Surface Claude subscription plan usage limits (5-hour rolling + 7-day
weekly: percent used + reset time) in the header, opt-in via App Settings
→ Display → "Plan Usage Limits" (default OFF, no behavior change when off).
A Codeman-managed Claude statusLine exporter forwards the rate_limits JSON
to a new auth-exempt POST /api/status-telemetry (same loopback + hook-secret
gate as /api/hook-event); parsed telemetry broadcasts over SSE
session:statusTelemetry to a header chip (amber >=80%, red >=95%, reset
times on hover). The exporter prints the same summary back as the
in-terminal footer (print-through).
- src/usage-telemetry.ts: pure parser/formatter (epoch-sec -> ms, clamp,
change signature) + test/usage-telemetry.test.ts
- hooks-config.ts: generateStatusLineCommand + applyStatusLineConfig
(add/remove; never clobbers a user's own statusLine)
- session-routes.ts: inject gate (Claude-only, Codeman-managed cases),
driven by create-payload statusLineTelemetry (session-ui.js)
- schemas.ts: StatusTelemetrySchema + showPlanUsageLimits + payload field
- frontend: header chip, applyHeaderVisibilitySettings toggle,
renderIndexHtml strip, _onSessionStatusTelemetry handler
Schema empirically confirmed against Claude Code 2.1.177 (Claude Max):
only five_hour/seven_day windows exist (no Opus-weekly field); rate_limits
is absent before the first API response and for non-subscriber auth. Design
+ verification method in docs/usage-limits-display-plan.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Review fixes for COD-54:
- Generated hook curl commands now present X-Codeman-Hook-Secret, read from
the secret file AT EXECUTION TIME via $CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE (exported
into every managed session's env by tmux buildEnvExports / the direct-PTY
env builders). Without this, every local hook 401'd the moment a managed
tunnel came up — the enforcement existed but nothing presented the secret.
Path-not-value keeps the secret off command lines and out of config files,
and running sessions pick up a newly generated secret with no respawn;
server.start() ensures the file exists up front.
- Hook-secret failures now count into a DEDICATED per-IP bucket
(hookSecretFailures) instead of the shared authFailures map. Legacy
(pre-secret) hook configs fire constantly from 127.0.0.1; counting their
401s against the shared bucket would 429 every cookie-less loopback
request — locking out the Basic-Auth login path (and, through a tunnel,
every client, since tunneled traffic also arrives as 127.0.0.1).
- docs/security-architecture.md: secret-gated hook exemption, dedicated
bucket, COD-55 refusal, and the residual caveat for EXTERNAL loopback
proxies (user-run cloudflared / tailscale serve), which the
managed-tunnel probe cannot see.
- test/cod54-hook-event-auth.test.ts: +3 tests — login path unaffected
after hook-bucket exhaustion; generated hooks reference the header +
$CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE without embedding the value; env builders
export the path only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two hardening fixes for the public-tunnel exposure path (COD-54 / COD-55).
COD-54 — gate the /api/hook-event localhost bypass when a tunnel is up:
`cloudflared --url http://127.0.0.1:port` proxies internet traffic INTO the
loopback origin, so a tunneled hook request arrives with req.ip === 127.0.0.1
and the old bare-localhost bypass would pass it unauthenticated. Now:
- tunnel running → bypass requires a shared per-instance hook secret
(X-Codeman-Hook-Secret header; constant-time compare) + per-IP rate limiting
- tunnel not running (loopback-only, the normal case) → unchanged, so
already-deployed credential-less hooks keep working.
New src/config/hook-secret.ts; auth middleware takes a getTunnelRunning probe
(wired from server.ts via tunnelManager.isRunning()).
