Two home-screen reports from @jordan8037310, both about history that is
present but unreachable.
#260 — "Resume Conversation" rendered 4 rows, then a button that appended
every remaining row into a `max-height: 240px` box, so 35 conversations
landed in a four-row scroll well with no ordering or filtering. Rendering
now goes through `_renderHistoryList()` over a cached corpus: 10 rows to
start, Show more/Show less that grows and shrinks the box (the height cap
is class-driven, `.history-list.expanded`), plus a filter box (name,
folder, #case label, prompts), a sort control (recent / name / folder,
pinned rows still first) and a shown-of-total count. A filter implies
expansion, so every match is visible, and the whole header hides as one
unit while a federated search is active. The A-Z sort keys off the same
string the row renders, since most rows are transcript-backed and carry
no session name at all.
#261 — the search box could not match a past project by folder name:
`harvestSources()` built its session corpus from the live in-memory map,
while past sessions come from `/api/sessions/unified` (lifecycle log +
transcript scan). Folding that scan into the request path would have cost
the search its no-filesystem-reads property, so the corpus arrives via a
bounded snapshot instead: `session-history-index.ts` is published as a
side effect of `/api/sessions/unified` (the home screen fetches it on
open, which is the same screen the search box lives on) and rebuilt
fire-and-forget, single-flight and TTL-guarded when a search finds it
stale. A result for a closed session now resumes the conversation rather
than selecting a tab that no longer exists, and is badged RESUME.
The snapshot is stored unscoped with a per-row owner and re-filtered
through canAccessOwned() on read, so multi-user sees exactly what
/api/sessions/unified exposes: own sessions only, host-wide transcript
history admin-only. Live rows are harvested first and win the dedupe.
Verified end-to-end against a real instance with 60 past sessions: cold
process answers its first search without history and its second with it;
folder-name queries return resume targets; clicking one posts the right
resumeSessionId + workingDir.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses all four findings from the #251 review:
- Scaffolding no longer writes through repository-controlled symlinks.
The guard lives in hooks-config.ts (settingsWriteBlocker) so it also
covers quick-start/docker/ralph writers, not just the clone route:
refuses a symlinked .claude or settings.local.json, a .claude that is
a file, or one resolving outside the case. The clone route surfaces
the refusal as a user-visible warning, and the CLAUDE.md write checks
presence via lstat so a BROKEN repo-shipped symlink counts as present
(existsSync follows links and would have created the outside target).
- Failed-clone cleanup can no longer delete a concurrent winner's tree:
git clones into an attempt-owned temp sibling (.<name>.cloning-<rand>)
which is atomically renamed into place; the loser reports
DESTINATION_EXISTS and only ever removes its own temp dir.
- decodeURIComponent(url.pathname) is guarded: malformed percent-escapes
now come back as BAD_SYNTAX instead of an uncaught URIError 500.
- The git pool's waiter queue is bounded (CODEMAN_MAX_GIT_QUEUE, default
16): overflow answers BUSY immediately (HTTP 429 via RATE_LIMITED),
and queue time counts against the operation's own deadline.
Tests: hostile symlink fixture repo (route level), settingsWriteBlocker
units, concurrent same-destination race, temp-dir leak assertions,
percent-escape rejection, and a fake-git pool-bounds suite.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The feature as pitched in docs/readmymind-plan.md: pressing the header
brain button predicts the prompt you were about to type, from the case's
intent profile plus everything the session already knows.
Backend:
- readmymind-context.ts: pure budgeted context assembler (9 ranked
sources: pending approval dialog, user goals, last assistant turn tail,
recent prompts, tool activity, git workspace signals, away context,
sibling sessions, rethink state; 30 KB budget, whole-section drop from
the bottom of the ranking, trust tiers stated in the prompt)
- readmymind-collectors.ts: transcript tail reader (the live watcher
keeps only a 500-char snippet) and git signal collection (execFile,
2s timeout, skipped for remote-SSH cases)
- readmymind-predictor.ts: one-shot claude -p in a throwaway tmux
session, opus by default (readMyMindModel setting), strict JSON
contract with 1-3 suggestions (continue / verify / redirect), newline
stripping, 90s timeout; mutable singleton so route tests can stub it
- POST /api/sessions/:id/readmymind: claude-mode only (400), one
prediction in flight per session (409 CONFLICT), rethink body
{ steer, rejected }; ownership via findSessionOrFail
Frontend:
- readmymind-ui.js (loadorder 11.3): header brain button, marker-hidden
until readMyMindEnabled is ON, desktop only (phone key is phase 3);
modal with editable suggestion + rationale and Send / Insert /
Rethink / Dismiss; suggestion text rendered via value/textContent only
and nothing ever auto-sends
- App Settings -> Panels checkbox for readMyMindEnabled; en + zh-CN
strings
Verified end to end against a live isolated instance: transcript
capture, a real opus prediction grounded in the stated goals, rethink
steering, the 409, and the browser modal incl. Insert leaving the text
unsubmitted on the composer. 41 new unit/route tests; full test:ci
sweep green (4680 tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Per-case profiles of user intent (docs/readmymind-plan.md): user-stated goals
plus the user's recently submitted prompts, captured from the Claude session
transcript behind the new synced readMyMindEnabled setting (default OFF).
