Files
Codeman/src
Codeman maintainer 93df8188a5 fix(clone): harden per review: symlink-safe scaffolding, race-safe cleanup, decode guard, bounded git queue
Addresses all four findings from the #251 review:

- Scaffolding no longer writes through repository-controlled symlinks.
  The guard lives in hooks-config.ts (settingsWriteBlocker) so it also
  covers quick-start/docker/ralph writers, not just the clone route:
  refuses a symlinked .claude or settings.local.json, a .claude that is
  a file, or one resolving outside the case. The clone route surfaces
  the refusal as a user-visible warning, and the CLAUDE.md write checks
  presence via lstat so a BROKEN repo-shipped symlink counts as present
  (existsSync follows links and would have created the outside target).

- Failed-clone cleanup can no longer delete a concurrent winner's tree:
  git clones into an attempt-owned temp sibling (.<name>.cloning-<rand>)
  which is atomically renamed into place; the loser reports
  DESTINATION_EXISTS and only ever removes its own temp dir.

- decodeURIComponent(url.pathname) is guarded: malformed percent-escapes
  now come back as BAD_SYNTAX instead of an uncaught URIError 500.

- The git pool's waiter queue is bounded (CODEMAN_MAX_GIT_QUEUE, default
  16): overflow answers BUSY immediately (HTTP 429 via RATE_LIMITED),
  and queue time counts against the operation's own deadline.

Tests: hostile symlink fixture repo (route level), settingsWriteBlocker
units, concurrent same-destination race, temp-dir leak assertions,
percent-escape rejection, and a fake-git pool-bounds suite.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 00:07:01 +02:00
..
2026-05-31 05:17:07 +02:00
2026-07-20 02:36:02 +02:00
2026-02-18 12:51:35 +01:00
2026-08-09 01:18:03 +02:00
2026-08-09 01:18:03 +02:00