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The opt-in multi-user feature's only enforcement is web-layer scoping (all sessions share one OS account). An adversarial review found 8 critical + 7 high cross-user holes that defeated it, plus mediums; all fixed here. Single-user (flag-off) behavior stays byte-identical apart from documented consistency deltas. Ownership / confinement: - DELETE /api/sessions (bulk) + /:id now owner-scope / findSessionOrFail - quick-start, cron (create+fire), scheduled runs confine workingDir to the owner's space; case link/docker-link/docker-import confine the host path - resolveCasePath no longer resolves linked cases for non-admins; foreign remote/docker cases are skipped (fall through to the caller's own local case) - history, subagents/workflows, mux-sessions, orchestrator, cron run-history, away-digest, and remote/docker host reads are owner- or admin-scoped Permission policy (section 6.3): - non-granted users are downgraded at every spawn site incl. legacy /api/scheduled, PlanOrchestrator one-shots, remote launch, and the cron-fire gemini/codex bypass switches; resolveClaudeModeForUsername now fails closed Auth / store: - verify-first login throttle (a correct password is never locked out), /ws terminal subject to the change-password lockbox, cookie fast-path re-validates identity live, role/grant changes revoke sessions, admin delete runs the last-admin guard before any teardown - users.json: distinguish missing (ENOENT) from corrupt/unreadable so a bad read can't overwrite all accounts; unique per-process temp write path Event streams: - debounced session:updated + batched task:updated, clipboard, and push notifications route by owner (fail closed); getLightState hides machine-wide globalStats from non-admins Tests: two suites updated to assert the fixed (secure) behavior. tsc, eslint, and test:ci all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
208 lines
8.5 KiB
TypeScript
208 lines
8.5 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* @fileoverview Phase 2 multi-user auth integration tests (live server, port 3170+).
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*
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* Verifies the multi-user auth branch end to end: per-user Basic verify, cookie
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* identity, wrong-password / disabled-user rejection, the mustChangePassword
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* lockbox + self-service change, per-account rate limiting, and QR identity binding
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* (tunnel-manager unit level). Single-user auth is covered by auth-security.test.ts.
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*
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* Ports: 3170 (multi-user server), 3171 (rate-limit server).
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*/
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import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
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import fs from 'node:fs/promises';
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import os from 'node:os';
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import path from 'node:path';
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import { WebServer } from '../src/web/server.js';
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import { TmuxManager } from '../src/tmux-manager.js';
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import { TunnelManager } from '../src/tunnel-manager.js';
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import { createUser, invalidateUsersCache } from '../src/user-store.js';
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import { AUTH_FAILURE_MAX } from '../src/config/auth-config.js';
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vi.spyOn(TmuxManager, 'isTmuxAvailable').mockReturnValue(true);
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const PORT = 3170;
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const RATE_PORT = 3171;
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function basic(user: string, pass: string): string {
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return 'Basic ' + Buffer.from(`${user}:${pass}`).toString('base64');
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}
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function cookieFrom(res: Response): string | null {
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const raw = res.headers.get('set-cookie');
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const m = raw?.match(/codeman_session=([^;]+)/);
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return m ? `codeman_session=${m[1]}` : null;
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}
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let server: WebServer;
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let rateServer: WebServer;
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let dataDir: string;
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let spacesDir: string;
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const saved: Record<string, string | undefined> = {};
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beforeAll(async () => {
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dataDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'mu-auth-data-'));
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spacesDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'mu-auth-spaces-'));
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for (const k of [
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'CODEMAN_DATA_DIR',
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'CODEMAN_USER_SPACES_DIR',
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'CODEMAN_MULTIUSER',
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'CODEMAN_PASSWORD',
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'CODEMAN_USERNAME',
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]) {
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saved[k] = process.env[k];
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}
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process.env.CODEMAN_DATA_DIR = dataDir;
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process.env.CODEMAN_USER_SPACES_DIR = spacesDir;
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process.env.CODEMAN_MULTIUSER = '1';
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delete process.env.CODEMAN_PASSWORD;
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delete process.env.CODEMAN_USERNAME;
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invalidateUsersCache();
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await createUser({ username: 'alice', role: 'admin', password: 'alicepass1' });
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await createUser({ username: 'bob', role: 'user', password: 'bobpass123' });
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await createUser({ username: 'carol', role: 'user', password: 'carolpass1' });
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await createUser({ username: 'carol', role: 'user', password: 'x' }).catch(() => {}); // no-op dup guard
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await createUser({ username: 'dave', role: 'user', password: 'davepass12', mustChangePassword: true });
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// Disable carol after creation.
