Files
Codeman/src/config/hook-secret.ts
T
Aamer Akhter 42f0b28c75 feat(security): hook-event auth secret + tunnel password guard
Two hardening fixes for the public-tunnel exposure path (COD-54 / COD-55).

COD-54 — gate the /api/hook-event localhost bypass when a tunnel is up:
`cloudflared --url http://127.0.0.1:port` proxies internet traffic INTO the
loopback origin, so a tunneled hook request arrives with req.ip === 127.0.0.1
and the old bare-localhost bypass would pass it unauthenticated. Now:
- tunnel running  → bypass requires a shared per-instance hook secret
  (X-Codeman-Hook-Secret header; constant-time compare) + per-IP rate limiting
- tunnel not running (loopback-only, the normal case) → unchanged, so
  already-deployed credential-less hooks keep working.
New src/config/hook-secret.ts; auth middleware takes a getTunnelRunning probe
(wired from server.ts via tunnelManager.isRunning()).

COD-55 — refuse starting the Cloudflare tunnel without auth:
enabling the tunnel publishes full terminal control to a public URL; with no
CODEMAN_PASSWORD the auth middleware is inactive and the bind guard never trips
(tunnel binds loopback). PUT /api/settings now refuses tunnelEnabled:true with a
403 (before persisting) unless CODEMAN_PASSWORD is set or
CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1 is acknowledged. New
isUnauthenticatedNetworkAcknowledged() in network-auth-policy; settings-ui
surfaces the refusal as an error toast and reverts the toggle.

Scope: the always-on CSRF/Origin guard, Host-header allowlist, and
network-auth-policy itself are already upstream (#113) and not re-proposed here.

Verification: tsc, eslint, prettier, check:frontend-syntax clean; full test:ci
green (2723 passed), incl. test/cod54-hook-event-auth and
test/routes/system-routes-tunnel-guard.
2026-06-10 12:25:26 -04:00

68 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* @fileoverview Per-instance shared hook secret (COD-54).
*
* Claude Code hooks POST to `/api/hook-event` with no Basic-Auth credentials,
* relying on a localhost bypass in `web/middleware/auth.ts`. That bypass is safe
* for loopback-only deploys, but a `cloudflared --url http://127.0.0.1:port`
* tunnel proxies internet traffic INTO the loopback origin, so tunneled requests
* arrive with `req.ip === 127.0.0.1` and would otherwise pass the bypass and
* drive respawn/Ralph signals unauthenticated.
*
* To close that hole WITHOUT breaking the loop's own (credential-less) hook
* channel, every locally-generated hook command now presents a per-instance
* shared secret in the `X-Codeman-Hook-Secret` header. The middleware requires
* a matching secret for the bypass WHEN A TUNNEL IS RUNNING. Tunneled internet
* traffic can't know the secret; local hooks (which we generate) do.
*
* Storage mirrors the VAPID-key pattern in `push-store.ts`: a small file under
* the instance data dir (`dataPath('hook-secret')`), read-if-present /
* generate-if-missing, stable across restarts. 256 bits of hex.
*/
import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, mkdirSync } from 'node:fs';
import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
import { getDataDir, dataPath } from './instance.js';
/** HTTP header local hooks use to present the shared secret. */
export const HOOK_SECRET_HEADER = 'X-Codeman-Hook-Secret';
/** Number of random bytes in the secret (256 bits → 64 hex chars). */
const SECRET_BYTES = 32;
let cachedSecret: string | null = null;
/**
* Return this instance's hook secret, generating and persisting it on first use.
* Stable across restarts. Cached in-process after the first read.
*/
export function getHookSecret(): string {
if (cachedSecret) return cachedSecret;
const secretFile = dataPath('hook-secret');
if (existsSync(secretFile)) {
try {
const raw = readFileSync(secretFile, 'utf-8').trim();
if (raw) {
cachedSecret = raw;
return cachedSecret;
}
// Empty/whitespace file — fall through and regenerate.
} catch {
// Unreadable — fall through and regenerate.
}
}
const secret = randomBytes(SECRET_BYTES).toString('hex');
try {
mkdirSync(getDataDir(), { recursive: true });
// Owner-only perms — the secret gates the hook bypass.
writeFileSync(secretFile, secret, { mode: 0o600 });
} catch {
// Best-effort persistence: even if the write fails we still return a usable
// secret for this process so hooks/middleware agree within this run.
}
cachedSecret = secret;
return cachedSecret;
}