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docs(remote): document the wake-on-LAN invariants; drop wake state on bulk delete
Self-review pass: the input-ladder's two 'buffer' branches were the same three lines, and bulk delete left a session's (bounded, per-random-uuid) wake state behind. Documents the design where the code refers to it - remote-sessions.md section, the architecture invariant, and the CLAUDE.md key pattern.
This commit is contained in:
Randalix
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
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| **AI** | `src/ai-checker-base.ts`, `ai-idle-checker.ts`, `ai-plan-checker.ts` | |
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| **Tasks** | `src/task.ts`, `task-queue.ts`, `task-tracker.ts` | |
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| **State** | `src/state-store.ts`, `run-summary.ts`, `session-lifecycle-log.ts`, `intent-store.ts`, `tab-layout.ts` (pure model) + `-service` (sole mutation boundary) + `-persistence` + `-legacy-order` | |
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| **Infra** | `src/hooks-config.ts`, `push-store`, `tunnel-manager`, `image-watcher`, `file-stream-manager`, `remote-hosts` + `remote-reconnect` (pure), `docker-hosts` + `docker-export` | Remote/docker case overlays; see Key Patterns |
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| **Infra** | `src/hooks-config.ts`, `push-store`, `tunnel-manager`, `image-watcher`, `file-stream-manager`, `remote-hosts` + `remote-reconnect` + `remote-wake` (pure), `docker-hosts` + `docker-export` | Remote/docker case overlays; see Key Patterns |
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| **Web tabs** | `src/webview-store.ts`, `webview-capabilities.ts`, `src/web/webview-proxy.ts` (pure), `src/web/routes/webview-routes.ts` | Dashboard URLs as tabs; NOT a SessionMode |
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| **Search** | `src/search-service.ts` | Pure in-memory core for `GET /api/search` |
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| **Attachments** | `src/attachment-registry.ts`, `attachment-magic`, `generated-artifact-attachments`, `session-attachment-history`, `document-preview-cache`, `document-thumbnailer`, `document-conversion-limiter`, `config/attachment-guard` | See Key Patterns |
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@@ -217,6 +217,8 @@ Codeman is a Claude Code session manager with web interface and autonomous Ralph
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**Remote sessions + remote SSH cases**: a case can point at a remote host. The agent runs inside a durable remote `tmux -L codeman-remote` (session name `codeman-ssh-<id>`, deliberately failing the remote Codeman's `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN` so an instance on the target host never adopts it), fronted by a LOCAL tmux pane running `ssh`. Attached (`owned:false`) sessions **detach, never kill** on tab close; owned ones propagate `kill-session`. A bounded-backoff watcher auto-reconnects dropped sessions (`remoteAutoReconnect`, default ON). ⚠️ **It revives ONLY when the durable remote tmux session is verifiably still alive** (`remoteTmuxSessionAlive()`, a `has-session` probe over ssh, #355): a clean agent exit (Ctrl-C, Ctrl-D, `exit`) tears that session down, and `isPaneDead()` cannot tell it from a transport drop, so the watcher used to relaunch a FRESH agent after every clean exit (claude only looked fine because its `|| --resume` fallback masked it). An unreachable host answers `undefined`, which also means do not revive. ⚠️ `has-session` prints NOTHING on success, so the probe is classified by EXIT STATUS (`classifyRemoteAliveExit`: 0 alive, ssh's 255 or a timeout unknown, anything else gone); reading stdout classified every live session as gone and silently disabled transport-drop reconnects. The answer is cached per session and forgotten whenever the pane is seen alive again, or a stale `true` from one transport drop would revive the next clean exit. ⚠️ **File reads in a remote case are the second ssh surface** (#415, `src/remote-files.ts`): they go through `buildSshConnectionArgs()` as well, a browser-supplied path is only ever a `shellescape`d token, an unreachable host answers 502 (never 404), the size cap uses the REMOTE size, and no remote file is ever copied onto the server's disk — which is why writes, office previews and thumbnails are deliberately unsupported over ssh (the `PUT` guard sits BEFORE the local path validation, or a same-named local directory such as an sshfs mount takes the write). The probe's symlink resolution FAILS CLOSED (a path it cannot canonicalize is a 404, never its own unresolved string: the directory-only fallback let a `notes.txt -> ~/.ssh/id_rsa` link pass containment), and ssh children are BOUNDED by `src/remote-ssh-limiter.ts` plus one batched probe per attachment-history listing, because terminal output in a remote session is written on the remote host and a prompt-injected agent can print hundreds of `codeman://attach` links. The ATTACHMENT routes (a clicked path outside the case dir) go through the same layer, and which host a record is read from follows the SESSION, never the path string. ⚠️ **Command-injection surface: every ssh command line must flow through `buildSshConnectionArgs()`**, which `shellescape`s every user field. Never hand-build an ssh line elsewhere. ⚠️ Run flows must route remote cases through `POST /api/quick-start`, not `POST /api/sessions` (which stat-validates `workingDir` locally and has no `caseName`). → [architecture-invariants#remote-sessions-over-ssh](docs/architecture-invariants.md#remote-sessions-over-ssh), [#remote-ssh-cases](docs/architecture-invariants.md#remote-ssh-cases), `docs/remote-sessions.md`
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**Wake-on-LAN (`remote-wake.ts`)**: an optional `RemoteHost.wakeCommand` (single executable path, run without a shell) lets the INPUT route wake a sleeping host instead of writing into a stalled ssh pane. ⚠️ Only user input may wake: the auto-reconnect watcher, `handleRemoteSessionDropped` and boot recovery have no access to the registry (a wake there would re-wake the host seconds after every suspend), which `test/remote-wake.test.ts` asserts as a wiring guard. Detection is a throttled bare TCP probe — deliberately no `ServerAliveInterval`, because keepalives move bytes into an idle connection every interval and that is what a byte-threshold idle detector must not read as activity. Input arriving during a wake is buffered and flushed in order after `reattachRemote()`; send-and-wait blocks instead. `wakeCommand` is re-read from `remote-hosts.json` on recovery, since the persisted `remote` snapshot never sees a field added later.
