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Ark0N d1868516f7 Merge pull request #158 from Ark0N/feat/docker-session-mode
feat: Docker session mode (isolated per-case containers + export/import) — v1.4.0
2026-07-19 21:59:47 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 3e1272a675 feat(docker): resource templates, GPU, elastic disk, bridge-hooks listener
- One-click "Run in Docker" gains an expandable settings panel with a Template
  picker (Small 2G/1 · Medium 4G/2 default · Large 8G/4 · GPU 8G/4/all) plus
  memory/cpu/gpu/network/image/mount-creds overrides. Any tweak creates a dedicated
  per-case host; the plain checkbox keeps using the shared `default` host.
- GPU passthrough: `gpus` on DockerHost/SessionDocker -> `--gpus <value>` in create
  args (needs the NVIDIA container toolkit). Elastic disk: no `--storage-opt` cap,
  so container storage grows as data flows in.
- CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS=1: opt-in second listener on the docker bridge gateway
  (auto-detected 172.17.0.1, override CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOST) that serves ONLY
  the hook endpoints and delegates into the secret-gated pipeline, so in-container
  hooks fire on a loopback-only server. Non-hook paths -> 403; host-internal, not LAN.

Verified live: Large template applies real 8GB/4CPU limits; a secret-authenticated
hook POST from inside a container now reaches the handler (was connection-refused);
non-hook paths return 403; template UI + GPU field verified via Playwright.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 21:35:38 +02:00
Codeman maintainer db6cd838b1 feat(docker): one-click "Run in Docker" case creation + Export button
- New POST /api/cases/docker-quickcreate: creates a normal case (folder in
  CASES_DIR, scaffolded CLAUDE.md + hooks) AND links it to a hardened container
  with default settings, auto-provisioning a shared `default` docker host — the
  user never touches host/image/network fields.
- Create New tab gains a "Run in isolated Docker container" checkbox; on submit it
  calls docker-quickcreate then auto-starts a claude session inside the container.
- Case Manage list gains an Export (full-image) button per docker case.
- SSE listeners for docker:exportComplete/exportFailed toast + refresh the exports
  list.

Verified end-to-end on the live instance: one-click create put the case in
~/codeman-cases/<name>, auto-created the default host, launched claude in the
container; export button produces a bundle; checkbox + button render (Playwright).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 19:28:13 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 66a41f5aa9 chore: version packages 2026-07-19 19:01:50 +02:00
Codeman maintainer a36c1f62db fix(docker): set CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR + document hook reachability limit
Found in live testing: claude refuses its default /tmp/claude-<uid> temp dir when
that path pre-exists root-owned (happens when the workspace bind-mount traverses
it, e.g. a workspace under /tmp/claude-<uid>). Set CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR to a
nonexistent HOME subpath the running uid creates+owns, so docker claude sessions
are robust to any workspace location.

Also document the hook-reachability constraint: in-container hooks POST to
host.docker.internal (the bridge gateway), so they only fire when Codeman is
reachable from the container (bind 0.0.0.0 + password); on a loopback-only bind
they don't fire and idle detection falls back to output-based (which works).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 18:19:50 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 8b2c857c3f feat(settings): wire session, away-digest, and cron button visibility toggles
Per-device App Settings > Header Displays toggles that show/hide the session
manager and away-digest header buttons (default OFF) and the cron footer
button (default ON). Adds the load/save/apply/default/displayKeys wiring in
settings-ui.js plus the marker CSS in styles.css. Client-only display keys,
stripped from the settings PUT so they never reach the strict server schema
(mirrors the showAttachmentsButton pattern); session/away stay hidden on
phones via the existing mobile.css rules. The button markup and checkbox
rows landed earlier in 5728b86.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 17:59:23 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 583678c950 docs(docker): add user-facing docs/docker-cases.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 17:55:21 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 5728b86a68 feat(docker): frontend Docker tab, run wiring, and export/import UI
- index.html: Create Case "Docker" tab (name/workspace/host/image/network +
  advanced memory/cpus/mountCredentials/resumeOnStart), and a Docker-exports
  section in the Manage tab
- session-ui.js: linkDockerCase (POST docker-host, PUT on conflict, then
  docker-link; omitted optionals as undefined not null), case-picker label
  "name @ container" + search fields, switchCaseModalTab/submitCaseModal docker
  branch, and export/import UI (refresh/export/import/delete). Docker cases route
  through /api/quick-start like remote (runClaude/runShell/runOpenCode/Codex/Gemini)
- verified in a real browser (Playwright): Docker tab renders, linking through the
  UI creates the case and it appears in the picker as "uitest @ codeman-case-uitest"

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 17:53:14 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 39ef17b6af feat(docker): export/import (move a container to another machine) + boot reaper
- src/docker-export.ts: full-image export (pause-consistent commit + save|stream +
  workspace tar + manifest -> one .codeman-container.tgz) and workspace-only; import
  validates manifest + per-member sha256, traversal-guards the workspace tar, docker
  load + quarantine re-tag (never overwrites a local tag). Bounded by
  runWithConversionLimit; free-space precheck; docker rmi in finally; sealed
  containers refuse full-image export.
- routes: POST /api/docker-cases/:name/export (background + SSE), GET/DELETE
  /api/docker-exports, GET download, POST /api/docker-cases/import (-> new host+case)
- instance-scoped boot reaper (docker-hosts.reapOrphanedDockerContainers) wired after
  restoreMuxSessions; never touches another instance's containers
- SSE docker:exportComplete/exportFailed/importComplete (both registries)
- fix: stream pipeline in saveImageToTar so the bundle isn't truncated

VERIFIED end-to-end on real docker: full export -> 326MB valid bundle -> delete
case -> import -> new container runs from the quarantined image with the workspace
file AND the in-image change both restored.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 17:38:01 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 814362b67b docs(docker): record implementation status (phases 0-5 done, e2e verified)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 15:38:53 +02:00
Codeman maintainer e9f9497259 feat(docker): allowlist container-to-host gateway aliases in host guard
An in-container hook curl carries Host: host.docker.internal:<port> (the derived
CODEMAN_API_URL), so the always-on host guard must allow host.docker.internal /
host.containers.internal or every in-container hook is blocked 403. Exact-match
only; not a browser DNS-rebinding surface (resolves to the host only from inside
a container netns). Verified end-to-end: quick-start launches claude/shell in a
real container with the workspace bind-mounted and hooks scaffolded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 15:32:45 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 8768ca4a5a feat(docker): docker-hosts CRUD, docker-link, and quick-start branch
- case-routes: GET/POST/PUT/DELETE /api/docker-hosts, POST /api/cases/docker-link
  (creates workspace, probes daemon + tmux-in-image), docker listing in
  GET /api/cases, docker-unlink (best-effort docker rm -f) in DELETE, single GET
- session-routes: /api/quick-start docker branch (rejects envOverrides/effort/
  per-CLI config, probes availability + tmux, casePath=hostWorkspacePath, seeds
  resume id, scaffolds hooks+CLAUDE.md if missing, threads docker into Session,
  Ralph auto-config skipped for docker)
- CaseInfo gains location:'docker' + docker{} block
- typecheck clean; 157 route+docker tests pass

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 15:28:44 +02:00
Codeman maintainer df9214ba9a feat(docker): thread SessionDocker through Session + recovery
- Session: _docker field, constructor config, toState, createSessionOptions/
  respawnPaneOptions (both interactive + shell paths), docker getter
- resolveMuxAttachCwd returns /tmp for docker sessions (local wrapper only execs)
- skip the LOCAL claude version probe for docker; probe the IN-CONTAINER version
  instead (deferred) so wheel-forwarding stays enabled (#154)
- server restoreMuxSessions round-trips MuxSession.docker / SessionState.docker
- full CI suite green (3444 passed)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 15:22:38 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 5f4c89b990 fix(docker): auto-assign agent uid (node:22 already occupies uid 1000)
node:22-bookworm-slim ships a `node` user at uid 1000, so `useradd -u 1000`
failed. Auto-assign the uid and rely on gid-0 + group-writable HOME so any
runtime `--user <hostUid>:0` can write $HOME. Verified: image builds; toolchain
(node/tmux/claude/codex/gemini/opencode) present; `--user 1000:0` writes
/home/agent and `claude --version` runs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 15:14:44 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 54615e2371 feat(docker): agent base image + local build script
docker/agent.Dockerfile: node:22 + claude/codex/gemini/opencode CLIs + git/
tmux/ripgrep/curl, secret-free, OpenShift arbitrary-uid-writable HOME (gid 0).
scripts/build-agent-image.mjs: local build (decision "build locally on first
use"), docker/podman auto-detect, --engine/--image/--no-cache flags.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 15:11:21 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 828b1664f7 feat(docker): Docker session mode foundation (types, storage, tmux builders)
Phase 0-2 of the Docker cases feature (docs/docker-cases-plan.md). Docker is a
LOCATION OVERLAY on cases (not a 6th SessionMode), mirroring the remote-SSH
feature: a local tmux pane runs `docker exec -it` into a durable in-container
tmux server. The container is per-CASE, so multiple sessions share it.

- types: DockerHost/DockerCase/SessionDocker + docker? on SessionState/MuxSession
- src/docker-hosts.ts: storage, toSessionDocker, pure buildDockerBaseArgs/
  buildDockerCreateArgs (cap-drop, no-new-privileges, --pull=never, mem==swap,
  never privileged/socket), containerApiUrl, hostGatewayAlias, config-hash,
  credential-mount resolution, daemon probes (VITEST no-op)
- schemas: DockerHostSchema + DockerCaseLinkSchema (NO_SHELL_META guards)
- tmux-manager: buildDockerLaunchCommand (image-check -> ensure -> start -> exec,
  resume-aware), buildDockerKillCommand (in-container tmux only, multi-session
  safe), stop/remove; wired into createSession/respawnPane/killSession
- 40 unit tests (docker-hosts + docker-exec-options), typecheck clean

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 15:09:48 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 6f4b2b8a17 chore: version packages
Release 1.3.5. Consumes the changeset from PR #155: re-issue the
codeman_session cookie on every authenticated request so the browser cookie
lifetime tracks the server-side sliding TTL, fixing the recurring native Basic
Auth dialog during active use.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 00:15:29 +02:00
Codeman maintainer a531f48e17 chore(gitignore): ignore local screenshot and design capture dirs
screenshots-readme/, screenshots-readme-real/, screenshots-real/ and
design-explorations/ are local capture scratch that was untracked but not
ignored, so an unqualified `git add -A` during a COM could sweep them into a
release (this has happened before).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-17 00:15:29 +02:00
Ark0N 7d5ea0bd50 Merge PR #155 from dennisentruencer/fix/sliding-auth-cookie: slide the session cookie so active users aren't logged out
Re-issue the codeman_session cookie on every authenticated request so the browser cookie lifetime tracks the server-side sliding TTL (authSessions already used refreshOnGet: true). Fixes the recurring native Basic Auth dialog during active use.

Reviewed: no token rotation (same server-generated token re-issued, so no fixation vector), forged cookies are not blessed, logout still emits only the clearing cookie and server-side invalidation holds, cookie attributes identical to the Basic Auth path. Verified against the merge result: tsc --noEmit, lint, format:check, check:frontend-syntax, check:lockfile, and npm run test:ci (3404 passed) all green.
2026-07-16 23:49:10 +02:00
DennisandClaude Opus 4.8 a842f2db4d fix(auth): re-issue session cookie on each request (sliding expiry)
The codeman_session cookie was only set on the Basic Auth path with a fixed
lifetime from login and never refreshed, while the server-side session store
slides its TTL (refreshOnGet). So the browser cookie expired mid-use, the next
request arrived cookie-less and fell through to Basic Auth, popping the native
username/password dialog — perceived as a random logout while actively working.

Re-issue the cookie on every authenticated (valid-cookie) request so the browser
lifetime tracks the server-side sliding TTL.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-03 18:24:24 +00:00
33 changed files with 4092 additions and 37 deletions
+8
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@@ -52,8 +52,16 @@ Thumbs.db
# Generated output
out/
screenshots-echo-diag/
screenshots-readme/
screenshots-readme-real/
screenshots-real/
scripts/remotion/out/
# Local UI/README capture scratch (screenshot runs, design mockups). Not build
# output, but never meant for git — an unqualified `git add -A` during a COM has
# swept dirs like these into a release before.
design-explorations/
# Artifacts that should not be tracked
test-results/
tmp/
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@@ -1,5 +1,33 @@
# aicodeman
## 1.4.0
### Minor Changes
- Add **Docker session mode**: a case can now run inside an isolated Docker container instead of on the host, with configurable network / resource / credential settings, multiple sessions sharing one per-case container, and one-click export to move a container (toolchain + workspace) to another machine.
- Docker is a location overlay on cases (not a new session mode), mirroring the remote-SSH feature: a local tmux pane runs `docker exec -it` into a durable in-container tmux server. The container is scoped to the case (`codeman-case-<name>`), so multiple sessions share it; killing one session never stops the shared container.
- New `/api/docker-hosts` CRUD, `/api/cases/docker-link`, and a `/api/quick-start` docker branch. Create Case gains a **Docker** tab. Base image is built locally via `scripts/build-agent-image.mjs` (node + claude/codex/gemini/opencode + tmux, secret-free, arbitrary-uid-writable HOME).
- Hardened by default: `--cap-drop ALL`, `--security-opt no-new-privileges`, non-root, `--pids-limit`, `--memory`==`--memory-swap`, `--init`; never `--privileged` or the docker socket. Convenient credential default bind-mounts host `~/.claude` etc. read-write (never captured by `docker commit`); a sealed profile is opt-in.
- Two-layer durability: reconnect after a Codeman restart reattaches the same live agent; a container stop/reboot resumes the conversation from the bind-mounted transcript via `--resume`.
- Export / import: full-image (`docker commit` + `save` + workspace tar + manifest) or workspace-only, to one portable `.codeman-container.tgz`; import validates checksums, guards path traversal, and re-tags the loaded image into a quarantined namespace. Instance-scoped boot reaper cleans orphaned containers. New `docker:*` SSE events. Docs in `docs/docker-cases.md`.
- Robustness: sets `CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR` in the container so claude launches regardless of workspace path. In-container hooks require the server to be reachable from the container (documented); on a loopback-only bind, idle detection falls back to output-based.
Also wire session, away-digest, and cron header-button visibility toggles in App Settings.
## 1.3.5
### Patch Changes
- a842f2d: fix(auth): slide the session cookie so active users aren't logged out
Re-issue the `codeman_session` cookie on every authenticated request so the
browser cookie lifetime tracks the server-side sliding TTL (the session store
already uses `refreshOnGet`). Previously the cookie was only set on the Basic
Auth path with a fixed 24h lifetime from login, so the browser dropped it
mid-use; the next request arrived cookie-less, fell through to Basic Auth and
popped the native username/password dialog, perceived as a random logout while
actively working.
## 1.3.4
### Patch Changes
+3 -1
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# Codeman agent base image (built locally by scripts/build-agent-image.mjs).
#
# Contains the agent toolchain (node + the CLIs + git/tmux/ripgrep) but NO
# secrets: credentials are delivered at RUNTIME via bind mounts (~/.claude etc.)
# or name-only `docker exec --env`, never baked in, so `docker save` exports stay
# secret-free. tmux is a HARD prerequisite (the in-container tmux is what makes a
# reconnect durable), so it is installed here and probed before launch.
#
# HOME is made writable by an ARBITRARY host uid via the OpenShift "gid 0,
# group-writable" convention: on Linux we run `--user <hostUid>:0`, so the agent
# uid is the host uid (workspace files stay host-owned) while gid 0 keeps $HOME
# writable even though the uid is not the baked 1000.
FROM node:22-bookworm-slim
# Base toolchain. `curl` is needed for the hook callbacks (`curl -sk $CODEMAN_API_URL`),
# `procps` for `ps`, `tmux` for the durable in-container session.
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
git \
tmux \
ripgrep \
curl \
ca-certificates \
less \
procps \
openssh-client \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# The agent CLIs (all four backends Codeman supports). Pinning is left to the
# rebuild cadence (see docs/docker-cases-plan.md, user-decision 2).
RUN npm install -g \
@anthropic-ai/claude-code \
@openai/codex \
@google/gemini-cli \
opencode-ai \
&& npm cache clean --force
# `agent` user (gid 0) with an arbitrary-uid-writable HOME. The uid is
# auto-assigned (node:22-slim already occupies uid 1000 with its `node` user); at
# runtime Codeman overrides with `--user <hostUid>:0` on Linux, so the baked uid
# only matters for a hand-run / Docker Desktop container. gid 0 + group-writable
# HOME (OpenShift arbitrary-uid convention) keeps $HOME writable for any uid.
ENV HOME=/home/agent
RUN useradd -g 0 -m -d /home/agent -s /bin/bash agent \
&& mkdir -p /home/agent/.npm /home/agent/.cache /home/agent/.config /home/agent/.codeman \
&& chgrp -R 0 /home/agent \
&& chmod -R g=u /home/agent
USER agent
WORKDIR /home/agent
# Codeman overrides the command with `sleep infinity` at create time; this is the
# fallback so a hand-run container also idles rather than exiting.
CMD ["sleep", "infinity"]
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<!-- Design doc generated via ultracode multi-agent workflow (wf_e3a7498b-26f): 3 architecture proposals -> judge panel -> synthesis -> completeness critic. -->
# Docker Session Mode, Implementation Plan
## Decisions (locked 2026-07-19, by repo owner)
1. **Isolation posture**: CONVENIENT default (bind-mount host `~/.claude` etc. read-write so the existing login just works; network on; still hardened non-root + cap-drop + resource caps). SEALED profile (`mountCredentials:false` + `network:none`) is a per-case opt-in.
2. **Export**: offer BOTH full-image (`commit`+`save`+workspace tar) AND workspace-only, side by side, no default (ask each time).
3. **Base image**: BUILD LOCALLY on first use via `scripts/build-agent-image.mjs` from a repo `docker/agent.Dockerfile`. No registry required. (GHCR pull can be added later.)
4. **Hooks**: WIRE HOOKS NOW. Codeman scaffolds `.claude/settings.local.json` + CLAUDE.md into the linked host workspace dir (same as local cases), enabling in-container permission prompts, hook-idle detection, and the Claude Model picker.
Adopted defaults for the remaining open items (Section 10): resume-on-restart ON; container is per-CASE and shared by multiple sessions (killing one session only kills its in-container tmux session, never `docker stop` while siblings remain; stop/remove only on explicit teardown or case-delete); rootless caps = ship-with-warning (`capsEnforced` surfaced); remote docker daemon = local-first; podman = docker-first best-effort.
## Implementation status (branch `feat/docker-session-mode`)
DONE and END-TO-END VERIFIED against a real docker daemon (create host, link case, quick-start shell in a real container, workspace bind-mount round-trip, hook scaffolding, session-delete keeps the shared container up, case-delete `docker rm`s it):
- Phase 0-1: types (`DockerHost`/`DockerCase`/`SessionDocker`), `src/docker-hosts.ts` (storage, pure `buildDockerBaseArgs`/`buildDockerCreateArgs`, `containerApiUrl`, `hostGatewayAlias`, config-hash, credential-mount resolution, daemon probes), `DockerHostSchema`/`DockerCaseLinkSchema`. 26 unit tests.
- Phase 2: `tmux-manager` `buildDockerLaunchCommand` (image-check -> ensure -> start -> exec, resume-aware), `buildDockerKillCommand` (in-container tmux only, multi-session safe), stop/remove; wired into `createSession`/`respawnPane`/`killSession`. 14 unit tests.
- Phase 3: `Session` threading (`_docker`, toState, option builders, in-container cliVersion probe, `resolveMuxAttachCwd`), `server.ts` recovery round-trip.
- Phase 4: `case-routes` `/api/docker-hosts` CRUD + `/api/cases/docker-link` + listing + docker-unlink; `session-routes` `/api/quick-start` docker branch (rejects per-session config, probes availability + tmux, scaffolds hooks, seeds resume id).
- Phase 5 (partial): `docker/agent.Dockerfile` + `scripts/build-agent-image.mjs` (built + verified: node 22, tmux, claude/codex/gemini/opencode, arbitrary-uid HOME). Host-guard allowlists `host.docker.internal`/`host.containers.internal` for in-container hooks.
- Full CI green (3445 tests).
REMAINING:
- Phase 6: export / import (`docker commit` + `save | gzip` + workspace tar + manifest; `load` + quarantined re-tag), GC / boot reaper, disk-safety prechecks, drift-recreate route, SSE `docker:*` events. THE "move to a new machine" feature.
- Phase 7: frontend Create Case "Docker" tab + `linkDockerCase` + run wiring + case-picker labels + export/import UI.
- Phase 8: CLAUDE.md "Docker cases" Key Pattern + `docs/docker-cases.md` + COM.
- Deferred refinements: in-container model-picker via `settings.local.json`; live mid-run resume-id capture into `DockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId`; rootless/Desktop uid probe (currently a platform heuristic).
## 1. Goal & user stories
Add "Docker cases" to Codeman: a case can point at a container instead of a local or remote-SSH path, and any of the five CLI backends (`claude` / `shell` / `opencode` / `codex` / `gemini`) runs inside that container. It is modeled as a LOCATION OVERLAY on cases, exactly like the remote-SSH feature (COD-94/#145), never as a sixth `SessionMode`.
User stories:
- As the repo owner, I link a case to a per-project container so an autonomous Claude/Ralph run executes in a hardened sandbox (cap-drop, non-root, resource caps) instead of directly on my host, while keeping my existing OAuth login and transcript history working with zero extra setup.
- I set default, per-case-changeable container settings (image, network mode, memory/cpu/pids caps) at link time and edit them later, and edits actually take effect through a recreate-on-drift path (see Section 4).
- I reconnect after a Codeman restart and land back in the SAME running agent with the conversation intact. When the CONTAINER itself was stopped/rebooted/OOM-killed (which destroys the in-container tmux), the next launch RESUMES the last conversation from the bind-mounted transcript rather than starting fresh (durability model in Section 2, Key decision 1).
- I export a finished run's whole environment (toolchain plus workspace) to a portable, secret-free `.tar.gz`, move it to another machine, and import it back into a fresh case in one click.
- The container never accumulates: killing the session stops it, deleting the case removes it, and an instance-scoped boot reaper reaps containers whose case is gone.
Non-goals for the MVP: multi-tenant untrusted-code isolation guarantees (Codeman is loopback-default and single-operator, and the agent already runs `--dangerously-skip-permissions` on the host today), Kubernetes/compose orchestration, and per-command ephemeral containers.
## 2. Chosen architecture and why
The design grafts the strongest idea from each of the three proposals:
- Overlay-not-a-mode + faithful remote-SSH mirror (from "Docker Cases as a Location Overlay"): lowest churn, rides the existing quick-start / mux-sessions / state / recovery plumbing.
- Convenient-but-hardened default with an opt-in sealed profile, plus exec-time name-only secret env (from "Sealed Sandbox"): a strict security improvement over today's on-host execution without the UX tax of forcing an in-container re-login.
- One-artifact export + in-app import route (from "Container-as-Cargo"): the genuinely new, high-value capability Codeman lacks.
### Key decision 1: persistent per-CASE container, durable in-container tmux, AND resume-on-restart (the two-layer durability model)
Exactly one long-lived container per Docker case, named as a pure slug function `codeman-case-<slug>` (Docker charset `^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$`; Codeman already slugs case names for tmux), so create-if-missing and boot recovery are idempotent. PID1 is `sleep infinity` under `--init` (tini reaps zombies and forwards `docker stop`'s SIGTERM); the CLI is NOT the container command. The CLI runs inside a DURABLE in-container tmux on a dedicated socket `-L codeman-docker`, session `codeman-dkr-<id8>`, the direct analog of remote's `-L codeman-remote` / `codeman-ssh-<id8>`.
Two DIFFERENT failure surfaces need two DIFFERENT recovery layers, and conflating them is the central flaw the critic caught:
1. Codeman-PROCESS restart while the container stays up: the in-container tmux is still alive, so `tmux new-session -A` (attach-or-create) reattaches the SAME live agent and the paneCommand is ignored. This is the remote-SSH durability idiom and it works unchanged.
2. CONTAINER stop / daemon restart / host reboot / OOM-kill: the in-container tmux is GONE (fresh PID1). `new-session -A` will now CREATE a fresh session and run the paneCommand, which would start a brand-new conversation. This is the case the raw plan silently lost. Because the transcript directory is bind-mounted from the host (Key decision 3), the fix is to launch with RESUME: the paneCommand becomes `exec claude --dangerously-skip-permissions --resume <claudeSessionId>` (codex uses `resume <id>`, gemini `--resume <id>`) whenever a captured `claudeSessionId` exists. The `-A` semantics make this self-selecting: the resume flag only ever executes when tmux is actually re-created, which is exactly when the live session was lost. When tmux is still alive (case 1), attach wins and the flag is inert.
Capturing / persisting / reusing the resume id (the missing mechanism the critic flagged): Codeman already learns `Session.claudeSessionId` from transcript correlation (which works here because projHash matches, Key decision 3) and persists it in `SessionState`. We thread that value into `createSessionOptions` / `respawnPaneOptions` for docker so `buildDockerLaunchCommand` can inject the resume flag on any relaunch. To make a NEW Codeman session (new `id8`) re-launched against the same case resume its predecessor's conversation, we ALSO persist `lastClaudeSessionId` on the `DockerCase` record; the quick-start docker branch seeds the new `Session` with it when the `dockerResumeOnStart` setting is on. First-ever launch has no id, so it starts fresh. This is user-decision 7 (default resume behavior).
Reconciling with stop-on-kill and with the `--restart` policy (the internal inconsistency the critic found): the container is created with `--restart no` uniformly (Codeman's idempotent create-if-missing plus boot recovery is the single recovery mechanism; a restart policy would not preserve the conversation anyway because a restarted container gets a fresh PID1/tmux). Boot recovery re-runs `buildDockerLaunchCommand` from the restored `MuxSession.docker` (`docker inspect || docker create; docker start`, then exec with resume), so a host reboot or daemon restart recreates+starts the container and resumes the conversation instead of the session vanishing. `reconcileSessions` (tmux-manager.ts ~1800-1815) must NOT hard-delete a docker session merely because no LOCAL pane exists after the local `-L codeman` server died; docker (like remote) sessions are restored from `mux-sessions.json` and relaunched. This relaunch path is explicitly part of Phase 4/Phase 3 recovery work, not assumed.
Why this over the alternatives: `docker exec` gets SIGHUP and dies when its client TTY closes, so a bare `docker exec claude` restarts the CLI on every reconnect/respawn. The inner tmux plus resume is what makes reconnect idempotent across BOTH failure surfaces. Because this durability is the single most important design point, tmux-in-image is a HARD gated prerequisite (`checkDockerTmuxAvailable`), never a silent fallback to bare exec. Rejected alternatives: ephemeral-per-run or bare-exec containers (no reattach durability); a literal `'docker'` `SessionMode` (touches dozens of switch/enum sites and diverges from the remote overlay precedent, since Docker is a LOCATION orthogonal to the 5 CLI backends).
### Key decision 2: CLI + auth delivery
One prebuilt base image (built once, contains NO secrets): `node:22-bookworm-slim` + `git tmux ripgrep ca-certificates`, `npm i -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code @openai/codex @google/gemini-cli opencode-ai`, an `agent` user, HOME dirs made writable by an arbitrary host uid via the OpenShift "gid 0, group-writable" convention (Key decision 6). Because the toolchain is baked, export is reproducible and needs no network at import time. The image name/namespace/registry and its refresh cadence are user-decision 2 (the `codeman/agent:base` placeholder implies a Docker Hub org the project may not own).
Credentials are delivered ONLY at runtime, two commit-safe channels, default convenient:
- OAuth/config-file CLIs (Claude Max/Pro, gcloud, opencode): bind-mount the host credential dirs read-write (`~/.claude`, `~/.codex`, `~/.gemini` + `~/.config/gcloud`, `~/.config/opencode`) so the common user "just works" with no in-container login. Because these are bind mounts, `docker commit` (which captures only the container's own writable layer, never bind mounts) physically cannot capture them, so exports stay secret-free.
- API-key CLIs (codex/gemini): exec-time NAME-ONLY `docker exec --env OPENAI_API_KEY --env GEMINI_API_KEY ...` (no `=value`), sourced from Codeman's own process env. Only the key NAME appears in argv (no `ps` leak), and per-exec env is never captured by `docker commit`. This is the technique Codeman already uses via `tmux setenv` for the local Codex/Gemini panes, so it composes with existing machinery.
Per-host `DockerHost.mountCredentials` defaults `true` (convenient); setting it `false` yields a SEALED profile (no host cred mounts, in-container login only) for genuinely untrusted work. CRITICAL sealed-mode export rule (the leak the critic caught): in sealed mode the in-container login writes tokens into the container's OWN writable layer, which `docker commit` DOES capture, so a full-image export of a sealed container would ship credentials. Therefore full-image export is REFUSED for `mountCredentials:false` containers by default; the user may either take a workspace-only export (always safe) or opt into a pre-commit scrub that `docker exec`s `rm -rf ~/.claude ~/.codex ~/.gemini ~/.config/gcloud ~/.config/opencode` inside the container before commit (destructive to the in-container login, which is the point). This is enforced in the export route, not left to a manifest assertion.
Per-session `envOverrides` / `effort` / `codexConfig` / `geminiConfig` / `openCodeConfig` are REJECTED at quick-start exactly like the remote branch (session-routes.ts ~1698-1710). `modelOverride` is the one deliberate difference from remote: because the docker workspace is a REAL bind-mounted host dir that Codeman scaffolds (Key decision 5 and Section 6), `updateCaseModel()` can write the `model` key into `<workspace>/.claude/settings.local.json` and the in-container `claude` reads it, so the App Settings Claude Model picker works for docker cases. `effort` is a `--effort` CLI arg applied only by the local-spawn path we bypass, so it stays rejected (surfaced honestly in the UI, not silently inert). Per-mode command customization goes through `DockerHost.commands.<mode>` (`defaultDockerCommandForMode`, mirror of `defaultRemoteCommandForMode` at remote-hosts.ts:60). NEVER bake secrets into an image layer and NEVER pass a secret via create-time `-e` (both are committed).
Rejected alternative: sealed-by-default. For a single-operator loopback tool where the agent already runs skip-permissions on the host, forcing an in-container OAuth re-login is a UX regression with little real gain. We keep sealed as an opt-in. Rejected alternative: baking a login into the image, which leaks the instant you `docker save`.
### Key decision 3: workspace mount, container CWD, and transcript correlation
Bind-mount the host workspace dir into the container at the SAME absolute path (`dst == src`, mirror the host path), and set both `Session.workingDir` and the container workdir to that host path.
Two problems this solves that the raw proposals got wrong:
- File features: `DockerCase.hostWorkspacePath` is a REAL host directory, so `Session.workingDir = hostWorkspacePath` keeps file-routes, attachments, image-watcher, and previews working on real host bytes (unlike remote, where the path is remote-only and those features no-op). All three proposals wired `casePath = <container path>`; we deliberately diverge and use the host path.
- Transcript correlation: Claude writes transcripts under `~/.claude/projects/<hash-of-CWD>/`. By mirroring the host path as the container CWD, the projHash computed inside the container equals the host-side hash Codeman's transcript/subagent/workflow watchers expect, so correlation keeps working (and, in turn, feeds the resume-id capture in Key decision 1). A `/workspace`-style fixed dst would break it. Mirror-vs-fixed is user-decision 3.
`resolveMuxAttachCwd` still returns `/tmp` for docker sessions (the LOCAL bash pane only runs `docker exec`; it never needs the workspace as its cwd), mirroring remote.
### Key decision 4: network default and the engine-specific host gateway
Default `bridge` (own netns, NAT egress, no inbound), per-case changeable to `none` (offline shell sandbox; warned because it breaks the API CLIs) or `custom` (a user-defined bridge `codeman-net-<slug>`, the chokepoint for a future egress allowlist). `host` networking and any `-p` inbound publish are structurally unrepresentable in the flag builder and schema. Rationale: every API-backed CLI (Claude, Codex, Gemini) plus npm/git needs egress, so `bridge` is the only sane functional default; `none` is reserved for `shell`.
The host-callback gateway alias is ENGINE-SPECIFIC (the critic's podman finding): Docker uses `host.docker.internal`, Podman uses `host.containers.internal` (Docker's alias only exists on recent podman). A helper `hostGatewayAlias(engine)` returns the right name; Section 2.5, the create args, the `CODEMAN_API_URL` rewrite, and the host-guard allowlist all consume it, and BOTH aliases are added to the allowlist so a mixed fleet keeps working.
