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Codeman/src/config/cli-registry/stock.ts
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Ark0N e6e5a62d9b Merge pull request #380 from opticon454/feature/cli-catalog-consumers
feat(cli-registry): drive install.sh and the Docker agent image from the CLI catalogue
2026-09-14 15:55:08 +02:00

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/**
* @fileoverview The shipped stock catalog — one `CliEntry` per CLI Codeman supports out of
* the box, transcribed to be byte-identical (via the argv engine) to the hand-written
* builders in tmux-manager.ts that they replace.
*
* This is the ONE file allowed to know a CLI's id by name (`test/cli-registry-no-id-branching
* .test.ts` enforces that nowhere else does). Everything downstream — session.ts,
* tmux-manager.ts, the routes, the frontend — reads capability flags, never `entry.id ===`.
*
* @module config/cli-registry/stock
*/
import type { CliEntry } from './types.js';
const HOME_DIRS = {
local: '~/.local/bin',
usrLocal: '/usr/local/bin',
bunBin: '~/.bun/bin',
npmGlobal: '~/.npm-global/bin',
homeBin: '~/bin',
};
const NO_GATES = {};
const NO_PRIVILEGED_PARAMS: CliEntry['capabilities']['privilegedParams'] = [];
/**
* The common case: every CLI whose privileged switch is a command-line FLAG, reachable
* only through its own config object and therefore already covered by `privilegedParams`.
* DeepSeek is the sole exception — its switch is an env var. See CliCapabilities.
*/
const NO_PRIVILEGED_ENV_KEYS: CliEntry['capabilities']['privilegedEnvKeys'] = [];
/** Shared skeleton for the "agent CLI, no unusual behaviour" case (pi's own shape). */
function agentDefaults(): Pick<
CliEntry['capabilities'],
| 'external'
| 'requiresMux'
| 'hooks'
| 'transcript'
| 'altScreen'
| 'wheelForward'
| 'keyboardAccessory'
| 'privilegedCommandGate'
| 'startMode'
| 'stripInkBloat'
| 'ralph'
| 'respawn'
| 'effort'
| 'agentSkillInjection'
| 'statusLineTelemetry'
| 'model'
| 'privilegedParams'
| 'privilegedEnvKeys'
| 'gates'
> {
return {
external: true,
requiresMux: true,
hooks: 'none',
transcript: 'none',
altScreen: 'strip-mux-only',
wheelForward: { mode: 'never' },
keyboardAccessory: 'agent',
privilegedCommandGate: false,
startMode: 'interactive',
stripInkBloat: true,
ralph: false,
respawn: false,
effort: false,
agentSkillInjection: false,
statusLineTelemetry: false,
model: { source: 'flag', param: 'model' },
privilegedParams: NO_PRIVILEGED_PARAMS,
privilegedEnvKeys: NO_PRIVILEGED_ENV_KEYS,
gates: NO_GATES,
};
}
const CLAUDE: CliEntry = {
id: 'claude' as CliEntry['id'],
label: 'Claude',
shortBadge: 'CC',
accent: '#d97757',
enabled: true,
stock: true,
order: 0,
kind: 'agent',
discovery: {
binaries: ['claude'],
searchDirs: [HOME_DIRS.local, '~/.claude/local', HOME_DIRS.usrLocal, HOME_DIRS.npmGlobal, HOME_DIRS.homeBin],
version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)', retryOnTransientFailure: true },
install: {
command: {
linux: 'curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash',
darwin: 'curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash',
wsl: 'curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash',
},
npmPackage: '@anthropic-ai/claude-code',
docsUrl: 'https://docs.claude.com/claude-code',
},
},
launch: {
chain: 'fallback',
params: {
claudeMode: {
type: 'enum',
values: ['dangerously-skip-permissions', 'auto', 'normal', 'allowedTools'],
default: 'dangerously-skip-permissions',
},
allowedTools: { type: 'token', pattern: 'tool-list' },
model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model-claude' },
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'uuid' },
// buildEffortCliArgs carries `ultracode` as a settings JSON blob and every other
// level as a plain `--effort <level>` flag — two engine values because the two
// shapes are mutually exclusive and neither is user-typed text (both are produced
// from the EFFORT_LEVELS allowlist upstream, same as every other engine value).
