Files
Codeman/docker
Codeman maintainer 1851d80f3a fix(docker): keep SIGTERM reaching the server, pin root's PATH, probe writability
Three changes to how the Compose container starts as root and drops to
PUID:PGID, each reproduced on Docker 29.1.3 / Compose v5.5.0 with a minimal
image of the same shape as server.Dockerfile.

- cap_add gains KILL. `init: true` makes tini PID 1, and tini stays root while
  the entrypoint drops the server to PUID. Signalling a process of a different
  uid needs CAP_KILL, and `cap_drop: ALL` had removed it, so every `docker
  compose down`/`restart` ended in `[FATAL tini (1)] Unexpected error when
  forwarding signal: 'Operation not permitted'` and the server being SIGKILLed
  instead of running `server.stop()`. Measured: without KILL the trap never
  fires, with it the child logs `GOT SIGTERM`.
- /opt/codeman-cli/bin is appended to PATH, never prepended, and entrypoint.sh
  pins its own PATH to the system directories before its first command. The
  prefix is chowned to the runtime account so sessions can update the agent
  CLIs in place, and the root entrypoint resolved stat/chown/setpriv by bare
  name through it: a `setpriv` planted there by the unprivileged uid ran as
  uid 0 at the next start. The image's full PATH is handed back to the server
  at the exec (`env PATH=...`), since Codeman resolves the CLIs through it.
- The ownership gate becomes a writability probe. A directory owned by neither
  root nor PUID:PGID is no longer refused on ownership alone; it is tested with
  `setpriv --reuid PUID --regid PGID --groups <same groups> test -w`, the exact
  identity the server gets, so a group-writable tree, an ACL or a CIFS/NFS
  mount reporting some unrelated uid all pass, and the refusal names path,
  owner and PUID:PGID. Root-owned directories are still chowned first.

Also: a pre-flight runs the drop before touching anything and, when it fails,
prints the cap_add list the compose file needs, so an out-of-tree compose file
(Unraid's Compose Manager) gets a one-line diagnosis instead of a restart loop;
`--bounding-set -all` is gone, since it is a silent no-op without CAP_SETPCAP;
a root:root Docker socket now produces a warning that Docker cases will not
work rather than silently losing group 0 at the drop; and CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS
is forwarded from .env with an empty default (documented as a commented entry
in .env.example so the parity test and the updater's env gate both stay quiet).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 23:37:04 +02:00
..

Codeman Docker deployment

This folder contains the Compose configuration, server image Dockerfile, and environment template for a locally built Codeman server.

Start

From the repository root, create the runtime environment file and set the required values, especially CODEMAN_PASSWORD.

cp docker/.env.example docker/.env
bash docker/Start-Codeman.sh

On PowerShell, use the following command instead.

Copy-Item docker/.env.example docker/.env
docker compose --env-file docker/.env -f docker/docker-compose.yaml up --build -d

Every required value is defined and explained in .env.example. GEMINI_API_KEY is intentionally optional and may remain blank.

On Linux, Start-Codeman.sh stops with an error when required paths are missing. It creates the application-data directory when safe, detects its numeric owner as PUID:PGID, and detects DOCKER_SOCKET_GID from the configured Docker socket. It rejects a root-owned application-data directory because Codeman and its local CLI sessions must remain unprivileged.

Codeman, Claude, OpenCode, and other local sessions run as the unprivileged account named by CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER, which defaults to codeman. When Compose is run directly, PUID and PGID default to 1000:1000; set them in .env when the application-data directory has a different owner. The Bash start script determines them automatically instead.

To retain Docker-case support without root when running Compose directly, set DOCKER_SOCKET_GID to the numeric group ID of the host socket. On a standard Linux Docker host, obtain it with stat -c '%g' /var/run/docker.sock. The Bash start script detects it automatically.

Updating

Use App Settings → Updates in the web UI. The checkout Compose builds from is also mounted at /opt/codeman, so an update's git checkout and rebuild persist on the host, and the server exiting is what restarts the container onto the new build.

Releases that change server.Dockerfile, docker-compose.yaml, or add a key to .env.example cannot be applied that way — the updater detects them, names what changed, and asks you to run Start-Codeman.sh here on the host instead. Details: ../docs/docker-self-update.md.

Local customisation

Compose merges docker-compose.override.yml on top of docker-compose.yaml. Keep host-specific changes there rather than editing docker-compose.yaml, so this repository can be updated without losing them. Both docker-compose.override.yml and docker-compose.override.yaml are ignored by Git.

