Closes#212. The file-preview overlay can now edit workspace text files in
place, phone-first: agent writes a file, you review it in the viewer, tweak
two lines, save, tell the agent to continue.
Backend (file-routes.ts, policy in src/config/file-editing.ts):
- GET file-content?edit=1: read-for-edit that never truncates (a truncated
buffer must never become an edit buffer), 512KB cap (413 over it), and
returns the sha256 hash + detected EOL the client echoes back on save.
- PUT /api/sessions/:id/file-content: edit-in-place only, with no O_CREAT
anywhere in the handler. Confinement matches the read path (realpath +
workspace boundary + ownership via findSessionOrFail), plus sensitive-path
and attachment-guard blocklists, a .git subtree deny, and an extension
allowlist (svg and env deliberately excluded). Optimistic concurrency via
baseHash: mismatch is a 409 unless force. Writes are wx-temp + fchmod +
fsync + rename, closing the validate-then-write TOCTOU window.
- Corruption guards: NUL sniff + UTF-8 round-trip compare (refuses binary
and latin-1), and server-side EOL re-application so a textarea's LF
normalization cannot rewrite every line of a CRLF file.
- Plain reads gain an additive editable flag the UI keys the button off.
Frontend (panels-ui.js + overlay markup/styles):
- Edit button on editable text previews; textarea editor with Save/Cancel,
dirty indicator, discard-confirm on cancel/close, and a conflict dialog
that offers overwrite (force) when the file changed on disk mid-edit.
- Phone: full-bleed window sized by --app-height so the editor and Save bar
track the OS keyboard; 16px editor font (iOS zoom guard); no autofocus.
- zh-CN strings for the new chrome.
Tests: pure policy unit tests plus a route suite that deliberately does NOT
mock node:fs. It runs against a real temp workspace so symlink escapes,
write-through of in-workspace symlinks, mode preservation, CRLF round-trip,
409/force, and the no-create property are exercised for real. Also verified
end to end on an isolated beta instance: 39-check curl matrix, Playwright
desktop flow (real clicks and typing, bytes asserted on disk, live conflict
with an external rewrite), and a 393px phone profile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#211. Copying from the terminal only worked through the browser
context menu, because xterm turns Ctrl+C into 0x03 and cancels the keydown,
so the muscle-memory copy failed silently and read as "no copy-paste at all".
With a selection, Ctrl+C now copies it, toasts, clears the selection and
sends nothing to the PTY. With no selection it falls through unchanged, so
the interrupt is intact. Ctrl+Shift+C is an explicit copy chord that never
falls through: an explicit copy that interrupts a running agent because the
selection happened to be empty would be a footgun.
Three details that keep the interrupt safe:
- The decision lives in attachCustomKeyEventHandler (terminal-ui.js) and the
no-selection path returns true WITHOUT preventDefault. xterm calls the
custom handler before its own cancel(), so returning false alone does not
cancel the event; the copy path therefore calls preventDefault explicitly,
or the browser would run its native copy on top of ours.
- copy-selection is a full registry entry (rebindable and disableable in App
Settings) whose action is deliberately absent from SHORTCUT_ACTIONS, the
same trick command-palette uses: the generic capture loop preventDefaults
every match it dispatches, which would cost the user the interrupt key.
- The gate is keydown-only, since the custom handler also runs for keypress
and keyup.
Copy goes through _copyText (Clipboard API, then hidden-textarea +
execCommand) rather than raw navigator.clipboard, because install.sh's LAN
option serves plain HTTP where navigator.clipboard is undefined; the
fallback steals focus, so the terminal is refocused afterwards.
Tests: test/terminal-copy-selection.test.ts pins the gate and the
SHORTCUT_ACTIONS invariant; test/terminal-copy-shortcut.test.ts drives real
key presses in chromium and asserts on the clipboard plus the bytes xterm
emitted (browser-driven, so excluded from test:ci like the other Playwright
suites). Verified manually on an isolated beta instance before landing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release 1.9.8 (aicodeman) and 0.1.8 (xterm-zerolag-input).
