label>Memory</label>
+                  <input type="text" id="dockerMemory" placeholder="4g" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false">
+                  <span class="form-hint">Optional, e.g. 4g / 512m. Enforced as a hard OOM cap where the engine supports it.</span>
+                </div>
+                <div class="form-row">
+                  <label>CPUs</label>
+                  <input type="text" id="dockerCpus" placeholder="2" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false">
+                </div>
+                <div class="form-row">
+                  <label class="checkbox-row"><input type="checkbox" id="dockerMountCredentials" checked> Mount host credentials (~/.claude etc.)</label>
+                  <span class="form-hint">On: your existing login just works (creds stay on the host, never in exports). Off: sealed sandbox, log in inside the container.</span>
+                </div>
+                <div class="form-row">
+                  <label class="checkbox-row"><input type="checkbox" id="dockerResumeOnStart" checked> Resume last conversation on relaunch</label>
+                </div>
+              </div>
+            </details>
+            <span class="form-hint" id="dockerLinkStatus" style="margin-top: 8px; display: block;"></span>
           </div>
           <!-- Manage Tab -->
           <div class="modal-tab-content hidden" id="case-manage">
@@ -1922,6 +2180,13 @@
               <!-- Populated by JS -->
             </div>
             <span class="form-hint" style="margin-top: 8px; display: block;">Use arrows to reorder. Changes are saved automatically.</span>
+            <div id="dockerExportsSection" style="margin-top: 16px; border-top: 1px solid var(--border, #333); padding-top: 12px;">
+              <div style="display:flex; align-items:center; justify-content:space-between; margin-bottom:8px;">
+                <strong style="font-size: 13px;">Docker exports</strong>
+                <button class="btn-toolbar" onclick="app.refreshDockerExports()">Refresh</button>
+              </div>
+              <div class="case-manage-list" id="dockerExportsList"><span class="form-hint">No exports yet. Export a docker case from its tab.</span></div>
+            </div>
           </div>
         </div>
         <div class="form-actions">
@@ -2341,6 +2606,7 @@
   </svg>
 
   <script defer src="constants.js"></script>
+  <script defer src="i18n.js"></script>
   <script defer src="mobile-handlers.js"></script>
   <script defer src="voice-input.js"></script>
   <script defer src="notification-manager.js"></script>
@@ -2357,7 +2623,9 @@
   <script defer src="settings-ui.js"></script>
   <script defer src="panels-ui.js"></script>
   <script defer src="ultracode-panel.js"></script>
+  <script defer src="admin-ui.js"></script>
   <script defer src="session-ui.js"></script>
+  <script defer src="webview-tabs.js"></script>
   <script defer src="ralph-wizard.js"></script>
   <script defer src="api-client.js"></script>
   <script defer src="subagent-windows.js"></script>

src/web/public/keyboard-accessory.js

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /**
  * @fileoverview Mobile keyboard accessory bar and modal focus trap.
  *
- * Defines two exports:
+ * Defines three exports:
  *
  * - KeyboardAccessoryBar (singleton object) — Quick action buttons shown above the virtual
  *   keyboard on mobile: arrow up/down, /init, /clear, /compact, paste, Esc, and dismiss.
@@ -10,12 +10,15 @@
  *   Destructive actions (/clear, /compact) require double-tap confirmation (2s amber state).
  *   Commands are sent as text + Enter separately for Ink compatibility.
  *   Only initializes on touch devices (MobileDetection.isTouchDevice guard).
+ * - PathPicker (singleton object) — Lazy server-side file/folder browser shared
+ *   by Link Existing and the extended mobile keyboard bar.
  *
  * - FocusTrap (class) — Traps Tab/Shift+Tab keyboard focus within a modal element.
  *   Saves and restores previously focused element on deactivate. Used by Ralph wizard
  *   and other modal dialogs.
  *
  * @globals {object} KeyboardAccessoryBar
+ * @globals {object} PathPicker
  * @globals {class} FocusTrap
  *
  * @dependency mobile-handlers.js (MobileDetection.isTouchDevice)
@@ -26,6 +29,338 @@
 // Codeman — Keyboard accessory bar and focus trap for modals
 // Loaded after mobile-handlers.js, before app.js
 
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+// Shared Filesystem Path Picker
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+const PathPicker = {
+  overlay: null,
+  _options: null,
+  _selectedPath: '',
+  _previousFocus: null,
+  _keydownHandler: null,
+  _loadSequence: 0,
+  _previewOverlay: null,
+  _previewRequestSequence: 0,
+  _previewPreviousFocus: null,
+
+  /**
+   * Open the lazy filesystem browser.
+   * @param {{sessionId?: string, initialPath?: string, directoriesOnly?: boolean,
+   *   title?: string, onSelect: (path: string) => void}} options
+   */
+  open(options) {
+    this.close(false);
+    this._options = options;
+    this._selectedPath = '';
+    this._previousFocus = document.activeElement;
+    this._previousFocus?.blur?.();
+
+    const overlay = document.createElement('div');
+    overlay.className = 'path-picker-overlay';
+    overlay.setAttribute('role', 'dialog');
+    overlay.setAttribute('aria-modal', 'true');
+    overlay.setAttribute('aria-label', options.title || 'Select a path');
+    overlay.innerHTML = `
+      <div class="path-picker-dialog">
+        <div class="path-picker-header">
+          <strong class="path-picker-title"></strong>
+          <button type="button" class="path-picker-close" aria-label="Close">&times;</button>
+        </div>
+        <div class="path-picker-roots-row">
+          <label for="pathPickerRoot">Location</label>
+          <select id="pathPickerRoot" class="path-picker-roots"></select>
+        </div>
+        <div class="path-picker-nav">
+          <button type="button" class="path-picker-up" title="Parent folder" aria-label="Parent folder">&#x2191;</button>
+          <div class="path-picker-current" title="Current folder"></div>
+          <button type="button" class="path-picker-refresh" title="Refresh" aria-label="Refresh">&#x21BB;</button>
+        </div>
+        <div class="path-picker-status" aria-live="polite">Loading...</div>
+        <div class="path-picker-list" role="listbox"></div>
+        <div class="path-picker-selection">
+          <span class="path-picker-selection-label">Selected</span>
+          <span class="path-picker-selection-value">None</span>
+        </div>
+        <div class="path-picker-actions">
+          <button type="button" class="path-picker-current-select">Select Current Folder</button>
+          <span class="path-picker-action-spacer"></span>
+          <button type="button" class="path-picker-cancel">Cancel</button>
+          <button type="button" class="path-picker-confirm" disabled>Select</button>
+        </div>
+      </div>`;
+
+    this.overlay = overlay;
+    overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-title').textContent = options.title || 'Select a Path';
+    overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-close').addEventListener('click', () => this.close(true));
+    overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-cancel').addEventListener('click', () => this.close(true));
+    overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-confirm').addEventListener('click', () => this.confirm());
+    overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-current-select').addEventListener('click', () => {
+      const current = overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-current').textContent;
+      if (current) this.select(current);
+    });
+    overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-refresh').addEventListener('click', () => this.load());
+    overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-up').addEventListener('click', () => {
+      const parent = overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-up').dataset.parent;
+      if (parent) this.load(parent);
+    });
+    overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-roots').addEventListener('change', (event) => this.load(event.target.value));
+    overlay.addEventListener('click', (event) => {
+      if (event.target === overlay) this.close(true);
+    });
+    this._keydownHandler = (event) => {
+      if (event.key === 'Escape') {
+        event.preventDefault();
+        if (this._previewOverlay) this.closePreview(true);
+        else this.close(true);
+      }
+    };
+    document.addEventListener('keydown', this._keydownHandler);
+    document.body.appendChild(overlay);
+    this.load(options.initialPath || '');
+  },
+
+  async load(path) {
+    if (!this.overlay || !this._options) return;
+    const loadSequence = ++this._loadSequence;
+    const list = this.overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-list');
+    const status = this.overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-status');
+    list.replaceChildren();
+    status.textContent = 'Loading...';
+
+    const params = new URLSearchParams();
+    if (path) params.set('path', path);
+    if (this._options.sessionId) params.set('sessionId', this._options.sessionId);
+    try {
+      const response = await fetch(`/api/filesystem/browse?${params.toString()}`);
+      const result = await response.json();
+      if (!response.ok || !result.success) throw new Error(result.error || 'Failed to browse this folder');
+      if (!this.overlay || loadSequence !== this._loadSequence) return;
+      this.render(result.data);
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (!this.overlay || loadSequence !== this._loadSequence) return;
+      if (path) {
+        this.load('');
+        return;
+      }
+      status.textContent = error.message || 'Failed to browse this folder';
+      status.classList.add('error');
+    }
+  },
+
+  render(data) {
+    const rootSelect = this.overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-roots');
+    rootSelect.replaceChildren();
+    for (const root of data.roots) {
+      const option = document.createElement('option');
+      option.value = root.path;
+      option.textContent = `${root.label} — ${root.path}`;
+      option.selected = data.path === root.path || data.root === root.path;
+      rootSelect.appendChild(option);
+    }
+
+    this.overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-current').textContent = data.path;
+    const up = this.overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-up');
+    up.dataset.parent = data.parent || '';
+    up.disabled = !data.parent;
+    const status = this.overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-status');
+    status.classList.remove('error');
+    status.textContent = data.entries.length === 0
+      ? 'This folder is empty'
+      : `${data.entries.length} item${data.entries.length === 1 ? '' : 's'}${data.truncated ? ' (first 500)' : ''}`;
+
+    const list = this.overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-list');
+    list.replaceChildren();
+    for (const entry of data.entries) {
+      const row = document.createElement('div');
+      row.className = 'path-picker-item';
+      if (entry.type === 'file' && this._options.directoriesOnly && !entry.previewKind) {
+        row.classList.add('not-selectable');
+      }
+      row.dataset.path = entry.path;
+      row.dataset.type = entry.type;
+      row.setAttribute('role', 'option');
+
+      const open = document.createElement('button');
+      open.type = 'button';
+      open.className = 'path-picker-item-main';
+      const icon = document.createElement('span');
+      icon.className = 'path-picker-item-icon';
+      icon.textContent = entry.type === 'directory' ? '\uD83D\uDCC1' : '\uD83D\uDCC4';
+      const name = document.createElement('span');
+      name.className = 'path-picker-item-name';
+      name.textContent = entry.name;
+      open.append(icon, name);
+      if (entry.symlink) {
+        const link = document.createElement('span');
+        link.className = 'path-picker-item-link';
+        link.textContent = '\u2197';
+        open.appendChild(link);
+      }
+      if (entry.type === 'directory') {
+        const chevron = document.createElement('span');
+        chevron.className = 'path-picker-item-chevron';
+        chevron.textContent = '\u203A';
+        open.appendChild(chevron);
+        open.addEventListener('click', () => this.load(entry.path));
+      } else if (entry.previewKind) {
+        const preview = document.createElement('span');
+        preview.className = 'path-picker-item-preview';
+        preview.textContent = '\uD83D\uDC41';
+        open.appendChild(preview);
+        open.title = `Preview ${entry.name}`;
+        open.setAttribute('aria-label', `Preview ${entry.name}`);
+        open.addEventListener('click', () => this.openPreview(entry));
+      } else if (!this._options.directoriesOnly) {
+        open.addEventListener('click', () => this.select(entry.path));
+      } else {
+        open.disabled = true;
+      }
+      row.appendChild(open);
+
+      if (entry.type === 'directory' || !this._options.directoriesOnly) {
+        const choose = document.createElement('button');
+        choose.type = 'button';
+        choose.className = 'path-picker-item-select';
+        choose.textContent = 'Choose';
+        choose.addEventListener('click', () => this.select(entry.path));
+        row.appendChild(choose);
+      }
+      list.appendChild(row);
+    }
+  },
+
+  select(path) {
+    if (!this.overlay) return;
+    this._selectedPath = path;
+    this.overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-selection-value').textContent = path;
+    this.overlay.querySelector('.path-picker-confirm').disabled = false;
+    this.overlay.querySelectorAll('.path-picker-item').forEach((row) => {
+      const selected = row.dataset.path === path;
+      row.classList.toggle('selected', selected);
+      row.setAttribute('aria-selected', selected ? 'true' : 'false');
+    });
+  },
+
+  openPreview(entry) {
+    this.closePreview(false);
+    this._previewPreviousFocus = document.activeElement;
+    const requestSequence = ++this._previewRequestSequence;
+    const params = new URLSearchParams({ path: entry.path });
+    if (this._options?.sessionId) params.set('sessionId', this._options.sessionId);
+    const previewUrl = `/api/filesystem/preview?${params.toString()}`;
+
+    const overlay = document.createElement('div');
+    overlay.className = 'path-preview-overlay';
+    overlay.setAttribute('role', 'dialog');
+    overlay.setAttribute('aria-modal', 'true');
+    overlay.setAttribute('aria-label', `Preview ${entry.name}`);
+    overlay.innerHTML = `
+      <div class="path-preview-dialog">
+        <div class="path-preview-header">
+          <div class="path-preview-heading">
+            <strong class="path-preview-title"></strong>
+            <span class="path-preview-path"></span>
+          </div>
+          <a class="path-preview-open" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Open</a>
+          <button type="button" class="path-preview-close" aria-label="Close preview">&times;</button>
+        </div>
+        <div class="path-preview-body"><div class="path-preview-loading">Loading preview...</div></div>
+      </div>`;
+    overlay.querySelector('.path-preview-title').textContent = entry.name;
+    overlay.querySelector('.path-preview-path').textContent = entry.path;
+    overlay.querySelector('.path-preview-open').href = previewUrl;
+    overlay.querySelector('.path-preview-close').addEventListener('click', () => this.closePreview(true));
+    overlay.addEventListener('click', (event) => {
+      if (event.target === overlay) this.closePreview(true);
+    });
+    document.body.appendChild(overlay);
+    this._previewOverlay = overlay;
+
+    const body = overlay.querySelector('.path-preview-body');
+    if (entry.previewKind === 'image') {
+      const image = document.createElement('img');
+      image.className = 'path-preview-image';
+      image.alt = entry.name;
+      image.addEventListener('load', () => body.querySelector('.path-preview-loading')?.remove());
+      image.addEventListener('error', () => this.showPreviewError('Image preview failed to load'));
+      image.src = previewUrl;
+      body.appendChild(image);
+    } else if (entry.previewKind === 'text') {
+      fetch(previewUrl)
+        .then(async (response) => {
+          const content = await response.text();
+          if (!response.ok) {
+            let message = 'Text preview failed to load';
+            try {
+              message = JSON.parse(content).error || message;
+            } catch {}
+            throw new Error(message);
+          }
+          return content;
+        })
+        .then((content) => {
+          if (!this._previewOverlay || requestSequence !== this._previewRequestSequence) return;
+          const pre = document.createElement('pre');
+          pre.className = 'path-preview-text';
+          pre.textContent = content;
+          body.replaceChildren(pre);
+        })
+        .catch((error) => {
+          if (requestSequence === this._previewRequestSequence) this.showPreviewError(error.message);
+        });
+    } else {
+      const frame = document.createElement('iframe');
+      frame.className = 'path-preview-frame';
+      frame.title = entry.name;
+      frame.addEventListener('load', () => body.querySelector('.path-preview-loading')?.remove());
+      frame.src = previewUrl;
+      body.appendChild(frame);
+    }
+    overlay.querySelector('.path-preview-close').focus();
+  },
+
+  showPreviewError(message) {
+    const body = this._previewOverlay?.querySelector('.path-preview-body');
+    if (!body) return;
+    const error = document.createElement('div');
+    error.className = 'path-preview-error';
+    error.textContent = message || 'Preview failed to load';
+    body.replaceChildren(error);
+  },
+
+  closePreview(restoreFocus = true) {
+    this._previewRequestSequence += 1;
+    this._previewOverlay?.remove();
+    this._previewOverlay = null;
+    const previousFocus = this._previewPreviousFocus;
+    this._previewPreviousFocus = null;
+    if (restoreFocus) previousFocus?.focus?.();
+  },
+
+  confirm() {
+    if (!this._selectedPath || !this._options) return;
+    const selectedPath = this._selectedPath;
+    const onSelect = this._options.onSelect;
+    this.close(false);
+    onSelect(selectedPath);
+  },
+
+  close(restoreFocus = true) {
+    if (this._keydownHandler) document.removeEventListener('keydown', this._keydownHandler);
+    this._keydownHandler = null;
+    this._loadSequence += 1;
+    this.closePreview(false);
+    this.overlay?.remove();
+    this.overlay = null;
+    const previousFocus = this._previousFocus;
+    this._previousFocus = null;
+    this._options = null;
+    this._selectedPath = '';
+    if (restoreFocus) previousFocus?.focus?.();
+  },
+};
+
 // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 // Mobile Keyboard Accessory Bar
 // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@@ -92,6 +427,8 @@ const KeyboardAccessoryBar = {
           <rect x="8" y="2" width="8" height="4" rx="1" ry="1"/>
         </svg>
       </button>
+      <button class="accessory-btn" data-action="pick-path" title="Insert a file or folder path">&#x1F4C1; Path</button>
+      <button class="accessory-btn" data-action="clear-input" title="Clear the current unsent input">&#x232B; All</button>
       <button class="accessory-btn" data-action="tab" title="Tab">Tab</button>
       <button class="accessory-btn" data-action="shift-tab" title="Shift+Tab">⇧Tab</button>
       <button class="accessory-btn" data-action="effort-max" title="/effort max">Max</button>
@@ -128,7 +465,7 @@ const KeyboardAccessoryBar = {
       this.handleAction(action, btn);
 
