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Widening the servable extensions to EDITABLE_EXTENSIONS made ~/.codeman JSON previewable for the first time, and the blocklist named only state.json. But settings.json holds a credential BY SCHEMA (voiceSettings.apiKey), push-keys.json holds the VAPID PRIVATE key, and intents.json is written 0600 precisely because captured prompts can carry secrets — all three were one authenticated click away once an agent printed the path. Blocked alongside state.json, whose rule now also catches state-* siblings. The never-re-cuts-inside-an-anchor test used an unmatchable URL tail, so it passed with the guard deleted; the fixture now carries a matchable /tmp path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
126 lines
6.3 KiB
TypeScript
126 lines
6.3 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* @fileoverview The shared sensitive-path blocklist (`src/web/sensitive-path.ts`).
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*
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* This list guards every browser-facing file surface: workspace download,
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* cross-workspace attachment registration, raw/preview serving, and the
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* filesystem path picker.
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*
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* It became load-bearing when the picker gained `showHidden` (issue #221).
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* Before that, the picker refused any path with a dot-prefixed segment, so most
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* of the credential locations below were unreachable by construction and the
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* list only had to cover secrets that sit in plain sight. Opting into hidden
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* entries removes that accident, which is why each entry is pinned here: a
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* pattern silently dropped in a refactor would re-expose a real token.
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*
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* The list is a BLOCKLIST by design (cross-workspace attachment is a supported
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* feature), so the "stays attachable" cases matter just as much: over-blocking
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* breaks the publish skill and the review-card loop.
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*/
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import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
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import { isSensitivePath } from '../src/web/sensitive-path.js';
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const HOME = '/home/dev';
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describe('isSensitivePath', () => {
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describe('blocks', () => {
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const blocked: Array<[string, string]> = [
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['system shadow file', '/etc/shadow'],
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['system gshadow file', '/etc/gshadow'],
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['BSD master password db', '/etc/master.passwd'],
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['ssh keys in home', `${HOME}/.ssh/id_ed25519`],
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// Not only under homedir(): a deploy key in a project is the same secret,
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// and the old homedir()-anchored pattern was captured at module load.
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['ssh keys anywhere', '/srv/deploy/.ssh/id_rsa'],
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['gpg keyring', `${HOME}/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d/key.key`],
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['dotenv', '/srv/app/.env'],
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['suffixed dotenv', '/srv/app/.env.production'],
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// Pre-existing and deliberate: `.env.*` is blocked wholesale, so even a
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// committed `.env.example` is refused rather than risking the one repo
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// whose "example" holds a live key.
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['a dotenv example', '/srv/app/.env.example'],
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['generic credentials file', '/srv/app/credentials'],
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['json credentials', '/srv/app/credentials.json'],
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['toml credentials', '/srv/app/credentials.toml'],
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['aws credentials', `${HOME}/.aws/credentials`],
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['aws config', `${HOME}/.aws/config`],
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['aws sso cache', `${HOME}/.aws/sso/cache/abc.json`],
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['legacy gcloud credential db', `${HOME}/.gcloud/credentials.db`],
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['modern gcloud config tree', `${HOME}/.config/gcloud/application_default_credentials.json`],
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['azure profile', `${HOME}/.azure/accessTokens.json`],
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['docker registry auth', `${HOME}/.docker/config.json`],
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['kubernetes context', `${HOME}/.kube/config`],
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['npm token', `${HOME}/.npmrc`],
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['yarn token', `${HOME}/.yarnrc.yml`],
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['git credential store', `${HOME}/.git-credentials`],
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['gh cli token', `${HOME}/.config/gh/hosts.yml`],
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['hub token', `${HOME}/.config/hub`],
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['netrc', `${HOME}/.netrc`],
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['windows netrc', `${HOME}/_netrc`],
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['pypi token', `${HOME}/.pypirc`],
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['rubygems token', `${HOME}/.gem/credentials`],
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['cargo token', `${HOME}/.cargo/credentials.toml`],
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['terraform cli config', `${HOME}/.terraformrc`],
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['terraform credentials dir', `${HOME}/.terraform.d/credentials.tfrc.json`],
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['postgres password file', `${HOME}/.pgpass`],
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['mysql client config', `${HOME}/.my.cnf`],
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['claude oauth token', `${HOME}/.claude/.credentials.json`],
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['codeman hook secret', `${HOME}/.codeman/hook-secret`],
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['codeman user table', `${HOME}/.codeman/users.json`],
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['codeman hook secret on a named instance', `${HOME}/.codeman-beta/hook-secret`],
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// state.json persists SessionState.envOverrides, and the env allowlist
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// admits key-shaped names (GEMINI_API_KEY, CLAUDE_CODE_*), so it can hold
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// a live credential. Named once .json became previewable from outside the
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// workspace.
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['codeman state file', `${HOME}/.codeman/state.json`],
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['codeman state file on a named instance', `${HOME}/.codeman-beta/state.json`],
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['codeman state sibling (same payload)', `${HOME}/.codeman/state-inner.json`],
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// settings.json holds voiceSettings.apiKey by schema; push-keys.json holds
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// the VAPID PRIVATE key; intents.json is 0600 because captured prompts can
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// contain secrets and is deliberately kept out of /api/search.
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['codeman settings (Deepgram key)', `${HOME}/.codeman/settings.json`],
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['codeman push keys (VAPID private)', `${HOME}/.codeman/push-keys.json`],
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['codeman intent profiles', `${HOME}/.codeman/intents.json`],
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['codeman intents on a named instance', `${HOME}/.codeman-beta/intents.json`],
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];
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it.each(blocked)('blocks the %s', (_label, path) => {
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expect(isSensitivePath(path)).toBe(true);
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});
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});
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describe('leaves ordinary files attachable', () => {
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const allowed: Array<[string, string]> = [
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['a source file', '/srv/app/src/index.ts'],
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['a dotfile that carries no secret', '/srv/app/.gitignore'],
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['a hidden CI directory', '/srv/app/.github/workflows/ci.yml'],
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// The publish skill and the review-card loop attach from these trees, so
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// only their named secret members are blocked, never the whole tree.
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['a codeman screenshot', `${HOME}/.codeman/screenshots/shot.png`],
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['a codeman lifecycle log', `${HOME}/.codeman/session-lifecycle.jsonl`],
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['a claude transcript', `${HOME}/.claude/projects/proj/session.jsonl`],
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['a claude team inbox', `${HOME}/.claude/teams/alpha/inboxes/bob.json`],
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// isUnderTree-style separator awareness: a sibling name that merely starts
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// with a blocked segment must not be caught.
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['an unrelated sshd notes file', '/srv/notes/.sshd-setup.md'],
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['a file named credentials-policy.md', '/srv/app/credentials-policy.md'],
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];
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it.each(allowed)('allows %s', (_label, path) => {
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expect(isSensitivePath(path)).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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it('matches on the resolved path, so callers must realpath first', () => {
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// The function itself is pure string matching; this pins the contract its
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// docblock states, which every caller depends on.
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expect(isSensitivePath('/srv/app/looks-innocent')).toBe(false);
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expect(isSensitivePath(`${HOME}/.ssh/looks-innocent`)).toBe(true);
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});
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});
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