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Merge pull request #210 from timkjr/fix/remote-ssh-login-shell
fix(remote-ssh): route shell + agent CLIs through a real interactive login shell
This commit is contained in:
+19
-6
@@ -59,16 +59,29 @@ export async function writeRemoteCases(configDir: string, cases: RemoteCase[]):
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}
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export function defaultRemoteCommandForMode(mode: SessionMode): string {
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// Agent CLIs (claude/opencode/codex/gemini/antigravity) are typically installed
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// under per-user paths like ~/.local/bin or ~/.opencode/bin, added to PATH only by
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// the remote user's interactive-login shell startup files (~/.zshrc etc.). ssh's
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// remote-command execution is neither interactive nor login, so a bare `exec
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// claude` sees only sshd's minimal default PATH and fails with "command not
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// found" (exit 127) — confirmed via `tmux capture-pane` on the
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// remain-on-exit-preserved dead pane. Route through `$SHELL -i -l -c`, the same
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// fix already used for shell mode below, so PATH is fully resolved before the
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// CLI name is looked up.
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const commands: Record<RemoteCommandMode, string> = {
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shell: 'exec bash -l',
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// $SHELL, not a hardcoded bash: sshd sets it from the remote user's
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// /etc/passwd entry, so this launches their actual login shell (zsh,
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// fish, etc.). -i -l so it sources rc files (~/.zshrc etc.), matching
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// the local shell-mode launch.
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shell: 'exec $SHELL -i -l',
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// Mirror the LOCAL claude default so the remote agent runs non-interactively
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// (no trust-folder/permission prompt that nothing on the remote answers). The
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// per-host `commands.claude` override stays the escape hatch.
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claude: 'exec claude --dangerously-skip-permissions',
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opencode: 'exec opencode',
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codex: 'exec codex',
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gemini: 'exec gemini',
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antigravity: 'exec agy',
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claude: `exec $SHELL -i -l -c ${shellescape('claude --dangerously-skip-permissions')}`,
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opencode: `exec $SHELL -i -l -c ${shellescape('opencode')}`,
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codex: `exec $SHELL -i -l -c ${shellescape('codex')}`,
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gemini: `exec $SHELL -i -l -c ${shellescape('gemini')}`,
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antigravity: `exec $SHELL -i -l -c ${shellescape('agy')}`,
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};
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return commands[mode as RemoteCommandMode] || commands.shell;
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}
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+12
-3
@@ -860,13 +860,14 @@ export function buildRemoteLaunchCommand(options: {
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// hardcoding --dangerously-skip-permissions, so a non-granted multi-user user's
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// downgraded 'auto' actually reaches the remote agent (the default command otherwise
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// ignored claudeMode). A per-host `commands.claude` override stays authoritative
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// (admin's explicit choice). For the DEFAULT single-user config (skip), the emitted
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// command is byte-identical to before. Non-claude modes are unchanged.
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// (admin's explicit choice). Wrapped in `$SHELL -i -l -c` for the same reason as
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// `defaultRemoteCommandForMode`: `claude` lives under a per-user PATH entry that
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// only an interactive login shell resolves (see that function's comment).
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const override = remote.commands?.[mode];
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const modeCommand = override
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? override
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: mode === 'claude'
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? `exec claude${buildClaudePermissionFlags(claudeMode, allowedTools)}`
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? `exec $SHELL -i -l -c ${shellescape(`claude${buildClaudePermissionFlags(claudeMode, allowedTools)}`)}`
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: defaultRemoteCommandForMode(mode);
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const remoteName = remoteTmuxSessionName(sessionId);
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@@ -881,6 +882,14 @@ export function buildRemoteLaunchCommand(options: {
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// shared remote tmux server's other sessions keep their own prefix/mouse.
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const tmuxInvocation = [
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`tmux -L ${REMOTE_TMUX_SOCKET} new-session -A -s ${remoteName} -c ${shellescape(remote.remotePath)} ${shellescape(paneCommand)}`,
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// Without this, tmux's default behavior destroys the pane -> window ->
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// session (and, being the only session, the whole remote server) the
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// instant paneCommand exits for ANY reason -- even something transient.
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// That tears down the local ssh -t attach along with it (dead pane,
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// status whatever ssh reported), and reconnect's `-A` then creates a
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// fresh session with no trace of what actually happened. Set first, so
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// it applies as early as possible after the pane starts.