COD-55 — refuse starting the Cloudflare tunnel without auth:
enabling the tunnel publishes full terminal control to a public URL; with no
CODEMAN_PASSWORD the auth middleware is inactive and the bind guard never trips
(tunnel binds loopback). PUT /api/settings now refuses tunnelEnabled:true with a
403 (before persisting) unless CODEMAN_PASSWORD is set or
CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1 is acknowledged. New
isUnauthenticatedNetworkAcknowledged() in network-auth-policy; settings-ui
surfaces the refusal as an error toast and reverts the toggle.
Scope: the always-on CSRF/Origin guard, Host-header allowlist, and
network-auth-policy itself are already upstream (#113) and not re-proposed here.
Verification: tsc, eslint, prettier, check:frontend-syntax clean; full test:ci
green (2723 passed), incl. test/cod54-hook-event-auth and
test/routes/system-routes-tunnel-guard.
cmdPattern's empty-matchable unbounded arg group backtracked exponentially
on wrapped heredoc/table lines — hovering one froze the tab for minutes.
Non-empty tokens + bounded reps make it O(n); regression test extracts the
shipped patterns and pins timing on the real killer shapes.
worker-src 'self' blob: is now unconditional so terminal-ui's _safeYield
tick worker (throttling escape) isn't CSP-blocked on non-gesture installs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an always-on Host-header allowlist and a cross-site Origin/CSRF guard,
hardens the text/plain body parser, validates the WebSocket upgrade origin,
and escapes AI-derived fields in the subagent panel. Closes the two
CRITICALs and 5 HIGHs from the 2026-06-09 adversarial security review.
- C1: no Host allowlist -> DNS rebinding drove the full API (RCE) on the
default no-auth loopback install. New registerHostGuard rejects rebound
custom domains; allows loopback, any IP literal, the bind host,
*.ts.net / *.trycloudflare.com / *.cfargotunnel.com, the active managed
tunnel, and CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS.
- C2: a global text/plain parser JSON-parsed every body, enabling cross-site
simple-request CSRF. Parser now keeps the raw string; /api/crash-diag
self-parses; the global Origin guard rejects cross-site state changes.
- H1/H3/H6: self-update, session create/input, and settings/tunnel toggles
were CSRF-triggerable -> now covered by the Origin guard.
- H4: the subagent activity panel injected raw AI tool names/inputs into
innerHTML (executed under CSP 'unsafe-inline'). All sinks now escapeHtml'd.
- H5: the WebSocket upgrade had no Origin/Host check (CSWSH) -> now validated.
A missing Origin is allowed so curl/CLI and Claude Code hooks keep working;
custom reverse-proxy domains need CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS=host,.suffix.
Deferred: H2 (self-update tag signing, needs signing infra) and CSP
'unsafe-inline' removal (needs a nonce migration).
Tests: test/network-host-guard.test.ts (19), test/routes/ws-routes.test.ts
updated. Report: docs/reports/security-review-2026-06-09.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
MediaPipe's wasm runtime + model are served same-origin from /gesture/, so the
gesture CSP no longer needs https://cdn.jsdelivr.net / https://storage.googleapis
.com in connect-src ('self' covers same-origin). Kept 'wasm-unsafe-eval'
(script-src, WASM compile) and worker-src 'self' blob: (MediaPipe blob workers).
Codeman's base jsdelivr entries (script/style/font-src) are unchanged — those
aren't gesture's.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wrap the two long CSP-builder lines in registerSecurityHeaders to the 120-col
Prettier limit. Formatting only — no behavior change. Fixes the failing
"Typecheck & Lint" check (prettier --check) on PR #103.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Loads a hand-tracking overlay into the dashboard that detaches a session by
pinch-grabbing its tab and pulling it out — driving the existing
app.detachSession(id) hook. Bundle (src/web/public/gesture/gesture-codeman.js)
is built from the codeman-gesture-control project's src/codeman/entry.ts
(esbuild, MediaPipe included) and served same-origin.
OFF by default — guarded entirely by CODEMAN_GESTURE=1:
- server.ts: injects the module script into the dashboard HTML only (not solo
/session/:id popups, which have no tab strip).