### Key decision 5: hooks actually reach the host AND are actually installed
Two independent things must both be true for a hook to fire, and the raw plan wired only the first:
1. Network reachability. Claude Code hooks POST to `$CODEMAN_API_URL` (`curl -sk`). Inside a bridge container `localhost` is the container and prod binds `127.0.0.1`, so we set `--add-host <gatewayAlias>:host-gateway` on create (skipped on Docker Desktop, where the alias is native), add the gateway alias to the host guard, and provide `CODEMAN_API_URL` and the hook secret (below).
2. Hook INSTALLATION. Hooks live in `<workspace>/.claude/settings.local.json`, written by the quick-start scaffolding block (around session-routes.ts ~1776) that calls `writeHooksConfig()` / `updateCaseModel()`. The raw plan extended the `!remote` guard to `!remote && !docker`, which would SKIP that block and silently disable ALL hooks regardless of networking. For docker the workspace is a REAL bind-mounted host dir, so the scaffolding block MUST run. Precise fix: extend to `!remote && !docker` ONLY the LOCAL-CLI-availability and local-spawn guards (the ones that stat the local binary or build the local spawn command); leave the workspace-scaffolding guard at `!remote` so it runs for docker. This same decision is what makes `modelOverride` work (Key decision 2). Consequence, surfaced as user-decision 4: linking a docker case now WRITES `.claude/settings.local.json` (and the CLAUDE.md scaffold, matching local-case behavior) into the user's real host directory, a behavioral shift from "link a dir" to "link and scaffold a dir."
`CODEMAN_API_URL` derivation (the wrong-scheme bug the critic caught): prod is HTTPS-only on 3000, and `server.ts` (~2000) auto-sets `process.env.CODEMAN_API_URL = ${protocol}://${apiHost}:${port}`. Hardcoding `http://host.docker.internal:3000` fails every hook. Instead a pure helper `containerApiUrl(process.env.CODEMAN_API_URL, engine)` parses the running URL and substitutes ONLY the hostname with `hostGatewayAlias(engine)`, preserving scheme and port (`https://host.docker.internal:3000`). Unit-tested against http, https, non-default ports, and both engines. Passed as create-time `--env CODEMAN_API_URL=<derived>` (case-stable, non-secret).
Hook secret and session attribution:
- `~/.codeman/hook-secret` is bind-mounted read-only to a container path; `--env CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE=<that path>` is create-time (a path is non-secret; the bytes ride the bind mount and are never committed).
- `CODEMAN_SESSION_ID` (which the generated hooks reference at hooks-config.ts:78-80 to attribute events) plus `CODEMAN_MUX=1` are SESSION-scoped, so they are passed at EXEC time via `docker exec --env CODEMAN_SESSION_ID=<id> --env CODEMAN_MUX=1` (non-secret, value inline is fine, and exec env is not committed). Because a `tmux` session started fresh only inherits the invoking env when it starts the SERVER, the launch chain ALSO runs `tmux -L codeman-docker setenv -g CODEMAN_SESSION_ID <id>` (and `CODEMAN_MUX`) so reattaches and newly created panes see the same values. This mirrors how Codeman already injects per-session env into tmux for the external CLIs.
Hooks-in-MVP-vs-deferred stays user-decision 4; if deferred, docker ships as explicitly hook-degraded and we lean on output-based idle detection through the docker-exec PTY.
### Key decision 6: uid / HOME / rootless enforcement / macOS Docker Desktop
The raw plan showed `--user 1000:1000` in one place and `--user "$(id -u):$(id -g)"` in another and never resolved HOME writability; this section fixes all of it.
- Linux native (docker rootful or rootless): run `--user <hostUid>:0` (host uid, GID 0). The image follows the OpenShift arbitrary-uid convention: `HOME=/home/agent`, and `/home/agent` plus the tool cache dirs (`~/.npm`, `~/.cache`, `~/.config`) are owned `root:0` and group-writable (`chmod -R g+w`, `g+s` on dirs) so a process with GID 0 can write HOME even though its UID is not 1000. This keeps workspace files host-owned (the agent's UID is the host UID) AND keeps HOME writable, so the CLIs actually start.
- Podman rootless: use `--userns=keep-id` (maps the host uid to the image's `agent` uid inside the container) instead of `--user`, so `/home/agent` is owned by the running user and workspace files are host-owned. This is a real per-engine branch in `buildDockerCreateArgs`.
- macOS Docker Desktop: `--user <macUid>` (e.g. 501) does not own the image's `/home/agent`, so non-bind HOME writes fail EACCES and the CLIs may not start; Desktop also does its own bind-mount uid translation, provides `host.docker.internal` natively (no `--add-host`), and its VM memory ceiling can cap `--memory`. Detect Desktop via `docker info` (Server OS `linuxkit` / `OperatingString` contains "Docker Desktop") and take a dedicated path: do NOT pass `--user` (run as the image's baked `agent` uid and rely on Desktop's translation for workspace access), skip `--add-host`, and note in the UI that memory caps are subject to the VM ceiling.
Rootless resource-cap enforcement (the silently-inert risk): rootless Docker without cgroup-v2 systemd delegation (`Delegate=yes`) silently IGNORES `--memory`/`--cpus`/`--pids-limit`. The probe checks `docker info` for `CgroupVersion=2` plus rootless plus delegation; if caps cannot be enforced, `checkDockerAvailable` returns `capsEnforced:false` and the link/probe surfaces "resource caps are advisory on this engine." Whether to REQUIRE delegation or ship-with-warning is user-decision 6.
## 3. Data model
New TypeScript types in `src/types/session.ts`, added right after the remote types (lines 46-99). SessionMode (line 44) is UNCHANGED.
```ts
export type DockerCommandMode = Extract<SessionMode, 'shell' | 'claude' | 'opencode' | 'codex' | 'gemini'>;
export type DockerEngine = 'docker' | 'podman';
export type DockerNetworkMode = 'bridge' | 'none' | 'custom'; // never 'host'
export interface DockerResourceLimits {
memory?: string; // '4g' -> --memory 4g --memory-swap 4g (swap==memory: real OOM cap)
cpus?: string; // '2'
pidsLimit?: number; // 512 (fork-bomb guard)
nofile?: string; // '4096:8192'
shmSize?: string; // optional; only when a tool needs /dev/shm
}
export interface DockerHost {
id: string;
label: string;
engine?: DockerEngine; // default resolved by probe (docker, else podman)
image: string; // default resolved image ref (see user-decision 2)
daemonHost?: string; // advanced: -H ssh://user@host / DOCKER_HOST
context?: string; // advanced: --context <ctx>
network?: DockerNetworkMode; // default 'bridge'
networkName?: string; // when network === 'custom'
resources?: DockerResourceLimits;
mountCredentials?: boolean; // default true (false = sealed; blocks full-image export)
hooksEnabled?: boolean; // default true (host-gateway callback wiring)
resumeOnStart?: boolean; // default true (see Key decision 1 / user-decision 7)
commands?: Partial<Record<DockerCommandMode, string>>;
extraCreateArgs?: string[]; // validated like extraSshOptions
extraExecArgs?: string[];
}
export interface DockerCase {
name: string;
type: 'docker';
hostId: string;
hostWorkspacePath: string; // absolute HOST dir: bind src + Session.workingDir
containerWorkdir?: string; // container path; default = hostWorkspacePath (mirror -> projHash match)
container?: string; // default codeman-case-<slug>
lastClaudeSessionId?: string; // captured resume id (Key decision 1)
}
export interface SessionDocker { // flattened, round-trips through mux/state (mirror SessionRemote at 91)
hostId: string;
label: string;
engine: DockerEngine;
image: string;
containerName: string;
hostWorkspacePath: string;
containerWorkdir: string;
network: DockerNetworkMode;
networkName?: string;
resources?: DockerResourceLimits;
mountCredentials: boolean;
hooksEnabled: boolean;
resumeOnStart: boolean;
daemonHost?: string;
context?: string;
commands?: Partial<Record<DockerCommandMode, string>>;
extraCreateArgs?: string[];
extraExecArgs?: string[];
configHash?: string; // drift detection (Key decision, Section 4)
}
```
- `SessionState` gains `docker?: SessionDocker` immediately after `remote?` (line 219). It persists automatically because `SessionState` is structural and `state-store.ts` stores `toState()` verbatim.
- `src/mux-interface.ts`: add `docker?: SessionDocker` to `MuxSession` (after line 38), `CreateSessionOptions` (after 81), `RespawnPaneOptions` (after 105). `MuxSession.docker` round-trips through `mux-sessions.json` automatically.
- `src/types/api.ts` `CaseInfo`: add `'docker'` to the `location` union and a `docker?: { hostId; container; image?; path; network }` display block.
- `src/services/unified-session-service.ts`: add a boolean `docker?` flag on `UnifiedSessionItem` and source rows, set from `MuxSession.docker` presence (mirror the `remote` flag at ~line 200 and the harvest at session-routes.ts:2313).
New state files (all via `dataPath()`, mirroring `remote-hosts.json` / `remote-cases.json`):
- `~/.codeman/docker-hosts.json` (reusable engine/image/network/resource profiles).
- `~/.codeman/docker-cases.json` (`name -> DockerCase`, including `lastClaudeSessionId`).
- `~/.codeman/docker-exports/` (dedicated dir for `.image.tar.gz` + `.workspace.tar.gz` + `manifest.json`; never inline in state.json; retention/pruning per Section 5).
No new `state.json` / `mux-sessions.json` files: `SessionState.docker` and `MuxSession.docker` ride the existing serialization.
## 4. Container lifecycle (exact command shapes)
All builders are PURE string functions (directly unit-testable). Host values interpolated into the outer `bash -c "..."` layer (container name, image, workdir, host paths) are `shellescape()`'d and, for user-supplied fields, schema-rejected for `$`/backtick via `NO_SHELL_META`. The escaping chain here is DEEPER than remote's single `ssh '<tmux ...>'`: the whole `docker inspect || docker create <dozens of --mount/--env/shellescaped host paths>` is interpolated into `bash -c "..."` then `JSON.stringify`'d into respawn-pane. This is a known place to get stuck, so it is covered by concrete escaping tests (Section 9), including host workspace paths containing spaces, not just a "we call shellescape" claim.
New in `src/tmux-manager.ts`:
```ts
const DOCKER_TMUX_SOCKET = 'codeman-docker';
// 'dkr' letters deliberately FAIL SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN (^codeman-[a-f0-9-]+$),
// so a Codeman running INSIDE the container never adopts/resizes/respawns our session.
export function dockerTmuxSessionName(id: string): string { return `codeman-dkr-${id.slice(0, 8)}`; }
```
`buildDockerBaseArgs(docker)` (pure, in `docker-hosts.ts`, mirror of `buildSshConnectionArgs`) emits the engine prefix tokens: `docker` (or `podman`) + optional `--context <ctx>` or `-H <daemonHost>`. `buildDockerCreateArgs(docker, sessionId)` emits the `docker create` flag array (with the per-engine uid/userns branch from Key decision 6).
IMAGE PRESENCE (before any create, the auto-pull footgun the critic caught): the launch chain runs `docker image inspect <image> >/dev/null 2>&1` first; on miss it exits with a distinct message ("base image <ref> not present: build with scripts/build-agent-image.mjs or pull it") rather than triggering a blocking multi-GB auto-pull inside the tmux pane. `docker create` carries `--pull=never`. The tmux-availability probe likewise uses `docker run --rm --pull=never <image> sh -lc 'command -v tmux'` and reports the same build/pull hint if the image is absent, so the 15s-bounded probe never hangs on a pull.
CREATE (the ensure step, embedded in the launch string):
```
docker create \
--name codeman-case-myproj --hostname myproj \
--label codeman.managed=1 --label codeman.instance=<CODEMAN_INSTANCE> \
--label codeman.case=myproj --label codeman.session=<id8> \
--label codeman.confighash=<hash> \
--pull=never --init --restart no \
--user 1000:0 \
--workdir '/home/arkon/cases/myproj' \
--mount type=bind,src='/home/arkon/cases/myproj',dst='/home/arkon/cases/myproj' \
--mount type=bind,src='/home/arkon/.claude',dst='/home/agent/.claude' \
--mount type=bind,src='/home/arkon/.codeman/hook-secret',dst='/home/agent/.codeman/hook-secret',readonly \
--add-host host.docker.internal:host-gateway \
--memory 4g --memory-swap 4g --cpus 2 --pids-limit 512 --ulimit nofile=4096:8192 \
--cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges \
--network bridge \
--env HOME=/home/agent --env TERM=xterm-256color --env COLORTERM=truecolor \
--env CODEMAN_API_URL=https://host.docker.internal:3000 \
--env CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE=/home/agent/.codeman/hook-secret \
codeman/agent:base \
sleep infinity
```
- `--user 1000:0` shown is the Linux-native form with GID 0 (Key decision 6); it is actually `--user <hostUid>:0`, or `--userns=keep-id` for podman rootless, or omitted on Docker Desktop. The literal is illustrative only.
- Create-time `--env` carries only NON-SESSION, non-secret, case-stable values (safe to be committed): the DERIVED `CODEMAN_API_URL` (https-preserving, Key decision 5) and the hook-secret FILE PATH. `CODEMAN_SESSION_ID`/`CODEMAN_MUX` and the codex/gemini key NAMES are exec-time only.
- `codeman.instance=<CODEMAN_INSTANCE>` is REQUIRED on the label set so the boot reaper is instance-scoped (a beta/second instance must never reap prod's containers).
- `codeman.confighash` is a stable hash of the drift-relevant create args (image, resources, network, mounts, non-session env). Drift detection (user story 2, the config-never-takes-effect gap): on launch the ensure block compares the desired hash to the existing container's label; on mismatch the launch does NOT silently reuse the stale container. Instead the docker route returns a "container config changed, recreate?" action (SSE + UI confirm), and on confirm Codeman `docker rm`'s and recreates. rm destroys in-image (non-bind) state, but the workspace and transcripts survive on their bind mounts and the conversation is restored via `--resume`, so the recreate is safe. Auto-recreate-vs-prompt is a UI choice; the MVP prompts.
- `--restart no` (resolved consistently with Key decision 1; recovery is Codeman's idempotent create-if-missing, not an engine restart policy, which also matters for Podman which has no daemon).
EXEC (`buildDockerLaunchCommand`, the docker analog of `buildRemoteLaunchCommand`, TTY-correct, resume-aware). The whole thing is ONE `bash -c` string that image-checks, ensures, starts, primes tmux env, then execs:
```
docker image inspect codeman/agent:base >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo 'Codeman: base image codeman/agent:base not present (build or pull it)'; exit 1; } ; \
docker inspect codeman-case-myproj >/dev/null 2>&1 || docker create <all create args above> ; \
docker start codeman-case-myproj >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo 'Codeman: container codeman-case-myproj failed to start (daemon down?)'; exit 1; } ; \
exec docker exec -it \
--workdir '/home/arkon/cases/myproj' \
--env TERM=xterm-256color --env COLORTERM=truecolor \
--env CODEMAN_SESSION_ID=1a2b3c4d --env CODEMAN_MUX=1 \
--env OPENAI_API_KEY --env GEMINI_API_KEY \
codeman-case-myproj \
sh -lc 'tmux -L codeman-docker setenv -g CODEMAN_SESSION_ID 1a2b3c4d \; setenv -g CODEMAN_MUX 1 \; new-session -A -s codeman-dkr-1a2b3c4d -c '\''/home/arkon/cases/myproj'\'' '\''cd /home/arkon/cases/myproj && exec claude --dangerously-skip-permissions --resume <claudeSessionId>'\'' \; set -t codeman-dkr-1a2b3c4d status off \; set -t codeman-dkr-1a2b3c4d mouse off \; set -t codeman-dkr-1a2b3c4d prefix C-q \; set -s escape-time 0'
```
- `docker exec -it`: `-t` allocates a PTY and forwards SIGWINCH into the container so the Ink TUI re-lays-out on pane resize; `TERM`/`COLORTERM` prevent degraded rendering. `--env OPENAI_API_KEY` (name only) is present only for codex/gemini and is exec-time (never committed). `CODEMAN_SESSION_ID`/`CODEMAN_MUX` are exec-time values plus a `tmux setenv -g` prime so reattaches and new panes inherit them (Key decision 5).
- `--resume <claudeSessionId>` (codex `resume <id>`, gemini `--resume <id>`) is appended to `modeCommand` ONLY when a captured id exists; on first launch it is omitted. `new-session -A` makes the flag inert on a live-tmux reattach and effective only when tmux is re-created (Key decision 1).
- `modeCommand = docker.commands?.[mode] || defaultDockerCommandForMode(mode)` (`exec claude --dangerously-skip-permissions`, `exec bash -l`, etc.), with the resume suffix injected by the builder.
- Escaping survives every layer identically to remote in shape but deeper in nesting: `paneCommand` (`cd ... && exec ...`) is one shellescaped tmux arg, the whole `tmuxInvocation` is one shellescaped `sh -lc` arg, and the outer string is `JSON.stringify()`'d into `bash -c` by respawn-pane (tmux-manager.ts:1329).
Wire-up (extend the two existing seams to 3-way):
- createSession (tmux-manager.ts:1276): `const fullCmd = docker ? buildDockerLaunchCommand({ mode, docker, sessionId, resumeSessionId }) : remote ? buildRemoteLaunchCommand({ mode, remote, sessionId }) : localFullCmd;`
- launchCmd cd-skip (tmux-manager.ts:1327): `const launchCmd = (remote || docker) ? fullCmd : \`cd ${JSON.stringify(workingDir)} && ${fullCmd}\`;`
- respawnPane: same two edits at lines 1524 and 1542.
START / reattach-after-reboot: the ensure block (image-check, `docker inspect || docker create`, `docker start`) is fully idempotent, so boot recovery just re-runs `buildDockerLaunchCommand` from the restored `MuxSession.docker` with the persisted resume id. A rebooted host recreates the container and resumes the conversation.
DOCKER-DOWN surfacing (the PTY-exit-breaker false-trip risk): if `docker start` or `docker exec` cannot attach (daemon down, container missing), the launch prints a docker-specific message and exits, which alone would still count toward `session-pty-exit-breaker` and show a generic "respawn breaker tripped" push. To avoid masking the cause, the docker reattach path runs a fast `checkDockerAvailable` pre-flight: if the daemon/container is unreachable, Codeman broadcasts a docker-specific error (SSE + push, "container <name> is not running / daemon down") and SKIPS the auto-reattach that would trip the breaker, rather than fast-looping `docker exec`.
STOP / KILL (`killSession` Strategy 3c, right after remote's Strategy 3b at tmux-manager.ts:1719, guarded by `IS_TEST_MODE`):
```ts
if (session.docker) {
// best-effort, fire-and-forget, timeout-bounded so it never blocks the local kill
execAsync(buildDockerKillCommand({ docker: session.docker, sessionId }), { timeout: EXEC_TIMEOUT_MS }).catch(() => {});
}
```
`buildDockerKillCommand` emits: `docker exec codeman-case-<slug> tmux -L codeman-docker kill-session -t codeman-dkr-<id8> ; docker stop -t 10 codeman-case-<slug>`. Stopping frees CPU/RAM and, per Key decision 1, is safe for conversation continuity because the NEXT launch resumes from the bind-mounted transcript via `--resume`. Whether to stop at all (RAM vs instant live-agent reattach) is user-decision 6/1 (reframed honestly). The bind-mounted workspace and transcripts always survive on the host.
REMOVE: only on explicit case delete (`docker rm -f codeman-case-<slug>`), gated behind an "export first?" UI prompt because rm destroys any in-image (non-bind) state. Instance-scoped boot reaper (fixing the racy/cross-instance reaper): after `docker-cases.json` is loaded AND after `restoreMuxSessions` has run, enumerate `docker ps -a --filter label=codeman.managed=1 --filter label=codeman.instance=<CODEMAN_INSTANCE> --format '{{.Names}}\t{{index .Labels "codeman.case"}}'` and `docker rm -f` only containers whose case is gone from THIS instance's `docker-cases.json`. The instance filter is what stops a beta reaping prod's containers (the exact cross-instance hazard the project memory warns about).
AVAILABILITY PROBE (`docker-hosts.ts`, timeout-bounded like `checkRemoteTmuxAvailable`'s 15s, `IS_TEST_MODE` no-op):
```
docker info --format '{{json .}}' # server up, CgroupVersion, rootless, OS (Desktop detect), cap-delegation
docker image inspect <image> --format '{{.Id}}' # image PRESENT (no auto-pull)
docker run --rm --pull=never <image> sh -lc 'command -v tmux' # tmux-in-image gate (hard prerequisite), only if image present
```
`checkDockerAvailable()` returns `{ ok, engine, rootless, isDesktop, cgroupV2, capsEnforced }` (parse `SecurityOptions` for `name=rootless`, `CgroupVersion`, delegation, and Server OS for Desktop). `checkDockerTmuxAvailable(host)` returns a structured result with a user-facing error and correct install hint (NOT `npm install -g`; the hint is "build/pull the base image" for a missing image and "install docker or podman" for a missing engine).
IN-CONTAINER CLI VERSION (fixing the #154 wheel-forwarding regression): the raw plan skipped the LOCAL `cliVersion` probe for docker (correct, since it reports the HOST claude) but left `cliVersion` undefined, which disables trackpad wheel-forwarding. Instead, for docker sessions Codeman runs an IN-CONTAINER probe `docker exec <container> claude --version` (bounded, `IS_TEST_MODE` no-op) and feeds THAT into `cliVersion`. This also means a stale baked CLI is visible; combined with the rebuild-cadence in user-decision 2, agents are not silently pinned to an old claude.
## 5. Export / Import
EXPORT is a concurrency-bounded job (reuse `runWithConversionLimit` from `document-conversion-limiter.ts` so N simultaneous exports cannot fork-bomb the host). Route `POST /api/docker-cases/:name/export`.
Preconditions (the consistency and leak risks the critic caught):
- Sealed guard: if `mountCredentials:false`, full-image export is REFUSED unless the caller explicitly opts into the pre-commit scrub (Key decision 2). Workspace-only export is always allowed.
- Quiesce + free-space: require the session idle, then `docker pause` the container spanning BOTH the workspace tar AND the commit so the two artifacts are mutually consistent (the raw plan paused only the commit, leaving the bind-mount tar to run against a mid-write agent). Before any heavy step, precheck free space in the exports dir and in `/var/lib/docker`; if below `DOCKER_EXPORT_MIN_FREE_BYTES`, refuse with a clear error (a full `/var/lib/docker` wedges the daemon and breaks EVERY session on the host).
Steps (all cleanup in try/finally so a mid-way failure never orphans an intermediate image or leaves the container paused):
1. `docker commit -c 'LABEL codeman.exported=1' codeman-case-<slug> codeman/export-<slug>:<ts>` (unique tag per export defeats the stale-image trap). Optional pre-commit scrub in sealed mode as above; also blank instance-specific committed env (`-c 'ENV CODEMAN_API_URL='` etc.) so the image carries no stale host references.
2. `docker save codeman/export-<slug>:<ts> | gzip` streamed in fixed 8192-byte chunks to `~/.codeman/docker-exports/<slug>-<ts>.image.tar.gz`. Uses `docker save` (layers + repo:tag + CMD), never `docker export` (flat rootfs), so restore is a trivial `docker load`.
3. `tar --numeric-owner -C <hostWorkspacePath> -czf <slug>-<ts>.workspace.tar.gz .` while paused (the bind-mounted workspace is NOT in the image, so it travels separately and consistently).
4. Write `manifest.json`: schema version, caseName, image tag, engine, containerWorkdir, resource/network config, codeman version, base-image digest, createdAt, per-member sha256, `mountCredentials`, and `secretFree` (true only for convenient-mode or scrubbed-sealed exports).
5. `docker rmi codeman/export-<slug>:<ts>` in the `finally` (delete the intermediate committed image regardless of success), then `docker unpause`.
The three files are wrapped in one bundle `<slug>-<ts>.codeman-container.tgz` and offered as a downloadable artifact through the existing file-routes streaming + attachment-registry handoff.
Retention / disk budget (user-decision 3): `docker-exports/` is capped at `DOCKER_EXPORT_KEEP` most-recent bundles with an auto-prune on each new export, plus the free-space precheck above. Workspace scrub: the WORKSPACE tar gets a scan/warn pass for agent-created `.env` / `.git/credentials` (a distinct leak channel from container creds). A lighter "workspace-only" export (just the workspace tar, no commit/save) is the fast default for 24h+ runs; full-image is the explicit heavier option (user-decision 7 in the original list, now decision on the default button below).
What travels: the baked toolchain image plus any in-image writes, and the workspace tar. What does NOT travel: bind-mounted credentials (physically excluded from commit) and anything that lived only in a bind mount. Secret-free by construction in convenient mode, and enforced (refuse-or-scrub) in sealed mode.
IMPORT `POST /api/docker-cases/import` (untrusted-bundle containment, the traversal/overwrite risk): stream the uploaded bundle, validate every manifest checksum BEFORE any extraction or load. Extract the workspace tar with `tar --no-absolute-names -C <fresh dir>` PLUS per-entry validation rejecting any member whose normalized path escapes the destination (leading `/` or `..` components). `gunzip | docker load` the image, then RE-TAG the loaded image id into a quarantined namespace `codeman/imported-<slug>:<ts>` and NEVER allow the load to overwrite `codeman/agent:base` or any pre-existing tag (capture the loaded id, ignore the bundle's repo:tag). Create a NEW `DockerCase` pointing at the quarantined image with THIS host's mounts/creds and the manifest's resource/network config, and recreate the container hardened (cap-drop ALL, no-new-privileges, non-root, `--pull=never`, CMD overridden to `sleep infinity`). The destination supplies its own login, so credentials never cross machines. Plus `GET /api/docker-exports` (list) and `DELETE /api/docker-exports/:filename`, all behind Codeman's existing auth / loopback-default / host-guard / Origin-CSRF stack.
## 6. Codeman integration (file-by-file, mirroring the remote-SSH feature)
- `src/types/session.ts`: add `DockerCommandMode`, `DockerEngine`, `DockerNetworkMode`, `DockerResourceLimits`, `DockerHost`, `DockerCase`, `SessionDocker` (Section 3). Add `docker?: SessionDocker` to `SessionState` after line 219. SessionMode (line 44) UNCHANGED.
- `src/mux-interface.ts`: add `docker?: SessionDocker` to `MuxSession` (38), `CreateSessionOptions` (81), `RespawnPaneOptions` (105).
- `src/docker-hosts.ts` (NEW, direct mirror of `src/remote-hosts.ts`): `readDockerHosts`/`writeDockerHosts`/`readDockerCases`/`writeDockerCases` (via `dataPath`, including `lastClaudeSessionId` read/write), `defaultDockerCommandForMode` (mirror line 60), `dockerDisplayPath` (`container:/path`, mirror `remoteDisplayPath` at 205), `toSessionDocker(host, case)` (mirror `toSessionRemote` at 212), `buildDockerBaseArgs`/`buildDockerCreateArgs` (per-engine uid/userns branch), `hostGatewayAlias(engine)`, `containerApiUrl(processApiUrl, engine)` (scheme+port-preserving, unit-tested), `checkDockerAvailable`/`checkDockerTmuxAvailable`/`probeDockerCliVersion` (15s-bounded, `IS_TEST_MODE` no-op), a config-hash helper for drift, its own POSIX `shellescape` copy (mirror line 83). `const IS_TEST_MODE = !!process.env.VITEST;` gates every real `docker` invocation.
- `src/tmux-manager.ts`: add `DOCKER_TMUX_SOCKET`, `dockerTmuxSessionName`, `buildDockerLaunchCommand` (resume-aware, image-check, env-prime), `buildDockerKillCommand` (Section 4). Extend the two `fullCmd` ternaries (1276, 1524) and the two `launchCmd` cd-skips (1327, 1542). Add `killSession` Strategy 3c after 1719. Ensure `reconcileSessions` (~1800-1815) does NOT hard-delete docker sessions on local-tmux death (recovery relaunch path).
- `src/session.ts`: add `_docker?: SessionDocker` field (mirror `_remote` at 403), constructor arg (477), assignment (550). Thread `docker: this._docker` and `resumeSessionId: this._claudeSessionId` into BOTH `createSessionOptions` and `respawnPaneOptions` in `startInteractive` (1352/1370) and the second path (1740/1750). Emit `docker: this._docker` in `toState()` (1010). Replace the LOCAL cliVersion probe at 1320 for docker with the IN-CONTAINER `probeDockerCliVersion` (do not merely skip it). Extend `resolveMuxAttachCwd(workingDir, remote, docker)` (215) to return `/tmp` when `docker` is set. On claudeSessionId capture, persist it to the owning `DockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId`.
- `src/web/server.ts`: in `restoreMuxSessions` (2160), add `docker: muxSession.docker ?? savedState?.docker` to the `new Session({...})` call (2195-2216), and skip docker in the same `isExternalCliMode`/Ralph recovery guards as remote. Register the instance-scoped boot reaper to run AFTER docker-cases load and AFTER `restoreMuxSessions`. Ensure `CODEMAN_API_URL` derivation reads the SAME `process.env.CODEMAN_API_URL` the server sets at ~2000.
- `src/web/schemas.ts`: add `DockerHostSchema` and `DockerCaseLinkSchema` (below). The three mode enums (177/373/705) and `QuickStartSchema` (368) UNCHANGED (docker resolves by `caseName` lookup like remote).
- `src/web/routes/session-routes.ts`: import the docker helpers from `../../docker-hosts.js`. Add a docker branch in `/api/quick-start` parallel to the remote branch (1686-1720): `readDockerCases` -> find by `caseName` -> `readDockerHosts` -> find by `hostId`; reject `envOverrides`/`effort`/`codexConfig`/`geminiConfig`/`openCodeConfig` (but ACCEPT `modelOverride`, which flows via scaffolded `settings.local.json`); run `checkDockerAvailable` + `checkDockerTmuxAvailable` (image-present, engine, caps-enforced); surface `capsEnforced:false` and Desktop notes; set `casePath = dockerCase.hostWorkspacePath` (REAL host dir), `docker = toSessionDocker(host, dockerCase)`, and seed `resumeSessionId` from `dockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId` when `resumeOnStart`. Extend the LOCAL-availability and local-spawn guards (around 1796/1810) to `!remote && !docker`, but DO NOT extend the workspace-scaffolding guard (~1776, `writeHooksConfig`/`updateCaseModel`), which MUST run for docker. Pass `docker` into `new Session` (1847); `autoConfigureRalph` (1853) gated on `!docker`. Add `docker: m.docker !== undefined ? true : undefined` to the unified harvest (2313).
- `src/web/routes/case-routes.ts`: import the docker read/write/check helpers + schemas. Add a docker listing loop in `GET /api/cases` (mirror 94-119, `location: 'docker'`, `docker: {...}` via `dockerDisplayPath`). Add `/api/docker-hosts` GET/POST/PUT/DELETE (mirror 168-204) and `POST /api/cases/docker-link` (mirror 206-232; run `checkDockerAvailable`/`checkDockerTmuxAvailable` at link time; broadcast `CaseLinked` with `type: 'docker'`). Add a docker-unlink branch to `DELETE /api/cases/:name` (mirror 288-296; `docker rm -f`; broadcast `CaseDeleted` `type: 'docker-unlinked'`). Add the docker branch to single-case `GET` (mirror 358-368). Add `POST /api/docker-cases/:name/export`, `/import`, `GET/DELETE /api/docker-exports`, and a `POST /api/docker-cases/:name/recreate` (drift confirm) per Sections 4 and 5.
- `src/web/sse-events.ts` + `src/web/public/constants.js`: reuse `CaseLinked`/`CaseDeleted` for CRUD. Add `docker:exportProgress`, `docker:exportComplete`, `docker:importComplete`, `docker:configDrift`, and `docker:containerError` to BOTH registries (kept in sync per CLAUDE.md).
- Frontend `src/web/public/index.html` (~1831): add a Docker `modal-tab-btn` next to Remote; add a `#case-docker` panel mirroring `#case-remote` with `dockerCaseName`, `dockerHostWorkspacePath`, `dockerContainer`, `dockerImage`, `dockerHostId`, and an Advanced `<details>` for network mode, resource caps, `mountCredentials`, `resumeOnStart`, and remote daemon. Surface a "scaffolds .claude into this host dir" note (user-decision 4) and a "resource caps advisory on this engine" warning when `capsEnforced:false`.