Fixes macOS session start (`posix_spawnp failed.`, issues #6 and #204):
node-pty ships its macOS spawn-helper as mode 0644 and macOS launches every
PTY through it. `scripts/fix-node-pty.mjs` (npm run fix:node-pty) chmods every
helper, prebuilds/ included, then verifies by really opening a PTY; the blind
Node-22+ rebuild is gone. `spawnPtyWithHelperRepair()` self-heals an already
broken install on the first failed spawn.
Adds the phone home screen (session overview under 430px, per-device
`mobileOverviewEnabled`, default ON) and a guided Tailscale path in
install.sh, plus `install.sh tailscale` to retrofit it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Plan-usage chip defaults ON on desktop (handhelds stay OFF), resolved
through a single planUsageChipEnabled() helper so the checkbox, the chip
and the create-time statusLineTelemetry flag cannot disagree. Correct the
stale "Cron button defaults ON" comment (it is OFF in code, template and
CSS) and the styles.css comment claiming the server strips the chip's
hidden class.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Only CLAUDE.md conflicted: master restructured it into the short-rule +
docs/architecture-invariants.md pointer layout while this PR was open.
The response-viewer detail now lives in architecture-invariants, so the
Claude turn-grouping and restored-placeholder rebind notes moved there.
Changeset rewritten to record the measured effect on real transcripts.
Both picker endpoints are a second file-serving surface, and they
inherited neither the attachment guard's confinement nor its ownership
scoping. Two separate holes:
1. `sessionId` contributes that session's workingDir as a browse root,
but it was resolved straight off ctx.sessions/ctx.store with no owner
check, unlike the nine other session-scoped handlers in this file. A
non-admin could pin ANOTHER user's working directory as a root just
by passing their session id, then list and preview underneath it. Now
runs canAccessOwned and reports 404, which also avoids confirming
that a session id exists.
2. `Home` and `CASES_DIR` were unconditional roots for every caller.
Per-user spaces live at <USER_SPACES_DIR>/<username>, which is INSIDE
homedir(), so the Home root alone exposed every other user's
workspace. A multi-user non-admin now gets only their own
userSpacePath plus anything explicitly listed in
CODEMAN_FILE_PICKER_ROOTS. /mnt/d is dropped as well: a broad host
mount should be an explicit operator decision in a multi-user
deployment, and operators who want it can name it in that env var.
Admins and single-user mode keep the host-wide roots, so behavior is
unchanged unless CODEMAN_MULTIUSER is on (opt-in, off by default).
All three discriminating tests were verified to fail against the
previous code: browse and preview both returned 200 instead of 404, and
the roots came back as [Home, Codeman Cases, ...] instead of [My Space].
Full suite green, 3784 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Only CLAUDE.md conflicted: master restructured it into the short-rule +
docs/architecture-invariants.md pointer layout while this PR was open.
Route counts reconciled against master's numbering (files 14 -> 16 for
the two new filesystem endpoints, total ~197 -> ~199) and the path
picker's detail moved into architecture-invariants under its own
section.
Adds a "Web / URL" section to the Run dropdown. A saved URL renders as a tab in
the same strip as Claude/Codex/Gemini sessions, with the same Alt+1..9 numbering,
so Codeman is one mission control instead of Codeman plus a pile of browser tabs.
A webview is NOT a sixth SessionMode: no PTY, no tmux, no respawn, no idle
detection. It is a separate resource sharing only the tab strip and the main
content area, the same call that keeps Docker and remote-SSH as case overlays.
Dashboards are proxied through Codeman's own origin, because a direct iframe
fails three ways at once in the shipped deployment: prod serves HTTPS behind
tailscale serve, so http:// targets are hard-blocked as mixed content (with no
override at all on iOS Safari); Grafana/Portainer-class dashboards send
X-Frame-Options: DENY; and our own default-src 'self' CSP blocks cross-origin
frames. Proxying dissolves all three and leaves the production CSP byte-for-byte
unchanged, since /webview/... is already covered by 'self'. A useful side effect:
the fetch happens server-side, so a tailnet-only dashboard is reachable from a
phone that is not on the tailnet.
