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Codeman maintainer
a0fbd1d28d
- claude's declared-for-later wheelForward says the live rule in _shouldForwardWheelToApp is the version AND the server-published cliMouseTracking flag, so whoever wires the field up needs both Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
1365 lines
62 KiB
TypeScript
1365 lines
62 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* @fileoverview The shipped stock catalog — one `CliEntry` per CLI Codeman supports out of
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* the box, transcribed to be byte-identical (via the argv engine) to the hand-written
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* builders in tmux-manager.ts that they replace.
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*
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* This is the ONE file allowed to know a CLI's id by name (`test/cli-registry-no-id-branching
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* .test.ts` enforces that nowhere else does). Everything downstream — session.ts,
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* tmux-manager.ts, the routes, the frontend — reads capability flags, never `entry.id ===`.
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*
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* @module config/cli-registry/stock
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*/
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import type { CliEntry } from './types.js';
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const HOME_DIRS = {
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local: '~/.local/bin',
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usrLocal: '/usr/local/bin',
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bunBin: '~/.bun/bin',
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npmGlobal: '~/.npm-global/bin',
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homeBin: '~/bin',
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};
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const NO_GATES = {};
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const NO_PRIVILEGED_PARAMS: CliEntry['capabilities']['privilegedParams'] = [];
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/**
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* The common case: every CLI whose privileged switch is a command-line FLAG, reachable
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* only through its own config object and therefore already covered by `privilegedParams`.
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* DeepSeek is the sole exception — its switch is an env var. See CliCapabilities.
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*/
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const NO_PRIVILEGED_ENV_KEYS: CliEntry['capabilities']['privilegedEnvKeys'] = [];
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/** Shared skeleton for the "agent CLI, no unusual behaviour" case (pi's own shape). */
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function agentDefaults(): Pick<
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CliEntry['capabilities'],
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| 'external'
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| 'requiresMux'
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| 'hooks'
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| 'transcript'
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| 'altScreen'
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| 'wheelForward'
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| 'keyboardAccessory'
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| 'privilegedCommandGate'
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| 'startMode'
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| 'stripInkBloat'
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| 'ralph'
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| 'respawn'
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| 'effort'
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| 'agentSkillInjection'
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| 'statusLineTelemetry'
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| 'model'
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| 'privilegedParams'
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| 'privilegedEnvKeys'
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| 'gates'
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> {
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return {
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external: true,
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requiresMux: true,
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hooks: 'none',
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transcript: 'none',
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altScreen: 'strip-mux-only',
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wheelForward: { mode: 'never' },
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keyboardAccessory: 'agent',
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privilegedCommandGate: false,
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startMode: 'interactive',
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stripInkBloat: true,
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ralph: false,
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respawn: false,
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effort: false,
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agentSkillInjection: false,
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statusLineTelemetry: false,
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model: { source: 'flag', param: 'model' },
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privilegedParams: NO_PRIVILEGED_PARAMS,
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privilegedEnvKeys: NO_PRIVILEGED_ENV_KEYS,
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gates: NO_GATES,
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};
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}
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// `accent` on every entry below (except SHELL, which the frontend renders no
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// distinct color for) is measured from the actual `.btn-toolbar.btn-run.mode-<id>`
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// CSS rule's `border-color` on the OG skin (styles.css) — the single cleanest
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// representative hex each entry's own multi-stop gradient resolves around.
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// Corrected 2026-09-21 after PR #458's review found several were simply wrong
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// (e.g. claude was registered as Anthropic's brand orange, `#d97757`, but the
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// button renders blue): `docs/cli-registry.md`'s own "transcribed, not
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// authoritative, re-measure before wiring one up" warning for this
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// DECLARED-FOR-LATER field, taken literally. The one exception is GEMINI, whose
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// run-button border (#60a5fa) is the only one that disagrees with its own tab badge
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// and run-mode dot (#8ab4f8); it takes the badge colour, so every accent names the
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// same hex the frontend uses as that CLI's flat identity. This is a data-accuracy fix only —
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// `accent` still has no reader, so nothing rendered changes because of it.
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const CLAUDE: CliEntry = {
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id: 'claude' as CliEntry['id'],
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label: 'Claude Code',
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shortBadge: 'CC',
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accent: '#3b82f6',
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enabled: true,
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stock: true,
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order: 0,
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kind: 'agent',
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discovery: {
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binaries: ['claude'],
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searchDirs: [HOME_DIRS.local, '~/.claude/local', HOME_DIRS.usrLocal, HOME_DIRS.npmGlobal, HOME_DIRS.homeBin],
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version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)', retryOnTransientFailure: true },
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install: {
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command: {
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linux: 'curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash',
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darwin: 'curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash',
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wsl: 'curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash',
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},
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npmPackage: '@anthropic-ai/claude-code',
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docsUrl: 'https://docs.claude.com/claude-code',
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},
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},
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launch: {
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chain: 'fallback',
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params: {
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claudeMode: {
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type: 'enum',
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values: ['dangerously-skip-permissions', 'auto', 'normal', 'allowedTools'],
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default: 'dangerously-skip-permissions',
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},
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allowedTools: { type: 'token', pattern: 'tool-list' },
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model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model-claude' },
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resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'uuid' },
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// buildEffortCliArgs carries `ultracode` as a settings JSON blob and every other
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// level as a plain `--effort <level>` flag — two engine values because the two
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// shapes are mutually exclusive and neither is user-typed text (both are produced
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// from the EFFORT_LEVELS allowlist upstream, same as every other engine value).
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effortLevel: { type: 'engine', source: 'effortLevel' },
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effortJson: { type: 'engine', source: 'effortSettingsJson' },
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sessionId: { type: 'engine', source: 'sessionId' },
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sessionName: { type: 'engine', source: 'sessionName' },
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},
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variants: [
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{
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id: 'resume',
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when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' },
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args: [
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{ lit: 'claude' },
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{ flag: '--dangerously-skip-permissions', when: { param: 'claudeMode', is: 'dangerously-skip-permissions' } },
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{ flag: '--permission-mode', value: 'auto', when: { param: 'claudeMode', is: 'auto' } },
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{
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flag: '--allowedTools',
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valueFrom: 'allowedTools',
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quote: 'double',
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when: {
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allOf: [
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{ param: 'claudeMode', is: 'allowedTools' },
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{ param: 'allowedTools', state: 'set' },
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],
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},
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},
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{ flag: '--resume', valueFrom: 'resumeId', quote: 'double' },
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{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', quote: 'double', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
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{ flag: '--effort', valueFrom: 'effortLevel', quote: 'single', when: { param: 'effortLevel', state: 'set' } },
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{ flag: '--settings', valueFrom: 'effortJson', quote: 'single', when: { param: 'effortJson', state: 'set' } },
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{ flag: '--name', valueFrom: 'sessionName', quote: 'double', when: { capabilityGate: 'nameFlag' } },
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],
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},
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{
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id: 'new',
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args: [
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{ lit: 'claude' },
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{ flag: '--dangerously-skip-permissions', when: { param: 'claudeMode', is: 'dangerously-skip-permissions' } },
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{ flag: '--permission-mode', value: 'auto', when: { param: 'claudeMode', is: 'auto' } },
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{
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flag: '--allowedTools',
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valueFrom: 'allowedTools',
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quote: 'double',
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when: {
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allOf: [
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{ param: 'claudeMode', is: 'allowedTools' },
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{ param: 'allowedTools', state: 'set' },
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],
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},
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},
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{ flag: '--session-id', valueFrom: 'sessionId', quote: 'double' },
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{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', quote: 'double', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
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{ flag: '--effort', valueFrom: 'effortLevel', quote: 'single', when: { param: 'effortLevel', state: 'set' } },
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{ flag: '--settings', valueFrom: 'effortJson', quote: 'single', when: { param: 'effortJson', state: 'set' } },
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{ flag: '--name', valueFrom: 'sessionName', quote: 'double', when: { capabilityGate: 'nameFlag' } },
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],
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},
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],
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// Claude has no `<Mode>Config` object of its own — the bridge synthesizes one from its
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// discrete top-level spawn fields, under their EXISTING field name `resumeSessionId`.
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legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'resumeSessionId' },
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},
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env: {
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// Claude asks for truecolor, like every CLI here except `shell` and `opencode`.
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// tmux hands the pane TERM=screen, which supports-color reads as 16 colors, and
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// Claude then quantizes every RGB color its theme asks for down to that palette.
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// Each dark background lands on ESC[40m, the terminal's own black, so the block
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// Claude draws behind the user's own messages renders invisible. PR #3 unset
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// COLORTERM here against xterm.js#484, which xterm.js had already closed in 2019,
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// and Codeman now ships @xterm/xterm 6 and sets `terminal-overrides *:Tc` itself.