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**Docker cases**: a case can point at a **container**, with any of the CLI run modes running inside it. Like remote-SSH this is a **LOCATION OVERLAY on cases, never a `SessionMode` of its own**. Exactly one long-lived container **per case**, shared by all its sessions, so killing a session kills only that session's in-container tmux and **never** `docker stop` while siblings remain. The workspace is a real host dir bind-mounted at the **same absolute path**, which is what keeps file-routes/watchers on real host bytes and makes the in-container transcript projHash match the host. Credentials are **seeded** (RO mount, copied into the container once) rather than shared RW, so in-container CLIs never write refreshed tokens back to the host, and bind mounts are excluded from `docker commit` so exports stay secret-free. **NEVER a create-time `-e` for secrets, NEVER `--privileged`, NEVER the docker socket.** Config drift is detected via a label hash and a drifted launch is REFUSED rather than silently launched with stale config. ⚠️ A case may instead **ADOPT** a container the user already runs (`DockerCase.owned === false`, mirror of remote-SSH's `owned:false`): Codeman only `exec`s into it and never creates, starts, stops, restarts or removes it, so a missing or stopped container FAILS CLOSED with an actionable message instead of being fixed. Absent = owned, so existing cases are byte-identical. ⚠️ An ADOPTED container may back SEVERAL cases at different in-container directories (`classifyAdoptContainerConflict` in `docker-hosts.ts`: an exact twin on the same container AND directory is refused, an owned container still backs exactly one case, and a container another user adopted is refused), which is what the Add Case panel's "copy an existing case" picker relies on; the wire carries `CaseInfo.docker.owned` ONLY when false, so the picker tests `=== false`, never truthiness. The guarantee is enforced at four independent layers because it cannot be observed by using the feature: `buildDockerStopCommand`/`buildDockerRemoveCommand` throw during pure STRING CONSTRUCTION, `removeDockerContainer` refuses again, drift reports "none" (an adopted container carries no `codeman.confighash` label, so a real comparison would 409 the launch forever), and the boot reaper skips it. ⚠️ Two lifecycle touches the original design missed and that are easy to re-introduce: the full-image export `docker commit`s the container (refused for an adopted case) and the workspace export `docker pause`s it first (skipped — it freezes the owner's processes for the length of the tar). ⚠️ `owned` is applied AFTER `dockerConfigHash`, which takes an explicit field list, or every pre-existing case would trip the drift gate at once. ⚠️ Run modes for a container case come from the CONTAINER (`availableModes`, live-probed): gating the run menu on HOST CLIs (#201) is right for local sessions and wrong here, since a host with no `claude` may run a container that ships one. ⚠️ **A failed probe means opposite things per ownership** — for an ADOPTED case it is a fault worth reporting, for an OWNED one it is the NORMAL state before the first session (the launch chain creates the container), so treating it as a fault hid every agent mode on every freshly linked Docker case behind "start it yourself first". That is why `CaseInfo.docker.owned` is on the wire. ⚠️ Claude is launched WITHOUT `--dangerously-skip-permissions` when the container's exec user is root (Claude Code refuses the flag as root and the refusal is visible only inside the container); which flag to drop is a per-CLI fact, so it is the registry's `overlays.docker.rootCommand`, never a branch. ⚠️ Adoption is **admin-only in multi-user mode**, unlike `docker-link`: linking creates OUR container, whose one bind mount `isWorkingDirAllowed` has already confined, while an adopted container's mounts belong to its owner and one mounting `/` hands the adopter the host. The same reasoning admin-gates the container listing and the in-container directory browser; the preflight instead admits a non-admin for a container already linked to a case they own, because the run menu probes it for every docker case. ⚠️ On the loopback-only prod bind a container cannot reach 127.0.0.1, so in-container hooks need `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS=1`; otherwise idle detection falls back to output-based. → [architecture-invariants#docker-cases](docs/architecture-invariants.md#docker-cases), `docs/docker-cases.md` (user guide), `docs/docker-cases-plan.md` (design)
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**Docker Compose deployment** (`docker/`, contributed): Codeman itself runs in a container and spawns Docker cases as **SIBLING** containers through the mounted host socket (Docker-outside-of-Docker), never nested. That inverts one assumption the bare-host path takes for granted: the daemon no longer shares Codeman's filesystem, so a bind source valid *inside* Codeman means nothing to it. `resolveDockerDaemonMountSource()` translates sources under HOME into the daemon's namespace via `CODEMAN_DOCKER_HOST_HOME`, and `CODEMAN_CASES_PATH` points the cases dir at a host-absolute bind mount so a workspace resolves to the SAME absolute path on both sides (which is what keeps the transcript projHash matching, per Docker cases above). ⚠️ **`CODEMAN_CASES_PATH` must move every consumer or none**: it is resolved once in `config/cases-dir.ts` because `src/cli.ts` resolves case paths too, and when only the server's `CASES_DIR` learned the override, `codeman skill install --case <name>` reported "Case not found" on exactly the deployment the override exists for. ⚠️ **`.dockerignore` patterns match the WHOLE context-relative path**, so a bare `.env` line excludes only the ROOT file: `docker/.env` (which holds `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` and any provider keys) rode `COPY . .` into the image until `**/.env` was added — verified in both directions with a real build context. ⚠️ A Compose LONG-form bind (`type: bind`) **creates a missing host source directory ROOT-OWNED** rather than refusing. `Start-Codeman.sh` pre-creates both `CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH` and `CODEMAN_CASES_PATH` on the host before `up`, which is what keeps the daemon from ever having to materialise either as root in the first place; the container ALSO starts as root (`cap_add: [CHOWN, DAC_OVERRIDE, KILL, SETGID, SETUID]` against the base `cap_drop: ALL`; `test/docker-entrypoint.test.ts` pins that list) so `docker/entrypoint.sh` can correct a bind source that turns up root-owned anyway (a restored backup, a cleared directory, plain `docker compose up` run without the script) before dropping to `PUID:PGID` via `setpriv` — a directory owned by neither root nor `PUID:PGID` is never re-owned, since that ownership is not this container's to reassign; it is PROBED for writability as the runtime account (`setpriv ... test -w`, so ACLs, group-writable trees and CIFS/NFS mounts pass) and refused with a message naming path, owner and PUID:PGID if that fails. ⚠️ `KILL` is in that list for tini, not the entrypoint: `init: true` keeps tini as root while the server runs as PUID, and without CAP_KILL its SIGTERM forward fails and the server is SIGKILLed on every `compose down`/`restart` instead of flushing state. ⚠️ `/opt/codeman-cli` (the runtime-owned CLI prefix) is APPENDED to `PATH`, never prepended, and the entrypoint pins its own `PATH` to the system dirs: the root part of the start resolves `setpriv` by bare name, and a prefix ahead of `/usr/bin` let a planted `setpriv` run as uid 0 (measured). `CODEMAN_DOCKER_DISABLE_SWAP_LIMIT=1` drops `--memory-swap` (and filters only that one kernel warning) for hosts without swap accounting; `--memory` still applies. ⚠️ The deployment ALSO self-updates in place (the repo bind mount at `/opt/codeman` + a restart-by-exiting supervisor) — see Self-update below and `docs/docker-self-update.md` before touching `server.Dockerfile`, the compose file or `.env.example`, since each is an input to the updater's environment gate. `docs/docker-compose.md` + `docker/README.md` (user guides)
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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# Architecture invariants
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Implementation detail extracted from `CLAUDE.md` so that file stays small enough to load into every session cheaply. Most sections are the original paragraphs, verbatim, including the version history and PR references that explain *why* each rule exists; newer ones are written here first and summarized back into `CLAUDE.md` as a short rule plus a pointer.
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Implementation detail extracted from `CLAUDE.md` so that file stays small enough to load into every session cheaply. Most sections are the original paragraphs, verbatim, including the version history and PR references that explain _why_ each rule exists; newer ones are written here first and summarized back into `CLAUDE.md` as a short rule plus a pointer.
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`CLAUDE.md` keeps the short form of each rule plus a pointer to the section here. Read the pointer first; come here when you need the mechanism, the file names, or the history behind a constraint.
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@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ Model is NOT a session field: it is a composition entry in the profile's config
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### Remote SSH cases
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**Remote host wake-on-LAN from user input**: an optional `RemoteHost.wakeCommand` (a single executable path, run WITHOUT a shell) lets the input route wake a SLEEPING host instead of writing into a stalled ssh pane — `tmux send-keys` succeeds against a stalled pane, so the bytes used to vanish silently. The wake flow lives in `src/remote-wake.ts` and is reachable **only** from `POST /api/sessions/:id/input`: the COD-108 auto-reconnect watcher, `Server.handleRemoteSessionDropped` and boot recovery must never wake a host, or it would be re-woken seconds after each suspend and could never stay asleep (asserted by a wiring guard in `test/remote-wake.test.ts`, not just documented). Detection is a throttled bare TCP probe (no ssh, no `ServerAliveInterval` — keepalives would move bytes into an idle connection every interval), input is buffered and flushed in order after `reattachRemote()` (the send-and-wait path blocks instead), and `wakeCommand` is re-read from `remote-hosts.json` on session recovery because the persisted `remote` snapshot would never see a field added later (`rehydrateRemoteHostFields`). Design + invariants: `docs/remote-sessions.md` §Wake-on-LAN from user input.
