Files
Codeman/test/routes/external-cli-bypass-clamp.test.ts
Codeman maintainer 3f8c8e99d1 feat(grok): add Grok Build (xAI) as a seventh CLI run mode
SessionMode gains 'grok', a first-class backend alongside Claude Code,
shell, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity and Pi: its own PTY, tmux
session, charcoal tab identity ('gk' badge), welcome button, run-mode
entry, cron agentType, Docker and remote-SSH command defaults, and
clone-repo Brain option. Flag surface verified live against grok 1.0.5.

Grok mixes two existing shapes and the wiring follows from that:

- Codex-shaped on permissions: the bypass switch is GrokConfig.alwaysApprove
  (--always-approve, grok's bypassPermissions mode; config-level deny rules
  still apply on top). The Run button sends it true, like runAntigravity(),
  and clampExternalCliBypassForOwner() puts grok in the only-if-sent branch:
  a bare grok spawn is grok's own ask-mode default, which is already safe,
  so only a sent config needs the flag forced off. Cron needs nothing for
  the same reason.
- OpenCode-shaped on rendering: grok is a fullscreen alternate-screen TUI
  with mouse support, so it stays OUT of isAltScreenStripMode() and lands
  on the narrow tmux-attach strip and the 'buffer' local-echo fallthrough
  (unmeasured against an authenticated composer; documented fallback is the
  'off' branch).
- Pi-shaped on resolution: 'grok' has npm squatters (@vibe-kit/grok-cli
  also installs a grok bin), so grok-cli-resolver.ts version-probes every
  candidate (grok --version, killSignal SIGKILL, VITEST-gated) and
  GET /api/grok/status surfaces path AND version; GROK_VERSION_REGEX is
  shared with the dependency registry so doctor and run mode cannot drift.

Env allowlist gains GROK_* plus the XAI_* vendor namespace (XAI_API_KEY is
grok's documented headless auth var), the same narrow-vendor reasoning as
GOOGLE_* for gemini. Resume is id-regexed on purpose: grok's own --resume
also matches session titles, which are arbitrary user strings that must
never reach the bash -c spawn line.

Docker: grok is not on npm, so the agent image installs it in its own step
(xAI's installer has no --dir override; the binary is copied to
/usr/local/bin and root's ~/.grok dropped in the same layer), and
credentials are seeded per-file (auth.json, config.toml, pager.toml; the
dir also holds sessions/, memory/ and the ~160MB binary). Remote SSH routes
through the login-shell wrapper like the other agent CLIs.

Verified end to end on an isolated CODEMAN_INSTANCE with grok 1.0.5
installed: /api/grok/status resolves and reports the probed version,
quick-start spawns a pane whose command line ends in 'grok
--always-approve', the real TUI renders (OAuth device screen on an
unauthenticated box), and grokConfig round-trips through state.json.
Docs: docs/grok-integration.md (user guide) + docs/grok-integration-plan.md
(decisions, verification record, follow-ups).

Tests: test/grok-mode.test.ts, test/grok-cli-resolver.test.ts, plus
extended clamp/system-routes/render-index-html/run-mode-ui/mobile-overview/
local-echo-gating coverage. npm test (the CI gate) green: 5910 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 08:39:03 +02:00

