mirror of
https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman.git
synced 2026-10-03 05:59:43 +02:00
Aamer Akhter
f1c64994ad
Adds the foundation for serving local files to the browser as live external attachments with a stable id, so requests never carry arbitrary absolute paths. - attachment-registry: in-memory, session-scoped registry. registerExternalAttachment validates an absolute path, resolves symlinks, enforces the path guard, and mints an `att_<uuid>` id; records are cleared when the session is removed. - attachment path guard: a configurable blocklist (secret locations + /root,/etc trees, extendable via attachmentBlockedPaths / CODEMAN_ATTACHMENT_BLOCKED_PATHS) plus an optional, default-off workspace-confinement mode. Shares one sensitive-path blocklist (web/sensitive-path.ts) with /api/download, which is refactored to use the extracted module instead of an inline copy. - terminal magic links: the session scans output for codeman://attach?path=... and emits `attachmentRequested`; the web server registers the file and broadcasts an `attachment:detected` SSE event. `codeman attach <path>` (CLI) prints the magic link or POSTs directly when a session id is known. - image watcher: detects png/pdf/docx/pptx dropped into a session's working dir and emits `attachment:detected`. - routes: POST /api/sessions/:id/attachments (register) and GET /api/sessions/:id/attachments/:attachmentId/raw (serve), both re-checking the guard before streaming. Document previews/thumbnails and the attachment-history drawer build on this foundation and land separately. Verified: tsc --noEmit, lint, format, frontend-syntax, full test:ci (2846 passed), and a server boot smoke (/api/status 200).
42 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript
42 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* @fileoverview Shared sensitive-path blocklist.
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*
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* A small defense-in-depth blocklist of absolute paths that must never be
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* served to the browser regardless of how the path was obtained (workspace
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* download, cross-workspace attachment registration, raw/preview serving).
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*
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* This is intentionally a BLOCKLIST, not a workspace-confinement check:
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* cross-workspace attachment is a supported feature (codeman-publish skill +
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* the automated review-card loop attaching files under ~/.codeman/), so a
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* strict session-workspace boundary would break legitimate use. The blocklist
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* rejects well-known secret locations (system password files, SSH keys, cloud
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* credentials, dotenv files) while leaving ordinary cross-workspace files
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* attachable.
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*
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* Callers MUST resolve symlinks (realpath) BEFORE calling isSensitivePath so a
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* symlink pointing at a sensitive target is also caught.
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*/
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import { homedir } from 'node:os';
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const SENSITIVE_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
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/^\/etc\/shadow$/,
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/^\/etc\/gshadow$/,
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/^\/etc\/master\.passwd$/,
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new RegExp(`^${homedir().replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&')}\\/\\.ssh\\/`),
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/\/\.env$/,
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/\/\.env\./,
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/\/credentials(\.json|\.yml|\.yaml|\.xml)?$/i,
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/\/\.aws\/credentials$/,
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/\/\.gcloud\/credentials\.db$/,
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/\/\.docker\/config\.json$/,
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];
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/**
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* Returns true if the given ABSOLUTE, symlink-resolved path matches the
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* sensitive-file blocklist and must not be served to the browser.
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*/
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export function isSensitivePath(absPath: string): boolean {
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return SENSITIVE_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(absPath));
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}
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