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fix: COD-157 refine shortcut palette labels

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This commit is contained in:
Saqeb Akhter
2026-07-09 11:11:33 -04:00
committed by Aamer Akhter
parent e8f5ac94f3
commit 596899e19b
7 changed files with 329 additions and 56 deletions
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README.md
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@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ codeman web
<summary><strong>Run as a background service</strong></summary>
**Linux (systemd):**
```bash
mkdir -p ~/.config/systemd/user
cat > ~/.config/systemd/user/codeman-web.service << EOF
@@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ loginctl enable-linger $USER
```
**macOS (launchd):**
```bash
mkdir -p ~/Library/LaunchAgents
cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.codeman.web.plist << EOF
@@ -94,6 +96,7 @@ cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.codeman.web.plist << EOF
EOF
launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.codeman.web.plist
```
</details>
<details>
@@ -104,6 +107,7 @@ wsl bash -c "curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Ark0N/Codeman/master/i
```
Codeman requires tmux, so Windows users need [WSL](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/wsl/install). If you don't have WSL yet: run `wsl --install` in an admin PowerShell, reboot, open Ubuntu, then install your preferred AI coding CLI inside WSL ([Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code), [OpenCode](https://opencode.ai), or [Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli)). After installing, `http://localhost:3000` is accessible from your Windows browser.
</details>
---
@@ -214,7 +218,7 @@ WATCHING → IDLE DETECTED → SEND UPDATE → /clear → /init → CONTINUE →
```
- **Multi-layer idle detection** — completion messages, AI-powered idle check, output silence, token stability
- **Auto-resume on usage limit** *(opt-in, off by default)* — when Claude halts on a subscription limit ("You've hit your limit · resets 3pm"), Codeman parses the reset time, waits it out plus a 2-minute safety buffer, then dismisses the rate-limit dialog and sends `continue` — so an overnight run survives the 5-hour window instead of stalling until morning. Recognizes every Claude Code limit-message format, retries if still limited, survives Codeman restarts, and holds respawn cycles while paused so `/clear` can't wipe the waiting conversation. Enable per session at the top of the Respawn tab
- **Auto-resume on usage limit** _(opt-in, off by default)_ — when Claude halts on a subscription limit ("You've hit your limit · resets 3pm"), Codeman parses the reset time, waits it out plus a 2-minute safety buffer, then dismisses the rate-limit dialog and sends `continue` — so an overnight run survives the 5-hour window instead of stalling until morning. Recognizes every Claude Code limit-message format, retries if still limited, survives Codeman restarts, and holds respawn cycles while paused so `/clear` can't wipe the waiting conversation. Enable per session at the top of the Respawn tab
- **Circuit breaker** — prevents respawn thrashing when Claude is stuck (CLOSED -> HALF_OPEN -> OPEN states, tracks consecutive no-progress and repeated errors)
- **Health scoring** — 0-100 health score with component scores for cycle success, circuit breaker state, iteration progress, and stuck recovery
- **Built-in presets** — `solo-work` (3s idle, 60min), `subagent-workflow` (45s, 240min), `team-lead` (90s, 480min), `ralph-todo` (8s, 480min), `overnight-autonomous` (10s, 480min)
@@ -260,10 +264,10 @@ The title is templated into the served HTML on first byte, so it's correct from
### Smart Token Management
| Threshold | Action | Result |
|-----------|--------|--------|
| Threshold | Action | Result |
| --------------- | --------------- | ---------------------------------- |
| **110k tokens** | Auto `/compact` | Context summarized, work continues |
| **140k tokens** | Auto `/clear` | Fresh start with `/init` |
| **140k tokens** | Auto `/clear` | Fresh start with `/init` |
### Notifications
@@ -298,8 +302,8 @@ PTY Output → 16ms Server Batch → DEC 2026 Wrap → SSE → Client rAF → xt
