Files
Codeman/src/web/routes/cron-routes.ts
T
Codeman maintainer ccb3afc9ee fix(multiuser): close cross-user web-layer scoping holes found in review
The opt-in multi-user feature's only enforcement is web-layer scoping
(all sessions share one OS account). An adversarial review found 8 critical
+ 7 high cross-user holes that defeated it, plus mediums; all fixed here.
Single-user (flag-off) behavior stays byte-identical apart from documented
consistency deltas.

Ownership / confinement:
- DELETE /api/sessions (bulk) + /:id now owner-scope / findSessionOrFail
- quick-start, cron (create+fire), scheduled runs confine workingDir to the
  owner's space; case link/docker-link/docker-import confine the host path
- resolveCasePath no longer resolves linked cases for non-admins; foreign
  remote/docker cases are skipped (fall through to the caller's own local case)
- history, subagents/workflows, mux-sessions, orchestrator, cron run-history,
  away-digest, and remote/docker host reads are owner- or admin-scoped

Permission policy (section 6.3):
- non-granted users are downgraded at every spawn site incl. legacy
  /api/scheduled, PlanOrchestrator one-shots, remote launch, and the cron-fire
  gemini/codex bypass switches; resolveClaudeModeForUsername now fails closed

Auth / store:
- verify-first login throttle (a correct password is never locked out),
  /ws terminal subject to the change-password lockbox, cookie fast-path
  re-validates identity live, role/grant changes revoke sessions, admin delete
  runs the last-admin guard before any teardown
- users.json: distinguish missing (ENOENT) from corrupt/unreadable so a bad
  read can't overwrite all accounts; unique per-process temp write path

Event streams:
- debounced session:updated + batched task:updated, clipboard, and push
  notifications route by owner (fail closed); getLightState hides machine-wide
  globalStats from non-admins

Tests: two suites updated to assert the fixed (secure) behavior. tsc, eslint,
and test:ci all green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 12:33:12 +02:00