       // Refocus terminal so keyboard stays open (tap blurs terminal → keyboard dismisses → toolbar shifts)
-      const refocusActions = new Set(['scroll-up', 'scroll-down', 'arrow-left', 'arrow-right', 'tab', 'shift-tab', 'ctrl-o', 'opt-enter', 'esc', 'effort-max']);
+      const refocusActions = new Set(['scroll-up', 'scroll-down', 'arrow-left', 'arrow-right', 'tab', 'shift-tab', 'ctrl-o', 'opt-enter', 'esc', 'effort-max', 'clear-input']);
       if (refocusActions.has(action) ||
           ((action === 'clear' || action === 'compact') && this._confirmAction)) {
         if (typeof app !== 'undefined' && app.terminal) {
@@ -207,6 +544,12 @@ const KeyboardAccessoryBar = {
       case 'paste':
         this.pasteFromClipboard();
         break;
+      case 'pick-path':
+        this.pickPath();
+        break;
+      case 'clear-input':
+        app.clearTerminalInput?.();
+        break;
       case 'dismiss':
         // Blur active element to dismiss keyboard
         document.activeElement?.blur();
@@ -265,6 +608,22 @@ const KeyboardAccessoryBar = {
     }).catch(() => {});
   },
 
+  /** Browse the active session's workspace and insert a selected path without Enter. */
+  pickPath() {
+    if (!app.activeSessionId) return;
+    const session = app.sessions?.get(app.activeSessionId);
+    PathPicker.open({
+      title: 'Insert File or Folder Path',
+      sessionId: app.activeSessionId,
+      initialPath: session?.workingDir || '',
+      directoriesOnly: false,
+      onSelect: (path) => {
+        app.insertTerminalText?.(path);
+        setTimeout(() => app.terminal?.focus(), 100);
+      },
+    });
+  },
+
   /** Show a paste overlay for iOS compatibility.
    *  Handles three input paths from one dialog:
    *   - Text: long-press the textarea → Paste → Send (unchanged).

src/web/public/mobile-handlers.js

@@ -43,6 +43,35 @@ const MobileDetection = {
     );
   },
 
+  /**
+   * Check whether this browser belongs to a handheld device.
+   *
+   * Unlike getDeviceType(), this classification must remain stable when a
+   * foldable changes posture. An unfolded phone can expose a desktop-width
+   * viewport, but it still needs the same per-device settings that were saved
+   * while folded. User-Agent Client Hints are preferred where available; the
+   * legacy token fallback covers Android WebView and iPhone browsers.
+   */
+  isHandheldDevice() {
+    if (!this.isTouchDevice()) return false;
+
+    const userAgent = navigator.userAgent || '';
+
+    // Prefer explicit UA form-factor signals. Besides matching real browsers,
+    // this avoids Chromium emulation reporting userAgentData.mobile=true for
+    // an iPad/tablet context created with isMobile=true.
+    if (/iPad|Tablet|Silk|PlayBook|Kindle|Windows NT|CrOS|Macintosh/i.test(userAgent)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (/Android/i.test(userAgent) && !/Mobile/i.test(userAgent)) return false;
+    if (/Mobi|iPhone|iPod/i.test(userAgent)) return true;
+
+    const uaDataMobile = navigator.userAgentData?.mobile;
+    if (typeof uaDataMobile === 'boolean') return uaDataMobile;
+
+    return false;
+  },
+
   /** Check if device is iOS (iPhone, iPad, iPod) */
   isIOS() {
     return (

src/web/public/mobile.css

@@ -350,7 +350,8 @@ html.mobile-init .file-browser-panel {
    Phone Breakpoint (<430px)
    ============================================================================ */
 @media (max-width: 430px) {
-  /* Compact header brand on phones — acts as home button */
+  /* Phone brand collapses to a single "C" home button: hide the wordmark,
+     keep the tap target */
   .header-brand {
     padding-right: 0.25rem;
     margin-right: 0.2rem;
@@ -358,7 +359,15 @@ html.mobile-init .file-browser-panel {
   }
 
   .header-brand .logo {
-    font-size: 0.7rem;
+    font-size: 0.85rem;
+  }
+
+  .header-brand .logo .logo-text {
+    display: none;
+  }
+
+  .header-brand .logo .logo-compact {
+    display: inline;
   }
 
   /* Font controls - compact on phones, visibility controlled by JS */
@@ -459,16 +468,25 @@ html.mobile-init .file-browser-panel {
     height: 12px;
   }
 
-  /* Hide header settings gear, lifecycle log, away digest, and session manager on
-     mobile - settings moved to toolbar; away digest and the session manager are
-     secondary controls that don't belong on the cramped phone header (the session
-     manager stays reachable via the Ctrl+K palette's "Browse all sessions" item).
+  /* Hide header settings gear, lifecycle log, away digest, session manager, and
+     file viewer on mobile - settings moved to toolbar; the others are secondary /
+     desktop-oriented controls that don't belong on the cramped phone header (the
+     session manager stays reachable via the Ctrl+K palette's "Browse all sessions"
+     item; the file viewer button is opt-in but its panel is desktop-sized).
      (The attachments button is opt-in / default-hidden everywhere via its own
      --hidden marker, so it needs no mobile-specific rule here.) */
   .btn-icon-header.btn-settings,
   .btn-icon-header.btn-lifecycle-log,
   .btn-icon-header.btn-away-digest,
-  .btn-icon-header.btn-session-manager {
+  .btn-icon-header.btn-session-manager,
+  .btn-icon-header.btn-file-viewer {
+    display: none !important;
+  }
+
+  /* The big labeled Admin Panel button is desktop-only (admin-gated, revealed by
+     admin-ui.js). On phones admins still reach user management via App Settings →
+     Users, so the cramped header stays minimal. */
+  .btn-admin-panel {
     display: none !important;
   }
 