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// The other truecolor CLIs also unset NO_COLOR. Claude does not, so a user who
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// exports NO_COLOR globally keeps the monochrome panes they asked for.
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// CLAUDECODE stays unset, because Claude reads it as a signal that it is running
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// nested inside itself.
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exports: [{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' }],
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unset: ['CLAUDECODE'],
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tmuxSetenvKeys: [],
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dockerExecEnvNames: [],
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// Deliberately excludes ANTHROPIC_* (base URL / API key / default-model overrides):
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// custom-model-injection.ts's claude recipe uses those names, but they must reach a
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// session ONLY through the admin-configured, SSRF-guarded custom-model route, never
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// through a plain client-supplied envOverrides field. Widening this prefix would let
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// any session-create caller redirect a session's Anthropic traffic and credentials to
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// an arbitrary, unvalidated URL.
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allowedPrefixes: ['CLAUDE_CODE_'],
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allowedKeys: ['CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR'],
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},
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capabilities: {
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external: false,
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// Claude indents its transcript body two columns and puts its own ●/✻/❯ markers
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// in them, so a copy can drop two and paste flush. Claude and codex are the only
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// entries that declare this, because theirs are the only gutters that have been measured.
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transcriptGutter: 2,
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// The historical hard-coded pair, now stated as data. `workingLine` matches both the
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// `✻ Actualizing… (39s · ↓ 2.0k tokens)` status line and the bare `esc to interrupt`
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// footer, because tmux repaints partially and only one of the two may land in a chunk.
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workDetect: {
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promptGlyph: '❯',
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workingLine: String.raw`…\s*\((?:\d+h\s+)?(?:\d+m\s+)?\d+s\b|esc to interrupt`,
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// Claude prints what it started in the background on the footer row beneath its
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// composer, as `⏵⏵ bypass permissions on · 1 monitor · ← for agents`. The labels are
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// the CLI's own words for each kind of background task, and group 1 is the one
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// Codeman badges the session with. Verified against a live 2.1.278 pane on
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// 2026-09-21.
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// ⚠️ Two things keep an agent from writing its own label here, and both matter.
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// The footer is the LAST row, so the default one-row window (`WATCHING_TAIL_LINES`)
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// holds nothing but Ink's own chrome — in particular it leaves out the status line
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// directly above, whose content comes from a `statusLine` command a bypassed
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// session can write into its own `.claude/settings.json`. And the leading `·` keeps
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// the match on the footer's own item list rather than on any text that happens to
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// carry a count. A footer that ever drew the chip as its only item would report no
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// watching rather than open that door. See `watchingLabel()` in
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// `session-activity.ts`.
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// ⚠️ An Artifact comment monitor is the one chip that waits on the user. The agent
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// has published a page and hears nothing until somebody comments on it, so the
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// lookahead refuses the whole row while that chip is on it, whatever else is
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// running beside it. The `^` is what makes the lookahead judge the row once:
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// without it the engine retries from each later position, and a start past the
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// chip reports the shell beside it. The lookahead keys on "Artifact" alone, so a
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// footer cut off mid-chip (`· 1 Artifact…`, `· 1 Artifact comm…`) is still refused;
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// no other chip on this row says "Artifact". Counting the chip as watching kept the
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// idle alert quiet for a session that was waiting for a human.
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watchingLine: String.raw`^(?!.*Artifact).*?·\s*(\d+ (?:monitors?|shells?|teams?|local agents?|cloud sessions?|MCP tasks?|background tasks?|(?:background|remote) dynamic workflows?))`,
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// When a turn ends while background agents or an ultracode workflow are still
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// running, Claude swaps its `✻ Brewed for 1m 18s` closing row for
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// `✻ Waiting for 2 background agents and 1 dynamic workflow to finish` and resumes
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// by itself when they report back. Read from the 2.1.283 bundle (the turn-duration
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// renderer) and a live pane on 2026-09-28. The row is a snapshot taken at turn end
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// and never redrawn, which is why only the newest row above the composer counts.
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// Anchored on column 0: Claude's own rows start there, the agent's prose never does.
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awaitingLine: String.raw`^✻ Waiting for \d+ (?:background agents?|dynamic workflows?)\b`,
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},
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requiresMux: false,
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// Claude installs Codeman's own hooks block into every workspace it runs in, so its
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// stop/idle signals are unconditional — no per-session veto, unlike deepseek's bridge.
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hooks: 'always',
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transcript: 'claude-jsonl',
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altScreen: 'strip-full',
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echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'glyph', glyph: '❯', offset: 2 } },
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// Declared-for-later: the live rule (`_shouldForwardWheelToApp`, terminal-ui.js) is this version
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// AND the server-published `cliMouseTracking` flag (#498), so wiring this field up needs both.
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wheelForward: { mode: 'version-gated', minVersion: '2.1.187' },
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keyboardAccessory: 'agent',
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privilegedCommandGate: false,
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startMode: 'interactive',
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stripInkBloat: true,
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ralph: true,
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respawn: true,
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effort: true,
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agentSkillInjection: true,
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statusLineTelemetry: true,
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model: { source: 'claude-settings-file' },
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privilegedParams: [],
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// ANTHROPIC_* is NOT in allowedPrefixes/allowedKeys above (deliberately — see the
|
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// allowedPrefixes comment nearby), so these are unreachable via plain envOverrides
|
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// today. privilegedEnvKeys has exactly one consumer, ownerClampedEnvKeys() in
|
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// session-env-clamp.ts, which feeds the generic envOverrides clamp on
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// POST /api/sessions, POST /api/quick-start and reboot-restore — no custom-model
|
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// route reads this field at all, and the values it injects are merged in AFTER
|
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// that clamp runs regardless of what's listed here.
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privilegedEnvKeys: [
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'ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL',
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'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY',
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'ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_SONNET_MODEL',
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'ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_HAIKU_MODEL',
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'ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_OPUS_MODEL',
|
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// CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS already matches the CLAUDE_CODE_* allowedPrefix, and
|
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// CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR is already an allowed exact key (docs/wiki/Agent-CLIs.md), so both
|
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// were already reachable via plain envOverrides before this pair existed and this
|
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// feature does not strictly need either listed. They stay listed anyway, because
|
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// types.ts's rule ("every traffic-redirecting var this feature introduces MUST also
|
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// appear in privilegedEnvKeys") is meant to hold literally, not with an exception
|
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// carved out for the two vars that happen not to need it today. The real
|
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// consequence lands on the GENERIC envOverrides clamp above, not on this feature:
|
||
// a non-granted multi-user owner can no longer set CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR through
|
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// envOverrides at all (the per-client-account override, #255), and a PERSISTED one
|
||
// is now stripped on reboot-restore for such an owner too — see
|
||
// session-env-clamp.ts's own fileoverview.
|
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'CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS',
|
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'CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR',
|
||
],
|
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gates: { nameFlag: { minVersion: '2.1.224', failClosed: true } },
|
||
// Custom Model Endpoint Profiles (docs/custom-model-endpoints-plan.md) — verified by hand against a real
|
||
// llama.cpp server. Claude reads these at process start only, so switching requires a
|
||
// respawn, never a live hot-swap.
|
||
customModelInjection: {
|
||
kind: 'env',
|
||
baseUrlVar: 'ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL',
|
||
apiKeyVar: 'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY',
|
||
modelVars: ['ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_SONNET_MODEL', 'ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_HAIKU_MODEL', 'ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_OPUS_MODEL'],
|
||
// Verified via Claude Code's own docs: CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS overrides the
|
||
// assumed context window and applies directly for a model name Claude Code doesn't
|
||
// recognize as one of its own — exactly the custom-model case. Without it, Claude Code
|
||
// assumes a large (200k) window for any unrecognized model id and never compacts,
|
||
// eventually overflowing a much smaller real local context (see plan doc reasoning
|
||
// above the interface for the confirmed failure).
|
||
contextLengthVar: 'CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS',
|
||
// Isolates this session's config/credential directory so an injected ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
|
||
// never shares a directory with a stored claude.ai OAuth login — see the doc comment on
|
||
// customModelInjection in cli-registry/types.ts for the traded-off side effect.
|
||
configDirVar: 'CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR',
|
||
// ⚠️ Required alongside configDirVar, not optional in practice: verified live that an
|
||
// isolated, otherwise-empty config directory makes claude stop at an interactive
|
||
// "Detected a custom API key — use it?" prompt on EVERY launch, defaulting to "No" with
|
||
// no one at the TTY to answer — silently refusing the very key this feature injected.