effortLevel: { type: 'engine', source: 'effortLevel' },
effortJson: { type: 'engine', source: 'effortSettingsJson' },
sessionId: { type: 'engine', source: 'sessionId' },
sessionName: { type: 'engine', source: 'sessionName' },
},
variants: [
{
id: 'resume',
when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' },
args: [
{ lit: 'claude' },
{ flag: '--dangerously-skip-permissions', when: { param: 'claudeMode', is: 'dangerously-skip-permissions' } },
{ flag: '--permission-mode', value: 'auto', when: { param: 'claudeMode', is: 'auto' } },
{
flag: '--allowedTools',
valueFrom: 'allowedTools',
quote: 'double',
when: {
allOf: [
{ param: 'claudeMode', is: 'allowedTools' },
{ param: 'allowedTools', state: 'set' },
],
},
},
{ flag: '--resume', valueFrom: 'resumeId', quote: 'double' },
{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', quote: 'double', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
{ flag: '--effort', valueFrom: 'effortLevel', quote: 'single', when: { param: 'effortLevel', state: 'set' } },
{ flag: '--settings', valueFrom: 'effortJson', quote: 'single', when: { param: 'effortJson', state: 'set' } },
{ flag: '--name', valueFrom: 'sessionName', quote: 'double', when: { capabilityGate: 'nameFlag' } },
],
},
{
id: 'new',
args: [
{ lit: 'claude' },
{ flag: '--dangerously-skip-permissions', when: { param: 'claudeMode', is: 'dangerously-skip-permissions' } },
{ flag: '--permission-mode', value: 'auto', when: { param: 'claudeMode', is: 'auto' } },
{
flag: '--allowedTools',
valueFrom: 'allowedTools',
quote: 'double',
when: {
allOf: [
{ param: 'claudeMode', is: 'allowedTools' },
{ param: 'allowedTools', state: 'set' },
],
},
},
{ flag: '--session-id', valueFrom: 'sessionId', quote: 'double' },
{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', quote: 'double', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
{ flag: '--effort', valueFrom: 'effortLevel', quote: 'single', when: { param: 'effortLevel', state: 'set' } },
{ flag: '--settings', valueFrom: 'effortJson', quote: 'single', when: { param: 'effortJson', state: 'set' } },
{ flag: '--name', valueFrom: 'sessionName', quote: 'double', when: { capabilityGate: 'nameFlag' } },
],
},
],
// Claude has no `<Mode>Config` object of its own — the bridge synthesizes one from its
// discrete top-level spawn fields, under their EXISTING field name `resumeSessionId`.
legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'resumeSessionId' },
},
env: {
// Claude asks for truecolor, like every CLI here except `shell` and `opencode`.
// tmux hands the pane TERM=screen, which supports-color reads as 16 colors, and
// Claude then quantizes every RGB color its theme asks for down to that palette.
// Each dark background lands on ESC[40m, the terminal's own black, so the block
// Claude draws behind the user's own messages renders invisible. PR #3 unset
// COLORTERM here against xterm.js#484, which xterm.js had already closed in 2019,
// and Codeman now ships @xterm/xterm 6 and sets `terminal-overrides *:Tc` itself.
// The other truecolor CLIs also unset NO_COLOR. Claude does not, so a user who
// exports NO_COLOR globally keeps the monochrome panes they asked for.
// CLAUDECODE stays unset, because Claude reads it as a signal that it is running
// nested inside itself.
exports: [{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' }],
unset: ['CLAUDECODE'],
tmuxSetenvKeys: [],
dockerExecEnvNames: [],
allowedPrefixes: ['CLAUDE_CODE_'],
allowedKeys: ['CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR'],
},
capabilities: {
external: false,
// The historical hard-coded pair, now stated as data. `workingLine` matches both the
// `✻ Actualizing… (39s · ↓ 2.0k tokens)` status line and the bare `esc to interrupt`
// footer, because tmux repaints partially and only one of the two may land in a chunk.
workDetect: {
promptGlyph: '❯',
workingLine: String.raw`…\s*\((?:\d+h\s+)?(?:\d+m\s+)?\d+s\b|esc to interrupt`,
},
requiresMux: false,
// Claude installs Codeman's own hooks block into every workspace it runs in, so its
// stop/idle signals are unconditional — no per-session veto, unlike deepseek's bridge.
hooks: 'always',
transcript: 'claude-jsonl',
altScreen: 'strip-full',
echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'glyph', glyph: '❯', offset: 2 } },
wheelForward: { mode: 'version-gated', minVersion: '2.1.187' },
keyboardAccessory: 'agent',
privilegedCommandGate: false,
startMode: 'interactive',
stripInkBloat: true,
ralph: true,
respawn: true,
effort: true,
agentSkillInjection: true,
statusLineTelemetry: true,
model: { source: 'claude-settings-file' },
privilegedParams: [],
privilegedEnvKeys: [],
gates: { nameFlag: { minVersion: '2.1.224', failClosed: true } },
},
overlays: {
// Mirrors the local default so the remote/in-container agent runs non-interactively
// (no trust-folder/permission prompt that nothing on that side can answer). A per-host
// `commands.claude` override, or the docker multi-user clamp, stays the escape hatch.
remote: { command: 'claude --dangerously-skip-permissions' },
// ⚠️ As root the flag is not merely unnecessary, it is REFUSED ("cannot be used with
// root/sudo privileges"), and only inside the container — so an adopted root container
// would just show a dead pane. Drop it there and let claude ask.
docker: { command: 'claude --dangerously-skip-permissions', rootCommand: 'claude' },
// Claude's docker/remote credential handling has its own dedicated code path
// (claudeDockerPaneCommand, artifacts at docker-hosts.ts:537-575) — no generic credStore.