@@ -837,6 +855,17 @@ html.mobile-init .file-browser-panel {
     -webkit-tap-highlight-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.1);
   }
 
+  /* Per-URL edit/delete in the Web / URL list need a real touch target, and they
+     sit next to the row's own tap area, so they get sized up rather than relying
+     on the 24px desktop hit box. */
+  .run-mode-row-btn {
+    width: 34px;
+    height: 34px;
+    font-size: 1rem;
+    -webkit-tap-highlight-color: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.1);
+  }
+  .run-mode-webview-delete { font-size: 1.2rem; }
+
   .run-mode-history {
     -webkit-overflow-scrolling: touch;
     touch-action: manipulation;
@@ -857,19 +886,44 @@ html.mobile-init .file-browser-panel {
     margin-right: 0;
   }
 
-  /* Secondary action - Run Shell - right side */
+  /* Shell is NOT a toolbar button on phones — it moved into the Run dropdown
+     (Terminal / Shell), freeing this slot for Enter. Starting a shell is a rare,
+     deliberate act; sending Enter is a constant one, so the scarce phone real
+     estate goes to Enter. */
   .btn-toolbar.btn-shell {
-    flex: 0 0 auto;
-    background: transparent;
-    border: 1px solid rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.2);
-    color: #9ca3af;
-    order: 4; /* Right position */
+    display: none !important;
   }
 
-  .btn-toolbar.btn-shell:hover,
-  .btn-toolbar.btn-shell:active {
-    background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.1);
-    color: #fff;
+  /* Secondary action - Enter - right side. Takes the slot (and the order) the
+     Shell button used to hold, so the toolbar rhythm is unchanged. */
+  .btn-toolbar.btn-enter {
+    display: flex !important;
+    flex: 0 0 auto;
+    align-items: center;
+    justify-content: center;
+    min-width: 54px;
+    width: 54px;
+    white-space: nowrap;
+    padding: 0 8px !important;
+    overflow: hidden;
+    font-size: 0.65rem;
+    font-weight: 600;
+    letter-spacing: 0.01em;
+    /* !important is REQUIRED here, not defensive habit: styles.css nests its skin
+       overrides inside `html:not([data-skin="og"]) { … }`, so a plain `.btn-toolbar`
+       in that block resolves to (0,2,1) and outranks this (0,2,0) rule. Without
+       !important the button silently renders in generic toolbar grey. */
+    background: rgba(30, 58, 95, 0.85) !important;
+    border: 1px solid rgba(59, 130, 246, 0.45) !important;
+    color: #dbeafe !important;
+    order: 4; /* Right position — same slot Shell used to occupy */
+  }
+
+  .btn-toolbar.btn-enter:hover,
+  .btn-toolbar.btn-enter:active {
+    background: rgba(37, 74, 122, 0.95) !important;
+    border-color: rgba(59, 130, 246, 0.7) !important;
+    color: #fff !important;
   }
 
   /* Hide case selector on mobile - simplified toolbar */
@@ -877,27 +931,12 @@ html.mobile-init .file-browser-panel {
     display: none !important;
   }
 
-  /* Simplified toolbar layout — Run, Shell, and Case */
+  /* Simplified toolbar layout — Run, Enter, and Case */
   .toolbar-left .toolbar-group:first-child {
     width: 100%;
     gap: 8px;
   }
 
-  .btn-toolbar.btn-shell {
-    flex: 0 0 auto;
-    min-width: 54px;
-    width: 54px;
-    white-space: nowrap;
-    padding: 0 8px !important;
-    overflow: hidden;
-    font-size: 0 !important;
-  }
-
-  .btn-toolbar.btn-shell::after {
-    content: "Shell";
-    font-size: 0.65rem;
-  }
-
   /* Mobile case button - visible on mobile */
   .btn-toolbar.btn-case-mobile {
     display: flex !important;
@@ -2208,6 +2247,68 @@ html.mobile-init .file-browser-panel {
   }
 }
 
+/* Light-skin compatibility for mobile-only chrome. These components predate
+   the shared skin system and intentionally retain their original dark values
+   for the three dark skins above. */
+html:is([data-skin="paper-gray"], [data-skin="solarized-light"], [data-skin="catppuccin-latte"], [data-skin="rose-pine-dawn"]) :is(.header, .toolbar, .keyboard-accessory-bar) {
+  background: var(--glass-bg);
+  border-color: var(--glass-border);
+  color: var(--text);
+}
+
+html:is([data-skin="paper-gray"], [data-skin="solarized-light"], [data-skin="catppuccin-latte"], [data-skin="rose-pine-dawn"]) :is(.btn-voice-mobile, .btn-settings-mobile, .btn-toolbar.btn-shell, .toolbar .btn-case-add, .accessory-btn) {
+  background: var(--control-bg);
+  border-color: var(--control-border);
+  color: var(--text-dim);
+}
+
+html:is([data-skin="paper-gray"], [data-skin="solarized-light"], [data-skin="catppuccin-latte"], [data-skin="rose-pine-dawn"]) :is(.btn-voice-mobile:active, .btn-settings-mobile:active, .btn-toolbar.btn-shell:hover, .btn-toolbar.btn-shell:active, .btn-case-add:hover, .btn-case-add:active, .accessory-btn:active) {
+  background: var(--control-bg-hover);
+  border-color: var(--control-border-hover);
+  color: var(--text);
+}
+
+html:is([data-skin="paper-gray"], [data-skin="solarized-light"], [data-skin="catppuccin-latte"], [data-skin="rose-pine-dawn"]) :is(.btn-toolbar.btn-run.mode-claude, .btn-toolbar.btn-run-gear.mode-claude) {
+  background: linear-gradient(135deg, var(--accent-grad-a), var(--accent-grad-b));
+  border-color: var(--accent);
+  color: var(--accent-ink);
+}
+
+html:is([data-skin="paper-gray"], [data-skin="solarized-light"], [data-skin="catppuccin-latte"], [data-skin="rose-pine-dawn"]) :is(.btn-toolbar.btn-run.mode-opencode, .btn-toolbar.btn-run-gear.mode-opencode) {
+  background: linear-gradient(135deg, var(--accent-d), var(--accent-grad-b));
+  border-color: var(--accent);
+  color: var(--accent-ink);
+}
+
+html:is([data-skin="paper-gray"], [data-skin="solarized-light"], [data-skin="catppuccin-latte"], [data-skin="rose-pine-dawn"]) :is(.btn-toolbar.btn-run.mode-gemini, .btn-toolbar.btn-run-gear.mode-gemini) {
+  background: linear-gradient(135deg, #174ea6, #4f46e5);
+  border-color: #315fc3;
+  color: #ffffff;
+}
+
+html:is([data-skin="paper-gray"], [data-skin="solarized-light"], [data-skin="catppuccin-latte"], [data-skin="rose-pine-dawn"]) .btn-toolbar.btn-run-gear {
+  border-left-color: var(--control-border-hover) !important;
+}
+
+html:is([data-skin="paper-gray"], [data-skin="solarized-light"], [data-skin="catppuccin-latte"], [data-skin="rose-pine-dawn"]) :is(.case-settings-popover-mobile, .mobile-case-picker-sheet) {
+  background: var(--floating-bg);
+  border-color: var(--control-border);
+  color: var(--text);
+  box-shadow: var(--elevated-shadow);
+}
+
+html:is([data-skin="paper-gray"], [data-skin="solarized-light"], [data-skin="catppuccin-latte"], [data-skin="rose-pine-dawn"]) :is(.case-settings-popover-mobile .checkbox-inline, #createCaseModal .form-row label) {
+  color: var(--text);
+}
+
+html:is([data-skin="paper-gray"], [data-skin="solarized-light"], [data-skin="catppuccin-latte"], [data-skin="rose-pine-dawn"]) .case-settings-popover-mobile .form-hint {
+  color: var(--text-muted);
+}
+
+html:is([data-skin="paper-gray"], [data-skin="solarized-light"], [data-skin="catppuccin-latte"], [data-skin="rose-pine-dawn"]) .mobile-case-picker .modal-backdrop {
+  background: var(--modal-backdrop);
+}
+
 
 /* Keyboard accessory bar + paste overlay base styles moved to styles.css
    (always loaded — covers iPad landscape where mobile.css doesn't load).

src/web/public/notification-manager.js

@@ -330,8 +330,10 @@ class NotificationManager {
     if (now - this.lastBrowserNotifTime < BROWSER_NOTIF_RATE_LIMIT_MS) return;
     this.lastBrowserNotifTime = now;
 
-    const notif = new Notification(`${this.originalTitle}: ${title}`, {
-      body,
+    const localizedTitle = window.codemanT?.(title) || title;
+    const localizedBody = window.codemanT?.(body) || body;
+    const notif = new Notification(`${this.originalTitle}: ${localizedTitle}`, {
+      body: localizedBody,
       tag, // Groups same-tag notifications
       icon: '/favicon.ico',
       silent: true, // We handle audio ourselves

src/web/public/panels-ui.js

@@ -82,6 +82,33 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     }
   },
 
+  // Remote auto-reconnect (COD-108)
+  _onRemoteSessionReconnected(data) {
+    const id = this.getShortId(data.sessionId);
+    this.showToast(`Remote session ${id} reconnected`, 'success');
+  },
+
+  _onRemoteReconnectExhausted(data) {
+    const sessionId = data.sessionId;
+    const id = this.getShortId(sessionId);
+    // Auto-reconnect gave up after the bounded backoff. Surface a manual
+    // "Reconnect" affordance that re-triggers the attach path (force-reload the
+    // session, which re-runs the create/attach flow against the durable remote).
+    this.showToast(`Remote session ${id} dropped — auto-reconnect gave up`, 'error', {
+      duration: 15000,
+      action: {
+        label: 'Reconnect',
+        onClick: () => {
+          if (this.sessions && this.sessions.has(sessionId)) {
+            this.selectSession(sessionId, { forceReload: true });
+          } else {
+            this.showToast('Session no longer available', 'warning');
+          }
+        },
+      },
+    });
+  },
+
 
   // Bash tools
   _onBashToolStart(data) {
@@ -2240,6 +2267,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
 
       const terminal = new Terminal({
         theme: { ...window.codemanCurrentXtermTheme() },
+        minimumContrastRatio: window.codemanCurrentSkinIsLight() ? 4.5 : 1,
         fontFamily: '"Fira Code", "Cascadia Code", "JetBrains Mono", "SF Mono", Monaco, monospace',
         fontSize: 12,
         lineHeight: 1.2,
@@ -3098,6 +3126,32 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     }
   },
 
