xlsx files were download-only. Add a read-only, virtualized preview (sheet
tabs, number formats, merges, theme colours) parsed entirely in a browser
Web Worker with exceljs and fflate, loaded only when a spreadsheet is
opened. The workbook is checked against ZIP-bomb, entry and cell limits
before exceljs loads; cell text is written with textContent, formulas are
never evaluated and nothing referenced by the workbook is fetched. On the
server xlsx only joins the existing allowlist and classification, with a
10 MB cap on ?preview=true. xls and ods stay download-only.
A .json/.log/.yaml/code path outside the session workspace was refused as an
unsupported type, and clicking one in the terminal made it worse: text goes to
the log viewer, which spawns `tail -f` and allows only the workspace, /var/log
and ~/logs, so it answered "Path must be within working directory or allowed
log directories" while the same path clicked in the response viewer previewed
fine. Two surfaces, two answers, for a file the session can already cat.
- TEXT_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS IS EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS (config/file-editing.ts),
not a second curated list that would drift from it. The rule reads: if the
viewer would open a file for editing inside the workspace, the same file
outside it can be read. The suffix was never the confidentiality gate here,
the path guard is (sensitive-file blocklist, /root and /etc trees, realpath
before the check), and it still runs on every registration.
- Widening what can be READ must not widen what can RUN. html/htm join svg in
serveRawFile's download-only branch, so markup is never served with a
renderable type on our own origin; other text goes out as inert
text/plain; charset=utf-8 with nosniff, matching what the path picker does.
The preview reads through fetch(), which ignores the disposition, so a
clicked .html still shows its source.
- ~/.codeman*/state.json joins isSensitivePath. It persists
SessionState.envOverrides and the env allowlist admits key-shaped names
(GEMINI_API_KEY, CLAUDE_CODE_*), so it can hold a live credential. Same
treatment as hook-secret and users.json, and the rest of the tree stays
attachable.
- The terminal sends an out-of-workspace path to the preview instead of the log
viewer. In-workspace text keeps the tail viewer, which is the point of it, and
file-stream-manager's allowlist is untouched: no `tail -f` on arbitrary host
paths.
- The by-id text preview is bounded like the workspace one: a Range request for
the first 512KB (a real partial read, not a discarded 50MB download) plus a
500-line cap, with the footer saying so.
Verified on an isolated instance: a 1.1MB external log opens in ~1.8s showing
500 lines with "showing first 500 lines" in the footer; json, yaml and code
preview; an .html carrying a script tag renders as source and does not execute;
.svg is still refused; a terminal click on an external .yaml opens the preview
with no log viewer and no attachment card; an in-workspace .log still opens the
streaming tail viewer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A clip an agent wrote inside the workspace played with a working scrub bar,
while the same file in /tmp was refused as an unsupported type. The workspace
preview classified media with its own inline extension sets and the attachment
allowlist had no media at all, so the two paths disagreed about what a video is.
- VIDEO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS and AUDIO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS now live in
attachment-registry.ts and are imported by file-content's classification, so
both paths answer the same. mp4/webm/mov/m4v/ogv and
mp3/wav/ogg/oga/m4a/aac/flac/opus join the attachment allowlist.
- Real MIME types for those extensions. Without one the raw route falls back to
application/octet-stream, which a <video> refuses to decode: the player
renders and then does nothing.
- getAttachmentType() gained the video and audio members of
AttachmentDetectedType. Attachment cards have no per-type CSS and their
thumbnail falls back to the type label, since the thumbnailer has no media
branch and answers 204 rather than spawning a converter.
- The preview overlay's by-id branch renders <video>/<audio> with the same
markup as the workspace branch, playsinline included. Serving was already
range-aware, so seeking works.
The image-watcher keeps its own narrow detection list (png/pdf/docx/pptx), so
this does not start popping cards for every video an agent writes. Text types
that are not md or txt (.json, .log, code files) remain out of the allowlist by
choice and still report what is previewable instead.
Verified on an isolated instance: an external mp4 and mp3 both play, seek, and
report the right duration, matching the in-workspace clip exactly, and a click
on an external mp4 in the terminal opens the player with no attachment card.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A path an agent prints was already underlined in the terminal, but clicking
one opened the preview overlay on "File not found": file-content/file-raw
resolve against the session workingDir and refuse anything outside it, and the
paths agents print most (a /tmp capture, Claude's own scratchpad, another
checkout) are outside it by definition. In the response viewer those paths were
not links at all.
