/**
 * @fileoverview Shared sensitive-path blocklist.
 *
 * A small defense-in-depth blocklist of absolute paths that must never be
 * served to the browser regardless of how the path was obtained (workspace
 * download, cross-workspace attachment registration, raw/preview serving).
 *
 * This is intentionally a BLOCKLIST, not a workspace-confinement check:
 * cross-workspace attachment is a supported feature (codeman-publish skill +
 * the automated review-card loop attaching files under ~/.codeman/), so a
 * strict session-workspace boundary would break legitimate use. The blocklist
 * rejects well-known secret locations (system password files, SSH keys, cloud
 * credentials, dotenv files) while leaving ordinary cross-workspace files
 * attachable.
 *
 * ⚠️ The path picker's `showHidden` option is what makes the dot-prefixed half
 * of this list load-bearing. Before it existed, the picker refused every path
 * with a hidden segment, so `~/.config/gh/hosts.yml` and friends were
 * unreachable by construction and the list only had to cover the few secrets
 * that live in plain sight. Opting into hidden entries removes that accident,
 * so every credential location below has to be named. Adding a new browse
 * surface means re-reading this file, not assuming it already covers you.
 *
 * ⚠️ Deliberately NOT whole-tree blocks: `~/.codeman/` (the publish skill
 * attaches from it) and `~/.claude/` (transcripts and team state are ordinary
 * files worth attaching). Only their secret-bearing members are named.
 *
 * Callers MUST resolve symlinks (realpath) BEFORE calling isSensitivePath so a
 * symlink pointing at a sensitive target is also caught.
 */

import { homedir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';

const SENSITIVE_PATTERNS: RegExp[] = [
  // System account databases.
  /^\/etc\/shadow$/,
  /^\/etc\/gshadow$/,
  /^\/etc\/master\.passwd$/,

  // SSH and GPG private key material. `.ssh/` is matched at any depth rather
  // than only under homedir(): a per-project or per-deploy key directory holds
  // exactly the same secret, and it drops a homedir() read that is captured at
  // module load and therefore wrong for anything that changes HOME later.
  /\/\.ssh\//,
  /\/\.gnupg\//,

  // Dotenv, in every conventional spelling (.env, .env.local, .env.production).
  /\/\.env$/,
  /\/\.env\./,

  // Generic credential files, plus the per-vendor spellings that do not match it.
  /\/credentials(\.json|\.yml|\.yaml|\.xml|\.toml|\.db)?$/i,
  /\/\.aws\/(credentials|config)$/,
  /\/\.aws\/sso\/cache\//,
  /\/\.gcloud\/credentials\.db$/,
  /\/\.config\/gcloud\//,
  /\/\.azure\//,
  /\/\.docker\/config\.json$/,
  /\/\.kube\/config$/,

  // Package-registry and forge tokens. Each of these is a bearer credential in
  // a plain-text dotfile, which is exactly what a path picker will surface.
  /\/\.npmrc$/,
  /\/\.yarnrc\.yml$/,
  /\/\.git-credentials$/,
  /\/\.config\/gh\//,
  /\/\.config\/hub$/,
  /\/\.netrc$/,
  /\/_netrc$/,
  /\/\.pypirc$/,
  /\/\.gem\/credentials$/,
  /\/\.cargo\/credentials(\.toml)?$/,
  /\/\.terraformrc$/,
  /\/\.terraform\.d\//,

  // Database client credentials.
  /\/\.pgpass$/,
  /\/\.my\.cnf$/,

  // Agent CLI credentials, including Codeman's own hook secret and user table.
  // Named individually so the surrounding trees stay attachable (see above).
  /\/\.claude\/\.credentials\.json$/,
  /\/\.codeman[^/]*\/hook-secret$/,
  /\/\.codeman[^/]*\/users\.json$/,
  // Codeman's own state files. Named once `.json` became previewable outside
  // the workspace: `SessionState.envOverrides` persists whatever the user set
  // for a session, and the env allowlist admits key-shaped names
  // (`GEMINI_API_KEY`, `CLAUDE_CODE_*`), so state can hold a live credential.
  // `state[^/]*` rather than `state`: siblings like state-inner.json carry the
  // same payload. Same reasoning as the two entries above, and it leaves the
  // rest of ~/.codeman attachable.
  /\/\.codeman[^/]*\/state[^/]*\.json$/,
  // settings.json holds a credential BY SCHEMA (`voiceSettings.apiKey`, the
  // Deepgram key); push-keys.json holds the VAPID PRIVATE key (enough to forge
  // push notifications to every subscribed device); intents.json is written
  // 0600 precisely because captured prompts can contain secrets, and is
  // deliberately kept out of /api/search — it must not be readable through a
  // different route instead.
  /\/\.codeman[^/]*\/settings\.json$/,
  /\/\.codeman[^/]*\/push-keys\.json$/,
  /\/\.codeman[^/]*\/intents\.json$/,
];

/**
 * Claude config members that are credential-bearing ONLY under the user's real
 * home directory: `~/.claude/settings.json` can hold `env.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`
 * and `apiKeyHelper` by schema (settings.local.json shares that schema), and
 * `~/.claude.json` holds account/OAuth-adjacent state. A blanket
 * `/\.claude\/settings\.json$/` would also block every CASE-level
 * `.claude/settings.json`, which users legitimately view and edit in the File
 * Viewer (model override, hooks) — so these are anchored to homedir(), read at
 * CHECK time inside isSensitivePath, never captured at module load (wrong for
 * anything that changes HOME later, e.g. per-file test fixtures — same
 * reasoning as the `.ssh/` note above).
 */
const HOME_SENSITIVE_MEMBERS = ['.claude.json', '.claude/settings.json', '.claude/settings.local.json'];

/**
 * Returns true if the given ABSOLUTE, symlink-resolved path matches the
 * sensitive-file blocklist and must not be served to the browser.
 */
export function isSensitivePath(absPath: string): boolean {
  if (SENSITIVE_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(absPath))) return true;
  const home = homedir();
  return HOME_SENSITIVE_MEMBERS.some((member) => absPath === join(home, member));
}