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Codeman maintainer
3cff98fe56
Both picker endpoints are a second file-serving surface, and they inherited neither the attachment guard's confinement nor its ownership scoping. Two separate holes: 1. `sessionId` contributes that session's workingDir as a browse root, but it was resolved straight off ctx.sessions/ctx.store with no owner check, unlike the nine other session-scoped handlers in this file. A non-admin could pin ANOTHER user's working directory as a root just by passing their session id, then list and preview underneath it. Now runs canAccessOwned and reports 404, which also avoids confirming that a session id exists. 2. `Home` and `CASES_DIR` were unconditional roots for every caller. Per-user spaces live at <USER_SPACES_DIR>/<username>, which is INSIDE homedir(), so the Home root alone exposed every other user's workspace. A multi-user non-admin now gets only their own userSpacePath plus anything explicitly listed in CODEMAN_FILE_PICKER_ROOTS. /mnt/d is dropped as well: a broad host mount should be an explicit operator decision in a multi-user deployment, and operators who want it can name it in that env var. Admins and single-user mode keep the host-wide roots, so behavior is unchanged unless CODEMAN_MULTIUSER is on (opt-in, off by default). All three discriminating tests were verified to fail against the previous code: browse and preview both returned 200 instead of 404, and the roots came back as [Home, Codeman Cases, ...] instead of [My Space]. Full suite green, 3784 passed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>