Files
Codeman/test/routes/file-routes-attachment-path-guard.test.ts
T
arkon f7ce8e4767 fix(attachments): harden registry + close magic-link injection vector
Security (MAJOR): the terminal-output codeman://attach scanner registered any
matching path server-side with no user confirmation and broadcast the rawUrl
over SSE. Terminal output is attacker-influenceable (a prompt-injected session
can print an arbitrary path), so on the default no-auth deployment this was an
arbitrary host-file (png/pdf/docx/pptx/md/txt) read primitive reachable by any
SSE client. Magic-link registration is now force-confined to the session
workspace (forceWorkspaceConfinement) regardless of the global confine setting;
deliberate cross-workspace attach still works through the explicit,
Origin-guarded POST /attachments route and 'codeman attach' (which POSTs
directly inside a managed session). Documented in security-architecture.md.

Regression (MAJOR): .png was rerouted from the image-popup path to
attachment:detected, which has no frontend consumer — silently breaking the
dropped/pasted-screenshot popup. PNG stays on image:detected; only pdf/docx/pptx
(which never had a popup) emit attachment:detected.

Also:
- raw route streams the freshly-resolved path, not the stored one, so a
  post-registration symlink swap can't redirect the stream (TOCTOU).
- 50MB cap on the attachment raw route, matching file-raw / download.
- per-session attachment registry cap (200) to bound the POST path.
- CLI reads creds via dataPath('.env'), honoring CODEMAN_INSTANCE.

Tests: forced-confinement reject/allow cases; PNG popup-path assertions updated.
2026-06-11 10:27:09 +02:00

359 lines
14 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* @fileoverview COD-53 — attachment path-traversal / sensitive-file guard.
*
* Verifies the sensitive-path blocklist is enforced at:
* - attachment registration (POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments)
* - raw / preview / thumbnail serving (defense-in-depth against a record that
* was crafted or registered before the guard existed)
* while still allowing legitimate cross-workspace attachment (codeman-publish
* skill + the ~/.codeman review-card loop) to succeed.
*
* Uses app.inject() — no real HTTP ports needed.
* Port: N/A (app.inject doesn't open ports)
*/
import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach, vi } from 'vitest';
import { Readable } from 'node:stream';
import { homedir } from 'node:os';
import { createRouteTestHarness, type RouteTestHarness } from './_route-test-utils.js';
import { registerFileRoutes } from '../../src/web/routes/file-routes.js';
// Mock fs/promises for file operations
vi.mock('node:fs/promises', () => ({
default: {
readdir: vi.fn(async () => []),
readFile: vi.fn(async () => 'file content'),
writeFile: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
stat: vi.fn(async () => ({ size: 100, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 1 })),
mkdir: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
mkdtemp: vi.fn(async () => '/tmp/codeman-preview-test'),
rename: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
rm: vi.fn(async () => undefined),
},
}));
// Mock realpathSync for symlink resolution (identity by default)
vi.mock('node:fs', async (importOriginal) => {
const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import('node:fs')>();
return {
...actual,
realpathSync: vi.fn((p: string) => p),
createReadStream: vi.fn(() => Readable.from([Buffer.from('file content')])),
};
});
vi.mock('../../src/file-stream-manager.js', () => ({
fileStreamManager: {
createStream: vi.fn(async () => ({ success: true, streamId: 'stream-1' })),
closeStream: vi.fn(() => true),
},
}));
import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
import { createReadStream, realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
import {
attachmentRegistry,
registerExternalAttachment,
type AttachmentRecord,
} from '../../src/attachment-registry.js';
const mockedStat = vi.mocked(fs.stat);
const mockedRealpathSync = vi.mocked(realpathSync);
const mockedCreateReadStream = vi.mocked(createReadStream);
describe('file-routes attachment path guard (COD-53)', () => {
let harness: RouteTestHarness;
beforeEach(async () => {
harness = await createRouteTestHarness(registerFileRoutes);
vi.clearAllMocks();
attachmentRegistry.clearSession('test-session-1');
mockedRealpathSync.mockImplementation((p: string) => p as never);
mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 100, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 1 } as never);
mockedCreateReadStream.mockReturnValue(Readable.from([Buffer.from('file content')]) as never);
});
afterEach(async () => {
await harness.app.close();
attachmentRegistry.clearSession(harness.ctx._sessionId);
// Reset attachment-guard env knobs so one test can't leak into the next.
