diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index ef36d07b..7c799cf8 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ codeman web Run as a background service **Linux (systemd):** + ```bash mkdir -p ~/.config/systemd/user cat > ~/.config/systemd/user/codeman-web.service << EOF @@ -67,6 +68,7 @@ loginctl enable-linger $USER ``` **macOS (launchd):** + ```bash mkdir -p ~/Library/LaunchAgents cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.codeman.web.plist << EOF @@ -94,6 +96,7 @@ cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.codeman.web.plist << EOF EOF launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.codeman.web.plist ``` +
@@ -104,6 +107,7 @@ wsl bash -c "curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Ark0N/Codeman/master/i ``` Codeman requires tmux, so Windows users need [WSL](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/wsl/install). If you don't have WSL yet: run `wsl --install` in an admin PowerShell, reboot, open Ubuntu, then install your preferred AI coding CLI inside WSL ([Claude Code](https://docs.anthropic.com/en/docs/claude-code), [OpenCode](https://opencode.ai), or [Codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli)). After installing, `http://localhost:3000` is accessible from your Windows browser. +
--- @@ -214,7 +218,7 @@ WATCHING → IDLE DETECTED → SEND UPDATE → /clear → /init → CONTINUE → ``` - **Multi-layer idle detection** — completion messages, AI-powered idle check, output silence, token stability -- **Auto-resume on usage limit** *(opt-in, off by default)* — when Claude halts on a subscription limit ("You've hit your limit · resets 3pm"), Codeman parses the reset time, waits it out plus a 2-minute safety buffer, then dismisses the rate-limit dialog and sends `continue` — so an overnight run survives the 5-hour window instead of stalling until morning. Recognizes every Claude Code limit-message format, retries if still limited, survives Codeman restarts, and holds respawn cycles while paused so `/clear` can't wipe the waiting conversation. Enable per session at the top of the Respawn tab +- **Auto-resume on usage limit** _(opt-in, off by default)_ — when Claude halts on a subscription limit ("You've hit your limit · resets 3pm"), Codeman parses the reset time, waits it out plus a 2-minute safety buffer, then dismisses the rate-limit dialog and sends `continue` — so an overnight run survives the 5-hour window instead of stalling until morning. Recognizes every Claude Code limit-message format, retries if still limited, survives Codeman restarts, and holds respawn cycles while paused so `/clear` can't wipe the waiting conversation. Enable per session at the top of the Respawn tab - **Circuit breaker** — prevents respawn thrashing when Claude is stuck (CLOSED -> HALF_OPEN -> OPEN states, tracks consecutive no-progress and repeated errors) - **Health scoring** — 0-100 health score with component scores for cycle success, circuit breaker state, iteration progress, and stuck recovery - **Built-in presets** — `solo-work` (3s idle, 60min), `subagent-workflow` (45s, 240min), `team-lead` (90s, 480min), `ralph-todo` (8s, 480min), `overnight-autonomous` (10s, 480min) @@ -260,10 +264,10 @@ The title is templated into the served HTML on first byte, so it's correct from ### Smart Token Management -| Threshold | Action | Result | -|-----------|--------|--------| +| Threshold | Action | Result | +| --------------- | --------------- | ---------------------------------- | | **110k tokens** | Auto `/compact` | Context summarized, work continues | -| **140k tokens** | Auto `/clear` | Fresh start with `/init` | +| **140k tokens** | Auto `/clear` | Fresh start with `/init` | ### Notifications @@ -298,8 +302,8 @@ PTY Output → 16ms Server Batch → DEC 2026 Wrap → SSE → Client rAF → xt - **Effort & Ultracode** — set a per-session default effort (`low`–`max`) or enable **ultracode** (dynamic multi-agent workflows). Soft defaults only — switchable anytime with `/effort` in-session. Extended-thinking budget is configurable too - **Voice input** — dictate prompts with Deepgram Nova-3 (Web Speech API fallback): toggle recording, auto-silence stop, live level meter (`Ctrl+Shift+V`) - **Image input** — paste or drag-and-drop images straight into a session -- **Gesture control** *(opt-in)* — a MediaPipe hand-tracking overlay to grab/drag session windows and pinch buttons, hands-free. Enable with `CODEMAN_GESTURE=1` + App Settings → Display -- **Multi-monitor span** *(macOS)* — one click opens a browser window maximized across all displays, so floating agent/gesture panels can cross the physical seam +- **Gesture control** _(opt-in)_ — a MediaPipe hand-tracking overlay to grab/drag session windows and pinch buttons, hands-free. Enable with `CODEMAN_GESTURE=1` + App Settings → Display +- **Multi-monitor span** _(macOS)_ — one click opens a browser window maximized across all displays, so floating agent/gesture panels can cross the physical seam - **CJK / IME input** — full composition support for Chinese / Japanese / Korean - **OS notifications & hostname-aware titles** — desktop alerts and tab titles are prefixed `codeman:` so multi-host setups stay unambiguous @@ -372,14 +376,14 @@ Every **60 seconds**, the server automatically rotates to a fresh token. The pre The design is informed by ["Demystifying the (In)Security of QR Code-based Login"](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/zhang-xin) (USENIX Security 2025), which found 47 of the top-100 websites vulnerable to QR auth attacks due to 6 critical design flaws across 42 CVEs. Codeman addresses all six: -| USENIX Flaw | Mitigation | -|-------------|------------| -| **Flaw-1**: Missing single-use enforcement | Token atomically consumed on first scan — replays always fail | -| **Flaw-2**: Long-lived tokens | 60s TTL with 90s grace, auto-rotation via timer | -| **Flaw-3**: Predictable token generation | `crypto.randomBytes(32)` — 256-bit entropy. Short codes use rejection sampling to eliminate modulo bias | -| **Flaw-4**: Client-side token generation | Server-side only — tokens never leave the server until embedded in the QR | -| **Flaw-5**: Missing status notification | Desktop toast: *"Device [IP] authenticated via QR (Safari). Not you? [Revoke]"* — real-time QRLjacking detection | -| **Flaw-6**: Inadequate session binding | IP + User-Agent stored for audit. Manual session revocation via API. HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=lax cookies | +| USENIX Flaw | Mitigation | +| ------------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| **Flaw-1**: Missing single-use enforcement | Token atomically consumed on first scan — replays always fail | +| **Flaw-2**: Long-lived tokens | 60s TTL with 90s grace, auto-rotation via timer | +| **Flaw-3**: Predictable token generation | `crypto.randomBytes(32)` — 256-bit entropy. Short codes use rejection sampling to eliminate modulo bias | +| **Flaw-4**: Client-side token generation | Server-side only — tokens never leave the server until embedded in the QR | +| **Flaw-5**: Missing status notification | Desktop toast: _"Device [IP] authenticated via QR (Safari). Not you? [Revoke]"_ — real-time QRLjacking detection | +| **Flaw-6**: Inadequate session binding | IP + User-Agent stored for audit. Manual session revocation via API. HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=lax cookies | #### Timing-Safe Lookup @@ -404,23 +408,23 @@ When someone authenticates via QR, the desktop shows a notification toast with t #### Threat Coverage -| Threat | Why it doesn't work | -|--------|-------------------| -| **QR screenshot shared** | Single-use: consumed on first scan. 60s TTL: expired before the attacker can act. Desktop notification alerts you immediately. | -| **Replay attack** | Atomic single-use consumption + 60s TTL. Old URLs always return 401. | -| **Cloudflare edge logs** | Short code is an opaque 6-char lookup key, not the real 256-bit token. Single-use means replaying from logs always fails. | -| **Brute force** | 56.8 billion combinations, ~2 valid at any time, dual-layer rate limiting blocks well before statistical feasibility. | -| **QRLjacking** | 60s rotation forces real-time relay. Desktop toast provides instant detection. Self-hosted single-user context makes phishing implausible. | -| **Timing attack** | Hash-based Map lookup — no string comparison timing leak. | -| **Session cookie theft** | HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=lax + 24h TTL. Manual revocation at `POST /api/auth/revoke`. | +| Threat | Why it doesn't work | +| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | +| **QR screenshot shared** | Single-use: consumed on first scan. 60s TTL: expired before the attacker can act. Desktop notification alerts you immediately. | +| **Replay attack** | Atomic single-use consumption + 60s TTL. Old URLs always return 401. | +| **Cloudflare edge logs** | Short code is an opaque 6-char lookup key, not the real 256-bit token. Single-use means replaying from logs always fails. | +| **Brute force** | 56.8 billion combinations, ~2 valid at any time, dual-layer rate limiting blocks well before statistical feasibility. | +| **QRLjacking** | 60s rotation forces real-time relay. Desktop toast provides instant detection. Self-hosted single-user context makes phishing implausible. | +| **Timing attack** | Hash-based Map lookup — no string comparison timing leak. | +| **Session cookie theft** | HttpOnly + Secure + SameSite=lax + 24h TTL. Manual revocation at `POST /api/auth/revoke`. | #### How It Compares -| Platform | Model | Comparison | -|----------|-------|------------| -| **Discord** | Long-lived token, no confirmation, [repeatedly exploited](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Qrljacking) | Codeman: single-use + TTL + notification | -| **WhatsApp Web** | Phone confirms "Link device?", ~60s rotation | Comparable rotation; WhatsApp adds explicit confirmation (acceptable tradeoff for single-user) | -| **Signal** | Ephemeral public key, E2E encrypted channel | Stronger crypto, but [exploited by Russian state actors in 2025](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger) via social engineering despite it | +| Platform | Model | Comparison | +| ---------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | +| **Discord** | Long-lived token, no confirmation, [repeatedly exploited](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Qrljacking) | Codeman: single-use + TTL + notification | +| **WhatsApp Web** | Phone confirms "Link device?", ~60s rotation | Comparable rotation; WhatsApp adds explicit confirmation (acceptable tradeoff for single-user) | +| **Signal** | Ephemeral public key, E2E encrypted channel | Stronger crypto, but [exploited by Russian state actors in 2025](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger) via social engineering despite it | > Full design rationale, security analysis, and implementation details: [`docs/qr-auth-plan.md`](docs/qr-auth-plan.md) @@ -428,20 +432,20 @@ When someone authenticates via QR, the desktop shows a notification toast with t ## Security -Codeman launches sessions with `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, so the web UI is by design a remote-code-execution surface for whoever can reach it — the whole security model exists to control *who* that is. Recent hardening (v0.9.0 + v0.9.5) closes the browser-driven attack paths that bite self-hosted dev tools. Full model: [`docs/security-architecture.md`](docs/security-architecture.md). **Found a vulnerability?** See [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) for private disclosure and the list of known limitations. +Codeman launches sessions with `--dangerously-skip-permissions`, so the web UI is by design a remote-code-execution surface for whoever can reach it — the whole security model exists to control _who_ that is. Recent hardening (v0.9.0 + v0.9.5) closes the browser-driven attack paths that bite self-hosted dev tools. Full model: [`docs/security-architecture.md`](docs/security-architecture.md). **Found a vulnerability?** See [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) for private disclosure and the list of known limitations. ### Network & access -- **Loopback by default** — binds `127.0.0.1`, reachable only from the same machine, so the no-password default is safe out of the box. Binding a non-loopback host without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` *starts but prints a loud warning* with three concrete fixes (set a password, loopback + an authenticated tunnel, or explicitly acknowledge with `--allow-unauthenticated-network`) +- **Loopback by default** — binds `127.0.0.1`, reachable only from the same machine, so the no-password default is safe out of the box. Binding a non-loopback host without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` _starts but prints a loud warning_ with three concrete fixes (set a password, loopback + an authenticated tunnel, or explicitly acknowledge with `--allow-unauthenticated-network`) - **Optional auth, real sessions** — HTTP Basic via `CODEMAN_USERNAME` (default `admin`) / `CODEMAN_PASSWORD`. Success issues an opaque 256-bit `codeman_session` cookie (`randomBytes(32)`) — validated server-side, not