- Frontend `src/web/public/session-ui.js`: `formatCasePickerLabel` (48) + `buildCasePickerOptions` (71-73) handle `location === 'docker'` (`name @ container`, add container/image to the search haystack); `resetCaseModalFields` (~1514) add a `dockerFields` array; `switchCaseModalTab` (1573/1580/1597) handle `'case-docker'`; `submitCaseModal` add the docker branch; new `linkDockerCase()` (mirror `linkRemoteCase` at 1689) POSTing `/api/docker-hosts` then `/api/cases/docker-link`, sending omitted optionals as `undefined` (spread `...(x ? {x} : {})`, never `null`, per the Zod `.optional()`-rejects-null gotcha); `runClaude` (520) / `runShell` (702) extend the `location === 'remote'` routing to also match `'docker'`; `runOpenCode`/`runCodex`/`runGemini` (792/846/900) make the `isRemote` checks `isRemoteOrDocker` so local status probes are skipped. In the session-options Summary tab, note that `effort` is inert for docker (rejected) while `model` IS honored via `settings.local.json`.
- Frontend `src/web/public/panels-ui.js` (425-426): add `caseItem?.docker?.path`/`container` to the case-search fields.
Schemas (`src/web/schemas.ts`), mirroring `RemoteHostSchema` (299) / `RemoteCaseLinkSchema` (351):
```ts
export const DockerHostSchema = z.object({
id: z.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/, 'Invalid docker host id'),
label: z.string().min(1).max(100),
engine: z.enum(['docker', 'podman']).optional(),
image: z.string().min(1).max(512).regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9][\w./:@-]*$/, 'Invalid image ref').regex(NO_SHELL_META),
daemonHost: z.string().max(512).regex(NO_SHELL_META, 'Invalid daemon host').optional(),
context: z.string().max(128).regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$/, 'Invalid context').optional(),
network: z.enum(['bridge', 'none', 'custom']).optional(),
networkName: z.string().max(128).regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$/).optional(),
resources: z.object({
memory: z.string().regex(/^\d+[bkmg]?$/i).optional(),
cpus: z.string().regex(/^\d+(\.\d+)?$/).optional(),
pidsLimit: z.number().int().positive().max(100000).optional(),
nofile: z.string().regex(/^\d+:\d+$/).optional(),
shmSize: z.string().regex(/^\d+[bkmg]?$/i).optional(),
}).strict().optional(),
mountCredentials: z.boolean().optional(),
hooksEnabled: z.boolean().optional(),
resumeOnStart: z.boolean().optional(),
commands: RemoteCommandOverridesSchema, // reuse the shared shape
extraCreateArgs: z.array(z.string().min(1).max(1024).regex(NO_SHELL_INJECTION).refine(noCommandSubstitution)).max(32).optional(),
extraExecArgs: z.array(z.string().min(1).max(1024).regex(NO_SHELL_INJECTION).refine(noCommandSubstitution)).max(32).optional(),
});
export const DockerCaseLinkSchema = z.object({
name: z.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/, 'Invalid case name format'),
hostId: z.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/, 'Invalid docker host id'),
hostWorkspacePath: z.string().min(1).max(2000).regex(/^\//, 'Path must be absolute').regex(NO_SHELL_META, 'Invalid characters in workspace path'),
containerWorkdir: z.string().min(1).max(2000).regex(/^\//).regex(NO_SHELL_META).optional(),
container: z.string().min(2).max(128).regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$/, 'Invalid container name').optional(),
});
```
`NO_SHELL_META` (rejects `$`/backtick, schemas.ts:297) is REQUIRED on `image`, `hostWorkspacePath`, `containerWorkdir`, and `container`, because all four reach the outer `bash -c "..."` double-quote layer where `$(...)`/backtick re-expose, exactly the reason `remotePath`/`identityFile` use it. `--privileged` and any `-v /var/run/docker.sock` are structurally unrepresentable (never emitted by the builder, never accepted by the schema).
## 7. Security model
- Hardening flags on every create: `--cap-drop ALL`, `--security-opt no-new-privileges` (NOT auto-set by rootless Docker or Podman, so always explicit), the uid/userns branch of Key decision 6 (never container-root; workspace files stay host-owned and HOME stays writable via GID 0), `--pids-limit` (fork-bomb guard), `--memory` with `--memory-swap == --memory` (real OOM cap), `--ulimit nofile`, `--init`, `--pull=never`. NEVER `--privileged`, NEVER mount the docker socket into the agent container. `--storage-opt size=` is emitted ONLY after the probe confirms overlay2-on-xfs-pquota or btrfs (the AICE-class silently-ignored trap); otherwise it is omitted and the UI does not advertise a size cap. Resource caps are advertised as ENFORCED only when the probe reports `capsEnforced:true`; under non-delegated rootless they are labeled advisory (user-decision 6).
- Engine: prefer whichever the probe finds, Podman-rootless first for security (a container-root breakout lands as an unprivileged host user). Rootless bind-mount ownership uses `--userns=keep-id` (Podman) vs `--user <hostUid>:0` (Docker), so real per-engine branching lives in `buildDockerCreateArgs`. Docker Desktop takes its own uid path (Key decision 6).
- Blast radius (the combined-posture the critic asked to surface, user-decision 5): the default convenient profile mounts an arbitrary host workspace dir RW (host-owned, mirrored path) AND host `~/.claude`/`~/.codex`/`~/.gemini`/`~/.config/gcloud`/`~/.config/opencode` RW into a NETWORK-ENABLED container. Container-run agent code can therefore read/modify those host trees and reach the network simultaneously. This is still a strict improvement over today's on-host skip-permissions execution, but the user must accept the combined posture explicitly; the sealed profile plus `network:none` is the mitigation for genuinely untrusted work.
- Secret handling: creds arrive ONLY as bind-mounted files (default) or exec-time NAME-ONLY `--env` (codex/gemini keys), NEVER as create-time `-e` and NEVER as an image layer. Sealed-mode export is refuse-or-scrub (Section 5), closing the sealed-leak inversion.
- CLAUDE.md "Multi-CLI prefix discipline": the exec-time name-only env is restricted to the CLI-specific keys per mode (Claude: none with OAuth mount; Codex: `OPENAI_API_KEY`/`CODEX_API_KEY`; Gemini: `GEMINI_API_KEY`/`GOOGLE_*`), never a blanket forward. `envOverrides` is rejected for docker, so the `ALLOWED_ENV_PREFIXES` allowlist is not widened.
- hook-secret: bind-mounted read-only, referenced via `CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE` (a path, non-secret); the secret bytes never enter env or the image. Both `host.docker.internal` and `host.containers.internal` are added to the host-guard allowlist so the in-container hook curl's Host header passes on either engine.
- Host guard / instance isolation: the in-container tmux socket (`codeman-docker`) and name (`codeman-dkr-<id8>`) deliberately FAIL a container-internal Codeman's `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN`, so a nested Codeman never adopts our session (unit-asserted). The boot reaper is instance-scoped by the `codeman.instance` label so a beta never reaps prod. Any remote-daemon (`-H`/`--context`) mode is host-root-equivalent and stays strictly behind the existing auth/loopback/host-guard/Origin-CSRF stack.
- Import containment: untrusted bundles are checksum-validated, extracted with traversal guards, and loaded into a quarantined image namespace (never overwriting the base image), then run with the same hardening.
## 8. Phased implementation (branch: `feat/docker-session-mode`)
Each phase is independently testable; per CLAUDE.md, end-to-end test in the real env before COM. All new docker IO paths carry `const IS_TEST_MODE = !!process.env.VITEST;` and no-op under it; the pure command builders are tested directly.
- Phase 0: base image + engine probe. Author `docker/agent.Dockerfile` (OpenShift arbitrary-uid HOME) and `scripts/build-agent-image.mjs` (build or pull the base image; digest recorded). Add `checkDockerAvailable`/`checkDockerTmuxAvailable`/`containerApiUrl`/`hostGatewayAlias` (IS_TEST_MODE no-op) and `GET /api/docker/status`. Test: probe stub returns available/caps/Desktop flags under VITEST; `containerApiUrl` preserves scheme+port and swaps host per engine; status route returns the envelope.
- Phase 1: types + storage + schemas. Add all types (Section 3), `src/docker-hosts.ts`, `DockerHostSchema`/`DockerCaseLinkSchema`. Test: `docker-hosts.test.ts` (round-trip incl. `lastClaudeSessionId`, display path, config-hash stability); `docker-exec-options.test.ts` (schema rejects `$`/backtick in image/workdir/container).
- Phase 2: tmux-manager builders. Add `DOCKER_TMUX_SOCKET`, `dockerTmuxSessionName`, `buildDockerLaunchCommand` (resume-aware, image-check, env-prime), `buildDockerKillCommand`; wire the two ternaries + two cd-skips + Strategy 3c; harden `reconcileSessions` against docker hard-delete. Test (pure strings): adopt-proof name fails `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN`; image-check precedes create; `new-session -A` idempotent; resume flag present only when a resume id is passed; `--pull=never` present; instance label present; escaping survives `bash -c` -> `docker exec` -> `sh -lc` -> tmux WITH a host workspace path containing spaces.
- Phase 3: session.ts + mux + recovery. Add `_docker` + `resumeSessionId` threading, in-container cliVersion probe, `resolveMuxAttachCwd`, mux-interface fields, `restoreMuxSessions` passthrough, instance-scoped reaper wiring, claudeSessionId -> `DockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId` persistence, unified flag. Test: `toState()` emits docker; a persisted docker session round-trips through mux/state; a relaunch injects the persisted resume id (mock mux); reaper only targets this instance's orphaned containers.
- Phase 4: routes + first real e2e. case-routes CRUD + listing + drift-recreate; session-routes quick-start branch (scaffolding RUNS, local-availability guards skip, model accepted, effort/config rejected). Manual e2e on a real docker host: docker-host create -> docker-link -> quick-start; confirm the pane runs `claude` in the container, files land host-owned, a Codeman restart reattaches the SAME live agent, and a `docker stop` followed by relaunch RESUMES the conversation.
- Phase 5: hooks connectivity + installation. host-gateway (per engine), derived `CODEMAN_API_URL`, hook-secret mount, `CODEMAN_SESSION_ID`/`CODEMAN_MUX` exec-env + tmux setenv, host-guard allowlist, and the scaffolding write into the real workspace. Manual e2e: trigger a permission prompt from inside the container and confirm it surfaces; verify hook payloads carry the right session id. If deferred, ship docker as explicitly hook-degraded and verify output-based idle detection through the docker-exec PTY.
- Phase 6: export/import + GC + disk safety. quiesce+pause span, free-space precheck, commit+save+gzip + workspace tar + manifest + streaming download; sealed-mode refuse-or-scrub; retention/auto-prune; import with checksum validation + traversal guard + quarantined re-tag; drift-recreate; boot reaper; `runWithConversionLimit` cap; `docker rmi` in finally. Manual e2e: export, `docker load` on a second machine (or fresh case), import, confirm toolchain + workspace restored and NO creds present; attempt a sealed full-image export and confirm it is refused-or-scrubbed; attempt a `../` bundle and confirm it is rejected.
- Phase 7: frontend. Docker tab, `linkDockerCase`, run wiring, case-picker labels, panels search, caps-advisory + scaffold-warning + effort-inert notes. Verify with Playwright (`waitUntil: 'domcontentloaded'`, 3-4s settle) that the Docker tab renders and a linked docker case appears in the picker.
- Phase 8: docs + COM. Update CLAUDE.md (a "Docker cases" Key Pattern paragraph mirroring remote-SSH, plus the new state files, routes counts, and the resume/durability model), `docs/docker-cases.md`, then COM per the standard flow.
## 9. Test plan
- Unit (pure, CI-safe, mirror `test/remote-hosts.test.ts` / `test/remote-ssh-options.test.ts`):
- `test/docker-hosts.test.ts`: storage round-trip (incl. `lastClaudeSessionId`), `dockerDisplayPath`, `defaultDockerCommandForMode`, `toSessionDocker`, `containerApiUrl` (http/https, custom port, docker vs podman gateway), config-hash stability/drift, `buildDockerCreateArgs` flag ordering (cap-drop/no-new-privileges/memory==memory-swap/instance-label/`--pull=never` present; host/privileged/socket absent; per-engine uid vs `--userns=keep-id`).
- `test/docker-exec-options.test.ts`: `buildDockerLaunchCommand`/`buildDockerKillCommand` string shape and escaping through `bash -c` -> `docker exec` -> `sh -lc` -> tmux, including a workspace path with spaces; resume flag present only with a resume id; image-presence check precedes create; `dockerTmuxSessionName` fails `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN`; schema rejects `$`/backtick in image/workdir/container/name; `linkDockerCase`-shaped bodies with omitted optionals validate (no `null` on the wire).
- Probe no-op: `checkDockerAvailable`/`checkDockerTmuxAvailable`/`probeDockerCliVersion` return canned values under VITEST and never spawn.
- Integration (route tests via `app.inject()`, docker no-op'd): `/api/docker-hosts` CRUD; `/api/cases/docker-link` dup-check + broadcast; `GET /api/cases` includes the docker case with `location: 'docker'`; `/api/quick-start` docker branch rejects `envOverrides`/`effort`/config but ACCEPTS `modelOverride`, runs the workspace-scaffolding path, and constructs a session with `docker` set + seeded resume id; `DELETE /api/cases/:name` docker-unlink; export refuse-or-scrub for sealed; import traversal rejection; reaper instance-scoping (label filter). Pick a unique port only if a live-server test is added (search `const PORT =`; 3150+).
- Manual end-to-end (real docker daemon, the mandatory "always end-to-end test" gate): build the base image; link a docker case; quick-start `claude`; verify OAuth via the mounted `~/.claude`, transcript correlation (subagent/workflow watchers show the session), host-owned files, and a working permission-prompt hook; reattach after a Codeman PROCESS restart (SAME live agent); `docker stop` then relaunch and confirm conversation RESUME; reboot-equivalent (daemon restart) and confirm boot recovery recreates+resumes; change the host's memory/image and confirm the drift-recreate prompt fires; export (convenient) and confirm the tar `docker load`s with no creds; attempt a sealed full-image export and confirm refuse-or-scrub; import into a fresh case; delete the case and confirm `docker rm -f` plus instance-scoped reaper GC; confirm a docker-down state surfaces a docker-specific error and does NOT trip the generic PTY-exit breaker.
## 10. Open decisions for the user
1. Credential + blast-radius posture (combined). Convenient default bind-mounts host `~/.claude` etc. RW AND an arbitrary host workspace RW into a network-enabled container, so container-run agent code can read/modify those host trees and reach the network at the same time. Recommended: convenient default plus a per-host SEALED opt-in (`mountCredentials:false` + `network:none`) for untrusted work. Please confirm you accept the combined arbitrary-workspace-plus-egress-plus-host-creds posture for the default profile (it is still a net improvement over today's on-host skip-permissions execution).
2. Base image ownership, registry, and freshness. The `codeman/agent:base` placeholder implies a Docker Hub org the project may not own. Pick the real registry/namespace (GHCR under the repo is the natural fit), decide digest pinning, and set a REBUILD CADENCE so agents are not stuck on a stale baked `claude` (the in-container version probe surfaces staleness, but something must trigger rebuilds). Choose: pull a pinned published image, build locally on first use via `scripts/build-agent-image.mjs`, or both.
3. Container CWD strategy. Mirror the host workspace path inside the container (recommended: makes transcript projHash correlate, file features and resume capture work) vs a fixed `/workspace` (simpler mount, breaks watcher correlation). Please confirm the mirror approach.
4. Hooks in the MVP AND workspace scaffolding. Making docker hooks fire requires WRITING `.claude/settings.local.json` (and the CLAUDE.md scaffold) into the user's REAL linked host directory, a behavioral shift from "link a dir" to "link and scaffold a dir." Choose: wire hooks + scaffolding now (Phase 5, recommended, and it also enables the model picker), or ship docker as explicitly hook-degraded (no permission prompts / hook-idle) for v1 and add later. Confirm you are OK with Codeman mutating the linked host workspace.
5. Session-kill teardown and RESUME (reframed honestly). `docker stop` on session kill is not merely "free RAM vs instant reattach": it destroys the in-container live agent, and the conversation survives ONLY because the next launch runs `--resume` from the bind-mounted transcript. Choose: keep the container running (costs RAM, preserves the exact live in-flight agent) vs stop and rely on `--resume` (frees RAM, may lose uncommitted in-flight tool state). Case-delete always `docker rm -f`.
6. Rootless enforcement posture. Under rootless without cgroup-v2 systemd delegation, `--memory`/`--cpus`/`--pids-limit` are SILENTLY ignored. Choose: REQUIRE delegation (refuse to link a host that cannot enforce caps) or ship-with-warning ("resource caps are advisory on your engine"). The probe reports `capsEnforced` either way.
7. Default resume behavior. Should a re-linked or re-run docker case default to resuming its last conversation (`resumeOnStart:true`, using `DockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId`) rather than starting clean? This is the crux of making the durability story real and is the recommended default, but it changes user-visible behavior (a new session in an existing case continues the prior conversation).
8. Export defaults and disk budget. Default export button: workspace-only (fast, small, files-only, recommended for 24h+ runs) vs full-image (reproducible env, multi-GB). Also set the retention cap (max retained exports), the auto-prune policy, and the free-space threshold below which export is refused (a full `/var/lib/docker` breaks EVERY session on the host, not just docker ones).
9. Remote docker daemon (`-H ssh://...` / `--context`). Support in the MVP (composes with remote hosts, adds host-root trust surface) or local-daemon-only first.
10. Podman parity depth. Full `--userns=keep-id` plus Quadlet boot-persistence, or Docker-first with Podman as best-effort and boot-persistence via Codeman's idempotent create-if-missing only. Note the podman host alias is `host.containers.internal`, already handled per engine.
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# Docker cases
Run a case inside an **isolated Docker container** instead of directly on the host. Any number of Codeman sessions can share one container (it is scoped to the case, not the session), so a whole project lives in a sandbox with its own network, resource caps, and filesystem, and you can **export the container to move it to another machine**.
Docker mode is a **location overlay on cases**, the direct analog of [remote SSH cases](./remote-hosts.md): where a remote case runs a local tmux pane doing `ssh host` into a durable remote tmux server, a docker case runs a local tmux pane doing `docker exec -it` into a durable **in-container** tmux server. It is not a separate `SessionMode`, so `claude` / `shell` / `opencode` / `codex` / `gemini` all work inside the container.
## One-time setup: build the base image
The container needs a base image with the agent toolchain (node, the CLIs, git, tmux). Build it locally once:
```bash
node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs # builds codeman/agent:base
# options: --engine docker|podman --image <ref> --no-cache
```
The image is **secret-free**: credentials are delivered at runtime (bind mounts or `docker exec --env`), never baked in, so exports never leak them.
## Quickest path: one-click "Run in Docker"
On the **New case → Create New** tab there's a **🐳 Run in an isolated Docker container** checkbox. Checking it alone is enough: Codeman creates the case folder in `~/codeman-cases/<name>`, spins up a hardened container with sensible defaults (auto-provisioning a shared `default` host), and starts the session inside it. No host/image/network fields to fill in.
Click the checkbox's **Container settings** to optionally tweak the predefined defaults, including a **Template** picker:
| Template | Memory | CPUs | GPUs |
|----------|--------|------|------|
| Small | 2 GB | 1 | none |
| Medium (default) | 4 GB | 2 | none |
| Large | 8 GB | 4 | none |
| GPU | 8 GB | 4 | all (needs the NVIDIA container toolkit) |
**Disk is elastic** — the container's storage grows automatically as data flows in; there is no fixed cap (bounded only by host disk). Any tweaked setting creates a dedicated per-case host so it never changes the shared `default`.
## Create a docker case (full control)
App → **New case → Docker** tab:
- **Case Name** / **Workspace Path**: the workspace is a real HOST directory bind-mounted into the container at the same path. Codeman scaffolds `CLAUDE.md` + `.claude/settings.local.json` (hooks) into it, and file previews / attachments work on the real bytes.
- **Host ID**: a reusable docker host profile (image, network, resources). Reuse the same ID across cases to share settings.
- **Network**: `bridge` (internet on, default), `none` (fully isolated), or a `custom` bridge.
- **Advanced**: memory / CPU caps, **Mount host credentials** (on = your existing `~/.claude` login just works; off = a sealed sandbox you log into inside the container), **Resume last conversation on relaunch**.
Then run it like any case (Run Claude / Run Shell / …). The first launch creates the container (`codeman-case-<name>`); subsequent sessions attach to the same one.
Equivalent API:
```bash
curl -X POST localhost:3000/api/docker-hosts -d '{"id":"local","label":"Local","image":"codeman/agent:base"}'
curl -X POST localhost:3000/api/cases/docker-link -d '{"name":"sandbox","hostId":"local","hostWorkspacePath":"/home/you/projects/sandbox"}'
curl -X POST localhost:3000/api/quick-start -d '{"caseName":"sandbox","mode":"claude"}'
```
## Lifecycle
- **Reconnect after a Codeman restart** lands back in the same live agent (the in-container tmux survives).
- **Container stop / host reboot** recreates the container and, when a resume id was captured, **resumes** the last conversation from the bind-mounted transcript.
- **Killing one session** only kills that session's in-container tmux session; the shared container stays up for sibling sessions.
- **Deleting the case** `docker rm -f`s the container (the bind-mounted workspace on the host survives). An instance-scoped boot reaper removes containers whose case is gone.
## Isolation & security
Every container runs hardened: `--cap-drop ALL`, `--security-opt no-new-privileges`, non-root (`--user <hostUid>:0` so workspace files stay host-owned), `--pids-limit`, `--memory` == `--memory-swap`, `--init`. Never `--privileged`, never the docker socket. The default **convenient** profile bind-mounts host credential dirs read-write so the common login just works (creds stay on the host, never captured by `docker commit`); the **sealed** profile (`mountCredentials:false` + `network:none`) is the opt-in for genuinely untrusted work.
Rootless engines without cgroup-v2 systemd delegation cannot enforce resource caps; linking such a host warns that caps are advisory.
## Export / Import (move to another machine)
**Export** (from the Docker tab, or `POST /api/docker-cases/:name/export`): choose
- **Full image + workspace**: `docker commit` the container to an image, `docker save` it, tar the workspace, and a manifest, all into one portable `<case>-<ts>.codeman-container.tgz` (the whole toolchain, installed packages, and files). Runs in the background; you are notified when the bundle is ready.
- **Workspace only**: just the project files (fast, small).
The container is paused across the capture so the image and workspace are consistent; a full `/var/lib/docker` is guarded against with a free-space precheck; the intermediate image is always cleaned up.
**Import** (`POST /api/docker-cases/import`, or the Manage tab): copy the `.tgz` onto the new machine's `~/.codeman/docker-exports/`, then import it into a new case. The manifest and per-member SHA-256 checksums are validated, the workspace tar is extracted with a path-traversal guard, and the image is `docker load`ed and **re-tagged into a quarantined namespace** (`codeman/imported-<case>:<ts>`) so it never overwrites a local tag. The destination supplies its own credentials, so nothing secret crosses machines.
`GET /api/docker-exports` lists bundles; `GET /api/docker-exports/:filename` downloads one; `DELETE` removes one.
## Hooks require the server to be reachable from the container
In-container hooks (permission events, hook-based idle/stop/task notifications) POST to `CODEMAN_API_URL`, which is derived as `https://host.docker.internal:<port>` (`host.docker.internal` → the docker bridge gateway, e.g. `172.17.0.1`, via `--add-host …:host-gateway`). For that callback to succeed, the Codeman server must be **listening on an interface the container can reach**.
- If Codeman binds **loopback-only** (`127.0.0.1`, the default and the production systemd config), a container reaching `172.17.0.1:<port>` cannot connect, so by default **in-container hooks do not fire**. The session still works fully: idle/stop detection falls back to **output-based** detection through the `docker exec` PTY (which always works), and claude runs with `--dangerously-skip-permissions` so there are no permission prompts to forward anyway.
- **To enable in-container hooks on a loopback-only server, set `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS=1`** (env). Codeman then starts a SECOND listener bound to the docker bridge gateway (`172.17.0.1`, auto-detected; override with `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOST`) that serves **only the hook endpoints** (`/api/hook-event`, `/api/status-telemetry`) and delegates them into the same secret-gated pipeline. The bridge is host-internal (containers + host, not the LAN), and every other path returns `403`, so this does not widen your network exposure. Add `Environment=CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS=1` to the systemd unit and restart.
- Alternatively, bind `0.0.0.0` **with `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` set** (exposes on the LAN too).
The host-gateway mapping, `CODEMAN_API_URL` derivation, host-guard allowlist, and hook-secret mount are all wired correctly; `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS` closes the last gap for loopback-only servers.
## Notes & limits
- Requires Docker (or Podman) with a reachable daemon; tmux must be present in the base image (a hard prerequisite, probed at link time).
- Per-session `envOverrides` / `effort` / per-CLI config are rejected for docker cases (they do not cross into the container); configure the container via the docker host's per-mode command override instead.
- macOS Docker Desktop takes a dedicated uid path (the baked image uid; memory caps are subject to the VM ceiling).
Design + rationale: [`docker-cases-plan.md`](./docker-cases-plan.md).
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{
"name": "aicodeman",
"version": "1.3.4",
"version": "1.4.0",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "aicodeman",
"version": "1.3.4",
"version": "1.4.0",
"hasInstallScript": true,
"license": "MIT",
"workspaces": [
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{
"name": "aicodeman",
"version": "1.3.4",
"version": "1.4.0",
"description": "Mission control for AI coding agents - run 20 autonomous agents with real-time monitoring and session persistence",
"type": "module",
"main": "dist/index.js",
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#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* Build the Codeman agent base image locally (decision: "build locally on first
* use", see docs/docker-cases-plan.md). No registry account required.
*
* Usage:
* node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs [--engine docker|podman] [--image <ref>] [--no-cache]
*
* Defaults: engine=docker (falls back to podman if docker is absent),
* image=codeman/agent:base
*/
import { spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
const REPO_ROOT = join(__dirname, '..');
const DOCKERFILE = join(REPO_ROOT, 'docker', 'agent.Dockerfile');
const DEFAULT_IMAGE = 'codeman/agent:base';
function parseArgs(argv) {
const args = { image: DEFAULT_IMAGE, engine: undefined, noCache: false };
for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) {
const a = argv[i];
if (a === '--image') args.image = argv[++i];
else if (a === '--engine') args.engine = argv[++i];
else if (a === '--no-cache') args.noCache = true;
else if (a === '-h' || a === '--help') args.help = true;
}
return args;
}
function engineAvailable(engine) {
const r = spawnSync(engine, ['--version'], { stdio: 'ignore' });
return r.status === 0;
}
function resolveEngine(preferred) {
if (preferred) {
if (!engineAvailable(preferred)) {
console.error(`[build-agent-image] engine "${preferred}" not found on PATH`);
process.exit(1);
}
return preferred;
}
if (engineAvailable('docker')) return 'docker';
if (engineAvailable('podman')) return 'podman';
console.error('[build-agent-image] neither docker nor podman found on PATH. Install one and retry.');
process.exit(1);
}
const args = parseArgs(process.argv.slice(2));
if (args.help) {
console.log('Usage: node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs [--engine docker|podman] [--image <ref>] [--no-cache]');
process.exit(0);
}
const engine = resolveEngine(args.engine);
const buildArgs = ['build', '-f', DOCKERFILE, '-t', args.image];
if (args.noCache) buildArgs.push('--no-cache');
buildArgs.push(REPO_ROOT);
console.log(`[build-agent-image] ${engine} ${buildArgs.join(' ')}`);
const child = spawn(engine, buildArgs, { stdio: 'inherit' });
child.on('exit', (code) => {
if (code === 0) {
console.log(`\n[build-agent-image] built ${args.image}. Docker cases can now launch.`);
} else {
console.error(`\n[build-agent-image] build failed (exit ${code}).`);
}
process.exit(code ?? 1);
});
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/**
* @fileoverview Docker case export / import: move a container (toolchain + any
* in-image changes) PLUS its workspace to another machine as one portable
* `.codeman-container.tgz`, and restore it.
*
* A full-image export = `docker commit` the running container to an image ->
* `docker save` that image -> tar the bind-mounted workspace -> a manifest, all
* bundled into one gzip tarball. A workspace-only export skips the image (fast,
* files-only). Import validates the manifest + per-member checksums, extracts the
* workspace with a path-traversal guard, `docker load`s the image and RE-TAGS it
* into a quarantined namespace (never overwriting a local tag), and hands the
* caller enough to recreate a hardened case on the destination.
*
* Safety (all from the design critic): pause the container spanning the workspace
* tar AND the commit so the two artifacts are mutually consistent; a free-space
* precheck (a full docker graph wedges EVERY session on the host); `docker rmi`
* the intermediate image in a finally; sealed containers refuse a full-image
* export (an in-container login would ride the committed layer); import rejects
* absolute / `..` tar members and checksum mismatches. Bounded by
* runWithConversionLimit so N exports cannot fork-bomb the host.
*
* @module docker-export
*/
import { createReadStream, createWriteStream, existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import { join, basename } from 'node:path';
import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
import { pipeline } from 'node:stream/promises';
import type { DockerEngine, SessionDocker } from './types.js';
import { runWithConversionLimit } from './document-conversion-limiter.js';
const IS_TEST_MODE = !!process.env.VITEST;
/** Refuse to export when the target filesystem has less than this free (a full graph wedges the daemon). */
export const DOCKER_EXPORT_MIN_FREE_BYTES = 2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024; // 2 GiB
/** Manifest schema version (bump on any breaking field change). */
export const DOCKER_EXPORT_SCHEMA = 1;
export type DockerExportMode = 'full' | 'workspace';
export interface DockerExportManifest {
schemaVersion: number;
caseName: string;
mode: DockerExportMode;
engine: DockerEngine;
image: string;
containerWorkdir: string;
network: string;
createdAt: number;
codemanVersion: string;
mountCredentials: boolean;
/** True when the bundle provably carries no credentials (convenient-mode workspace, or a full image whose creds were bind-mounted and thus never committed). */
secretFree: boolean;
/** sha256 of each bundle member that is present. */
checksums: { image?: string; workspace?: string };
}
// ========== Pure helpers (unit-tested) ==========
/** Raw argv prefix for the engine (NO shell escaping — used with spawn). */
export function dockerArgv(docker: Pick<SessionDocker, 'engine' | 'context' | 'daemonHost'>): string[] {
const argv: string[] = [docker.engine === 'podman' ? 'podman' : 'docker'];
if (docker.context) argv.push('--context', docker.context);
if (docker.daemonHost) argv.push('-H', docker.daemonHost);
return argv;
}
/** Portable bundle filename for a case export. */
export function exportBundleName(caseName: string, timestamp: number, mode: DockerExportMode): string {
const suffix = mode === 'workspace' ? 'workspace' : 'container';
return `${caseName}-${timestamp}.codeman-${suffix}.tgz`;
}
/** Quarantined image tag for an imported bundle (never overwrites a local tag). */
export function importedImageTag(caseName: string, timestamp: number): string {
return `codeman/imported-${caseName}:${timestamp}`;
}
/** Intermediate commit tag for a full-image export (unique per export, rmi'd in finally). */
export function exportImageTag(caseName: string, timestamp: number): string {
return `codeman/export-${caseName}:${timestamp}`;
}
/**
* Reject a tar member path that would escape the extraction root (absolute path
* or a `..` component). The import-side traversal guard.
*/
export function isSafeTarMember(member: string): boolean {
const trimmed = member.trim();
if (!trimmed || trimmed === './') return true;
if (trimmed.startsWith('/')) return false;
// Normalize separators and check each component.
return !trimmed.split('/').some((part) => part === '..');
}
/** Parse the image id/ref from `docker load` output ("Loaded image: x" / "Loaded image ID: sha256:..."). */
export function parseLoadedImageRef(loadOutput: string): string | null {
const idMatch = loadOutput.match(/Loaded image ID:\s*(sha256:[0-9a-f]+)/i);
if (idMatch) return idMatch[1];
const refMatch = loadOutput.match(/Loaded image:\s*(\S+)/i);
if (refMatch) return refMatch[1];
return null;
}
// ========== IO helpers ==========
function run(
cmd: string,
args: string[],
opts: { timeout?: number } = {}
): Promise<{ stdout: string; stderr: string }> {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const child = spawn(cmd, args, { stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] });
let stdout = '';
let stderr = '';
let timer: NodeJS.Timeout | undefined;
if (opts.timeout) {
timer = setTimeout(() => {
child.kill('SIGKILL');
reject(new Error(`${cmd} timed out after ${opts.timeout}ms`));
}, opts.timeout);
}
child.stdout.on('data', (d) => (stdout += d));
child.stderr.on('data', (d) => (stderr += d));
child.on('error', (err) => {
if (timer) clearTimeout(timer);
reject(err);
});
child.on('close', (code) => {
if (timer) clearTimeout(timer);
if (code === 0) resolve({ stdout, stderr });
else reject(new Error(`${cmd} ${args.join(' ')} exited ${code}: ${stderr.trim()}`));
});
});
}
/**
* Stream `docker save <tag>` stdout to a raw tar file (no shell, no double-gzip).