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**Remote SSH cases** (COD-94/#145): cases can point at a **remote host** (`~/.codeman/remote-hosts.json` + `remote-cases.json` via `src/remote-hosts.ts`; CRUD under `/api/cases` — cases route file). A remote session launches a LOCAL tmux pane running `ssh <host>` that creates a durable REMOTE tmux session on a **dedicated socket** `-L codeman-remote` with name `codeman-ssh-<id>` — deliberately failing the remote Codeman's `SAFE_MUX_NAME_PATTERN` so a Codeman instance on the target host never adopts it; no `-g` global tmux options are set remotely. `remotePath`/`identityFile` are schema-guarded against shell injection (backticks/`$` rejected — same approach as `extraSshOptions`); remote tmux availability is probed via `checkRemoteTmuxAvailable()` in quick-start (ssh args carry `-o ConnectTimeout=10`). Remote claude defaults to an idempotent `claude --session-id <id> || claude --resume <id>` pair under a login shell, so a respawn or reattach continues the SAME conversation rather than starting a fresh one (remote omp gets the same treatment via `--continue`; ⚠️ because the claude arm is an `a || b` pair under `-c`, that pane's PID is the login shell, not the agent); per-host `commands.*` override. Session kill best-effort kills the remote tmux too. `SessionState.remote`/`MuxSession.remote` round-trip through recovery (`restoreMuxSessions` passes `remote` back into the Session constructor). ⚠️ Run flows must route remote cases through `POST /api/quick-start` (which resolves the remote case and skips LOCAL CLI availability gates) — `POST /api/sessions` stat-validates `workingDir` locally and has no `caseName`. `envOverrides`/`effort`/`modelOverride`/`codexConfig`/`geminiConfig` are rejected for remote quick-starts (not silently dropped). UI: Create Case modal → Remote tab. Tests: `test/remote-hosts.test.ts`, `test/remote-ssh-options.test.ts`. ⚠️ **Reading a file in a remote case goes over ssh too** (#415): `src/remote-files.ts` is the single remote-READ layer (`buildRemoteFileCommand` = `buildSshConnectionArgs` + one shellescaped remote command; `remoteProbePaths` returns remote realpath + stat; `remoteCreateReadStream` streams a `Range` via `tail -c +N | head -c L` and its `close()` must be wired to the response's `close` or the ssh child outlives an aborted download). The guard order matches the local path exactly (`validateSessionFilePathLexical` → remote realpath of BOTH file and workspace root → containment → sensitive-path → size cap on the REMOTE size), a request path arrives from the browser and is only ever interpolated as a `shellescape`d token, and an unreachable host answers **502**, never a 404. ⚠️ The probe's symlink resolution FAILS CLOSED: `readlink -f` where it exists, otherwise a `cd -P`/`pwd -P` directory walk plus a bounded plain-`readlink` loop over the last component, and anything it cannot fully resolve is reported unresolvable (404), never as the unresolved string — the first version resolved the directory chain only, so on a host without `readlink -f` a `ws/notes.txt -> ~/.ssh/id_rsa` link passed containment under its own path while `cat` served the key. Records are NUL-separated and index-keyed so a newline in a filename cannot shift the mapping. ⚠️ ssh children are BOUNDED: probes and buffered reads go through `src/remote-ssh-limiter.ts` (a `document-conversion-limiter`-shaped semaphore, default 4), the attachment-history list probes its whole history in ONE batched call (`probeRemoteAttachmentHistory`, threaded into `registerExternalAttachment({remoteProbes})`), and probes chunk at 40 paths — a prompt-injected agent printing `codeman://attach` links in a remote session used to fork one `ssh` per link. `describeExecError` never returns Node's `Command failed: <ssh line>` message (identity path + probe script in a 502 body). The `PUT /file-content` guard sits AHEAD of `validateSessionFilePath`, which resolves LOCALLY, or a same-named local directory (an sshfs mount) takes the write. Under `VITEST` the three IO functions refuse rather than connect. This covers the ATTACHMENT routes too, which is the half a clicked path needs when the file is OUTSIDE the case directory (`_isExternalPreviewPath` sends it to `POST …/attachments`): registration, by-id `raw`, metadata and the history list all resolve over ssh (`registerExternalAttachment({remote})`, `resolveServableRemoteAttachment`), and what decides the host is the SESSION, never the path string — the same absolute path means a different file on each host. Deliberately NOT supported over ssh: writes (`edit=1`/`PUT` answer 400, `editable` is always false), office previews/thumbnails, the file tree/picker, `tail-file`. Tests: `test/remote-files.test.ts`, `test/routes/file-routes-remote.test.ts`.
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### Docker cases
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@@ -104,7 +106,7 @@ Tests: `test/docker-hosts.test.ts`, `test/docker-exec-options.test.ts`, `test/do
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### Session lineage lines (tab → tab it spawned)
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**The relationship did not exist before this** (1.17.0): `SessionState` had no `parentSessionId`, `quick-start` recorded only the multi-user *human* owner, and an agent's spawn call is plain `curl` from a tmux pane, so nothing in the request identifies the caller (`SO_PEERCRED` needs a unix socket; the API is TCP). The caller therefore supplies it — every managed pane already gets `CODEMAN_SESSION_ID` from `session-cli-builder.ts`. Two equivalent inputs, body wins: a `parentSessionId` field on `POST /api/sessions` / `POST /api/quick-start`, or the `X-Codeman-Parent-Session` header, which exists so the agent skill can set it ONCE on its shared curl invocation and have every present and future spawn recipe carry it.
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**The relationship did not exist before this** (1.17.0): `SessionState` had no `parentSessionId`, `quick-start` recorded only the multi-user _human_ owner, and an agent's spawn call is plain `curl` from a tmux pane, so nothing in the request identifies the caller (`SO_PEERCRED` needs a unix socket; the API is TCP). The caller therefore supplies it — every managed pane already gets `CODEMAN_SESSION_ID` from `session-cli-builder.ts`. Two equivalent inputs, body wins: a `parentSessionId` field on `POST /api/sessions` / `POST /api/quick-start`, or the `X-Codeman-Parent-Session` header, which exists so the agent skill can set it ONCE on its shared curl invocation and have every present and future spawn recipe carry it.
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**Resolved, not trusted** (`resolveParentSessionId()`, route-helpers.ts): exact id first, then a UNIQUE prefix of ≥8 chars (ids reach agents truncated — mux names and a Docker export's `$CODEMAN_SESSION_ID` both carry 8), and an ambiguous prefix resolves to NOTHING rather than to a guess. The parent must be a live session the caller can already see (`canAccessOwned`) AND carry the same owner as the session being created, so a multi-user caller cannot staple their session under someone else's tab. ⚠️ **Everything unresolvable is DROPPED, never a 400**: a stale id from a cached skill preamble must cost a decorative line, not a worker. ⚠️ It is decoration at every layer — never an ownership, permission or lifecycle signal; a child outlives its parent, and the Session ctor refuses a self-parent (reachable only via recovery, where both values come off disk). It rides `toState()` into `session_created` / `session_updated`, so there is **no new SSE event**, and `server.ts`'s recovery path restores it so lineage survives a restart.
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@@ -164,7 +166,7 @@ A file path an agent prints is a link on both surfaces it can appear on, and cli
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**Media is single-sourced across the two preview paths.** `VIDEO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` / `AUDIO_ATTACHMENT_EXTENSIONS` live in `attachment-registry.ts` and are imported by `file-content`'s media classification, so a clip plays identically whether it is in the workspace or reached by id from outside it. They diverged first: the workspace path had its own inline sets and the registry allowlist had no media at all, so a video an agent wrote to `/tmp` was refused as an unsupported type while the same file inside the repo played. ⚠️ Three things have to line up for a player rather than a dead frame: the extension in the allowlist, a **real MIME entry** in `MIME_TYPES` (a `<video>` refuses to decode `application/octet-stream`, which presents as a player that renders and then does nothing), and the range-aware body (`serveRawFile` → `sendFileBody`) that makes the scrub bar work. `getAttachmentType()` returns the `video`/`audio` members of `AttachmentDetectedType` for them; the attachment card has no per-type CSS and its thumbnail falls back to the type label, since `generateFirstPageThumbnail` has no media branch and answers 204. ⚠️ The image-watcher keeps its OWN narrow detection list (`png/pdf/docx/pptx`), so this does not start popping cards for every video an agent writes.
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⚠️ **The preview overlay must outrank the panel that launched it.** `.file-preview-overlay` sits at `z-index: 5100`, above the response viewer (5000) and its backdrop (4999); at its historical 2000 a path clicked in the chat opened the overlay *behind* the chat, which reads as a dead link. It stays below the toast/picker band (10000+) so a "Saved" toast still lands on top.
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⚠️ **The preview overlay must outrank the panel that launched it.** `.file-preview-overlay` sits at `z-index: 5100`, above the response viewer (5000) and its backdrop (4999); at its historical 2000 a path clicked in the chat opened the overlay _behind_ the chat, which reads as a dead link. It stays below the toast/picker band (10000+) so a "Saved" toast still lands on top.
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### Filesystem path picker
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@@ -186,7 +188,7 @@ The general rule: **any new endpoint that turns a caller-supplied `sessionId` in
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- **Confinement is the read path's, plus write-only gates.** `findSessionOrFail` (ownership) → `validateSessionFilePath` (realpath + workspace boundary; escapes report as 404, same as reads) → sensitive-path + attachment-guard blocklists (403) → `.git/` subtree deny (403 — `.git/hooks/*` is code execution) → extension **allowlist** (400; `svg` and `env` deliberately excluded). ⚠️ **There is no `O_CREAT` anywhere in the handler** — that absence is what makes "edit-in-place only, never create" a structural property instead of a convention. Do not add a create path without treating it as a new security surface.
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- **A truncated buffer must never become an edit buffer.** The plain preview truncates to `lines` (default 500); saving such a buffer would silently delete everything past the cut, and the hash check cannot catch it (the loaded prefix hashes differently from the full file, which reads as an ordinary conflict at best). `edit=1` therefore never truncates — it 413s over `MAX_EDITABLE_BYTES` (512KB) instead — and the frontend always re-fetches with `edit=1` before swapping in the textarea, even though the preview already holds content.