- **Effort & Ultracode** — set a per-session default effort (`low`–`max`) or enable **ultracode** (dynamic multi-agent workflows). Soft defaults only — switchable anytime with `/effort` in-session. Extended-thinking budget is configurable too
- **Voice input** — dictate prompts with Deepgram Nova-3 (Web Speech API fallback): toggle recording, auto-silence stop, live level meter (`Ctrl+Shift+V`)
- **Image input** — paste or drag-and-drop images straight into a session
- **Gesture control** *(opt-in)* — a MediaPipe hand-tracking overlay to grab/drag session windows and pinch buttons, hands-free. Enable with `CODEMAN_GESTURE=1` + App Settings → Display
- **Multi-monitor span** *(macOS)* — one click opens a browser window maximized across all displays, so floating agent/gesture panels can cross the physical seam
- **Gesture control** _(opt-in)_ — a MediaPipe hand-tracking overlay to grab/drag session windows and pinch buttons, hands-free. Enable with `CODEMAN_GESTURE=1` + App Settings → Display
- **Multi-monitor span** _(macOS)_ — one click opens a browser window maximized across all displays, so floating agent/gesture panels can cross the physical seam
- **CJK / IME input** — full composition support for Chinese / Japanese / Korean
- **OS notifications & hostname-aware titles** — desktop alerts and tab titles are prefixed `codeman:<host>` so multi-host setups stay unambiguous
@@ -372,14 +376,14 @@ Every **60 seconds**, the server automatically rotates to a fresh token. The pre
The design is informed by ["Demystifying the (In)Security of QR Code-based Login"](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/zhang-xin) (USENIX Security 2025), which found 47 of the top-100 websites vulnerable to QR auth attacks due to 6 critical design flaws across 42 CVEs. Codeman addresses all six:
| USENIX Flaw | Mitigation |
|-------------|------------|
| **Flaw-1**: Missing single-use enforcement | Token atomically consumed on first scan — replays always fail |
| **Flaw-2**: Long-lived tokens | 60s TTL with 90s grace, auto-rotation via timer |
| **Flaw-3**: Predictable token generation | `crypto.randomBytes(32)` — 256-bit entropy. Short codes use rejection sampling to eliminate modulo bias |
| **Flaw-4**: Client-side token generation | Server-side only — tokens never leave the server until embedded in the QR |
| **Flaw-5**: Missing status notification | Desktop toast: *"Device [IP] authenticated via QR (Safari). Not you? [Revoke]"* — real-time QRLjacking detection |
| **Flaw-6**: Inadequate session binding | IP + User-Agent stored for audit. Manual session revocation via API. HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=lax cookies |
| USENIX Flaw | Mitigation |
| ------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Flaw-1**: Missing single-use enforcement | Token atomically consumed on first scan — replays always fail |
| **Flaw-2**: Long-lived tokens | 60s TTL with 90s grace, auto-rotation via timer |
| **Flaw-3**: Predictable token generation | `crypto.randomBytes(32)` — 256-bit entropy. Short codes use rejection sampling to eliminate modulo bias |
| **Flaw-4**: Client-side token generation | Server-side only — tokens never leave the server until embedded in the QR |
| **Flaw-5**: Missing status notification | Desktop toast: _"Device [IP] authenticated via QR (Safari). Not you? [Revoke]"_ — real-time QRLjacking detection |
| **Flaw-6**: Inadequate session binding | IP + User-Agent stored for audit. Manual session revocation via API. HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=lax cookies |
#### Timing-Safe Lookup
@@ -404,23 +408,23 @@ When someone authenticates via QR, the desktop shows a notification toast with t
#### Threat Coverage
| Threat | Why it doesn't work |
|--------|-------------------|
| **QR screenshot shared** | Single-use: consumed on first scan. 60s TTL: expired before the attacker can act. Desktop notification alerts you immediately. |
| **Replay attack** | Atomic single-use consumption + 60s TTL. Old URLs always return 401. |
| **Cloudflare edge logs** | Short code is an opaque 6-char lookup key, not the real 256-bit token. Single-use means replaying from logs always fails. |
