Files
Codeman/src/web/routes/search-routes.ts
T
Codeman maintainer 2a06f7a5a8 feat(multiuser): phase 4, event fan-out + stream scoping
Scopes real-time streams and the init snapshot so a multi-user client only
receives what it owns. No-op in single-user mode (identity-less clients).

- WS terminal (ws-routes): owner gate after the session lookup. A non-admin may
  only attach to their own session (close 4003); the global auth hook already
  ran on the upgrade and decorated req.authUser, so an unauthenticated upgrade
  never reaches the handler.
- SSE (sse-stream-manager): per-client identity stored at addClient; broadcast()
  and the terminal-batch flush both enforce a routing hint via canDeliver().
  WebServer.broadcast auto-derives the hint (deriveSseHint): session-scoped event
  families resolve the owner from the payload's session id (fail closed when the
  owner can't be resolved), machine-level families (docker/tunnel/update/system/
  cron) + host-plan telemetry are admin-only, everything else stays global. Raw
  terminal bytes resolve the owner once and are withheld from non-owners.
- getLightState is filtered per connection AFTER the shared cache (sessions,
  respawnStatus, subagents, workflowRuns by owner; scheduledRuns + planUsage
  admin-only); applied to both the SSE init snapshot and GET /api/status.
- file-routes: getKnownSessionWorkingDir + getSessionAttachmentHistory (the
  preview/thumbnail/history helpers that bypass findSessionOrFail) now owner-check
  the session, closing a cross-user file-read path.
- GET /api/search: harvestSources is owner-scoped.

Deferred to a follow-up (documented in docs/multi-user-plan.md): away-digest +
subagent/workflow REST list scoping, push-subscription identity + routing,
per-user screenshot subdirs. The live-event versions of these are already routed
by the SSE hint; only the on-demand REST aggregates remain global for admins-only
follow-up.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 04:17:17 +02:00

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/**
* @fileoverview Cross-session federated search route (COD-9).
*
* Registers `GET /api/search?q=&types=&limit=` — a bounded, in-memory search
* across three v1 sources, returned in the standard ApiResponse envelope:
* 1. sessions/cases — name, working directory, session id
* 2. run-summary events — event title/details (from the live run-summary trackers)
* 3. file paths — per-session attachment history (workspace-relative paths only)
*
* This route is a THIN wrapper: it harvests the source arrays from the live
* server stores (held on the route context) in a bounded way, then delegates
* grouping/ranking/capping to the pure `searchSources()` core in
* `src/search-service.ts`. Terminal-buffer scanning and any persisted index are
* out of scope for v1.
*
* Safety: query input is Zod-validated (length-bounded `q`, allowlisted `types`,
* numeric `limit`); only workspace-relative file paths are ever exposed (the
* server-private `externalPath` on attachment history is never read here); and
* the pure core enforces a per-group and total result cap so a broad query
* cannot return an unbounded payload. No terminal output is read.
*
* Endpoints: GET /api/search
*/
import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { canAccessOwned, getAuthUser, parseBody } from '../route-helpers.js';
import { SearchQuerySchema } from '../schemas.js';
import {
searchSources,
type SearchSources,
type SessionSearchInput,
type EventSearchInput,
type FileSearchInput,
} from '../../search-service.js';
import type { SearchSourceType } from '../../types/search.js';
import type { SessionPort, InfraPort } from '../ports/index.js';
/**
* Per-source harvest caps. These bound how much in-memory data we hand to the
* pure core BEFORE it applies its own result caps — they keep the harvest itself
* cheap on large deployments (e.g. 50 sessions × many events). They are
* deliberately well above the result caps so ranking still sees enough candidates.
*/
const MAX_EVENTS_PER_SESSION = 500;
interface SessionLike {
id: string;
name: string;
workingDir: string;
lastActivityAt?: number;
createdAt?: number;
attachmentHistory?: Array<{
id: string;
fileName: string;
relativePath?: string;
timestamp?: number;
mtimeMs?: number;
}>;
}
/**
* Harvest the three source arrays from the live in-memory stores. Reads only
* bounded, already-loaded data — no disk I/O, no terminal buffers.
*/
function harvestSources(ctx: SessionPort & InfraPort, canSee?: (owner?: string) => boolean): SearchSources {
const sessions: SessionSearchInput[] = [];
const events: EventSearchInput[] = [];
const files: FileSearchInput[] = [];
for (const raw of ctx.sessions.values()) {
const s = raw as unknown as SessionLike & { owner?: string };
if (canSee && !canSee(s.owner)) continue; // multi-user ownership scope
const sessionName = s.name ?? '';
const timestamp = s.lastActivityAt ?? s.createdAt ?? 0;
sessions.push({
sessionId: s.id,
sessionName,
workingDir: s.workingDir ?? '',
timestamp,
});
// Files: per-session attachment history. Only the workspace-relative path is
// surfaced; the server-private externalPath is intentionally never read.
const history = s.attachmentHistory ?? [];
for (const item of history) {
files.push({
sessionId: s.id,
sessionName,
fileName: item.fileName,
relativePath: item.relativePath,
timestamp: item.timestamp ?? item.mtimeMs ?? timestamp,
itemId: item.id,
});
}
}
// Events: from the live run-summary trackers, keyed by session id.
for (const [sessionId, tracker] of ctx.runSummaryTrackers) {
const session = ctx.sessions.get(sessionId) as unknown as (SessionLike & { owner?: string }) | undefined;
if (canSee && !canSee(session?.owner)) continue; // multi-user ownership scope
const sessionName = session?.name ?? '';
const summary = tracker.getSummary();
// Newest events are most relevant; cap the per-session harvest.
const evts = summary.events.slice(-MAX_EVENTS_PER_SESSION);
for (const e of evts) {
events.push({
sessionId,
sessionName,
eventId: e.id,
title: e.title,
details: e.details ?? '',
timestamp: e.timestamp,
});
}
}
return { sessions, events, files };
}
export function registerSearchRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: SessionPort & InfraPort): void {
app.get('/api/search', async (req) => {
// Zod-validate the query. parseBody throws a structured 400 on failure.
const { q, types, limit } = parseBody(SearchQuerySchema, req.query);
const user = getAuthUser(req);
const canSee = (owner?: string) => canAccessOwned(user, owner);
const allowed: Set<SearchSourceType> | null = types
? new Set(
types
.split(',')
.map((t) => t.trim())
.filter(Boolean) as SearchSourceType[]
)
: null;
const sources = harvestSources(ctx, canSee);
// Apply the optional source-type filter before searching so excluded
// sources never contribute to (or consume budget in) the result set.
const filtered: SearchSources = {
sessions: !allowed || allowed.has('session') ? sources.sessions : [],
events: !allowed || allowed.has('event') ? sources.events : [],
files: !allowed || allowed.has('file') ? sources.files : [],
};
const result = searchSources(q, filtered);
// Optional caller-supplied total cap (always on top of the core's hard caps).
if (limit !== undefined && result.totalResults > limit) {
let remaining = limit;
const cappedGroups = [];
for (const group of result.groups) {
if (remaining <= 0) break;
const slice = group.results.slice(0, remaining);
remaining -= slice.length;
cappedGroups.push({ type: group.type, results: slice });
}
result.groups = cappedGroups;
result.totalResults = limit;
result.truncated = true;
}
return { success: true, data: result };
});
}