},
};
const SHELL: CliEntry = {
id: 'shell' as CliEntry['id'],
label: 'Shell',
shortBadge: 'SH',
accent: '#6b7280',
enabled: true,
stock: true,
order: 1,
kind: 'shell',
discovery: {
binaries: [],
searchDirs: [],
install: { command: {} },
},
launch: {
params: {},
variants: [{ id: 'shell', args: [] }], // tmux-manager resolves the real login shell in code
},
env: {
exports: [],
unset: ['COLORTERM'],
tmuxSetenvKeys: [],
dockerExecEnvNames: [],
allowedPrefixes: [],
allowedKeys: [],
},
capabilities: {
external: false,
requiresMux: false,
// ⚠️ `false` here while `external` is ALSO false is the pairing that matters: a shell
// has no hooks but is not an "external CLI", so a predicate derived from `external`
// once accepted `until=stop` on a shell session and hung for the full timeout.
hooks: 'none',
transcript: 'none',
altScreen: 'preserve',
echo: { policy: 'off', anchor: { kind: 'none' } },
wheelForward: { mode: 'never' },
keyboardAccessory: 'shell',
privilegedCommandGate: true,
startMode: 'shell',
stripInkBloat: false,
ralph: false,
respawn: false,
effort: false,
agentSkillInjection: false,
statusLineTelemetry: false,
model: { source: 'none' },
privilegedParams: [],
privilegedEnvKeys: [],
gates: {},
},
overlays: {
// No `remote` entry: defaultRemoteCommandForMode special-cases kind==='shell' directly
// (an interactive login shell, no `-c '<command>'` wrapping at all).
docker: { disabled: true },
},
};
const OPENCODE: CliEntry = {
id: 'opencode' as CliEntry['id'],
label: 'OpenCode',
shortBadge: 'OC',
accent: '#f59e0b',
enabled: true,
stock: true,
order: 10,
kind: 'agent',
discovery: {
binaries: ['opencode'],
searchDirs: [
'~/.opencode/bin',
HOME_DIRS.local,
HOME_DIRS.usrLocal,
'~/go/bin',
HOME_DIRS.bunBin,
HOME_DIRS.npmGlobal,
HOME_DIRS.homeBin,
],
version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)' },
install: {
command: {
linux: 'curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/install | bash',
darwin: 'curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/install | bash',
},
npmPackage: 'opencode-ai',
docsUrl: 'https://opencode.ai/docs',
},
},
launch: {
params: {
model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model' },
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'id' },
forkSession: { type: 'bool' },
},
variants: [
{
id: 'default',
args: [
{ lit: 'opencode' },
{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
{ flag: '--session', valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
{
flag: '--fork',
when: {
allOf: [
{ param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' },
{ param: 'forkSession', is: true },
],
},
},
],
},
],
legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'continueSession' },
legacyConfigField: 'openCodeConfig',
},
env: {
exports: [],
unset: ['COLORTERM'],
tmuxSetenvKeys: ['ANTHROPIC_API_KEY', 'OPENAI_API_KEY', 'GOOGLE_API_KEY'],
dockerExecEnvNames: [],
allowedPrefixes: ['OPENCODE_'],
allowedKeys: [],
configContentVar: 'OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT',
},
capabilities: {
...agentDefaults(),
altScreen: 'strip-mux-only',
echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' }, predictProfile: undefined },
},
overlays: {
credStore: { rel: '.config/opencode', seedWhole: true },
},
};
const CODEX: CliEntry = {
id: 'codex' as CliEntry['id'],
label: 'Codex',
shortBadge: 'CX',
accent: '#6b7fd7',
enabled: true,
stock: true,
order: 20,
kind: 'agent',
discovery: {
binaries: ['codex'],
searchDirs: [
'~/.codex/bin',
HOME_DIRS.local,
HOME_DIRS.usrLocal,
HOME_DIRS.bunBin,
HOME_DIRS.npmGlobal,
HOME_DIRS.homeBin,
],
version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)' },
install: {
command: { linux: 'npm install -g @openai/codex', darwin: 'npm install -g @openai/codex' },
npmPackage: '@openai/codex',
docsUrl: 'https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli',
},
},
launch: {
params: {
bypassApprovals: { type: 'bool' },
animations: { type: 'bool' },
model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model' },
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'id' },
},
variants: [
{
id: 'default',
args: [
{ lit: 'codex' },
{ flag: '--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox', when: { param: 'bypassApprovals', is: true } },
{ flag: '--config', value: 'tui.animations=true', when: { param: 'animations', is: true } },
{ flag: '--config', value: 'tui.animations=false', when: { param: 'animations', is: false } },
{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
{ lit: 'resume', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
{ valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
],
},
],
legacyConfigAliases: { bypassApprovals: 'dangerouslyBypassApprovals', resumeId: 'resumeSessionId' },
legacyConfigField: 'codexConfig',
resumeAppend: { style: 'positional', token: 'resume' },
},
env: {
exports: [
{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' },
{ name: 'CODEX_INTERNAL_ORIGINATOR_OVERRIDE', value: { engine: 'codemanPrefixedSessionId' } },
],
unset: ['NO_COLOR'],
tmuxSetenvKeys: ['OPENAI_API_KEY', 'CODEX_API_KEY', 'CODEX_HOME'],
dockerExecEnvNames: ['OPENAI_API_KEY', 'CODEX_API_KEY'],
allowedPrefixes: ['CODEX_'],
allowedKeys: [],
},
capabilities: {
...agentDefaults(),
// Codex draws `› Ask Codex to do anything` on its composer row and
// `Working (2m 49s • esc to interrupt)` above it while a turn runs. It animates no
// braille spinner, and it never prints `esc to interrupt` at rest, so that phrase
// alone separates a running turn from an idle one.