|
||
// Pre-seeding this file's customApiKeyResponses.approved list (verified against a real
|
||
// ~/.claude.json after answering the prompt once by hand) answers it in advance instead.
|
||
apiKeyTrustFile: { relPath: '.claude.json', shape: 'claude-api-key-responses' },
|
||
// ⚠️ Same isolated-directory root cause, one step further: verified live that on top
|
||
// of the API-key prompt above, a fresh CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR also replays claude's ENTIRE
|
||
// first-run sequence on every launch — the theme picker, the security-notes screen,
|
||
// the per-project "trust this folder?" dialog, and (running with
|
||
// --dangerously-skip-permissions) a one-time bypass-permissions warning — none of
|
||
// which a real, already-onboarded profile shows again. Pre-seeds that same
|
||
// already-onboarded state instead of leaving a human to click through it.
|
||
skipFirstRunPrompts: true,
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
overlays: {
|
||
// Mirrors the local default so the remote/in-container agent runs non-interactively
|
||
// (no trust-folder/permission prompt that nothing on that side can answer). A per-host
|
||
// `commands.claude` override, or the docker multi-user clamp, stays the escape hatch.
|
||
remote: { command: 'claude --dangerously-skip-permissions' },
|
||
// ⚠️ As root the flag is not merely unnecessary, it is REFUSED ("cannot be used with
|
||
// root/sudo privileges"), and only inside the container — so an adopted root container
|
||
// would just show a dead pane. Drop it there and let claude ask.
|
||
docker: { command: 'claude --dangerously-skip-permissions', rootCommand: 'claude' },
|
||
// Claude's docker/remote credential handling has its own dedicated code path
|
||
// (claudeDockerPaneCommand, artifacts at docker-hosts.ts:537-575) — no generic credStore.
|
||
},
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
const SHELL: CliEntry = {
|
||
id: 'shell' as CliEntry['id'],
|
||
label: 'Shell',
|
||
shortBadge: 'SH',
|
||
accent: '#6b7280',
|
||
enabled: true,
|
||
stock: true,
|
||
order: 1,
|
||
kind: 'shell',
|
||
discovery: {
|
||
binaries: [],
|
||
searchDirs: [],
|
||
install: { command: {} },
|
||
},
|
||
launch: {
|
||
params: {},
|
||
variants: [{ id: 'shell', args: [] }], // tmux-manager resolves the real login shell in code
|
||
},
|
||
env: {
|
||
exports: [],
|
||
unset: ['COLORTERM'],
|
||
tmuxSetenvKeys: [],
|
||
dockerExecEnvNames: [],
|
||
allowedPrefixes: [],
|
||
allowedKeys: [],
|
||
},
|
||
capabilities: {
|
||
external: false,
|
||
requiresMux: false,
|
||
// ⚠️ `false` here while `external` is ALSO false is the pairing that matters: a shell
|
||
// has no hooks but is not an "external CLI", so a predicate derived from `external`
|
||
// once accepted `until=stop` on a shell session and hung for the full timeout.
|
||
hooks: 'none',
|
||
transcript: 'none',
|
||
altScreen: 'preserve',
|
||
echo: { policy: 'off', anchor: { kind: 'none' } },
|
||
wheelForward: { mode: 'never' },
|
||
keyboardAccessory: 'shell',
|
||
privilegedCommandGate: true,
|
||
startMode: 'shell',
|
||
stripInkBloat: false,
|
||
ralph: false,
|
||
respawn: false,
|
||
effort: false,
|
||
agentSkillInjection: false,
|
||
statusLineTelemetry: false,
|
||
model: { source: 'none' },
|
||
privilegedParams: [],
|
||
privilegedEnvKeys: [],
|
||
gates: {},
|
||
customModelInjection: { kind: 'unsupported' }, // a raw shell has no "model" concept
|
||
},
|
||
overlays: {
|
||
// No `remote` entry: defaultRemoteCommandForMode special-cases kind==='shell' directly
|
||
// (an interactive login shell, no `-c '<command>'` wrapping at all).
|
||
docker: { disabled: true },
|
||
},
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
const OPENCODE: CliEntry = {
|
||
id: 'opencode' as CliEntry['id'],
|
||
label: 'OpenCode',
|
||
shortBadge: 'OC',
|
||
accent: '#10b981',
|
||
enabled: true,
|
||
stock: true,
|
||
order: 10,
|
||
kind: 'agent',
|
||
discovery: {
|
||
binaries: ['opencode'],
|
||
searchDirs: [
|
||
'~/.opencode/bin',
|
||
HOME_DIRS.local,
|
||
HOME_DIRS.usrLocal,
|
||
'~/go/bin',
|
||
HOME_DIRS.bunBin,
|
||
HOME_DIRS.npmGlobal,
|
||
HOME_DIRS.homeBin,
|
||
],
|
||
version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)' },
|
||
install: {
|
||
command: {
|
||
linux: 'curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/install | bash',
|
||
darwin: 'curl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/install | bash',
|
||
},
|
||
npmPackage: 'opencode-ai',
|
||
docsUrl: 'https://opencode.ai/docs',
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
launch: {
|
||
params: {
|
||
model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model' },
|
||
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'id' },
|
||
forkSession: { type: 'bool' },
|
||
},
|
||
variants: [
|
||
{
|
||
id: 'default',
|
||
args: [
|
||
{ lit: 'opencode' },
|
||
{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
|
||
{ flag: '--session', valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
|
||
{
|
||
flag: '--fork',
|
||
when: {
|
||
allOf: [
|
||
{ param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' },
|
||
{ param: 'forkSession', is: true },
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'continueSession' },
|
||
legacyConfigField: 'openCodeConfig',
|
||
},
|
||
env: {
|
||
exports: [],
|
||
unset: ['COLORTERM'],
|
||
tmuxSetenvKeys: ['ANTHROPIC_API_KEY', 'OPENAI_API_KEY', 'GOOGLE_API_KEY'],
|
||
dockerExecEnvNames: [],
|
||
allowedPrefixes: ['OPENCODE_'],
|
||
allowedKeys: [],
|
||
configContentVar: 'OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT',
|
||
},
|
||
capabilities: {
|
||
...agentDefaults(),
|
||
altScreen: 'strip-mux-only',
|
||
echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' }, predictProfile: undefined },
|
||
// Verified by hand against a real llama.cpp server. Reuses the SAME env var opencode's
|
||
// own `env.configContentVar` already declares — the builder in custom-model-injection.ts
|
||
// must merge into whatever opencode config Codeman would otherwise send, not clobber it.
|
||
customModelInjection: { kind: 'configContentEnv', envVar: 'OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT', template: 'opencode-json' },
|
||
// OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT already matches the OPENCODE_ allowedPrefix above, so it was
|
||
// ALREADY reachable via plain envOverrides before this feature existed — it replaces
|
||
// opencode's whole config, provider api keys included, so a non-granted multi-user owner
|
||
// sending it is a pre-existing credential-redirection gap, not one this feature opens.
|
||
privilegedEnvKeys: ['OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT'],
|
||
},
|
||
overlays: {
|
||
credStore: { rel: '.config/opencode', seedWhole: true },
|
||
},
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
const CODEX: CliEntry = {
|
||
id: 'codex' as CliEntry['id'],
|
||
label: 'Codex',
|
||
shortBadge: 'CX',
|
||
accent: '#a855f7',
|
||
enabled: true,
|
||
stock: true,
|
||
order: 20,
|
||
kind: 'agent',
|
||
discovery: {
|
||
binaries: ['codex'],
|
||
searchDirs: [
|
||
'~/.codex/bin',
|
||
HOME_DIRS.local,
|
||
HOME_DIRS.usrLocal,
|
||
HOME_DIRS.bunBin,
|
||
HOME_DIRS.npmGlobal,
|
||
HOME_DIRS.homeBin,
|
||
],
|
||
version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)' },
|
||
install: {
|
||
command: { linux: 'npm install -g @openai/codex', darwin: 'npm install -g @openai/codex' },
|
||
npmPackage: '@openai/codex',
|
||
docsUrl: 'https://developers.openai.com/codex/cli',
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
launch: {
|
||
params: {
|
||
bypassApprovals: { type: 'bool' },
|
||
animations: { type: 'bool' },
|
||
model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model' },
|
||
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'id' },
|
||
},
|
||
variants: [
|
||
{
|
||
id: 'default',
|
||
args: [
|
||
{ lit: 'codex' },
|
||
{ flag: '--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox', when: { param: 'bypassApprovals', is: true } },
|
||
{ flag: '--config', value: 'tui.animations=true', when: { param: 'animations', is: true } },
|
||
{ flag: '--config', value: 'tui.animations=false', when: { param: 'animations', is: false } },
|
||
{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
|
||
{ lit: 'resume', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
|
||
{ valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
legacyConfigAliases: { bypassApprovals: 'dangerouslyBypassApprovals', resumeId: 'resumeSessionId' },
|
||
legacyConfigField: 'codexConfig',
|
||
resumeAppend: { style: 'positional', token: 'resume' },
|
||
},
|
||
env: {
|
||
exports: [
|
||
{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' },
|
||
{ name: 'CODEX_INTERNAL_ORIGINATOR_OVERRIDE', value: { engine: 'codemanPrefixedSessionId' } },
|
||
],
|
||
unset: ['NO_COLOR'],
|
||
tmuxSetenvKeys: ['OPENAI_API_KEY', 'CODEX_API_KEY', 'CODEX_HOME'],
|
||
dockerExecEnvNames: ['OPENAI_API_KEY', 'CODEX_API_KEY'],
|
||
allowedPrefixes: ['CODEX_'],
|
||
allowedKeys: [],
|
||
},
|
||
capabilities: {
|
||
...agentDefaults(),
|
||
// Codex draws `› Ask Codex to do anything` on its composer row and
|
||
// `Working (2m 49s • esc to interrupt)` above it while a turn runs. It animates no
|
||
// braille spinner, and it never prints `esc to interrupt` at rest, so that phrase
|
||
// alone separates a running turn from an idle one.