- intent-store.ts: keyed by owner + realpath(workingDir), FIFO/size caps,
consecutive-dupe collapse, atomic 0600 writes to ~/.codeman/intents.json
- transcript-watcher.ts: new transcript:user_prompt event for typed user turns
(tool_result-only entries stay silent); capture wiring in server.ts is
claude-only and gated on the setting per event
- readmymind-routes.ts: GET/PUT/DELETE /api/sessions/:id/intent, ownership
via findSessionOrFail, strict Zod schema
- agent skill: SKILL.md recipe + endpoints.md rows so agents can read and
record intent (PUT replaces: read + merge; never delete unprompted)
- groundwork for the phase-2 predictor button; nothing is ever auto-sent
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds an Add Case -> "Clone Repo" tab plus two endpoints, implementing
@DodgyBadger's proposal in #236: clone a public repository straight into
codeman-cases/<name> and register it as a normal local case.
POST /api/cases/clone is synchronous by design (request held open, bounded
by GIT_CLONE_TIMEOUT_MS): no job store, no polling, no cancellation
surface. Success broadcasts the usual case:created event, so the case
still appears when a proxy idle-timeout kills the request mid-clone.
POST /api/cases/clone-preflight runs `git ls-remote --symref` so the UI can
say, while the user is still typing, whether the URL is cloneable without
credentials, what its default branch is, and which branches/tags exist.
Core lives in src/git-clone.ts, split into a pure half (URL parse, argv/env,
ls-remote parse, stderr classification) and a thin IO half, so every
security decision is unit-testable without spawning anything:
- `<name>::<payload>` transports are refused as a family, not by name:
ext:: is the famous one, but any of them dispatches to git-remote-<name>
and turns a clone into arbitrary command execution.
- A leading `-` is refused AND every spawn puts `--` before the operands.
Either alone is one edit away from being a hole.
- argv arrays, never a shell. URLs carrying user:password@ are refused.
- gitNonInteractiveEnv() closes all four ways git can block on a prompt
with no terminal attached (terminal prompt, askpass/GUI, ssh, GCM).
HOME/PATH stay inherited, so a user's own credential helper or ssh agent
keeps working; Codeman itself collects and stores nothing.
- The timeout signals the process GROUP, since clone fans out into
git-remote-https/index-pack children that outlive a signal to the parent.
- Bounded output (redacted stderr tail, capped ls-remote stdout, 500 refs
each) and a global 2-op pool, so N large clones cannot exhaust the host.
Repository contents beat scaffolding: an existing CLAUDE.md is kept, hooks
are merged into whatever .claude/settings.local.json the repo shipped, and
a repo that ships its own Claude settings is reported back as a warning
(those hooks run locally as soon as a session starts there). A failed clone
removes only the directory the attempt created, and refuses a pre-existing
destination outright, so it can never squat on a case name.
Not admin-gated in multi-user mode, unlike /api/cases/link: it writes only
inside the caller's own case space. Local-path/file:// sources are the
exception and stay admin-only there.
UI: live verdict under the URL field, case name filled from the parsed repo
until the user types their own, branch/tag as a datalist of the remote's
real refs, optional shallow clone, and a Brain picker (installed CLIs only)
that points the Run button at the chosen agent. Starting a session stays
opt-in. The tab hides itself when the server reports no git.
Tests: the pure half exhaustively (every refusal has a case), plus real git
against a real local bare repo for clone/ref/timeout/cleanup, and a
route-level suite with unmocked fs that clones through the endpoint.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The picker behind Link Existing's "Browse" and the mobile keyboard's Path key
refused every path with a dot-prefixed segment, so `.github/workflows/ci.yml`
could not be selected and a hidden folder could not be opened at all. It gains
the same `.*` toggle as the File Viewer: default OFF, per-device, and applied to
both the listing and the preview endpoint, which re-resolves the path
independently.
That dotfile filter was quietly doing security work. The picker's roots include
Home, so with every hidden path unreachable the shared blocklist never had to
name the credentials that live in dot-directories. Lifting the filter removes
that accident, so `isSensitivePath` now covers them explicitly: SSH keys at any
depth rather than only under $HOME, GPG keyrings, AWS/GCloud/Azure/Docker/
Kubernetes credentials, npm, Yarn, git, gh, netrc, PyPI, RubyGems, Cargo and
Terraform tokens, .pgpass and .my.cnf, and the Claude and Codeman agent
credentials. `~/.codeman/` and `~/.claude/` stay attachable as trees, since the
publish skill and the review-card loop read from them; only their secret-bearing
members are named.
