chore: version packages

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Codeman maintainer
2026-08-09 17:10:29 +02:00
parent 527ce10491
commit 6fc772f697
7 changed files with 70 additions and 63 deletions
-23
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@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
---
'aicodeman': patch
---
The File Viewer can show hidden files and folders.
`GET /api/sessions/:id/files` has always accepted `showHidden=true`, but the panel
hardcoded `showHidden=false`, so dot-prefixed entries were unreachable from the
tree: no `.gitignore`, no `.github/`, no `.env.example`, and nothing under them.
Opening one meant guessing its path.
The panel header gains a `.*` toggle. It re-fetches rather than re-rendering the
cached tree, because the filtering happens server-side, and it keeps the expanded
directories so toggling does not collapse the tree you just navigated. The state
is per-device (its own `codeman:fileBrowserShowHidden` key rather than the
app-settings object, which is rebuilt from the settings-modal DOM on save and
would drop a key toggled from outside it), defaults to OFF, and survives a reload.
Generated and version-control directories (`.git`, `node_modules`, `.next`,
`.venv`, ...) stay excluded either way: that list is about tree size, not about
hiding dotfiles.
Closes #221.
-7
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@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
---
"aicodeman": minor
---
Cross-session messaging integration, two halves. **Workers now carry their Codeman session names as messaging peer names**: local claude spawns pass `--name <session name>` when the installed CLI is 2.1.224+ (the cross-session-messaging release). The gate is fail-closed, since an older claude aborts startup on an unknown option: an unknown or older version yields a spawn command byte-identical to before, the value is allowlist-sanitized before shell interpolation, and docker/remote spawns never carry the flag (their CLI is not the probed binary). Verified end to end on an isolated instance: the worker lists as its session name in `ListAgents`, and its replies arrive tagged `from-name="<session name>"`.
**The Codeman agent skill teaches cross-session messaging**: drive claude workers over `ListAgents`/`SendMessage` where available, map rows to Codeman sessions via the `tmux codeman-<id8>` column, deliver multi-line exactly-once task messages (including mid-turn steering), collect results as latched replies instead of polling, and fall back to the HTTP recipes whenever the feature is absent (version, feature flag, telemetry-disabling env vars, Docker/remote cases, non-claude modes). Adds `reference/messaging.md` (ships automatically, the installer enumerates `reference/*.md`), fan-out Flow 5 in `reference/recipes.md`, troubleshooting rows in `reference/endpoints.md`, and safety rules for the shared peer namespace (message only workers you created, no permission laundering in either direction). All mechanics verified live against claude-cli 2.1.226.
-29
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@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
---
'aicodeman': patch
---
The filesystem path picker can show hidden files and folders, and the shared secret blocklist grew to make that safe.
The picker behind Link Existing's "Browse" and the mobile keyboard's `Path` key
refused every path with a dot-prefixed segment, so `.github/workflows/ci.yml`
could not be selected and a hidden folder could not even be opened. It now has
the same `.*` toggle as the File Viewer, default OFF, per-device, and it applies
to both the listing and the preview endpoint (which re-resolves the path
independently).
That filter was quietly doing security work. With every hidden path unreachable,
`isSensitivePath` never had to name the credentials that live in dot-directories,
because the picker's roots include Home. Lifting the filter removes that
accident, so the blocklist now covers them explicitly: SSH keys at any depth (not
only under `$HOME`), GPG keyrings, AWS/GCloud/Azure/Docker/Kubernetes
credentials, npm, Yarn, git, `gh`, netrc, PyPI, RubyGems, Cargo and Terraform
tokens, `.pgpass` and `.my.cnf`, and the Claude and Codeman agent credentials.
`~/.codeman/` and `~/.claude/` stay attachable as trees, since the publish skill
and the review-card loop read from them; only their secret-bearing members are
named.
Blocked trees, sensitive files, root confinement and symlink-escape checks are
all unchanged and still apply with the toggle on: a hidden entry that resolves
to a secret is dropped from the listing, and opening it is refused.
Follows #221.
+66
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@@ -1,5 +1,71 @@
# aicodeman
## 1.16.0
### Minor Changes
- Approvals Inbox, truthful idle detection, a revived trust-dialog auto-accept, and an unmistakable offline state.
**Approvals Inbox (#245, opt-in, default OFF)**: one cross-session inbox for every prompt that is waiting on a human (permission dialogs, AskUserQuestion questions, idle prompts). Enable "Approvals Inbox" in App Settings -> Panels (synced setting `approvalsInboxEnabled`); until then no new UI renders anywhere. Desktop gets a header bell (visible only while something is pending, with a count badge) opening a drawer of cards answerable in place: session, tool/message summary, the captured dialog frame, and one button per parsed dialog option (fallback: Approve / Deny-Esc). The phone overview's NEEDS YOU rows gain compact answer strips, and push notification action buttons were fixed along the way.
**Sessions no longer report idle while working (#246)**: every working Claude session flipped to `status: "idle"` about two seconds into its turn, and tabs, notifications, respawn and the phone overview all read that bad value. The `❯` prompt redraws throughout a turn, so readiness now requires a sustained repaint streak plus a capture-pane probe that recognizes the live working line (`✻ ... (Xs)`), and the UI shows a working state you can actually see.