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const { updateUser } = await import('../src/user-store.js');
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await updateUser('carol', { disabled: true });
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server = new WebServer(PORT, false, true);
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await server.start();
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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await server?.stop();
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await rateServer?.stop().catch(() => {});
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for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(saved)) {
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if (v === undefined) delete process.env[k];
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else process.env[k] = v;
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}
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invalidateUsersCache();
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await fs.rm(dataDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
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await fs.rm(spacesDir, { recursive: true, force: true }).catch(() => {});
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});
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const url = (p: string) => `http://localhost:${PORT}${p}`;
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describe('multi-user auth', () => {
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it('rejects unauthenticated requests', async () => {
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const res = await fetch(url('/api/status'));
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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it('authenticates a valid user and issues an identity cookie', async () => {
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const res = await fetch(url('/api/status'), { headers: { Authorization: basic('alice', 'alicepass1') } });
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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const cookie = cookieFrom(res);
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expect(cookie).toBeTruthy();
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const me = await fetch(url('/api/me'), { headers: { Cookie: cookie! } });
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expect(me.status).toBe(200);
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const body = await me.json();
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expect(body.data).toMatchObject({ username: 'alice', role: 'admin', mustChangePassword: false });
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});
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it('reports role for a regular user', async () => {
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const res = await fetch(url('/api/me'), { headers: { Authorization: basic('bob', 'bobpass123') } });
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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expect((await res.json()).data).toMatchObject({ username: 'bob', role: 'user' });
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});
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it('rejects a wrong password', async () => {
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const res = await fetch(url('/api/status'), { headers: { Authorization: basic('bob', 'wrongwrong') } });
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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it('rejects a disabled user even with the correct password', async () => {
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const res = await fetch(url('/api/status'), { headers: { Authorization: basic('carol', 'carolpass1') } });
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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});
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it('is case-insensitive on the username', async () => {
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const res = await fetch(url('/api/status'), { headers: { Authorization: basic('ALICE', 'alicepass1') } });
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expect(res.status).toBe(200);
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});
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it('enforces the mustChangePassword lockbox and clears it on self-service change', async () => {
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// Basic auth as dave succeeds (cookie issued) but non-exempt routes 403.
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const authed = await fetch(url('/api/status'), { headers: { Authorization: basic('dave', 'davepass12') } });
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expect(authed.status).toBe(403);
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const body = await authed.json();
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expect(body.errorCode).toBe('PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED');
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const cookie = cookieFrom(authed);
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expect(cookie).toBeTruthy();
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// /api/me is exempt.
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const me = await fetch(url('/api/me'), { headers: { Cookie: cookie! } });
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expect(me.status).toBe(200);
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expect((await me.json()).data.mustChangePassword).toBe(true);
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// Wrong current password is refused.
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const bad = await fetch(url('/api/me/password'), {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: { Cookie: cookie!, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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body: JSON.stringify({ currentPassword: 'nope', newPassword: 'brandnew123' }),
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});
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expect(bad.status).toBe(403);
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// Correct change clears the flag.
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const ok = await fetch(url('/api/me/password'), {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: { Cookie: cookie!, 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
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body: JSON.stringify({ currentPassword: 'davepass12', newPassword: 'brandnew123' }),
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});
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expect(ok.status).toBe(200);
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// Same cookie now reaches a non-exempt route.
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const after = await fetch(url('/api/status'), { headers: { Cookie: cookie! } });
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expect(after.status).toBe(200);
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});
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it('verify-first: a correct password is never rate-limited and self-heals failures (#17)', async () => {
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rateServer = new WebServer(RATE_PORT, false, true);
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await rateServer.start();
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const rurl = (p: string) => `http://localhost:${RATE_PORT}${p}`;
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// Nine wrong passwords (one below the cap) are each rejected 401 — not throttled yet.
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for (let i = 0; i < AUTH_FAILURE_MAX - 1; i++) {
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const res = await fetch(rurl('/api/status'), { headers: { Authorization: basic('bob', `bad-${i}`) } });
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expect(res.status).toBe(401);
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}
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// Finding #17: the CORRECT password must ALWAYS win (verified BEFORE the per-username
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// throttle) — the accumulated failures can never lock the account out — and success
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// clears the failure buckets. Previously this returned 429 (the DoS being fixed).
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const good = await fetch(rurl('/api/status'), { headers: { Authorization: basic('bob', 'bobpass123') } });
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expect(good.status).toBe(200);
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// Self-heal: a fresh wrong attempt is 401 again (the counter was reset by the success).
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const afterReset = await fetch(rurl('/api/status'), { headers: { Authorization: basic('bob', 'nope') } });
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expect(afterReset.status).toBe(401);
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// Sustained wrong passwords ARE still throttled: 429 once the cap is reached.
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let limited = false;
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for (let i = 0; i < AUTH_FAILURE_MAX + 1 && !limited; i++) {
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const res = await fetch(rurl('/api/status'), { headers: { Authorization: basic('bob', `x-${i}`) } });
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limited = res.status === 429;
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}
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expect(limited).toBe(true);
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});
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});
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describe('QR token identity (tunnel-manager)', () => {
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it('binds a minted token to a user and returns it on consume (single-use)', () => {
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const tm = new TunnelManager();
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const code = tm.mintUserToken('alice');
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expect(code).toHaveLength(6);
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const first = tm.consumeTokenWithIdentity(code);
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expect(first).toEqual({ ok: true, username: 'alice' });
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// single-use
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expect(tm.consumeTokenWithIdentity(code)).toEqual({ ok: false });
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});
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it('unknown code is rejected', () => {
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const tm = new TunnelManager();
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expect(tm.consumeTokenWithIdentity('ZZZZZZ')).toEqual({ ok: false });
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});
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});
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