|
||
// Codex pins a row of its own while a background terminal it started is still
|
||
// running: ` 1 background terminal running · /ps to view · /stop to close`. Unlike
|
||
// Claude's footer chip that row sits ABOVE the composer, which puts it third from the
|
||
// bottom once the status line and the composer are counted, hence `watchingLines`.
|
||
// Measured against a live codex-cli 0.154.0 pane on 2026-09-22: the row appears when
|
||
// the terminal starts, follows the composer down as the conversation grows, and is
|
||
// gone after `/stop`.
|
||
// ⚠️ This entry CANNOT promise what Claude's does, and the difference is Codex's
|
||
// layout rather than its pattern. The third row from the bottom is the chip only
|
||
// while a terminal runs; with none running it is the last row of the transcript,
|
||
// which the agent writes. Matching the complete row raises the bar — an assistant
|
||
// message has to end with this exact line, to the character — but nothing here makes
|
||
// forging it impossible, so do not read the Claude comment above as applying here.
|
||
// What contains it is that codex declares `hooks: 'none'`: no hook event from a codex
|
||
// session ever reaches `notePrompt()`, so there is no idle item to pre-acknowledge
|
||
// and a forged label costs a wrong badge and nothing else. A CLI that gains hook
|
||
// signals must not keep a pattern this soft.
|
||
// ⚠️ Background TERMINALS are the only background work codex advertises on screen.
|
||
// A sub-agent started without waiting outlives the turn just as a terminal does —
|
||
// measured 2026-09-22, the sandboxed process was still running — and the pane shows
|
||
// nothing at all for it: the last rows are the composer and the status line, and
|
||
// `Sub-agents running` lives in the on-demand `/subagents` panel, not above the
|
||
// composer. So a codex session waiting on a sub-agent reads as plainly idle here.
|
||
// Nothing is misfiled by that (codex raises no idle prompts), and there is no row to
|
||
// match until codex pins one.
|
||
workDetect: {
|
||
promptGlyph: '›',
|
||
workingLine: '[Ee]sc to interrupt',
|
||
watchingLine: String.raw`^\s{0,4}(\d+ background terminals?) running · /ps to view · /stop to close$`,
|
||
watchingLines: 3,
|
||
},
|
||
// Two columns, like claude's, measured on a live 0.154.0 answer: the `•`/`›`/`⚠`
|
||
// markers sit in the gutter, prose continuations sit at 2, and a nested YAML block
|
||
// the model wrote rendered at 2/4/6/8 for its own 0/2/4/6. Replayed at 100, 120,
|
||
// 160, 198, 235 and 282 columns the indents were 0, 2, 4, 6 and 8 at every one,
|
||
// never 1, so the width is not a function of the pane.
|
||
transcriptGutter: 2,
|
||
transcript: 'codex-rollout',
|
||
altScreen: 'strip-full',
|
||
echo: { policy: 'predict', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' }, predictProfile: 'codex' },
|
||
wheelForward: { mode: 'never' }, // #227: codex ignores SGR wheel reports, never forward
|
||
maxFrameBytes: 32 * 1024,
|
||
// codex's own bare-spawn default (no config sent) is already safe (no bypass flag), so
|
||
// the multi-user clamp only needs to force an EXPLICITLY-SENT bypass back off.
|
||
//
|
||
// `param` names the REGISTRY param, like every other `param` in this file — the clamp
|
||
// resolves it through `legacyConfigAliases` on the way out, exactly as `configSetenv`
|
||
// does. codex is the entry where the two names differ (`bypassApprovals` here,
|
||
// `dangerouslyBypassApprovals` on the wire), so it is the one that would have caught a
|
||
// regression; `schema.ts` now rejects a name that is not a declared param.
|
||
privilegedParams: [{ param: 'bypassApprovals', clampTo: false }],
|
||
// Verified by hand against a real llama.cpp server. Written to an isolated CODEX_HOME
|
||
// so the user's real ~/.codex/config.toml is never touched.
|
||
customModelInjection: {
|
||
kind: 'configDir',
|
||
dirEnvVar: 'CODEX_HOME',
|
||
fileName: 'config.toml',
|
||
template: 'codex-toml',
|
||
},
|
||
// CODEX_HOME already matches the CODEX_ allowedPrefix above, so it was ALREADY
|
||
// reachable via plain envOverrides before this feature existed. It is arguably
|
||
// MORE sensitive than a bare base-url var: a redirected CODEX_HOME points codex at a
|
||
// config.toml a non-granted owner fully controls, which can restate sandbox/approval
|
||
// policy INSIDE that file — a path the argv-level `bypassApprovals` clamp above
|
||
// cannot see or stop.
|
||
// CODEMAN_CUSTOM_MODEL_API_KEY: the credential config.toml's env_key references
|
||
// (see custom-model-injection.ts) — same reasoning as CODEX_HOME above.
|
||
privilegedEnvKeys: ['CODEX_HOME', 'CODEMAN_CUSTOM_MODEL_API_KEY'],
|
||
},
|
||
overlays: {
|
||
credStore: {
|
||
rel: '.codex',
|
||
shareDirs: ['sessions'],
|
||
shareFiles: ['history.jsonl'],
|
||
seedFiles: ['auth.json', 'config.toml'],
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
const GEMINI: CliEntry = {
|
||
id: 'gemini' as CliEntry['id'],
|
||
label: 'Gemini',
|
||
shortBadge: 'GM',
|
||
// The tab badge / run-mode-dot colour, not the run-button border (see the note above CLAUDE).
|
||
accent: '#8ab4f8',
|
||
enabled: true,
|
||
stock: true,
|
||
order: 30,
|
||
kind: 'agent',
|
||
discovery: {
|
||
binaries: ['gemini'],
|
||
searchDirs: [
|
||
'~/.gemini/bin',
|
||
HOME_DIRS.local,
|
||
HOME_DIRS.usrLocal,
|
||
HOME_DIRS.bunBin,
|
||
HOME_DIRS.npmGlobal,
|
||
HOME_DIRS.homeBin,
|
||
],
|
||
version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)' },
|
||
install: {
|
||
command: { linux: 'npm install -g @google/gemini-cli', darwin: 'npm install -g @google/gemini-cli' },
|
||
npmPackage: '@google/gemini-cli',
|
||
docsUrl: 'https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli',
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
launch: {
|
||
params: {
|
||
approvalMode: { type: 'enum', values: ['default', 'auto_edit', 'yolo', 'plan'], default: 'yolo' },
|
||
model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model' },
|
||
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'id-dotted' },
|
||
},
|
||
variants: [
|
||
{
|
||
id: 'default',
|
||
args: [
|
||
{ lit: 'gemini' },
|
||
{ flag: '--skip-trust' },
|
||
{ flag: '--approval-mode', valueFrom: 'approvalMode' },
|
||
{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
|
||
{ flag: '--resume', valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'resumeSession' },
|
||
legacyConfigField: 'geminiConfig',
|
||
resumeAppend: { style: 'flag', flag: '--resume' },
|
||
},
|
||
env: {
|
||
exports: [{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' }],
|
||
unset: ['NO_COLOR'],
|
||
tmuxSetenvKeys: [
|
||
'GEMINI_API_KEY',
|
||
'GEMINI_MODEL',
|
||
'GOOGLE_API_KEY',
|
||
'GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT',
|
||
'GOOGLE_CLOUD_LOCATION',
|
||
'GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS',
|
||
'GOOGLE_GENAI_USE_VERTEXAI',
|
||
],
|
||
dockerExecEnvNames: ['GEMINI_API_KEY', 'GOOGLE_API_KEY'],
|
||
allowedPrefixes: ['GEMINI_', 'GOOGLE_'],
|
||
allowedKeys: [],
|
||
},
|
||
capabilities: {
|
||
...agentDefaults(),
|
||
altScreen: 'strip-full',
|
||
echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' } },
|
||
// gemini's builder defaults an ABSENT approvalMode to 'yolo', so the clamp must
|
||
// MATERIALIZE a config (not just touch an already-sent one) or a non-granted owner who
|
||
// sends no geminiConfig at all would still get yolo for free.