+  // Header "File Viewer" button (opt-in via App Settings → Header Displays →
+  // File Viewer). Toggles the file browser panel open/closed without a trip
+  // through settings. Persists via the same `showFileBrowser` flag the Panels
+  // section + the panel's own close (X) use, so the three stay in sync.
+  toggleFileBrowserButton() {
+    const panel = this.$('fileBrowserPanel');
+    const isOpen = panel?.classList.contains('visible');
+    const btn = document.querySelector('.btn-file-viewer');
+    if (isOpen) {
+      this.closeFileBrowserPanel();
+      if (btn) btn.setAttribute('aria-expanded', 'false');
+      return;
+    }
+    if (!this.activeSessionId) {
+      this.showToast('Open a session to browse its files', 'info');
+      return;
+    }
+    const settings = this.loadAppSettingsFromStorage();
+    settings.showFileBrowser = true;
+    this.saveAppSettingsToStorage(settings);
+    const checkbox = document.getElementById('appSettingsShowFileBrowser');
+    if (checkbox) checkbox.checked = true;
+    this.applyMonitorVisibility();
+    if (btn) btn.setAttribute('aria-expanded', 'true');
+  },
+
   closeFileBrowserPanel() {
     const panel = this.$('fileBrowserPanel');
     if (panel) {
@@ -3130,6 +3184,10 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     const settings = this.loadAppSettingsFromStorage();
     settings.showFileBrowser = false;
     this.saveAppSettingsToStorage(settings);
+    const checkbox = document.getElementById('appSettingsShowFileBrowser');
+    if (checkbox) checkbox.checked = false;
+    const headerBtn = document.querySelector('.btn-file-viewer');
+    if (headerBtn) headerBtn.setAttribute('aria-expanded', 'false');
   },
 
   async openFilePreview(filePath, sessionId = this.activeSessionId, attachmentId = null) {

src/web/public/session-ui.js

@@ -45,7 +45,18 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
   // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
 
   formatCasePickerLabel(c) {
-    return c?.location === 'remote' && c.remote?.hostId ? `${c.name} @ ${c.remote.hostId}` : c?.name || '';
+    if (c?.location === 'remote' && c.remote?.hostId) return `${c.name} @ ${c.remote.hostId}`;
+    if (c?.location === 'docker') return `${c.name} (${this.dockerCaseTag(c.docker?.hostId)})`;
+    return c?.name || '';
+  },
+
+  // Short parenthetical tag for a dockerized case: '(docker)' for the default /
+  // auto-provisioned host (one-click "Run in Docker", the Docker-tab 'local'
+  // default, or a per-case 'q-<name>' resource-override host), otherwise the custom
+  // docker host id the user named (e.g. '(gpu-box)'). Keeps the case name short.
+  dockerCaseTag(hostId) {
+    if (!hostId || hostId === 'default' || hostId === 'local' || /^q-/.test(hostId)) return 'docker';
+    return hostId;
   },
 
   buildCasePickerOptions(cases = []) {
@@ -70,7 +81,10 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
           c.location,
           c.remote?.hostId,
           c.remote?.label,
-          c.remote?.path
+          c.remote?.path,
+          c.docker?.container,
+          c.docker?.image,
+          c.docker?.path
         ].filter(Boolean).join(' ').toLowerCase();
         return { name: c.name, label, case: c, searchText };
       })
@@ -336,19 +350,63 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     return this.run();
   },
 
+  /** Ensure a newly-created session is visible without waiting for the SSE event.
+   *  The POST response and session:created can arrive in either order, so the
+   *  normal idempotent SSE handler remains the single state-upsert path. */
+  async _ensureCreatedSessionVisible(sessionId, sessionSnapshot) {
+    if (!sessionId) return;
+
+    let session = sessionSnapshot;
+    if (!session && !this.sessions?.has(sessionId)) {
+      const res = await fetch(`/api/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(sessionId)}`);
+      const data = await res.json();
+      if (!data.success) throw new Error(data.error || 'Failed to load the new session');
+      session = data.data?.session || data.data;
+    }
+
+    if (session?.id) this._onSessionCreated(session);
+    // session:created normally uses the debounced renderer. The direct POST path
+    // needs the tab in the DOM before selectSession() marks it active.
+    this._renderSessionTabsImmediate?.();
+  },
+
   /** Run using the selected mode (Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, or Gemini) */
   async run() {
-    const mode = this._runMode || 'claude';
-    if (mode === 'opencode') {
-      return this.runOpenCode();
+    if (this._runInFlight) return;
+
+    const startedAt = Date.now();
+    const minLockMs = Number.isFinite(this._runMinLockMs) ? this._runMinLockMs : 500;
+    const runBtn = document.getElementById('runBtn');
+    this._runInFlight = true;
+    if (runBtn) {
+      runBtn.disabled = true;
+      runBtn.setAttribute('aria-busy', 'true');
     }
-    if (mode === 'codex') {
-      return this.runCodex();
+
+    try {
+      const mode = this._runMode || 'claude';
+      if (mode === 'opencode') {
+        return await this.runOpenCode();
+      }
+      if (mode === 'codex') {
+        return await this.runCodex();
+      }
+      if (mode === 'gemini') {
+        return await this.runGemini();
+      }
+      if (mode === 'shell') {
+        return await this.runShell();
+      }
+      return await this.runClaude();
+    } finally {
+      const remaining = minLockMs - (Date.now() - startedAt);
+      if (remaining > 0) await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, remaining));
+      this._runInFlight = false;
+      if (runBtn) {
+        runBtn.disabled = false;
+        runBtn.removeAttribute('aria-busy');
+      }
     }
-    if (mode === 'gemini') {
-      return this.runGemini();
-    }
-    return this.runClaude();
   },
 
   // Note: `runMode` is an accessor defined via Object.defineProperty at the bottom of
@@ -424,7 +482,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
         btn.append(dirSpan, metaSpan);
         btn.addEventListener('click', (e) => {
           e.stopPropagation();
-          this.resumeHistorySession(s.sessionId, s.workingDir);
+          this.resumeHistorySession(s.sessionId, s.workingDir, s.name);
         });
         container.appendChild(btn);
       }
@@ -445,10 +503,32 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       gearBtn.className = `btn-toolbar btn-run-gear mode-${mode}`;
     }
     if (label) {
-      label.textContent = mode === 'opencode' ? 'Run OC' : mode === 'codex' ? 'Run CX' : mode === 'gemini' ? 'Run GM' : 'Run';
+      label.textContent = mode === 'opencode' ? 'Run OC' : mode === 'codex' ? 'Run CX' : mode === 'gemini' ? 'Run GM' : mode === 'shell' ? 'Run SH' : 'Run';
     }
   },
 
+  /** Send Enter to the active session (phone toolbar button).
+   *
+   *  MUST go through xterm's onData path, NOT straight to sendInput()/the API.
+   *  With local echo on (the mobile default) the characters you typed are still
+   *  buffered in the LocalEchoOverlay and have NEVER reached the PTY. The onData
+   *  Enter branch (terminal-ui.js) is what flushes that pending text and only
+   *  then sends \r. Send a bare \r instead and you submit an empty line while the
+   *  typed text stays stranded on screen — which reads as "the button does
+   *  nothing". triggerDataEvent replays it exactly as if the key were pressed,
+   *  so overlay flush, flushed-offset cleanup and ordering are all reused. */
+  sendEnterKey() {
+    if (!this.activeSessionId) return;
+    const coreService = this.terminal?._core?.coreService;
+    if (coreService && typeof coreService.triggerDataEvent === 'function') {
+      coreService.triggerDataEvent('\r', true);
+      return;
+    }
+    // Fallback only if xterm's private core API moves: correct when local echo
+    // is off, and still better than doing nothing.
+    this.sendInput('\r');
+  },
+
   _initRunMode() {
     try { this._runMode = localStorage.getItem('codeman_runMode') || 'claude'; } catch { this._runMode = 'claude'; }
     this._applyRunMode();
@@ -480,6 +560,22 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     input.value = Math.max(1, current - 1);
   },
 
+  // Next free <prefix><n> index for a case's session tabs (e.g. w1-<case>,
+  // w2-<case> for agents, s1-<case> for shells), shared by the local and
+  // remote/docker launch paths so all tabs follow the same naming convention.
+  _nextCaseSessionStartNumber(caseName, prefix = 'w') {
+    const re = new RegExp(`^${prefix}(\\d+)-([a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)`);
+    let startNumber = 1;
+    for (const [, session] of this.sessions || []) {
+      const match = session.name && session.name.match(re);
+      if (match && match[2] === caseName) {
+        const num = parseInt(match[1]);
+        if (num >= startNumber) startNumber = num + 1;
+      }
+    }
+    return startNumber;
+  },
+
   async runClaude() {
     const caseName = document.getElementById('quickStartCase').value || 'testcase';
     const tabCount = Math.min(20, Math.max(1, parseInt(document.getElementById('tabCount').value) || 1));
@@ -517,16 +613,56 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       // Remote cases run over ssh — POST /api/sessions stat-validates workingDir on
       // the LOCAL fs (a remote user@host:/path never exists locally), so route them
       // through /api/quick-start, which resolves the remote case + launches via ssh.
-      if (caseData.location === 'remote') {
+      if (caseData.location === 'remote' || caseData.location === 'docker') {
+        // Name remote/docker tabs with the same w<n>-<case> convention as local
+        // sessions (quick-start would otherwise auto-generate codeman-<id>).
+        const startNumber = this._nextCaseSessionStartNumber(caseName);
+        // Docker (NOT remote): the App Settings Claude Model choice applies — the
+        // workspace is a real host dir, so quick-start writes it to the case's
+        // .claude/settings.local.json and the in-container claude reads it.
+        // Remote quick-starts REJECT modelOverride (the file would land on the
+        // wrong machine), so never send it there.
+        let dockerModelOverride;
+        if (caseData.location === 'docker') {
+          const dockerGlobalSettings = this.loadAppSettingsFromStorage();
+          const dockerCaseSettings = this.getCaseSettings(caseName);
+          const dockerUseOpus1m = dockerCaseSettings.opusContext1m || dockerGlobalSettings.opusContext1mEnabled;
+          dockerModelOverride = dockerGlobalSettings.claudeModel || (dockerUseOpus1m ? 'opus[1m]' : '');
+        }
         const remoteIds = [];
+        let driftHandled = false;
         for (let i = 0; i < tabCount; i++) {
-          const res = await fetch('/api/quick-start', {
-            method: 'POST',
-            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-            body: JSON.stringify({ caseName, mode: 'claude' })
+          const quickStartBody = JSON.stringify({
+            caseName, mode: 'claude', sessionName: `w${startNumber + i}-${caseName}`,
+            ...(dockerModelOverride !== undefined ? { modelOverride: dockerModelOverride } : {})
           });
-          const data = await res.json();
+          const doQuickStart = async () => {
+            const res = await fetch('/api/quick-start', {
+              method: 'POST',
+              headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+              body: quickStartBody
+            });
+            return res.json();
+          };
+          let data = await doQuickStart();
+          // Docker config drift: the host config changed since the container was
+          // created (CONFLICT from quick-start). Confirm once, recreate, retry.
+          if (!data.success && data.errorCode === 'CONFLICT' && caseData.location === 'docker' && !driftHandled) {
+            driftHandled = true;
+            const recreate = confirm(
+              `Container config for "${caseName}" changed since its container was created.\n\n` +
+              'Recreate the container to apply the new config? Workspace files and the ' +
+              'conversation survive (the conversation resumes on launch).'
+            );
+            if (recreate) {
+              const recRes = await fetch(`/api/docker-cases/${encodeURIComponent(caseName)}/recreate`, { method: 'POST' });
+              const recData = await recRes.json();
+              if (!recData.success) throw new Error(recData.error || 'Failed to recreate container');
+              data = await doQuickStart();
+            }
+          }
           if (!data.success) throw new Error(data.error || 'Failed to start remote Claude session');
+          await this._ensureCreatedSessionVisible(data.data.sessionId, data.data.session);
           remoteIds.push(data.data.sessionId);
         }
         this.terminal.writeln(`\x1b[90m All ${tabCount} remote session(s) ready\x1b[0m`);
@@ -541,16 +677,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       let firstSessionId = null;
 