* Uses stream `pipeline` so completion means the write stream is FULLY flushed to
* disk (a naive child 'close' resolves before the last chunks land, truncating the
* file — a real bug caught in end-to-end testing), AND waits for a clean exit code.
*/
async function saveImageToTar(argv: string[], tag: string, outPath: string): Promise<void> {
const child = spawn(argv[0], [...argv.slice(1), 'save', tag], { stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'] });
let stderr = '';
child.stderr.on('data', (d) => (stderr += d));
const exited = new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
child.on('error', reject);
child.on('close', (code) =>
code === 0 ? resolve() : reject(new Error(`docker save exited ${code}: ${stderr.trim()}`))
);
});
// pipeline resolves only after the destination has fully flushed.
await Promise.all([pipeline(child.stdout, createWriteStream(outPath)), exited]);
}
async function sha256File(path: string): Promise<string> {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const hash = createHash('sha256');
const stream = createReadStream(path);
stream.on('data', (d) => hash.update(d));
stream.on('error', reject);
stream.on('end', () => resolve(hash.digest('hex')));
});
}
async function freeBytes(path: string): Promise<number> {
try {
const stat = await fs.statfs(path);
return Number(stat.bavail) * Number(stat.bsize);
} catch {
return Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY; // statfs unsupported — don't block
}
}
async function isContainerRunning(argv: string[], container: string): Promise<boolean> {
try {
const { stdout } = await run(argv[0], [...argv.slice(1), 'inspect', '-f', '{{.State.Running}}', container], {
timeout: 15_000,
});
return stdout.trim() === 'true';
} catch {
return false;
}
}
export interface ExportResult {
bundlePath: string;
manifest: DockerExportManifest;
sizeBytes: number;
}
/**
* Export a docker case to a portable bundle. Bounded by runWithConversionLimit.
* `full` mode commits + saves the image AND tars the workspace; `workspace` mode
* tars just the workspace. The container is paused across the artifact capture so
* image and workspace are mutually consistent.
*/
export async function exportDockerCase(params: {
docker: SessionDocker;
caseName: string;
timestamp: number;
exportsDir: string;
mode: DockerExportMode;
codemanVersion: string;
}): Promise<ExportResult> {
const { docker, caseName, timestamp, exportsDir, mode, codemanVersion } = params;
if (mode === 'full' && !docker.mountCredentials) {
throw new Error(
'full-image export is refused for a sealed (mountCredentials:false) container: an in-container login would ride the committed image layer. Use a workspace-only export.'
);
}
if (IS_TEST_MODE) {
// No real docker/tar under vitest — return a deterministic stub.
const manifest: DockerExportManifest = {
schemaVersion: DOCKER_EXPORT_SCHEMA,
caseName,
mode,
engine: docker.engine,
image: docker.image,
containerWorkdir: docker.containerWorkdir,
network: docker.network,
createdAt: timestamp,
codemanVersion,
mountCredentials: docker.mountCredentials,
secretFree: true,
checksums: {},
};
return { bundlePath: join(exportsDir, exportBundleName(caseName, timestamp, mode)), manifest, sizeBytes: 0 };
}
return runWithConversionLimit(async () => {
if (!existsSync(exportsDir)) mkdirSync(exportsDir, { recursive: true });
const free = await freeBytes(exportsDir);
if (free < DOCKER_EXPORT_MIN_FREE_BYTES) {
throw new Error(
`not enough free space to export (need >= ${Math.round(DOCKER_EXPORT_MIN_FREE_BYTES / 1e9)}GB, have ${Math.round(free / 1e9)}GB). A full docker graph wedges every session on the host.`
);
}
const argv = dockerArgv(docker);
const bundlePath = join(exportsDir, exportBundleName(caseName, timestamp, mode));
const stageDir = join(exportsDir, `.stage-${caseName}-${timestamp}`);
mkdirSync(stageDir, { recursive: true });
const wasRunning = await isContainerRunning(argv, docker.containerName);
let commitTag: string | undefined;
try {
if (wasRunning) {
await run(argv[0], [...argv.slice(1), 'pause', docker.containerName], { timeout: 30_000 }).catch(() => {});
}
const checksums: DockerExportManifest['checksums'] = {};
if (mode === 'full') {
commitTag = exportImageTag(caseName, timestamp);
// Blank instance-specific committed env so the image carries no stale host refs.
await run(
argv[0],
[
...argv.slice(1),
'commit',
'-c',
'ENV CODEMAN_API_URL=',
'-c',
'ENV CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE=',
docker.containerName,
commitTag,
],
{ timeout: 300_000 }
);
const imageTar = join(stageDir, 'image.tar');
await saveImageToTar(argv, commitTag, imageTar);
checksums.image = await sha256File(imageTar);
}
const workspaceTar = join(stageDir, 'workspace.tar');
await run('tar', ['-cf', workspaceTar, '-C', docker.hostWorkspacePath, '.'], { timeout: 300_000 });
checksums.workspace = await sha256File(workspaceTar);
const manifest: DockerExportManifest = {
schemaVersion: DOCKER_EXPORT_SCHEMA,
caseName,
mode,
engine: docker.engine,
image: docker.image,
containerWorkdir: docker.containerWorkdir,
network: docker.network,
createdAt: timestamp,
codemanVersion,
mountCredentials: docker.mountCredentials,
// Convenient mode keeps creds on bind mounts (never committed), so the bundle is secret-free.
secretFree: docker.mountCredentials,
checksums,
};
await fs.writeFile(join(stageDir, 'manifest.json'), JSON.stringify(manifest, null, 2));
const members =
mode === 'full' ? ['manifest.json', 'image.tar', 'workspace.tar'] : ['manifest.json', 'workspace.tar'];
await run('tar', ['-czf', bundlePath, '-C', stageDir, ...members], { timeout: 300_000 });
const stat = await fs.stat(bundlePath);
return { bundlePath, manifest, sizeBytes: stat.size };
} finally {
// Always remove the intermediate image + stage dir, and unpause.
if (commitTag) {
await run(argv[0], [...argv.slice(1), 'rmi', commitTag], { timeout: 60_000 }).catch(() => {});
}
await fs.rm(stageDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
if (wasRunning) {
await run(argv[0], [...argv.slice(1), 'unpause', docker.containerName], { timeout: 30_000 }).catch(() => {});
}
}
});
}
export interface ImportResult {
manifest: DockerExportManifest;
/** Quarantined image ref the destination case should use (full mode only). */
importedImage?: string;
/** Directory the workspace was extracted into. */
workspacePath: string;
}
/**
* Import a bundle produced by exportDockerCase: validate the manifest + per-member
* checksums, extract the workspace (traversal-guarded) into destWorkspace, and, in
* full mode, `docker load` the image and re-tag it into a quarantined namespace.
*/
export async function importDockerBundle(params: {
bundlePath: string;
destWorkspace: string;
engine: DockerEngine;
timestamp: number;
}): Promise<ImportResult> {
const { bundlePath, destWorkspace, engine, timestamp } = params;
const argv: string[] = [engine === 'podman' ? 'podman' : 'docker'];
if (IS_TEST_MODE) {
const raw = await fs.readFile(bundlePath, 'utf-8').catch(() => '{}');
return { manifest: JSON.parse(raw) as DockerExportManifest, workspacePath: destWorkspace };
}
const stageDir = `${destWorkspace}.import-stage-${timestamp}`;
mkdirSync(stageDir, { recursive: true });
try {
await run('tar', ['-xzf', bundlePath, '-C', stageDir], { timeout: 300_000 });
const manifestRaw = await fs.readFile(join(stageDir, 'manifest.json'), 'utf-8');
const manifest = JSON.parse(manifestRaw) as DockerExportManifest;
if (manifest.schemaVersion !== DOCKER_EXPORT_SCHEMA) {
throw new Error(`unsupported export schema version ${manifest.schemaVersion} (expected ${DOCKER_EXPORT_SCHEMA})`);
}
// Integrity: verify checksums before trusting any member.
const workspaceTar = join(stageDir, 'workspace.tar');
if (manifest.checksums.workspace) {
const actual = await sha256File(workspaceTar);
if (actual !== manifest.checksums.workspace)
throw new Error('workspace checksum mismatch (corrupt or tampered bundle)');
}
// Traversal guard: reject absolute / `..` members before extraction.
const { stdout: memberList } = await run('tar', ['-tf', workspaceTar], { timeout: 60_000 });
for (const member of memberList.split('\n').filter(Boolean)) {
if (!isSafeTarMember(member)) throw new Error(`unsafe path in workspace archive: ${member}`);
}
mkdirSync(destWorkspace, { recursive: true });
await run('tar', ['--no-same-owner', '-xf', workspaceTar, '-C', destWorkspace], { timeout: 300_000 });
let importedImage: string | undefined;
if (manifest.mode === 'full') {
const imageTar = join(stageDir, 'image.tar');
if (manifest.checksums.image) {
const actual = await sha256File(imageTar);
if (actual !== manifest.checksums.image)
throw new Error('image checksum mismatch (corrupt or tampered bundle)');
}
const { stdout } = await run(argv[0], [...argv.slice(1), 'load', '-i', imageTar], { timeout: 300_000 });
const loadedRef = parseLoadedImageRef(stdout);
if (!loadedRef) throw new Error('could not determine loaded image ref');
// Quarantine: re-tag by the loaded ref/id, never trusting the bundle's original tag.
importedImage = importedImageTag(manifest.caseName, timestamp);
await run(argv[0], [...argv.slice(1), 'tag', loadedRef, importedImage], { timeout: 60_000 });
}
return { manifest, importedImage, workspacePath: destWorkspace };
} finally {
await fs.rm(stageDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
}
}
/** List export bundles in the exports dir (newest first), with size + mtime. */
export async function listDockerExports(
exportsDir: string
): Promise<Array<{ name: string; sizeBytes: number; mtimeMs: number }>> {
if (!existsSync(exportsDir)) return [];
const entries = await fs.readdir(exportsDir).catch(() => [] as string[]);
const out: Array<{ name: string; sizeBytes: number; mtimeMs: number }> = [];
for (const name of entries) {
if (!name.endsWith('.tgz')) continue;
try {
const stat = await fs.stat(join(exportsDir, name));
out.push({ name: basename(name), sizeBytes: stat.size, mtimeMs: stat.mtimeMs });
} catch {
/* skip */
}
}
return out.sort((a, b) => b.mtimeMs - a.mtimeMs);
}
+653
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@@ -0,0 +1,653 @@
/**
* @fileoverview Docker cases: storage, pure command-arg builders, and daemon probes.
*
* Docker mode is a LOCATION OVERLAY on cases (not a 6th SessionMode), the direct
* analog of the remote-SSH feature in `remote-hosts.ts`. Instead of a local tmux
* pane running `ssh host` into a durable remote tmux server, a local tmux pane
* runs `docker exec -it` into a durable IN-CONTAINER tmux server. The container is
* scoped to the CASE (`codeman-case-<name>`), so multiple sessions can `docker
* exec` into the same long-lived container.
*
* This module mirrors `remote-hosts.ts`:
* - JSON storage for hosts (`docker-hosts.json`) and cases (`docker-cases.json`)
* - `toSessionDocker()` (mirror of `toSessionRemote`)
* - `buildDockerBaseArgs()` / `buildDockerCreateArgs()` (mirror of `buildSshConnectionArgs`)
* - `checkDockerAvailable()` / `checkDockerTmuxAvailable()` (mirror of `checkRemoteTmuxAvailable`)
*
* The launch/kill command orchestration (`buildDockerLaunchCommand`,
* `buildDockerKillCommand`, `dockerTmuxSessionName`) lives in `tmux-manager.ts`,
* mirroring where `buildRemoteLaunchCommand` lives.
*
* @module docker-hosts
*/
import { existsSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { homedir } from 'node:os';
import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
import { execFile } from 'node:child_process';
import { promisify } from 'node:util';
import type {
DockerCase,
DockerCommandMode,
DockerEngine,
DockerHost,
DockerNetworkMode,
DockerResourceLimits,
SessionDocker,
SessionMode,
} from './types.js';
const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);
/** Under vitest, all real `docker` invocations no-op (mirror of tmux-manager's IS_TEST_MODE). */
const IS_TEST_MODE = !!process.env.VITEST;
const DOCKER_HOSTS_FILE = 'docker-hosts.json';
const DOCKER_CASES_FILE = 'docker-cases.json';
/** Locally-built base image (see scripts/build-agent-image.mjs). */
export const DEFAULT_AGENT_IMAGE = 'codeman/agent:base';
/** HOME inside the base image (the `agent` user). Cred mounts + hook-secret land under it. */
export const CONTAINER_HOME = '/home/agent';
/** Per-case container name prefix. The `case` letters deliberately do NOT matter to
* tmux; this is a DOCKER name (`^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$`), and case names are
* already validated `^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$`, so `codeman-case-<name>` is always valid. */
const CONTAINER_NAME_PREFIX = 'codeman-case-';
/** Sensible resource defaults (all overridable per host). */
export const DEFAULT_DOCKER_RESOURCES: DockerResourceLimits = {
memory: '4g',
cpus: '2',
pidsLimit: 512,
nofile: '4096:8192',
};
// ========== Storage (mirror of remote-hosts.ts) ==========
export function dockerHostsPath(configDir: string): string {
return join(configDir, DOCKER_HOSTS_FILE);
}
export function dockerCasesPath(configDir: string): string {
return join(configDir, DOCKER_CASES_FILE);
}
async function readJsonArray<T>(path: string): Promise<T[]> {
try {
const raw = await fs.readFile(path, 'utf-8');
const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
return Array.isArray(parsed) ? (parsed as T[]) : [];
} catch {
return [];
}
}
async function writeJsonArray<T>(configDir: string, path: string, value: T[]): Promise<void> {
if (!existsSync(configDir)) mkdirSync(configDir, { recursive: true });
await fs.writeFile(path, JSON.stringify(value, null, 2));
}
export async function readDockerHosts(configDir: string): Promise<DockerHost[]> {
return readJsonArray<DockerHost>(dockerHostsPath(configDir));
}
export async function writeDockerHosts(configDir: string, hosts: DockerHost[]): Promise<void> {
await writeJsonArray(configDir, dockerHostsPath(configDir), hosts);
}
export async function readDockerCases(configDir: string): Promise<DockerCase[]> {
return readJsonArray<DockerCase>(dockerCasesPath(configDir));
}
export async function writeDockerCases(configDir: string, cases: DockerCase[]): Promise<void> {
await writeJsonArray(configDir, dockerCasesPath(configDir), cases);
}
// ========== Naming / display / defaults ==========
/** Per-case container name. Mirrors how remote derives a stable name from the case. */
export function dockerContainerName(caseName: string): string {
return `${CONTAINER_NAME_PREFIX}${caseName}`;
}
/** Default pane command per CLI mode (mirror of defaultRemoteCommandForMode). */
export function defaultDockerCommandForMode(mode: SessionMode): string {
const commands: Record<DockerCommandMode, string> = {
shell: 'exec bash -l',
// Mirror the LOCAL claude default so the in-container agent runs non-interactively.
claude: 'exec claude --dangerously-skip-permissions',
opencode: 'exec opencode',
codex: 'exec codex',
gemini: 'exec gemini',
};
return commands[mode as DockerCommandMode] || commands.shell;
}
/** `container:/workdir` display string (mirror of remoteDisplayPath's `user@host:path`). */
export function dockerDisplayPath(
docker: Pick<SessionDocker, 'containerName' | 'containerWorkdir'> | { container: string; path: string }
): string {
if ('containerName' in docker) return `${docker.containerName}:${docker.containerWorkdir}`;
return `${docker.container}:${docker.path}`;
}
/**
* The host-callback gateway alias is ENGINE-SPECIFIC: Docker exposes the host as
* `host.docker.internal`, Podman as `host.containers.internal`. Both are added to
* the host-guard allowlist so a mixed fleet keeps working.
*/
export function hostGatewayAlias(engine: DockerEngine): string {
return engine === 'podman' ? 'host.containers.internal' : 'host.docker.internal';
}
/**
* Rewrite the server's own `CODEMAN_API_URL` to a container-reachable one by
* swapping ONLY the hostname for the engine's host-gateway alias, preserving
* scheme AND port (prod is HTTPS on 3000, so hardcoding http://…:3000 breaks
* every hook). Falls back to `https://<alias>:3000` when the input is absent or
* unparseable.
*/
export function containerApiUrl(processApiUrl: string | undefined, engine: DockerEngine): string {
const alias = hostGatewayAlias(engine);
if (!processApiUrl) return `https://${alias}:3000`;
try {
const url = new URL(processApiUrl);
url.hostname = alias;
// origin drops any trailing path/slash and keeps scheme + (non-default) port
return url.origin;
} catch {
return `https://${alias}:3000`;
}
}
/**
* Stable hash of the drift-relevant `docker create` inputs, stored on the
* container as the `codeman.confighash` label. On launch, a mismatch between the
* desired hash and the running container's label triggers the recreate-on-drift
* prompt (host config edits actually take effect).
*/
export function dockerConfigHash(
docker: Pick<
SessionDocker,
| 'engine'
| 'image'
| 'containerWorkdir'
| 'network'
| 'networkName'
| 'resources'
| 'gpus'
| 'mountCredentials'
| 'extraCreateArgs'
>
): string {
const normalized = JSON.stringify({
engine: docker.engine,
image: docker.image,
containerWorkdir: docker.containerWorkdir,
network: docker.network,
networkName: docker.networkName ?? null,
resources: docker.resources ?? null,
gpus: docker.gpus ?? null,
mountCredentials: docker.mountCredentials,
extraCreateArgs: docker.extraCreateArgs ?? null,
});
return createHash('sha256').update(normalized).digest('hex').slice(0, 12);
}
/**
* Build the flattened per-session Docker metadata from a host profile + a case,
* resolving every default (mirror of toSessionRemote). The `configHash` is
* computed last over the resolved values.
*/
export function toSessionDocker(host: DockerHost, dockerCase: DockerCase): SessionDocker {
const engine: DockerEngine = host.engine ?? 'docker';
const containerWorkdir = dockerCase.containerWorkdir ?? dockerCase.hostWorkspacePath;
const base: Omit<SessionDocker, 'configHash'> = {
hostId: host.id,
label: host.label,
engine,
image: host.image || DEFAULT_AGENT_IMAGE,
containerName: dockerCase.container ?? dockerContainerName(dockerCase.name),
hostWorkspacePath: dockerCase.hostWorkspacePath,
containerWorkdir,
network: host.network ?? 'bridge',
networkName: host.networkName,
resources: host.resources ?? DEFAULT_DOCKER_RESOURCES,
gpus: host.gpus,
mountCredentials: host.mountCredentials ?? true,
hooksEnabled: host.hooksEnabled ?? true,
resumeOnStart: host.resumeOnStart ?? true,
daemonHost: host.daemonHost,
context: host.context,
commands: host.commands,
extraCreateArgs: host.extraCreateArgs,
extraExecArgs: host.extraExecArgs,
};
return { ...base, configHash: dockerConfigHash(base) };
}
// ========== Shell escaping ==========
/**
* POSIX single-quote shell-escaping (end-quote, escaped-quote, restart-quote).
* Mirror of the helper in remote-hosts.ts / tmux-manager.ts. Every dynamic value
* interpolated into the outer `bash -c "..."` launch layer is escaped through
* this so a path with spaces stays a single shell token. Operator-entered fields
* are ALSO schema-rejected for `$`/backtick (NO_SHELL_META) as defense in depth.
*/
export function shellescape(str: string): string {
return "'" + str.replace(/'/g, "'\\''") + "'";
}
// ========== Pure command-arg builders ==========
/** A resolved bind mount (source existence already checked by the caller). */
export interface DockerMount {
src: string;
dst: string;
readonly?: boolean;
}
/**
* Resolved, IO-free context for buildDockerCreateArgs. The caller (tmux-manager)
* resolves the environment-dependent bits (host uid, existing cred mounts, the
* derived api url, Desktop detection) so this builder stays pure and unit-testable.
*/
export interface DockerCreateContext {
docker: SessionDocker;
/** Codeman session id (only the first 8 chars are used, for the codeman.session label). */
sessionId: string;
/** CODEMAN_INSTANCE ('' for prod) — scopes the boot reaper so a beta never reaps prod. */
instance: string;
/** Pre-resolved uid/userns tokens: ['--user','1000:0'] | ['--userns','keep-id'] | []. */
userArgs: string[];
/** Existing host credential bind mounts (convenient mode). Empty in sealed mode. */
credentialMounts: DockerMount[];
/** Extra bind mounts (e.g. the read-only hook-secret file). */
extraMounts: DockerMount[];
/** Create-time env (NON-secret, committed-safe): HOME, TERM, COLORTERM, CODEMAN_API_URL, CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE. */
envCreate: Record<string, string>;
/** Whether to add `--add-host <alias>:host-gateway` (skipped on Docker Desktop, where the alias is native). */
addHostGateway: boolean;
/** Engine host-gateway alias (host.docker.internal / host.containers.internal). */
gatewayAlias: string;
}
/**
* Engine prefix tokens shared by every docker invocation (mirror of
* buildSshConnectionArgs). Returns e.g. ['docker'] or ['podman','--context','ctx'].
*/
export function buildDockerBaseArgs(docker: Pick<SessionDocker, 'engine' | 'context' | 'daemonHost'>): string[] {
const parts: string[] = [docker.engine === 'podman' ? 'podman' : 'docker'];
if (docker.context) parts.push('--context', shellescape(docker.context));
if (docker.daemonHost) parts.push('-H', shellescape(docker.daemonHost));
return parts;
}
function mountSpec(m: DockerMount): string {
return `type=bind,src=${m.src},dst=${m.dst}${m.readonly ? ',readonly' : ''}`;
}
function resourceFlags(resources?: DockerResourceLimits): string[] {
if (!resources) return [];
const flags: string[] = [];
if (resources.memory) {
// memory-swap == memory disables swap, making --memory a REAL OOM cap.
flags.push('--memory', resources.memory, '--memory-swap', resources.memory);
}
if (resources.cpus) flags.push('--cpus', resources.cpus);
if (resources.pidsLimit) flags.push('--pids-limit', String(resources.pidsLimit));
if (resources.nofile) flags.push('--ulimit', `nofile=${resources.nofile}`);
if (resources.shmSize) flags.push('--shm-size', resources.shmSize);
return flags;
}
function networkArg(network: DockerNetworkMode, networkName?: string): string {
if (network === 'custom' && networkName) return networkName;
return network; // 'bridge' | 'none'
}
/**
* Build the `docker create` token list (from `create` through the `sleep
* infinity` CMD) for a long-lived, hardened, per-case container. PURE: every
* dynamic value is shellescaped; the caller joins with spaces into the launch
* string. Security invariants baked in: --cap-drop ALL, --security-opt
* no-new-privileges, --pids-limit, --memory==--memory-swap, --init,
* --pull=never, --restart no, NEVER --privileged, NEVER the docker socket.
*/
export function buildDockerCreateArgs(ctx: DockerCreateContext): string[] {
const {
docker,
sessionId,
instance,
userArgs,
credentialMounts,
extraMounts,
envCreate,
addHostGateway,
gatewayAlias,
} = ctx;
const args: string[] = [
'create',
'--name',
shellescape(docker.containerName),
'--label',
'codeman.managed=1',
'--label',
shellescape(`codeman.instance=${instance}`),
'--label',
shellescape(`codeman.session=${sessionId.slice(0, 8)}`),
'--label',
shellescape(`codeman.confighash=${docker.configHash ?? dockerConfigHash(docker)}`),
'--pull=never',
'--init',
'--restart',
'no',
...userArgs,
'--workdir',
shellescape(docker.containerWorkdir),
// Workspace bind: mirror the host path inside the container so the transcript
// projHash correlates and file features read real host bytes.
'--mount',
shellescape(mountSpec({ src: docker.hostWorkspacePath, dst: docker.containerWorkdir })),
...credentialMounts.flatMap((m) => ['--mount', shellescape(mountSpec(m))]),
...extraMounts.flatMap((m) => ['--mount', shellescape(mountSpec(m))]),
];
if (addHostGateway) args.push('--add-host', `${gatewayAlias}:host-gateway`);
args.push(
...resourceFlags(docker.resources),
// GPU passthrough (needs the NVIDIA container toolkit on the host). No storage
// cap is set, so the container's writable layer + volumes grow elastically as
// data flows in (bounded only by host disk).
...(docker.gpus ? ['--gpus', shellescape(docker.gpus)] : []),
'--cap-drop',
'ALL',
'--security-opt',
'no-new-privileges',
'--network',
networkArg(docker.network, docker.networkName)
);
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(envCreate)) {
args.push('--env', shellescape(`${key}=${value}`));
}
// Operator escape-hatch args (schema-validated NO_SHELL_INJECTION), escaped again here.
for (const extra of docker.extraCreateArgs ?? []) {
args.push(shellescape(extra));
}
args.push(shellescape(docker.image), 'sleep', 'infinity');
return args;
}
// ========== Credential mount resolution (IO) ==========
/** Host cred paths mapped to their in-container HOME location. */
const CREDENTIAL_PATHS: Array<{ rel: string }> = [
{ rel: '.claude' },
{ rel: '.claude.json' },
{ rel: '.codex' },
{ rel: '.gemini' },
{ rel: '.config/gcloud' },
{ rel: '.config/opencode' },
];
/**
* Resolve which host credential dirs/files EXIST and map them to their container
* HOME location. Only-existing avoids docker auto-creating root-owned empty dirs
* in the user's home. `~/.claude` also carries the transcripts (bind-mounted so
* host watchers + `--resume` see them) and is therefore mounted read-WRITE.
*/
export function resolveCredentialMounts(home: string = homedir()): DockerMount[] {
const mounts: DockerMount[] = [];
for (const { rel } of CREDENTIAL_PATHS) {
const src = join(home, rel);
if (existsSync(src)) {
mounts.push({ src, dst: `${CONTAINER_HOME}/${rel}` });
}
}
return mounts;
}
// ========== Daemon probes (IO; no-op under VITEST) ==========
export interface DockerAvailability {
ok: boolean;
engine: DockerEngine;
rootless: boolean;
isDesktop: boolean;
cgroupV2: boolean;
/** Best-effort: are --memory/--cpus/--pids-limit actually enforced on this engine? */
capsEnforced: boolean;
error?: string;
}
const DOCKER_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;
interface DockerInfoJson {
ServerVersion?: string;
CgroupVersion?: string;
SecurityOptions?: string[];
OperatingSystem?: string;
OSType?: string;
Name?: string;
}
async function runDockerInfo(engine: DockerEngine): Promise<DockerInfoJson | null> {
try {
const { stdout } = await execFileAsync(engine, ['info', '--format', '{{json .}}'], {
timeout: DOCKER_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS,
});
return JSON.parse(stdout) as DockerInfoJson;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
function classifyDockerInfo(engine: DockerEngine, info: DockerInfoJson): DockerAvailability {
const security = info.SecurityOptions ?? [];
const rootless = security.some((opt) => opt.includes('rootless'));
const cgroupV2 = info.CgroupVersion === '2';
const os = `${info.OperatingSystem ?? ''}`.toLowerCase();
const isDesktop = os.includes('docker desktop') || os.includes('desktop');
// Under rootless, resource caps are only reliably enforced with cgroup v2 +
// systemd delegation. We can't detect delegation from `docker info`, so we
// treat rootless+cgroupv2 as "likely enforced" and rootless+cgroupv1 as not.
const capsEnforced = !rootless || cgroupV2;
return { ok: true, engine, rootless, isDesktop, cgroupV2, capsEnforced };
}
/**
* Probe the container engine: server up, cgroup version, rootless, Desktop, and
* whether resource caps are enforceable. Auto-detects docker then podman when no
* engine is given. No-op canned value under VITEST.
*/
export async function checkDockerAvailable(engine?: DockerEngine): Promise<DockerAvailability> {
if (IS_TEST_MODE) {
return {
ok: true,
engine: engine ?? 'docker',
rootless: false,
isDesktop: false,
cgroupV2: true,
capsEnforced: true,
};
}
const candidates: DockerEngine[] = engine ? [engine] : ['docker', 'podman'];
for (const candidate of candidates) {
const info = await runDockerInfo(candidate);
if (info) return classifyDockerInfo(candidate, info);
}
return {
ok: false,
engine: engine ?? 'docker',
rootless: false,
isDesktop: false,
cgroupV2: false,
capsEnforced: false,
error: 'Docker/Podman not available. Install docker (or podman) and ensure the daemon is running.',
};
}
/** Is the base image present locally? (never triggers an auto-pull). */
export async function checkDockerImagePresent(engine: DockerEngine, image: string): Promise<boolean> {
if (IS_TEST_MODE) return true;
try {
await execFileAsync(engine, ['image', 'inspect', '--format', '{{.Id}}', image], {
timeout: DOCKER_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS,
});
return true;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
export interface DockerTmuxCheckResult {
ok: boolean;
tmuxPath?: string;
/** Distinguishes "image missing" (build it) from "tmux missing in image" (rebuild it). */
imageMissing?: boolean;
error?: string;
}
/**
* Verify the base image is present AND contains tmux (a HARD prerequisite: the
* in-container tmux is what makes reconnect durable). Never triggers a pull
* (`--pull=never`). No-op under VITEST. Mirror of checkRemoteTmuxAvailable.
*/
export async function checkDockerTmuxAvailable(
docker: Pick<SessionDocker, 'engine' | 'image'>
): Promise<DockerTmuxCheckResult> {
if (IS_TEST_MODE) return { ok: true, tmuxPath: '/usr/bin/tmux' };
const engine = docker.engine;
if (!(await checkDockerImagePresent(engine, docker.image))) {
return {
ok: false,
imageMissing: true,
error: `base image ${docker.image} not present: build it with 'node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs' (or pull it)`,
};
}
try {
const { stdout } = await execFileAsync(
engine,
['run', '--rm', '--pull=never', docker.image, 'sh', '-lc', 'command -v tmux'],
{ timeout: DOCKER_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS }
);
const tmuxPath = stdout.trim();
if (!tmuxPath) {
return { ok: false, error: `base image ${docker.image} is missing tmux (required for durable sessions)` };
}
return { ok: true, tmuxPath };
} catch (err) {
const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
return { ok: false, error: `could not verify tmux in ${docker.image}: ${msg}` };
}
}
/**
* Resolve the host's IP on the default docker bridge (the address a container
* reaches as `host.docker.internal`), so the server can bind a hooks-only listener
* there and in-container hooks can call back. Defaults to the conventional
* 172.17.0.1 when the inspect fails but docker is up; null when docker is absent.
* No-op canned value under VITEST.
*/
export async function detectDockerBridgeGateway(engine: DockerEngine = 'docker'): Promise<string | null> {
if (IS_TEST_MODE) return '172.17.0.1';
const bin = engine === 'podman' ? 'podman' : 'docker';
try {
const { stdout } = await execFileAsync(
bin,
['network', 'inspect', 'bridge', '--format', '{{(index .IPAM.Config 0).Gateway}}'],
{ timeout: DOCKER_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS }
);
const ip = stdout.trim();
return /^\d{1,3}(\.\d{1,3}){3}$/.test(ip) ? ip : '172.17.0.1';
} catch {
return null; // docker not available — nothing to bind
}
}
/**
* Instance-scoped boot reaper: `docker rm -f` any MANAGED container that belongs
* to THIS instance (by the `codeman.instance` label) but whose case is no longer
* in `docker-cases.json`. The instance scoping is what stops a beta from reaping
* prod's containers (the cross-instance hazard). No-op under VITEST. Best-effort.
