2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Codeman maintainer	3f8c8e99d1	feat(grok): add Grok Build (xAI) as a seventh CLI run mode ... SessionMode gains 'grok', a first-class backend alongside Claude Code, shell, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity and Pi: its own PTY, tmux session, charcoal tab identity ('gk' badge), welcome button, run-mode entry, cron agentType, Docker and remote-SSH command defaults, and clone-repo Brain option. Flag surface verified live against grok 1.0.5. Grok mixes two existing shapes and the wiring follows from that: - Codex-shaped on permissions: the bypass switch is GrokConfig.alwaysApprove (--always-approve, grok's bypassPermissions mode; config-level deny rules still apply on top). The Run button sends it true, like runAntigravity(), and clampExternalCliBypassForOwner() puts grok in the only-if-sent branch: a bare grok spawn is grok's own ask-mode default, which is already safe, so only a sent config needs the flag forced off. Cron needs nothing for the same reason. - OpenCode-shaped on rendering: grok is a fullscreen alternate-screen TUI with mouse support, so it stays OUT of isAltScreenStripMode() and lands on the narrow tmux-attach strip and the 'buffer' local-echo fallthrough (unmeasured against an authenticated composer; documented fallback is the 'off' branch). - Pi-shaped on resolution: 'grok' has npm squatters (@vibe-kit/grok-cli also installs a grok bin), so grok-cli-resolver.ts version-probes every candidate (grok --version, killSignal SIGKILL, VITEST-gated) and GET /api/grok/status surfaces path AND version; GROK_VERSION_REGEX is shared with the dependency registry so doctor and run mode cannot drift. Env allowlist gains GROK_* plus the XAI_* vendor namespace (XAI_API_KEY is grok's documented headless auth var), the same narrow-vendor reasoning as GOOGLE_* for gemini. Resume is id-regexed on purpose: grok's own --resume also matches session titles, which are arbitrary user strings that must never reach the bash -c spawn line. Docker: grok is not on npm, so the agent image installs it in its own step (xAI's installer has no --dir override; the binary is copied to /usr/local/bin and root's ~/.grok dropped in the same layer), and credentials are seeded per-file (auth.json, config.toml, pager.toml; the dir also holds sessions/, memory/ and the ~160MB binary). Remote SSH routes through the login-shell wrapper like the other agent CLIs. Verified end to end on an isolated CODEMAN_INSTANCE with grok 1.0.5 installed: /api/grok/status resolves and reports the probed version, quick-start spawns a pane whose command line ends in 'grok --always-approve', the real TUI renders (OAuth device screen on an unauthenticated box), and grokConfig round-trips through state.json. Docs: docs/grok-integration.md (user guide) + docs/grok-integration-plan.md (decisions, verification record, follow-ups). Tests: test/grok-mode.test.ts, test/grok-cli-resolver.test.ts, plus extended clamp/system-routes/render-index-html/run-mode-ui/mobile-overview/ local-echo-gating coverage. npm test (the CI gate) green: 5910 tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-23 08:39:03 +02:00
Codeman maintainer	c5b59633d8	feat(pi): add Pi (pi.dev) as a sixth CLI run mode (#206) ... SessionMode gains 'pi', a first-class backend alongside Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini and Antigravity: its own PTY, tmux session, rose tab identity, welcome button, run-mode entry, cron agentType, Docker and remote-SSH command defaults, and clone-repo Brain option. Pi is a different shape of CLI from the other four, and three decisions follow from that: - It has NO permission prompts and no sandbox, so there is no --dangerously-skip-permissions analog and none was invented. The privilege-shaped knob is the tri-state approveProjectTrust, which makes pi load and EXECUTE repo-local .pi/extensions TypeScript and install missing project packages. clampExternalCliBypassForOwner() therefore puts pi in the MATERIALIZE branch: a non-granted multi-user owner gets --no-approve even when no config was sent, because pi's own default is a prompt the session user could answer themselves. That helper had zero test coverage; it now has coverage for all four CLIs. - Only the PI_ prefix joins the env allowlist. Pi's ~34 provider key vars share no prefix and ALLOWED_ENV_PREFIXES is one global list with no mode context, so admitting them would widen the allowlist for every mode at once. Auth goes through pi's /login or the server's own environment. --api-key is deliberately never wired: it would put a provider secret on the spawn command line. - pi stays OUT of isAltScreenStripMode(). Its default TUI renders into the main screen with terminal-owned scrollback, and its 0.84.0 fullscreen mode is runtime-switchable via /settings; that flip was measured to put the pane into the alt screen, which the strip would have corrupted. pi-cli-resolver.ts additionally sanity-probes `pi --version` and requires semver-shaped output, because `pi` is a short generic name a stray binary can shadow; GET /api/pi/status surfaces path and version so a misresolution is diagnosable rather than presenting as a broken mode. Docker installs pi in its own --ignore-scripts step so that flag cannot affect the other four CLIs, and seeds its credentials per-file rather than whole-dir (~/.pi/agent also holds sessions, extensions and package trees). Verified end to end against pi 0.84.1 on an isolated instance: resolver search-dir fallback, flag construction, piConfig persistence across a full server restart, the trust prompt and its --no-approve suppression, the rose Run button on the default daylight-blue skin (the nested skin block eats per-mode gradients unless the rule lives inside it), and the buffer local-echo policy, which pi tolerates where codex did not. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-13 13:54:47 +02:00