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`set -t ${remoteName} remain-on-exit on`,
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`set -t ${remoteName} status off`,
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`set -t ${remoteName} mouse off`,
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`set -t ${remoteName} prefix C-q`,
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@@ -118,6 +118,8 @@ describe('Antigravity mode gates', () => {
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it('has docker/remote default commands', () => {
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expect(defaultDockerCommandForMode('antigravity')).toBe('exec agy');
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expect(defaultRemoteCommandForMode('antigravity')).toBe('exec agy');
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// Routed through an interactive login shell so per-user PATH entries resolve —
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// same fix as the other remote agent CLIs (see defaultRemoteCommandForMode).
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expect(defaultRemoteCommandForMode('antigravity')).toBe("exec $SHELL -i -l -c 'agy'");
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});
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});
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@@ -55,10 +55,13 @@ describe('remote-hosts domain', () => {
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});
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it('returns safe mode defaults and remote display values', () => {
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expect(defaultRemoteCommandForMode('shell')).toBe('exec bash -l');
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expect(defaultRemoteCommandForMode('codex')).toBe('exec codex');
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expect(defaultRemoteCommandForMode('shell')).toBe('exec $SHELL -i -l');
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// Routed through an interactive login shell so per-user PATH entries (e.g.
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// ~/.local/bin, ~/.opencode/bin) resolve — a bare `exec codex` sees only
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// sshd's minimal default PATH and fails with "command not found".
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expect(defaultRemoteCommandForMode('codex')).toBe("exec $SHELL -i -l -c 'codex'");
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// Mirrors the local claude default so the remote agent runs non-interactively.
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expect(defaultRemoteCommandForMode('claude')).toBe('exec claude --dangerously-skip-permissions');
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expect(defaultRemoteCommandForMode('claude')).toBe("exec $SHELL -i -l -c 'claude --dangerously-skip-permissions'");
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expect(remoteSshTarget({ id: 'h1', label: 'H1', host: 'box.local', username: 'aamer' })).toBe('aamer@box.local');
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expect(remoteDisplayPath({ username: 'aamer', host: 'box.local', path: '/opt/work' })).toBe(
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'aamer@box.local:/opt/work'
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@@ -150,9 +150,10 @@ describe('COD-107 buildRemoteLaunchCommand — threads connection args', () => {
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const sh = (s: string) => "'" + s.replace(/'/g, "'\\''") + "'";
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const remoteName = `codeman-ssh-${SESSION_ID.slice(0, 8)}`;
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const path = sh('/home/ubuntu/work');
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const paneCommand = `cd ${path} && exec bash -l`;
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const paneCommand = `cd ${path} && exec $SHELL -i -l`;
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const tmuxInvocation = [
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`tmux -L codeman-remote new-session -A -s ${remoteName} -c ${path} ${sh(paneCommand)}`,
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`set -t ${remoteName} remain-on-exit on`,
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`set -t ${remoteName} status off`,
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`set -t ${remoteName} mouse off`,
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`set -t ${remoteName} prefix C-q`,
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@@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ describe('TmuxManager (unit)', () => {
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sessionId: 'abc123def456',
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});
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expect(command).toContain('exec bash -l');
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expect(command).toContain('exec $SHELL -i -l');
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expect(command).toContain('remain-on-exit on');
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});
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it('defaults claude to a non-interactive launch (--dangerously-skip-permissions)', () => {
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@@ -155,7 +156,13 @@ describe('TmuxManager (unit)', () => {
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remote: { hostId: 'gpu-box', label: 'GPU Box', host: '10.0.0.42', username: 'ubuntu', remotePath: '/w' },
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sessionId: 'abc123def456',
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});
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expect(command).toContain('exec claude --dangerously-skip-permissions');
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// Routed through an interactive login shell so ~/.local/bin (where `claude`
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// typically lives) is on PATH — ssh's remote-command execution is neither
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// interactive nor login, so a bare `exec claude` fails with "command not found".
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// The inner quoting is escaped twice over (once per shellescape() layer), so
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// assert on the unescaped substrings rather than the literal quoted form.
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expect(command).toContain('exec $SHELL -i -l -c');
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expect(command).toContain('claude --dangerously-skip-permissions');
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});
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});
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