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- **Concurrency is optimistic by content hash, not mtime.** The client echoes the sha256 it loaded (`baseHash`); mismatch → 409 CONFLICT (plain envelope — the error arm carries no data; the client re-fetches `edit=1` for fresh state) unless `force:true`. mtime alone is wrong: agents rewrite files within one timestamp tick.
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- **Writes are `wx` temp + `fchmod` + `fsync` + `rename` in the target's directory.** `wx` cannot follow a pre-existing symlink and `rename()` replaces (not follows) a symlink final component, which closes the validate-then-write TOCTOU window; `fchmod` because `open()`'s mode argument is masked by the umask; a symlink whose target is *inside* the workspace is deliberately written through (validation returns the realpath). Trade-off (same as vim): the inode changes, so hardlinks keep old content.
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- **Writes are `wx` temp + `fchmod` + `fsync` + `rename` in the target's directory.** `wx` cannot follow a pre-existing symlink and `rename()` replaces (not follows) a symlink final component, which closes the validate-then-write TOCTOU window; `fchmod` because `open()`'s mode argument is masked by the umask; a symlink whose target is _inside_ the workspace is deliberately written through (validation returns the realpath). Trade-off (same as vim): the inode changes, so hardlinks keep old content.
|
||||
- **Corruption guards**: NUL-sniff + UTF-8 **round-trip compare** (`Buffer.from(buf.toString('utf8'), 'utf8').equals(buf)`) refuse binary and non-UTF-8 files — decoding latin-1 yields U+FFFD replacements and writing those back destroys the original bytes. EOL is detected server-side and re-applied on save because a `<textarea>` normalizes to LF (a two-line edit of a CRLF file must not become a whole-file diff).
|
||||
- **Two size caps on the wire**: the Zod `.max()` counts UTF-16 code units (coarse pre-filter, 400) while the handler's `Buffer.byteLength` check enforces the real byte cap (413); the route sets `bodyLimit: 4MB` because JSON escaping can expand 512KB of content past Fastify's 1MB default. Error paths **throw** structured `{statusCode, body}` errors (`throwFileEditError`) rather than returning envelopes — the central preSerialization status-mapping hook is absent from the route-test harness, and 413 has no errorCode mapping at all.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -282,7 +284,7 @@ Invariants:
|
||||
|
||||
**Terminal smart copy** (#211): `Ctrl+C` copies the selection when there is one and stays the interrupt when there isn't. Three rules keep that split honest, and breaking any of them silently costs the user their interrupt key:
|
||||
|
||||
1. The branch lives in `attachCustomKeyEventHandler` (terminal-ui.js) and the **no-selection path returns `true` with no `preventDefault()`**, so xterm still evaluates `Ctrl+C` into `0x03`. Returning `false` alone does not cancel the event either way: xterm's `_keyDown` calls the custom handler *before* its own `cancel()`, which is exactly why the copy path calls `preventDefault()` explicitly (otherwise the browser also runs its native copy on top).
|
||||
1. The branch lives in `attachCustomKeyEventHandler` (terminal-ui.js) and the **no-selection path returns `true` with no `preventDefault()`**, so xterm still evaluates `Ctrl+C` into `0x03`. Returning `false` alone does not cancel the event either way: xterm's `_keyDown` calls the custom handler _before_ its own `cancel()`, which is exactly why the copy path calls `preventDefault()` explicitly (otherwise the browser also runs its native copy on top).
|
||||
2. `copyTerminalSelection` is a registry `action` **deliberately missing from `SHORTCUT_ACTIONS`** (same trick as `command-palette`): the entry stays rebindable and disableable in App Settings, while the generic document-capture loop, which `preventDefault()`s every match it dispatches, skips it and lets the terminal handler decide.
|
||||
3. The gate is keydown-only (the custom handler also runs for `keypress`/`keyup`), and `Ctrl+Shift+C` never falls through to the PTY: an "explicit copy" chord that interrupts a running agent because the selection happened to be empty is a footgun with no upside.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -361,9 +363,9 @@ Anatomy: `.set-shell` → `.set-shell-head` (title + `.set-head-actions`) + `.se
|
||||
|
||||
⚠️ **A first-hand conversation id outranks every correlation, and the correlation must never run when one exists.** `UserPromptSubmit` and `Stop` hook payloads carry `session_id` — the pane's LIVE conversation, reported from inside the CLI process — and reach Codeman addressed by that pane's own `$CODEMAN_SESSION_ID`. That binding is a fact: it never consults `workingDir`, so it cannot be claimed by a sibling pane on the same folder, by a closed tab, or by a bare `claude` in the user's terminal. `Session.claudeSessionIdIsFirstHand` gates `resolveActiveClaudeSessionIdFromHistory()` at its first line, so the number of prompts eligible for cwd-based guessing goes DOWN, never up. There is no TTL: if hooks stop arriving the last hook-supplied id is kept forever rather than falling back to guessing, which is the same rule as the paragraph below. ⚠️ **This is also the only fix for a pane driven by attaching to its tmux session directly.** `lastSubmitAt` was bumped only by `Session.write()`/`writeViaMux()`, i.e. input that flows through Codeman, so such a pane's anchor stayed 0 and the resolver returned at `if (!submitAt)` for the pane's entire life. The hook stamps it too (`markPromptSubmitted()`), so it finally means "a prompt was submitted". ⚠️ **Only a first-hand adoption may extend `Session.claudeSessionChain`** — a correlated guess writing into the pane's permanent record is precisely the bug the paragraph above describes, made durable. The chain is persisted because `/clear` is otherwise unrecoverable: once the pane moves on, the predecessor id exists nowhere else. Its tail re-pins the conversation on a RESTORED mux attach, where the launch id is a lie (the CLI never stopped and may have `/clear`ed before the restart); a NEW pane has an empty chain and keeps the launch id unchanged. ⚠️ **The hook's stdout must stay discarded, using curl's own `-o /dev/null`** (`curlCmdSilent`): Claude Code injects a `UserPromptSubmit` hook's stdout into the model's context — the CLI's own hook reference says "Exit code 0 - stdout shown to Claude" — so an undiscarded curl pastes Codeman's `{"success":true,…}` envelope into the user's own prompt on every turn. ⚠️ **A trailing `>/dev/null` does NOT work and looks like it does**: `curlCmd` already ends `… 2>/dev/null || true`, and in `pipeline || true >/dev/null` the shell binds the redirection to `true`, which never runs on the success path. An `endsWith('>/dev/null')` assertion passes on exactly that broken form, so the test asserts the `-o` flag instead. The other events feed SSE, where their stdout is harmless — hence a separate builder rather than a change to `curlCmd`. Tests: `test/hooks-config.test.ts`, `test/routes/hook-event-routes.test.ts`, `test/routes/session-routes-claude-last-response.test.ts`.
|
||||
|
||||
⚠️ **`Session.lastSubmitAt` is persisted state, not a runtime counter.** `start()` reassigns `_claudeSessionId = resumeSessionId || id` on every launch — including the re-attach path for a mux session that survived the restart — so a recovered pane always points the viewer at its *launch* conversation, even when the CLI moved on via `/clear` hours earlier. The submit anchor is the only thing that can correct that without user input, so it round-trips through `SessionState.lastSubmitAt` and is restored in `restoreMuxSessions()`. Drop it from `toState()` and recovered panes silently show the pre-`/clear` transcript until the user types again. Restoring a *stale* anchor is safe: the resolver's staleness guard rejects any candidate transcript older than the one the pane is currently on, which is exactly the shape of a respawn into a fresh conversation.
|
||||
⚠️ **`Session.lastSubmitAt` is persisted state, not a runtime counter.** `start()` reassigns `_claudeSessionId = resumeSessionId || id` on every launch — including the re-attach path for a mux session that survived the restart — so a recovered pane always points the viewer at its _launch_ conversation, even when the CLI moved on via `/clear` hours earlier. The submit anchor is the only thing that can correct that without user input, so it round-trips through `SessionState.lastSubmitAt` and is restored in `restoreMuxSessions()`. Drop it from `toState()` and recovered panes silently show the pre-`/clear` transcript until the user types again. Restoring a _stale_ anchor is safe: the resolver's staleness guard rejects any candidate transcript older than the one the pane is currently on, which is exactly the shape of a respawn into a fresh conversation.
