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WebviewCapabilityStore.revokeOwner() shipped for two releases with a docstring claiming logout called it and no caller at all. The capability is a bearer credential exempt from cookie auth with a rolling TTL refreshed on every use, so a proxy URL that leaked (browser history, a screenshot, a dashboard with a loose referrer policy) stayed valid for as long as anything kept polling it. - POST /api/logout revokes the caller's capabilities (all of them in single-user mode), the admin forced logout revokes the target user's, and user deletion revokes whatever that user had open. revokeOwner returns the count for the admin audit line. - Proxied responses carry `Referrer-Policy: same-origin` and the upstream's own policy is dropped: every URL inside the frame carries the capability, and a dashboard on no-referrer-when-downgrade or unsafe-url handed it to any third-party host it linked. Verified with Playwright that a sandboxed frame under an upstream `unsafe-url` sends no Referer to a third party while the root-absolute fetch and the CSS-triggered 404 fallback still reach the dashboard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WKtW48T1UjAaecHAJxKobE