       // Find the highest existing w-number for THIS case to avoid duplicates
-      let startNumber = 1;
-      for (const [, session] of this.sessions) {
-        const match = session.name && session.name.match(/^w(\d+)-([a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)/);
-        if (match && match[2] === caseName) {
-          const num = parseInt(match[1]);
-          if (num >= startNumber) {
-            startNumber = num + 1;
-          }
-        }
-      }
+      const startNumber = this._nextCaseSessionStartNumber(caseName);
 
       // Get global Ralph tracker setting
       const ralphEnabled = this.isRalphTrackerEnabledByDefault();
@@ -589,7 +716,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
             // is shared by sibling sessions, so create-with-false must not yank it
             // — see the comment in session-routes create). Disabling the setting
             // removes it via the App Settings toggle path (system-routes), not here.
-            statusLineTelemetry: globalSettings.showPlanUsageLimits === true,
+            statusLineTelemetry: this.planUsageChipEnabled(globalSettings),
           })
         }).then(r => r.json())
       );
@@ -599,6 +726,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       const sessionIds = [];
       for (const result of createResults) {
         if (!result.success) throw new Error(result.error);
+        await this._ensureCreatedSessionVisible(result.data.session.id, result.data.session);
         sessionIds.push(result.data.session.id);
       }
       firstSessionId = sessionIds[0];
@@ -694,21 +822,27 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       }
 
       const selectedCase = (this.cases || []).find(c => c.name === caseName);
-      const isRemoteCase = caseData.location === 'remote' || selectedCase?.location === 'remote';
+      const isRemoteCase =
+        caseData.location === 'remote' ||
+        caseData.location === 'docker' ||
+        selectedCase?.location === 'remote' ||
+        selectedCase?.location === 'docker';
       const workingDir = caseData.path;
       if (!workingDir) throw new Error('Case path not found');
 
       // Remote cases run over ssh — route through /api/quick-start (see runClaude).
-      if (caseData.location === 'remote') {
+      if (caseData.location === 'remote' || caseData.location === 'docker') {
+        const startNumber = this._nextCaseSessionStartNumber(caseName, 's');
         const remoteIds = [];
         for (let i = 0; i < shellCount; i++) {
           const res = await fetch('/api/quick-start', {
             method: 'POST',
             headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-            body: JSON.stringify({ caseName, mode: 'shell' })
+            body: JSON.stringify({ caseName, mode: 'shell', sessionName: `s${startNumber + i}-${caseName}` })
           });
           const data = await res.json();
           if (!data.success) throw new Error(data.error || 'Failed to start remote shell session');
+          await this._ensureCreatedSessionVisible(data.data.sessionId, data.data.session);
           remoteIds.push(data.data.sessionId);
         }
         if (remoteIds[0]) {
@@ -721,16 +855,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       }
 
       // Find the highest existing s-number for THIS case to avoid duplicates
-      let startNumber = 1;
-      for (const [, session] of this.sessions) {
-        const match = session.name && session.name.match(/^s(\d+)-([a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)/);
-        if (match && match[2] === caseName) {
-          const num = parseInt(match[1]);
-          if (num >= startNumber) {
-            startNumber = num + 1;
-          }
-        }
-      }
+      const startNumber = this._nextCaseSessionStartNumber(caseName, 's');
 
       // Create all shell sessions in parallel
       const sessionNames = [];
@@ -751,6 +876,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       const sessionIds = [];
       for (const result of createResults) {
         if (!result.success) throw new Error(result.error);
+        await this._ensureCreatedSessionVisible(result.data.session.id, result.data.session);
         sessionIds.push(result.data.session.id);
       }
 
@@ -789,7 +915,8 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     const caseName = document.getElementById('quickStartCase').value || 'testcase';
     // Remote cases run the CLI on the REMOTE host — the local /api/opencode/status
     // probe and the local-only config/env below don't apply (quick-start rejects them).
-    const isRemote = (this.cases || []).find(c => c.name === caseName)?.location === 'remote';
+    const _runLoc = (this.cases || []).find(c => c.name === caseName)?.location;
+    const isRemote = _runLoc === 'remote' || _runLoc === 'docker';
 
     this.terminal.clear();
     this.terminal.writeln(`\x1b[1;32m Starting OpenCode session in ${caseName}...\x1b[0m`);
@@ -818,6 +945,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
         body: JSON.stringify({
           caseName,
           mode: 'opencode',
+          sessionName: `w${this._nextCaseSessionStartNumber(caseName)}-${caseName}`,
           ...(isRemote ? {} : {
             openCodeConfig: { autoAllowTools: true },
             ...(Object.keys(envOverrides).length > 0 ? { envOverrides } : {}),
@@ -826,6 +954,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       });
       const data = await res.json();
       if (!data.success) throw new Error(data.error || 'Failed to start OpenCode');
+      await this._ensureCreatedSessionVisible(data.data.sessionId, data.data.session);
 
       // Switch to the new session (don't pre-set activeSessionId — selectSession
       // early-returns when IDs match, skipping buffer load and sendResize)
@@ -843,7 +972,8 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     const caseName = document.getElementById('quickStartCase').value || 'testcase';
     // Remote cases run Codex on the REMOTE host — skip the local status probe and the
     // local-only config/env below (quick-start rejects them for remote cases).
-    const isRemote = (this.cases || []).find(c => c.name === caseName)?.location === 'remote';
+    const _runLoc = (this.cases || []).find(c => c.name === caseName)?.location;
+    const isRemote = _runLoc === 'remote' || _runLoc === 'docker';
 
     this.terminal.clear();
     this.terminal.writeln(`\x1b[1;32m Starting Codex session in ${caseName}...\x1b[0m`);
@@ -869,6 +999,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
         body: JSON.stringify({
           caseName,
           mode: 'codex',
+          sessionName: `w${this._nextCaseSessionStartNumber(caseName)}-${caseName}`,
           ...(isRemote ? {} : {
             codexConfig: {
               dangerouslyBypassApprovals: globalSettings.codexDangerouslyBypassApprovals ?? false,
@@ -880,6 +1011,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       });
       const data = await res.json();
       if (!data.success) throw new Error(data.error || 'Failed to start Codex');
+      await this._ensureCreatedSessionVisible(data.data.sessionId, data.data.session);
 
       // Switch to the new session (don't pre-set activeSessionId — selectSession
       // early-returns when IDs match, skipping buffer load and sendResize)
@@ -897,7 +1029,8 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     const caseName = document.getElementById('quickStartCase').value || 'testcase';
     // Remote cases run Gemini on the REMOTE host — skip the local status probe and the
     // local-only config/env below (quick-start rejects them for remote cases).
-    const isRemote = (this.cases || []).find(c => c.name === caseName)?.location === 'remote';
+    const _runLoc = (this.cases || []).find(c => c.name === caseName)?.location;
+    const isRemote = _runLoc === 'remote' || _runLoc === 'docker';
 
     this.terminal.clear();
     this.terminal.writeln(`\x1b[1;32m Starting Gemini session in ${caseName}...\x1b[0m`);
@@ -922,6 +1055,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
         body: JSON.stringify({
           caseName,
           mode: 'gemini',
+          sessionName: `w${this._nextCaseSessionStartNumber(caseName)}-${caseName}`,
           ...(isRemote ? {} : {
             geminiConfig: { approvalMode: 'yolo' },
             ...(Object.keys(envOverrides).length > 0 ? { envOverrides } : {}),
@@ -930,6 +1064,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       });
       const data = await res.json();
       if (!data.success) throw new Error(data.error || 'Failed to start Gemini');
+      await this._ensureCreatedSessionVisible(data.data.sessionId, data.data.session);
 
       if (data.data.sessionId) {
         await this.selectSession(data.data.sessionId);
@@ -1567,10 +1702,17 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     if (tabName === 'case-manage') {
       submitBtn.style.display = 'none';
       this.renderCaseManageList();
+      this.refreshDockerExports();
     } else {
       submitBtn.style.display = '';
       submitBtn.textContent =
-        tabName === 'case-create' ? 'Create' : tabName === 'case-remote' ? 'Link Remote' : 'Link';
+        tabName === 'case-create'
+          ? 'Create'
+          : tabName === 'case-remote'
+            ? 'Link Remote'
+            : tabName === 'case-docker'
+              ? 'Link Docker'
+              : 'Link';
     }
     // Focus appropriate input
     if (tabName === 'case-create') {
@@ -1579,6 +1721,8 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       document.getElementById('linkCaseName').focus();
     } else if (tabName === 'case-remote') {
       document.getElementById('remoteCaseName').focus();
+    } else if (tabName === 'case-docker') {
+      document.getElementById('dockerCaseName').focus();
     }
   },
 
@@ -1596,6 +1740,8 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
         await this.createCase();
       } else if (this.caseModalTab === 'case-remote') {
         await this.linkRemoteCase();
+      } else if (this.caseModalTab === 'case-docker') {
+        await this.linkDockerCase();
       } else {
         await this.linkCase();
       }
@@ -1619,21 +1765,36 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       return;
     }
 
+    // One-click "Run in Docker": create the case folder AND a container, then start
+    // a session inside it. Optional expandable settings override the defaults.
+    const inDocker = document.getElementById('newCaseDocker')?.checked;
+    const endpoint = inDocker ? '/api/cases/docker-quickcreate' : '/api/cases';
+    const payload = inDocker
+      ? { name, description, ...this._collectDockerQuickSettings() }
+      : { name, description };
+
     try {
-      const res = await fetch('/api/cases', {
+      const res = await fetch(endpoint, {
         method: 'POST',
         headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-        body: JSON.stringify({ name, description })
+        body: JSON.stringify(payload)
       });
 
       const data = await res.json();
       if (data.success) {
         this.closeCreateCaseModal();
-        this.showToast(`Case "${name}" created`, 'success');
         // Reload cases and select the new one
         await this.loadQuickStartCases(name);
         // Save as last used case
         await this.saveLastUsedCase(name);
+        if (inDocker) {
+          const caps = data.data?.capsEnforced === false ? ' (resource caps advisory on this engine)' : '';
+          this.showToast(`Docker case "${name}" created${caps} — starting session…`, 'success');
+          // Start a session INSIDE the container (routes through quick-start).
+          await this.runClaude();
+        } else {
+          this.showToast(`Case "${name}" created`, 'success');
+        }
       } else {
         this.showToast(data.error || 'Failed to create case', 'error');
       }
@@ -1643,6 +1804,47 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     }
   },
 
+  // Fill the memory/cpu/gpu fields from a resource template. `medium` clears them so
+  // the server uses its defaults (no per-case host); `custom` leaves them editable.
+  applyDockerTemplate() {
+    const t = document.getElementById('quickDockerTemplate')?.value;
+    const presets = {
+      small: { m: '2g', c: '1', g: '' },
+      medium: { m: '', c: '', g: '' },
+      large: { m: '8g', c: '4', g: '' },
+      gpu: { m: '8g', c: '4', g: 'all' },
+    };
+    const p = presets[t];
+    if (!p) return; // 'custom' — leave fields as-is
+    const set = (id, v) => {
+      const el = document.getElementById(id);
+      if (el) el.value = v;
+    };
+    set('quickDockerMemory', p.m);
+    set('quickDockerCpus', p.c);
+    set('quickDockerGpus', p.g);
+  },
+
+  // Collect only the non-default docker overrides (empty fields fall back to defaults
+  // server-side; sent as undefined, never null, per the Zod .optional() gotcha).
+  _collectDockerQuickSettings() {
+    const val = (id) => (document.getElementById(id)?.value || '').trim();
+    const o = {};
+    const mem = val('quickDockerMemory');
+    if (mem) o.memory = mem;
+    const cpus = val('quickDockerCpus');
+    if (cpus) o.cpus = cpus;
+    const gpus = val('quickDockerGpus');
+    if (gpus && gpus.toLowerCase() !== 'none') o.gpus = gpus;
+    const net = document.getElementById('quickDockerNetwork')?.value;
+    if (net && net !== 'bridge') o.network = net;
+    const img = val('quickDockerImage');
+    if (img) o.image = img;
+    const mc = document.getElementById('quickDockerMountCreds');
+    if (mc && !mc.checked) o.mountCredentials = false;
+    return o;
+  },
+
   async linkCase() {
     const name = document.getElementById('linkCaseName').value.trim();
     const path = document.getElementById('linkCasePath').value.trim();
@@ -1686,6 +1888,25 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     }
   },
 