client-signed, so it can't be forged offline (24h TTL, auto-extend, device-context audit log) -- **Per-IP rate limiting** — 10 failed attempts → `429` with `Retry-After` (15-min decay). A valid cookie or correct password recovers *immediately* even while an attacker hammers the same IP — important because all tunnel traffic shares one loopback IP. QR auth has its own separate limiter +- **Per-IP rate limiting** — 10 failed attempts → `429` with `Retry-After` (15-min decay). A valid cookie or correct password recovers _immediately_ even while an attacker hammers the same IP — important because all tunnel traffic shares one loopback IP. QR auth has its own separate limiter ### Always-on browser hardening (v0.9.5) These run for **every** request — before auth, even on the default no-password loopback install: - **Host-header allowlist → blocks DNS rebinding.** A custom domain rebound to `127.0.0.1` is rejected with `403 host not allowed` before any handler runs. Allowed: `localhost`, any IP literal, the bind host, `.ts.net` / `.trycloudflare.com` / `.cfargotunnel.com`, the active managed tunnel, and `CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS` (add custom reverse-proxy domains here — comma-separated; exact host or leading-dot `.suffix` for subdomains) -- **Cross-site Origin / CSRF guard.** On state-changing methods (`POST`/`PUT`/`PATCH`/`DELETE`) the `Origin` must pass the same allowlist, else `403 cross-site request blocked`. A *missing* Origin is allowed (so `curl`, the CLI, and Claude Code hooks keep working); only a present-but-foreign or opaque `null` origin is rejected +- **Cross-site Origin / CSRF guard.** On state-changing methods (`POST`/`PUT`/`PATCH`/`DELETE`) the `Origin` must pass the same allowlist, else `403 cross-site request blocked`. A _missing_ Origin is allowed (so `curl`, the CLI, and Claude Code hooks keep working); only a present-but-foreign or opaque `null` origin is rejected - **Raw `text/plain` bodies.** The global parser no longer JSON-parses `text/plain`, closing the CORS "simple request" CSRF vector where a cross-site `fetch` could smuggle JSON into a write route with no preflight - **WebSocket origin validation.** The terminal WS upgrade runs the same Host + Origin check and closes with code `4003` on failure (anti-CSWSH) - **XSS-escaped agent output.** AI-derived strings (tool names, command arguments, subagent descriptions) are HTML-escaped at every injection site before rendering in the subagent / activity panels @@ -502,25 +506,28 @@ Single-digit selection (1-9), color-coded status, token counts, auto-refresh. De REST over Fastify — **~140 handlers across 15 route modules**, plus an SSE stream and a WebSocket terminal channel. A representative subset: ### Sessions -| Method | Endpoint | Description | -|--------|----------|-------------| -| `GET` | `/api/sessions` | List all | -| `POST` | `/api/quick-start` | Create case + start session | -| `DELETE` | `/api/sessions/:id` | Delete session | -| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/input` | Send input | + +| Method | Endpoint | Description | +| -------- | ------------------------- | --------------------------- | +| `GET` | `/api/sessions` | List all | +| `POST` | `/api/quick-start` | Create case + start session | +| `DELETE` | `/api/sessions/:id` | Delete session | +| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/input` | Send input | ### Respawn -| Method | Endpoint | Description | -|--------|----------|-------------| + +| Method | Endpoint | Description | +| ------ | ---------------------------------- | -------------------------- | | `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/enable` | Enable with config + timer | -| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/stop` | Stop controller | -| `PUT` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/config` | Update config | +| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/stop` | Stop controller | +| `PUT` | `/api/sessions/:id/respawn/config` | Update config | ### Ralph / Todo -| Method | Endpoint | Description | -|--------|----------|-------------| -| `GET` | `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-state` | Get loop state + todos | -| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-config` | Configure tracking | + +| Method | Endpoint | Description | +| ------ | -------------------------------- | ---------------------- | +| `GET` | `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-state` | Get