Files
Codeman/test/sensitive-path.test.ts
Codeman maintainer ea4b940cef review fixes: block Codeman's own credential-bearing JSON, make the inside-anchor test bite
Widening the servable extensions to EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS made ~/.codeman
JSON previewable for the first time, and the blocklist named only
state.json. But settings.json holds a credential BY SCHEMA
(voiceSettings.apiKey), push-keys.json holds the VAPID PRIVATE key, and
intents.json is written 0600 precisely because captured prompts can carry
secrets — all three were one authenticated click away once an agent
printed the path. Blocked alongside state.json, whose rule now also
catches state-* siblings.

The never-re-cuts-inside-an-anchor test used an unmatchable URL tail, so
it passed with the guard deleted; the fixture now carries a matchable
/tmp path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 19:21:43 +02:00

126 lines
6.3 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* @fileoverview The shared sensitive-path blocklist (`src/web/sensitive-path.ts`).
*
* This list guards every browser-facing file surface: workspace download,
* cross-workspace attachment registration, raw/preview serving, and the
* filesystem path picker.
*
* It became load-bearing when the picker gained `showHidden` (issue #221).
* Before that, the picker refused any path with a dot-prefixed segment, so most
* of the credential locations below were unreachable by construction and the
* list only had to cover secrets that sit in plain sight. Opting into hidden
* entries removes that accident, which is why each entry is pinned here: a
* pattern silently dropped in a refactor would re-expose a real token.
*
* The list is a BLOCKLIST by design (cross-workspace attachment is a supported
* feature), so the "stays attachable" cases matter just as much: over-blocking
* breaks the publish skill and the review-card loop.
*/
import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
import { isSensitivePath } from '../src/web/sensitive-path.js';
const HOME = '/home/dev';
describe('isSensitivePath', () => {
describe('blocks', () => {
const blocked: Array<[string, string]> = [
['system shadow file', '/etc/shadow'],
['system gshadow file', '/etc/gshadow'],
['BSD master password db', '/etc/master.passwd'],
['ssh keys in home', `${HOME}/.ssh/id_ed25519`],
// Not only under homedir(): a deploy key in a project is the same secret,
// and the old homedir()-anchored pattern was captured at module load.
['ssh keys anywhere', '/srv/deploy/.ssh/id_rsa'],
['gpg keyring', `${HOME}/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/key.key`],
['dotenv', '/srv/app/.env'],
['suffixed dotenv', '/srv/app/.env.production'],
// Pre-existing and deliberate: `.env.*` is blocked wholesale, so even a
// committed `.env.example` is refused rather than risking the one repo
// whose "example" holds a live key.
['a dotenv example', '/srv/app/.env.example'],
['generic credentials file', '/srv/app/credentials'],
['json credentials', '/srv/app/credentials.json'],
['toml credentials', '/srv/app/credentials.toml'],
['aws credentials', `${HOME}/.aws/credentials`],
['aws config', `${HOME}/.aws/config`],
['aws sso cache', `${HOME}/.aws/sso/cache/abc.json`],
['legacy gcloud credential db', `${HOME}/.gcloud/credentials.db`],
['modern gcloud config tree', `${HOME}/.config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json`],
['azure profile', `${HOME}/.azure/accessTokens.json`],
['docker registry auth', `${HOME}/.docker/config.json`],
['kubernetes context', `${HOME}/.kube/config`],
['npm token', `${HOME}/.npmrc`],
['yarn token', `${HOME}/.yarnrc.yml`],
['git credential store', `${HOME}/.git-credentials`],
['gh cli token', `${HOME}/.config/gh/hosts.yml`],
['hub token', `${HOME}/.config/hub`],
['netrc', `${HOME}/.netrc`],
['windows netrc', `${HOME}/_netrc`],
['pypi token', `${HOME}/.pypirc`],
['rubygems token', `${HOME}/.gem/credentials`],
['cargo token', `${HOME}/.cargo/credentials.toml`],
['terraform cli config', `${HOME}/.terraformrc`],
['terraform credentials dir', `${HOME}/.terraform.d/credentials.tfrc.json`],
['postgres password file', `${HOME}/.pgpass`],
['mysql client config', `${HOME}/.my.cnf`],
['claude oauth token', `${HOME}/.claude/.credentials.json`],
['codeman hook secret', `${HOME}/.codeman/hook-secret`],
['codeman user table', `${HOME}/.codeman/users.json`],
['codeman hook secret on a named instance', `${HOME}/.codeman-beta/hook-secret`],
// state.json persists SessionState.envOverrides, and the env allowlist
// admits key-shaped names (GEMINI_API_KEY, CLAUDE_CODE_*), so it can hold
// a live credential. Named once .json became previewable from outside the
// workspace.
['codeman state file', `${HOME}/.codeman/state.json`],
['codeman state file on a named instance', `${HOME}/.codeman-beta/state.json`],
['codeman state sibling (same payload)', `${HOME}/.codeman/state-inner.json`],
// settings.json holds voiceSettings.apiKey by schema; push-keys.json holds
// the VAPID PRIVATE key; intents.json is 0600 because captured prompts can
// contain secrets and is deliberately kept out of /api/search.
['codeman settings (Deepgram key)', `${HOME}/.codeman/settings.json`],
['codeman push keys (VAPID private)', `${HOME}/.codeman/push-keys.json`],
['codeman intent profiles', `${HOME}/.codeman/intents.json`],
['codeman intents on a named instance', `${HOME}/.codeman-beta/intents.json`],
];
it.each(blocked)('blocks the %s', (_label, path) => {
expect(isSensitivePath(path)).toBe(true);
});
});
describe('leaves ordinary files attachable', () => {
const allowed: Array<[string, string]> = [
['a source file', '/srv/app/src/index.ts'],
['a dotfile that carries no secret', '/srv/app/.gitignore'],
['a hidden CI directory', '/srv/app/.github/workflows/ci.yml'],
// The publish skill and the review-card loop attach from these trees, so
// only their named secret members are blocked, never the whole tree.
['a codeman screenshot', `${HOME}/.codeman/screenshots/shot.png`],
['a codeman lifecycle log', `${HOME}/.codeman/session-lifecycle.jsonl`],
['a claude transcript', `${HOME}/.claude/projects/proj/session.jsonl`],
['a claude team inbox', `${HOME}/.claude/teams/alpha/inboxes/bob.json`],
// isUnderTree-style separator awareness: a sibling name that merely starts
// with a blocked segment must not be caught.
['an unrelated sshd notes file', '/srv/notes/.sshd-setup.md'],
['a file named credentials-policy.md', '/srv/app/credentials-policy.md'],
];
it.each(allowed)('allows %s', (_label, path) => {
expect(isSensitivePath(path)).toBe(false);
});
});
it('matches on the resolved path, so callers must realpath first', () => {
// The function itself is pure string matching; this pins the contract its
// docblock states, which every caller depends on.
expect(isSensitivePath('/srv/app/looks-innocent')).toBe(false);
expect(isSensitivePath(`${HOME}/.ssh/looks-innocent`)).toBe(true);
});
});