+  openLinkCasePathPicker() {
+    const pathInput = document.getElementById('linkCasePath');
+    PathPicker.open({
+      title: 'Select Existing Project Folder',
+      initialPath: pathInput.value.trim(),
+      directoriesOnly: true,
+      onSelect: (path) => {
+        pathInput.value = path;
+        const nameInput = document.getElementById('linkCaseName');
+        if (!nameInput.value.trim()) {
+          const folderName = path.split('/').filter(Boolean).pop() || '';
+          if (/^[\p{L}\p{N}_-]+$/u.test(folderName)) nameInput.value = folderName;
+        }
+        pathInput.focus();
+        pathInput.setSelectionRange(path.length, path.length);
+      },
+    });
+  },
+
   async linkRemoteCase() {
     const name = document.getElementById('remoteCaseName').value.trim();
     const remotePath = document.getElementById('remoteCasePath').value.trim();
@@ -1767,6 +1988,328 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     }
   },
 
+  async linkDockerCase() {
+    const name = document.getElementById('dockerCaseName').value.trim();
+    const hostWorkspacePath = document.getElementById('dockerWorkspacePath').value.trim();
+    const hostId = document.getElementById('dockerHostId').value.trim() || 'local';
+    const image = document.getElementById('dockerImage').value.trim() || 'codeman/agent:base';
+    const network = document.getElementById('dockerNetwork').value;
+    const memory = document.getElementById('dockerMemory').value.trim();
+    const cpus = document.getElementById('dockerCpus').value.trim();
+    const mountCredentials = document.getElementById('dockerMountCredentials').checked;
+    const resumeOnStart = document.getElementById('dockerResumeOnStart').checked;
+    const statusEl = document.getElementById('dockerLinkStatus');
+
+    if (!name || !hostWorkspacePath) {
+      this.showToast('Please enter a case name and workspace path', 'error');
+      return;
+    }
+    if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(name) || !/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(hostId)) {
+      this.showToast('Invalid name. Use only letters, numbers, hyphens, underscores.', 'error');
+      return;
+    }
+    if (!hostWorkspacePath.startsWith('/')) {
+      this.showToast('Workspace path must be absolute', 'error');
+      return;
+    }
+
+    try {
+      if (statusEl) statusEl.textContent = 'Checking docker daemon + base image...';
+      // omitted optionals sent as UNDEFINED (never null — Zod .optional() rejects null)
+      const resources = {};
+      if (memory) resources.memory = memory;
+      if (cpus) resources.cpus = cpus;
+      const hostPayload = {
+        id: hostId,
+        label: hostId,
+        image,
+        network,
+        mountCredentials,
+        resumeOnStart,
+        ...(Object.keys(resources).length ? { resources } : {}),
+      };
+      // PUT (update-or-create) so re-linking with the same host id refreshes its settings.
+      let hostRes = await fetch('/api/docker-hosts', {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify(hostPayload),
+      });
+      let hostData = await hostRes.json();
+      if (!hostData.success && hostData.errorCode === 'ALREADY_EXISTS') {
+        hostRes = await fetch(`/api/docker-hosts/${encodeURIComponent(hostId)}`, {
+          method: 'PUT',
+          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+          body: JSON.stringify(hostPayload),
+        });
+        hostData = await hostRes.json();
+      }
+      if (!hostData.success) throw new Error(hostData.error || 'Failed to save docker host');
+
+      const caseRes = await fetch('/api/cases/docker-link', {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ name, hostId, hostWorkspacePath }),
+      });
+      const caseData = await caseRes.json();
+      if (caseData.success) {
+        this.closeCreateCaseModal();
+        const caps = caseData.data?.capsEnforced === false ? ' (resource caps are advisory on this engine)' : '';
+        this.showToast(`Docker case "${name}" linked${caps}`, 'success');
+        await this.loadQuickStartCases(name);
+        await this.saveLastUsedCase(name);
+      } else {
+        if (statusEl) statusEl.textContent = caseData.error || 'Failed to link docker case';
+        this.showToast(caseData.error || 'Failed to link docker case', 'error');
+      }
+    } catch (err) {
+      console.error('Failed to link docker case:', err);
+      if (statusEl) statusEl.textContent = err.message;
+      this.showToast('Failed to link docker case: ' + err.message, 'error');
+    }
+  },
+
+  // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+  // Docker export / import UI
+  // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+  async refreshDockerExports() {
+    const listEl = document.getElementById('dockerExportsList');
+    if (!listEl) return;
+    try {
+      const res = await fetch('/api/docker-exports');
+      const data = await res.json();
+      const exports = data?.data?.exports || [];
+      if (exports.length === 0) {
+        listEl.innerHTML = '<span class="form-hint">No exports yet. Export a docker case from its tab.</span>';
+        return;
+      }
+      listEl.innerHTML = exports
+        .map(e => {
+          const mb = (e.sizeBytes / 1e6).toFixed(1);
+          // escapeHtml is the free function from constants.js (never a method on `this`)
+          const nm = escapeHtml(e.name);
+          return `<div class="case-manage-item" style="display:flex; align-items:center; gap:8px; justify-content:space-between;">
+            <span style="overflow:hidden; text-overflow:ellipsis; white-space:nowrap;" title="${nm}">${nm} <span class="form-hint">(${mb} MB)</span></span>
+            <span style="flex-shrink:0;">
+              <a class="btn-toolbar" href="/api/docker-exports/${encodeURIComponent(e.name)}" download>Download</a>
+              <button class="btn-toolbar" onclick="app.importDockerBundle('${nm.replace(/'/g, "\\'")}')">Import</button>
+              <button class="btn-toolbar" onclick="app.deleteDockerExport('${nm.replace(/'/g, "\\'")}')">Delete</button>
+            </span>
+          </div>`;
+        })
+        .join('');
+    } catch (err) {
+      listEl.innerHTML = `<span class="form-hint">Failed to load exports: ${err.message}</span>`;
+    }
+  },
+
+  async exportDockerCaseBundle(caseName, mode = 'full') {
+    try {
+      const res = await fetch(`/api/docker-cases/${encodeURIComponent(caseName)}/export`, {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ mode }),
+      });
+      const data = await res.json();
+      if (data.success) {
+        this.showToast(`Exporting "${caseName}" (${mode})... you'll be notified when the bundle is ready`, 'info');
+      } else {
+        this.showToast(data.error || 'Export failed', 'error');
+      }
+    } catch (err) {
+      this.showToast('Export failed: ' + err.message, 'error');
+    }
+  },
+
+  async importDockerBundle(bundle) {
+    const newCaseName = prompt('New case name for the imported bundle:', bundle.split('-')[0] + '-imported');
+    if (!newCaseName) return;
+    const destWorkspacePath = prompt('Absolute host directory to restore the workspace into:', '');
+    if (!destWorkspacePath) return;
+    try {
+      const res = await fetch('/api/docker-cases/import', {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ bundle, newCaseName, destWorkspacePath }),
+      });
+      const data = await res.json();
+      if (data.success) {
+        this.showToast(`Imported as "${newCaseName}"`, 'success');
+        await this.loadQuickStartCases(newCaseName);
+      } else {
+        this.showToast(data.error || 'Import failed', 'error');
+      }
+    } catch (err) {
+      this.showToast('Import failed: ' + err.message, 'error');
+    }
+  },
+
+  async deleteDockerExport(filename) {
+    if (!confirm(`Delete export bundle "${filename}"?`)) return;
+    try {
+      const res = await fetch(`/api/docker-exports/${encodeURIComponent(filename)}`, { method: 'DELETE' });
+      const data = await res.json();
+      if (data.success) {
+        this.showToast('Export deleted', 'success');
+        this.refreshDockerExports();
+      } else {
+        this.showToast(data.error || 'Delete failed', 'error');
+      }
+    } catch (err) {
+      this.showToast('Delete failed: ' + err.message, 'error');
+    }
+  },
+
+  // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+  // COD-105 — Discover + attach existing remote tmux sessions
+  // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+  /** Read the remote-host fields from the remote-case form into a host payload. */
+  _readRemoteHostFromForm() {
+    const hostId = document.getElementById('remoteHostId').value.trim();
+    const host = document.getElementById('remoteHostAddress').value.trim();
+    const username = document.getElementById('remoteHostUsername').value.trim();
+    const portRaw = document.getElementById('remoteHostPort').value.trim();
+    const identityFile = document.getElementById('remoteHostIdentityFile').value.trim();
+    const socksProxy = document.getElementById('remoteHostSocksProxy').value.trim();
+    const jumpHost = document.getElementById('remoteHostJumpHost').value.trim();
+    const codexCommand = document.getElementById('remoteHostCodexCommand').value.trim();
+    const extraSshOptions = document.getElementById('remoteHostExtraSshOptions').value
+      .split('\n')
+      .map(line => line.trim())
+      .filter(line => line.length > 0);
+    let port;
+    if (portRaw) {
+      const n = Number(portRaw);
+      if (Number.isInteger(n) && n >= 1 && n <= 65535) port = n;
+    }
+    return {
+      id: hostId,
+      label: hostId,
+      host,
+      username,
+      ...(port ? { port } : {}),
+      ...(identityFile ? { identityFile } : {}),
+      ...(socksProxy ? { socksProxy } : {}),
+      ...(jumpHost ? { jumpHost } : {}),
+      ...(extraSshOptions.length ? { extraSshOptions } : {}),
+      ...(codexCommand ? { commands: { codex: codexCommand } } : {}),
+    };
+  },
+
+  /**
+   * Explicit Discover action (Decision A — never auto-runs on host select).
+   * Saves the host config (idempotent), then queries the host for `codeman-*`
+   * tmux sessions it didn't create and renders an Attach action per session.
+   */
+  async discoverRemoteSessions() {
+    const results = document.getElementById('remoteDiscoverResults');
+    const btn = document.getElementById('remoteDiscoverBtn');
+    const hostPayload = this._readRemoteHostFromForm();
+    if (!hostPayload.id || !hostPayload.host || !hostPayload.username) {
+      this.showToast('Fill in Host ID, address, and username first', 'error');
+      return;
+    }
+    if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(hostPayload.id)) {
+      this.showToast('Invalid Host ID. Use letters, numbers, hyphens, underscores.', 'error');
+      return;
+    }
+    if (btn) btn.disabled = true;
+    if (results) results.innerHTML = '<div class="form-hint">Discovering…</div>';
+    try {
+      // Persist the host so the discovery endpoint can resolve it by id (idempotent).
+      const hostRes = await fetch('/api/remote-hosts', {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify(hostPayload)
+      });
+      const hostData = await hostRes.json();
+      if (!hostData.success && hostData.errorCode !== 'ALREADY_EXISTS') {
+        throw new Error(hostData.error || 'Failed to save remote host');
+      }
+      const res = await fetch(`/api/remote-hosts/${encodeURIComponent(hostPayload.id)}/sessions`);
+      const data = await res.json();
+      if (!data.success) throw new Error(data.error || 'Discovery failed');
+      this._renderDiscoveredSessions(hostPayload.id, data.data.sessions || []);
+    } catch (err) {
+      console.error('Discover remote sessions failed:', err);
+      if (results) results.innerHTML = `<div class="form-hint" style="color: var(--error, #e06c75);">${escapeHtml(err.message)}</div>`;
+    } finally {
+      if (btn) btn.disabled = false;
+    }
+  },
+
+  /** Render the discovered remote sessions with an Attach action each. */
+  _renderDiscoveredSessions(hostId, sessions) {
+    const results = document.getElementById('remoteDiscoverResults');
+    if (!results) return;
+    if (!sessions.length) {
+      results.innerHTML = '<div class="form-hint">No <code>codeman-*</code> sessions running on this host (or it is unreachable).</div>';
+      return;
+    }
+    const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
+    const rows = sessions.map(s => {
+      const ageSecs = Math.max(0, now - (s.created || 0));
+      const age = ageSecs < 3600 ? `${Math.floor(ageSecs / 60)}m` : ageSecs < 86400 ? `${Math.floor(ageSecs / 3600)}h` : `${Math.floor(ageSecs / 86400)}d`;
+      // COD-106 — show "shared · N clients" when more than one client is attached
+      // (genuinely collaborative), else a plain "attached" badge for a single client.
+      const clients = s.attachedClients != null ? s.attachedClients : s.attached ? 1 : 0;
+      const attachedBadge =
+        clients > 1
+          ? `<span class="case-location-badge" style="background: var(--warning, #e5c07b); color: #000;">shared · ${clients} clients</span>`
+          : clients === 1
+            ? '<span class="case-location-badge" style="background: var(--accent, #61afef);">attached</span>'
+            : '';
+      return `
+        <div class="remote-discover-item">
+          <div class="remote-discover-info">
+            <span class="remote-discover-name">${escapeHtml(s.name)} ${attachedBadge}</span>
+            <span class="form-hint">age ${age} · ${s.windows || 1} window(s)</span>
+          </div>
+          <button type="button" class="btn-toolbar" onclick="app.attachDiscoveredSession('${escapeHtml(hostId)}', '${escapeHtml(s.name)}')">Attach</button>
+        </div>`;
+    }).join('');
+    results.innerHTML = rows;
+  },
+
+  /**
+   * Create a NON-owned session that attaches to a discovered remote tmux session.
+   * Closing this tab detaches — it never kills the remote session.
+   */
+  async attachDiscoveredSession(hostId, remoteSessionName) {
+    try {
+      const createRes = await fetch('/api/sessions', {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({
+          mode: 'shell',
+          name: remoteSessionName,
+          attachRemoteSession: { hostId, remoteSessionName },
+        })
+      });
+      const createData = await createRes.json();
+      if (!createData.success) throw new Error(createData.error || 'Failed to create session');
+      const id = createData.data.session.id;
+      await fetch(`/api/sessions/${id}/shell`, { method: 'POST' });
+      const dims = this.getTerminalDimensions();
+      if (dims) {
+        await fetch(`/api/sessions/${id}/resize`, {
+          method: 'POST',
+          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+          body: JSON.stringify(dims)
+        });
+      }
+      this.closeCreateCaseModal();
+      this.showToast(`Attached to ${remoteSessionName} (detach on close)`, 'success');
+      this.activeSessionId = id;
+      await this.selectSession(id);
+      if (this.terminal && typeof this.terminal.focus === 'function') this.terminal.focus();
+    } catch (err) {
+      console.error('Attach discovered session failed:', err);
+      this.showToast('Failed to attach: ' + err.message, 'error');
+    }
+  },
+
   // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
   // Case Management (reorder + delete)
   // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@@ -1791,6 +2334,12 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
             <span class="case-manage-path">${escapeHtml(pathDisplay)}</span>
           </div>
           <div class="case-manage-actions">
+            ${
+              c.location === 'docker'
+                ? `<button class="case-manage-btn" onclick="app.exportDockerCaseBundle(${escapeHtml(JSON.stringify(c.name))}, 'full')"
+                    title="Export container (full image + workspace) to move to another machine">&#x1F4E6;</button>`
+                : ''
+            }
             <button class="case-manage-btn" onclick="app.moveCaseUp(${escapeHtml(JSON.stringify(c.name))})"
                     title="Move up" ${isFirst ? 'disabled' : ''}>&#x25B2;</button>
             <button class="case-manage-btn" onclick="app.moveCaseDown(${escapeHtml(JSON.stringify(c.name))})"