loop state + todos | +| `POST` | `/api/sessions/:id/ralph-config` | Configure tracking | ### Orchestrator | Method | Endpoint | Description | @@ -531,12 +538,13 @@ REST over Fastify — **~140 handlers across 15 route modules**, plus an SSE str | `POST` | `/api/orchestrator/stop` | Stop and clean up | ### Subagents -| Method | Endpoint | Description | -|--------|----------|-------------| -| `GET` | `/api/subagents` | List all background agents | -| `GET` | `/api/subagents/:id` | Agent info and status | -| `GET` | `/api/subagents/:id/transcript` | Full activity transcript | -| `DELETE` | `/api/subagents/:id` | Kill agent process | + +| Method | Endpoint | Description | +| -------- | ------------------------------- | -------------------------- | +| `GET` | `/api/subagents` | List all background agents | +| `GET` | `/api/subagents/:id` | Agent info and status | +| `GET` | `/api/subagents/:id/transcript` | Full activity transcript | +| `DELETE` | `/api/subagents/:id` | Kill agent process | ### System | Method | Endpoint | Description | diff --git a/src/web/public/app.js b/src/web/public/app.js index 1a08d601..2004a9c1 100644 --- a/src/web/public/app.js +++ b/src/web/public/app.js @@ -281,6 +281,126 @@ function parseSessionPrefix(name) { return null; } +const DEFAULT_SHORTCUTS = [ + { + id: 'show-shortcuts', + group: 'Panels', + label: 'Show Shortcuts', + bindings: [ + { modifiers: ['ctrl'], key: '?', code: 'Slash' }, + { modifiers: ['alt'], key: '?', code: 'Slash' }, + ], + action: 'showShortcutOverlay', + }, + { + id: 'close-session', + group: 'Session', + label: 'Close Session', + bindings: [{ modifiers: ['ctrl'], key: 'w' }], + action: 'killActiveSession', + }, + { + id: 'next-session', + group: 'Session', + label: 'Next Session', + bindings: [{ modifiers: ['ctrl'], key: 'Tab' }], + action: 'nextSession', + }, + { + id: 'clear-terminal', + group: 'Terminal', + label: 'Clear Terminal', + bindings: [{ modifiers: ['ctrl'], key: 'l' }], + action: 'clearTerminal', + }, + { + id: 'increase-font', + group: 'Terminal', + label: 'Increase Font', + bindings: [ + { modifiers: ['ctrl'], key: '=', code: 'Equal' }, + { modifiers: ['ctrl'], key: '+', code: 'Equal' }, + ], + action: 'increaseFontSize', + }, + { + id: 'decrease-font', + group: 'Terminal', + label: 'Decrease Font', + bindings: [{ modifiers: ['ctrl'], key: '-', code: 'Minus' }], + action: 'decreaseFontSize', + }, + { + id: 'voice-input', + group: 'Terminal', + label: 'Voice Input', + bindings: [{ modifiers: ['ctrl', 'shift'], key: 'V' }], + action: 'toggleVoiceInput', + }, + { + id: 'move-tab-left', + group: 'Tabs', + label: 'Move Active Tab Left', + bindings: [{ modifiers: ['ctrl', 'shift'], key: '{', code: 'BracketLeft' }], + action: 'moveActiveTabLeft', + }, + { + id: 'move-tab-right', + group: 'Tabs', + label: 'Move Active Tab Right', + bindings: [{ modifiers: ['ctrl', 'shift'], key: '}', code: 'BracketRight' }], + action: 'moveActiveTabRight', + }, + { + id: 'command-palette', + group: 'Session', + label: 'Find Open Session', + bindings: [ + { modifiers: ['ctrl'], key: 'k', code: 'KeyK' }, + { modifiers: ['meta'], key: 'k', code: 'KeyK' }, + { modifiers: ['alt'], key: 'k', code: 'KeyK' }, + ], + action: 'openCommandPalette', + }, + { + id: 'previous-next-session', + group: 'Session', + label: 'Previous / Next Session', + displayBindings: ['Alt/Option+[', 'Alt/Option+]'], + }, + { + id: 'switch-tab-n', + group: 'Session', + label: 'Switch to Tab N', + displayBindings: ['Alt/Option+1-9'], + }, + { + id: 'focus-tabs', + group: 'Tabs', + label: 'Focus Tabs', + displayBindings: ['ArrowLeft', 'ArrowRight', 'Home', 'End'], + }, + { + id: 'activate-focused-tab', + group: 'Tabs', + label: 'Activate Focused Tab', + displayBindings: ['Enter', 'Space'], + }, + { + id: 'insert-newline', + group: 'Terminal', + label: 'Insert Newline', + displayBindings: ['Shift+Enter', 'Ctrl+Enter'], + }, + { + id: 'close-panels', + group: 'Panels', + label: 'Close Panels', + displayBindings: ['Escape'], + }, +]; + + // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ // CodemanApp Class — constructor and global state // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════ diff --git a/src/web/public/index.html b/src/web/public/index.html index cf45bcc9..41731bed 100644 --- a/src/web/public/index.html +++ b/src/web/public/index.html @@ -605,8 +605,8 @@

Panels

-
Ctrl+?