|
||
privilegedParams: [{ param: 'approvalMode', clampTo: 'auto_edit', materializeWhenAbsent: true }],
|
||
// Web-researched, unverified — needs a restart to pick up (CLI reads these at process
|
||
// start). Confirm the exact model-override env var name against the installed
|
||
// gemini-cli version before shipping.
|
||
customModelInjection: {
|
||
kind: 'env',
|
||
baseUrlVar: 'GOOGLE_GEMINI_BASE_URL',
|
||
apiKeyVar: 'GEMINI_API_KEY',
|
||
modelVars: ['GEMINI_MODEL'],
|
||
},
|
||
// All three already match the GEMINI_/GOOGLE_ allowedPrefixes above, so they were
|
||
// ALREADY reachable via plain envOverrides before this feature existed — a non-granted
|
||
// multi-user owner redirecting a gemini session's endpoint/credentials is a
|
||
// pre-existing gap this feature's analysis surfaced, not one it opens.
|
||
privilegedEnvKeys: ['GOOGLE_GEMINI_BASE_URL', 'GEMINI_API_KEY', 'GEMINI_MODEL'],
|
||
},
|
||
overlays: {
|
||
credStore: { rel: '.gemini', seedWhole: true }, // also covers antigravity — see its own entry
|
||
},
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
const ANTIGRAVITY: CliEntry = {
|
||
id: 'antigravity' as CliEntry['id'],
|
||
label: 'Antigravity',
|
||
shortBadge: 'AG',
|
||
accent: '#22d3ee',
|
||
enabled: true,
|
||
stock: true,
|
||
order: 40,
|
||
kind: 'agent',
|
||
discovery: {
|
||
// Binary is `agy`, NOT `antigravity` — the mode-name/binary-name split that made
|
||
// probeDockerCliVersion wrong before this registry existed.
|
||
binaries: ['agy'],
|
||
searchDirs: [HOME_DIRS.local, '~/.antigravity/bin', HOME_DIRS.usrLocal, HOME_DIRS.homeBin],
|
||
version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)' },
|
||
install: {
|
||
command: {
|
||
linux: 'curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash',
|
||
darwin: 'curl -fsSL https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh | bash',
|
||
},
|
||
docsUrl: 'https://antigravity.google/cli',
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
launch: {
|
||
params: {
|
||
dangerouslySkipPermissions: { type: 'bool' },
|
||
model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model' },
|
||
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'id-dotted' },
|
||
},
|
||
variants: [
|
||
{
|
||
id: 'default',
|
||
args: [
|
||
{ lit: 'agy' },
|
||
{ flag: '--dangerously-skip-permissions', when: { param: 'dangerouslySkipPermissions', is: true } },
|
||
{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
|
||
{ flag: '--conversation', valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'resumeConversationId' },
|
||
legacyConfigField: 'antigravityConfig',
|
||
resumeAppend: { style: 'flag', flag: '--conversation' },
|
||
},
|
||
env: {
|
||
exports: [{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' }],
|
||
unset: ['NO_COLOR'],
|
||
tmuxSetenvKeys: [],
|
||
dockerExecEnvNames: [],
|
||
allowedPrefixes: ['ANTIGRAVITY_'],
|
||
allowedKeys: [],
|
||
},
|
||
capabilities: {
|
||
...agentDefaults(),
|
||
altScreen: 'strip-mux-only',
|
||
echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' } },
|
||
// Like codex: an ABSENT config already defaults safe (no bypass flag), so only a
|
||
// SENT config needs the flag forced off — nothing is materialized.
|
||
privilegedParams: [{ param: 'dangerouslySkipPermissions', clampTo: false }],
|
||
// No known CLI/env/config mechanism — Antigravity's own docs describe a GUI-only
|
||
// custom-endpoint setting and explicitly say it "cannot currently" become the core
|
||
// reasoning model. Toolbar entry stays disabled for this mode.
|
||
customModelInjection: { kind: 'unsupported' },
|
||
},
|
||
overlays: {
|
||
// No credStore of its own: agy nests its whole state under ~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/,
|
||
// which gemini's seedWhole entry already covers.
|
||
},
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
const PI: CliEntry = {
|
||
id: 'pi' as CliEntry['id'],
|
||
label: 'Pi',
|
||
shortBadge: 'PI',
|
||
accent: '#f472b6',
|
||
enabled: true,
|
||
stock: true,
|
||
order: 50,
|
||
kind: 'agent',
|
||
discovery: {
|
||
binaries: ['pi'],
|
||
searchDirs: [HOME_DIRS.local, HOME_DIRS.usrLocal, HOME_DIRS.bunBin, HOME_DIRS.npmGlobal, HOME_DIRS.homeBin],
|
||
// pi is a generic binary name (Raspberry Pi tooling, personal scripts), so a `which`
|
||
// hit alone is not evidence of the right program — require the version match.
|
||
version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(?:^|\\s)(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)', requireVersionMatch: true },
|
||
install: {
|
||
command: {
|
||
linux: 'npm install -g --ignore-scripts @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent',
|
||
darwin: 'npm install -g --ignore-scripts @earendil-works/pi-coding-agent',
|
||
},
|
||
npmPackage: '@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent',
|
||
docsUrl: 'https://pi.dev',
|
||
agentImageLayer: {
|
||
kind: 'dedicated',
|
||
reason: 'installed with --ignore-scripts in its own layer, so the flag cannot leak to the shared block',
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
launch: {
|
||
params: {
|
||
approveProjectTrust: { type: 'bool' },
|
||
model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model-pi' },
|
||
provider: { type: 'token', pattern: 'slug' },
|
||
thinking: { type: 'enum', values: ['off', 'minimal', 'low', 'medium', 'high', 'xhigh', 'max'] },
|
||
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'id-dotted' },
|
||
continueSession: { type: 'bool' },
|
||
},
|
||
variants: [
|
||
{
|
||
id: 'default',
|
||
args: [
|
||
{ lit: 'pi' },
|
||
{ flag: '--approve', when: { param: 'approveProjectTrust', is: true } },
|
||
{ flag: '--no-approve', when: { param: 'approveProjectTrust', is: false } },
|
||
{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
|
||
{ flag: '--provider', valueFrom: 'provider', when: { param: 'provider', state: 'set' } },
|
||
{ flag: '--thinking', valueFrom: 'thinking', when: { param: 'thinking', state: 'set' } },
|
||
{ flag: '--session', valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
|
||
{
|
||
lit: '-c',
|
||
when: {
|
||
allOf: [
|
||
{ param: 'continueSession', is: true },
|
||
{ param: 'resumeId', state: 'unset' },
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'resumeSessionId' },
|
||
legacyConfigField: 'piConfig',
|
||
resumeAppend: { style: 'flag', flag: '--session' },
|
||
},
|
||
env: {
|
||
exports: [{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' }],
|
||
unset: ['NO_COLOR'],
|
||
// Pi's ~34 provider keys share no common prefix, so they are deliberately NOT
|
||
// allowlisted here — same reasoning as today's PI_ only prefix. Pi users authenticate
|
||
// via `/login` or the server process's own env.
|
||
tmuxSetenvKeys: [],
|
||
dockerExecEnvNames: [],
|
||
allowedPrefixes: ['PI_'],
|
||
allowedKeys: [],
|
||
},
|
||
capabilities: {
|
||
...agentDefaults(),
|
||
altScreen: 'preserve', // pi's TUI renders into the main screen with terminal-owned scrollback
|
||
echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' } },
|
||
// pi's absent-config default is an interactive trust PROMPT the session user could
|
||
// just answer "yes" to, so omitting --approve is not itself a clamp — MATERIALIZE
|
||
// approveProjectTrust:false so buildPiCommand emits --no-approve outright.