**Workspace trust dialog auto-accept has been dead and now works (#249)**: a session started in a directory Claude had not seen before sat on the workspace-trust dialog until a human pressed Enter, because tmux delivers cursor-forward sequences rather than spaces. Detection now goes through the capture-pane text added in #246 and the dialog is answered reliably.
**A dead connection is unmistakable instead of a red dot (#248)**: the service worker serves the cached app shell, so opening Codeman with nothing reachable rendered a normal-looking empty dashboard with only an 8px red header dot as a clue. Now a connection-loss overlay (retry button, server host, actionable hints) plus a persistent banner make the state obvious on desktop and phone, and clear the moment the server answers again.
- 1e1db94: Cross-session messaging integration, two halves. **Workers now carry their Codeman session names as messaging peer names**: local claude spawns pass `--name <session name>` when the installed CLI is 2.1.224+ (the cross-session-messaging release). The gate is fail-closed, since an older claude aborts startup on an unknown option: an unknown or older version yields a spawn command byte-identical to before, the value is allowlist-sanitized before shell interpolation, and docker/remote spawns never carry the flag (their CLI is not the probed binary). Verified end to end on an isolated instance: the worker lists as its session name in `ListAgents`, and its replies arrive tagged `from-name="<session name>"`.
**The Codeman agent skill teaches cross-session messaging**: drive claude workers over `ListAgents`/`SendMessage` where available, map rows to Codeman sessions via the `tmux codeman-<id8>` column, deliver multi-line exactly-once task messages (including mid-turn steering), collect results as latched replies instead of polling, and fall back to the HTTP recipes whenever the feature is absent (version, feature flag, telemetry-disabling env vars, Docker/remote cases, non-claude modes). Adds `reference/messaging.md` (ships automatically, the installer enumerates `reference/*.md`), fan-out Flow 5 in `reference/recipes.md`, troubleshooting rows in `reference/endpoints.md`, and safety rules for the shared peer namespace (message only workers you created, no permission laundering in either direction). All mechanics verified live against claude-cli 2.1.226.
### Patch Changes
- c50bb02: The File Viewer can show hidden files and folders.
`GET /api/sessions/:id/files` has always accepted `showHidden=true`, but the panel
hardcoded `showHidden=false`, so dot-prefixed entries were unreachable from the
tree: no `.gitignore`, no `.github/`, no `.env.example`, and nothing under them.
Opening one meant guessing its path.
The panel header gains a `.*` toggle. It re-fetches rather than re-rendering the
cached tree, because the filtering happens server-side, and it keeps the expanded
directories so toggling does not collapse the tree you just navigated. The state
is per-device (its own `codeman:fileBrowserShowHidden` key rather than the
app-settings object, which is rebuilt from the settings-modal DOM on save and
would drop a key toggled from outside it), defaults to OFF, and survives a reload.
Generated and version-control directories (`.git`, `node_modules`, `.next`,
`.venv`, ...) stay excluded either way: that list is about tree size, not about
hiding dotfiles.
Closes #221.
- ce22c2a: The filesystem path picker can show hidden files and folders, and the shared secret blocklist grew to make that safe.
The picker behind Link Existing's "Browse" and the mobile keyboard's `Path` key
refused every path with a dot-prefixed segment, so `.github/workflows/ci.yml`
could not be selected and a hidden folder could not even be opened. It now has
the same `.*` toggle as the File Viewer, default OFF, per-device, and it applies
to both the listing and the preview endpoint (which re-resolves the path
independently).
That filter was quietly doing security work. With every hidden path unreachable,
`isSensitivePath` never had to name the credentials that live in dot-directories,
because the picker's roots include Home. Lifting the filter removes that
accident, so the blocklist now covers them explicitly: SSH keys at any depth (not
only under `$HOME`), GPG keyrings, AWS/GCloud/Azure/Docker/Kubernetes
credentials, npm, Yarn, git, `gh`, netrc, PyPI, RubyGems, Cargo and Terraform
tokens, `.pgpass` and `.my.cnf`, and the Claude and Codeman agent credentials.
`~/.codeman/` and `~/.claude/` stay attachable as trees, since the publish skill
and the review-card loop read from them; only their secret-bearing members are
named.
Blocked trees, sensitive files, root confinement and symlink-escape checks are
all unchanged and still apply with the toggle on: a hidden entry that resolves
to a secret is dropped from the listing, and opening it is refused.
Follows #221.
## 1.15.0
### Minor Changes
+1 -1
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@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ When user says "COM":
CI runs `npm run check:lockfile` on every push/PR, so lockfile drift fails the build even if the `version-packages` script is bypassed.
**Version**: 1.15.0 (must match `package.json`)
**Version**: 1.16.0 (must match `package.json`)
## Project Overview
+2 -2
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@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
{
"name": "aicodeman",
"version": "1.15.0",
"version": "1.16.0",
"lockfileVersion": 3,
"requires": true,
"packages": {
"": {
"name": "aicodeman",
"version": "1.15.0",
"version": "1.16.0",
"hasInstallScript": true,
"license": "MIT",
"workspaces": [
+1 -1
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"name": "aicodeman",
"version": "1.15.0",
"version": "1.16.0",
"description": "Mission control for AI coding agents - run 20 autonomous agents with real-time monitoring and session persistence",
"type": "module",
"main": "dist/index.js",