workDetect: { promptGlyph: '›', workingLine: '[Ee]sc to interrupt' },
transcript: 'codex-rollout',
altScreen: 'strip-full',
echo: { policy: 'predict', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' }, predictProfile: 'codex' },
wheelForward: { mode: 'never' }, // #227: codex ignores SGR wheel reports, never forward
maxFrameBytes: 32 * 1024,
// codex's own bare-spawn default (no config sent) is already safe (no bypass flag), so
// the multi-user clamp only needs to force an EXPLICITLY-SENT bypass back off.
//
// `param` names the REGISTRY param, like every other `param` in this file — the clamp
// resolves it through `legacyConfigAliases` on the way out, exactly as `configSetenv`
// does. codex is the entry where the two names differ (`bypassApprovals` here,
// `dangerouslyBypassApprovals` on the wire), so it is the one that would have caught a
// regression; `schema.ts` now rejects a name that is not a declared param.
privilegedParams: [{ param: 'bypassApprovals', clampTo: false }],
},
overlays: {
credStore: {
rel: '.codex',
shareDirs: ['sessions'],
shareFiles: ['history.jsonl'],
seedFiles: ['auth.json', 'config.toml'],
},
},
};
const GEMINI: CliEntry = {
id: 'gemini' as CliEntry['id'],
label: 'Gemini',
shortBadge: 'GM',
accent: '#4285f4',
enabled: true,
stock: true,
order: 30,
kind: 'agent',
discovery: {
binaries: ['gemini'],
searchDirs: [
'~/.gemini/bin',
HOME_DIRS.local,
HOME_DIRS.usrLocal,
HOME_DIRS.bunBin,
HOME_DIRS.npmGlobal,
HOME_DIRS.homeBin,
],
version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)' },
install: {
command: { linux: 'npm install -g @google/gemini-cli', darwin: 'npm install -g @google/gemini-cli' },
npmPackage: '@google/gemini-cli',
docsUrl: 'https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli',
},
},
launch: {
params: {
approvalMode: { type: 'enum', values: ['default', 'auto_edit', 'yolo', 'plan'], default: 'yolo' },
model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model' },
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'id-dotted' },
},
variants: [
{
id: 'default',
args: [
{ lit: 'gemini' },
{ flag: '--skip-trust' },
{ flag: '--approval-mode', valueFrom: 'approvalMode' },
{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
{ flag: '--resume', valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
],
},
],
legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'resumeSession' },
legacyConfigField: 'geminiConfig',
resumeAppend: { style: 'flag', flag: '--resume' },
},
env: {
exports: [{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' }],
unset: ['NO_COLOR'],
tmuxSetenvKeys: [
'GEMINI_API_KEY',
'GEMINI_MODEL',
'GOOGLE_API_KEY',
'GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT',
'GOOGLE_CLOUD_LOCATION',
'GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS',
'GOOGLE_GENAI_USE_VERTEXAI',
],
dockerExecEnvNames: ['GEMINI_API_KEY', 'GOOGLE_API_KEY'],
allowedPrefixes: ['GEMINI_', 'GOOGLE_'],
allowedKeys: [],
},
capabilities: {
...agentDefaults(),
altScreen: 'strip-full',
echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' } },
// gemini's builder defaults an ABSENT approvalMode to 'yolo', so the clamp must
// MATERIALIZE a config (not just touch an already-sent one) or a non-granted owner who
// sends no geminiConfig at all would still get yolo for free.
privilegedParams: [{ param: 'approvalMode', clampTo: 'auto_edit', materializeWhenAbsent: true }],
},
overlays: {
credStore: { rel: '.gemini', seedWhole: true }, // also covers antigravity — see its own entry
},
};
const ANTIGRAVITY: CliEntry = {
id: 'antigravity' as CliEntry['id'],
label: 'Antigravity',
shortBadge: 'AG',
accent: '#8b5cf6',
enabled: true,
stock: true,
order: 40,
kind: 'agent',
discovery: {
// Binary is `agy`, NOT `antigravity` — the mode-name/binary-name split that made
// probeDockerCliVersion wrong before this registry existed.
