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The opt-in multi-user feature's only enforcement is web-layer scoping (all sessions share one OS account). An adversarial review found 8 critical + 7 high cross-user holes that defeated it, plus mediums; all fixed here. Single-user (flag-off) behavior stays byte-identical apart from documented consistency deltas. Ownership / confinement: - DELETE /api/sessions (bulk) + /:id now owner-scope / findSessionOrFail - quick-start, cron (create+fire), scheduled runs confine workingDir to the owner's space; case link/docker-link/docker-import confine the host path - resolveCasePath no longer resolves linked cases for non-admins; foreign remote/docker cases are skipped (fall through to the caller's own local case) - history, subagents/workflows, mux-sessions, orchestrator, cron run-history, away-digest, and remote/docker host reads are owner- or admin-scoped Permission policy (section 6.3): - non-granted users are downgraded at every spawn site incl. legacy /api/scheduled, PlanOrchestrator one-shots, remote launch, and the cron-fire gemini/codex bypass switches; resolveClaudeModeForUsername now fails closed Auth / store: - verify-first login throttle (a correct password is never locked out), /ws terminal subject to the change-password lockbox, cookie fast-path re-validates identity live, role/grant changes revoke sessions, admin delete runs the last-admin guard before any teardown - users.json: distinguish missing (ENOENT) from corrupt/unreadable so a bad read can't overwrite all accounts; unique per-process temp write path Event streams: - debounced session:updated + batched task:updated, clipboard, and push notifications route by owner (fail closed); getLightState hides machine-wide globalStats from non-admins Tests: two suites updated to assert the fixed (secure) behavior. tsc, eslint, and test:ci all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
36 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript
36 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* @fileoverview Clipboard routes.
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* Accepts text via POST and broadcasts to connected browsers for clipboard write.
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*/
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import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
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import { SseEvent } from '../sse-events.js';
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import type { EventPort, SessionPort } from '../ports/index.js';
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import { getAuthUser, canAccessOwned } from '../route-helpers.js';
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import { createErrorResponse, ApiErrorCode } from '../../types.js';
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export function registerClipboardRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: EventPort & SessionPort): void {
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app.post('/api/clipboard', async (req) => {
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const body = req.body as { text?: string; sessionId?: string };
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const text = body?.text;
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if (typeof text !== 'string' || text.length === 0) {
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return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT, 'Missing or empty "text" field');
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}
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// Multi-user: a supplied sessionId must belong to the caller — never let a
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// client target another user's session (no-op in single-user).
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if (body.sessionId && !canAccessOwned(getAuthUser(req), ctx.sessions.get(body.sessionId)?.owner)) {
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return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.FORBIDDEN, 'Cannot target another user session');
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}
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ctx.broadcast(SseEvent.ClipboardWrite, {
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text,
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sessionId: body.sessionId ?? null,
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// Stamp the trusted caller identity so deriveSseHint routes this write to the
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// caller's own tabs only (multi-user). Undefined in single-user → JSON drops
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// the field and delivery stays global to that one user's browsers.
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callerUsername: req.authUser?.username,
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timestamp: Date.now(),
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});
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return {};
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});
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}
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