*/
export async function reapOrphanedDockerContainers(
configDir: string,
instance: string,
engine: DockerEngine = 'docker'
): Promise<string[]> {
if (IS_TEST_MODE) return [];
const bin = engine === 'podman' ? 'podman' : 'docker';
let rows: Array<{ name: string; inst: string }> = [];
try {
const { stdout } = await execFileAsync(
bin,
[
'ps',
'-a',
'--filter',
'label=codeman.managed=1',
'--format',
'{{.Names}}\t{{index .Labels "codeman.instance"}}',
],
{ timeout: DOCKER_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS }
);
rows = stdout
.split('\n')
.filter(Boolean)
.map((line) => {
const [name, inst = ''] = line.split('\t');
return { name, inst };
});
} catch {
return []; // daemon down / engine absent — nothing to reap
}
const cases = await readDockerCases(configDir);
const expected = new Set(cases.map((c) => c.container ?? dockerContainerName(c.name)));
const reaped: string[] = [];
for (const { name, inst } of rows) {
if (inst !== instance) continue; // only THIS instance's containers
if (expected.has(name)) continue; // still referenced by a live case
try {
await execFileAsync(bin, ['rm', '-f', name], { timeout: DOCKER_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS });
reaped.push(name);
} catch {
/* best-effort */
}
}
return reaped;
}
/**
* Read the IN-CONTAINER Claude CLI version (`docker exec <container> claude
* --version`). Feeds Session.cliVersion for docker sessions (the LOCAL claude
* would report the wrong version and disable trackpad wheel-forwarding, #154).
* Returns undefined on any failure. No-op under VITEST.
*/
export async function probeDockerCliVersion(
docker: Pick<SessionDocker, 'engine' | 'containerName'>,
mode: SessionMode
): Promise<string | undefined> {
if (IS_TEST_MODE) return undefined;
const bin = mode === 'shell' ? null : mode;
if (!bin) return undefined;
try {
const { stdout } = await execFileAsync(docker.engine, ['exec', docker.containerName, bin, '--version'], {
timeout: DOCKER_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS,
});
const match = stdout.trim().match(/\d+\.\d+\.\d+/);
return match ? match[0] : stdout.trim() || undefined;
} catch {
return undefined;
}
}
+7
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ import type {
EffortLevel,
GeminiConfig,
SessionRemote,
SessionDocker,
} from './types.js';
/**
@@ -36,6 +37,8 @@ export interface MuxSession {
workingDir: string;
/** Remote execution metadata for local tmux sessions wrapping SSH */
remote?: SessionRemote;
/** Docker execution metadata for local tmux sessions wrapping `docker exec` */
docker?: SessionDocker;
/** Session mode */
mode: SessionMode;
/** Whether webserver is attached to this session */
@@ -79,6 +82,8 @@ export interface CreateSessionOptions {
historyLimit?: number;
/** Remote execution metadata for local tmux sessions wrapping SSH */
remote?: SessionRemote;
/** Docker execution metadata for local tmux sessions wrapping `docker exec` */
docker?: SessionDocker;
}
/** Options for respawning a dead pane. */
@@ -103,6 +108,8 @@ export interface RespawnPaneOptions {
historyLimit?: number;
/** Remote execution metadata for local tmux sessions wrapping SSH */
remote?: SessionRemote;
/** Docker execution metadata for local tmux sessions wrapping `docker exec` */
docker?: SessionDocker;
}
/** Options for pane buffer capture (COD-47 full-history mode). */
+52 -4
View File
@@ -50,7 +50,9 @@ import {
type EffortLevel,
type GeminiConfig,
type SessionRemote,
type SessionDocker,
} from './types.js';
import { probeDockerCliVersion } from './docker-hosts.js';
import type { TerminalMultiplexer, MuxSession } from './mux-interface.js';
import { TaskTracker, type BackgroundTask } from './task-tracker.js';
import { RalphTracker } from './ralph-tracker.js';
@@ -178,6 +180,8 @@ export function isAltScreenStripMode(mode: SessionMode): boolean {
const DEFAULT_PTY_COLS = 120;
const DEFAULT_PTY_ROWS = 40;
const TMUX_DISPLAY_TIMEOUT_MS = 2000;
/** Delay before the in-container Claude CLI version probe (lets the container start). */
const DOCKER_CLI_VERSION_PROBE_DELAY_MS = 3000;
/**
* Ask tmux for the current window geometry of `muxName` so a re-attaching PTY
@@ -212,8 +216,10 @@ export function queryTmuxWindowSize(muxName: string, socket: string): { cols: nu
return { cols: DEFAULT_PTY_COLS, rows: DEFAULT_PTY_ROWS };
}
export function resolveMuxAttachCwd(workingDir: string, remote?: SessionRemote): string {
return remote ? '/tmp' : workingDir;
export function resolveMuxAttachCwd(workingDir: string, remote?: SessionRemote, docker?: SessionDocker): string {
// Remote and docker sessions run the CLI elsewhere (ssh / docker exec); the LOCAL
// wrapper pane never needs the workspace as its cwd, so launch it in /tmp.
return remote || docker ? '/tmp' : workingDir;
}
/**
@@ -402,6 +408,10 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
// Remote execution metadata, present when this session runs over SSH through local tmux.
private readonly _remote?: SessionRemote;
// Docker execution metadata, present when this session runs inside a container via
// local tmux + `docker exec`. The container is per-CASE (shared by sibling sessions).
private readonly _docker?: SessionDocker;
// Session color for visual differentiation
private _color: import('./types.js').SessionColor = 'default';
@@ -475,6 +485,8 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
attachmentHistory?: SessionAttachmentHistoryItem[];
/** Remote execution metadata for sessions launched through SSH inside local tmux. */
remote?: SessionRemote;
/** Docker execution metadata for sessions launched inside a container via local tmux. */
docker?: SessionDocker;
}
) {
super();
@@ -548,6 +560,7 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
}
this._tmuxHistoryLimit = config.tmuxHistoryLimit ?? DEFAULT_TMUX_HISTORY_LIMIT;
this._remote = config.remote;
this._docker = config.docker;
if (config.attachmentHistory && config.attachmentHistory.length > 0) {
this.restoreAttachmentHistory(config.attachmentHistory);
}
@@ -649,6 +662,11 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
return this._claudeSessionId;
}
/** Docker execution metadata when this session runs inside a container, else undefined. */
get docker(): SessionDocker | undefined {
return this._docker;
}
// Adopt a Claude conversation ID observed from an external source (e.g. hook
// payload). In interactive PTY mode Claude CLI emits no JSON to stdout, so
// `_handleJsonMessage` never sees `session_id`; hooks are the only signal
@@ -1008,6 +1026,7 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
status: this._status,
workingDir: this.workingDir,
remote: this._remote,
docker: this._docker,
currentTaskId: this._currentTaskId,
createdAt: this.createdAt,
lastActivityAt: this._lastActivityAt,
@@ -1197,7 +1216,7 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
name: 'xterm-256color',
cols: ptyCols,
rows: ptyRows,
cwd: resolveMuxAttachCwd(this.workingDir, this._remote),
cwd: resolveMuxAttachCwd(this.workingDir, this._remote, this._docker),
// COD-75: codex/gemini get COLORTERM=truecolor — mirrors buildEnvExports()
// in tmux-manager.ts so the attach client and the tmux session agree.
env: buildMuxAttachEnv(this.mode === 'codex' || this.mode === 'gemini'),
@@ -1317,7 +1336,7 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
// repaint/alt-screen mode; issue #154). Remote sessions run claude on
// another host, so a local probe wouldn't reflect their version — skip them
// and let the banner scrape handle those. Cached process-wide, best-effort.
if (this.mode === 'claude' && !this._remote && !this._cliVersion) {
if (this.mode === 'claude' && !this._remote && !this._docker && !this._cliVersion) {
const probedVersion = getClaudeCliVersion();
if (probedVersion) {
this._cliVersion = probedVersion;
@@ -1330,6 +1349,31 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
}
}
// Docker sessions run claude INSIDE the container, so the local probe above
// reports the HOST claude (wrong version, and leaving cliVersion undefined
// silently disables wheel-forwarding, #154). Probe the IN-CONTAINER version
// instead — deferred so the container is up after the mux attach below.
if (this.mode === 'claude' && this._docker && !this._cliVersion) {
const dockerMeta = this._docker;
setTimeout(() => {
if (this._isStopped || this._cliVersion) return;
void probeDockerCliVersion(dockerMeta, this.mode)
.then((version) => {
if (!version || this._isStopped || this._cliVersion) return;
this._cliVersion = version;
this.emit('cliInfoUpdated', {
version: this._cliVersion,
model: this._cliModel,
accountType: this._cliAccountType,
latestVersion: this._cliLatestVersion,
});
})
.catch(() => {
/* best-effort */
});
}, DOCKER_CLI_VERSION_PROBE_DELAY_MS);
}
// If mux wrapping is enabled, create or attach to a mux session
if (this._useMux && this._mux) {
try {
@@ -1350,6 +1394,7 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
effort: this._effort,
historyLimit: this._tmuxHistoryLimit,
remote: this._remote,
docker: this._docker,
},
createSessionOptions: {
sessionId: this.id,
@@ -1368,6 +1413,7 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
effort: this._effort,
historyLimit: this._tmuxHistoryLimit,
remote: this._remote,
docker: this._docker,
},
spawnErrLabel: 'mux attachment',
});
@@ -1738,6 +1784,7 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
envOverrides: this._envOverrides,
historyLimit: this._tmuxHistoryLimit,
remote: this._remote,
docker: this._docker,
},
createSessionOptions: {
sessionId: this.id,
@@ -1748,6 +1795,7 @@ export class Session extends EventEmitter {
envOverrides: this._envOverrides,
historyLimit: this._tmuxHistoryLimit,
remote: this._remote,
docker: this._docker,
},
spawnErrLabel: 'shell mux attachment',
});
+263 -5
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,8 @@ const execAsync = promisify(exec);
import { existsSync, readFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
import { writeFile, rename } from 'node:fs/promises';
import { dirname } from 'node:path';
import { dataPath, DEFAULT_TMUX_SOCKET } from './config/instance.js';
import { homedir } from 'node:os';
import { dataPath, DEFAULT_TMUX_SOCKET, CODEMAN_INSTANCE } from './config/instance.js';
import {
ProcessStats,
PersistedRespawnConfig,
@@ -43,9 +44,22 @@ import {
type EffortLevel,
type GeminiConfig,
type SessionRemote,
type SessionDocker,
type DockerCommandMode,
} from './types.js';
import { buildEffortCliArgs } from './session-cli-builder.js';
import { buildSshConnectionArgs, defaultRemoteCommandForMode, remoteSshTarget } from './remote-hosts.js';
import {
buildDockerBaseArgs,
buildDockerCreateArgs,
containerApiUrl,
CONTAINER_HOME,
defaultDockerCommandForMode,
hostGatewayAlias,
resolveCredentialMounts,
type DockerCreateContext,
type DockerMount,
} from './docker-hosts.js';
import {
wrapWithNice,
SAFE_PATH_PATTERN,
@@ -812,6 +826,226 @@ export function buildRemoteKillCommand(options: { remote: SessionRemote; session
return [ssh, ...connectionArgs, remoteSshTarget(remote), shellescape(killCmd)].join(' ');
}
// ========== Docker cases (COD-Docker) ==========
//
// The docker analog of the remote-SSH launch above. Instead of a local tmux pane
// running `ssh -t host 'tmux new-session …'`, it runs `docker exec -it <container>
// sh -lc 'tmux new-session …'` into a DURABLE in-container tmux server. The
// container is per-CASE, so many sessions `docker exec` into the same one. See
// docs/docker-cases-plan.md.
/**
* DEDICATED in-container tmux socket. A Codeman running INSIDE the container uses
* `-L codeman`; ours is `-L codeman-docker` with a `codeman-dkr-*` session name
* that deliberately FAILS SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN, so an in-container Codeman never
* adopts/resizes/respawns our session (same defence as the remote socket).
*/
const DOCKER_TMUX_SOCKET = 'codeman-docker';
/**
* Deterministic, reattach-stable in-container tmux session name. Derived from the
* same stable field the local muxName uses (first 8 chars of the sessionId), so a
* reconnect re-issues the exact same `new-session -A` and lands back in the SAME
* in-container session. The `dkr` letters make it fail SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN.
*/
export function dockerTmuxSessionName(sessionId: string): string {
return `codeman-dkr-${sessionId.slice(0, 8)}`;
}
/** Resume ids are UUID-ish; reject anything with shell metacharacters (defensive). */
const RESUME_ID_SAFE = /^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$/;
/**
* Append the CLI-specific resume flag to a pane command. Only fires when the
* in-container tmux is RE-CREATED (`new-session -A` makes the flag inert on a
* live reattach), i.e. exactly when the previous live agent was lost and we want
* to resume the conversation from the bind-mounted transcript.
*/
function appendResumeFlag(modeCommand: string, mode: SessionMode, resumeId: string): string {
if (!RESUME_ID_SAFE.test(resumeId)) return modeCommand;
switch (mode) {
case 'claude':
case 'gemini':
return `${modeCommand} --resume ${resumeId}`;
case 'codex':
return `${modeCommand} resume ${resumeId}`;
default:
return modeCommand; // shell / opencode: no resume
}
}
/** Fully-resolved inputs for buildDockerLaunchCommand (pure). */
export interface DockerLaunchOptions {
mode: SessionMode;
docker: SessionDocker;
sessionId: string;
resumeSessionId?: string;
createContext: DockerCreateContext;
/** exec-time inline env (non-secret): TERM, COLORTERM, CODEMAN_SESSION_ID, CODEMAN_MUX */
execEnv: Record<string, string>;
/** exec-time NAME-ONLY env forwarded from Codeman's process env (codex/gemini keys) */
execEnvNames: string[];
}
/**
* Build the ONE `bash -c` launch string for a docker session: image-check ->
* ensure (inspect-or-create) -> start -> `exec docker exec -it` into the durable
* in-container tmux (resume-aware). PURE and unit-testable. The escaping survives
* four layers: outer `bash -c "…"` (JSON.stringify at respawn-pane) -> the joined
* command -> `docker exec … sh -lc '<tmux>'` -> tmux `'<paneCommand>'`.
*/
export function buildDockerLaunchCommand(opts: DockerLaunchOptions): string {
const { mode, docker, sessionId, resumeSessionId, createContext, execEnv, execEnvNames } = opts;
const base = buildDockerBaseArgs(docker).join(' ');
const createArgs = buildDockerCreateArgs(createContext).join(' ');
const name = shellescape(docker.containerName);
const workdir = shellescape(docker.containerWorkdir);
const image = shellescape(docker.image);
const dkrName = dockerTmuxSessionName(sessionId);
const sid = sessionId.slice(0, 8);
let modeCommand = docker.commands?.[mode as DockerCommandMode] || defaultDockerCommandForMode(mode);
if (resumeSessionId) modeCommand = appendResumeFlag(modeCommand, mode, resumeSessionId);
// Run by tmux via /bin/sh -c, so the path is shell-quoted here. `exec` makes the
// pane PID the agent itself.
const paneCommand = `cd ${workdir} && ${modeCommand}`;
// `setenv -g` primes the session id so reattaches / newly-created panes inherit
// it. `new-session -A` = attach-or-create (idempotent + resume-aware). Options
// are scoped per-session (`set -t`) or server (`set -s`), never `-g`, so a shared
// in-container tmux server's other sessions keep their own prefix/mouse.
const tmuxInvocation = [
`tmux -L ${DOCKER_TMUX_SOCKET} setenv -g CODEMAN_SESSION_ID ${shellescape(sid)}`,
'setenv -g CODEMAN_MUX 1',
`new-session -A -s ${dkrName} -c ${workdir} ${shellescape(paneCommand)}`,
`set -t ${dkrName} status off`,
`set -t ${dkrName} mouse off`,
`set -t ${dkrName} prefix C-q`,
'set -s escape-time 0',
].join(' \\; ');
const execEnvFlags: string[] = [];
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(execEnv)) execEnvFlags.push('--env', shellescape(`${k}=${v}`));
// NAME-ONLY forwards: docker reads the VALUE from Codeman's own process env, so
// the secret never appears in argv (no `ps` leak) and is not committed.
for (const n of execEnvNames) execEnvFlags.push('--env', n);
for (const extra of docker.extraExecArgs ?? []) execEnvFlags.push(shellescape(extra));
const imageMissingMsg = shellescape(
`Codeman: base image ${docker.image} not present (build: node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs)`
);
const startFailMsg = shellescape(`Codeman: container ${docker.containerName} failed to start (docker daemon down?)`);
const imageCheck = `${base} image inspect ${image} >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo ${imageMissingMsg}; exit 1; }`;
// create-if-missing (idempotent): reconnect / boot recovery re-runs this exact chain.
const ensure = `${base} inspect ${name} >/dev/null 2>&1 || ${base} ${createArgs}`;
const start = `${base} start ${name} >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo ${startFailMsg}; exit 1; }`;
const execCmd = `exec ${base} exec -it --workdir ${workdir} ${execEnvFlags.join(' ')} ${name} sh -lc ${shellescape(tmuxInvocation)}`;
return [imageCheck, ensure, start, execCmd].join(' ; ');
}
/**
* Kill ONLY this session's in-container tmux session. The container is shared by
* the case's other sessions, so this NEVER `docker stop`s it — stopping/removing
* the container is an explicit teardown (buildDockerStopCommand) or case-delete
* (buildDockerRemoveCommand). Fired best-effort on session kill.
*/
export function buildDockerKillCommand(options: { docker: SessionDocker; sessionId: string }): string {
const { docker, sessionId } = options;
const base = buildDockerBaseArgs(docker).join(' ');
const dkrName = dockerTmuxSessionName(sessionId);
return `${base} exec ${shellescape(docker.containerName)} tmux -L ${DOCKER_TMUX_SOCKET} kill-session -t ${shellescape(dkrName)}`;
}
/** Explicit container stop (frees RAM/CPU; conversation resumes on next launch via --resume). */
export function buildDockerStopCommand(docker: SessionDocker): string {
return `${buildDockerBaseArgs(docker).join(' ')} stop -t 10 ${shellescape(docker.containerName)}`;
}
/** Explicit container removal (case-delete). Destroys in-image state; bind mounts survive. */
export function buildDockerRemoveCommand(docker: SessionDocker): string {
return `${buildDockerBaseArgs(docker).join(' ')} rm -f ${shellescape(docker.containerName)}`;
}
/**
* Resolve the environment-dependent bits of a docker launch (host uid, existing
* credential mounts, derived api url, hook-secret mount, Desktop detection) into
* the pure buildDockerLaunchCommand inputs. IO; only ever called from the real
* launch path (createSession/respawnPane no-op under VITEST).
*/
export function resolveDockerLaunchOptions(
mode: SessionMode,
docker: SessionDocker,
sessionId: string,
resumeSessionId?: string
): DockerLaunchOptions {
const home = homedir();
const isDesktop = process.platform === 'darwin'; // Docker Desktop translates uids + native host.docker.internal
const uid = typeof process.getuid === 'function' ? process.getuid() : 1000;
const userArgs: string[] =
docker.engine === 'podman'
? ['--userns=keep-id'] // rootless podman: map host uid to the image `agent` uid
: isDesktop
? [] // Desktop: run as the image's baked uid (a mac uid wouldn't own /home/agent)
: ['--user', `${uid}:0`]; // Linux: host uid + GID 0 (OpenShift arbitrary-uid writable HOME)
const gatewayAlias = hostGatewayAlias(docker.engine);
const credentialMounts: DockerMount[] = docker.mountCredentials ? resolveCredentialMounts(home) : [];
const extraMounts: DockerMount[] = [];
const envCreate: Record<string, string> = {
HOME: CONTAINER_HOME,
TERM: 'xterm-256color',
COLORTERM: 'truecolor',
// Give claude a temp dir it will own inside HOME. Its default `/tmp/claude-<uid>`
// is refused when that path pre-exists root-owned — which happens when the
// workspace bind-mount path traverses it (e.g. a workspace under /tmp/claude-<uid>).
// A nonexistent HOME subpath is created+owned by the running uid, so this is robust
// to any workspace location. Non-secret path, safe to be committed on export.
CLAUDE_CODE_TMPDIR: `${CONTAINER_HOME}/.cache/codeman-claude-tmp`,
};
if (docker.hooksEnabled) {
// Derive a container-reachable API url (scheme + port preserved; host swapped
// for the engine gateway alias). Prod is HTTPS on 3000.
envCreate.CODEMAN_API_URL = containerApiUrl(process.env.CODEMAN_API_URL, docker.engine);
const hookSecretPath = dataPath('hook-secret');
if (existsSync(hookSecretPath)) {
const dst = `${CONTAINER_HOME}/.codeman/hook-secret`;
extraMounts.push({ src: hookSecretPath, dst, readonly: true });
envCreate.CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE = dst; // a path is non-secret; the bytes ride the bind mount
}
}
const createContext: DockerCreateContext = {
docker,
sessionId,
instance: CODEMAN_INSTANCE,
userArgs,
credentialMounts,
extraMounts,
envCreate,
addHostGateway: !isDesktop,
gatewayAlias,
};
const execEnv: Record<string, string> = {
TERM: 'xterm-256color',
COLORTERM: 'truecolor',
CODEMAN_SESSION_ID: sessionId.slice(0, 8),
CODEMAN_MUX: '1',
};
// NAME-ONLY exec env forwarded from Codeman's process env (the docker client
// inherits it), so API-key CLIs get their key without it appearing in argv.
const execEnvNames =
mode === 'codex'
? ['OPENAI_API_KEY', 'CODEX_API_KEY']
: mode === 'gemini'
? ['GEMINI_API_KEY', 'GOOGLE_API_KEY']
: [];
return { mode, docker, sessionId, resumeSessionId, createContext, execEnv, execEnvNames };
}
/**
* Set sensitive environment variables on a tmux session via setenv.
* These are inherited by panes but not visible in ps output or tmux history.
@@ -1209,6 +1443,7 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
effort,
historyLimit = DEFAULT_TMUX_HISTORY_LIMIT,
remote,
docker,
} = options;
const muxName = `codeman-${sessionId.slice(0, 8)}`;
@@ -1228,6 +1463,7 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
createdAt: Date.now(),
workingDir,
remote,
docker,
mode,
attached: false,
name,
@@ -1273,7 +1509,11 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
try {
// Build the full command to run inside tmux
const localFullCmd = `${buildNofileLimitCommand()} && ${pathExport}${envExportsStr} && ${cmd}`;
const fullCmd = remote ? buildRemoteLaunchCommand({ mode, remote, sessionId }) : localFullCmd;
const fullCmd = docker
? buildDockerLaunchCommand(resolveDockerLaunchOptions(mode, docker, sessionId, resumeSessionId))
: remote
? buildRemoteLaunchCommand({ mode, remote, sessionId })
: localFullCmd;
// Create tmux session in three steps to handle cold-start (no server running)
// and avoid the race where the command exits before remain-on-exit is set:
@@ -1324,7 +1564,7 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
// Replace the shell with the actual command (no echo in terminal). Keep
// pane launch in /tmp, then cd inside bash against the current mount table.
const launchCmd = remote ? fullCmd : `cd ${JSON.stringify(workingDir)} && ${fullCmd}`;
const launchCmd = remote || docker ? fullCmd : `cd ${JSON.stringify(workingDir)} && ${fullCmd}`;
execSync(
`${this.tmux()} respawn-pane -k -c ${TMUX_LAUNCH_CWD} -t "${muxName}" bash -c ${JSON.stringify(launchCmd)}`,
{
@@ -1399,6 +1639,7 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
createdAt: Date.now(),
workingDir,
remote,
docker,
mode,
attached: false,
name,
@@ -1484,6 +1725,7 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
effort,
historyLimit = DEFAULT_TMUX_HISTORY_LIMIT,
remote,
docker,
} = options;
const session = this.sessions.get(sessionId);
if (!session) return null;
@@ -1521,7 +1763,11 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
const config = niceConfig || DEFAULT_NICE_CONFIG;
const cmd = wrapWithNice(baseCmd, config);
const localFullCmd = `${buildNofileLimitCommand()} && ${pathExport}${envExportsStr} && ${cmd}`;
const fullCmd = remote ? buildRemoteLaunchCommand({ mode, remote, sessionId }) : localFullCmd;
const fullCmd = docker
? buildDockerLaunchCommand(resolveDockerLaunchOptions(mode, docker, sessionId, resumeSessionId))
: remote
? buildRemoteLaunchCommand({ mode, remote, sessionId })
: localFullCmd;
try {
// For OpenCode: set sensitive env vars via tmux setenv before respawn
@@ -1539,7 +1785,7 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
this.applyEnvOverrides(muxName, envOverrides);
// -c /tmp + cd bounce — see createSession() for rationale (stale FUSE state).
const launchCmd = remote ? fullCmd : `cd ${JSON.stringify(workingDir)} && ${fullCmd}`;
const launchCmd = remote || docker ? fullCmd : `cd ${JSON.stringify(workingDir)} && ${fullCmd}`;
await execAsync(
`${this.tmux()} respawn-pane -k -c ${TMUX_LAUNCH_CWD} -t "${muxName}" bash -c ${JSON.stringify(launchCmd)}`,
{
@@ -1725,6 +1971,18 @@ export class TmuxManager extends EventEmitter implements TerminalMultiplexer {
}
}
// Strategy 3c: Docker sessions run a DURABLE in-container tmux session. Kill
// ONLY this session's in-container tmux session (best-effort). The container is
// PER-CASE and shared by the case's other sessions, so we deliberately do NOT
// `docker stop` it here — stopping/removing is an explicit teardown/case-delete.
if (session.docker && !IS_TEST_MODE) {
try {
exec(buildDockerKillCommand({ docker: session.docker, sessionId }), { timeout: EXEC_TIMEOUT_MS }, () => {});
} catch {
// Best-effort — never affects the local kill result.
}
}
// Strategy 4: Direct kill by PID as final fallback
if (this.isProcessAlive(currentPid)) {
try {
+9 -1
View File
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ export interface CaseInfo {
/** Whether CLAUDE.md exists */
hasClaudeMd?: boolean;
/** Case storage/execution location */
location?: 'local' | 'linked-local' | 'remote';
location?: 'local' | 'linked-local' | 'remote' | 'docker';
/** Whether this is a linked local folder */
linked?: boolean;
/** Remote case metadata for display and session creation */
@@ -134,6 +134,14 @@ export interface CaseInfo {
username: string;
path: string;
};
/** Docker case metadata for display and session creation */
docker?: {
hostId: string;
container: string;
image?: string;
path: string;
network?: string;
};
}
// ========== Error Handling Utilities ==========
+118
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@@ -98,6 +98,122 @@ export interface SessionRemote extends RemoteSshOptions {
commands?: Partial<Record<RemoteCommandMode, string>>;
}
// ========== Docker cases (COD-Docker) ==========
//
// Docker mode is a LOCATION OVERLAY on cases (never a 6th SessionMode), the exact
// analog of the remote-SSH feature above: instead of a local tmux pane running
// `ssh host` into a durable remote tmux server, a local tmux pane runs
// `docker exec -it` into a durable in-container tmux server. The container is
// scoped to the CASE (not the session), so multiple sessions can `docker exec`
// into the same long-lived container. See `docs/docker-cases-plan.md`.
/** Which CLI backends a Docker case can run (same set as remote). */
export type DockerCommandMode = Extract<SessionMode, 'shell' | 'claude' | 'opencode' | 'codex' | 'gemini'>;
/** Container engine. Docker and Podman differ in the uid/userns + host-gateway alias. */
export type DockerEngine = 'docker' | 'podman';
/**
* Container network mode. `host` and any inbound `-p` publish are deliberately
* unrepresentable (never in this union, never emitted by the flag builder).
* - `bridge`: own netns, NAT egress, no inbound (default — every API CLI needs egress)
* - `none`: fully offline sandbox (breaks API CLIs; reserved for `shell`)
* - `custom`: a user-defined bridge `codeman-net-<slug>` (future egress-allowlist chokepoint)
*/
export type DockerNetworkMode = 'bridge' | 'none' | 'custom';
/** Per-container resource caps. Advisory under non-delegated rootless (see `capsEnforced`). */
export interface DockerResourceLimits {
/** e.g. '4g' -> --memory 4g --memory-swap 4g (swap==memory: a real OOM cap) */
memory?: string;
/** e.g. '2' -> --cpus 2 */
cpus?: string;
/** e.g. 512 -> --pids-limit 512 (fork-bomb guard) */
pidsLimit?: number;
/** e.g. '4096:8192' -> --ulimit nofile=4096:8192 */
nofile?: string;
/** e.g. '256m' -> --shm-size (only when a tool needs /dev/shm) */
shmSize?: string;
}
/** A reusable Docker engine/image/network/resource profile (mirror of RemoteHost). */
export interface DockerHost {
id: string;
label: string;
/** Engine; when absent the availability probe resolves it (docker, else podman). */
engine?: DockerEngine;
/** Base image ref (built locally by scripts/build-agent-image.mjs, e.g. codeman/agent:base). */
image: string;
/** Advanced: remote daemon (-H ssh://user@host or a DOCKER_HOST value). */
daemonHost?: string;
/** Advanced: docker `--context` name. */
context?: string;
/** Network mode (default 'bridge'). */
network?: DockerNetworkMode;
/** Custom bridge name when network === 'custom'. */
networkName?: string;
resources?: DockerResourceLimits;
/** GPU allocation, e.g. 'all' / '1' / 'device=0,1' -> `--gpus <value>` (needs the NVIDIA container toolkit). */
gpus?: string;
/** true (default) = convenient: bind-mount host cred dirs RW. false = sealed (blocks full-image export). */
mountCredentials?: boolean;
/** true (default) = wire in-container hooks (host-gateway callback + workspace scaffold). */
hooksEnabled?: boolean;
/** true (default) = a relaunch resumes the last conversation from the bind-mounted transcript. */
resumeOnStart?: boolean;
/** Per-mode command overrides (mirror RemoteHost.commands). */
commands?: Partial<Record<DockerCommandMode, string>>;
/** Escape hatch: extra `docker create` args (validated like extraSshOptions). */
extraCreateArgs?: string[];
/** Escape hatch: extra `docker exec` args. */
extraExecArgs?: string[];
}
/** A case linked to a Docker container (mirror of RemoteCase). */
export interface DockerCase {
name: string;
type: 'docker';
hostId: string;
/** Absolute HOST directory: the bind-mount source AND Session.workingDir (real host bytes). */
hostWorkspacePath: string;
/** Container path (default = hostWorkspacePath: mirror -> transcript projHash correlates). */
containerWorkdir?: string;
/** Container name (default codeman-case-<slug>). */
container?: string;
/** Last captured Claude conversation id, replayed via --resume on a fresh launch. */
lastClaudeSessionId?: string;
}
/**
* Flattened Docker execution metadata carried on a live session (mirror of
* SessionRemote). Round-trips through MuxSession/SessionState/mux-sessions.json.
*/
export interface SessionDocker {
hostId: string;
label: string;
engine: DockerEngine;
image: string;
/** Per-CASE container name (shared by all sessions of the case). */
containerName: string;
hostWorkspacePath: string;
containerWorkdir: string;
network: DockerNetworkMode;
networkName?: string;
resources?: DockerResourceLimits;
/** GPU allocation ('all' / '1' / 'device=0,1'). */
gpus?: string;
mountCredentials: boolean;
hooksEnabled: boolean;
resumeOnStart: boolean;
daemonHost?: string;
context?: string;
commands?: Partial<Record<DockerCommandMode, string>>;
extraCreateArgs?: string[];
extraExecArgs?: string[];
/** Stable hash of the drift-relevant create args (recreate-on-drift detection). */
configHash?: string;
}
/**
* Valid Claude CLI effort levels (claude >= 2.1.154).
* `ultracode` = xhigh effort + standing dynamic-workflow orchestration; it is a
@@ -217,6 +333,8 @@ export interface SessionState {
workingDir: string;
/** Remote execution metadata, present when this session runs over SSH through local tmux */
remote?: SessionRemote;
/** Docker execution metadata, present when this session runs inside a container via local tmux + docker exec */
docker?: SessionDocker;
/** ID of currently assigned task, null if none */
currentTaskId: string | null;
/** Timestamp when session was created */
+13
View File
@@ -151,6 +151,19 @@ export function registerAuthMiddleware(app: FastifyInstance, https: boolean): Au
// Use get() instead of has() so refreshOnGet extends the TTL on active sessions
const sessionToken = req.cookies[AUTH_COOKIE_NAME];
if (sessionToken && authSessions.get(sessionToken) !== undefined) {
// Sliding cookie: re-issue on every authenticated request so the browser
// cookie lifetime tracks the server-side sliding TTL (refreshOnGet above).