|
||
privilegedParams: [{ param: 'approveProjectTrust', clampTo: false, materializeWhenAbsent: true }],
|
||
// CORRECTED after live-testing: `PI_CONFIG_DIR` does NOT exist anywhere in pi's own
|
||
// bundled source (grepped the installed package directly) — it does nothing for pi
|
||
// itself, despite being a real Codeman env var that OTHER things (omp) read. The
|
||
// confirmed working redirect is `HOME` itself: pi hardcodes `~/.pi/agent/models.json`
|
||
// with no dedicated override, so redirecting the CHILD PROCESS's HOME is what
|
||
// actually relocates it (verified: a model written under an isolated HOME's
|
||
// `.pi/agent/models.json` shows up in `pi --list-models` and answers a real prompt
|
||
// against a real llama-swap server; PI_CONFIG_DIR alone left it silently unable to
|
||
// see any provider). ⚠️ This is a bigger blast radius than a dedicated config-dir
|
||
// var: it also redirects pi's real sessions/auth/extensions for the DURATION of a
|
||
// custom-model session, not just its provider config — document this trade-off
|
||
// wherever this capability is surfaced.
|
||
customModelInjection: {
|
||
kind: 'configDir',
|
||
dirEnvVar: 'HOME',
|
||
fileName: '.pi/agent/models.json',
|
||
template: 'pi-models-json',
|
||
// Writing models.json is not enough: without `--model custom/<id>` pi stays on its
|
||
// own default provider and fails with "No API key found for the selected model"
|
||
// (confirmed live). `custom` is the provider name pi-models-json declares.
|
||
launchModel: 'custom/{modelId}',
|
||
},
|
||
// HOME is not `PI_`-prefixed, so unlike the old (wrong) PI_CONFIG_DIR guess this was
|
||
// never reachable via the generic envOverrides allowlist at all — listed here anyway,
|
||
// matching the documented pattern for every other CLI's dir-redirect var, since a
|
||
// redirected HOME is at least as sensitive as CODEX_HOME/GROK_HOME (pi executes
|
||
// repo-local .pi/extensions TypeScript — see the External CLI modes note in CLAUDE.md).
|
||
privilegedEnvKeys: ['HOME'],
|
||
},
|
||
overlays: {
|
||
credStore: {
|
||
rel: '.pi/agent',
|
||
seedFiles: ['auth.json', 'settings.json', 'trust.json', 'models.json', 'models-store.json'],
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
// Grok Build (xAI, `grok`). Transcribed from the hand-written buildGrokCommand into
|
||
// registry data; enabled by default, like every other shipped mode.
|
||
const GROK: CliEntry = {
|
||
id: 'grok' as CliEntry['id'],
|
||
label: 'Grok',
|
||
shortBadge: 'GK',
|
||
// Upstream hand-authored a charcoal GRADIENT across 4+ CSS spots (welcome button, tab
|
||
// badge, run-mode dot, mobile skin overrides) rather than one flat colour; our registry's
|
||
// `accent` is a single hex, so this is the closest single value (zinc-300, the run-button
|
||
// border and tab-badge colour). Nothing reads `accent` yet: the frontend keeps its own
|
||
// hand-authored CSS; the field is here so the entry is complete.
|
||
accent: '#d4d4d8',
|
||
enabled: true,
|
||
stock: true,
|
||
order: 70,
|
||
kind: 'agent',
|
||
discovery: {
|
||
binaries: ['grok'],
|
||
searchDirs: ['~/.grok/bin', HOME_DIRS.local, HOME_DIRS.usrLocal, HOME_DIRS.homeBin],
|
||
// `grok` has a known npm squatter (@vibe-kit/grok-cli also installs a `grok` bin), so a
|
||
// bare `which grok` hit is not evidence of the right program — same defence as pi,
|
||
// byte-identical regex.
|
||
version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(?:^|\\s)(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)', requireVersionMatch: true },
|
||
install: {
|
||
command: {
|
||
linux: 'curl -fsSL https://x.ai/cli/install.sh | bash',
|
||
darwin: 'curl -fsSL https://x.ai/cli/install.sh | bash',
|
||
},
|
||
// Not on npm — xAI ships a standalone installer/binary, same shape as Antigravity.
|
||
docsUrl: 'https://github.com/xai-org/grok-build',
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
launch: {
|
||
params: {
|
||
alwaysApprove: { type: 'bool' },
|
||
model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model' },
|
||
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'id-dotted' },
|
||
continueSession: { type: 'bool' },
|
||
},
|
||
variants: [
|
||
{
|
||
id: 'default',
|
||
args: [
|
||
{ lit: 'grok' },
|
||
{ flag: '--always-approve', when: { param: 'alwaysApprove', is: true } },
|
||
{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
|
||
{ flag: '--resume', valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
|
||
{
|
||
lit: '--continue',
|
||
when: {
|
||
allOf: [
|
||
{ param: 'continueSession', is: true },
|
||
{ param: 'resumeId', state: 'unset' },
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'resumeSessionId' },
|
||
legacyConfigField: 'grokConfig',
|
||
resumeAppend: { style: 'flag', flag: '--resume' },
|
||
},
|
||
env: {
|
||
exports: [{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' }],
|
||
unset: ['NO_COLOR'],
|
||
// No tmuxSetenvKeys: XAI_API_KEY (xAI's documented headless auth var) is covered by the
|
||
// XAI_ prefix allowlist below, same "rely on the prefix, not an explicit key list"
|
||
// reasoning as pi's ~34 provider keys.
|
||
tmuxSetenvKeys: [],
|
||
dockerExecEnvNames: [],
|
||
allowedPrefixes: ['GROK_', 'XAI_'],
|
||
allowedKeys: [],
|
||
},
|
||
capabilities: {
|
||
...agentDefaults(),
|
||
// Fullscreen alt-screen TUI with mouse support — same shape as opencode/antigravity:
|
||
// only the tmux-attach-time smcup strip, not Ink's full erase-scrollback+DECSET strip.
|
||
altScreen: 'strip-mux-only',
|
||
// Buffer-policy fallthrough default, unmeasured against an authenticated grok composer
|
||
// (the existing hedge, preserved verbatim) — same as gemini/antigravity/pi.
|
||
echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' } },
|
||
// codex/antigravity-shaped clamp: grok's own bare-spawn default (no config sent) is
|
||
// already its safe interactive ask-mode, so the multi-user clamp only needs to force an
|
||
// EXPLICITLY-SENT bypass flag back off — nothing is materialized when config is absent.
|
||
privilegedParams: [{ param: 'alwaysApprove', clampTo: false }],
|
||
// CORRECTED after live-testing against a real grok binary: the original `env` kind
|
||
// (GROK_BASE_URL/GROK_MODEL/XAI_API_KEY) produced "Not signed in" — those env vars
|
||
// are NOT grok's real custom-endpoint mechanism. The real one (verified against
|
||
// xAI's own docs) is a `[model.<name>]` block in a config.toml under GROK_HOME,
|
||
// the same configDir shape as codex/pi/omp. `api_backend = "chat_completions"` is
|
||
// explicitly supported (unlike codex, which dropped it) — grok CAN talk to a plain
|
||
// OpenAI Chat-Completions server directly.
|
||
customModelInjection: {
|
||
kind: 'configDir',
|
||
dirEnvVar: 'GROK_HOME',
|
||
fileName: 'config.toml',
|
||
template: 'grok-toml',
|
||
// The `[model.<name>]` block the grok-toml template writes; `--model <name>` is what
|
||
// selects it (GROK_CUSTOM_MODEL_NAME in custom-model-injection.ts, pinned equal by
|
||
// test/custom-model-injection.test.ts so the two cannot drift).
|
||
launchModel: 'codeman-custom',
|
||
},
|
||
// GROK_HOME already matches the GROK_ allowedPrefix above, so it was ALREADY
|
||
// reachable via plain envOverrides before this feature existed — same reasoning
|
||
// as CODEX_HOME: a redirected config dir can restate policy the argv-level
|
||
// `alwaysApprove` clamp above cannot see.
|
||
privilegedEnvKeys: ['GROK_HOME'],
|
||
},
|
||
overlays: {
|
||
// ~/.grok also holds sessions/, memory/, downloads/ (the ~160MB binary), completions/,
|
||
// docs/, bin/ — per-file seeding like pi's credStore, not a whole-dir seedWhole copy.
|
||
credStore: { rel: '.grok', seedFiles: ['auth.json', 'config.toml', 'pager.toml'] },
|
||
// No remote/docker overlay needed: the defaults (exec grok / login-shell `grok`) are
|
||
// already correct — verified against upstream's own pinned test/grok-mode.test.ts
|
||
// expectation `exec "${SHELL:-/bin/sh}" -i -l -c 'grok'`.
