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SessionMode gains 'grok', a first-class backend alongside Claude Code,
shell, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity and Pi: its own PTY, tmux
session, charcoal tab identity ('gk' badge), welcome button, run-mode
entry, cron agentType, Docker and remote-SSH command defaults, and
clone-repo Brain option. Flag surface verified live against grok 1.0.5.
Grok mixes two existing shapes and the wiring follows from that:
- Codex-shaped on permissions: the bypass switch is GrokConfig.alwaysApprove
(--always-approve, grok's bypassPermissions mode; config-level deny rules
still apply on top). The Run button sends it true, like runAntigravity(),
and clampExternalCliBypassForOwner() puts grok in the only-if-sent branch:
a bare grok spawn is grok's own ask-mode default, which is already safe,
so only a sent config needs the flag forced off. Cron needs nothing for
the same reason.
- OpenCode-shaped on rendering: grok is a fullscreen alternate-screen TUI
with mouse support, so it stays OUT of isAltScreenStripMode() and lands
on the narrow tmux-attach strip and the 'buffer' local-echo fallthrough
(unmeasured against an authenticated composer; documented fallback is the
'off' branch).
- Pi-shaped on resolution: 'grok' has npm squatters (@vibe-kit/grok-cli
also installs a grok bin), so grok-cli-resolver.ts version-probes every
candidate (grok --version, killSignal SIGKILL, VITEST-gated) and
GET /api/grok/status surfaces path AND version; GROK_VERSION_REGEX is
shared with the dependency registry so doctor and run mode cannot drift.
Env allowlist gains GROK_* plus the XAI_* vendor namespace (XAI_API_KEY is
grok's documented headless auth var), the same narrow-vendor reasoning as
GOOGLE_* for gemini. Resume is id-regexed on purpose: grok's own --resume
also matches session titles, which are arbitrary user strings that must
never reach the bash -c spawn line.
Docker: grok is not on npm, so the agent image installs it in its own step
(xAI's installer has no --dir override; the binary is copied to
/usr/local/bin and root's ~/.grok dropped in the same layer), and
credentials are seeded per-file (auth.json, config.toml, pager.toml; the
dir also holds sessions/, memory/ and the ~160MB binary). Remote SSH routes
through the login-shell wrapper like the other agent CLIs.
Verified end to end on an isolated CODEMAN_INSTANCE with grok 1.0.5
installed: /api/grok/status resolves and reports the probed version,
quick-start spawns a pane whose command line ends in 'grok
--always-approve', the real TUI renders (OAuth device screen on an
unauthenticated box), and grokConfig round-trips through state.json.
Docs: docs/grok-integration.md (user guide) + docs/grok-integration-plan.md
(decisions, verification record, follow-ups).
Tests: test/grok-mode.test.ts, test/grok-cli-resolver.test.ts, plus
extended clamp/system-routes/render-index-html/run-mode-ui/mobile-overview/
local-echo-gating coverage. npm test (the CI gate) green: 5910 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
160 lines
6.6 KiB
TypeScript
160 lines
6.6 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* First coverage for `clampExternalCliBypassForOwner` (session-routes.ts), the
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* multi-user §6.3 gate that keeps a NON-GRANTED owner from launching an external
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* CLI with its safety switches off. It backs both `POST /api/sessions` and
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* `POST /api/quick-start` and, until pi was added, had no tests at all.
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*
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* The helper has two shapes and the difference is the whole point:
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* - only-if-sent (codex, antigravity, grok): an ABSENT config already spawns safe, so
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* only a sent config needs its flag forced off.
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* - MATERIALIZE (gemini, pi): the absent-config default is itself unsafe for a
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* non-granted owner (gemini's builder defaults to `yolo`; pi's default is an
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* interactive trust prompt the session user could just answer "yes" to), so
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* the clamp has to CREATE a config.
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*/
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import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
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import { _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner } from '../../src/web/routes/session-routes.js';
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import { createUser, invalidateUsersCache } from '../../src/user-store.js';
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const PASSWORD = 'clamp-test-password';
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describe('clampExternalCliBypassForOwner — single-user mode', () => {
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it('passes every config through untouched (the gate is a no-op)', async () => {
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const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner(
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undefined,
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{ dangerouslyBypassApprovals: true },
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{ approvalMode: 'yolo' },
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{ dangerouslySkipPermissions: true },
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{ approveProjectTrust: true },
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{ alwaysApprove: true }
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);
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expect(out.codexConfig).toEqual({ dangerouslyBypassApprovals: true });
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expect(out.geminiConfig).toEqual({ approvalMode: 'yolo' });
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expect(out.antigravityConfig).toEqual({ dangerouslySkipPermissions: true });
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expect(out.piConfig).toEqual({ approveProjectTrust: true });
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expect(out.grokConfig).toEqual({ alwaysApprove: true });
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});
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it('leaves absent configs absent', async () => {
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const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner(undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined);
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expect(out.codexConfig).toBeUndefined();
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expect(out.geminiConfig).toBeUndefined();
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expect(out.antigravityConfig).toBeUndefined();
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expect(out.piConfig).toBeUndefined();
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expect(out.grokConfig).toBeUndefined();
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});
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});
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describe('clampExternalCliBypassForOwner — multi-user mode', () => {
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// The temp HOME from test/setup.ts is per-FILE, so users.json survives between
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// tests here — create the three accounts once.