- auth.ts: widens CSP only under the flag — adds 'wasm-unsafe-eval' (MediaPipe
WASM) and the pinned MediaPipe CDNs (cdn.jsdelivr.net wasm, storage.googleapis.com
model) to connect-src, plus worker-src 'self' blob:. Production CSP is unchanged
when the flag is off.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Knip-driven cleanup. All changes verified with tsc --noEmit, lint, and
build.
Removed (zero consumers):
- VERIFICATION_PROMPT constant + its barrel re-export
- createInitialOrchestratorPersistState factory
- transcriptWatcher singleton export
- createAnsiPatternFull / createAnsiPatternSimple factories
- TimerInfo interface + unused AiCheckResult/AiPlanCheckResult imports
in respawn-controller.ts
- 35 unused Zod z.infer \`*Input\` types in schemas.ts
- Dead re-exports: SessionMode from session.ts, AuthSessionRecord from
web/ports/index.ts, EnhancedPlanTask/CheckpointReview from
ralph-tracker.ts, 7 unused entries in utils/index.ts
- 14 event/config interfaces that lived only as JSDoc hints (no TS type
position usage): Session/Respawn/RalphLoop/RalphTracker/
SessionManager/SessionAutoOps/Subagent/TaskQueue/TaskTracker/
TranscriptWatcher/Image/OrchestratorLoop Events + RespawnPreset +
SessionOutput
Narrowed to module scope (kept but no longer exported):
- buildPermissionArgs in session-cli-builder.ts
- 28 type/interface declarations used only within their own file:
Ai{Idle,Plan}Check{Config,State}, BashToolParser{Events,Config},
FileStream/CreateStream{Options,Result}, PlanSubagentEvent,
SubagentCallback, RalphLoopConfig, RalphLoop{Events,Options},
ActiveTimerInfo, DetectionStatus, ActionLogEntry, AutoOpsCallbacks,
TunnelStatus, Timer/LRUMap/StaleExpirationMap Options, AuthState,
SessionListenerDeps, SseStreamManagerDeps, and 8 more
Docs: CLAUDE.md advice for global-regex `lastIndex` now points to the
remaining `execPattern()` helper instead of the deleted factories.
Knip delta: unused files 42→0, unused exports 161→16, unused types 92→0.
The 16 remaining exports are a mobile-test helper toolkit intentionally
kept for upcoming tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds ephemeral single-use QR tokens for passwordless tunnel login.
Scanning the QR auto-authenticates; bare tunnel URL requires Basic Auth.
Backend:
- TunnelManager: 60s token rotation, 90s grace, rejection-sampled 6-char
base62 short codes, Map-based O(1) lookup, SVG caching, global rate limit
- Auth middleware: /q/ bypass, separate qrAuthFailures counter, enhanced
AuthSessionRecord with device context (ip, ua, createdAt, method)
- Routes: GET /q/:code (consume + cookie + redirect), POST /api/tunnel/qr/
regenerate, POST /api/auth/revoke, updated GET /api/tunnel/qr with cache
- SSE: tunnel:qrRotated, tunnel:qrRegenerated, tunnel:qrAuthUsed events
- Audit: qr_auth lifecycle log entries
Frontend:
- Auto-refresh QR via inline SVG in SSE (fallback fetch if absent)
- 60s countdown indicator on QR badge
- Regenerate QR button
- QRLjacking detection toast with [Revoke All] action button (10s duration)
- showToast enhanced with optional duration and action button support
Fixes:
- /api/logout now invalidates server-side session token (was only clearing
browser cookie, leaving token valid for replay)
Tests: 20 new tests in test/qr-auth.test.ts covering token lifecycle,
bias check, rate limiting, SVG caching, and full server integration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Split 6,710-line server.ts into focused route modules using port
interfaces for dependency injection. 107/109 routes extracted into
12 domain files with auth middleware, 5 port interfaces, and shared
helpers. Server.ts retains orchestration (SSE, lifecycle, state).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
