Files
Codeman/src/session-cli-builder.ts
T
Codeman maintainer 453605a58f feat(multiuser): phase 3, ownership threading + scoping
Threads per-user ownership through sessions, cases, cron, and the permission
policy. All scoping is a no-op in single-user mode (isMultiUserMode() guards).

Sessions
- Session.owner stamped at every create path from req.authUser / job.owner:
  POST /api/sessions, /api/run, /api/quick-start, ralph start, cron launch,
  plan generation. Round-trips through recovery (MuxSession.owner mirror, read
  muxSession.owner ?? savedState?.owner) and the mux layer.
- findSessionOrFail(ctx, id, req) now does a NOT_FOUND owner check (never 403, so
  other users' session existence is not leaked); wired at ~50 call sites.
- List endpoints filtered by owner: GET /api/sessions, /api/sessions/unified
  (live+persisted+lifecycle scoped, host-wide transcripts admin-only), cron jobs.

Permission policy (section 6.3)
- resolveClaudeModeForUsername wraps getClaudeModeConfig at every spawn site so a
  non-granted user is forced to --permission-mode auto (bypass -> auto), including
  recovery (or a reboot would un-downgrade). buildPromptArgs now respects the
  session's claudeMode, closing the one-shot (runPrompt) bypass hole.
- Shell mode and cron launchCommand require canBypassPermissions: 403 at
  POST /api/sessions, /api/quick-start create, cron job create, AND cron fire time
  (re-checked against the owner's current grant).

Cases
- resolveCasesDir(user): per-user ~/codeman-users/<name>/cases in multi-user, the
  shared ~/codeman-cases otherwise. All case CRUD + ralph + plan + quick-start
  resolve through it. resolveCasePath is owner-aware.
- GET /api/cases scoped per user (own folders; legacy linked cases admin-only;
  remote/docker cases owner-filtered). RemoteCase/DockerCase gain owner, stamped
  at link/quickcreate/import.
- Remote + Docker host CRUD is admin-only.
- Non-admin workingDir confinement (the linchpin): realpath must resolve inside the
  user's space, enforced at POST /api/sessions and /api/run BEFORE any disk write.

Limits
- sessionCapacityState / sessionCapacityMessage centralize the global + per-user
  cap (CODEMAN_MAX_SESSIONS_PER_USER, default global/2), replacing the 6 copy-pasted
  MAX_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS checks.

Tests: test/ownership-scoping.test.ts (case isolation, host-CRUD gate, workingDir +
shell gates, and the scoping helpers). Deferred to phase 4: WS owner gate, SSE
fan-out filtering, file-route preview/thumbnail helper scoping, push routing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 04:02:46 +02:00

