Files
Codeman/src/web/middleware/auth.ts
T
arkonandClaude Opus 4.6 97ca13916a refactor: consolidate ~70 scattered constants into 6 new config files (phase 6)
Create 6 domain-focused config files in src/config/ to centralize operational
tuning knobs that were scattered across 15+ source files:

- server-timing.ts: SSE batching, state debounce, scheduled runs, error recovery
- auth-config.ts: session TTL, rate limits, hook timeout
- tunnel-config.ts: QR token rotation, tunnel process lifecycle
- terminal-limits.ts: input length, terminal cols/rows, session name
- ai-defaults.ts: AI model string, idle/plan context limits
- team-config.ts: poll interval, cache sizes

Eliminates all cross-file duplicates:
- AI model string: 5 occurrences → 1 (config only)
- STATS_COLLECTION_INTERVAL_MS: 2 → 1
- timeout: 10000 in hooks-config: 6 → 0 (now HOOK_TIMEOUT_MS)
- MAX_TRACKED_AGENTS shadow: removed, imports from map-limits

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-01 13:19:16 +01:00

194 lines
6.6 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* @fileoverview Authentication and security middleware.
*
* Extracted from server.ts setupRoutes() — handles:
* - HTTP Basic Auth with session cookies
* - Rate limiting (per-IP failure tracking)
* - Security headers (CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS)
* - CORS (localhost only)
*/
import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
import { StaleExpirationMap } from '../../utils/index.js';
import type { AuthSessionRecord } from '../ports/auth-port.js';
import {
AUTH_SESSION_TTL_MS,
MAX_AUTH_SESSIONS,
AUTH_FAILURE_MAX,
AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS,
} from '../../config/auth-config.js';
// Auth session cookie name
export const AUTH_COOKIE_NAME = 'codeman_session';
/** State returned from registerAuthMiddleware for cleanup in server stop() */
export interface AuthState {
authSessions: StaleExpirationMap<string, AuthSessionRecord> | null;
authFailures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number> | null;
qrAuthFailures: StaleExpirationMap<string, number> | null;
}
/**
* Register HTTP Basic Auth middleware with session cookies and rate limiting.
* Only active when CODEMAN_PASSWORD is set.
*
* @returns AuthState for lifecycle management (dispose on server stop)
*/
export function registerAuthMiddleware(app: FastifyInstance, https: boolean): AuthState {
const state: AuthState = {
authSessions: null,
authFailures: null,
qrAuthFailures: null,
};
const authPassword = process.env.CODEMAN_PASSWORD;
if (!authPassword) return state;
const authUsername = process.env.CODEMAN_USERNAME || 'admin';
const expectedHeader = 'Basic ' + Buffer.from(`${authUsername}:${authPassword}`).toString('base64');
// Session token store — active sessions extend TTL on access
state.authSessions = new StaleExpirationMap<string, AuthSessionRecord>({
ttlMs: AUTH_SESSION_TTL_MS,
refreshOnGet: true,
});
// Failure counter per IP — decay naturally after 15 minutes
state.authFailures = new StaleExpirationMap<string, number>({
ttlMs: AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS,
refreshOnGet: false,
});
// Separate QR auth failure counter — independent from Basic Auth failures
state.qrAuthFailures = new StaleExpirationMap<string, number>({
ttlMs: AUTH_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS,
refreshOnGet: false,
});
const authSessions = state.authSessions;
const authFailures = state.authFailures;
app.addHook('onRequest', (req, reply, done) => {
// Hook events come from local Claude Code hooks (curl from localhost) — no auth headers available.
// Safe: validated by HookEventSchema, only triggers broadcasts.
// Security: restrict bypass to localhost only — prevents forged hook events via tunnel/LAN.
if (req.url === '/api/hook-event' && req.method === 'POST') {
const ip = req.ip;
if (ip === '127.0.0.1' || ip === '::1' || ip === '::ffff:127.0.0.1') {
done();
return;
}
// Non-localhost hook requests fall through to normal auth
}
// QR auth path — handled by the route itself (token validation + rate limiting)
if (req.url?.startsWith('/q/')) {
done();
return;
}
const clientIp = req.ip;
// Rate limit: reject if too many failed attempts from this IP
const failures = authFailures.get(clientIp) ?? 0;
if (failures >= AUTH_FAILURE_MAX) {
reply.code(429).send('Too Many Requests — try again later');
return;
}
// Check session cookie first (avoids re-sending credentials on every request)
// Use get() instead of has() so refreshOnGet extends the TTL on active sessions
const sessionToken = req.cookies[AUTH_COOKIE_NAME];
if (sessionToken && authSessions.get(sessionToken) !== undefined) {
done();
return;
}
// Check Basic Auth header (timing-safe comparison to prevent side-channel attacks)
const auth = req.headers.authorization;
const authBuf = Buffer.from(auth ?? '');
const expectedBuf = Buffer.from(expectedHeader);
if (authBuf.length === expectedBuf.length && timingSafeEqual(authBuf, expectedBuf)) {
// Issue session token cookie so browser doesn't need to re-send credentials
const token = randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
// Evict oldest if at capacity (prevent unbounded growth)
if (authSessions.size >= MAX_AUTH_SESSIONS) {
const oldestKey = authSessions.keys().next().value;
if (oldestKey !== undefined) authSessions.delete(oldestKey);
}
authSessions.set(token, {
ip: clientIp,
ua: req.headers['user-agent'] ?? '',
createdAt: Date.now(),
method: 'basic',
});
// Reset failure count on successful auth
authFailures.delete(clientIp);
reply.setCookie(AUTH_COOKIE_NAME, token, {
httpOnly: true,
secure: https,
sameSite: 'lax',
maxAge: AUTH_SESSION_TTL_MS / 1000, // seconds
path: '/',
});
done();
return;
}
// Auth failed — track failure count
authFailures.set(clientIp, failures + 1);
reply.header('WWW-Authenticate', 'Basic realm="Codeman"');
reply.code(401).send('Unauthorized');
});
return state;
}
/**
* Register security headers and CORS middleware on every response.
*/
export function registerSecurityHeaders(app: FastifyInstance, https: boolean): void {
app.addHook('onRequest', (req, reply, done) => {
reply.header('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
reply.header('X-Frame-Options', 'SAMEORIGIN');
reply.header(
'Content-Security-Policy',
"default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net; img-src 'self' data: blob:; connect-src 'self' wss://api.deepgram.com; font-src 'self' https://cdn.jsdelivr.net; frame-ancestors 'self'"
);
if (https) {
reply.header('Strict-Transport-Security', 'max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains');
}
// CORS: restrict to same-origin (localhost) only
const origin = req.headers.origin;
if (origin) {
try {
const url = new URL(origin);
if (url.hostname === 'localhost' || url.hostname === '127.0.0.1' || url.hostname === '::1') {
reply.header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', origin);
reply.header('Access-Control-Allow-Methods', 'GET, POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE, OPTIONS');
reply.header('Access-Control-Allow-Headers', 'Content-Type, Authorization');
reply.header('Access-Control-Max-Age', '86400');
}
} catch {
// Invalid origin header — do not set CORS headers
}
}
// Handle CORS preflight
if (req.method === 'OPTIONS') {
reply.code(204).send();
done();
return;
}
done();
});
}