binaries: ['agy'],
searchDirs: [HOME_DIRS.local, '~/.antigravity/bin', HOME_DIRS.usrLocal, HOME_DIRS.homeBin],
version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)' },
install: {
command: {
linux: 'curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash',
darwin: 'curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash',
},
docsUrl: 'https://antigravity.google/cli',
},
},
launch: {
params: {
dangerouslySkipPermissions: { type: 'bool' },
model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model' },
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'id-dotted' },
},
variants: [
{
id: 'default',
args: [
{ lit: 'agy' },
{ flag: '--dangerously-skip-permissions', when: { param: 'dangerouslySkipPermissions', is: true } },
{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
{ flag: '--conversation', valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
],
},
],
legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'resumeConversationId' },
legacyConfigField: 'antigravityConfig',
resumeAppend: { style: 'flag', flag: '--conversation' },
},
env: {
exports: [{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' }],
unset: ['NO_COLOR'],
tmuxSetenvKeys: [],
dockerExecEnvNames: [],
allowedPrefixes: ['ANTIGRAVITY_'],
allowedKeys: [],
},
capabilities: {
...agentDefaults(),
altScreen: 'strip-mux-only',
echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' } },
// Like codex: an ABSENT config already defaults safe (no bypass flag), so only a
// SENT config needs the flag forced off — nothing is materialized.
privilegedParams: [{ param: 'dangerouslySkipPermissions', clampTo: false }],
},
overlays: {
// No credStore of its own: agy nests its whole state under ~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/,
// which gemini's seedWhole entry already covers.
},
};
const PI: CliEntry = {
id: 'pi' as CliEntry['id'],
label: 'Pi',
shortBadge: 'PI',
accent: '#10b981',
enabled: true,
stock: true,
order: 50,
kind: 'agent',
discovery: {
binaries: ['pi'],
searchDirs: [HOME_DIRS.local, HOME_DIRS.usrLocal, HOME_DIRS.bunBin, HOME_DIRS.npmGlobal, HOME_DIRS.homeBin],
// pi is a generic binary name (Raspberry Pi tooling, personal scripts), so a `which`
// hit alone is not evidence of the right program — require the version match.
version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(?:^|\\s)(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)', requireVersionMatch: true },
install: {
command: {
linux: 'npm install -g --ignore-scripts @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent',
darwin: 'npm install -g --ignore-scripts @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent',
},
npmPackage: '@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent',
docsUrl: 'https://pi.dev',
agentImageLayer: {
kind: 'dedicated',
reason: 'installed with --ignore-scripts in its own layer, so the flag cannot leak to the shared block',
},
},
},
launch: {
params: {
approveProjectTrust: { type: 'bool' },
model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model-pi' },
provider: { type: 'token', pattern: 'slug' },
thinking: { type: 'enum', values: ['off', 'minimal', 'low', 'medium', 'high', 'xhigh', 'max'] },
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'id-dotted' },
continueSession: { type: 'bool' },
},
variants: [
{
id: 'default',
args: [
{ lit: 'pi' },
{ flag: '--approve', when: { param: 'approveProjectTrust', is: true } },
{ flag: '--no-approve', when: { param: 'approveProjectTrust', is: false } },
{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
{ flag: '--provider', valueFrom: 'provider', when: { param: 'provider', state: 'set' } },
{ flag: '--thinking', valueFrom: 'thinking', when: { param: 'thinking', state: 'set' } },
{ flag: '--session', valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
{
lit: '-c',
when: {
allOf: [
{ param: 'continueSession', is: true },
{ param: 'resumeId', state: 'unset' },
],
},
},
],
},
],
legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'resumeSessionId' },
legacyConfigField: 'piConfig',
resumeAppend: { style: 'flag', flag: '--session' },
},
env: {
exports: [{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' }],
unset: ['NO_COLOR'],
// Pi's ~34 provider keys share no common prefix, so they are deliberately NOT
// allowlisted here — same reasoning as today's PI_ only prefix. Pi users authenticate
// via `/login` or the server process's own env.
tmuxSetenvKeys: [],
dockerExecEnvNames: [],
allowedPrefixes: ['PI_'],
allowedKeys: [],
},
capabilities: {
...agentDefaults(),
altScreen: 'preserve', // pi's TUI renders into the main screen with terminal-owned scrollback
echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' } },
// pi's absent-config default is an interactive trust PROMPT the session user could
// just answer "yes" to, so omitting --approve is not itself a clamp — MATERIALIZE
// approveProjectTrust:false so buildPiCommand emits --no-approve outright.
privilegedParams: [{ param: 'approveProjectTrust', clampTo: false, materializeWhenAbsent: true }],
},
overlays: {
credStore: {
rel: '.pi/agent',
seedFiles: ['auth.json', 'settings.json', 'trust.json', 'models.json', 'models-store.json'],
},
},
};
// Grok Build (xAI, `grok`). Transcribed from the hand-written buildGrokCommand into
// registry data; enabled by default, like every other shipped mode.