The proxy is not an API surface. It authenticates on a 192-bit capability in the
path (memory-only, rolling TTL, bound to the minting user, revoked on edit or
delete) and is correspondingly exempt from the cookie and Origin checks, because
a sandboxed iframe is opaque-origin: it sends no SameSite=lax cookie and its
writes arrive with Origin: null. The Host allowlist is never bypassed. A second
Referer-keyed form of the exemption exists for root-absolute assets and is fenced
to safe methods on non-/api, non-/ws, non-/q paths.
Iframes omit allow-same-origin unless a URL is explicitly marked trusted, since a
proxied page is served from Codeman's own origin and could otherwise read this
document and drive the agent-spawning API. Authorization and codeman_session are
stripped upstream in BOTH modes, so CODEMAN_PASSWORD cannot leak into a dashboard.
Two things only a real browser reveals, both presenting as the dashboard's own
"Failed to fetch" while the page itself renders fine:
- Runtime-built root-absolute URLs (fetch('/api/data')) escape <base href> and
land on Codeman's root. Widening the Referer fallback into /api would trade
security for it, so an injected shim patches fetch/XHR/WebSocket/EventSource
inside the frame instead, removing the class rather than the guard.
- An opaque-origin document CORS-checks every request, including to the host it
was served from. Script/css/img loads are not CORS-checked, which is why the
page renders while its API calls die. The proxy now emits CORS headers and
answers preflights itself. registerSecurityHeaders answered every OPTIONS with
a bare 204 before routing, carrying no ACAO for Origin: null, so that
short-circuit now exempts a valid capability.
Neither is reproducible with curl, which does not enforce CORS.
Also fixes a pre-existing bug found on the way: .toolbar has backdrop-filter,
making it a stacking context that trapped .run-mode-menu's z-index:1000, so
.welcome-overlay painted over the whole Run menu. With no session open, every
item in it (Claude Code included) was unclickable.
Verified end to end against a real tailnet dashboard: live data, WebSocket push,
no failed requests, and switching tabs does not reload the frame. 98 new tests
cover the pure rewrite helpers, the CORS helper, the shim's rewrite logic, route
CRUD, and every edge of the auth exemption.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CLAUDE.md was 110KB (~27.5k tokens) loaded into every session, with 30 lines
carrying 49% of the bytes as single-paragraph walls (the Docker cases entry
alone was 9,388 chars). Extract the implementation detail verbatim into
docs/architecture-invariants.md (41 sections) and leave the rule plus a
pointer inline. Result: 59.5KB, ~14.9k tokens, 46% smaller.
Also:
- Add CLAUDE.md to .prettierignore. Prettier's markdown printer escapes
underscores in the glob-heavy paths used throughout, which had already
corrupted the Ultracode paragraph (agent-*.jsonl became agent-\_.jsonl,
collapsing backtick spans). npm run format:check is unaffected; its globs
are src/** only.
- Move version archaeology (PR numbers, ticket ids, commit shas, "was X now
Y" lineage) into the invariants doc, keeping the rules and their reasoning
inline.
- De-duplicate the Core Files table against Key Patterns.
- Document install.sh in Scripts, and why Prettier's scope is deliberately
narrow (14 hand-formatted public JS modules are guarded by
check:public-assets and check:frontend-syntax instead).
Two factual fixes found while verifying: displayKeys is a client-side merge
policy, not a wire filter, and showResponseViewer / showPlanUsageLimits /
language are declared in SettingsUpdateSchema and do persist server-side; and
the respawn route count is 7, not 18.
Verified: 30/30 cross-doc pointers resolve, 1,184 of 1,190 backticked
identifiers from the original survive (the 6 others are dropped archaeology
or the prettier-corrupted spellings), 59 table rows well-formed,
format:check and check:frontend-syntax clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>