160 lines
6.6 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* First coverage for `clampExternalCliBypassForOwner` (session-routes.ts), the
* multi-user §6.3 gate that keeps a NON-GRANTED owner from launching an external
* CLI with its safety switches off. It backs both `POST /api/sessions` and
* `POST /api/quick-start` and, until pi was added, had no tests at all.
*
* The helper has two shapes and the difference is the whole point:
* - only-if-sent (codex, antigravity, grok): an ABSENT config already spawns safe, so
* only a sent config needs its flag forced off.
* - MATERIALIZE (gemini, pi): the absent-config default is itself unsafe for a
* non-granted owner (gemini's builder defaults to `yolo`; pi's default is an
* interactive trust prompt the session user could just answer "yes" to), so
* the clamp has to CREATE a config.
*/
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner } from '../../src/web/routes/session-routes.js';
import { createUser, invalidateUsersCache } from '../../src/user-store.js';
const PASSWORD = 'clamp-test-password';
describe('clampExternalCliBypassForOwner — single-user mode', () => {
it('passes every config through untouched (the gate is a no-op)', async () => {
const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner(
undefined,
{ dangerouslyBypassApprovals: true },
{ approvalMode: 'yolo' },
{ dangerouslySkipPermissions: true },
{ approveProjectTrust: true },
{ alwaysApprove: true }
);
expect(out.codexConfig).toEqual({ dangerouslyBypassApprovals: true });
expect(out.geminiConfig).toEqual({ approvalMode: 'yolo' });
expect(out.antigravityConfig).toEqual({ dangerouslySkipPermissions: true });
expect(out.piConfig).toEqual({ approveProjectTrust: true });
expect(out.grokConfig).toEqual({ alwaysApprove: true });
});
it('leaves absent configs absent', async () => {
const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner(undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined);
expect(out.codexConfig).toBeUndefined();
expect(out.geminiConfig).toBeUndefined();
expect(out.antigravityConfig).toBeUndefined();
expect(out.piConfig).toBeUndefined();
expect(out.grokConfig).toBeUndefined();
});
});
describe('clampExternalCliBypassForOwner — multi-user mode', () => {
// The temp HOME from test/setup.ts is per-FILE, so users.json survives between
// tests here — create the three accounts once.
beforeAll(async () => {
process.env.CODEMAN_MULTIUSER = '1';
invalidateUsersCache();
await createUser({ username: 'boss', role: 'admin', password: PASSWORD });
await createUser({ username: 'peon', role: 'user', password: PASSWORD });
await createUser({ username: 'trusted', role: 'user', password: PASSWORD, canBypassPermissions: true });
});
afterAll(() => {
delete process.env.CODEMAN_MULTIUSER;
invalidateUsersCache();
});
it('passes through for an admin owner', async () => {
const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner(
'boss',
{ dangerouslyBypassApprovals: true },
undefined,
{ dangerouslySkipPermissions: true },
{ approveProjectTrust: true },
{ alwaysApprove: true }
);
expect(out.codexConfig).toEqual({ dangerouslyBypassApprovals: true });
expect(out.geminiConfig).toBeUndefined();
expect(out.antigravityConfig).toEqual({ dangerouslySkipPermissions: true });
expect(out.piConfig).toEqual({ approveProjectTrust: true });
expect(out.grokConfig).toEqual({ alwaysApprove: true });
});
it('passes through for a user holding the bypass grant', async () => {
const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner(
'trusted',
undefined,
undefined,
undefined,
{ approveProjectTrust: true },
{ alwaysApprove: true }
);
expect(out.piConfig).toEqual({ approveProjectTrust: true });
expect(out.grokConfig).toEqual({ alwaysApprove: true });
});
it('forces codex/antigravity/grok bypass off for a non-granted owner (only-if-sent branch)', async () => {
const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner(
'peon',
{ dangerouslyBypassApprovals: true, model: 'gpt-5' },
undefined,
{ dangerouslySkipPermissions: true, model: 'gemini-3-pro' },
undefined,
{ alwaysApprove: true, model: 'grok-4.5' }
);
expect(out.codexConfig).toEqual({ dangerouslyBypassApprovals: false, model: 'gpt-5' });
expect(out.antigravityConfig).toEqual({ dangerouslySkipPermissions: false, model: 'gemini-3-pro' });
expect(out.grokConfig).toEqual({ alwaysApprove: false, model: 'grok-4.5' });
});
it('leaves codex/antigravity/grok absent when nothing was sent (they already spawn safe)', async () => {
const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner('peon', undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined);
expect(out.codexConfig).toBeUndefined();
expect(out.antigravityConfig).toBeUndefined();
expect(out.grokConfig).toBeUndefined();
});
it('MATERIALIZES gemini to auto_edit even when no config was sent', async () => {
const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner('peon', undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined);
expect(out.geminiConfig).toEqual({ approvalMode: 'auto_edit' });
});
it('MATERIALIZES pi to --no-approve even when no config was sent', async () => {
// The load-bearing case: omitting --approve is NOT a clamp for pi, because
// pi's own default is to ASK, and the session user can answer that prompt.
const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner('peon', undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined, undefined);
expect(out.piConfig).toEqual({ approveProjectTrust: false });
});
it('forces a sent pi approveProjectTrust:true down to false, keeping other fields', async () => {
const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner(
'peon',
undefined,
undefined,
undefined,
{
approveProjectTrust: true,
model: 'sonnet:high',
provider: 'anthropic',
},
undefined
);
expect(out.piConfig).toEqual({
approveProjectTrust: false,
model: 'sonnet:high',
provider: 'anthropic',
});
});
it('fails closed for an unknown/deleted owner', async () => {
const out = await _clampExternalCliBypassForOwner(
'ghost',
undefined,
undefined,
undefined,
{ approveProjectTrust: true },
{ alwaysApprove: true }
);
expect(out.piConfig).toEqual({ approveProjectTrust: false });
expect(out.geminiConfig).toEqual({ approvalMode: 'auto_edit' });
expect(out.grokConfig).toEqual({ alwaysApprove: false });
});
});