src/web/public/settings-ui.js

@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
   openAppSettings() {
     // Load current settings
     const settings = this.loadAppSettingsFromStorage();
+    document.getElementById('appSettingsDisplayName').value = settings.displayName || 'Codeman';
+    document.getElementById('appSettingsLanguage').value = settings.language === 'zh-CN' ? 'zh-CN' : 'en';
     document.getElementById('appSettingsClaudeMdPath').value = settings.defaultClaudeMdPath || '';
     document.getElementById('appSettingsDefaultDir').value = settings.defaultWorkingDir || '';
     // Use device-aware defaults for display settings (mobile has different defaults)
@@ -305,8 +307,9 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     // Header visibility settings
     document.getElementById('appSettingsShowFontControls').checked = settings.showFontControls ?? defaults.showFontControls ?? false;
     document.getElementById('appSettingsShowSystemStats').checked = settings.showSystemStats ?? defaults.showSystemStats ?? true;
-    document.getElementById('appSettingsShowLifecycleLog').checked = settings.showLifecycleLog ?? defaults.showLifecycleLog ?? true;
+    document.getElementById('appSettingsShowLifecycleLog').checked = settings.showLifecycleLog ?? defaults.showLifecycleLog ?? false;
     document.getElementById('appSettingsShowResponseViewer').checked = settings.showResponseViewer ?? defaults.showResponseViewer ?? false;
+    document.getElementById('appSettingsShowFileViewerButton').checked = settings.showFileViewerButton ?? defaults.showFileViewerButton ?? true;
     document.getElementById('appSettingsShowAttachmentsButton').checked = settings.showAttachmentsButton ?? defaults.showAttachmentsButton ?? false;
     document.getElementById('appSettingsSkin').value = settings.skin ?? defaults.skin ?? 'daylight-blue';
     // WebGL renderer (desktop only — mobile always uses the DOM renderer, so hide
@@ -322,8 +325,14 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     document.getElementById('appSettingsUltracodeFloatingWindows').checked =
       settings.ultracodeFloatingWindows ?? defaults.ultracodeFloatingWindows ?? false;
     document.getElementById('appSettingsShowMultiMonitorButton').checked = settings.showMultiMonitorButton ?? defaults.showMultiMonitorButton ?? false;
-    document.getElementById('appSettingsShowPlanUsageLimits').checked = settings.showPlanUsageLimits ?? defaults.showPlanUsageLimits ?? false;
+    document.getElementById('appSettingsShowPlanUsageLimits').checked = this.planUsageChipEnabled(settings);
     document.getElementById('appSettingsShowRedrawButton').checked = settings.showRedrawButton ?? defaults.showRedrawButton ?? false;
+    // Session Manager, Away Digest and Cron buttons all default OFF (opt-in under
+    // Display → Header Displays; the Cron button also ships with btn-cron--hidden
+    // in the template, so an unchecked box and a hidden button stay consistent).
+    document.getElementById('appSettingsShowSessionButton').checked = settings.showSessionButton ?? defaults.showSessionButton ?? false;
+    document.getElementById('appSettingsShowAwayDigestButton').checked = settings.showAwayDigestButton ?? defaults.showAwayDigestButton ?? false;
+    document.getElementById('appSettingsShowCronButton').checked = settings.showCronButton ?? defaults.showCronButton ?? false;
     // Gesture control lives in the Input section (alongside Local Echo / CJK Input)
     // but is only available when the instance runs with CODEMAN_GESTURE=1 (server sets
     // window.__codemanGestureAvailable). Hide just this item otherwise so the toggle
@@ -359,6 +368,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     document.getElementById('appSettingsAgentTeams').checked = settings.agentTeamsEnabled ?? false;
     document.getElementById('appSettingsClaudeModel').value = settings.claudeModel ?? '';
     document.getElementById('appSettingsOpusContext1m').checked = settings.opusContext1mEnabled ?? false;
+    document.getElementById('appSettingsRemoteAutoReconnect').checked = settings.remoteAutoReconnect ?? true;
     document.getElementById('appSettingsThinkingEffort').value = settings.thinkingEffort ?? '';
     // CPU Priority settings
     const niceSettings = settings.nice || {};
@@ -1414,6 +1424,12 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     // as "previously off" — used below to detect a real OFF→ON flip.
     const _prevWebglEnabled = (_prev.webglRendererEnabled ?? true) === true;
     const settings = {
+      displayName: window.CodemanI18n?.normalizeDisplayName(
+        document.getElementById('appSettingsDisplayName').value
+      ) || 'Codeman',
+      language: window.CodemanI18n?.normalizeLanguage(
+        document.getElementById('appSettingsLanguage').value
+      ) || 'en',
       defaultClaudeMdPath: document.getElementById('appSettingsClaudeMdPath').value.trim(),
       defaultWorkingDir: document.getElementById('appSettingsDefaultDir').value.trim(),
       ralphTrackerEnabled: document.getElementById('appSettingsRalphEnabled').checked,
@@ -1422,6 +1438,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       showSystemStats: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowSystemStats').checked,
       showLifecycleLog: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowLifecycleLog').checked,
       showResponseViewer: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowResponseViewer').checked,
+      showFileViewerButton: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowFileViewerButton').checked,
       showAttachmentsButton: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowAttachmentsButton').checked,
       showMonitor: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowMonitor').checked,
       showProjectInsights: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowProjectInsights').checked,
@@ -1432,6 +1449,9 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       showMultiMonitorButton: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowMultiMonitorButton').checked,
       showPlanUsageLimits: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowPlanUsageLimits').checked,
       showRedrawButton: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowRedrawButton').checked,
+      showSessionButton: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowSessionButton').checked,
+      showAwayDigestButton: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowAwayDigestButton').checked,
+      showCronButton: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowCronButton').checked,
       gestureControlEnabled: document.getElementById('appSettingsGestureControl').checked,
       subagentTrackingEnabled: document.getElementById('appSettingsSubagentTracking').checked,
       subagentActiveTabOnly: document.getElementById('appSettingsSubagentActiveTabOnly').checked,
@@ -1453,6 +1473,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       agentTeamsEnabled: document.getElementById('appSettingsAgentTeams').checked,
       claudeModel: document.getElementById('appSettingsClaudeModel').value,
       opusContext1mEnabled: document.getElementById('appSettingsOpusContext1m').checked,
+      remoteAutoReconnect: document.getElementById('appSettingsRemoteAutoReconnect').checked,
       thinkingEffort: document.getElementById('appSettingsThinkingEffort').value,
       // CPU Priority settings
       nice: {
@@ -1581,6 +1602,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     // Apply header visibility immediately
     this.applyHeaderVisibilitySettings();
     this.applySkin();
+    this.applyLocalization();
     this.applyTabWrapSettings();
     this._updateTokensImmediate();  // Re-render token display (picks up showCost change)
     this.applyMonitorVisibility();
@@ -1609,10 +1631,17 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       cjkInputEnabled: _cjk,
       extendedKeyboardBar: _ekb,
       skin: _skin,
+      language: _language,
       showPlanUsageLimits: _pul,
       showAttachmentsButton: _ahb,
+      showFileViewerButton: _fvb,
       webglRendererEnabled: _wgl,
       terminalWheelLocalScrollback: _twls,
+      // Per-device header/toolbar button toggles — client-only, and absent from
+      // SettingsUpdateSchema (.strict()), so sending them would 400 the PUT.
+      showSessionButton: _ssb,
+      showAwayDigestButton: _adb,
+      showCronButton: _crb,
       ...serverSettings
     } = settings;
     try {
@@ -1741,17 +1770,21 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     return settings.ralphTrackerEnabled ?? false;
   },
 