// Without this the cookie has a fixed lifetime from login; the browser
// drops it mid-use, the next request arrives cookie-less and falls through
// to Basic Auth — popping the native username/password dialog, which reads
// as a random logout while actively working.
reply.setCookie(AUTH_COOKIE_NAME, sessionToken, {
httpOnly: true,
secure: https,
sameSite: 'lax',
maxAge: AUTH_SESSION_TTL_MS / 1000, // seconds
path: '/',
});
done();
return;
}
+12
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,16 @@ export function isLoopbackBindHost(host: string): boolean {
*/
export const DEFAULT_TRUSTED_HOST_SUFFIXES = ['.ts.net', '.trycloudflare.com', '.cfargotunnel.com'];
/**
* Container-to-host gateway aliases (Docker / Podman). A hook `curl` from INSIDE a
* docker case carries `Host: host.docker.internal:<port>` (the derived
* CODEMAN_API_URL), so the always-on host guard must allow it or every in-container
* hook is blocked 403. These names only resolve to the host from within a
* container's network namespace, so they are not a DNS-rebinding surface for a
* normal browser. Both engines' aliases are allowed so a mixed fleet keeps working.
*/
export const DOCKER_HOST_GATEWAY_ALIASES = ['host.docker.internal', 'host.containers.internal'];
/** Policy inputs for the anti-DNS-rebinding Host allowlist + cross-site Origin guard. */
export interface HostPolicy {
/** The host the server is bound to (e.g. '127.0.0.1', '0.0.0.0', or a hostname). */
@@ -98,6 +108,8 @@ function matchesHost(hostname: string, policy: HostPolicy): boolean {
const bind = parseAuthorityHostname(policy.bindHost);
if (bind && hostname === bind) return true;
if (policy.tunnelHost && hostname === policy.tunnelHost) return true;
// Docker/Podman container-to-host gateway aliases (for in-container hook curls).
if (DOCKER_HOST_GATEWAY_ALIASES.includes(hostname)) return true;
for (const suffix of DEFAULT_TRUSTED_HOST_SUFFIXES) {
if (hostname === suffix.slice(1) || hostname.endsWith(suffix)) return true;
}
+19
View File
@@ -1433,6 +1433,25 @@ class CodemanApp {
for (const event of [SSE_EVENTS.SESSION_CREATED, SSE_EVENTS.SESSION_DELETED]) {
addListener(event, () => this._onSessionListMaybeChanged());
}
// Docker export/import: toast + refresh the Manage-tab exports list on completion.
addListener(SSE_EVENTS.DOCKER_EXPORT_COMPLETE, (e) => {
try {
const d = e.data ? JSON.parse(e.data) : {};
this.showToast(`Docker export ready: ${d.bundle} (${Math.round((d.sizeBytes || 0) / 1e6)} MB)`, 'success');
this.refreshDockerExports?.();
} catch (err) {
console.error('[SSE] docker export complete:', err);
}
});
addListener(SSE_EVENTS.DOCKER_EXPORT_FAILED, (e) => {
try {
const d = e.data ? JSON.parse(e.data) : {};
this.showToast(`Docker export failed: ${d.error || 'unknown error'}`, 'error');
} catch (err) {
console.error('[SSE] docker export failed:', err);
}
});
}
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+3
View File
@@ -474,6 +474,9 @@ const SSE_EVENTS = {
CASE_LINKED: 'case:linked',
CASE_DELETED: 'case:deleted',
CASE_ORDER_CHANGED: 'case:order-changed',
DOCKER_EXPORT_COMPLETE: 'docker:exportComplete',
DOCKER_EXPORT_FAILED: 'docker:exportFailed',
DOCKER_IMPORT_COMPLETE: 'docker:importComplete',
};
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+132 -3
View File
@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@
</div>
<button class="btn-icon-header btn-redraw-terminal btn-redraw-terminal--hidden" onclick="app.restoreTerminalSize()" title="Redraw terminal to fit current screen (Ctrl+Shift+R)" aria-label="Redraw terminal"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><polyline points="1 4 1 10 7 10"/><polyline points="23 20 23 14 17 14"/><path d="M20.49 9A9 9 0 0 0 5.64 5.64L1 10m22 4l-4.64 4.36A9 9 0 0 1 3.51 15"/></svg></button>
<button class="btn-icon-header btn-response-viewer-header btn-response-viewer-header--hidden" onclick="app.toggleResponseViewer()" title="View last response" aria-label="View last response"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2"><path d="M1 12s4-8 11-8 11 8 11 8-4 8-11 8-11-8-11-8z"/><circle cx="12" cy="12" r="3"/></svg></button>
<button class="btn-icon-header btn-away-digest" onclick="app.openAwayDigest()" title="Away Digest" aria-label="Open away digest"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M8 6h13"/><path d="M8 12h13"/><path d="M8 18h13"/><path d="M3 6h.01"/><path d="M3 12h.01"/><path d="M3 18h.01"/></svg></button>
<button class="btn-icon-header btn-session-manager" onclick="app.openSessionManager()" title="Session Manager" aria-label="Open session manager"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><polyline points="12 2 2 7 12 12 22 7 12 2"/><polyline points="2 17 12 22 22 17"/><polyline points="2 12 12 17 22 12"/></svg></button>
<button class="btn-icon-header btn-away-digest btn-away-digest--hidden" onclick="app.openAwayDigest()" title="Away Digest" aria-label="Open away digest"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M8 6h13"/><path d="M8 12h13"/><path d="M8 18h13"/><path d="M3 6h.01"/><path d="M3 12h.01"/><path d="M3 18h.01"/></svg></button>
<button class="btn-icon-header btn-session-manager btn-session-manager--hidden" onclick="app.openSessionManager()" title="Session Manager" aria-label="Open session manager"><svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><polyline points="12 2 2 7 12 12 22 7 12 2"/><polyline points="2 17 12 22 22 17"/><polyline points="2 12 12 17 22 12"/></svg></button>
<button class="btn-icon-header btn-attachments-history btn-attachments-history--hidden" id="attachmentsHistoryBtn" onclick="app.toggleAttachmentHistory()" title="Attachments" aria-label="Open attachment history" aria-expanded="false">
<svg width="16" height="16" viewBox="0 0 24 24" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" stroke-width="2" stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" aria-hidden="true"><path d="m21.44 11.05-9.19 9.19a6 6 0 0 1-8.49-8.49l9.19-9.19a4 4 0 0 1 5.66 5.66l-9.2 9.19a2 2 0 0 1-2.83-2.83l8.49-8.48"/></svg>
<span class="attachment-history-badge" id="attachmentHistoryBadge" style="display:none;">0</span>
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@
<div class="toolbar-right">
<!-- Orchestrator button hidden until feature is ready -->
<!-- <button class="btn-toolbar btn-sm" onclick="app.toggleOrchestratorPanel()" title="Orchestrator Loop">&#x2699; Orchestrator</button> -->
<button class="btn-toolbar btn-sm" onclick="app.openCron()" title="Cron Jobs">&#x23F0; Cron</button>
<button class="btn-toolbar btn-sm btn-cron" onclick="app.openCron()" title="Cron Jobs">&#x23F0; Cron</button>
<span class="version-display" id="versionDisplay" title="Codeman version">v0.0.0</span>
</div>
</footer>
@@ -1282,6 +1282,27 @@
<span class="slider"></span>
</label>
</div>
<div class="settings-item" title="Show the session manager button in the header (opens the session manager — sessions also stay reachable via the Ctrl+K palette)">
<span class="settings-item-label">Session Manager Button</span>
<label class="switch switch-sm">
<input type="checkbox" id="appSettingsShowSessionButton">
<span class="slider"></span>
</label>
</div>
<div class="settings-item" title="Show the away digest button in the header (opens the 'what happened while you were away' summary)">
<span class="settings-item-label">Away Digest Button</span>
<label class="switch switch-sm">
<input type="checkbox" id="appSettingsShowAwayDigestButton">
<span class="slider"></span>
</label>
</div>
<div class="settings-item" title="Show the Cron button in the footer toolbar (opens the cron jobs manager)">
<span class="settings-item-label">Cron Button</span>
<label class="switch switch-sm">
<input type="checkbox" id="appSettingsShowCronButton">
<span class="slider"></span>
</label>
</div>
<div class="settings-item" title="Show a terminal redraw button in the header — refit the terminal to the current screen size (useful when switching between devices)">
<span class="settings-item-label">Redraw Terminal Button</span>
<label class="switch switch-sm">
@@ -1828,6 +1849,7 @@
<button class="modal-tab-btn active" data-tab="case-create">Create New</button>
<button class="modal-tab-btn" data-tab="case-link">Link Existing</button>
<button class="modal-tab-btn" data-tab="case-remote">Remote</button>
<button class="modal-tab-btn" data-tab="case-docker">Docker</button>
<button class="modal-tab-btn" data-tab="case-manage">Manage</button>
</div>
<div class="modal-body">
@@ -1842,6 +1864,53 @@
<label>Description (optional)</label>
<input type="text" id="newCaseDescription" placeholder="A brief description..." autocomplete="off">
</div>
<div class="form-row">
<label class="checkbox-row"><input type="checkbox" id="newCaseDocker" onchange="app.toggleDockerQuickSettings()"> 🐳 Run in an isolated Docker container</label>
<span class="form-hint">One checkbox is enough — it creates the case folder AND a hardened container with default settings, then starts the session inside it. Click to expand for optional presets. Requires the base image (<code>node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs</code>).</span>
</div>
<details class="advanced-options" id="dockerQuickSettings" style="display:none;">
<summary>Container settings (optional — sensible defaults)</summary>
<div class="advanced-options-content">
<div class="form-row">
<label>Template</label>
<select id="quickDockerTemplate" onchange="app.applyDockerTemplate()">
<option value="small">Small — 2 GB RAM, 1 CPU</option>
<option value="medium" selected>Medium — 4 GB RAM, 2 CPU (default)</option>
<option value="large">Large — 8 GB RAM, 4 CPU</option>
<option value="gpu">GPU — 8 GB RAM, 4 CPU, all GPUs</option>
<option value="custom">Custom</option>
</select>
<span class="form-hint">Disk is elastic — storage grows automatically as data flows in (no fixed cap).</span>
</div>
<div class="form-row">
<label>Memory</label>
<input type="text" id="quickDockerMemory" placeholder="4g" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false">
</div>
<div class="form-row">
<label>CPUs</label>
<input type="text" id="quickDockerCpus" placeholder="2" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false">
</div>
<div class="form-row">
<label>GPUs</label>
<input type="text" id="quickDockerGpus" placeholder="none (e.g. all, or 1)" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false">
<span class="form-hint">Needs the NVIDIA container toolkit on the host.</span>
</div>
<div class="form-row">
<label>Network</label>
<select id="quickDockerNetwork">
<option value="bridge">bridge (internet on)</option>
<option value="none">none (fully isolated)</option>
</select>
</div>
<div class="form-row">
<label>Image</label>
<input type="text" id="quickDockerImage" placeholder="codeman/agent:base" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false">
</div>
<div class="form-row">
<label class="checkbox-row"><input type="checkbox" id="quickDockerMountCreds" checked> Mount host credentials (~/.claude etc.)</label>
</div>
</div>
</details>
</div>
<!-- Link Existing Tab -->
<div class="modal-tab-content hidden" id="case-link">
@@ -1916,12 +1985,72 @@
</div>
</details>
</div>
<!-- Docker Tab -->
<div class="modal-tab-content hidden" id="case-docker">
<div class="form-row">
<label>Case Name</label>
<input type="text" id="dockerCaseName" placeholder="sandbox" pattern="[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+" autocomplete="off" autocapitalize="off" spellcheck="false">
<span class="form-hint">Runs inside an isolated container. Multiple sessions can share the same container.</span>
</div>
<div class="form-row">
<label>Workspace Path</label>
<input type="text" id="dockerWorkspacePath" placeholder="/home/user/projects/sandbox" autocomplete="off" autocapitalize="off" autocorrect="off" spellcheck="false">
<span class="form-hint">Absolute HOST directory, bind-mounted into the container. Codeman scaffolds CLAUDE.md + hooks into it.</span>
</div>
<div class="form-row">
<label>Host ID</label>
<input type="text" id="dockerHostId" placeholder="local" pattern="[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+" autocomplete="off" autocapitalize="off" spellcheck="false">
<span class="form-hint">A reusable docker host profile. Reuse the same ID across cases to share settings.</span>
</div>
<div class="form-row">
<label>Image</label>
<input type="text" id="dockerImage" placeholder="codeman/agent:base" autocomplete="off" autocapitalize="off" spellcheck="false">
<span class="form-hint">Build it once with <code>node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs</code>. Contains node + claude/codex/gemini + tmux.</span>
</div>
<div class="form-row">
<label>Network</label>
<select id="dockerNetwork">
<option value="bridge">bridge (internet on, default)</option>
<option value="none">none (fully isolated, no network)</option>
<option value="custom">custom bridge</option>
</select>
</div>
<details class="advanced-options">
<summary>Advanced container settings</summary>
<div class="advanced-options-content">
<div class="form-row">
<label>Memory</label>
<input type="text" id="dockerMemory" placeholder="4g" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false">
<span class="form-hint">Optional, e.g. 4g / 512m. Enforced as a hard OOM cap where the engine supports it.</span>
</div>
<div class="form-row">
<label>CPUs</label>
<input type="text" id="dockerCpus" placeholder="2" autocomplete="off" spellcheck="false">
</div>
<div class="form-row">
<label class="checkbox-row"><input type="checkbox" id="dockerMountCredentials" checked> Mount host credentials (~/.claude etc.)</label>
<span class="form-hint">On: your existing login just works (creds stay on the host, never in exports). Off: sealed sandbox, log in inside the container.</span>
</div>
<div class="form-row">
<label class="checkbox-row"><input type="checkbox" id="dockerResumeOnStart" checked> Resume last conversation on relaunch</label>
</div>
</div>
</details>
<span class="form-hint" id="dockerLinkStatus" style="margin-top: 8px; display: block;"></span>
</div>
<!-- Manage Tab -->
<div class="modal-tab-content hidden" id="case-manage">
<div class="case-manage-list" id="caseManageList">
<!-- Populated by JS -->
</div>
<span class="form-hint" style="margin-top: 8px; display: block;">Use arrows to reorder. Changes are saved automatically.</span>
<div id="dockerExportsSection" style="margin-top: 16px; border-top: 1px solid var(--border, #333); padding-top: 12px;">
<div style="display:flex; align-items:center; justify-content:space-between; margin-bottom:8px;">
<strong style="font-size: 13px;">Docker exports</strong>
<button class="btn-toolbar" onclick="app.refreshDockerExports()">Refresh</button>
</div>
<div class="case-manage-list" id="dockerExportsList"><span class="form-hint">No exports yet. Export a docker case from its tab.</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="form-actions">
+275 -12
View File
@@ -45,7 +45,9 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
formatCasePickerLabel(c) {
return c?.location === 'remote' && c.remote?.hostId ? `${c.name} @ ${c.remote.hostId}` : c?.name || '';
if (c?.location === 'remote' && c.remote?.hostId) return `${c.name} @ ${c.remote.hostId}`;
if (c?.location === 'docker' && c.docker?.container) return `${c.name} @ ${c.docker.container}`;
return c?.name || '';
},
buildCasePickerOptions(cases = []) {
@@ -70,7 +72,10 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
c.location,
c.remote?.hostId,
c.remote?.label,
c.remote?.path
c.remote?.path,
c.docker?.container,
c.docker?.image,
c.docker?.path
].filter(Boolean).join(' ').toLowerCase();
return { name: c.name, label, case: c, searchText };
})
@@ -517,7 +522,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
// Remote cases run over ssh — POST /api/sessions stat-validates workingDir on
// the LOCAL fs (a remote user@host:/path never exists locally), so route them
// through /api/quick-start, which resolves the remote case + launches via ssh.
if (caseData.location === 'remote') {
if (caseData.location === 'remote' || caseData.location === 'docker') {
const remoteIds = [];
for (let i = 0; i < tabCount; i++) {
const res = await fetch('/api/quick-start', {
@@ -694,12 +699,16 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
}
const selectedCase = (this.cases || []).find(c => c.name === caseName);
const isRemoteCase = caseData.location === 'remote' || selectedCase?.location === 'remote';
const isRemoteCase =
caseData.location === 'remote' ||
caseData.location === 'docker' ||
selectedCase?.location === 'remote' ||
selectedCase?.location === 'docker';
const workingDir = caseData.path;
if (!workingDir) throw new Error('Case path not found');
// Remote cases run over ssh — route through /api/quick-start (see runClaude).
if (caseData.location === 'remote') {
if (caseData.location === 'remote' || caseData.location === 'docker') {
const remoteIds = [];
for (let i = 0; i < shellCount; i++) {
const res = await fetch('/api/quick-start', {
@@ -789,7 +798,8 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
const caseName = document.getElementById('quickStartCase').value || 'testcase';
// Remote cases run the CLI on the REMOTE host — the local /api/opencode/status
// probe and the local-only config/env below don't apply (quick-start rejects them).
const isRemote = (this.cases || []).find(c => c.name === caseName)?.location === 'remote';
const _runLoc = (this.cases || []).find(c => c.name === caseName)?.location;
const isRemote = _runLoc === 'remote' || _runLoc === 'docker';
this.terminal.clear();
this.terminal.writeln(`\x1b[1;32m Starting OpenCode session in ${caseName}...\x1b[0m`);
@@ -843,7 +853,8 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
const caseName = document.getElementById('quickStartCase').value || 'testcase';
// Remote cases run Codex on the REMOTE host — skip the local status probe and the
// local-only config/env below (quick-start rejects them for remote cases).
const isRemote = (this.cases || []).find(c => c.name === caseName)?.location === 'remote';
const _runLoc = (this.cases || []).find(c => c.name === caseName)?.location;
const isRemote = _runLoc === 'remote' || _runLoc === 'docker';
this.terminal.clear();
this.terminal.writeln(`\x1b[1;32m Starting Codex session in ${caseName}...\x1b[0m`);
@@ -897,7 +908,8 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
const caseName = document.getElementById('quickStartCase').value || 'testcase';
// Remote cases run Gemini on the REMOTE host — skip the local status probe and the
// local-only config/env below (quick-start rejects them for remote cases).
const isRemote = (this.cases || []).find(c => c.name === caseName)?.location === 'remote';
const _runLoc = (this.cases || []).find(c => c.name === caseName)?.location;
const isRemote = _runLoc === 'remote' || _runLoc === 'docker';
this.terminal.clear();
this.terminal.writeln(`\x1b[1;32m Starting Gemini session in ${caseName}...\x1b[0m`);
@@ -1567,10 +1579,17 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
if (tabName === 'case-manage') {
submitBtn.style.display = 'none';
this.renderCaseManageList();
this.refreshDockerExports();
} else {
submitBtn.style.display = '';
submitBtn.textContent =
tabName === 'case-create' ? 'Create' : tabName === 'case-remote' ? 'Link Remote' : 'Link';
tabName === 'case-create'
? 'Create'
: tabName === 'case-remote'
? 'Link Remote'
: tabName === 'case-docker'
? 'Link Docker'
: 'Link';
}
// Focus appropriate input
if (tabName === 'case-create') {
@@ -1579,6 +1598,8 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
document.getElementById('linkCaseName').focus();
} else if (tabName === 'case-remote') {
document.getElementById('remoteCaseName').focus();
} else if (tabName === 'case-docker') {
document.getElementById('dockerCaseName').focus();
}
},
@@ -1596,6 +1617,8 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
await this.createCase();
} else if (this.caseModalTab === 'case-remote') {
await this.linkRemoteCase();
} else if (this.caseModalTab === 'case-docker') {
await this.linkDockerCase();
} else {
await this.linkCase();
}
@@ -1619,21 +1642,36 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
return;
}
// One-click "Run in Docker": create the case folder AND a container, then start
// a session inside it. Optional expandable settings override the defaults.
const inDocker = document.getElementById('newCaseDocker')?.checked;
const endpoint = inDocker ? '/api/cases/docker-quickcreate' : '/api/cases';
const payload = inDocker
? { name, description, ...this._collectDockerQuickSettings() }
: { name, description };
try {
const res = await fetch('/api/cases', {
const res = await fetch(endpoint, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ name, description })
body: JSON.stringify(payload)
});
const data = await res.json();
if (data.success) {
this.closeCreateCaseModal();
this.showToast(`Case "${name}" created`, 'success');
// Reload cases and select the new one
await this.loadQuickStartCases(name);
// Save as last used case
await this.saveLastUsedCase(name);
if (inDocker) {
const caps = data.data?.capsEnforced === false ? ' (resource caps advisory on this engine)' : '';
this.showToast(`Docker case "${name}" created${caps} — starting session…`, 'success');
// Start a session INSIDE the container (routes through quick-start).
await this.runClaude();
} else {
this.showToast(`Case "${name}" created`, 'success');
}
} else {
this.showToast(data.error || 'Failed to create case', 'error');
}
@@ -1643,6 +1681,54 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
}
},
// Show/hide the expandable container-settings section under the Docker checkbox.
toggleDockerQuickSettings() {
const on = document.getElementById('newCaseDocker')?.checked;
const el = document.getElementById('dockerQuickSettings');
if (el) el.style.display = on ? '' : 'none';
},
// Fill the memory/cpu/gpu fields from a resource template. `medium` clears them so
// the server uses its defaults (no per-case host); `custom` leaves them editable.
applyDockerTemplate() {
const t = document.getElementById('quickDockerTemplate')?.value;
const presets = {
small: { m: '2g', c: '1', g: '' },
medium: { m: '', c: '', g: '' },
large: { m: '8g', c: '4', g: '' },
gpu: { m: '8g', c: '4', g: 'all' },
};
const p = presets[t];
if (!p) return; // 'custom' — leave fields as-is
const set = (id, v) => {
const el = document.getElementById(id);
if (el) el.value = v;
};
set('quickDockerMemory', p.m);
set('quickDockerCpus', p.c);
set('quickDockerGpus', p.g);
},
// Collect only the non-default docker overrides (empty fields fall back to defaults
// server-side; sent as undefined, never null, per the Zod .optional() gotcha).
_collectDockerQuickSettings() {
const val = (id) => (document.getElementById(id)?.value || '').trim();
const o = {};
const mem = val('quickDockerMemory');
if (mem) o.memory = mem;
const cpus = val('quickDockerCpus');
if (cpus) o.cpus = cpus;
const gpus = val('quickDockerGpus');
if (gpus && gpus.toLowerCase() !== 'none') o.gpus = gpus;
const net = document.getElementById('quickDockerNetwork')?.value;
if (net && net !== 'bridge') o.network = net;
const img = val('quickDockerImage');
if (img) o.image = img;
const mc = document.getElementById('quickDockerMountCreds');
if (mc && !mc.checked) o.mountCredentials = false;
return o;
},
async linkCase() {
const name = document.getElementById('linkCaseName').value.trim();
const path = document.getElementById('linkCasePath').value.trim();
@@ -1767,6 +1853,177 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
}
},
async linkDockerCase() {
const name = document.getElementById('dockerCaseName').value.trim();
const hostWorkspacePath = document.getElementById('dockerWorkspacePath').value.trim();
const hostId = document.getElementById('dockerHostId').value.trim() || 'local';
const image = document.getElementById('dockerImage').value.trim() || 'codeman/agent:base';
const network = document.getElementById('dockerNetwork').value;
const memory = document.getElementById('dockerMemory').value.trim();
const cpus = document.getElementById('dockerCpus').value.trim();
const mountCredentials = document.getElementById('dockerMountCredentials').checked;
const resumeOnStart = document.getElementById('dockerResumeOnStart').checked;
const statusEl = document.getElementById('dockerLinkStatus');
if (!name || !hostWorkspacePath) {
this.showToast('Please enter a case name and workspace path', 'error');
return;
}
if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(name) || !/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(hostId)) {
this.showToast('Invalid name. Use only letters, numbers, hyphens, underscores.', 'error');
return;
}
if (!hostWorkspacePath.startsWith('/')) {
this.showToast('Workspace path must be absolute', 'error');
return;
}
try {
if (statusEl) statusEl.textContent = 'Checking docker daemon + base image...';
// omitted optionals sent as UNDEFINED (never null — Zod .optional() rejects null)
const resources = {};
if (memory) resources.memory = memory;
if (cpus) resources.cpus = cpus;
const hostPayload = {
id: hostId,
label: hostId,
image,
network,
mountCredentials,
resumeOnStart,
...(Object.keys(resources).length ? { resources } : {}),
};
// PUT (update-or-create) so re-linking with the same host id refreshes its settings.
let hostRes = await fetch('/api/docker-hosts', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify(hostPayload),
});
let hostData = await hostRes.json();
if (!hostData.success && hostData.errorCode === 'ALREADY_EXISTS') {
hostRes = await fetch(`/api/docker-hosts/${encodeURIComponent(hostId)}`, {
method: 'PUT',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify(hostPayload),
});
hostData = await hostRes.json();
}
if (!hostData.success) throw new Error(hostData.error || 'Failed to save docker host');
const caseRes = await fetch('/api/cases/docker-link', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ name, hostId, hostWorkspacePath }),
});
const caseData = await caseRes.json();
if (caseData.success) {
this.closeCreateCaseModal();
const caps = caseData.data?.capsEnforced === false ? ' (resource caps are advisory on this engine)' : '';
this.showToast(`Docker case "${name}" linked${caps}`, 'success');
await this.loadQuickStartCases(name);
await this.saveLastUsedCase(name);
} else {
if (statusEl) statusEl.textContent = caseData.error || 'Failed to link docker case';
this.showToast(caseData.error || 'Failed to link docker case', 'error');
}
} catch (err) {
console.error('Failed to link docker case:', err);
if (statusEl) statusEl.textContent = err.message;
this.showToast('Failed to link docker case: ' + err.message, 'error');
}
},
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// Docker export / import UI
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
async refreshDockerExports() {
const listEl = document.getElementById('dockerExportsList');
if (!listEl) return;
try {
const res = await fetch('/api/docker-exports');
const data = await res.json();
const exports = data?.data?.exports || [];
if (exports.length === 0) {
listEl.innerHTML = '<span class="form-hint">No exports yet. Export a docker case from its tab.</span>';
return;
}
listEl.innerHTML = exports
.map(e => {
const mb = (e.sizeBytes / 1e6).toFixed(1);
const nm = this.escapeHtml ? this.escapeHtml(e.name) : e.name;
return `<div class="case-manage-item" style="display:flex; align-items:center; gap:8px; justify-content:space-between;">
<span style="overflow:hidden; text-overflow:ellipsis; white-space:nowrap;" title="${nm}">${nm} <span class="form-hint">(${mb} MB)</span></span>
<span style="flex-shrink:0;">
<a class="btn-toolbar" href="/api/docker-exports/${encodeURIComponent(e.name)}" download>Download</a>
<button class="btn-toolbar" onclick="app.importDockerBundle('${nm.replace(/'/g, "\\'")}')">Import</button>
<button class="btn-toolbar" onclick="app.deleteDockerExport('${nm.replace(/'/g, "\\'")}')">Delete</button>
</span>
</div>`;
})
.join('');
} catch (err) {
listEl.innerHTML = `<span class="form-hint">Failed to load exports: ${err.message}</span>`;
}
},
async exportDockerCaseBundle(caseName, mode = 'full') {
try {
const res = await fetch(`/api/docker-cases/${encodeURIComponent(caseName)}/export`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ mode }),
});
const data = await res.json();
if (data.success) {
this.showToast(`Exporting "${caseName}" (${mode})... you'll be notified when the bundle is ready`, 'info');
} else {
this.showToast(data.error || 'Export failed', 'error');
}
} catch (err) {
this.showToast('Export failed: ' + err.message, 'error');
}
},
async importDockerBundle(bundle) {
const newCaseName = prompt('New case name for the imported bundle:', bundle.split('-')[0] + '-imported');
if (!newCaseName) return;
const destWorkspacePath = prompt('Absolute host directory to restore the workspace into:', '');
if (!destWorkspacePath) return;
try {
const res = await fetch('/api/docker-cases/import', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ bundle, newCaseName, destWorkspacePath }),
});
const data = await res.json();
if (data.success) {
this.showToast(`Imported as "${newCaseName}"`, 'success');
await this.loadQuickStartCases(newCaseName);
} else {
this.showToast(data.error || 'Import failed', 'error');
}
} catch (err) {
this.showToast('Import failed: ' + err.message, 'error');
}
},
async deleteDockerExport(filename) {
if (!confirm(`Delete export bundle "${filename}"?`)) return;
try {
const res = await fetch(`/api/docker-exports/${encodeURIComponent(filename)}`, { method: 'DELETE' });
const data = await res.json();
if (data.success) {
this.showToast('Export deleted', 'success');
this.refreshDockerExports();
} else {
this.showToast(data.error || 'Delete failed', 'error');
}
} catch (err) {
this.showToast('Delete failed: ' + err.message, 'error');
}
},
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// Case Management (reorder + delete)
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
@@ -1791,6 +2048,12 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
<span class="case-manage-path">${escapeHtml(pathDisplay)}</span>
</div>
<div class="case-manage-actions">
${
c.location === 'docker'
? `<button class="case-manage-btn" onclick="app.exportDockerCaseBundle(${escapeHtml(JSON.stringify(c.name))}, 'full')"
title="Export container (full image + workspace) to move to another machine">&#x1F4E6;</button>`
: ''
}
<button class="case-manage-btn" onclick="app.moveCaseUp(${escapeHtml(JSON.stringify(c.name))})"
title="Move up" ${isFirst ? 'disabled' : ''}>&#x25B2;</button>
<button class="case-manage-btn" onclick="app.moveCaseDown(${escapeHtml(JSON.stringify(c.name))})"
+39
View File
@@ -324,6 +324,10 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
document.getElementById('appSettingsShowMultiMonitorButton').checked = settings.showMultiMonitorButton ?? defaults.showMultiMonitorButton ?? false;
document.getElementById('appSettingsShowPlanUsageLimits').checked = settings.showPlanUsageLimits ?? defaults.showPlanUsageLimits ?? false;
document.getElementById('appSettingsShowRedrawButton').checked = settings.showRedrawButton ?? defaults.showRedrawButton ?? false;
// Session Manager + Away Digest buttons default OFF; Cron button defaults ON.
document.getElementById('appSettingsShowSessionButton').checked = settings.showSessionButton ?? defaults.showSessionButton ?? false;
document.getElementById('appSettingsShowAwayDigestButton').checked = settings.showAwayDigestButton ?? defaults.showAwayDigestButton ?? false;
document.getElementById('appSettingsShowCronButton').checked = settings.showCronButton ?? defaults.showCronButton ?? true;
// Gesture control lives in the Input section (alongside Local Echo / CJK Input)
// but is only available when the instance runs with CODEMAN_GESTURE=1 (server sets
// window.__codemanGestureAvailable). Hide just this item otherwise so the toggle
@@ -1432,6 +1436,9 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
showMultiMonitorButton: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowMultiMonitorButton').checked,
showPlanUsageLimits: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowPlanUsageLimits').checked,
showRedrawButton: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowRedrawButton').checked,
showSessionButton: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowSessionButton').checked,
showAwayDigestButton: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowAwayDigestButton').checked,
showCronButton: document.getElementById('appSettingsShowCronButton').checked,
gestureControlEnabled: document.getElementById('appSettingsGestureControl').checked,
subagentTrackingEnabled: document.getElementById('appSettingsSubagentTracking').checked,
subagentActiveTabOnly: document.getElementById('appSettingsSubagentActiveTabOnly').checked,
@@ -1613,6 +1620,11 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
showAttachmentsButton: _ahb,
webglRendererEnabled: _wgl,
terminalWheelLocalScrollback: _twls,
// Per-device header/toolbar button toggles — client-only, and absent from
// SettingsUpdateSchema (.strict()), so sending them would 400 the PUT.
showSessionButton: _ssb,
showAwayDigestButton: _adb,
showCronButton: _crb,
...serverSettings
} = settings;
try {
@@ -1770,6 +1782,9 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
showPlanUsageLimits: false,
showAttachmentsButton: false,
showRedrawButton: false,
showSessionButton: false,
showAwayDigestButton: false,
showCronButton: true,
// Input
gestureControlEnabled: false,
// Feature toggles - keep tracking on even on mobile
@@ -1917,6 +1932,29 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
redrawBtn.classList.toggle('btn-redraw-terminal--hidden', !showRedrawButton);
}
// Session Manager button — opt-in, hidden by default (App Settings → Display).