| **Brute force** | 56.8 billion combinations, ~2 valid at any time, dual-layer rate limiting blocks well before statistical feasibility. |
| **QRLjacking** | 60s rotation forces real-time relay. Desktop toast provides instant detection. Self-hosted single-user context makes phishing implausible. |
| **Timing attack** | Hash-based Map lookup — no string comparison timing leak. |
| **Session cookie theft** | HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=lax + 24h TTL. Manual revocation at `POST /api/auth/revoke`. |
| Threat | Why it doesn't work |
| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| **QR screenshot shared** | Single-use: consumed on first scan. 60s TTL: expired before the attacker can act. Desktop notification alerts you immediately. |
| **Replay attack** | Atomic single-use consumption + 60s TTL. Old URLs always return 401. |
| **Cloudflare edge logs** | Short code is an opaque 6-char lookup key, not the real 256-bit token. Single-use means replaying from logs always fails. |
| **Brute force** | 56.8 billion combinations, ~2 valid at any time, dual-layer rate limiting blocks well before statistical feasibility. |
| **QRLjacking** | 60s rotation forces real-time relay. Desktop toast provides instant detection. Self-hosted single-user context makes phishing implausible. |
| **Timing attack** | Hash-based Map lookup — no string comparison timing leak. |
| **Session cookie theft** | HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=lax + 24h TTL. Manual revocation at `POST /api/auth/revoke`. |
#### How It Compares
| Platform | Model | Comparison |
|----------|-------|------------|
| **Discord** | Long-lived token, no confirmation, [repeatedly exploited](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Qrljacking) | Codeman: single-use + TTL + notification |
| **WhatsApp Web** | Phone confirms "Link device?", ~60s rotation | Comparable rotation; WhatsApp adds explicit confirmation (acceptable tradeoff for single-user) |
| **Signal** | Ephemeral public key, E2E encrypted channel | Stronger crypto, but [exploited by Russian state actors in 2025](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger) via social engineering despite it |
| Platform | Model | Comparison |
| ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Discord** | Long-lived token, no confirmation, [repeatedly exploited](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Qrljacking) | Codeman: single-use + TTL + notification |
| **WhatsApp Web** | Phone confirms "Link device?", ~60s rotation | Comparable rotation; WhatsApp adds explicit confirmation (acceptable tradeoff for single-user) |
| **Signal** | Ephemeral public key, E2E encrypted channel | Stronger crypto, but [exploited by Russian state actors in 2025](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger) via social engineering despite it |
> Full design rationale, security analysis, and implementation details: [`docs/qr-auth-plan.md`](docs/qr-auth-plan.md)
@@ -428,20 +432,20 @@ When someone authenticates via QR, the desktop shows a notification toast with t
## Security
Codeman launches sessions with `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, so the web UI is by design a remote-code-execution surface for whoever can reach it — the whole security model exists to control *who* that is. Recent hardening (v0.9.0 + v0.9.5) closes the browser-driven attack paths that bite self-hosted dev tools. Full model: [`docs/security-architecture.md`](docs/security-architecture.md). **Found a vulnerability?** See [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) for private disclosure and the list of known limitations.
Codeman launches sessions with `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, so the web UI is by design a remote-code-execution surface for whoever can reach it — the whole security model exists to control _who_ that is. Recent hardening (v0.9.0 + v0.9.5) closes the browser-driven attack paths that bite self-hosted dev tools. Full model: [`docs/security-architecture.md`](docs/security-architecture.md). **Found a vulnerability?** See [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) for private disclosure and the list of known limitations.