|
||
},
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
// DeepSeek Harness (`dsh`, deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness). The awkward one, and worth
|
||
// reading before assuming it looks like its siblings — it breaks four of this catalog's
|
||
// normal assumptions at once, which is why the schema carries four extensions for it:
|
||
//
|
||
// 1. `dsh` is a PROFILE LAUNCHER, not the agent. It boots $DSH_HOME/profiles/<name>, and
|
||
// DeepSeek ships only `web`/`headless`/`base`, none of which can drive a terminal
|
||
// pane — so the terminal front door is ALWAYS third-party and "installed" is not
|
||
// "runnable". Hence `discovery.launcherProfile`.
|
||
// 2. Its permission switch is the `DSH_PERMISSION_MODE` ENV VAR, not a flag — the
|
||
// harness has none. Hence `env.configSetenv` (so the ordinary privilegedParams clamp
|
||
// still reaches it) plus `capabilities.privilegedEnvKeys` (so an envOverrides send
|
||
// cannot hand the privilege straight back).
|
||
// 3. It is the only non-claude mode with real hook signals, and for it alone that is a
|
||
// per-SESSION question. Hence `hooks: 'supervised'`.
|
||
// 4. Its transcript is zstd session files, one frame per write. Hence
|
||
// `transcript: 'deepseek-zstd'`.
|
||
//
|
||
// The identity probe is the strictest in the catalog for a sharper reason than pi's or
|
||
// grok's npm squatters: Debian ships an unrelated `dsh` (dancer's shell, `apt install
|
||
// dsh`) that would pass a version probe perfectly happily.
|
||
const DEEPSEEK: CliEntry = {
|
||
id: 'deepseek' as CliEntry['id'],
|
||
label: 'DeepSeek',
|
||
shortBadge: 'DS',
|
||
accent: '#7c93ff',
|
||
enabled: true,
|
||
stock: true,
|
||
order: 80,
|
||
kind: 'agent',
|
||
discovery: {
|
||
binaries: ['dsh'],
|
||
searchDirs: [HOME_DIRS.local, HOME_DIRS.usrLocal, HOME_DIRS.npmGlobal, HOME_DIRS.homeBin],
|
||
// Checked BEFORE the version probe: dancer's shell answers --version happily, so a
|
||
// version match alone would accept it.
|
||
identity: { arg: '--help', regex: 'DeepSeek\\s+Harness' },
|
||
// Keeps the `-rc.2` prerelease tail — dsh ships them, and the `codeman doctor` row
|
||
// shares this regex so the two cannot disagree about what version a binary reports.
|
||
version: {
|
||
arg: '--version',
|
||
regex: '(?:^|\\s)v?(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+(?:-[0-9A-Za-z][0-9A-Za-z.-]*)?)',
|
||
requireVersionMatch: true,
|
||
},
|
||
launcherProfile: 'deepseek-profile',
|
||
launcherTargetParam: 'profile',
|
||
install: {
|
||
command: {
|
||
linux: 'npm install -g @deepseek-ai/dsh',
|
||
darwin: 'npm install -g @deepseek-ai/dsh',
|
||
},
|
||
npmPackage: '@deepseek-ai/dsh',
|
||
docsUrl: 'https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness',
|
||
agentImageLayer: {
|
||
kind: 'dedicated',
|
||
reason: 'needs pnpm alongside it (dsh plugin, issue #352) and a dsh-tui profile install',
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
launch: {
|
||
params: {
|
||
// A single path segment: interpolated into the shell line AND joined into a
|
||
// filesystem path, so `path-segment` rather than the looser `id-dotted`.
|
||
profile: { type: 'token', pattern: 'path-segment' },
|
||
// Resolved at spawn time from what is actually installed — see launcherProfile.
|
||
defaultProfile: { type: 'engine', source: 'launcherDefaultTarget' },
|
||
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'id-dotted' },
|
||
resumeSession: { type: 'bool' },
|
||
// Never appears in argv. Declared so `configSetenv` can export it and, more to the
|
||
// point, so `privilegedParams` can clamp it — see capabilities below.
|
||
permissionMode: { type: 'enum', values: ['read-only', 'workspace-write', 'danger-full-access'] },
|
||
// Never appears in argv either; read by the status-bridge setenv profile.
|
||
statusReporting: { type: 'bool' },
|
||
},
|
||
variants: [
|
||
{
|
||
id: 'default',
|
||
args: [
|
||
{ lit: 'dsh' },
|
||
{ flag: '--profile', valueFrom: 'profile', when: { param: 'profile', state: 'set' } },
|
||
// An invalid profile name resolves to undefined, so `profile` reads as UNSET and
|
||
// this arm takes over — reproducing the hand-written builder's fall back to the
|
||
// resolved default rather than failing the spawn outright.
|
||
{
|
||
flag: '--profile',
|
||
valueFrom: 'defaultProfile',
|
||
when: {
|
||
allOf: [
|
||
{ param: 'profile', state: 'unset' },
|
||
{ param: 'defaultProfile', state: 'set' },
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
// The launcher forwards everything after its own flags to the profile's app,
|
||
// which is where --resume is understood. An explicit id wins over the
|
||
// most-recent-session form, mirroring the sibling builders.
|
||
{ flag: '--resume', valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
|
||
{
|
||
flag: '--resume',
|
||
when: {
|
||
allOf: [
|
||
{ param: 'resumeId', state: 'unset' },
|
||
{ param: 'resumeSession', is: true },
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'resumeSessionId' },
|
||
legacyConfigField: 'deepSeekConfig',
|
||
resumeAppend: { style: 'flag', flag: '--resume' },
|
||
},
|
||
env: {
|
||
exports: [{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' }],
|
||
unset: ['NO_COLOR'],
|
||
// DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL is forwarded from the SERVER's own env alongside the API key,
|
||
// which is exactly why a non-granted owner may not override it — see privilegedEnvKeys.
|
||
tmuxSetenvKeys: ['DEEPSEEK_API_KEY', 'DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL', 'DSH_HOME'],
|
||
dockerExecEnvNames: [],
|
||
configSetenv: [{ name: 'DSH_PERMISSION_MODE', fromParam: 'permissionMode' }],
|
||
// Only the vendor namespaces. A dsh settings.yaml can nominate ANY env var as a
|
||
// provider credential (`apiKeyEnv`), so admitting foreign provider keys here would
|
||
// widen one GLOBAL allowlist for every mode at once — the same lesson pi taught.
|
||
allowedPrefixes: ['DSH_', 'DEEPSEEK_'],
|
||
allowedKeys: [],
|
||
setenvProfile: 'deepseek-status-bridge',
|
||
},
|
||
capabilities: {
|
||
...agentDefaults(),
|
||
// Definitive rather than inferred: the harness TUI reports idle/working/blocked to a
|
||
// supervisor and Codeman is that supervisor. 'supervised' rather than 'always' because
|
||
// the session can disarm the bridge, and docker/remote cannot reach it at all.
|
||
hooks: 'supervised',
|
||
transcript: 'deepseek-zstd',
|
||
altScreen: 'strip-mux-only',
|
||
echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' } },
|
||
// Model is NOT a session field for dsh — it is a profile composition entry.
|
||
model: { source: 'none' },
|
||
// Only-if-sent, like codex/antigravity/grok: an ABSENT permissionMode means the
|
||
// launcher's own default, `workspace-write`, which already asks. Clamping to
|
||
// `read-only` instead would break the workspace rather than protect it.
|
||
privilegedParams: [{ param: 'permissionMode', clampTo: 'workspace-write' }],
|
||
// The half no other CLI needs. `DSH_*` is an allowlisted envOverrides prefix and
|
||
// applyEnvOverrides() runs LAST, so without this a non-granted owner could send
|
||
// DSH_PERMISSION_MODE on the same request and land after the config clamp.
|
||
// ⚠️ DEEPSEEK_API_KEY deliberately stays OUT of this list (see the docstring on
|
||
// clampEnvOverridesForOwner() in session-routes.ts): _configureCliEnv() forwards the
|
||
// SERVER's own key into every dsh pane, so DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL is the exfiltration
|
||
// vector, not the key itself — a non-granted owner supplying THEIR OWN key removes
|
||
// privilege rather than granting it, and clamping it here was a real regression
|
||
// (test/deepseek-mode.test.ts) fixed before this shipped.
