- M7 (SSRF): add isSafePushEndpoint (https-only; reject internal/loopback/link-local/metadata IPs incl. IPv4-mapped); enforce in PushSubscribeSchema and re-check before webpush.sendNotification. + unit test.
- M1 (command injection): validate tmux session names with isValidMuxName in sessionExists, killSession, and reconcileSessions before they reach a shell call site.
- M5: keep the intentional /var/log + ~/logs log-tail roots (a tested feature) and document the wider read scope in docs/security-architecture.md section 5 instead of dropping it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
README: add a dedicated Security section (always-on Host/Origin
allowlist & DNS-rebinding defense, cross-site CSRF guard, raw
text/plain parser, WebSocket origin validation, XSS-escaped agent
output), plus an Orchestrator Loop section, Agent Teams, and a
More Features section (self-update, dual-CLI, effort/ultracode,
voice, image, gesture, multi-monitor, CJK). Correct stale stats
(tests 1435->2861, 13->15 route modules, 14->16 types, 9->10
config, server.ts 2697->2254, 9->18 frontend modules), fix the
keyboard-shortcut table to match the actual registry (drop the
unbound Ctrl+Enter/Ctrl+K), repoint a moved doc link, add
Orchestrator + self-update API rows, and add Orchestrator/Team
Watcher to the architecture diagram.
security-architecture.md: document the always-on Host-header &
Origin allowlist, text/plain hardening, WebSocket check, XSS
escaping, and CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS.
CLAUDE.md: add Host guard / CSRF guard rows + CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS.
security review report: add a remediation-status banner (the
pre-fix TL;DR now reads as v0.9.4 state; fixed in c669518).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Expand docs/security-architecture.md:
- Add a table-of-contents and an explicit "Trust model" section
framing the security boundary as network-bind + auth (not a
sandbox around --dangerously-skip-permissions), with an
actor/granted matrix and out-of-scope notes.
- Clarify the file-serving hardening: the octet-stream + attachment
+ nosniff combination (not the CSP, which allows 'unsafe-inline')
is what blocks SVG/HTML execution.
- Detail the actual transport security headers: enumerated CSP
widenings (cdn.jsdelivr.net, deepgram wss, data:/blob: img-src,
gesture wasm opt-in), HSTS, X-Frame-Options, localhost-only CORS.
- Add a "Key source files" table and a dated maintenance note.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>