|
||||
|
||||
⚠️ **The Claude viewer emits one message per model message and groups them with `turn`; it never concatenates them.** A Claude transcript is an append-only event log, so one logical exchange spans many rows: tool-result rows, meta/image/skill rows, compact summaries, task/team notifications, sidechains, replayed assistant snapshots. Rendering a card per *row* was the original bug (#169) — but the fix overshot to one card per *human turn*, which fused up to 74 distinct model messages into a single card and reported it as one message. One assistant row IS one whole model message: measured across a real `~/.claude/projects` (CLI 2.1.220-2.1.251) no assistant row carries more than one content block and no `message.id` carries more than one text block, so there was never anything to reassemble, and no adjacent pair of assistant rows continues a table, a list, or an open code fence. Each row is therefore its own message carrying `{kind, label, role, text, timestamp, turn}`; the frontend renders a same-role run inside one `turn` as badge-less continuation segments (`.rv-msg-cont`), which is what keeps a p90 of 11 messages per turn from reading as card spam. ⚠️ **A prompt typed while Claude is working is recorded ONLY as an `attachment/queued_command` row** — the CLI never re-emits it as a `user` row — so reading only `user` rows lost 162 of 353 user cards on that corpus AND lost the turn boundary each one carries, which is what let an assistant run fuse in the first place. Take it only when `attachment.origin.kind === 'human'` and `commandMode === 'prompt'`; the CLI's own queue entries (`commandMode: 'task-notification'`) carry no `origin` key at all. The shape is not a documented CLI contract, so every field check must fail closed. ⚠️ **`data.text` (no `?context=full`) is frozen on the last assistant row and must never be derived from `messages.at(-1)`** — agent pollers hash it (`skills/codeman/preamble.sh`), and the last message can be the user's own queued prompt. The BRIEF view therefore does not render `text`: it asks for `?context=turn`, which returns the assistant messages of the last ANSWERED turn (`selectLastAnsweredTurn()` in `src/web/response-viewer-transcript.ts`: the highest `turn` that has an assistant row, so a prompt queued after the answer does not blank the view), and renders them with the same numeric-`turn` continuation gate as the full view. `text` alone was the final row of a median-3-row turn — a "Done." tail with the substance in the rows before it. Readers that emit no `turn` (Codex, the pane parser, an older server) return `text` only, and the brief view falls back to one card for them. Replayed assistant snapshots are still deduped, and the tool/task/skill/compact/team metadata filtering is unchanged. Related: a recovered `restored-<uuid8>` tmux placeholder carries a **stale cwd**, so transcript lookup by working directory finds nothing; it rebinds to the matching top-level Claude transcript UUID instead when that match is unambiguous. Tests: `test/routes/session-routes-claude-last-response.test.ts`, `test/response-viewer-turn-segments.test.ts`. Purely client-side (no `renderIndexHtml` step): the template ships with `btn-response-viewer-header--hidden` and `applyHeaderVisibilitySettings()` (settings-ui.js) toggles it after settings load. Hiding must go through that marker class — the base rule is `display:inline-flex !important`, so an inline style can't override it. `showResponseViewer` is in the `displayKeys` per-device set (settings-ui.js), so it does NOT sync across devices.
|
||||
⚠️ **The Claude viewer emits one message per model message and groups them with `turn`; it never concatenates them.** A Claude transcript is an append-only event log, so one logical exchange spans many rows: tool-result rows, meta/image/skill rows, compact summaries, task/team notifications, sidechains, replayed assistant snapshots. Rendering a card per _row_ was the original bug (#169) — but the fix overshot to one card per _human turn_, which fused up to 74 distinct model messages into a single card and reported it as one message. One assistant row IS one whole model message: measured across a real `~/.claude/projects` (CLI 2.1.220-2.1.251) no assistant row carries more than one content block and no `message.id` carries more than one text block, so there was never anything to reassemble, and no adjacent pair of assistant rows continues a table, a list, or an open code fence. Each row is therefore its own message carrying `{kind, label, role, text, timestamp, turn}`; the frontend renders a same-role run inside one `turn` as badge-less continuation segments (`.rv-msg-cont`), which is what keeps a p90 of 11 messages per turn from reading as card spam. ⚠️ **A prompt typed while Claude is working is recorded ONLY as an `attachment/queued_command` row** — the CLI never re-emits it as a `user` row — so reading only `user` rows lost 162 of 353 user cards on that corpus AND lost the turn boundary each one carries, which is what let an assistant run fuse in the first place. Take it only when `attachment.origin.kind === 'human'` and `commandMode === 'prompt'`; the CLI's own queue entries (`commandMode: 'task-notification'`) carry no `origin` key at all. The shape is not a documented CLI contract, so every field check must fail closed. ⚠️ **`data.text` (no `?context=full`) is frozen on the last assistant row and must never be derived from `messages.at(-1)`** — agent pollers hash it (`skills/codeman/preamble.sh`), and the last message can be the user's own queued prompt. The BRIEF view therefore does not render `text`: it asks for `?context=turn`, which returns the assistant messages of the last ANSWERED turn (`selectLastAnsweredTurn()` in `src/web/response-viewer-transcript.ts`: the highest `turn` that has an assistant row, so a prompt queued after the answer does not blank the view), and renders them with the same numeric-`turn` continuation gate as the full view. `text` alone was the final row of a median-3-row turn — a "Done." tail with the substance in the rows before it. Readers that emit no `turn` (Codex, the pane parser, an older server) return `text` only, and the brief view falls back to one card for them. Replayed assistant snapshots are still deduped, and the tool/task/skill/compact/team metadata filtering is unchanged. Related: a recovered `restored-<uuid8>` tmux placeholder carries a **stale cwd**, so transcript lookup by working directory finds nothing; it rebinds to the matching top-level Claude transcript UUID instead when that match is unambiguous. Tests: `test/routes/session-routes-claude-last-response.test.ts`, `test/response-viewer-turn-segments.test.ts`. Purely client-side (no `renderIndexHtml` step): the template ships with `btn-response-viewer-header--hidden` and `applyHeaderVisibilitySettings()` (settings-ui.js) toggles it after settings load. Hiding must go through that marker class — the base rule is `display:inline-flex !important`, so an inline style can't override it. `showResponseViewer` is in the `displayKeys` per-device set (settings-ui.js), so it does NOT sync across devices.
|
||||
**File Viewer button** (header, 1.4.1) is **shown by default on desktop** since `211f3c0` (post-1.8.0): toggle under App Settings → Header & Panels → Header buttons → File Viewer (`showFileViewerButton`, in the per-device `displayKeys` set, fallback default `true`). Purely client-side like the response viewer: the template now ships the button VISIBLE (no `--hidden` class) and `applyHeaderVisibilitySettings()` toggles the `btn-file-viewer--hidden` marker class after settings load; phones still hide it via mobile.css. The button toggles the file-browser panel open/closed without opening the settings modal (`panels-ui.js`). The same commit set the **default desktop header** to WS/CPU/MEM + File Viewer + gear: the token-count chip (`showTokenCount`, no settings-UI toggle) and the lifecycle-log button (`showLifecycleLog`) both default **OFF** now (templates ship them hidden; stored prefs still honored). The plan-usage chip default is unchanged (opt-in, see Plan-usage chip). The **Cron toolbar button** joined the same opt-in pattern in 1.6.0: template ships `btn-cron--hidden`, `applyHeaderVisibilitySettings()` toggles it via the per-device `showCronButton` setting (default OFF, App Settings → Header & Panels → Scheduling); cron jobs themselves are unaffected.
|
||||
|
||||
### Session list layout (header strip vs. left sidebar)
|
||||
@@ -388,7 +390,7 @@ Anatomy: `.set-shell` → `.set-shell-head` (title + `.set-head-actions`) + `.se
|
||||
|
||||
**Light skins carry three extra obligations.** `color-scheme: light` on the `html[data-skin]` block, or the UA renders native `<select>` popups, date pickers and scrollbars as dark widgets on a light page. xterm `minimumContrastRatio: 4.5` (set at construction in terminal-ui.js **and** panels-ui.js for teammate terminals, and re-applied in `applyTerminalSkin()`), because CLIs emit colors chosen for dark backgrounds; dark skins keep `1` to avoid the per-cell contrast work. And `applyTerminalSkin()` must call `this._localEchoOverlay?.refreshFont()` — the zero-lag overlay **caches** the terminal fg/bg at construction, so without the refresh typed-but-not-yet-flushed text keeps the previous theme's dark backing after a live skin switch.