const GROK: CliEntry = {
id: 'grok' as CliEntry['id'],
label: 'Grok',
shortBadge: 'GK',
// Upstream hand-authored a charcoal GRADIENT across 4+ CSS spots (welcome button, tab
// badge, run-mode dot, mobile skin overrides) rather than one flat colour; our registry's
// `accent` is a single hex, so this is the closest single value (the run-mode-dot colour,
// zinc-400). Nothing reads `accent` yet — the frontend is untouched in this change and
// keeps its own hand-authored CSS; the field is here so the entry is complete.
accent: '#a1a1aa',
enabled: true,
stock: true,
order: 70,
kind: 'agent',
discovery: {
binaries: ['grok'],
searchDirs: ['~/.grok/bin', HOME_DIRS.local, HOME_DIRS.usrLocal, HOME_DIRS.homeBin],
// `grok` has a known npm squatter (@vibe-kit/grok-cli also installs a `grok` bin), so a
// bare `which grok` hit is not evidence of the right program — same defence as pi,
// byte-identical regex.
version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(?:^|\\s)(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)', requireVersionMatch: true },
install: {
command: {
linux: 'curl -fsSL https://x.ai/cli/install.sh | bash',
darwin: 'curl -fsSL https://x.ai/cli/install.sh | bash',
},
// Not on npm — xAI ships a standalone installer/binary, same shape as Antigravity.
docsUrl: 'https://github.com/xai-org/grok-build',
},
},
launch: {
params: {
alwaysApprove: { type: 'bool' },
model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model' },
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'id-dotted' },
continueSession: { type: 'bool' },
},
variants: [
{
id: 'default',
args: [
{ lit: 'grok' },
{ flag: '--always-approve', when: { param: 'alwaysApprove', is: true } },
{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
{ flag: '--resume', valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
{
lit: '--continue',
when: {
allOf: [
{ param: 'continueSession', is: true },
{ param: 'resumeId', state: 'unset' },
],
},
},
],
},
],
legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'resumeSessionId' },
legacyConfigField: 'grokConfig',
resumeAppend: { style: 'flag', flag: '--resume' },
},
env: {
exports: [{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' }],
unset: ['NO_COLOR'],
// No tmuxSetenvKeys: XAI_API_KEY (xAI's documented headless auth var) is covered by the
// XAI_ prefix allowlist below, same "rely on the prefix, not an explicit key list"
// reasoning as pi's ~34 provider keys.
tmuxSetenvKeys: [],
dockerExecEnvNames: [],
allowedPrefixes: ['GROK_', 'XAI_'],
allowedKeys: [],
},
capabilities: {
...agentDefaults(),
// Fullscreen alt-screen TUI with mouse support — same shape as opencode/antigravity:
// only the tmux-attach-time smcup strip, not Ink's full erase-scrollback+DECSET strip.
altScreen: 'strip-mux-only',
// Buffer-policy fallthrough default, unmeasured against an authenticated grok composer
// (the existing hedge, preserved verbatim) — same as gemini/antigravity/pi.
echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' } },
// codex/antigravity-shaped clamp: grok's own bare-spawn default (no config sent) is
// already its safe interactive ask-mode, so the multi-user clamp only needs to force an
// EXPLICITLY-SENT bypass flag back off — nothing is materialized when config is absent.
privilegedParams: [{ param: 'alwaysApprove', clampTo: false }],
},
overlays: {
// ~/.grok also holds sessions/, memory/, downloads/ (the ~160MB binary), completions/,
// docs/, bin/ — per-file seeding like pi's credStore, not a whole-dir seedWhole copy.
credStore: { rel: '.grok', seedFiles: ['auth.json', 'config.toml', 'pager.toml'] },
// No remote/docker overlay needed: the defaults (exec grok / login-shell `grok`) are
// already correct — verified against upstream's own pinned test/grok-mode.test.ts
// expectation `exec "${SHELL:-/bin/sh}" -i -l -c 'grok'`.
},
};
// DeepSeek Harness (`dsh`, deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness). The awkward one, and worth
// reading before assuming it looks like its siblings — it breaks four of this catalog's
// normal assumptions at once, which is why the schema carries four extensions for it:
//
// 1. `dsh` is a PROFILE LAUNCHER, not the agent. It boots $DSH_HOME/profiles/<name>, and
// DeepSeek ships only `web`/`headless`/`base`, none of which can drive a terminal
// pane — so the terminal front door is ALWAYS third-party and "installed" is not
// "runnable". Hence `discovery.launcherProfile`.
// 2. Its permission switch is the `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE` ENV VAR, not a flag — the
// harness has none. Hence `env.configSetenv` (so the ordinary privilegedParams clamp
// still reaches it) plus `capabilities.privilegedEnvKeys` (so an envOverrides send
// cannot hand the privilege straight back).
// 3. It is the only non-claude mode with real hook signals, and for it alone that is a
// per-SESSION question. Hence `hooks: 'supervised'`.
// 4. Its transcript is zstd session files, one frame per write. Hence
// `transcript: 'deepseek-zstd'`.