187 lines
6.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* @fileoverview Pure functions for building CLI arguments and environment variables
* for Claude and OpenCode CLI spawning.
*
* Extracted from Session to keep argument construction logic testable and
* separate from PTY lifecycle management.
*
* @module session-cli-builder
*/
import type { ClaudeMode, EffortLevel } from './types.js';
import { isEffortLevel } from './types.js';
import { getAugmentedPath } from './utils/index.js';
import { dataPath } from './config/instance.js';
/**
* Build Claude CLI permission flags based on the configured mode.
* Returns an array of args to pass to the CLI.
*/
function buildPermissionArgs(claudeMode: ClaudeMode, allowedTools?: string): string[] {
switch (claudeMode) {
case 'dangerously-skip-permissions':
return ['--dangerously-skip-permissions'];
case 'auto':
return ['--permission-mode', 'auto'];
case 'allowedTools':
if (allowedTools) {
return ['--allowedTools', allowedTools];
}
// Fall back to normal mode if no tools specified
return [];
case 'normal':
default:
return [];
}
}
/**
* Build the CLI args carrying the effort level as a SOFT default (switchable
* in-session via /effort). The CLAUDE_CODE_EFFORT_LEVEL env var is deliberately
* avoided — it hard-locks effort and blocks in-session `/effort` switching.
*
* Two carriers are needed because neither covers all levels:
* - regular levels (incl. `max`) → `--effort <level>` (the settings `effortLevel`
* key is enum(["low","medium","high","xhigh"]) with .catch(undefined), so `max`
* would be SILENTLY dropped there)
* - `ultracode` → `--settings '{"ultracode":true}'` (its own boolean settings key,
* claude >= 2.1.154; rejected by the --effort flag)
*/
export function buildEffortCliArgs(effort?: EffortLevel): string[] {
if (!effort || !isEffortLevel(effort)) return [];
return effort === 'ultracode' ? ['--settings', '{"ultracode":true}'] : ['--effort', effort];
}
/**
* Build args for an interactive Claude CLI session (direct PTY, non-mux fallback).
*
* @param sessionId - The Codeman session ID (passed as --session-id to Claude)
* @param claudeMode - Permission mode for the CLI
* @param model - Optional model override (e.g., 'opus', 'sonnet')
* @param allowedTools - Optional comma-separated allowed tools list
* @param effort - Optional effort level, injected via --settings (overridable in-session)
* @returns Array of CLI arguments
*/
export function buildInteractiveArgs(
sessionId: string,
claudeMode: ClaudeMode,
model?: string,
allowedTools?: string,
effort?: EffortLevel
): string[] {
const args = [...buildPermissionArgs(claudeMode, allowedTools), '--session-id', sessionId];
if (model) args.push('--model', model);
args.push(...buildEffortCliArgs(effort));
return args;
}
/**
* Build args for a one-shot Claude CLI prompt (runPrompt mode).
*
* @param prompt - The prompt text to send
* @param model - Optional model override
* @returns Array of CLI arguments
*/
export function buildPromptArgs(
prompt: string,
model?: string,
claudeMode: ClaudeMode = 'dangerously-skip-permissions',
allowedTools?: string
): string[] {
// Respect the session's permission mode instead of always skipping, so a
// multi-user non-granted user's one-shot runs classifier-guarded (auto) rather
// than with full bypass. Defaults to skip-permissions (unchanged single-user).
const args = ['-p', '--verbose', ...buildPermissionArgs(claudeMode, allowedTools), '--output-format', 'stream-json'];
if (model) {
args.push('--model', model);
}
args.push(prompt);
return args;
}
/**
* Build environment variables for Claude CLI processes (direct PTY, non-mux).
*
* Augments process.env with:
* - UTF-8 locale settings
* - Augmented PATH (includes Claude CLI directory)
* - xterm-256color terminal type
* - Codeman session identification vars
*
* @param sessionId - The Codeman session ID
* @returns Environment variables object for pty.spawn
*/
export function buildClaudeEnv(sessionId: string): Record<string, string | undefined> {
const env: Record<string, string | undefined> = {
...process.env,
LANG: 'en_US.UTF-8',
LC_ALL: 'en_US.UTF-8',
PATH: getAugmentedPath(),
TERM: 'xterm-256color',
// Inform Claude it's running within Codeman (helps prevent self-termination)
CODEMAN_MUX: '1',
CODEMAN_SESSION_ID: sessionId,
CODEMAN_API_URL: process.env.CODEMAN_API_URL || 'http://localhost:3000',
// Path only (not the secret value) — hook curls cat it at execution time (COD-54)
CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE: dataPath('hook-secret'),
};
// COD-115: `delete`, not `= undefined` — node-pty serializes a present-with-undefined
// key as the literal string "KEY=undefined" (see buildMuxAttachEnv below).
delete env.COLORTERM;
delete env.CLAUDECODE;
return env;
}
/**
* Build environment variables for mux-attached PTY sessions (tmux attach).
* Lighter than buildClaudeEnv — no PATH augmentation or Codeman vars needed
* since the mux session already has those set.
*
* @param truecolorEnabled - When true, set COLORTERM=truecolor (COD-75 opt-in);
* otherwise leave COLORTERM unset. Mirrors buildEnvExports() so both paths agree.
* @returns Environment variables object for pty.spawn
*/
export function buildMuxAttachEnv(truecolorEnabled?: boolean): Record<string, string | undefined> {
const env: Record<string, string | undefined> = {
...process.env,
LANG: 'en_US.UTF-8',
LC_ALL: 'en_US.UTF-8',
TERM: 'xterm-256color',
};
// COD-115: keys to UNSET must be `delete`d, NOT set to `undefined`. On a
// `{...process.env}` spread the key stays present with value undefined, and node-pty
// serializes it as the literal string "TMUX=undefined" — a non-empty value that still
// trips tmux's nesting guard, killing the attach-bridge PTY (exit 1 → respawn loop).
// The server can be launched from inside tmux; attach clients must never inherit that
// parent tmux context. (Same fix the working create path uses in tmux-manager.ts.)
delete env.TMUX;
delete env.TMUX_PANE;
delete env.CLAUDECODE;
if (truecolorEnabled) {
env.COLORTERM = 'truecolor';
} else {
delete env.COLORTERM; // COD-75: unset for non-truecolor (was `: undefined`, same node-pty quirk)
}
return env;
}
/**
* Build environment variables for a direct shell session (non-mux fallback).
*
* @param sessionId - The Codeman session ID
* @returns Environment variables object for pty.spawn
*/
export function buildShellEnv(sessionId: string): Record<string, string | undefined> {
return {
...process.env,
LANG: 'en_US.UTF-8',
LC_ALL: 'en_US.UTF-8',
TERM: 'xterm-256color',
CODEMAN_MUX: '1',
CODEMAN_SESSION_ID: sessionId,
CODEMAN_API_URL: process.env.CODEMAN_API_URL || 'http://localhost:3000',
// Path only (not the secret value) — hook curls cat it at execution time (COD-54)
CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE: dataPath('hook-secret'),
};
}