|
||||
|
||||
**Shared surface tokens, not literals.** Elevated/floating surfaces resolve through `--floating-bg`, `--control-bg{,-hover}`, `--control-border{,-hover}`, `--banner-bg-a/b`, `--modal-backdrop` and `--elevated-shadow`, so modals, the command palette, dropdowns, subagent/ultracode windows, file previews and the mobile sheets follow the skin instead of hardcoded near-black rgba. ⚠️ Every skin that wants its own elevated look must override these — a skin that omits `--floating-bg` silently inherits the `:root` value, which is how the OG skin's near-black modals drifted slate. `styles.css` also defines **compatibility aliases** (`--bg-primary/secondary/tertiary`, `--text-primary/secondary`, `--border-color`, `--accent-color`, `--success`, `--error`, `--danger`, `--font-mono`, `--shadow-lg`) that forward to the canonical tokens; panels written against those names previously resolved to *nothing* (invalid at computed-value time), so the aliases are load-bearing, not cosmetic.
|
||||
**Shared surface tokens, not literals.** Elevated/floating surfaces resolve through `--floating-bg`, `--control-bg{,-hover}`, `--control-border{,-hover}`, `--banner-bg-a/b`, `--modal-backdrop` and `--elevated-shadow`, so modals, the command palette, dropdowns, subagent/ultracode windows, file previews and the mobile sheets follow the skin instead of hardcoded near-black rgba. ⚠️ Every skin that wants its own elevated look must override these — a skin that omits `--floating-bg` silently inherits the `:root` value, which is how the OG skin's near-black modals drifted slate. `styles.css` also defines **compatibility aliases** (`--bg-primary/secondary/tertiary`, `--text-primary/secondary`, `--border-color`, `--accent-color`, `--success`, `--error`, `--danger`, `--font-mono`, `--shadow-lg`) that forward to the canonical tokens; panels written against those names previously resolved to _nothing_ (invalid at computed-value time), so the aliases are load-bearing, not cosmetic.
|
||||
|
||||
### Custom branding and UI language
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -421,7 +423,7 @@ Anatomy: `.set-shell` → `.set-shell-head` (title + `.set-head-actions`) + `.se
|
||||
| **Rate limit** | 10 failed auth/IP → 429 (15min decay). QR has separate limiter |
|
||||
| **Hook bypass** | `/api/hook-event` (and `/api/status-telemetry`, the statusLine exporter) skip Basic auth (localhost-only, schema-validated). When auth is active (`CODEMAN_PASSWORD` set), the loopback bypass requires the per-instance `X-Codeman-Hook-Secret` header **unconditionally** — COD-54 introduced it tunnel-gated; COD-91 (PR #127) made it always-on because Codeman can't detect a user's own loopback reverse proxy (own cloudflared/`tailscale serve`/nginx → 127.0.0.1), closing that residual plain-bypass gap. Hook curls cat the secret file at exec time via `$CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE` (session env, `config/hook-secret.ts`); a missing/wrong secret gets 401 and rate-limits in a dedicated bucket (never locks out login). Tunnel enable **refuses** without `CODEMAN_PASSWORD` unless exposure is acknowledged — via `CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1` (env, COD-55) **or** the per-request `acknowledgeUnauthTunnel:true` action field (1.1.9): the welcome/settings tunnel toggle pops a security confirm dialog and, on confirm, resends with that flag (server logs a loud warning on every passwordless tunnel start; curl/API stay refused without password/env/flag). The flag is an action field, never persisted |
|
||||
| **Env vars** | `CODEMAN_MUX` (managed session), `CODEMAN_API_URL` (auto-set for hooks), `CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS` (extra Host/Origin allowlist entries for reverse proxies, comma-separated; bare `.suffix` matches subdomains), `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOOKS`=1 (opt-in hooks-only listener on the docker bridge gateway so in-container hooks reach a loopback-bound server; bind IP from `CODEMAN_DOCKER_BRIDGE_HOST` or auto-detect) |
|
||||
| **Validation** | Zod schemas, Unicode-aware path allowlist regex, env prefix allowlist (`CLAUDE_CODE_*`/`OPENCODE_*`/`CODEX_*`/`GEMINI_*`/`GOOGLE_*`/`ANTIGRAVITY_*`/`PI_*`) |
|
||||
| **Validation** | Zod schemas, Unicode-aware path allowlist regex, env prefix allowlist (`CLAUDE_CODE_*`/`OPENCODE_*`/`CODEX_*`/`GEMINI_*`/`GOOGLE_*`/`ANTIGRAVITY_*`/`PI_*`) |
|
||||
| **Headers** | CORS localhost-only, CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS if HTTPS |
|
||||
|
||||
## Performance and limits
|
||||
@@ -442,7 +444,7 @@ Target: 20 sessions, 50 agent windows at 60fps. Limits in `src/config/`: termina
|
||||
|
||||
⚠️ **Look in `prebuilds/<platform>-<arch>/`, not just `build/Release/`.** node-pty's loader (`lib/utils.js`) tries `build/Release`, `build/Debug`, then `prebuilds/<platform>-<arch>`, and `unixTerminal.js` derives `helperPath` from **whichever directory the native module loaded out of**. The 0.15 fix only chmodded `build/Release/spawn-helper`, which on macOS does not exist at all (the prebuild is used, so node-gyp never runs), and it resolved the path off `require.resolve('node-pty')` (= `<pkg>/lib/index.js`), producing `<pkg>/lib/build/Release/spawn-helper`, so it was a no-op on every platform.
|
||||
|
||||
The repair is a **chmod, not a rebuild**: the prebuilt binary is fine. `scripts/fix-node-pty.mjs` (also `npm run fix:node-pty`) chmods every helper it finds, then **proves** the result by actually opening a PTY, because a `require()` alone passes on a broken install (the helper is only touched at spawn time). Only if that probe still fails does it rebuild from source, and it backs `prebuilds/` up first: node-pty's install script `rmSync`s the whole prebuilds tree the moment `npm_config_build_from_source` is set and only *then* shells out to node-gyp, so on a Mac without Xcode command line tools an unconditional rebuild leaves the install with neither a prebuilt nor a compiled binary. ⚠️ Do not reinstate a blind rebuild in `postinstall` for that reason (it also cost 30-120s on every install).
|
||||
The repair is a **chmod, not a rebuild**: the prebuilt binary is fine. `scripts/fix-node-pty.mjs` (also `npm run fix:node-pty`) chmods every helper it finds, then **proves** the result by actually opening a PTY, because a `require()` alone passes on a broken install (the helper is only touched at spawn time). Only if that probe still fails does it rebuild from source, and it backs `prebuilds/` up first: node-pty's install script `rmSync`s the whole prebuilds tree the moment `npm_config_build_from_source` is set and only _then_ shells out to node-gyp, so on a Mac without Xcode command line tools an unconditional rebuild leaves the install with neither a prebuilt nor a compiled binary. ⚠️ Do not reinstate a blind rebuild in `postinstall` for that reason (it also cost 30-120s on every install).
|
||||
|
||||
`src/utils/node-pty-repair.ts` is the runtime safety net for installs that are already broken: all four `pty.spawn()` calls in `session.ts` go through `spawnPtyWithHelperRepair()`, which chmods and retries **once** on a `posix_spawnp`/`spawn-helper` error and rethrows anything else untouched, so the user never sees a dead session. A second failure rethrows with the `npm run fix:node-pty` hint attached instead of a bare "posix_spawnp failed". The repair is attempted at most once per process (no chmod storms).
