Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WKtW48T1UjAaecHAJxKobE
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Web Tabs (dashboards as Codeman tabs)
Open any dashboard you run, Grafana, Uptime Kuma, Portainer, a status page on port 4000, as a tab beside your Claude/Codex/Antigravity sessions. Codeman becomes one mission control instead of Codeman plus a pile of browser tabs.
Using it
- Click the chevron next to Run to expand the dropdown.
- Under Web / URL, pick Add dashboard...
- Give it a name and a URL, optionally hit Test, then Save.
The dashboard opens as a tab immediately, and appears in the Run dropdown from then
on. Web tabs sit in the same strip as session tabs, continue the same Alt+1..9
numbering, and carry a globe icon so they never read as a running agent.
Closing a tab (the x) only closes it. The saved dashboard stays in the dropdown.
To delete it for good, use the x on its dropdown row (the tab's own x is
close, not delete). Each dropdown row also has a gear for editing, so a saved URL
can be changed or removed without opening it first.
Switching tabs does not reload a dashboard. Frames stay alive in the background,
so a dashboard that took a while to authenticate is still there when you come back.
Past six live frames the least-recently-viewed one is dropped to bound memory
(CODEMAN_MAX_LIVE_WEBVIEW_FRAMES).
Why dashboards are proxied
A plain <iframe src="http://your-box:4000"> does not work in the setup Codeman
actually ships in, for three separate reasons:
| Blocker | What happens |
|---|---|
| Mixed content | Production serves HTTPS (behind tailscale serve). Browsers hard-block http:// iframes on an HTTPS page, with no override, and none at all on iOS Safari. |
| Framing refusal | Grafana, Portainer, Home Assistant and many others send X-Frame-Options: DENY or frame-ancestors 'none'. |
| Codeman's CSP | default-src 'self' means frame-src falls back to 'self', so a cross-origin iframe is blocked before it starts. |
Serving the dashboard through Codeman's own origin dissolves all three. So by
default a web tab loads /webview/<capability>/ on Codeman, and Codeman relays to
the dashboard: stripping the framing refusal, rewriting redirects, cookies and
root-absolute URLs, and relaying WebSockets so live panels actually update.
A useful consequence: the dashboard is fetched from the Codeman server, so a
tailnet-only or localhost-only dashboard works from any device that can reach
Codeman, including a phone that is not on the tailnet.
direct mode (a plain cross-origin iframe) still exists and is cheaper, but it only
works for an HTTPS dashboard that permits framing. The Test button probes from
the server and tells you which mode applies. Note what Test actually verifies:
server-to-upstream reachability, nothing else. It does not exercise the browser
sandbox, cookies, CORS, CSP, or any reverse proxy sitting in front of Codeman, so a
passing Test does not guarantee the embedded page will render (see the
cookie-authenticated reverse proxy caveat below).
The sandbox, and when to turn it off
Because a proxied dashboard is served from Codeman's own address, it is same-origin with Codeman as far as the browser is concerned. Left unchecked, its JavaScript could read the Codeman page and call the API that spawns agents.
So the iframe is sandboxed without allow-same-origin by default. The page runs
in an opaque origin: it cannot touch Codeman, and it gets no cookies or
localStorage of its own.
Unchecking Open sandboxed grants allow-same-origin. Do that only for a
dashboard you fully trust, and only if you need it, which in practice means a
dashboard with its own login that stores a session in a cookie or localStorage.
Even in trusted mode, Codeman never forwards its own credentials upstream: the
Authorization header and the codeman_session cookie are stripped on the way out,
so CODEMAN_PASSWORD cannot leak into a dashboard.
⚠️ Sandboxed tabs may not work when Codeman itself is behind a cookie-authenticated reverse proxy (Cloudflare Access, Authelia, oauth2-proxy and similar). The sandboxed frame is opaque-origin, so its stylesheet, script, and API requests do not carry the proxy's authentication cookie; the proxy redirects them to the login provider, where CORS/CSP kills them, and the embedded app renders unstyled or broken while the Codeman page around it works fine. Trusted mode (Open sandboxed off) keeps a real origin and the cookie, so it works. The Test button cannot catch this: it checks that the Codeman server can reach the upstream, not that a sandboxed browser frame can load assets through the public authentication layer.
How the proxy authenticates
A sandboxed iframe is opaque-origin, so every request it makes is cross-site: the
SameSite=lax session cookie is not sent, and writes and WebSocket upgrades arrive
with Origin: null. Cookie auth cannot work.
Instead, opening a dashboard mints a capability: 192 bits of entropy in the URL path, held in memory only, with a rolling 12-hour TTL, bound to the user who minted it, and granting exactly one thing, relaying bytes to that one saved URL. Editing or deleting a dashboard revokes it, and a server restart invalidates every outstanding capability (tabs re-mint transparently on next click).