|
||
privilegedEnvKeys: ['DSH_PERMISSION_MODE', 'DSH_HOME', 'DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL'],
|
||
// Reuses the already-existing DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL/DEEPSEEK_API_KEY keys above. No
|
||
// modelVars — dsh's model is a profile-composition entry (see `model: { source: 'none'
|
||
// }` above), not an env var, so forcing a specific model name may not fully work;
|
||
// verify against a real profile before shipping.
|
||
//
|
||
// ⚠️ appendV1Suffix is REQUIRED, not optional-nice-to-have: without it every request
|
||
// 404s. Confirmed live and by reading dsh's own bundled source
|
||
// (@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm-deepseek): it builds the request URL as
|
||
// `${DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL}/chat/completions` with no "/v1" of its own (its real public
|
||
// API, https://api.deepseek.com, expects the caller's base URL to already carry any
|
||
// needed prefix), while llama-swap/llama.cpp only serves the OpenAI-conventional
|
||
// "/v1/chat/completions" — a bare POST to ".../chat/completions" 404s live, and the
|
||
// 404 reported here originally ("dsh: HTTP_404: DeepSeek API error (HTTP 404)")
|
||
// matches dsh's own error-message template for exactly this failure. See the
|
||
// customModelInjection doc comment in cli-registry/types.ts for the full reasoning,
|
||
// including why claude/gemini must NOT get this.
|
||
customModelInjection: {
|
||
kind: 'env',
|
||
baseUrlVar: 'DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL',
|
||
apiKeyVar: 'DEEPSEEK_API_KEY',
|
||
modelVars: [],
|
||
appendV1Suffix: true,
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
overlays: {
|
||
// No credStore: dsh keeps everything under $DSH_HOME (default ~/.dsh), which is
|
||
// forwarded as a plain env var above rather than seeded as a credential directory.
|
||
},
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
// OMP (`omp`, omp.sh). The plainest entry in the catalog after opencode: no permission
|
||
// flags at all — omp reads its model routing and hooks from `~/.omp/agent`, so the CLI's
|
||
// own config governs and there is deliberately nothing bypass-shaped to clamp. Its only
|
||
// privileged surface is a pair of ENV keys (see privilegedEnvKeys below).
|
||
const OMP: CliEntry = {
|
||
id: 'omp' as CliEntry['id'],
|
||
label: 'OMP',
|
||
shortBadge: 'OM',
|
||
accent: '#818cf8',
|
||
enabled: true,
|
||
stock: true,
|
||
order: 90,
|
||
kind: 'agent',
|
||
discovery: {
|
||
binaries: ['omp'],
|
||
// `~/.local/bin` leads: omp.sh's installer targets it with no `--dir` override
|
||
// (verified against a real `--no-cache` docker build); `~/.omp/bin` is a defensive
|
||
// fallback only.
|
||
searchDirs: [
|
||
HOME_DIRS.local,
|
||
'~/.omp/bin',
|
||
HOME_DIRS.usrLocal,
|
||
HOME_DIRS.bunBin,
|
||
HOME_DIRS.npmGlobal,
|
||
HOME_DIRS.homeBin,
|
||
],
|
||
// A real `omp --version` prints `omp/<semver>`. `omp` is another short generic name, so
|
||
// the `omp/` prefix is what distinguishes the coding agent from anything else of that
|
||
// name — same defence as pi and grok, one notch stricter because the prefix is checked.
|
||
version: { arg: '--version', regex: '(?:^|\\s)omp/(\\d+\\.\\d+\\.\\d+)', requireVersionMatch: true },
|
||
install: {
|
||
command: {
|
||
linux: 'curl -fsSL https://omp.sh/install | sh',
|
||
darwin: 'brew install can1357/tap/omp',
|
||
},
|
||
docsUrl: 'https://omp.sh',
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
launch: {
|
||
params: {
|
||
model: { type: 'token', pattern: 'model' },
|
||
resumeId: { type: 'token', pattern: 'id-dotted' },
|
||
continueSession: { type: 'bool' },
|
||
},
|
||
variants: [
|
||
{
|
||
id: 'default',
|
||
args: [
|
||
{ lit: 'omp' },
|
||
{ flag: '--model', valueFrom: 'model', when: { param: 'model', state: 'set' } },
|
||
// `--resume` and `--continue` conflict; a valid explicit id wins, mirroring the
|
||
// sibling builders (grok/pi/opencode).
|
||
{ flag: '--resume', valueFrom: 'resumeId', when: { param: 'resumeId', state: 'set' } },
|
||
{
|
||
lit: '--continue',
|
||
when: {
|
||
allOf: [
|
||
{ param: 'continueSession', is: true },
|
||
{ param: 'resumeId', state: 'unset' },
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
},
|
||
],
|
||
legacyConfigAliases: { resumeId: 'resumeSessionId' },
|
||
legacyConfigField: 'ompConfig',
|
||
resumeAppend: { style: 'flag', flag: '--resume' },
|
||
},
|
||
env: {
|
||
exports: [{ name: 'COLORTERM', value: 'truecolor' }],
|
||
unset: ['NO_COLOR'],
|
||
// omp's provider credentials live in `~/.omp` config files, not env vars, so there is
|
||
// nothing for the server to forward into the pane.
|
||
tmuxSetenvKeys: [],
|
||
dockerExecEnvNames: [],
|
||
allowedPrefixes: ['OMP_'],
|
||
allowedKeys: [],
|
||
},
|
||
capabilities: {
|
||
...agentDefaults(),
|
||
// Fullscreen alt-screen TUI, same shape as opencode/antigravity/grok: only the
|
||
// tmux-attach-time smcup strip, not Ink's full erase-scrollback+DECSET strip.
|
||
altScreen: 'strip-mux-only',
|
||
// Codeman reads omp's own `~/.omp/agent/sessions/**/*.jsonl` host-side, which is what
|
||
// makes an omp conversation survive a full session kill.
|
||
transcript: 'omp-jsonl',
|
||
echo: { policy: 'buffer', anchor: { kind: 'cursor' } },
|
||
// No permission prompts and no bypass flag, so nothing config-shaped to clamp — the
|
||
// whole privileged surface here is env-shaped.
|
||
privilegedParams: [],
|
||
// Where omp resolves its auth from. No known concrete exfiltration path today (omp
|
||
// forwards no operator-held key into a pane), but a non-granted owner redirecting where
|
||
// a shared multi-tenant deployment resolves auth is not something to allow silently.
|
||
// HOME added for custom-model-injection.ts's omp recipe (see below). Unlike pi,
|
||
// PI_CONFIG_DIR genuinely IS one of the env vars omp reads (per the DeepSeek/OMP
|
||
// note in CLAUDE.md) — but live-testing this feature found it did NOT relocate
|
||
// omp's model config the way expected, while redirecting HOME itself (like pi)
|
||
// worked immediately (verified end-to-end: a real "hello world" reply came back).
|
||
privilegedEnvKeys: ['OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL', 'OMP_AUTH_BROKER_TOKEN', 'HOME'],
|
||
// Verified end-to-end against a real llama-swap server (live-tested, not just
|
||
// researched — a real "hello world" reply came back). Same HOME-redirect mechanism
|
||
// as pi (see its customModelInjection comment for the full reasoning) — omp hardcodes
|
||
// `~/.omp/agent/models.yml` with no dedicated config-dir override either.
|
||
customModelInjection: {
|
||
kind: 'configDir',
|
||
dirEnvVar: 'HOME',
|
||
fileName: '.omp/agent/models.yml',
|
||
template: 'omp-models-yml',
|
||
// Same as pi: omp's own default model has no credential, so without an explicit
|
||
// `--model custom/<id>` it never reaches the injected provider at all.
|
||
launchModel: 'custom/{modelId}',
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
overlays: {
|
||
// `~/.omp/agent` also holds agent.db/history.db/models.db (SQLite caches) and
|
||
// terminal-sessions/blobs/cache (large, regenerable), so only the config files are
|
||
// seeded. UNLIKE pi/grok, `sessions/` is SHARED (RW) rather than host-invisible:
|
||
// Codeman reads it HOST-SIDE for history recovery and `--resume` pinning, the same
|
||
// reason codex's `sessions/` is shared — without it an in-container omp conversation
|
||
// would be invisible to Codeman's own resume logic.
|
||
credStore: {
|
||
rel: '.omp/agent',
|
||
shareDirs: ['sessions'],
|
||
seedFiles: ['config.yml', 'mcp.json', 'models.yml', 'settings.yml'],
|
||
},
|
||
},
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
/** The full stock catalog, in the order the run menu shows by default. */
|
||
export const STOCK_CLIS: CliEntry[] = [CLAUDE, SHELL, OPENCODE, CODEX, GEMINI, ANTIGRAVITY, PI, GROK, DEEPSEEK, OMP];
|