//
// The identity probe is the strictest in the catalog for a sharper reason than pi's or
// grok's npm squatters: Debian ships an unrelated `dsh` (dancer's shell, `apt install
// dsh`) that would pass a version probe perfectly happily.
const DEEPSEEK: CliEntry = {
id: 'deepseek' as CliEntry['id'],
label: 'DeepSeek',
shortBadge: 'DS',
accent: '#4d6bfe',
enabled: true,
stock: true,
order: 80,
kind: 'agent',
discovery: {
binaries: ['dsh'],
searchDirs: [HOME_DIRS.local, HOME_DIRS.usrLocal, HOME_DIRS.npmGlobal, HOME_DIRS.homeBin],
// Checked BEFORE the version probe: dancer's shell answers --version happily, so a
// version match alone would accept it.
identity: { arg: '--help', regex: 'DeepSeek\\s+Harness' },
// Keeps the `-rc.2` prerelease tail — dsh ships them, and the `codeman doctor` row
// shares this regex so the two cannot disagree about what version a binary reports.
version: {
arg: '--version',
regex: '(?:^|\\s)v?(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+(?:-[0-9A-Za-z][0-9A-Za-z.-]*)?)',
requireVersionMatch: true,
},
launcherProfile: 'deepseek-profile',
launcherTargetParam: 'profile',
install: {
command: {
linux: 'npm install -g @deepseek-ai/dsh',
darwin: 'npm install -g @deepseek-ai/dsh',
},
npmPackage: '@deepseek-ai/dsh',
docsUrl: 'https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness',
agentImageLayer: {
kind: 'dedicated',
reason: 'needs pnpm alongside it (dsh plugin, issue #352) and a dsh-tui profile install',
},
},
},
launch: {
params: {
// A single path segment: interpolated into the shell line AND joined into a
// filesystem path, so `path-segment` rather than the looser `id-dotted`.
profile: { type: 'token', pattern: 'path-segment' },
// Resolved at spawn time from what is actually installed — see launcherProfile.
defaultProfile: { type: 'engine', source: 'launcherDefaultTarget' },
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'id-dotted' },
resumeSession: { type: 'bool' },
// Never appears in argv. Declared so `configSetenv` can export it and, more to the
// point, so `privilegedParams` can clamp it — see capabilities below.
permissionMode: { type: 'enum', values: ['read-only', 'workspace-write', 'danger-full-access'] },
// Never appears in argv either; read by the status-bridge setenv profile.
statusReporting: { type: 'bool' },
},
variants: [
{
id: 'default',
args: [
{ lit: 'dsh' },
{ flag: '--profile', valueFrom: 'profile', when: { param: 'profile', state: 'set' } },
// An invalid profile name resolves to undefined, so `profile` reads as UNSET and
// this arm takes over — reproducing the hand-written builder's fall back to the
// resolved default rather than failing the spawn outright.
{
flag: '--profile',
valueFrom: 'defaultProfile',
when: {
allOf: [
{ param: 'profile', state: 'unset' },
{ param: 'defaultProfile', state: 'set' },
],
},
},
// The launcher forwards everything after its own flags to the profile's app,
// which is where --resume is understood. An explicit id wins over the
// most-recent-session form, mirroring the sibling builders.
{ flag: '--resume', valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
{
flag: '--resume',
when: {
allOf: [
{ param: 'resumeId', state: 'unset' },
{ param: 'resumeSession', is: true },
],
},
},
],
},
],
legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'resumeSessionId' },
legacyConfigField: 'deepSeekConfig',
resumeAppend: { style: 'flag', flag: '--resume' },
},
env: {
exports: [{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' }],
unset: ['NO_COLOR'],
// DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL is forwarded from the SERVER's own env alongside the API key,
// which is exactly why a non-granted owner may not override it — see privilegedEnvKeys.
tmuxSetenvKeys: ['DEEPSEEK_API_KEY', 'DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL', 'DSH_HOME'],
dockerExecEnvNames: [],
configSetenv: [{ name: 'DSH_PERMISSION_MODE', fromParam: 'permissionMode' }],
// Only the vendor namespaces. A dsh settings.yaml can nominate ANY env var as a
// provider credential (`apiKeyEnv`), so admitting foreign provider keys here would
// widen one GLOBAL allowlist for every mode at once — the same lesson pi taught.
allowedPrefixes: ['DSH_', 'DEEPSEEK_'],
allowedKeys: [],
setenvProfile: 'deepseek-status-bridge',
},
capabilities: {
...agentDefaults(),
// Definitive rather than inferred: the harness TUI reports idle/working/blocked to a
// supervisor and Codeman is that supervisor. 'supervised' rather than 'always' because
// the session can disarm the bridge, and docker/remote cannot reach it at all.
hooks: 'supervised',
transcript: 'deepseek-zstd',
altScreen: 'strip-mux-only',
echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' } },
// Model is NOT a session field for dsh — it is a profile composition entry.
model: { source: 'none' },
// Only-if-sent, like codex/antigravity/grok: an ABSENT permissionMode means the
// launcher's own default, `workspace-write`, which already asks. Clamping to
// `read-only` instead would break the workspace rather than protect it.
privilegedParams: [{ param: 'permissionMode', clampTo: 'workspace-write' }],
// The half no other CLI needs. `DSH_*` is an allowlisted envOverrides prefix and
// applyEnvOverrides() runs LAST, so without this a non-granted owner could send
// DSH_PERMISSION_MODE on the same request and land after the config clamp.
privilegedEnvKeys: ['DSH_PERMISSION_MODE', 'DSH_HOME', 'DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL'],
},
overlays: {
// No credStore: dsh keeps everything under $DSH_HOME (default ~/.dsh), which is
// forwarded as a plain env var above rather than seeded as a credential directory.