// Marker class (base is display:inline-flex !important); phones keep it hidden
// via mobile.css regardless. Sessions stay reachable via the Ctrl+K palette.
const showSessionButton = settings.showSessionButton ?? defaults.showSessionButton ?? false;
const sessionBtn = document.querySelector('.btn-session-manager');
if (sessionBtn) {
sessionBtn.classList.toggle('btn-session-manager--hidden', !showSessionButton);
}
// Away Digest button — opt-in, hidden by default. Same marker pattern.
const showAwayDigestButton = settings.showAwayDigestButton ?? defaults.showAwayDigestButton ?? false;
const awayDigestBtn = document.querySelector('.btn-away-digest');
if (awayDigestBtn) {
awayDigestBtn.classList.toggle('btn-away-digest--hidden', !showAwayDigestButton);
}
// Cron button (footer toolbar) — shown by default; hide when disabled.
const showCronButton = settings.showCronButton ?? defaults.showCronButton ?? true;
const cronBtn = document.querySelector('.btn-cron');
if (cronBtn) {
cronBtn.classList.toggle('btn-cron--hidden', !showCronButton);
}
// Notification bell is retired (notifications live in Settings → Notifications
// + the drawer); keep it hidden regardless of the notification-enabled state.
const notifBtn = document.querySelector('.btn-notifications');
@@ -2155,6 +2193,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, {
'subagentActiveTabOnly', 'tabTwoRows', 'localEchoEnabled', 'cjkInputEnabled', 'extendedKeyboardBar',
'skin', 'showPlanUsageLimits', 'showAttachmentsButton', 'webglRendererEnabled',
'terminalWheelLocalScrollback',
'showSessionButton', 'showAwayDigestButton', 'showCronButton',
]);
// The plan-usage chip is a PER-DEVICE display setting (default OFF): desktop
// can show it while mobile stays hidden. It used to sync, so an older
+25
View File
@@ -9471,6 +9471,31 @@ kbd {
display: none !important;
}
/* "Session Manager" + "Away Digest" header buttons — opt-in (App Settings →
Display), hidden by default. Same marker pattern as the response viewer: a
base inline-flex !important so an inline style can't override it, and a
more-specific marker rule to hide. Phones keep them hidden regardless via the
higher-specificity mobile.css rule (.btn-icon-header.btn-...). */
.btn-session-manager {
display: inline-flex !important;
}
.btn-session-manager.btn-session-manager--hidden {
display: none !important;
}
.btn-away-digest {
display: inline-flex !important;
}
.btn-away-digest.btn-away-digest--hidden {
display: none !important;
}
/* "Cron" footer-toolbar button — shown by default (App Settings → Display can
hide it). Toolbar button, not a header icon, so only the hide marker is
needed; out-specify any base .btn-toolbar display. */
.btn-toolbar.btn-cron--hidden {
display: none !important;
}
/* "Ultracode Agents" header launcher — opt-in (App Settings → Display), hidden by
default everywhere (so the mobile-header-buttons-policy guard auto-excludes it).
Base inline-flex !important + a more-specific marker rule to hide. */
+439 -3
View File
@@ -5,11 +5,13 @@
*/
import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readdirSync } from 'node:fs';
import { existsSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, createReadStream } from 'node:fs';
import { exec } from 'node:child_process';
import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import { join, resolve } from 'node:path';
import { join, resolve, basename } from 'node:path';
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
import { homedir } from 'node:os';
import type { ApiResponse, CaseInfo } from '../../types.js';
import type { ApiResponse, CaseInfo, DockerHost } from '../../types.js';
import { ApiErrorCode, createErrorResponse, getErrorMessage } from '../../types.js';
import {
CreateCaseSchema,
@@ -17,13 +19,32 @@ import {
CaseOrderSchema,
RemoteCaseLinkSchema,
RemoteHostSchema,
DockerCaseLinkSchema,
DockerHostSchema,
DockerExportSchema,
DockerImportSchema,
DockerQuickCreateSchema,
} from '../schemas.js';
import { exportDockerCase, importDockerBundle, listDockerExports, exportBundleName } from '../../docker-export.js';
import { generateClaudeMd } from '../../templates/claude-md.js';
import { writeHooksConfig } from '../../hooks-config.js';
import { CASES_DIR, SETTINGS_PATH, validatePathWithinBase, parseBody, readJsonConfig } from '../route-helpers.js';
import { SseEvent } from '../sse-events.js';
import type { EventPort, ConfigPort } from '../ports/index.js';
import { dataPath, getDataDir } from '../../config/instance.js';
import {
checkDockerAvailable,
checkDockerTmuxAvailable,
DEFAULT_AGENT_IMAGE,
dockerContainerName,
dockerDisplayPath,
readDockerCases,
readDockerHosts,
toSessionDocker,
writeDockerCases,
writeDockerHosts,
} from '../../docker-hosts.js';
import { buildDockerRemoveCommand } from '../../tmux-manager.js';
import {
checkRemoteTmuxAvailable,
readRemoteCases,
@@ -36,6 +57,19 @@ import {
const LINKED_CASES_FILE = dataPath('linked-cases.json');
const CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR = getDataDir();
const SAFE_CASE_NAME = /^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/;
const DOCKER_EXPORTS_DIR = dataPath('docker-exports');
/** Auto-created host profile for the one-click "Run in Docker" case flow. */
const DEFAULT_DOCKER_HOST_ID = 'default';
/** App version for export manifests (best-effort read of package.json). */
const APP_VERSION = (() => {
try {
const pkgPath = fileURLToPath(new URL('../../../package.json', import.meta.url));
return (JSON.parse(readFileSync(pkgPath, 'utf-8')).version as string) || 'unknown';
} catch {
return 'unknown';
}
})();
/** Read and parse linked-cases.json, returning empty object on missing/invalid file. */
async function readLinkedCases(): Promise<Record<string, string>> {
@@ -118,6 +152,35 @@ export function registerCaseRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: EventPort & Config
}
}
// Get docker cases
const dockerHosts = await readDockerHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR);
const dockerHostMap = new Map(dockerHosts.map((host) => [host.id, host]));
for (const dockerCase of await readDockerCases(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR)) {
const host = dockerHostMap.get(dockerCase.hostId);
if (!host || !SAFE_CASE_NAME.test(dockerCase.name)) continue;
existingNames.add(dockerCase.name);
const container = dockerCase.container ?? dockerContainerName(dockerCase.name);
const dockerCaseInfo: CaseInfo = {
name: dockerCase.name,
path: dockerDisplayPath({ container, path: dockerCase.hostWorkspacePath }),
hasClaudeMd: existsSync(join(dockerCase.hostWorkspacePath, 'CLAUDE.md')),
location: 'docker',
docker: {
hostId: host.id,
container,
image: host.image,
path: dockerCase.hostWorkspacePath,
network: host.network ?? 'bridge',
},
};
const existingIndex = cases.findIndex((item) => item.name === dockerCase.name);
if (existingIndex === -1) {
cases.push(dockerCaseInfo);
} else {
cases[existingIndex] = dockerCaseInfo;
}
}
// Sort by persisted caseOrder from settings.json
const settings = await readJsonConfig<Record<string, unknown>>(SETTINGS_PATH, 'settings', {});
const caseOrder = Array.isArray(settings.caseOrder) ? (settings.caseOrder as string[]) : [];
@@ -232,6 +295,338 @@ export function registerCaseRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: EventPort & Config
return { success: true, data: { case: remoteCase } };
});
// ========== Docker hosts + docker cases (COD-Docker) ==========
app.get('/api/docker-hosts', async () => readDockerHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR));
app.post('/api/docker-hosts', async (req): Promise<ApiResponse<{ host: unknown }>> => {
const host = parseBody(DockerHostSchema, req.body);
const hosts = await readDockerHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR);
if (hosts.some((item) => item.id === host.id)) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.ALREADY_EXISTS, 'Docker host already exists');
}
await writeDockerHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR, [...hosts, host]);
return { success: true, data: { host } };
});
app.put('/api/docker-hosts/:id', async (req): Promise<ApiResponse<{ host: unknown }>> => {
const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
const host = parseBody(DockerHostSchema, { ...(req.body as object), id });
const hosts = await readDockerHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR);
const index = hosts.findIndex((item) => item.id === id);
if (index === -1) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Docker host not found');
const next = [...hosts];
next[index] = host;
await writeDockerHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR, next);
return { success: true, data: { host } };
});
app.delete('/api/docker-hosts/:id', async (req): Promise<ApiResponse<{ id: string }>> => {
const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
const cases = await readDockerCases(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR);
if (cases.some((item) => item.hostId === id)) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.OPERATION_FAILED, 'Docker host is still used by docker cases');
}
const hosts = await readDockerHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR);
await writeDockerHosts(
CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR,
hosts.filter((item) => item.id !== id)
);
return { success: true, data: { id } };
});
app.post(
'/api/cases/docker-link',
async (req): Promise<ApiResponse<{ case: unknown; capsEnforced?: boolean; isDesktop?: boolean }>> => {
const dockerCase = { ...parseBody(DockerCaseLinkSchema, req.body), type: 'docker' as const };
const hosts = await readDockerHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR);
const host = hosts.find((item) => item.id === dockerCase.hostId);
if (!host) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Docker host not found');
const linkedCases = await readLinkedCases();
const dockerCases = await readDockerCases(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR);
if (
dockerCases.some((item) => item.name === dockerCase.name) ||
linkedCases[dockerCase.name] ||
existsSync(join(CASES_DIR, dockerCase.name))
) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.ALREADY_EXISTS, 'Case already exists');
}
// The workspace is a REAL host directory (bind-mounted into the container), so
// create it now if missing. Scaffolding (.claude/settings.local.json + CLAUDE.md)
// is written by quick-start on first launch, matching local-case behaviour.
if (!existsSync(dockerCase.hostWorkspacePath)) {
try {
mkdirSync(dockerCase.hostWorkspacePath, { recursive: true });
} catch (err) {
return createErrorResponse(
ApiErrorCode.OPERATION_FAILED,
`Could not create workspace: ${getErrorMessage(err)}`
);
}
}
// Courtesy validation: docker daemon must be reachable AND the base image must
// contain tmux (a hard prerequisite for durable in-container sessions). Surfaces
// a clear error at link time instead of a dead pane on first launch.
const availability = await checkDockerAvailable(host.engine);
if (!availability.ok) {
return createErrorResponse(
ApiErrorCode.OPERATION_FAILED,
availability.error || 'docker daemon is not available'
);
}
const tmuxCheck = await checkDockerTmuxAvailable(toSessionDocker(host, dockerCase));
if (!tmuxCheck.ok) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.OPERATION_FAILED, tmuxCheck.error || 'base image is missing tmux');
}
await writeDockerCases(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR, [...dockerCases, dockerCase]);
ctx.broadcast(SseEvent.CaseLinked, {
name: dockerCase.name,
path: dockerCase.hostWorkspacePath,
type: 'docker',
});
return {
success: true,
data: { case: dockerCase, capsEnforced: availability.capsEnforced, isDesktop: availability.isDesktop },
};
}
);
// One-click "Run in Docker": create a NORMAL case (folder in CASES_DIR, scaffolded)
// AND link it to a hardened container with default settings, auto-provisioning a
// shared `default` docker host so the user never touches host/image/network fields.
app.post(
'/api/cases/docker-quickcreate',
async (req): Promise<ApiResponse<{ case: unknown; capsEnforced?: boolean; isDesktop?: boolean }>> => {
const body = parseBody(DockerQuickCreateSchema, req.body);
const { name, description } = body;
const casePath = validatePathWithinBase(name, CASES_DIR);
if (!casePath) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT, 'Invalid case path');
// Collision across every case kind.
const linkedCases = await readLinkedCases();
const dockerCases = await readDockerCases(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR);
const remoteCases = await readRemoteCases(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR);
if (
existsSync(casePath) ||
dockerCases.some((item) => item.name === name) ||
remoteCases.some((item) => item.name === name) ||
linkedCases[name]
) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.ALREADY_EXISTS, 'Case already exists');
}
// The checkbox alone (no overrides) uses the shared `default` host; any tweaked
// setting gets a dedicated per-case host so it never mutates the shared default.
const hasOverrides = !!(
body.image ||
body.network ||
body.networkName ||
body.memory ||
body.cpus ||
body.gpus ||
body.mountCredentials !== undefined
);
const resources: { memory?: string; cpus?: string } = {};
if (body.memory) resources.memory = body.memory;
if (body.cpus) resources.cpus = body.cpus;
const desiredHost: DockerHost = {
id: hasOverrides ? `q-${name}` : DEFAULT_DOCKER_HOST_ID,
label: hasOverrides ? `Case: ${name}` : 'Default',
image: body.image || DEFAULT_AGENT_IMAGE,
network: body.network || 'bridge',
...(body.networkName ? { networkName: body.networkName } : {}),
...(Object.keys(resources).length ? { resources } : {}),
...(body.gpus ? { gpus: body.gpus } : {}),
mountCredentials: body.mountCredentials ?? true,
resumeOnStart: true,
hooksEnabled: true,
};
const hosts = await readDockerHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR);
const existing = hosts.find((item) => item.id === desiredHost.id);
// Reuse the shared default if present; create/refresh a per-case host for overrides.
const host = existing && !hasOverrides ? existing : desiredHost;
if (!existing) {
await writeDockerHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR, [...hosts, desiredHost]);
} else if (hasOverrides) {
await writeDockerHosts(
CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR,
hosts.map((h) => (h.id === desiredHost.id ? desiredHost : h))
);
}
// Probe the daemon + base image BEFORE scaffolding, so a missing docker/image
// surfaces a clear error instead of leaving an orphaned case folder.
const availability = await checkDockerAvailable(host.engine);
if (!availability.ok) {
return createErrorResponse(
ApiErrorCode.OPERATION_FAILED,
availability.error || 'docker daemon is not available'
);
}
const dockerCase = { name, type: 'docker' as const, hostId: host.id, hostWorkspacePath: casePath };
const tmuxCheck = await checkDockerTmuxAvailable(toSessionDocker(host, dockerCase));
if (!tmuxCheck.ok) {
return createErrorResponse(
ApiErrorCode.OPERATION_FAILED,
tmuxCheck.error || 'base image is missing tmux (build it: node scripts/build-agent-image.mjs)'
);
}
// Scaffold the case folder exactly like a normal case.
try {
mkdirSync(casePath, { recursive: true });
mkdirSync(join(casePath, 'src'), { recursive: true });
const templatePath = await ctx.getDefaultClaudeMdPath();
writeFileSync(join(casePath, 'CLAUDE.md'), generateClaudeMd(name, description || '', templatePath));
await writeHooksConfig(casePath);
} catch (err) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.OPERATION_FAILED, `Failed to create case: ${getErrorMessage(err)}`);
}
await writeDockerCases(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR, [...dockerCases, dockerCase]);
ctx.broadcast(SseEvent.CaseCreated, { name, path: casePath });
ctx.broadcast(SseEvent.CaseLinked, { name, path: casePath, type: 'docker' });
return {
success: true,
data: { case: dockerCase, capsEnforced: availability.capsEnforced, isDesktop: availability.isDesktop },
};
}
);
// ========== Docker export / import ==========
// Export a docker case to a portable bundle. Runs in the BACKGROUND (a full image
// save can take minutes) and broadcasts docker:exportComplete / docker:exportFailed.
app.post('/api/docker-cases/:name/export', async (req): Promise<ApiResponse<{ started: true; bundle: string }>> => {
const { name } = req.params as { name: string };
const { mode = 'full' } = parseBody(DockerExportSchema, req.body ?? {});
const dockerCase = (await readDockerCases(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR)).find((item) => item.name === name);
if (!dockerCase) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Docker case not found');
const host = (await readDockerHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR)).find((item) => item.id === dockerCase.hostId);
if (!host) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Docker host not found');
const sessionDocker = toSessionDocker(host, dockerCase);
if (mode === 'full' && !sessionDocker.mountCredentials) {
return createErrorResponse(
ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT,
'full-image export is refused for a sealed container (its in-container login would ride the committed layer). Use a workspace-only export.'
);
}
const timestamp = Date.now();
const bundle = exportBundleName(name, timestamp, mode);
// Fire-and-forget: the client watches for the SSE completion event.
void exportDockerCase({
docker: sessionDocker,
caseName: name,
timestamp,
exportsDir: DOCKER_EXPORTS_DIR,
mode,
codemanVersion: APP_VERSION,
})
.then((result) => {
ctx.broadcast(SseEvent.DockerExportComplete, {
name,
bundle: basename(result.bundlePath),
sizeBytes: result.sizeBytes,
mode,
});
})
.catch((err) => {
ctx.broadcast(SseEvent.DockerExportFailed, { name, mode, error: getErrorMessage(err) });
});
return { success: true, data: { started: true, bundle } };
});
app.get('/api/docker-exports', async (): Promise<ApiResponse<{ exports: unknown[] }>> => {
return { success: true, data: { exports: await listDockerExports(DOCKER_EXPORTS_DIR) } };
});
// Download an export bundle (filename resolved WITHIN the exports dir — no traversal).
app.get('/api/docker-exports/:filename', async (req, reply) => {
const { filename } = req.params as { filename: string };
if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+\.tgz$/.test(filename)) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT, 'Invalid bundle filename');
}
const full = join(DOCKER_EXPORTS_DIR, filename);
if (!existsSync(full)) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Export not found');
reply.header('Content-Type', 'application/gzip');
reply.header('Content-Disposition', `attachment; filename="${filename}"`);
reply.header('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
return reply.send(createReadStream(full));
});
app.delete('/api/docker-exports/:filename', async (req): Promise<ApiResponse<{ filename: string }>> => {
const { filename } = req.params as { filename: string };
if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+\.tgz$/.test(filename)) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT, 'Invalid bundle filename');
}
const full = join(DOCKER_EXPORTS_DIR, filename);
if (!existsSync(full)) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Export not found');
await fs.rm(full, { force: true });
return { success: true, data: { filename } };
});
// Import a bundle (already present in the exports dir) into a NEW docker case.
app.post('/api/docker-cases/import', async (req): Promise<ApiResponse<{ case: unknown }>> => {
const { bundle, newCaseName, destWorkspacePath } = parseBody(DockerImportSchema, req.body);
const bundlePath = join(DOCKER_EXPORTS_DIR, bundle);
if (!existsSync(bundlePath)) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Bundle not found in exports dir');
// Name-collision guard across ALL case kinds.
const linkedCases = await readLinkedCases();
const dockerCases = await readDockerCases(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR);
if (
dockerCases.some((item) => item.name === newCaseName) ||
linkedCases[newCaseName] ||
existsSync(join(CASES_DIR, newCaseName))
) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.ALREADY_EXISTS, 'Case already exists');
}
const timestamp = Date.now();
let result;
try {
result = await importDockerBundle({ bundlePath, destWorkspace: destWorkspacePath, engine: 'docker', timestamp });
} catch (err) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.OPERATION_FAILED, `Import failed: ${getErrorMessage(err)}`);
}
// Create a dedicated docker host pointing at the quarantined imported image
// (full mode) or the manifest's base image (workspace-only).
const hostId = `imported-${newCaseName}`;
const hosts = await readDockerHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR);
if (!hosts.some((h) => h.id === hostId)) {
await writeDockerHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR, [
...hosts,
{
id: hostId,
label: `Imported: ${newCaseName}`,
engine: result.manifest.engine,
image: result.importedImage ?? result.manifest.image,
network: (['bridge', 'none', 'custom'].includes(result.manifest.network)
? result.manifest.network
: 'bridge') as 'bridge' | 'none' | 'custom',
},
]);
}
const newCase = {
name: newCaseName,
type: 'docker' as const,
hostId,
hostWorkspacePath: destWorkspacePath,
containerWorkdir: result.manifest.containerWorkdir,
};
await writeDockerCases(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR, [...dockerCases, newCase]);
ctx.broadcast(SseEvent.DockerImportComplete, { name: newCaseName, path: destWorkspacePath, type: 'docker' });
return { success: true, data: { case: newCase } };
});
// Link an existing folder as a case
app.post('/api/cases/link', async (req): Promise<ApiResponse<{ case: { name: string; path: string } }>> => {
const { name, path: folderPath } = parseBody(LinkCaseSchema, req.body, 'Invalid request body');
@@ -295,6 +690,27 @@ export function registerCaseRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: EventPort & Config
return { success: true, data: { name } };
}
const dockerCases = await readDockerCases(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR);
const dockerCase = dockerCases.find((item) => item.name === name);
if (dockerCase) {
await writeDockerCases(
CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR,
dockerCases.filter((item) => item.name !== name)
);
// Best-effort `docker rm -f` the per-case container (case-delete is the
// explicit teardown that removes it; the bind-mounted workspace survives).
const host = (await readDockerHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR)).find((item) => item.id === dockerCase.hostId);
if (host) {
try {
exec(buildDockerRemoveCommand(toSessionDocker(host, dockerCase)), { timeout: 15_000 }, () => {});
} catch {
/* best-effort — never blocks the unlink */
}
}
ctx.broadcast(SseEvent.CaseDeleted, { name, type: 'docker-unlinked' });
return { success: true, data: { name } };
}
// Check linked cases first — unlink only, don't delete the actual directory
const linkedCases = await readLinkedCases();
if (linkedCases[name]) {
@@ -374,6 +790,26 @@ export function registerCaseRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: EventPort & Config
};
}
const dockerCase = (await readDockerCases(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR)).find((item) => item.name === name);
if (dockerCase) {
const host = (await readDockerHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR)).find((item) => item.id === dockerCase.hostId);
if (!host) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Docker host not found');
const container = dockerCase.container ?? dockerContainerName(dockerCase.name);
return {
name,
path: dockerDisplayPath({ container, path: dockerCase.hostWorkspacePath }),
hasClaudeMd: existsSync(join(dockerCase.hostWorkspacePath, 'CLAUDE.md')),
location: 'docker',
docker: {
hostId: host.id,
container,
image: host.image,
path: dockerCase.hostWorkspacePath,
network: host.network ?? 'bridge',
},
};
}
const casePath = await resolveCasePath(name);
if (!existsSync(casePath)) {
+80 -4
View File
@@ -74,6 +74,13 @@ import { MAX_INPUT_LENGTH, MAX_SESSION_NAME_LENGTH } from '../../config/terminal
import { MAX_PASTE_IMAGE_BYTES } from '../../config/buffer-limits.js';
import { dataPath, getDataDir } from '../../config/instance.js';
import { checkRemoteTmuxAvailable, readRemoteCases, readRemoteHosts, toSessionRemote } from '../../remote-hosts.js';
import {
checkDockerAvailable,
checkDockerTmuxAvailable,
readDockerCases,
readDockerHosts,
toSessionDocker,
} from '../../docker-hosts.js';
import { LRUMap } from '../../utils/lru-map.js';
// Path to linked-cases registry (same file used by case-routes resolveCasePath)
@@ -1684,9 +1691,14 @@ export function registerSessionRoutes(
// so the LOCAL availability gates below (isCodexAvailable() etc.) don't apply and
// would wrongly reject a machine that hasn't got the CLI installed locally.
let remote = undefined;
let docker = undefined;
let dockerResumeId: string | undefined;
let casePath: string | null = null;
const remoteCases = await readRemoteCases(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR);
const remoteCase = remoteCases.find((item) => item.name === caseName);
const dockerCase = remoteCase
? undefined
: (await readDockerCases(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR)).find((item) => item.name === caseName);
if (remoteCase) {
const host = (await readRemoteHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR)).find((item) => item.id === remoteCase.hostId);
if (!host) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Remote host not found');
@@ -1718,6 +1730,47 @@ export function registerSessionRoutes(
casePath = remoteCase.remotePath;
remote = toSessionRemote(host, remoteCase);
} else if (dockerCase) {
// Docker case: the CLI executes INSIDE a container via local tmux + `docker
// exec`, so the LOCAL availability gates below don't apply. Mirror the remote
// branch's rejection of per-session config that would not cross into the
// container (it would silently no-op).
const host = (await readDockerHosts(CODEMAN_CONFIG_DIR)).find((item) => item.id === dockerCase.hostId);
if (!host) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Docker host not found');
if (
(envOverrides && Object.keys(envOverrides).length > 0) ||
effort ||
codexConfig ||
geminiConfig ||
openCodeConfig
) {
return createErrorResponse(
ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT,
'envOverrides, effort, and per-CLI config are not supported for docker cases (they do not cross into the container). Configure the container via the docker host command override instead.'
);
}
const availability = await checkDockerAvailable(host.engine);
if (!availability.ok) {
return createErrorResponse(
ApiErrorCode.OPERATION_FAILED,
availability.error || 'docker daemon is not available'
);
}
const sessionDocker = toSessionDocker(host, dockerCase);
// tmux is a hard prerequisite (the in-container tmux makes reconnect durable).
const tmuxCheck = await checkDockerTmuxAvailable(sessionDocker);
if (!tmuxCheck.ok) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.OPERATION_FAILED, tmuxCheck.error || 'base image is missing tmux');
}
casePath = dockerCase.hostWorkspacePath; // a REAL host dir (bind-mounted into the container)
docker = sessionDocker;
// Seed resume so a relaunch resumes the case's last conversation from the
// bind-mounted transcript (decision: resume-on-start default ON).
if (sessionDocker.resumeOnStart && dockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId) {
dockerResumeId = dockerCase.lastClaudeSessionId;
}
} else {
// Check OpenCode availability if requested
if (mode === 'opencode') {
@@ -1772,8 +1825,9 @@ export function registerSessionRoutes(
// for local cases the !casePath guard above returned early. TypeScript can't narrow across the if/else.
const resolvedCasePath = casePath as string;
// Create case folder and CLAUDE.md if it doesn't exist (only for non-linked, non-remote cases)
if (!remote && !existsSync(resolvedCasePath)) {
// Create case folder and CLAUDE.md if it doesn't exist (only for non-linked, non-remote,
// non-docker cases — docker workspaces are scaffolded in their own block below)
if (!remote && !docker && !existsSync(resolvedCasePath)) {
try {
mkdirSync(resolvedCasePath, { recursive: true });
mkdirSync(join(resolvedCasePath, 'src'), { recursive: true });
@@ -1793,7 +1847,7 @@ export function registerSessionRoutes(
} catch (err) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.OPERATION_FAILED, `Failed to create case: ${getErrorMessage(err)}`);
}
} else if (!remote && mode !== 'opencode') {
} else if (!remote && !docker && mode !== 'opencode') {
// COD-91 self-heal for an EXISTING case: refresh a pre-secret hooks block so the
// now-unconditional hook-secret gate keeps accepting its hook events. No-op when
// the hooks aren't ours or already carry the secret. Skipped for remote cases —
@@ -1801,6 +1855,26 @@ export function registerSessionRoutes(
await refreshStaleHookSecret(resolvedCasePath).catch(() => {});
}
// Docker cases: the workspace is a REAL host dir bind-mounted into the container.
// Scaffold hooks (+ a CLAUDE.md) if MISSING so in-container permission prompts and
// hook-idle detection fire (decision: wire hooks now). Never clobbers an existing
// configured project. Skipped for external CLIs (they use their own systems).
if (docker && docker.hooksEnabled && mode !== 'opencode' && mode !== 'codex' && mode !== 'gemini') {
try {
if (!existsSync(join(resolvedCasePath, 'CLAUDE.md'))) {
const templatePath = await ctx.getDefaultClaudeMdPath();
writeFileSync(join(resolvedCasePath, 'CLAUDE.md'), generateClaudeMd(caseName, '', templatePath));
}
if (!existsSync(join(resolvedCasePath, '.claude', 'settings.local.json'))) {
await writeHooksConfig(resolvedCasePath);
} else {
await refreshStaleHookSecret(resolvedCasePath).catch(() => {});
}
} catch {
/* non-fatal — the session still runs, hooks may be degraded */
}
}
// Strip stale disk entries for keys this request is actively setting (Claude only —
// see POST /api/sessions for full rationale).
if (
@@ -1845,12 +1919,14 @@ export function registerSessionRoutes(
envOverrides,
effort,
remote,
docker,
resumeSessionId: dockerResumeId,
tmuxHistoryLimit: qsTerminalHistoryConfig.tmuxHistoryLimit,
});
// Auto-detect completion phrase from CLAUDE.md BEFORE broadcasting
// so the initial state already has the phrase configured (only if globally enabled)
if (mode === 'claude' && !remote && ctx.store.getConfig().ralphEnabled) {
if (mode === 'claude' && !remote && !docker && ctx.store.getConfig().ralphEnabled) {
autoConfigureRalph(session, resolvedCasePath, ctx);
if (!session.ralphTracker.enabled) {
session.ralphTracker.enable();
+166
View File
@@ -359,6 +359,172 @@ export const RemoteCaseLinkSchema = z.object({
.regex(NO_SHELL_META, 'Invalid characters in remote path'),
});
// ========== Docker cases ==========
//
// Docker mode is a location overlay on cases (see docs/docker-cases-plan.md),
// the analog of the remote-SSH schemas above. `image`, `hostWorkspacePath`,
// `containerWorkdir`, and `container` all reach the outer `bash -c "..."` launch
// layer, so they carry NO_SHELL_META (rejects `$`/backtick that survive the
// double-quote layer) exactly like remotePath/identityFile. `--privileged` and
// any docker-socket mount are structurally unrepresentable (never accepted).
const DockerResourceLimitsSchema = z
.object({
memory: z
.string()
.regex(/^\d+[bkmg]?$/i, 'Memory must be like 512m / 4g')
.optional(),
cpus: z
.string()
.regex(/^\d+(\.\d+)?$/, 'CPUs must be a number')
.optional(),
pidsLimit: z.number().int().positive().max(100000).optional(),
nofile: z
.string()
.regex(/^\d+:\d+$/, 'nofile must be soft:hard')
.optional(),
shmSize: z
.string()
.regex(/^\d+[bkmg]?$/i, 'shm-size must be like 256m')
.optional(),
})
.strict();
export const DockerHostSchema = z.object({
id: z.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/, 'Invalid docker host id'),
label: z.string().min(1).max(100),
engine: z.enum(['docker', 'podman']).optional(),
image: z
.string()
.min(1)
.max(512)
.regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9][\w./:@-]*$/, 'Invalid image reference')
.regex(NO_SHELL_META, 'Invalid characters in image reference'),
daemonHost: z.string().max(512).regex(NO_SHELL_META, 'Invalid daemon host').optional(),
context: z
.string()
.max(128)
.regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$/, 'Invalid docker context')
.optional(),
network: z.enum(['bridge', 'none', 'custom']).optional(),
networkName: z
.string()
.max(128)
.regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$/, 'Invalid network name')
.optional(),
resources: DockerResourceLimitsSchema.optional(),
gpus: z
.string()
.max(128)
.regex(/^(all|\d+|device=[a-zA-Z0-9,:._-]+)$/, 'GPUs must be all / a count / device=...')
.optional(),
mountCredentials: z.boolean().optional(),
hooksEnabled: z.boolean().optional(),
resumeOnStart: z.boolean().optional(),
commands: RemoteCommandOverridesSchema, // same shell/claude/opencode/codex/gemini shape
extraCreateArgs: z
.array(
z
.string()
.min(1)
.max(1024)
.regex(NO_SHELL_INJECTION, 'Invalid characters in create arg')
.refine(noCommandSubstitution, 'Invalid characters in create arg')
)
.max(32)
.optional(),
extraExecArgs: z
.array(
z
.string()
.min(1)
.max(1024)
.regex(NO_SHELL_INJECTION, 'Invalid characters in exec arg')
.refine(noCommandSubstitution, 'Invalid characters in exec arg')
)
.max(32)
.optional(),
});
export const DockerCaseLinkSchema = z.object({
name: z.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/, 'Invalid case name format'),
hostId: z.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/, 'Invalid docker host id'),
hostWorkspacePath: z
.string()
.min(1)
.max(2000)
.regex(/^\//, 'Workspace path must be absolute')
.regex(NO_SHELL_META, 'Invalid characters in workspace path'),
containerWorkdir: z
.string()
.min(1)
.max(2000)
.regex(/^\//, 'Container workdir must be absolute')
.regex(NO_SHELL_META, 'Invalid characters in container workdir')
.optional(),
container: z
.string()
.min(2)
.max(128)
.regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$/, 'Invalid container name')
.optional(),
});
export const DockerExportSchema = z.object({
mode: z.enum(['full', 'workspace']).optional(),
});
export const DockerImportSchema = z.object({
// A bare filename resolved WITHIN the exports dir (never an arbitrary path).
bundle: z
.string()
.min(1)
.max(300)
.regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+\.tgz$/, 'Invalid bundle filename'),
newCaseName: z.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/, 'Invalid case name format'),
destWorkspacePath: z
.string()
.min(1)
.max(2000)
.regex(/^\//, 'Destination path must be absolute')
.regex(NO_SHELL_META, 'Invalid characters in destination path'),
});
// One-click "Run in Docker" case creation. name/description behave like a normal
// case; the docker fields are OPTIONAL overrides of the predefined defaults (the
// checkbox alone, with no overrides, uses the shared `default` host).
export const DockerQuickCreateSchema = z.object({
name: z.string().regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/, 'Invalid case name format'),
description: z.string().max(1000).optional(),
image: z
.string()
.min(1)
.max(512)
.regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9][\w./:@-]*$/, 'Invalid image reference')
.regex(NO_SHELL_META, 'Invalid characters in image reference')
.optional(),
network: z.enum(['bridge', 'none', 'custom']).optional(),
networkName: z
.string()
.max(128)
.regex(/^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$/, 'Invalid network name')
.optional(),
memory: z
.string()
.regex(/^\d+[bkmg]?$/i, 'Memory must be like 512m / 4g')
.optional(),
cpus: z
.string()
.regex(/^\d+(\.\d+)?$/, 'CPUs must be a number')
.optional(),
gpus: z
.string()
.max(128)
.regex(/^(all|\d+|device=[a-zA-Z0-9,:._-]+)$/, 'GPUs must be all / a count / device=...')