delete process.env.CODEMAN_ATTACHMENT_BLOCKED_PATHS;
delete process.env.CODEMAN_ATTACHMENT_CONFINE;
});
// ===== BLOCK: registration rejects a sensitive path =====
it('rejects registering a .env file that carries a supported extension', async () => {
// A dotenv-style secret file named with a supported extension still leaks
// secrets; the blocklist's /\.env\./ pattern catches `.env.<ext>`.
const res = await harness.app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
payload: { path: '/home/someone/project/.env.txt' },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
const body = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(body.success).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects registering an SSH key path even with a supported extension', async () => {
const sshTxt = `${homedir()}/.ssh/id_rsa.txt`;
const res = await harness.app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
payload: { path: sshTxt },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
const body = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(body.success).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects registering a sensitive path that a symlink resolves to', async () => {
// The requested path looks innocent (.md) but realpath resolves it to an SSH key dir.
mockedRealpathSync.mockReturnValue(`${homedir()}/.ssh/known_hosts.md` as never);
const res = await harness.app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
payload: { path: '/home/someone/project/innocent.md' },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
});
// ===== BLOCK (defense-in-depth): raw serving rejects a sensitive record =====
it('refuses to serve raw bytes for a record whose path is sensitive', async () => {
// Simulate a record that was registered before the guard existed (or crafted).
const record: AttachmentRecord = {
attachmentId: 'att_sensitive',
sessionId: harness.ctx._sessionId,
filePath: `${homedir()}/.ssh/id_rsa.txt`,
fileName: 'id_rsa.txt',
extension: 'txt',
attachmentType: 'text',
size: 100,
mtimeMs: 1,
timestamp: Date.now(),
source: 'external',
};
attachmentRegistry.register(record);
const res = await harness.app.inject({
method: 'GET',
url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments/att_sensitive/raw`,
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
expect(mockedCreateReadStream).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
// ===== PRESERVE: legitimate cross-workspace attachment still works =====
it('still registers a normal cross-workspace file (codeman-publish / loop review card)', async () => {
mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 512, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
const res = await harness.app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
payload: { path: `${homedir()}/.codeman/jira-autoloop-questions.md` },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
const body = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(body.success).toBe(true);
expect(body.data.fileName).toBe('jira-autoloop-questions.md');
expect(body.data.extension).toBe('md');
});
it('still registers an arbitrary project-dir file (WSL path)', async () => {
mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 4096, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
const res = await harness.app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
payload: { path: '/mnt/c/decks/board-update.pdf' },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
const body = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(body.success).toBe(true);
expect(body.data.fileName).toBe('board-update.pdf');
});
it('still serves raw bytes for a legitimately registered cross-workspace file', async () => {
const content = Buffer.from('# notes');
mockedCreateReadStream.mockReturnValue(Readable.from([content]) as never);
mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: content.length, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
const registerRes = await harness.app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
payload: { path: `${homedir()}/.codeman/review-card.md` },
});
const attachmentId = JSON.parse(registerRes.body).data.attachmentId;
const rawRes = await harness.app.inject({
method: 'GET',
url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments/${attachmentId}/raw`,
});
expect(rawRes.statusCode).toBe(200);
expect(rawRes.headers['content-type']).toBe('text/markdown');
});
// ===== BLOCK (broadened defaults): /root and /etc trees =====
it('rejects registering a file anywhere under /root by default', async () => {
// /root is the root account home — blocked as a whole tree by default,
// even for an ordinary-looking note with a supported extension.
const res = await harness.app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
payload: { path: '/root/secret-notes.md' },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
const body = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(body.success).toBe(false);
});
it('rejects registering a file anywhere under /etc by default', async () => {
// The whole /etc tree is blocked by default (not just /etc/shadow).
const res = await harness.app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
payload: { path: '/etc/codeman/config-dump.txt' },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
const body = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(body.success).toBe(false);
});
it('does not block a lookalike sibling dir like /etcetera (separator-aware)', async () => {
// The /etc tree block must be path-separator-aware so an unrelated
// /etcetera/... path is NOT caught by accident.
mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 10, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
const res = await harness.app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
payload: { path: '/etcetera/notes.md' },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
});
// ===== CONFIG: extend the blocked set via env =====
it('rejects a path added via the extra-blocked-paths config', async () => {
process.env.CODEMAN_ATTACHMENT_BLOCKED_PATHS = '/srv/secrets,/data/private';
const res = await harness.app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
payload: { path: '/srv/secrets/keys.pdf' },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
const body = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(body.success).toBe(false);
});
it('still allows a normal path NOT in the configured blocked set', async () => {
process.env.CODEMAN_ATTACHMENT_BLOCKED_PATHS = '/srv/secrets,/data/private';
mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 20, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
const res = await harness.app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
payload: { path: '/srv/public/report.pdf' },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
const body = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(body.success).toBe(true);
expect(body.data.fileName).toBe('report.pdf');
});
// ===== CONFINEMENT MODE ON (opt-in) =====
it('confinement ON: rejects a file OUTSIDE the session workspace', async () => {
process.env.CODEMAN_ATTACHMENT_CONFINE = '1';
// Mock session workspace is /tmp/test-workdir; this file resolves elsewhere.
const res = await harness.app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
payload: { path: '/home/someone/elsewhere/report.pdf' },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(403);
const body = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(body.success).toBe(false);
});
it('confinement ON: allows a file INSIDE the session workspace', async () => {
process.env.CODEMAN_ATTACHMENT_CONFINE = '1';
// Mock session workspace is /tmp/test-workdir (see MockSession).
const insidePath = '/tmp/test-workdir/docs/report.pdf';
mockedRealpathSync.mockReturnValue(insidePath as never);
mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 30, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
const res = await harness.app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
payload: { path: insidePath },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
const body = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(body.success).toBe(true);
expect(body.data.fileName).toBe('report.pdf');
});
// ===== CONFINEMENT OFF (default) regression: legit cross-workspace attach =====
it('confinement OFF (default): legit cross-workspace attach still succeeds', async () => {
// No CODEMAN_ATTACHMENT_CONFINE set → default OFF. A ~/.codeman review-card
// file lives OUTSIDE the /tmp/test-workdir session workspace and must still
// attach (protects codeman-publish + the loop's review-card channel).
mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 64, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 5 } as never);
const res = await harness.app.inject({
method: 'POST',
url: `/api/sessions/${harness.ctx._sessionId}/attachments`,
payload: { path: `${homedir()}/.codeman/jira-autoloop-questions.md` },
});
expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
const body = JSON.parse(res.body);
expect(body.success).toBe(true);
expect(body.data.fileName).toBe('jira-autoloop-questions.md');
});
// ===== Magic-link scan path: FORCED workspace confinement =====
// The terminal-output `codeman://attach` scanner registers with
// forceWorkspaceConfinement: true so a prompt-injected session printing an
// arbitrary path can't expose a host file, even though global confine is OFF.
describe('forced workspace confinement (magic-link scan path)', () => {
it('rejects an out-of-workspace path even when global confinement is OFF', async () => {
mockedRealpathSync.mockImplementation((p: string) => p as never);
mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 10, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 1 } as never);
await expect(
registerExternalAttachment('test-session-mlc', '/home/someone/secret/report.pdf', {
sessionWorkingDir: '/tmp/test-workdir',
forceWorkspaceConfinement: true,
})
).rejects.toMatchObject({ statusCode: 403 });
attachmentRegistry.clearSession('test-session-mlc');
});
it('allows an in-workspace path on the forced path', async () => {
const inside = '/tmp/test-workdir/sub/report.pdf';
mockedRealpathSync.mockReturnValue(inside as never);
mockedStat.mockResolvedValue({ size: 10, isFile: () => true, mtimeMs: 1 } as never);
const event = await registerExternalAttachment('test-session-mlc', inside, {
sessionWorkingDir: '/tmp/test-workdir',
forceWorkspaceConfinement: true,
});
expect(event.fileName).toBe('report.pdf');
attachmentRegistry.clearSession('test-session-mlc');
});
});
});