},
};
// OMP (`omp`, omp.sh). The plainest entry in the catalog after opencode: no permission
// flags at all — omp reads its model routing and hooks from `~/.omp/agent`, so the CLI's
// own config governs and there is deliberately nothing bypass-shaped to clamp. Its only
// privileged surface is a pair of ENV keys (see privilegedEnvKeys below).
const OMP: CliEntry = {
id: 'omp' as CliEntry['id'],
label: 'OMP',
shortBadge: 'OM',
accent: '#7c9cf5',
enabled: true,
stock: true,
order: 90,
kind: 'agent',
discovery: {
binaries: ['omp'],
// `~/.local/bin` leads: omp.sh's installer targets it with no `--dir` override
// (verified against a real `--no-cache` docker build); `~/.omp/bin` is a defensive
// fallback only.
searchDirs: [
HOME_DIRS.local,
'~/.omp/bin',
HOME_DIRS.usrLocal,
HOME_DIRS.bunBin,
HOME_DIRS.npmGlobal,
HOME_DIRS.homeBin,
],
// A real `omp --version` prints `omp/<semver>`. `omp` is another short generic name, so
// the `omp/` prefix is what distinguishes the coding agent from anything else of that
// name — same defence as pi and grok, one notch stricter because the prefix is checked.
version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(?:^|\\s)omp/(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)', requireVersionMatch: true },
install: {
command: {
linux: 'curl -fsSL https://omp.sh/install | sh',
darwin: 'brew install can1357/tap/omp',
},
docsUrl: 'https://omp.sh',
},
},
launch: {
params: {
model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model' },
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'id-dotted' },
continueSession: { type: 'bool' },
},
variants: [
{
id: 'default',
args: [
{ lit: 'omp' },
{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
// `--resume` and `--continue` conflict; a valid explicit id wins, mirroring the
// sibling builders (grok/pi/opencode).
{ flag: '--resume', valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
{
lit: '--continue',
when: {
allOf: [
{ param: 'continueSession', is: true },
{ param: 'resumeId', state: 'unset' },
],
},
},
],
},
],
legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'resumeSessionId' },
legacyConfigField: 'ompConfig',
resumeAppend: { style: 'flag', flag: '--resume' },
},
env: {
exports: [{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' }],
unset: ['NO_COLOR'],
// omp's provider credentials live in `~/.omp` config files, not env vars, so there is
// nothing for the server to forward into the pane.
tmuxSetenvKeys: [],
dockerExecEnvNames: [],
allowedPrefixes: ['OMP_'],
allowedKeys: [],
},
capabilities: {
...agentDefaults(),
// Fullscreen alt-screen TUI, same shape as opencode/antigravity/grok: only the
// tmux-attach-time smcup strip, not Ink's full erase-scrollback+DECSET strip.
altScreen: 'strip-mux-only',
// Codeman reads omp's own `~/.omp/agent/sessions/**/*.jsonl` host-side, which is what
// makes an omp conversation survive a full session kill.
transcript: 'omp-jsonl',
echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' } },
// No permission prompts and no bypass flag, so nothing config-shaped to clamp — the
// whole privileged surface here is env-shaped.
privilegedParams: [],
// Where omp resolves its auth from. No known concrete exfiltration path today (omp
// forwards no operator-held key into a pane), but a non-granted owner redirecting where
// a shared multi-tenant deployment resolves auth is not something to allow silently.
privilegedEnvKeys: ['OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL', 'OMP_AUTH_BROKER_TOKEN'],
},
overlays: {
// `~/.omp/agent` also holds agent.db/history.db/models.db (SQLite caches) and
// terminal-sessions/blobs/cache (large, regenerable), so only the config files are
// seeded. UNLIKE pi/grok, `sessions/` is SHARED (RW) rather than host-invisible:
// Codeman reads it HOST-SIDE for history recovery and `--resume` pinning, the same
// reason codex's `sessions/` is shared — without it an in-container omp conversation
// would be invisible to Codeman's own resume logic.
credStore: {
rel: '.omp/agent',
shareDirs: ['sessions'],
seedFiles: ['config.yml', 'mcp.json', 'models.yml', 'settings.yml'],
},
},
};
/** The full stock catalog, in the order the run menu shows by default. */
export const STOCK_CLIS: CliEntry[] = [CLAUDE, SHELL, OPENCODE, CODEX, GEMINI, ANTIGRAVITY, PI, GROK, DEEPSEEK, OMP];