-  // Get the settings storage key based on device type (mobile vs desktop)
+  // Keep the settings namespace stable across foldable posture changes. Layout
+  // still follows viewport width, but an unfolded phone remains the same
+  // handheld device and must not silently switch to desktop preferences.
   getSettingsStorageKey() {
-    const isMobile = MobileDetection.getDeviceType() === 'mobile';
-    return isMobile ? 'codeman-app-settings-mobile' : 'codeman-app-settings';
+    const isHandheld =
+      MobileDetection.isHandheldDevice?.() ?? MobileDetection.getDeviceType() === 'mobile';
+    return isHandheld ? 'codeman-app-settings-mobile' : 'codeman-app-settings';
   },
 
   // Get default settings based on device type
   // Note: Notification prefs are handled separately by NotificationManager
   getDefaultSettings() {
-    const isMobile = MobileDetection.getDeviceType() === 'mobile';
-    if (isMobile) {
+    const isHandheld =
+      MobileDetection.isHandheldDevice?.() ?? MobileDetection.getDeviceType() === 'mobile';
+    if (isHandheld) {
       // Mobile defaults: minimal UI for small screens
       return {
         // Header visibility - hide everything on mobile
@@ -1767,9 +1800,18 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
         showUltracodeAgents: false,
         ultracodeFloatingWindows: false,
         showMultiMonitorButton: false,
+        // Desktop defaults this ON (see planUsageChipEnabled); handhelds keep it
+        // OFF so the phone header stays minimal and the mobile-header-buttons
+        // policy guard keeps passing.
         showPlanUsageLimits: false,
         showAttachmentsButton: false,
+        showFileViewerButton: false,
         showRedrawButton: false,
+        showSessionButton: false,
+        showAwayDigestButton: false,
+        showCronButton: false,
+        // Remote auto-reconnect (COD-108) — on by default
+        remoteAutoReconnect: true,
         // Input
         gestureControlEnabled: false,
         // Feature toggles - keep tracking on even on mobile
@@ -1829,6 +1871,8 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     const skin = settings.skin ?? defaults.skin ?? 'daylight-blue';
     document.documentElement.setAttribute('data-skin', skin);
     window.__codemanSkin = skin;
+    const themeColor = getComputedStyle(document.documentElement).getPropertyValue('--bg-dark').trim();
+    if (themeColor) document.querySelector('meta[name="theme-color"]')?.setAttribute('content', themeColor);
     try {
       localStorage.setItem('codeman:skin', skin);
     } catch (_e) {
@@ -1837,13 +1881,40 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     if (typeof this.applyTerminalSkin === 'function') this.applyTerminalSkin(skin);
   },
 
+  // Apply the per-device language and the synced user-facing product name.
+  // The i18n layer updates both existing static nodes and future dynamic DOM.
+  applyLocalization() {
+    const settings = this.loadAppSettingsFromStorage();
+    const result = window.CodemanI18n?.configure({
+      language: settings.language,
+      displayName: settings.displayName,
+    });
+    if (result && this.notificationManager) {
+      this.notificationManager.originalTitle = document.title;
+    }
+  },
+
+  // Resolved per-device state of the plan-usage chip. Desktop defaults ON,
+  // handhelds default OFF (the mobile block in getDefaultSettings() sets false,
+  // and the mobile-header-buttons-policy guard depends on that staying false).
+  // Single source of truth for THREE call sites that must never disagree: the
+  // App Settings checkbox, the chip's visibility, and the statusLineTelemetry
+  // flag sent on session create. A chip shown without telemetry renders "—"
+  // forever, which is exactly the drift this helper prevents.
+  planUsageChipEnabled(settings = null) {
+    const s = settings ?? this.loadAppSettingsFromStorage();
+    return s.showPlanUsageLimits ?? this.getDefaultSettings().showPlanUsageLimits ?? true;
+  },
+
   applyHeaderVisibilitySettings() {
     const settings = this.loadAppSettingsFromStorage();
     const defaults = this.getDefaultSettings();
     const compactHeader = MobileDetection.getDeviceType() !== 'desktop';
     const showFontControls = compactHeader ? false : (settings.showFontControls ?? defaults.showFontControls ?? false);
     const showSystemStats = compactHeader ? false : (settings.showSystemStats ?? defaults.showSystemStats ?? true);
-    const showTokenCount = compactHeader ? false : (settings.showTokenCount ?? defaults.showTokenCount ?? true);
+    // Default OFF: the header stays gear + usage chips + files button unless a
+    // stored preference explicitly re-enables the token chip (no UI toggle exists).
+    const showTokenCount = compactHeader ? false : (settings.showTokenCount ?? defaults.showTokenCount ?? false);
 
     const fontControlsEl = document.querySelector('.header-font-controls');
     const systemStatsEl = document.getElementById('headerSystemStats');
@@ -1860,7 +1931,9 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     }
 
     // Hide lifecycle log button when setting is disabled
-    const showLifecycleLog = settings.showLifecycleLog ?? defaults.showLifecycleLog ?? true;
+    // Default OFF: the lifecycle-log document icon is opt-in; the default header
+    // keeps only WS/CPU/MEM, the file-viewer folder, usage chips, and the gear.
+    const showLifecycleLog = settings.showLifecycleLog ?? defaults.showLifecycleLog ?? false;
     const lifecycleBtn = document.querySelector('.btn-lifecycle-log');
     if (lifecycleBtn) {
       lifecycleBtn.style.display = showLifecycleLog ? '' : 'none';
@@ -1882,6 +1955,16 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       attachmentsBtn.classList.toggle('btn-attachments-history--hidden', !showAttachmentsButton);
     }
 
+    // File Viewer header button — opt-in, default OFF. Marker class (base is
+    // display:inline-flex !important); clicking it toggles the file browser panel.
+    // Default ON (desktop): the folder button is part of the standard header now;
+    // phones still hide it via mobile.css (btn-file-viewer in the phone-hidden set).
+    const showFileViewerButton = settings.showFileViewerButton ?? defaults.showFileViewerButton ?? true;
+    const fileViewerBtn = document.querySelector('.btn-file-viewer');
+    if (fileViewerBtn) {
+      fileViewerBtn.classList.toggle('btn-file-viewer--hidden', !showFileViewerButton);
+    }
+
     // Multi-monitor button — hidden by default (App Settings → Display → "Header
     // Displays"). The server renders the correct initial state on every reload;
     // this handles a live toggle from a settings save (no reload). Toggle the
@@ -1901,11 +1984,13 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       ultracodeBtn.classList.toggle('btn-ultracode-agents--hidden', !showUltracodeAgents);
     }
 
-    // Plan-usage chip — hidden by default (App Settings → Display → "Plan Usage
-    // Limits"). Server renders the initial state on reload; this handles a live
-    // toggle from a settings save. Marker class (base is display:inline-flex
-    // !important), matching the response-viewer/multimonitor pattern.
-    const showPlanUsageLimits = settings.showPlanUsageLimits ?? defaults.showPlanUsageLimits ?? false;
+    // Plan-usage chip — shown by default on desktop, OFF on handhelds (App
+    // Settings → Display → "Plan Usage Limits"). The template always ships it
+    // hidden because display is per-device and the server cannot know a
+    // localStorage value, so THIS is what reveals it on every load as well as
+    // on a live toggle. Marker class (base is display:inline-flex !important),
+    // matching the response-viewer/multimonitor pattern.
+    const showPlanUsageLimits = this.planUsageChipEnabled(settings);
     const planUsageChip = document.getElementById('planUsageChip');
     if (planUsageChip) {
       planUsageChip.classList.toggle('header-plan-usage--hidden', !showPlanUsageLimits);
@@ -1917,6 +2002,29 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
       redrawBtn.classList.toggle('btn-redraw-terminal--hidden', !showRedrawButton);
     }
 
+    // Session Manager button — opt-in, hidden by default (App Settings → Display).
+    // Marker class (base is display:inline-flex !important); phones keep it hidden
+    // via mobile.css regardless. Sessions stay reachable via the Ctrl+K palette.
+    const showSessionButton = settings.showSessionButton ?? defaults.showSessionButton ?? false;
+    const sessionBtn = document.querySelector('.btn-session-manager');
+    if (sessionBtn) {
+      sessionBtn.classList.toggle('btn-session-manager--hidden', !showSessionButton);
+    }
+
+    // Away Digest button — opt-in, hidden by default. Same marker pattern.
+    const showAwayDigestButton = settings.showAwayDigestButton ?? defaults.showAwayDigestButton ?? false;
+    const awayDigestBtn = document.querySelector('.btn-away-digest');
+    if (awayDigestBtn) {
+      awayDigestBtn.classList.toggle('btn-away-digest--hidden', !showAwayDigestButton);
+    }
+
+    // Cron button (footer toolbar) — opt-in, hidden by default. Same marker pattern.
+    const showCronButton = settings.showCronButton ?? defaults.showCronButton ?? false;
+    const cronBtn = document.querySelector('.btn-cron');
+    if (cronBtn) {
+      cronBtn.classList.toggle('btn-cron--hidden', !showCronButton);
+    }
+
     // Notification bell is retired (notifications live in Settings → Notifications
     // + the drawer); keep it hidden regardless of the notification-enabled state.
     const notifBtn = document.querySelector('.btn-notifications');
@@ -2126,7 +2234,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
     // so mobile defaults to OFF; the desktop blob is untouched and keeps its value.
     try {
       if (
-        MobileDetection.getDeviceType() === 'mobile' &&
+        (MobileDetection.isHandheldDevice?.() ?? MobileDetection.getDeviceType() === 'mobile') &&
         !localStorage.getItem('codeman:planUsagePerDeviceMigrated')
       ) {
         const s = this.loadAppSettingsFromStorage();
@@ -2153,12 +2261,15 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
           'showLifecycleLog', 'showResponseViewer', 'showRedrawButton',
           'showMonitor', 'showProjectInsights', 'showFileBrowser', 'showSubagents',
           'subagentActiveTabOnly', 'tabTwoRows', 'localEchoEnabled', 'cjkInputEnabled', 'extendedKeyboardBar',
-          'skin', 'showPlanUsageLimits', 'showAttachmentsButton', 'webglRendererEnabled',
+          'skin', 'showPlanUsageLimits', 'showAttachmentsButton', 'showFileViewerButton', 'webglRendererEnabled',
+          'language',
           'terminalWheelLocalScrollback',
+          'showSessionButton', 'showAwayDigestButton', 'showCronButton',
         ]);
-        // The plan-usage chip is a PER-DEVICE display setting (default OFF): desktop
-        // can show it while mobile stays hidden. It used to sync, so an older
-        // server.json may still carry `true` — drop it so the server value is NEVER
+        // The plan-usage chip is a PER-DEVICE display setting (desktop default ON,
+        // handheld default OFF): desktop can show it while mobile stays hidden. It
+        // used to sync, so an older server.json may still carry a value — drop it
+        // so the server value is NEVER
         // seeded into a device that didn't explicitly enable it (collection is handled
         // separately via the statusLineTelemetry action, not this display flag).
         delete appSettings.showPlanUsageLimits;