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+89
-33
@@ -24,14 +24,14 @@ custom port, identity file, `-J` jump host, `-o ProxyCommand`).
|
||||
|
||||
Types live in `src/types/session.ts`; persistence in `src/remote-hosts.ts`.
|
||||
|
||||
| Type | Role |
|
||||
|------|------|
|
||||
| `RemoteSshOptions` | The **HOW-to-reach** fields, shared by host + session: `identityFile`, `socksProxy` (`host:port`), `jumpHost` (`[user@]host[:port]`), `extraSshOptions` (`KEY=VALUE[]`). Every field optional — all-absent reproduces port-22, default-identity, directly-SSH-able behavior. |
|
||||
| `RemoteHost` (extends `RemoteSshOptions`) | A saved host: `id`, `label`, `host`, `username`, `port?`, `commands?` (per-mode launch command override). |
|
||||
| `RemoteCase` | A working directory on a host: `name`, `type: 'remote'`, `hostId`, `remotePath`. |
|
||||
| Type | Role |
|
||||
| -------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
||||
| `RemoteSshOptions` | The **HOW-to-reach** fields, shared by host + session: `identityFile`, `socksProxy` (`host:port`), `jumpHost` (`[user@]host[:port]`), `extraSshOptions` (`KEY=VALUE[]`). Every field optional — all-absent reproduces port-22, default-identity, directly-SSH-able behavior. |
|
||||
| `RemoteHost` (extends `RemoteSshOptions`) | A saved host: `id`, `label`, `host`, `username`, `port?`, `commands?` (per-mode launch command override). |
|
||||
| `RemoteCase` | A working directory on a host: `name`, `type: 'remote'`, `hostId`, `remotePath`. |
|
||||
| `SessionRemote` (extends `RemoteSshOptions`) | The resolved bundle stamped onto a live session: host coordinates + `remotePath` + `commands`, plus **`owned?`** and **`remoteSessionName?`** (COD-105 — see [Ownership](#ownership-launched-vs-discovered-and-attached-cod-105)). Built by `toSessionRemote(host, case)` (sets `owned: true`) for the launch path, or `toAttachedSessionRemote(host, name, path)` (sets `owned: false`) for the attach path. Both copy the advanced SSH options through so every connection is identical. |
|
||||
| `RemoteCommandMode` | `Extract<SessionMode, 'shell' \| 'claude' \| 'opencode' \| 'codex' \| 'gemini' \| 'antigravity' \| 'pi' \| 'grok' \| 'deepseek' \| 'omp'>` — the modes that can run remotely. |
|
||||
| `RemoteSessionInfo` (COD-105) | One discovered remote tmux session: `name` (always `codeman-*`), `attached` (a client is connected), `created` (epoch s), `windows`. Returned by `listRemoteCodemanSessions()`. |
|
||||
| `RemoteCommandMode` | `Extract<SessionMode, 'shell' \| 'claude' \| 'opencode' \| 'codex' \| 'gemini' \| 'antigravity' \| 'pi' \| 'grok' \| 'deepseek' \| 'omp'>` — the modes that can run remotely. |
|
||||
| `RemoteSessionInfo` (COD-105) | One discovered remote tmux session: `name` (always `codeman-*`), `attached` (a client is connected), `created` (epoch s), `windows`. Returned by `listRemoteCodemanSessions()`. |
|
||||
|
||||
Persistence is two flat JSON arrays in the instance data dir:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ Rules that keep this safe — **do not bypass them by hand-building an ssh line
|
||||
single-quote `shellescape`d (`'…'` with embedded `'\''`). The helper mirrors
|
||||
the one in `tmux-manager.ts`.
|
||||
- **`~`/`$HOME` in `identityFile` is expanded at build time** (`expandIdentityPath`),
|
||||
*before* escaping — ssh does not expand `~` inside `-i`, and the escaped value
|
||||
_before_ escaping — ssh does not expand `~` inside `-i`, and the escaped value
|
||||
never reaches a shell that would.
|
||||
- **The ProxyCommand is one shellescaped `-o KEY=VALUE` token**, so its spaces and
|
||||
the `%h`/`%p` placeholders reach ssh as a single argument. `%h %p` survive
|
||||
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ Key points:
|
||||
asymmetry: **discovery/attach (COD-105) target the canonical `-L codeman`
|
||||
socket** — they join sessions the remote's own Codeman manages, while owned
|
||||
durable launches live on `-L codeman-remote`.
|
||||
- **`exec <cli>`** replaces the pane shell with the agent, so the pane PID *is*
|
||||
- **`exec <cli>`** replaces the pane shell with the agent, so the pane PID _is_
|
||||
the agent. The per-mode command comes from `remote.commands?.[mode]` or
|
||||
`defaultRemoteCommandForMode(mode)` (`exec claude` / `exec opencode` /
|
||||
`exec codex` / `exec gemini` / `exec agy` / `exec bash -l`).
|
||||
@@ -133,9 +133,9 @@ Because durable remote sessions require tmux on the remote host,
|
||||
`checkRemoteTmuxAvailable(host)` runs `command -v tmux` over SSH **before**
|
||||
creating a remote case/session and returns a structured, never-throwing result:
|
||||
|
||||
- empty stdout / non-zero exit → *"remote host `<host>` needs tmux installed for
|
||||
durable remote sessions"*
|
||||
- stderr present → *"could not verify tmux on remote host `<host>`: `<stderr>`"*
|
||||
- empty stdout / non-zero exit → _"remote host `<host>` needs tmux installed for
|
||||
durable remote sessions"_
|
||||
- stderr present → _"could not verify tmux on remote host `<host>`: `<stderr>`"_
|
||||
(a real connection failure, surfaced to the operator)
|
||||
- success → `{ ok: true, tmuxPath }`
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ skipped; command construction is still asserted by unit tests.
|
||||
|
||||
## Ownership: launched vs. discovered-and-attached (COD-105)
|
||||
|
||||
COD-104 (above) was Phase 1 — Codeman *launches* a remote session and owns it.
|
||||
COD-104 (above) was Phase 1 — Codeman _launches_ a remote session and owns it.
|
||||
COD-105 is Phase 2 — Codeman can also **discover** `codeman-*` tmux sessions
|
||||
already running on a remote host (created by the remote's own Codeman or another
|
||||
instance) and **attach** to one it didn't launch. Ownership decides what happens
|
||||
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ remote command line by ownership:
|
||||
|
||||
- **`owned === false`** → `buildRemoteAttachCommand(remote, name)` — emits
|
||||
`ssh … -t … 'tmux -L codeman attach -t <remoteSessionName>'`. It uses **`attach`,
|
||||
NOT `new-session -A`**, so it only *joins* an existing session and never creates
|
||||
NOT `new-session -A`**, so it only _joins_ an existing session and never creates
|
||||
one.
|
||||
- **owned (default)** → `buildRemoteLaunchCommand` (the COD-104 path above).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ remote command line by ownership:
|
||||
|
||||
`TmuxManager.killSession()` has an **early return for non-owned remote sessions**:
|
||||
it tears down **only the LOCAL pane** holding the ssh client (`tmux -L codeman
|
||||
kill-session` on *this* host's socket). Killing the local ssh sends SIGHUP to the
|
||||
kill-session` on _this_ host's socket). Killing the local ssh sends SIGHUP to the
|
||||
remote `tmux attach`, which **detaches** — the durable remote session survives.
|
||||
The early return is a structural guarantee that **no code path can ever issue a
|
||||
remote `kill-session` for a session we don't own** — the only `kill-session` run is
|
||||
@@ -261,16 +261,16 @@ perfectly (#415). `src/remote-files.ts` is the one module that reads remote byte
|
||||
and it follows the same rule as the launch path: every ssh command line comes from
|
||||
`buildSshConnectionArgs()` — **never** a hand-built ssh line.
|
||||
|
||||
| Request | What happens |
|
||||
|---------|--------------|
|
||||
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/file-raw` | Streamed over `ssh` (`cat`, or `tail -c +N \| head -c L` for a `Range`); the same 200/206/416 contract as a local file, so `<video>`/`<audio>` seeking works |
|
||||
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/file-content` | `cat` into memory, capped by the existing text limit; `edit=1` answers `400` (see below) and `editable` is always `false` |
|
||||
| `PUT /api/sessions/:id/file-content` | `400` before any path is looked at: the guard sits AHEAD of the local path validation, because with a same-named directory on the Codeman host (an `sshfs` mount) the write would otherwise land on the local twin |
|
||||
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/file-preview` | Non-office files redirect to `file-raw` (which works remotely); docx/pptx answer `400` |
|
||||
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/file-thumbnail` | `400` for remote files |
|
||||
| `POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments` | Registers an absolute path that lives on the **remote** host (a clicked link pointing outside the case directory) by probing it there |
|
||||
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/attachments/:attachmentId/raw` | Streams the registered remote file over ssh, same 200/206/416 contract; `preview` (office) and `thumbnail` answer `400` |
|
||||
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/attachments/:attachmentId`, `GET …/attachments` (history) | Size/mtime/existence resolved over ssh, so a remote entry is not reported `missing`; the history list resolves EVERY entry in one batched probe, never one connection per entry |
|
||||
| Request | What happens |
|
||||
| -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
||||
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/file-raw` | Streamed over `ssh` (`cat`, or `tail -c +N \| head -c L` for a `Range`); the same 200/206/416 contract as a local file, so `<video>`/`<audio>` seeking works |
|
||||
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/file-content` | `cat` into memory, capped by the existing text limit; `edit=1` answers `400` (see below) and `editable` is always `false` |
|
||||
| `PUT /api/sessions/:id/file-content` | `400` before any path is looked at: the guard sits AHEAD of the local path validation, because with a same-named directory on the Codeman host (an `sshfs` mount) the write would otherwise land on the local twin |
|
||||
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/file-preview` | Non-office files redirect to `file-raw` (which works remotely); docx/pptx answer `400` |
|
||||
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/file-thumbnail` | `400` for remote files |
|
||||
| `POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments` | Registers an absolute path that lives on the **remote** host (a clicked link pointing outside the case directory) by probing it there |
|
||||
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/attachments/:attachmentId/raw` | Streams the registered remote file over ssh, same 200/206/416 contract; `preview` (office) and `thumbnail` answer `400` |
|
||||
| `GET /api/sessions/:id/attachments/:attachmentId`, `GET …/attachments` (history) | Size/mtime/existence resolved over ssh, so a remote entry is not reported `missing`; the history list resolves EVERY entry in one batched probe, never one connection per entry |
|
||||
|
||||
⚠️ The attachment route is the one a clicked path takes when it is **outside** the case
|
||||
directory (a remote `/tmp` scratchpad capture, a screenshot elsewhere in the home dir):
|
||||
@@ -352,18 +352,74 @@ path but the SESSION (`session.remote`): a remote session never falls back to lo
|
||||
`fs`, and a local session never opens an ssh connection — including for attachment
|
||||
records, which are keyed to the session that registered them.