- openFilePreview() detects an out-of-workspace path and registers it through
POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments first, rendering by attachment id. That is
the surface built for live external files, so the server-side guard is
unchanged: secret trees blocked, symlinks resolved, extension allowlist. The
workspace routes keep refusing escapes exactly as before.
- New optional `notify` field on that route. `notify: false` suppresses only the
attachment:detected broadcast, so a click does not also pop a card announcing
the file already filling the screen. Default stays true for the CLI and
publish callers.
- _linkifyFilePaths() links paths in rendered response-viewer markdown. It walks
text nodes and builds anchors with DOM APIs (the source is model output; never
a string rebuild of sanitized markup), skips subtrees already inside an <a>,
and keeps the message text byte-identical so copy-code is unaffected.
- One path pattern in constants.js now feeds both the xterm link provider and
the chat linkifier, a fresh instance per call since lastIndex is per-object
state. It picks up /Users and /mnt roots (nothing was clickable on macOS or
WSL), plus docx/pptx and video/audio extensions.
- .file-preview-overlay moves to z-index 5100, above the response viewer at
5000. At its old 2000 a path clicked in the chat opened the overlay behind the
panel it was launched from.
Verified end to end on an isolated instance, desktop and phone viewport: real
clicks in the terminal and the chat both render the image, external md and pdf
render, /etc/hosts is still refused, workspace previews unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Security (MAJOR): the terminal-output codeman://attach scanner registered any
matching path server-side with no user confirmation and broadcast the rawUrl
over SSE. Terminal output is attacker-influenceable (a prompt-injected session
can print an arbitrary path), so on the default no-auth deployment this was an
arbitrary host-file (png/pdf/docx/pptx/md/txt) read primitive reachable by any
SSE client. Magic-link registration is now force-confined to the session
workspace (forceWorkspaceConfinement) regardless of the global confine setting;
deliberate cross-workspace attach still works through the explicit,
Origin-guarded POST /attachments route and 'codeman attach' (which POSTs
directly inside a managed session). Documented in security-architecture.md.
Regression (MAJOR): .png was rerouted from the image-popup path to
attachment:detected, which has no frontend consumer — silently breaking the
dropped/pasted-screenshot popup. PNG stays on image:detected; only pdf/docx/pptx
(which never had a popup) emit attachment:detected.
Also:
- raw route streams the freshly-resolved path, not the stored one, so a
post-registration symlink swap can't redirect the stream (TOCTOU).
- 50MB cap on the attachment raw route, matching file-raw / download.
- per-session attachment registry cap (200) to bound the POST path.
- CLI reads creds via dataPath('.env'), honoring CODEMAN_INSTANCE.
Tests: forced-confinement reject/allow cases; PNG popup-path assertions updated.
Adds the foundation for serving local files to the browser as live external
attachments with a stable id, so requests never carry arbitrary absolute paths.
- attachment-registry: in-memory, session-scoped registry. registerExternalAttachment
validates an absolute path, resolves symlinks, enforces the path guard, and mints
an `att_<uuid>` id; records are cleared when the session is removed.
- attachment path guard: a configurable blocklist (secret locations + /root,/etc
trees, extendable via attachmentBlockedPaths / CODEMAN_ATTACHMENT_BLOCKED_PATHS)
plus an optional, default-off workspace-confinement mode. Shares one
sensitive-path blocklist (web/sensitive-path.ts) with /api/download, which is
refactored to use the extracted module instead of an inline copy.
- terminal magic links: the session scans output for codeman://attach?path=... and
emits `attachmentRequested`; the web server registers the file and broadcasts an
`attachment:detected` SSE event. `codeman attach <path>` (CLI) prints the magic
link or POSTs directly when a session id is known.
- image watcher: detects png/pdf/docx/pptx dropped into a session's working dir and
emits `attachment:detected`.
- routes: POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments (register) and
GET /api/sessions/:id/attachments/:attachmentId/raw (serve), both re-checking the
guard before streaming.
Document previews/thumbnails and the attachment-history drawer build on this
foundation and land separately.
Verified: tsc --noEmit, lint, format, frontend-syntax, full test:ci (2846 passed),
and a server boot smoke (/api/status 200).
Aamer Akhter