Start-Codeman.sh names the Compose file explicitly, which disables Compose's automatic discovery of the override file, so the script adds it back when one is present and prints the file it used. Running docker compose from this folder without any -f option finds it automatically. When passing -f docker/docker-compose.yaml from the repository root, add -f docker/docker-compose.override.yml as well, or the override is silently ignored.

An override file adds to and replaces individual settings. It cannot delete a key from docker-compose.yaml, and Compose concatenates rather than replaces ports, so removing a published port still requires editing docker-compose.yaml. The example below replaces the restart policy and adds a mount, leaving every other setting in place:

services:
  codeman:
    restart: always
    volumes:
      - /srv/projects:/srv/projects

Reverse-proxy host allowlist

Codeman rejects any request whose Host header is not on its own allowlist - a DNS-rebinding guard, not a Compose or Docker concern. Loopback, any IP literal, the configured --host, and a few tunnel-provider suffixes are allowed by default; a reverse-proxied domain is not, and is rejected with 403 Forbidden: host not allowed before the request reaches any handler.

Add the domain with CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS in .env:

CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS='codeman.example.com,.internal.example.com'

docker-compose.yaml does not forward this variable into the container - it only passes through the environment keys it explicitly lists, and this is not one of them. Forward it yourself in docker-compose.override.yml:

services:
  codeman:
    environment:
      CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS: ${CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS}

See the application's own docs/wiki/Remote-Access.md for the full allowlist format and the tunnel providers it accepts by default.

Application data storage

The default configuration uses a host-folder bind mount:

volumes:
  - type: bind
    source: ${CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH}
    target: /home/${CODEMAN_RUNTIME_USER}

Set CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH in .env to a directory that the Docker daemon can access. The example value is /mnt/user/appdata/codeman.

CODEMAN_CASES_PATH is the separate host directory for managed case workspaces. It is mounted into Codeman at the same absolute path, allowing the host Docker daemon to bind it into an isolated case container. Set it to a child directory of CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH unless you deliberately store workspaces elsewhere.

Compose also exposes CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH to Codeman as CODEMAN_DOCKER_HOST_HOME. This lets Docker case seed files, CLI credentials and the hook secret be mounted using paths that exist in the host daemon's filesystem. Direct host installations do not set this variable and retain their existing behaviour.

Set CODEMAN_DOCKER_DISABLE_SWAP_LIMIT=1 when docker info reports SwapLimit=false. Codeman continues to apply the configured case memory limit, omits Docker's unsupported --memory-swap option, and filters only the daemon's exact swap-capability warning. Every other Docker create error and its exit status remain visible.

For an existing installation created by a root-running image, change ownership of the application-data directory before upgrading so the configured PUID and PGID can read the saved credentials and state:

chown -R 99:100 /mnt/user/appdata/codeman

Replace 99:100 and the path with the values from your .env file.

Do not replace this bind mount with a Docker-managed named volume when Docker cases are enabled. Codeman passes seed, credential, transcript and hook-secret bind sources to the host Docker daemon, so their source files must have stable paths in the daemon's filesystem. A named volume does not provide the required host path mapping.

Static macvlan networking

The default configuration publishes a host port. It does not use network_mode: host. To attach Codeman directly to an existing external macvlan network with a static IP address and MAC address, remove the ports: section from docker-compose.yaml and add the following to the codeman service. The service and network additions can instead be placed in docker-compose.override.yml, but the ports: removal cannot, as described under Local customisation:

mac_address: ${CODEMAN_MAC_ADDRESS}
networks:
  codeman_lan:
    ipv4_address: ${CODEMAN_IPV4_ADDRESS}

Then add this top-level network declaration:

networks:
  codeman_lan:
    external: true
    name: ${CODEMAN_MACVLAN_NETWORK}

Set CODEMAN_MACVLAN_NETWORK, CODEMAN_IPV4_ADDRESS, and CODEMAN_MAC_ADDRESS in .env. The values in .env.example match the supplied Unraid example network and should be changed for other hosts.

Create a managed macvlan network

If an external macvlan network does not already exist, use this top-level declaration instead. Do not use it together with the external-network declaration.

networks:
  codeman_lan:
    driver: macvlan
    driver_opts:
      parent: ${CODEMAN_MACVLAN_PARENT}
    ipam:
      config:
        - subnet: ${CODEMAN_MACVLAN_SUBNET}
          gateway: ${CODEMAN_MACVLAN_GATEWAY}

Macvlan containers are ordinarily not reachable from their Docker host without additional host-network routing. Confirm the selected address, MAC address, parent interface, and subnet are reserved and valid for the target network before starting the stack.