Limits and env vars
| Variable | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
CODEMAN_MAX_WEBVIEWS |
50 | Saved dashboards per owner |
CODEMAN_MAX_LIVE_WEBVIEW_FRAMES |
6 | Iframes kept mounted at once |
CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_CAPABILITY_TTL_MS |
12h | Rolling capability lifetime |
CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_TIMEOUT_MS |
30000 | Upstream request timeout |
CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS |
8000 | Timeout for the Test button |
CODEMAN_MAX_WEBVIEW_HTML_BYTES |
8MB | Largest HTML document rewritten |
CODEMAN_MAX_WEBVIEW_SOCKETS |
8 | Concurrent proxied WebSockets per dashboard |
Saved dashboards live in ~/.codeman/webviews.json. Which tabs you have open is
per-device (localStorage), since that is workspace layout rather than config.
How a dashboard's own API calls keep working
Worth knowing, because it is where this feature does its least obvious work. Three layers cooperate so a dashboard talking to its own backend just works:
<base href>handles relative URLs in the markup.- Attribute rewriting handles root-absolute
src/href/actionin the page the proxy serves. - A small injected script rebases URLs built at runtime, which the first two
cannot see:
fetch('/api/data')andnew WebSocket('/live'), but equallycard.innerHTML = '<img src="/api/hero">',img.src = '/api/slide', andurl(/img.png)inside a<style>the page injects. That second group is why images are covered too. A dashboard that renders its thumbnails from script would otherwise show all its data and none of its pictures, because<base>does not apply to root-absolute URLs and the attribute rewriting only ever saw the initial document. - As a last resort, a request that still lands on Codeman's own root is relayed
using its
Refererto identify the dashboard. This only fires for a request that already missed every Codeman route, and never for one that resolves to a real route, which is what keeps it from being an authentication bypass.
On top of that, the proxy answers those requests with CORS headers. That sounds
wrong for same-host requests, but a sandboxed iframe has an opaque origin, so the
browser treats every one of its fetch/XHR calls as cross-origin even though the
URL is on Codeman itself. Without those headers, a dashboard renders perfectly and
then every API call fails, which looks like the dashboard being broken.
Known limits
- Exotic loaders. The layers above cover normal
fetch/XHR/WebSocket/ EventSource, normal markup, the DOM sinks a page uses to build markup at runtime, andurl()inside stylesheets. Something that constructs requests by an unusual route can still slip through. Symptom: the page renders but a panel stays empty. - Root-absolute
locationnavigation. A dashboard that navigates itself withlocation.href = '/login'escapes the prefix, becauseLocation.hrefis unforgeable and cannot be patched the way the other sinks are. A relativelocation.href = 'login'is fine (<base>covers it). - Cross-origin redirects are not followed. If a dashboard bounces to a different host (an external SSO provider, say), the proxy hands the redirect back unchanged rather than relaying it, because relaying would make this an open proxy. Use Open in new tab for those.
- Login-protected dashboards need trusted mode, since a sandboxed frame has no cookie jar. A server-side per-dashboard cookie jar would lift this and is the natural next step if it becomes annoying.
- Cookie-authenticated reverse proxies in front of Codeman break sandboxed tabs (#238). The sandboxed frame's requests carry no auth cookie, so the proxy bounces them to its login provider and the app loads broken while Test reports reachable. Use trusted mode behind Cloudflare Access and friends; see the warning above.
- Slow endpoints and the upstream timeout (#237). The proxy waits
CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_TIMEOUT_MS(default 300s) for the upstream's response headers, then streams the body without any time bound; a header timeout is logged server-side and answered as a 502 that names the limit. WebSocket handshakes use the separateCODEMAN_WEBVIEW_WS_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS(default 30s). - Not a security boundary, with one carve-out. The proxy reaches whatever the
Codeman server can reach (a
localhostdashboard is the point), so it is not an escalation for someone who already commands--dangerously-skip-permissionsagents, but in multi-user mode it does mean a non-admin user's dashboard is fetched from the server's network position. The carve-out: link-local and cloud-metadata addresses (169.254.0.0/16,fe80::/10,fd00:ec2::254, Azure's168.63.129.16, Alibaba's100.100.100.200, themetadata.google.internalalias) are refused at save time AND at connect time, judged on the address a name actually resolves to. Nothing anyone embeds as a dashboard lives there; an instance's IAM credentials do. - The proxy URL is a bearer credential.
/webview/<cap>/...needs no cookie, so treat it like a password. It is revoked when you log out, when an admin logs you out, and when your account is deleted, and it expires after 12 hours without use. Proxied responses carryReferrer-Policy: same-origin, so a dashboard that links to third-party sites does not hand them the URL.
Where the code lives
| Concern | File |
|---|---|
| Pure rewrite helpers | src/web/webview-proxy.ts |
| Routes + proxy + sockets | src/web/routes/webview-routes.ts |
| Capability tokens | src/webview-capabilities.ts |
| Persistence | src/webview-store.ts |
| Limits | src/config/webview-limits.ts |
| Frontend | src/web/public/webview-tabs.js |
| Auth exemption | src/web/middleware/auth.ts |