|
||||
|
||||
## Wake-on-LAN from user input
|
||||
|
||||
A durable remote session survives an SSH drop (COD-104/108), but nothing brought the
|
||||
HOST back. When the remote machine suspended, the local pane's `ssh` child **stalled**
|
||||
rather than exited: `tmux send-keys` SUCCEEDS against a stalled pane, so typed input
|
||||
vanished with no error anywhere, and without a keepalive the pane could look alive for
|
||||
the OS TCP timeout. The only recovery was waiting for the reconnect watcher, which
|
||||
gave up after ~13 minutes and, once exhausted, never retried.
|
||||
|
||||
An **optional** `wakeCommand` on a remote host (a Wake-on-LAN wrapper such as
|
||||
`/home/joe/bin/whuff`) closes that: on user input, `POST /api/sessions/:id/input`
|
||||
probes the host, and if it is unreachable it runs the wake command, polls until the
|
||||
host answers, reattaches the pane (`Session.reattachRemote()`, which idempotently
|
||||
attaches the still-running remote tmux — the agent conversation is not restarted),
|
||||
and flushes the input that arrived meanwhile. Implementation: `src/remote-wake.ts`.
|
||||
|
||||
The invariants worth keeping:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Only real user input may wake a host.** The COD-108 watcher, the server's
|
||||
dropped-session handler and boot recovery have no access to the wake registry — a
|
||||
wake there would re-wake the host seconds after every suspend, so it could never
|
||||
stay asleep (the same failure `hufflepuff-mcp-lazy` exists to prevent for MCP
|
||||
keepalives). Enforced by `test/remote-wake.test.ts`'s wiring guard, not a comment.
|
||||
- **Detection is a bare TCP connect** to the SSH port (then the configured `port`, else
|
||||
22), throttled to one probe per `REMOTE_WAKE_PROBE_MIN_INTERVAL_MS` (30 s) per
|
||||
session, and only for wake-enabled hosts. No `ServerAliveInterval` is added to the
|
||||
launch command: keepalives push bytes into an otherwise idle connection every
|
||||
interval, which is exactly what a byte-threshold idle detector must not count as
|
||||
activity. A probe is ~200 bytes per 30 s, orders of magnitude below any such
|
||||
threshold, and the SYN alone cannot wake a host.
|
||||
- **Input is buffered while a wake is in flight** (`REMOTE_WAKE_PENDING_MAX_BYTES`,
|
||||
oldest bytes dropped, bounded so user input cannot grow memory) and flushed in order
|
||||
after the reattach, with a settle delay so bytes cannot land in a still-connecting
|
||||
pane. The **send-and-wait** path blocks on the wake instead — its response is open
|
||||
anyway, and buffering would break the wait contract.
|
||||
- **The command runs without a shell** (`spawn(path, [], { shell: false })`), and the
|
||||
schema requires a single executable path: no arguments, no `$`/backtick. A broken or
|
||||
missing wake command fails the wake, never the input route.
|
||||
- **`wakeCommand` is host-level config, refreshed on session recovery**
|
||||
(`rehydrateRemoteHostFields` in `src/remote-hosts.ts`). A session's `remote` block is
|
||||
persisted at launch time, so a field added to `remote-hosts.json` later would
|
||||
otherwise never reach an already-running session — not even across a Codeman restart.
|
||||
The host config is authoritative (removing the field disables the feature again);
|
||||
other host-level fields deliberately stay as persisted, so recovery cannot silently
|
||||
re-point an existing pane's SSH options.
|
||||
- **UI/SSE**: `remote:hostWaking` and `remote:hostWakeFailed` (plus the reused
|
||||
`remote:sessionReconnected`) drive toasts in `panels-ui.js`.
|
||||
|
||||
Tests: `test/remote-wake.test.ts` (decision/throttle table, single-flight registry,
|
||||
buffering + flush order, and the wiring guard) and
|
||||
`test/routes/session-remote-wake.test.ts` (the input route buffers instead of writing
|
||||
into a sleeping host, and the non-wake paths are unchanged).
|
||||
|
||||
## API
|
||||
|
||||
Routes are registered in `src/web/routes/case-routes.ts`:
|
||||
|
||||
| Method | Path | Purpose |
|
||||
|--------|------|---------|
|
||||
| `GET` | `/api/remote-hosts` | List saved hosts |
|
||||
| `POST` | `/api/remote-hosts` | Create a host |
|
||||
| `PUT` | `/api/remote-hosts/:id` | Update a host |
|
||||
| `DELETE` | `/api/remote-hosts/:id` | Delete a host |
|
||||
| `GET` | `/api/remote-hosts/:hostId/sessions` | Discover `codeman-*` sessions on the host (COD-105; `listRemoteCodemanSessions`, never errors) |
|
||||
| `POST` | `/api/cases/remote-link` | Link a case to a remote host (creates the `RemoteCase`) |
|
||||
| Method | Path | Purpose |
|
||||
| -------- | ------------------------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
||||
| `GET` | `/api/remote-hosts` | List saved hosts |
|
||||
| `POST` | `/api/remote-hosts` | Create a host |
|
||||
| `PUT` | `/api/remote-hosts/:id` | Update a host |
|
||||
| `DELETE` | `/api/remote-hosts/:id` | Delete a host |
|
||||
| `GET` | `/api/remote-hosts/:hostId/sessions` | Discover `codeman-*` sessions on the host (COD-105; `listRemoteCodemanSessions`, never errors) |
|
||||
| `POST` | `/api/cases/remote-link` | Link a case to a remote host (creates the `RemoteCase`) |
|
||||
|
||||
`RemoteHost` accepts the optional `wakeCommand` (single executable path, run without a
|
||||
shell) — see **Wake-on-LAN from user input** above.
|
||||
|
||||
Attaching to a discovered session is a **session-create** path, not a host route:
|
||||
`POST /api/sessions` accepts `attachRemoteSession: { hostId, remoteSessionName }`
|
||||
|
||||
+4
-8
@@ -214,15 +214,11 @@ export class RemoteWakeRegistry {
|
||||
|
||||
if (action === 'deliver') return 'deliver';
|
||||
if (action === 'buffer') {
|
||||
// A buffered decision with no wake in flight (the wake failed and the state
|
||||
// was reset, or the very first input of a session in the throttle window)
|
||||
// must still drive a wake, or the bytes would sit in the buffer forever.
|
||||
if (state.waking == null && remote?.wakeCommand) {
|
||||
this._enqueue(session.id, data);
|
||||
void this.wake(session);
|
||||
return 'buffered';
|
||||
}
|
||||
this._enqueue(session.id, data);
|
||||
// A buffered verdict with no wake in flight still has to DRIVE a wake (the
|
||||
// previous one failed and reset the probe state, or the ladder landed here
|
||||
// directly) — otherwise the bytes would sit in the buffer forever.
|
||||
if (state.waking == null && remote?.wakeCommand) void this.wake(session);
|
||||
return 'buffered';
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1322,6 +1322,7 @@ export function registerSessionRoutes(
|
||||
|
||||
for (const id of sessionIds) {
|
||||
if (ctx.sessions.has(id)) {
|
||||
remoteWake.drop(id);
|
||||
await ctx.cleanupSession(id, true, 'user_bulk_delete');
|
||||
killed++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user