Show Help
-
Ctrl+/
Show Help
+
Ctrl+?
Show Shortcuts
+
Alt/Option+?
Show Shortcuts
Escape
Close Panels
diff --git a/src/web/public/panels-ui.js b/src/web/public/panels-ui.js index 5c75a0e3..b5fc3cd2 100644 --- a/src/web/public/panels-ui.js +++ b/src/web/public/panels-ui.js @@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ Object.assign(CodemanApp.prototype, { seen.add(sessionId); const session = this.sessions?.get?.(sessionId); if (!session) continue; - const title = session.name || session.title || sessionId.slice(0, 8); + const title = this.getSessionName?.(session) || session.name || session.title || sessionId.slice(0, 8); const subtitleParts = [session.workingDir, session.mode, session.status].filter(Boolean); const haystack = [title, session.workingDir, session.mode, session.status, sessionId].filter(Boolean).join(' ').toLowerCase(); if (needle && !haystack.includes(needle)) continue; diff --git a/test/command-palette-ui.test.ts b/test/command-palette-ui.test.ts index cd8da07a..88eaf4be 100644 --- a/test/command-palette-ui.test.ts +++ b/test/command-palette-ui.test.ts @@ -93,12 +93,24 @@ function loadPaletteHarness(overrides: Record = {}) { status: 'idle', }, ], + [ + 'sess-gamma', + { + id: 'sess-gamma', + workingDir: '/repo/flux-player', + mode: 'codex', + status: 'busy', + }, + ], ]); - app.sessionOrder = ['sess-beta', 'sess-alpha']; + app.sessionOrder = ['sess-beta', 'sess-alpha', 'sess-gamma']; app.cases = [{ name: 'plex-previews' }, { name: 'flux-player' }, { name: 'api-tools' }]; app.selectSession = vi.fn(); app.run = vi.fn(); app.closeMobileHeaderUtilities = vi.fn(); + app.getShortId = (id: string) => id.slice(0, 8); + app.getSessionName = (session: any) => + session.name || session.workingDir?.split('/').pop() || app.getShortId(session.id); return { app, elements, listeners }; } @@ -185,6 +197,19 @@ describe('Command-K session palette', () => { expect(results[1]).toMatchObject({ type: 'new-session', title: 'New session' }); }); + it('uses the tab name instead of the short session id for unnamed sessions', () => { + const { app } = loadPaletteHarness(); + + const results = app.buildCommandPaletteItems('flux-player'); + + expect(results[0]).toMatchObject({ + type: 'session', + sessionId: 'sess-gamma', + title: 'flux-player', + }); + expect(results[0].title).not.toBe('sess-gam'); + }); + it('uses the best matching case for the new-session action', async () => { const { app, elements } = loadPaletteHarness(); diff --git a/test/help-modal-shortcuts.test.ts b/test/help-modal-shortcuts.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 00000000..c05c3514 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/help-modal-shortcuts.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; +import { join } from 'node:path'; +import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'; + +const INDEX_HTML = readFileSync(join(process.cwd(), 'src/web/public/index.html'), 'utf-8'); + +function normalizedHtml(value: string): string { + return value.replace(/\s+/g, ' '); +} + +function extractElementById(html: string, id: string): string { + const idIndex = html.indexOf(`id="${id}"`); + expect(idIndex, `expected #${id} to exist`).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0); + + const start = html.lastIndexOf('<', idIndex); + expect(start, `expected #${id} start tag`).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(0); + + const nextSection = html.indexOf('