138 lines
6.6 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* @fileoverview Cron Jobs routes.
*
* CRUD + enable/disable + Run Now + run history for `CronJob`s. These are
* separate from the legacy `/api/scheduled` (ScheduledRun) endpoints — see
* docs/cron-discovery.md §0.
*/
import { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { ApiErrorCode, createErrorResponse } from '../../types.js';
import { CronJobSchema, CronJobUpdateSchema, CronJobEnabledSchema } from '../schemas.js';
import { canAccessOwned, getAuthUser, isWorkingDirAllowed, ownerFor, parseBody } from '../route-helpers.js';
import { canUsernameRunPrivilegedCommands } from '../../user-store.js';
import { isMultiUserMode } from '../../config/multiuser.js';
import type { CronJob } from '../../types/cron.js';
import type { CronPort } from '../ports/index.js';
import type { FastifyRequest } from 'fastify';
export function registerCronRoutes(app: FastifyInstance, ctx: CronPort): void {
// A job the caller may see/act on (own, or admin/single-user).
const canTouch = (req: FastifyRequest, job: CronJob | null | undefined): job is CronJob =>
!!job && canAccessOwned(getAuthUser(req), job.owner);
// ── Jobs ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
app.get('/api/cron/jobs', async (req) => {
const jobs = ctx.cron.listJobs();
if (!isMultiUserMode()) return jobs;
const user = getAuthUser(req);
if (user.role === 'admin') return jobs;
return (jobs as CronJob[]).filter((j) => canAccessOwned(user, j.owner));
});
app.post('/api/cron/jobs', async (req) => {
// No custom errorMessage: surface the schema's field-specific messages
// (e.g. "runAt is required for a one-time schedule").
const body = parseBody(CronJobSchema, req.body);
// Section 6.2: confine the job's workingDir to the owner's case space (mirrors
// POST /api/sessions). No-op allow-all for admins/single-user. workingDir is
// required by CronJobSchema so it is always present here.
if (!isWorkingDirAllowed(getAuthUser(req), body.workingDir)) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.FORBIDDEN, 'workingDir is outside your workspace');
}
// Section 6.3: shell mode / a launchCommand is arbitrary host-account execution.
// Resolve the owner's grant from the store (AuthUser.role alone can't tell a GRANTED
// regular user from a plain one); mirrors session-routes + the cron fire-time re-check.
if (
(body.agentType === 'shell' || body.launchCommand) &&
!(await canUsernameRunPrivilegedCommands(ownerFor(req)))
) {
return createErrorResponse(
ApiErrorCode.FORBIDDEN,
'Shell/launchCommand cron jobs require the can-bypass-permissions grant'
);
}
return { job: ctx.cron.createJob(body, ownerFor(req)) };
});
app.get('/api/cron/jobs/:id', async (req) => {
const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
const job = ctx.cron.getJob(id);
if (!canTouch(req, job)) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Cron job not found');
return job;
});
app.put('/api/cron/jobs/:id', async (req) => {
const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
if (!canTouch(req, ctx.cron.getJob(id))) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Cron job not found');
const body = parseBody(CronJobUpdateSchema, req.body);
// Section 6.2: the update body is partial, so only confine when workingDir is set.
if (body.workingDir !== undefined && !isWorkingDirAllowed(getAuthUser(req), body.workingDir)) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.FORBIDDEN, 'workingDir is outside your workspace');
}
if (
(body.agentType === 'shell' || body.launchCommand) &&
!(await canUsernameRunPrivilegedCommands(ownerFor(req)))
) {
return createErrorResponse(
ApiErrorCode.FORBIDDEN,
'Shell/launchCommand cron jobs require the can-bypass-permissions grant'
);
}
const job = ctx.cron.updateJob(id, body);
if (!job) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Cron job not found');
return { job };
});
app.delete('/api/cron/jobs/:id', async (req) => {
const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
if (!canTouch(req, ctx.cron.getJob(id)) || !ctx.cron.deleteJob(id)) {
return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Cron job not found');
}
return {};
});
app.put('/api/cron/jobs/:id/enabled', async (req) => {
const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
if (!canTouch(req, ctx.cron.getJob(id))) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Cron job not found');
const { enabled } = parseBody(CronJobEnabledSchema, req.body, 'Invalid request body');
const job = ctx.cron.setEnabled(id, enabled);
if (!job) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Cron job not found');
return { job };
});
// ── Run Now ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
app.post('/api/cron/jobs/:id/run', async (req) => {
const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
const job = ctx.cron.getJob(id);
if (!canTouch(req, job)) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Cron job not found');
const run = await ctx.cron.runNow(id);
return { run, activeAgents: ctx.cron.countActiveAgents(job.agentType, job.id) };
});
// ── Run history ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
app.get('/api/cron/jobs/:id/runs', async (req) => {
const { id } = req.params as { id: string };
// Owner-gate like every other :id handler so a foreign job's run history (session
// ids, names, deep links) isn't leaked; NOT_FOUND avoids disclosing existence.
if (!canTouch(req, ctx.cron.getJob(id))) return createErrorResponse(ApiErrorCode.NOT_FOUND, 'Cron job not found');
return ctx.cron.listRuns(id);
});
app.get('/api/cron/runs', async (req) => {
const runs = ctx.cron.listRuns();
if (!isMultiUserMode()) return runs;
const user = getAuthUser(req);
if (user.role === 'admin') return runs;
// Non-admin: keep only runs whose owning job the caller can access (drops runs
// whose job is absent from the map — defensive; deleteJob already cascades).
const ownerByJobId = new Map<string, string | undefined>(
ctx.cron.listJobs().map((j): [string, string | undefined] => [j.id, j.owner])
);
return runs.filter((run) => canAccessOwned(user, ownerByJobId.get(run.cronJobId)));
});
}