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beforeAll(async () => {
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process.env.CODEMAN_MULTIUSER = '1';
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invalidateUsersCache();
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await createUser({ username: 'boss', role: 'admin', password: PASSWORD });
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await createUser({ username: 'peon', role: 'user', password: PASSWORD });
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await createUser({ username: 'trusted', role: 'user', password: PASSWORD, canBypassPermissions: true });
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});
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afterAll(() => {
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delete process.env.CODEMAN_MULTIUSER;
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invalidateUsersCache();
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});
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it('passes through for an admin owner', async () => {
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const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner(
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'boss',
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{ dangerouslyBypassApprovals: true },
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undefined,
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{ dangerouslySkipPermissions: true },
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{ approveProjectTrust: true },
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{ alwaysApprove: true }
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);
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expect(out.codexConfig).toEqual({ dangerouslyBypassApprovals: true });
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expect(out.geminiConfig).toBeUndefined();
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expect(out.antigravityConfig).toEqual({ dangerouslySkipPermissions: true });
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expect(out.piConfig).toEqual({ approveProjectTrust: true });
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expect(out.grokConfig).toEqual({ alwaysApprove: true });
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});
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it('passes through for a user holding the bypass grant', async () => {
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const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner(
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'trusted',
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undefined,
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undefined,
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undefined,
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{ approveProjectTrust: true },
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{ alwaysApprove: true }
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);
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expect(out.piConfig).toEqual({ approveProjectTrust: true });
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expect(out.grokConfig).toEqual({ alwaysApprove: true });
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});
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it('forces codex/antigravity/grok bypass off for a non-granted owner (only-if-sent branch)', async () => {
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const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner(
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'peon',
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{ dangerouslyBypassApprovals: true, model: 'gpt-5' },
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undefined,
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{ dangerouslySkipPermissions: true, model: 'gemini-3-pro' },
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undefined,
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{ alwaysApprove: true, model: 'grok-4.5' }
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);
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expect(out.codexConfig).toEqual({ dangerouslyBypassApprovals: false, model: 'gpt-5' });
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expect(out.antigravityConfig).toEqual({ dangerouslySkipPermissions: false, model: 'gemini-3-pro' });
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expect(out.grokConfig).toEqual({ alwaysApprove: false, model: 'grok-4.5' });
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});
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it('leaves codex/antigravity/grok absent when nothing was sent (they already spawn safe)', async () => {
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const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner('peon', undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined);
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expect(out.codexConfig).toBeUndefined();
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expect(out.antigravityConfig).toBeUndefined();
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expect(out.grokConfig).toBeUndefined();
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});
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it('MATERIALIZES gemini to auto_edit even when no config was sent', async () => {
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const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner('peon', undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined);
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expect(out.geminiConfig).toEqual({ approvalMode: 'auto_edit' });
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});
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it('MATERIALIZES pi to --no-approve even when no config was sent', async () => {
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// The load-bearing case: omitting --approve is NOT a clamp for pi, because
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// pi's own default is to ASK, and the session user can answer that prompt.
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const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner('peon', undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined);
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expect(out.piConfig).toEqual({ approveProjectTrust: false });
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});
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it('forces a sent pi approveProjectTrust:true down to false, keeping other fields', async () => {
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const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner(
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'peon',
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undefined,
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undefined,
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undefined,
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{
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approveProjectTrust: true,
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model: 'sonnet:high',
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provider: 'anthropic',
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},
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undefined
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);
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expect(out.piConfig).toEqual({
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approveProjectTrust: false,
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model: 'sonnet:high',
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provider: 'anthropic',
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});
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});
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it('fails closed for an unknown/deleted owner', async () => {
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const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner(
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'ghost',
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undefined,
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undefined,
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undefined,
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{ approveProjectTrust: true },
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{ alwaysApprove: true }
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);
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expect(out.piConfig).toEqual({ approveProjectTrust: false });
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expect(out.geminiConfig).toEqual({ approvalMode: 'auto_edit' });
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expect(out.grokConfig).toEqual({ alwaysApprove: false });
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});
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});
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