### Network & access
- **Loopback by default** — binds `127.0.0.1`, reachable only from the same machine, so the no-password default is safe out of the box. Binding a non-loopback host without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` *starts but prints a loud warning* with three concrete fixes (set a password, loopback + an authenticated tunnel, or explicitly acknowledge with `--allow-unauthenticated-network`)
- **Loopback by default** — binds `127.0.0.1`, reachable only from the same machine, so the no-password default is safe out of the box. Binding a non-loopback host without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` _starts but prints a loud warning_ with three concrete fixes (set a password, loopback + an authenticated tunnel, or explicitly acknowledge with `--allow-unauthenticated-network`)
- **Optional auth, real sessions** — HTTP Basic via `CODEMAN_USERNAME` (default `admin`) / `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`. Success issues an opaque 256-bit `codeman_session` cookie (`randomBytes(32)`) — validated server-side, not client-signed, so it can't be forged offline (24h TTL, auto-extend, device-context audit log)
- **Per-IP rate limiting** — 10 failed attempts → `429` with `Retry-After` (15-min decay). A valid cookie or correct password recovers *immediately* even while an attacker hammers the same IP — important because all tunnel traffic shares one loopback IP. QR auth has its own separate limiter
- **Per-IP rate limiting** — 10 failed attempts → `429` with `Retry-After` (15-min decay). A valid cookie or correct password recovers _immediately_ even while an attacker hammers the same IP — important because all tunnel traffic shares one loopback IP. QR auth has its own separate limiter
### Always-on browser hardening (v0.9.5)
These run for **every** request — before auth, even on the default no-password loopback install:
- **Host-header allowlist → blocks DNS rebinding.** A custom domain rebound to `127.0.0.1` is rejected with `403 host not allowed` before any handler runs. Allowed: `localhost`, any IP literal, the bind host, `.ts.net` / `.trycloudflare.com` / `.cfargotunnel.com`, the active managed tunnel, and `CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS` (add custom reverse-proxy domains here — comma-separated; exact host or leading-dot `.suffix` for subdomains)
- **Cross-site Origin / CSRF guard.** On state-changing methods (`POST`/`PUT`/`PATCH`/`DELETE`) the `Origin` must pass the same allowlist, else `403 cross-site request blocked`. A *missing* Origin is allowed (so `curl`, the CLI, and Claude Code hooks keep working); only a present-but-foreign or opaque `null` origin is rejected
- **Cross-site Origin / CSRF guard.** On state-changing methods (`POST`/`PUT`/`PATCH`/`DELETE`) the `Origin` must pass the same allowlist, else `403 cross-site request blocked`. A _missing_ Origin is allowed (so `curl`, the CLI, and Claude Code hooks keep working); only a present-but-foreign or opaque `null` origin is rejected
- **Raw `text/plain` bodies.** The global parser no longer JSON-parses `text/plain`, closing the CORS "simple request" CSRF vector where a cross-site `fetch` could smuggle JSON into a write route with no preflight
- **WebSocket origin validation.** The terminal WS upgrade runs the same Host + Origin check and closes with code `4003` on failure (anti-CSWSH)
- **XSS-escaped agent output.** AI-derived strings (tool names, command arguments, subagent descriptions) are HTML-escaped at every injection site before rendering in the subagent / activity panels
@@ -502,25 +506,28 @@ Single-digit selection (1-9), color-coded status, token counts, auto-refresh. De
REST over Fastify — **~140 handlers across 15 route modules**, plus an SSE stream and a WebSocket terminal channel. A representative subset:
### Sessions
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| `GET` | `/api/sessions` | List all |
| `POST` | `/api/quick-start` | Create case + start session |
| `DELETE` | `/api/sessions/:id` | Delete session |
| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/input` | Send input |
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
| -------- | ------------------------- | --------------------------- |
| `GET` | `/api/sessions` | List all |
| `POST` | `/api/quick-start` | Create case + start session |
| `DELETE` | `/api/sessions/:id` | Delete session |
| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/input` | Send input |
### Respawn
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
| ------ | ---------------------------------- | -------------------------- |
| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/enable` | Enable with config + timer |
| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/stop` | Stop controller |
| `PUT` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/config` | Update config |
| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/stop` | Stop controller |
| `PUT` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/config` | Update config |
### Ralph / Todo
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| `GET` | `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-state` | Get loop state + todos |
| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-config` | Configure tracking |
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
| ------ | -------------------------------- | ---------------------- |
| `GET` | `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-state` | Get loop state + todos |
| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-config` | Configure tracking |
### Orchestrator
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
@@ -531,12 +538,13 @@ REST over Fastify — **~140 handlers across 15 route modules**, plus an SSE str
| `POST` | `/api/orchestrator/stop` | Stop and clean up |
### Subagents
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| `GET` | `/api/subagents` | List all background agents |
| `GET` | `/api/subagents/:id` | Agent info and status |
| `GET` | `/api/subagents/:id/transcript` | Full activity transcript |
| `DELETE` | `/api/subagents/:id` | Kill agent process |
| Method | Endpoint | Description |
| -------- | ------------------------------- | -------------------------- |
| `GET` | `/api/subagents` | List all background agents |
| `GET` | `/api/subagents/:id` | Agent info and status |
| `GET` | `/api/subagents/:id/transcript` | Full activity transcript |
| `DELETE` | `/api/subagents/:id` | Kill agent process |
### System
| Method | Endpoint | Description |