Files
Codeman/src/web/routes/clipboard-routes.ts
T
Codeman maintainer ccb3afc9ee fix(multiuser): close cross-user web-layer scoping holes found in review
The opt-in multi-user feature's only enforcement is web-layer scoping
(all sessions share one OS account). An adversarial review found 8 critical
+ 7 high cross-user holes that defeated it, plus mediums; all fixed here.
Single-user (flag-off) behavior stays byte-identical apart from documented
consistency deltas.

Ownership / confinement:
- DELETE /api/sessions (bulk) + /:id now owner-scope / findSessionOrFail
- quick-start, cron (create+fire), scheduled runs confine workingDir to the
  owner's space; case link/docker-link/docker-import confine the host path
- resolveCasePath no longer resolves linked cases for non-admins; foreign
  remote/docker cases are skipped (fall through to the caller's own local case)
- history, subagents/workflows, mux-sessions, orchestrator, cron run-history,
  away-digest, and remote/docker host reads are owner- or admin-scoped

Permission policy (section 6.3):
- non-granted users are downgraded at every spawn site incl. legacy
  /api/scheduled, PlanOrchestrator one-shots, remote launch, and the cron-fire
  gemini/codex bypass switches; resolveClaudeModeForUsername now fails closed

Auth / store:
- verify-first login throttle (a correct password is never locked out),
  /ws terminal subject to the change-password lockbox, cookie fast-path
  re-validates identity live, role/grant changes revoke sessions, admin delete
  runs the last-admin guard before any teardown
- users.json: distinguish missing (ENOENT) from corrupt/unreadable so a bad
  read can't overwrite all accounts; unique per-process temp write path

Event streams:
- debounced session:updated + batched task:updated, clipboard, and push
  notifications route by owner (fail closed); getLightState hides machine-wide
  globalStats from non-admins

Tests: two suites updated to assert the fixed (secure) behavior. tsc, eslint,
and test:ci all green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 12:33:12 +02:00

36 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* @fileoverview Clipboard routes.
* Accepts text via POST and broadcasts to connected browsers for clipboard write.
*/
import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { SseEvent } from '../sse-events.js';
import type { EventPort, SessionPort } from '../ports/index.js';
import { getAuthUser, canAccessOwned } from '../route-helpers.js';
import { createErrorResponse, ApiErrorCode } from '../../types.js';
export function registerClipboardRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: EventPort & SessionPort): void {
app.post('/api/clipboard', async (req) => {
const body = req.body as { text?: string; sessionId?: string };
const text = body?.text;
if (typeof text !== 'string' || text.length === 0) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT, 'Missing or empty "text" field');
}
// Multi-user: a supplied sessionId must belong to the caller — never let a
// client target another user's session (no-op in single-user).
if (body.sessionId && !canAccessOwned(getAuthUser(req), ctx.sessions.get(body.sessionId)?.owner)) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.FORBIDDEN, 'Cannot target another user session');
}
ctx.broadcast(SseEvent.ClipboardWrite, {
text,
sessionId: body.sessionId ?? null,
// Stamp the trusted caller identity so deriveSseHint routes this write to the
// caller's own tabs only (multi-user). Undefined in single-user → JSON drops
// the field and delivery stays global to that one user's browsers.
callerUsername: req.authUser?.username,
timestamp: Date.now(),
});
return {};
});
}