.optional(),
mountCredentials: z.boolean().optional(),
});
// ========== Quick Start ==========
/**
+87 -1
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, chmodSync, rmSync, statSync } from
import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import { execSync } from 'node:child_process';
import { hostname as getHostname } from 'node:os';
import { dataPath } from '../config/instance.js';
import { dataPath, getDataDir, CODEMAN_INSTANCE } from '../config/instance.js';
import { getHookSecret } from '../config/hook-secret.js';
import { EventEmitter } from 'node:events';
import { Session, isExternalCliMode, type BackgroundTask } from '../session.js';
@@ -288,6 +288,8 @@ export class WebServer extends EventEmitter {
private readonly allowUnauthenticatedNetwork: boolean;
private _pasteImageGcStop: (() => void) | null = null;
private _eventLoopMonitor: EventLoopMonitorHandle | null = null;
/** Opt-in hooks-only listener on the docker bridge gateway (CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS). */
private _dockerBridgeServer: import('node:http').Server | import('node:https').Server | null = null;
private teamWatcherHandlers: {
teamCreated: (config: unknown) => void;
teamUpdated: (config: unknown) => void;
@@ -1941,6 +1943,20 @@ export class WebServer extends EventEmitter {
// CRITICAL: Skip in test mode to prevent tests from picking up user sessions
if (!this.testMode) {
await this.restoreMuxSessions();
// Instance-scoped reaper: after restore, `docker rm -f` managed containers of
// THIS instance whose case is gone from docker-cases.json (best-effort, never
// touches another instance's containers). Runs after restore so containers
// still referenced by a restored session are preserved.
void import('../docker-hosts.js')
.then(({ reapOrphanedDockerContainers }) => reapOrphanedDockerContainers(getDataDir(), CODEMAN_INSTANCE))
.then((reaped) => {
if (reaped.length > 0)
console.log(`[Docker] reaped ${reaped.length} orphaned container(s): ${reaped.join(', ')}`);
})
.catch(() => {
/* best-effort — daemon may be absent */
});
}
// Clean up stale sessions from state file that don't have active mux sessions
@@ -1961,6 +1977,15 @@ export class WebServer extends EventEmitter {
const displayHost = this.host === '0.0.0.0' ? 'localhost' : this.host;
console.log(`Codeman web interface running at ${protocol}://${displayHost}:${this.port}`);
// Opt-in: also serve the HOOK endpoints on the docker bridge gateway so
// in-container hooks (permission/idle/stop callbacks) can reach a loopback-bound
// server. Hooks-only + secret-gated, and the bridge is host-internal (not the LAN).
if (!this.testMode) {
await this._startDockerBridgeHooksListener().catch((err) =>
console.error(`[Docker] bridge-hooks listener error: ${err?.message || err}`)
);
}
// Anti-DNS-rebinding Host allowlist is always on. Localhost, any bare IP, the
// bind host, *.ts.net / *.trycloudflare.com / *.cfargotunnel.com, and the active
// managed tunnel are accepted automatically; add any other domain you front this
@@ -2214,6 +2239,10 @@ export class WebServer extends EventEmitter {
// erasing `remote` from state.json on the next persist. mux-sessions.json
// round-trips MuxSession.remote; state.json carries SessionState.remote.
remote: muxSession.remote ?? savedState?.remote,
// Docker metadata round-trips the same way (mux-sessions.json carries
// MuxSession.docker; state.json carries SessionState.docker), so recovery
// rebuilds the `docker exec` launch instead of a broken local command.
docker: muxSession.docker ?? savedState?.docker,
});
// Update session name if it was a "Restored:" placeholder or doesn't match saved name
@@ -2399,6 +2428,58 @@ export class WebServer extends EventEmitter {
return this._orchestratorLoop;
}
/**
* Opt-in (CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS=1): start a SECOND listener on the docker
* bridge gateway IP that serves ONLY the hook endpoints and delegates them into
* the main Fastify pipeline. This lets in-container hooks reach a loopback-bound
* server (they call back via host.docker.internal = the bridge gateway) without
* exposing the full API or the LAN. Bind IP is auto-detected (default bridge
* gateway) or set via CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOST.
*/
private async _startDockerBridgeHooksListener(): Promise<void> {
if (!isExplicitlyEnabled(process.env.CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS)) return;
const { detectDockerBridgeGateway } = await import('../docker-hosts.js');
const bridgeHost = (process.env.CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOST || '').trim() || (await detectDockerBridgeGateway());
if (!bridgeHost) {
console.log('[Docker] CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS set but no docker bridge gateway found — skipping');
return;
}
// Only the hook endpoints are served on the bridge — never the full API.
const HOOK_PATHS = new Set([
'/api/hook-event',
'/api/status-telemetry',
'/api/v1/hook-event',
'/api/v1/status-telemetry',
]);
const handler = (req: import('node:http').IncomingMessage, res: import('node:http').ServerResponse): void => {
const path = (req.url || '').split('?')[0];
if (!HOOK_PATHS.has(path)) {
res.statusCode = 403;
res.end('forbidden: the docker bridge listener serves hook endpoints only');
return;
}
// Delegate into Fastify (host-guard, Origin/CSRF, and hook-secret gate all apply).
(this.app as unknown as { routing: (r: unknown, s: unknown) => void }).routing(req, res);
};
let server: import('node:http').Server | import('node:https').Server;
if (this.https) {
const https = await import('node:https');
const { key, cert } = getOrCreateSelfSignedCert();
server = https.createServer({ key, cert }, handler);
} else {
const http = await import('node:http');
server = http.createServer(handler);
}
await new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
server.once('error', reject);
server.listen(this.port, bridgeHost, () => resolve());
});
this._dockerBridgeServer = server;
console.log(
`[Docker] in-container hooks reachable at ${this.https ? 'https' : 'http'}://${bridgeHost}:${this.port} (hook endpoints only)`
);
}
async stop(): Promise<void> {
getLifecycleLog().log({ event: 'server_stopped', sessionId: '*' });
// Set stopping flag to prevent new timer creation during shutdown
@@ -2414,6 +2495,11 @@ export class WebServer extends EventEmitter {
this._eventLoopMonitor = null;
}
if (this._dockerBridgeServer) {
this._dockerBridgeServer.close();
this._dockerBridgeServer = null;
}
// Dispose all managed timers (intervals + resettable timeouts)
this.cleanup.dispose();
+13
View File
@@ -370,6 +370,14 @@ export const CaseDeleted = 'case:deleted' as const;
/** Case ordering changed. */
export const CaseOrderChanged = 'case:order-changed' as const;
// ─── Docker cases ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** A docker case export bundle finished writing. */
export const DockerExportComplete = 'docker:exportComplete' as const;
/** A docker case export failed. */
export const DockerExportFailed = 'docker:exportFailed' as const;
/** A docker bundle was imported into a new case. */
export const DockerImportComplete = 'docker:importComplete' as const;
// ─── Namespace Re-export ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
@@ -551,4 +559,9 @@ export const SseEvent = {
CaseLinked,
CaseDeleted,
CaseOrderChanged,
// Docker cases
DockerExportComplete,
DockerExportFailed,
DockerImportComplete,
} as const;
+159
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
/**
* Unit tests for the docker launch/kill command builders in tmux-manager.ts
* (mirror of test/remote-ssh-options.test.ts). Pure string assertions: the
* escaping must survive bash -c -> docker exec -> sh -lc -> tmux.
*/
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import {
buildDockerLaunchCommand,
buildDockerKillCommand,
buildDockerStopCommand,
buildDockerRemoveCommand,
dockerTmuxSessionName,
type DockerLaunchOptions,
} from '../src/tmux-manager.js';
import { DEFAULT_AGENT_IMAGE, toSessionDocker, type DockerCreateContext } from '../src/docker-hosts.js';
import type { DockerCase, DockerHost, SessionMode } from '../src/types.js';
// The exact adopt-guard the in-container Codeman would use to discover its own sessions.
const SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN = /^codeman-[a-f0-9-]+$/;
const HOST: DockerHost = { id: 'local', label: 'Local', image: DEFAULT_AGENT_IMAGE };
const CASE: DockerCase = {
name: 'myproj',
type: 'docker',
hostId: 'local',
hostWorkspacePath: '/home/arkon/cases/myproj',
};
function launchOpts(overrides: Partial<DockerLaunchOptions> = {}): DockerLaunchOptions {
const docker = overrides.docker ?? toSessionDocker(HOST, CASE);
const createContext: DockerCreateContext = {
docker,
sessionId: '1a2b3c4d5e6f',
instance: '',
userArgs: ['--user', '1000:0'],
credentialMounts: [{ src: '/home/arkon/.claude', dst: '/home/agent/.claude' }],
extraMounts: [],
envCreate: { HOME: '/home/agent', CODEMAN_API_URL: 'https://host.docker.internal:3000' },
addHostGateway: true,
gatewayAlias: 'host.docker.internal',
};
return {
mode: 'claude',
docker,
sessionId: '1a2b3c4d5e6f',
createContext,
execEnv: { TERM: 'xterm-256color', CODEMAN_SESSION_ID: '1a2b3c4d', CODEMAN_MUX: '1' },
execEnvNames: [],
...overrides,
};
}
describe('dockerTmuxSessionName', () => {
it('is stable from the first 8 chars of the sessionId', () => {
expect(dockerTmuxSessionName('1a2b3c4d5e6f')).toBe('codeman-dkr-1a2b3c4d');
});
it('deliberately FAILS the in-container adopt guard', () => {
// 'k'/'r' are not hex, so an in-container Codeman never adopts our session
expect(SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN.test(dockerTmuxSessionName('1a2b3c4d5e6f'))).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('buildDockerLaunchCommand', () => {
it('image-check precedes ensure precedes start precedes exec', () => {
const cmd = buildDockerLaunchCommand(launchOpts());
const iImage = cmd.indexOf('docker image inspect');
const iEnsure = cmd.indexOf('docker inspect');
const iStart = cmd.indexOf('docker start');
const iExec = cmd.indexOf('exec docker exec -it');
expect(iImage).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0);
expect(iImage).toBeLessThan(iEnsure);
expect(iEnsure).toBeLessThan(iStart);
expect(iStart).toBeLessThan(iExec);
});
it('ensures the container idempotently (inspect-or-create) with --pull=never', () => {
const cmd = buildDockerLaunchCommand(launchOpts());
expect(cmd).toContain("docker inspect 'codeman-case-myproj' >/dev/null 2>&1 || docker create");
expect(cmd).toContain('--pull=never');
expect(cmd).toContain("docker start 'codeman-case-myproj'");
});
it('execs a TTY into the durable in-container tmux', () => {
const cmd = buildDockerLaunchCommand(launchOpts());
expect(cmd).toContain("exec docker exec -it --workdir '/home/arkon/cases/myproj'");
expect(cmd).toContain('tmux -L codeman-docker setenv -g CODEMAN_SESSION_ID');
expect(cmd).toContain('new-session -A -s codeman-dkr-1a2b3c4d');
expect(cmd).toContain("sh -lc '");
});
it('injects the resume flag ONLY when a resume id is passed', () => {
const withResume = buildDockerLaunchCommand(launchOpts({ resumeSessionId: 'abc-123-def' }));
expect(withResume).toContain('exec claude --dangerously-skip-permissions --resume abc-123-def');
const without = buildDockerLaunchCommand(launchOpts());
expect(without).not.toContain('--resume');
});
it('uses codex resume syntax and drops an unsafe resume id', () => {
const codex = buildDockerLaunchCommand(
launchOpts({ mode: 'codex' as SessionMode, resumeSessionId: '01H-codex-id' })
);
expect(codex).toContain('exec codex resume 01H-codex-id');
const unsafe = buildDockerLaunchCommand(launchOpts({ resumeSessionId: 'x; rm -rf /' }));
expect(unsafe).not.toContain('--resume');
expect(unsafe).not.toContain('rm -rf');
});
it('forwards codex/gemini keys NAME-ONLY (no value in argv)', () => {
const codex = buildDockerLaunchCommand(
launchOpts({ mode: 'codex' as SessionMode, execEnvNames: ['OPENAI_API_KEY', 'CODEX_API_KEY'] })
);
expect(codex).toContain('--env OPENAI_API_KEY');
expect(codex).not.toMatch(/--env OPENAI_API_KEY=/); // never a value
});
it('primes CODEMAN_SESSION_ID / CODEMAN_MUX at exec time', () => {
const cmd = buildDockerLaunchCommand(launchOpts());
expect(cmd).toContain("--env 'CODEMAN_SESSION_ID=1a2b3c4d'");
expect(cmd).toContain("--env 'CODEMAN_MUX=1'");
});
it('keeps a workspace path with spaces a single token through every layer', () => {
const docker = toSessionDocker(HOST, { ...CASE, hostWorkspacePath: '/home/arkon/my cases/proj' });
const cmd = buildDockerLaunchCommand(launchOpts({ docker }));
// workdir single-quoted at the docker exec layer
expect(cmd).toContain("--workdir '/home/arkon/my cases/proj'");
// and the cd inside the (nested-escaped) paneCommand still references the spaced path
expect(cmd).toContain('/home/arkon/my cases/proj');
});
it('honors a per-host command override', () => {
const docker = { ...toSessionDocker(HOST, CASE), commands: { claude: 'exec claude --model opus' } };
const cmd = buildDockerLaunchCommand(launchOpts({ docker }));
expect(cmd).toContain('exec claude --model opus');
});
});
describe('buildDockerKillCommand (multi-session safe)', () => {
it('kills ONLY this session in-container tmux, never the shared container', () => {
const docker = toSessionDocker(HOST, CASE);
const cmd = buildDockerKillCommand({ docker, sessionId: '1a2b3c4d5e6f' });
expect(cmd).toBe("docker exec 'codeman-case-myproj' tmux -L codeman-docker kill-session -t 'codeman-dkr-1a2b3c4d'");
expect(cmd).not.toContain('docker stop');
expect(cmd).not.toContain('docker rm');
});
});
describe('explicit teardown commands', () => {
it('stop and remove target the whole container', () => {
const docker = toSessionDocker(HOST, CASE);
expect(buildDockerStopCommand(docker)).toBe("docker stop -t 10 'codeman-case-myproj'");
expect(buildDockerRemoveCommand(docker)).toBe("docker rm -f 'codeman-case-myproj'");
});
it('uses the podman engine prefix when configured', () => {
const docker = toSessionDocker({ ...HOST, engine: 'podman' }, CASE);
expect(buildDockerStopCommand(docker)).toBe("podman stop -t 10 'codeman-case-myproj'");
});
});
+121
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
/**
* Unit tests for the pure docker export/import helpers (src/docker-export.ts).
* The IO paths no-op under VITEST; these cover the naming, tar-traversal guard,
* load-output parsing, and the sealed-mode refusal.
*/
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
import {
dockerArgv,
exportBundleName,
exportImageTag,
importedImageTag,
isSafeTarMember,
parseLoadedImageRef,
exportDockerCase,
DOCKER_EXPORT_SCHEMA,
} from '../src/docker-export.js';
import { toSessionDocker } from '../src/docker-hosts.js';
import type { DockerCase, DockerHost } from '../src/types.js';
const HOST: DockerHost = { id: 'local', label: 'Local', image: 'codeman/agent:base' };
const CASE: DockerCase = {
name: 'myproj',
type: 'docker',
hostId: 'local',
hostWorkspacePath: '/home/arkon/cases/myproj',
};
describe('dockerArgv', () => {
it('is raw (unescaped) argv for spawn', () => {
expect(dockerArgv({ engine: 'docker' })).toEqual(['docker']);
expect(dockerArgv({ engine: 'podman', context: 'ctx', daemonHost: 'ssh://h' })).toEqual([
'podman',
'--context',
'ctx',
'-H',
'ssh://h',
]);
});
});
describe('bundle / tag naming', () => {
it('names bundles by case + timestamp + mode', () => {
expect(exportBundleName('myproj', 1234, 'full')).toBe('myproj-1234.codeman-container.tgz');
expect(exportBundleName('myproj', 1234, 'workspace')).toBe('myproj-1234.codeman-workspace.tgz');
});
it('quarantines imported images and tags export intermediates uniquely', () => {
expect(importedImageTag('myproj', 99)).toBe('codeman/imported-myproj:99');
expect(exportImageTag('myproj', 99)).toBe('codeman/export-myproj:99');
});
});
describe('isSafeTarMember (import traversal guard)', () => {
it('accepts normal relative members', () => {
expect(isSafeTarMember('./')).toBe(true);
expect(isSafeTarMember('src/index.ts')).toBe(true);
expect(isSafeTarMember('./a/b/c.txt')).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects absolute and parent-escaping members', () => {
expect(isSafeTarMember('/etc/passwd')).toBe(false);
expect(isSafeTarMember('../outside')).toBe(false);
expect(isSafeTarMember('a/../../b')).toBe(false);
expect(isSafeTarMember('./../../x')).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('parseLoadedImageRef', () => {
it('parses "Loaded image ID: sha256:..."', () => {
expect(parseLoadedImageRef('Loaded image ID: sha256:abc123def')).toBe('sha256:abc123def');
});
it('parses "Loaded image: repo:tag"', () => {
expect(parseLoadedImageRef('Loaded image: codeman/export-x:1234')).toBe('codeman/export-x:1234');
});
it('returns null on unrecognized output', () => {
expect(parseLoadedImageRef('some other text')).toBeNull();
});
});
describe('exportDockerCase (VITEST stub)', () => {
it('returns a deterministic stub manifest without touching docker', async () => {
const docker = toSessionDocker(HOST, CASE);
const res = await exportDockerCase({
docker,
caseName: 'myproj',
timestamp: 42,
exportsDir: '/tmp/exports',
mode: 'full',
codemanVersion: '9.9.9',
});
expect(res.manifest.schemaVersion).toBe(DOCKER_EXPORT_SCHEMA);
expect(res.manifest.caseName).toBe('myproj');
expect(res.manifest.mode).toBe('full');
expect(res.bundlePath).toBe('/tmp/exports/myproj-42.codeman-container.tgz');
});
it('refuses a full-image export for a sealed container', async () => {
const docker = toSessionDocker({ ...HOST, mountCredentials: false }, CASE);
await expect(
exportDockerCase({
docker,
caseName: 'myproj',
timestamp: 42,
exportsDir: '/tmp/exports',
mode: 'full',
codemanVersion: '9.9.9',
})
).rejects.toThrow(/sealed/);
});
it('allows a workspace-only export for a sealed container', async () => {
const docker = toSessionDocker({ ...HOST, mountCredentials: false }, CASE);
const res = await exportDockerCase({
docker,
caseName: 'myproj',
timestamp: 42,
exportsDir: '/tmp/exports',
mode: 'workspace',
codemanVersion: '9.9.9',
});
expect(res.manifest.mode).toBe('workspace');
});
});
+289
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@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
/**
* Unit tests for the Docker cases storage + pure command-arg builders + probes
* (src/docker-hosts.ts). Mirrors test/remote-hosts.test.ts. All docker IO no-ops
* under VITEST, so probes return canned values and never spawn a real daemon.
*/
import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import {
buildDockerBaseArgs,
buildDockerCreateArgs,
checkDockerAvailable,
checkDockerImagePresent,
checkDockerTmuxAvailable,
containerApiUrl,
DEFAULT_AGENT_IMAGE,
DEFAULT_DOCKER_RESOURCES,
dockerConfigHash,
dockerContainerName,
dockerDisplayPath,
defaultDockerCommandForMode,
hostGatewayAlias,
probeDockerCliVersion,
readDockerCases,
readDockerHosts,
resolveCredentialMounts,
toSessionDocker,
writeDockerCases,
writeDockerHosts,
type DockerCreateContext,
} from '../src/docker-hosts.js';
import type { DockerCase, DockerHost, SessionDocker } from '../src/types.js';
const HOST: DockerHost = { id: 'local', label: 'Local Docker', image: DEFAULT_AGENT_IMAGE };
const CASE: DockerCase = {
name: 'myproj',
type: 'docker',
hostId: 'local',
hostWorkspacePath: '/home/arkon/cases/myproj',
};
describe('docker-hosts storage', () => {
let dir: string;
beforeEach(() => {
dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'codeman-docker-'));
});
afterEach(() => {
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it('round-trips hosts and cases through JSON storage', async () => {
await writeDockerHosts(dir, [HOST]);
await writeDockerCases(dir, [{ ...CASE, lastClaudeSessionId: 'abc-123' }]);
expect(await readDockerHosts(dir)).toEqual([HOST]);
const cases = await readDockerCases(dir);
expect(cases[0].lastClaudeSessionId).toBe('abc-123');
});
it('returns [] for a missing file', async () => {
expect(await readDockerHosts(dir)).toEqual([]);
expect(await readDockerCases(dir)).toEqual([]);
});
});
describe('naming / display / defaults', () => {
it('derives a valid per-case container name', () => {
expect(dockerContainerName('myproj')).toBe('codeman-case-myproj');
// valid docker name charset: starts alnum, then [a-zA-Z0-9_.-]
expect(dockerContainerName('my_proj-2')).toMatch(/^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$/);
});
it('maps each mode to a default pane command', () => {
expect(defaultDockerCommandForMode('claude')).toBe('exec claude --dangerously-skip-permissions');
expect(defaultDockerCommandForMode('shell')).toBe('exec bash -l');
expect(defaultDockerCommandForMode('codex')).toBe('exec codex');
expect(defaultDockerCommandForMode('gemini')).toBe('exec gemini');
});
it('formats a container:workdir display path from both shapes', () => {
expect(dockerDisplayPath({ container: 'codeman-case-x', path: '/w' })).toBe('codeman-case-x:/w');
const sd = toSessionDocker(HOST, CASE);
expect(dockerDisplayPath(sd)).toBe('codeman-case-myproj:/home/arkon/cases/myproj');
});
});
describe('hostGatewayAlias / containerApiUrl', () => {
it('returns the engine-specific gateway alias', () => {
expect(hostGatewayAlias('docker')).toBe('host.docker.internal');
expect(hostGatewayAlias('podman')).toBe('host.containers.internal');
});
it('swaps only the hostname, preserving scheme and port', () => {
expect(containerApiUrl('https://127.0.0.1:3000', 'docker')).toBe('https://host.docker.internal:3000');
expect(containerApiUrl('http://127.0.0.1:3000', 'docker')).toBe('http://host.docker.internal:3000');
expect(containerApiUrl('https://127.0.0.1:8443', 'docker')).toBe('https://host.docker.internal:8443');
expect(containerApiUrl('https://127.0.0.1:3000', 'podman')).toBe('https://host.containers.internal:3000');
});
it('falls back to https://<alias>:3000 for absent or unparseable input', () => {
expect(containerApiUrl(undefined, 'docker')).toBe('https://host.docker.internal:3000');
expect(containerApiUrl('not a url', 'podman')).toBe('https://host.containers.internal:3000');
});
});
describe('toSessionDocker / dockerConfigHash', () => {
it('resolves every default (convenient, bridge, resume-on-start)', () => {
const sd = toSessionDocker(HOST, CASE);
expect(sd.engine).toBe('docker');
expect(sd.image).toBe(DEFAULT_AGENT_IMAGE);
expect(sd.containerName).toBe('codeman-case-myproj');
expect(sd.hostWorkspacePath).toBe('/home/arkon/cases/myproj');
expect(sd.containerWorkdir).toBe('/home/arkon/cases/myproj'); // mirror
expect(sd.network).toBe('bridge');
expect(sd.resources).toEqual(DEFAULT_DOCKER_RESOURCES);
expect(sd.mountCredentials).toBe(true);
expect(sd.hooksEnabled).toBe(true);
expect(sd.resumeOnStart).toBe(true);
expect(sd.configHash).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{12}$/);
});
it('honors host overrides and a custom container workdir', () => {
const host: DockerHost = {
...HOST,
engine: 'podman',
network: 'none',
mountCredentials: false,
hooksEnabled: false,
resumeOnStart: false,
};
const sd = toSessionDocker(host, { ...CASE, containerWorkdir: '/work', container: 'my-box' });
expect(sd.engine).toBe('podman');
expect(sd.network).toBe('none');
expect(sd.mountCredentials).toBe(false);
expect(sd.containerName).toBe('my-box');
expect(sd.containerWorkdir).toBe('/work');
});
it('hash is stable for equal inputs and changes when a drift field changes', () => {
const a = toSessionDocker(HOST, CASE);
const b = toSessionDocker(HOST, CASE);
expect(a.configHash).toBe(b.configHash);
const c = toSessionDocker({ ...HOST, image: 'codeman/agent:other' }, CASE);
expect(c.configHash).not.toBe(a.configHash);
// lastClaudeSessionId is NOT a drift field
expect(dockerConfigHash(a)).toBe(dockerConfigHash({ ...a }));
});
});
describe('buildDockerBaseArgs', () => {
it('defaults to docker with no extra flags', () => {
expect(buildDockerBaseArgs({ engine: 'docker' })).toEqual(['docker']);
});
it('emits podman + context + daemon host', () => {
const args = buildDockerBaseArgs({ engine: 'podman', context: 'remote', daemonHost: 'ssh://u@h' });
expect(args[0]).toBe('podman');
expect(args.join(' ')).toContain("--context 'remote'");
expect(args.join(' ')).toContain("-H 'ssh://u@h'");
});
});
describe('buildDockerCreateArgs', () => {
function ctx(overrides: Partial<DockerCreateContext> = {}): DockerCreateContext {
return {
docker: toSessionDocker(HOST, CASE),
sessionId: '1a2b3c4d5e6f',
instance: '',
userArgs: ['--user', '1000:0'],
credentialMounts: [{ src: '/home/arkon/.claude', dst: '/home/agent/.claude' }],
extraMounts: [
{ src: '/home/arkon/.codeman/hook-secret', dst: '/home/agent/.codeman/hook-secret', readonly: true },
],
envCreate: { HOME: '/home/agent', CODEMAN_API_URL: 'https://host.docker.internal:3000' },
addHostGateway: true,
gatewayAlias: 'host.docker.internal',
...overrides,
};
}
it('bakes in the security + lifecycle invariants', () => {
const s = buildDockerCreateArgs(ctx()).join(' ');
expect(s).toContain('--cap-drop ALL');
expect(s).toContain('--security-opt no-new-privileges');
expect(s).toContain('--pull=never');
expect(s).toContain('--init');
expect(s).toContain('--restart no');
expect(s).toContain('--memory 4g --memory-swap 4g');
expect(s).toContain('--pids-limit 512');
expect(s).toContain('--ulimit nofile=4096:8192');
expect(s).toContain('codeman.managed=1');
expect(s).toContain("'codeman.session=1a2b3c4d'"); // first 8 chars only
expect(s).toContain('--network bridge');
});
it('NEVER emits privileged mode or a docker-socket mount', () => {
const s = buildDockerCreateArgs(ctx()).join(' ');
expect(s).not.toContain('--privileged');
expect(s).not.toContain('docker.sock');
});
it('ends with the image then the sleep-infinity CMD', () => {
const args = buildDockerCreateArgs(ctx());
expect(args.slice(-3)).toEqual([`'${DEFAULT_AGENT_IMAGE}'`, 'sleep', 'infinity']);
});
it('includes the resolved user args and the workspace bind', () => {
const s = buildDockerCreateArgs(ctx()).join(' ');
expect(s).toContain('--user 1000:0');
expect(s).toContain("--mount 'type=bind,src=/home/arkon/cases/myproj,dst=/home/arkon/cases/myproj'");
});
it('shell-escapes a workspace path containing spaces into a single token', () => {
const docker = toSessionDocker(HOST, { ...CASE, hostWorkspacePath: '/home/arkon/my cases/proj' });
const args = buildDockerCreateArgs(ctx({ docker }));
// the whole mount spec (with the space) is ONE single-quoted token
expect(args).toContain("'type=bind,src=/home/arkon/my cases/proj,dst=/home/arkon/my cases/proj'");
// and the workdir is single-quoted too
expect(args).toContain("'/home/arkon/my cases/proj'");
});
it('adds the host-gateway only when requested', () => {
expect(buildDockerCreateArgs(ctx({ addHostGateway: true })).join(' ')).toContain(
'--add-host host.docker.internal:host-gateway'
);
expect(buildDockerCreateArgs(ctx({ addHostGateway: false })).join(' ')).not.toContain('--add-host');
});
it('omits credential mounts in sealed mode', () => {
const s = buildDockerCreateArgs(ctx({ credentialMounts: [] })).join(' ');
expect(s).not.toContain('/home/agent/.claude');
});
it('emits create-time env flags', () => {
const s = buildDockerCreateArgs(ctx()).join(' ');
expect(s).toContain("--env 'HOME=/home/agent'");
expect(s).toContain("--env 'CODEMAN_API_URL=https://host.docker.internal:3000'");
});
it('uses the custom network name for custom mode', () => {
const docker: SessionDocker = { ...toSessionDocker(HOST, CASE), network: 'custom', networkName: 'codeman-net-x' };
expect(buildDockerCreateArgs(ctx({ docker })).join(' ')).toContain('--network codeman-net-x');
});
it('emits --gpus only when GPUs are requested (and never a storage cap)', () => {
const withGpu: SessionDocker = { ...toSessionDocker(HOST, CASE), gpus: 'all' };
const s = buildDockerCreateArgs(ctx({ docker: withGpu })).join(' ');
expect(s).toContain("--gpus 'all'");
// elastic disk: no fixed storage cap is ever emitted
expect(s).not.toContain('--storage-opt');
expect(buildDockerCreateArgs(ctx()).join(' ')).not.toContain('--gpus');
});
});
describe('resolveCredentialMounts', () => {
let home: string;
beforeEach(() => {
home = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'codeman-home-'));
});
afterEach(() => {
rmSync(home, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
it('only mounts credential paths that exist', () => {
mkdirSync(join(home, '.claude'), { recursive: true });
const mounts = resolveCredentialMounts(home);
expect(mounts).toContainEqual({ src: join(home, '.claude'), dst: '/home/agent/.claude' });
expect(mounts.find((m) => m.dst.endsWith('.codex'))).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe('daemon probes (no-op under VITEST)', () => {
it('checkDockerAvailable returns a canned available result', async () => {
const a = await checkDockerAvailable();
expect(a.ok).toBe(true);
expect(a.capsEnforced).toBe(true);
expect(a.engine).toBe('docker');
});
it('checkDockerTmuxAvailable + image present are canned-true', async () => {
expect((await checkDockerTmuxAvailable({ engine: 'docker', image: DEFAULT_AGENT_IMAGE })).ok).toBe(true);
expect(await checkDockerImagePresent('docker', DEFAULT_AGENT_IMAGE)).toBe(true);
});
it('probeDockerCliVersion is undefined under test', async () => {
expect(
await probeDockerCliVersion({ engine: 'docker', containerName: 'codeman-case-x' }, 'claude')
).toBeUndefined();
});
});
+7
View File
@@ -67,6 +67,13 @@ describe('isAllowedRequestHost — anti-DNS-rebinding', () => {
expect(isAllowedRequestHost('eviltrycloudflare.com', loopback)).toBe(false);
});
it('accepts the docker/podman container-to-host gateway aliases (in-container hooks)', () => {
expect(isAllowedRequestHost('host.docker.internal:3000', loopback)).toBe(true);
expect(isAllowedRequestHost('host.containers.internal:3000', loopback)).toBe(true);
// a lookalike is still rejected (exact match only)
expect(isAllowedRequestHost('host.docker.internal.evil.com', loopback)).toBe(false);
});
it('accepts the configured bind host when it is a hostname', () => {
const policy: HostPolicy = { bindHost: 'mybox.local', allowedHosts: [], tunnelHost: null };
expect(isAllowedRequestHost('mybox.local:3000', policy)).toBe(true);