Everything else still applies with the toggle on: blocked trees, sensitive
files, root confinement, ownership scoping and symlink-escape checks. A hidden
entry whose realpath is a secret is dropped from the listing, and opening it is
refused.
Follows #221
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Owner decision: every Approvals Inbox UI surface (header bell, drawer,
phone overview answer strips, reload seeding) now requires enabling
approvalsInboxEnabled in App Settings -> Panels; only an explicit true
turns it on. The store, endpoints, and push Approve/Deny actions keep
running regardless (the push buttons are already opt-in per subscription).
Also replaces em-dashes with plain punctuation across the newly authored
comments, docs, and strings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Permission dialogs, AskUserQuestion questions and idle prompts from every
session now land in a server-side inbox (web/approval-inbox.ts, one item per
session, claude-mode only) and are answerable in place: a header bell + drawer
on desktop, inline answer strips on the phone overview's NEEDS YOU rows, and
working push Approve/Deny buttons (previously dead ends, now answered straight
from sw.js with no tab open). Pending alerts survive reloads because the
frontend seeds from GET /api/approvals on init.
Answering sends the digit / Esc / prompt text through the existing tmux input
path; option digits are accepted only when they match options parsed from the
captured pane frame, and the answer path re-captures the pane first so a
dialog that already left the screen refuses with 409 instead of typing into
the composer. New elicitation_complete / elicitation_response hook matchers
resolve question items the moment they are answered in the terminal;
refreshStaleCodemanHooks heals existing cases.
Verified end-to-end against a live claude session: a real AskUserQuestion
dialog parsed into 5 option buttons and was answered from the drawer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three gaps found while auditing the agent skill.
`codeman skill install` / `uninstall` had no tests at all, including the linked-case
resolution that shipped in 1.14.2 with nothing guarding it. Covered now: global target
resolution, `--case` resolving through linked-cases.json, `--case` falling back to the
cases dir for an unlinked name, a missing or malformed registry degrading to the
fallback instead of throwing, and a nonexistent case being rejected. `resolveSkillTarget`
called `process.exit(1)` for a missing case, which would have killed the test runner, so
the pure resolution is split out and exported; CLI behavior is unchanged.
The `POST /api/sessions` injection call site was never exercised, because the shared
route mock hardcoded the gate off. The mock's gate is overridable per test now (default
still off, since other tests rely on that), and there is coverage that the path injects
when the setting is on, does not when it is off, and is claude-mode gated.
Nothing guarded skills/codeman/reference/endpoints.md against drifting from the routes
it documents, which is how it drifted in the first place. A static guard parses the
endpoints out of the markdown and asserts each is really registered, tolerating the
/api/v1 alias and path params.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two blockers from the pre-submission gate, both reproduced before fixing.
1. The changeset claimed the non-mux POST branch answers OPERATION_FAILED. The
code says the opposite in as many words ("NOT an error response,
deliberately"), the commit message says response codes are unchanged, and the
test asserts the 200. It was a leftover sentence from an earlier iteration that
would have shipped into the CHANGELOG announcing an API contract change that
does not exist — and errorCode values are SemVer-relevant per
docs/versioning-policy.md.
2. The WebSocket half of the fix had no test protection: reverting ws-routes.ts to
master left all 9 tests green, while the commit message sells "plus the whole
WebSocket path" as part of the fix. Three tests added against the real WS
route — ACK on delivery, ACK withheld and seq re-opened when the write did not
land, and a deduplicated frame still ACKed so the client can drop it. Verified
the other way round: with ws-routes.ts reverted, the middle one fails.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Both input paths recorded the (clientId, seq) pair as applied and acknowledged the
frame BEFORE knowing whether the write had landed: the POST route because its mux
write is fire-and-forget so the response never waits on a tmux child, the
WebSocket handler because it ACKed unconditionally.
When the write then failed, the client dropped the frame from its durable queue
and the server rejected the retry as a duplicate. The reliable-delivery layer was
guaranteeing exactly-once delivery of something that had never been delivered —
and `Session.write()` returned void, so a session whose PTY was gone swallowed the
data with no signal at all.
- `forgetInputSeq()` rolls the bookkeeping back on failure, but only when that seq
is still the newest one; a later input has superseded it and must not re-open.
- The WebSocket handler withholds its ACK when the write did not land, so the
client redelivers.
- `Session.write()` reports whether it reached a PTY.
Response codes are unchanged, deliberately: a session can legitimately have no PTY
yet, and turning that into a failure status would be a contract change of its own.
What this does NOT do: remove the root cause. The POST still answers 200 before
the mux write is attempted, so a client that treats any 2xx as final cannot learn
about that failure. What closes is the narrower window — the write failed AND the
ACK never reached the client — plus the whole WebSocket path. Closing the rest
would mean awaiting the tmux child inside the request.
9 tests. They drive the HTTP route, not only the Session primitives: with the
rollback removed from the route, 2 of them fail.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
#215 filters non-interactive transcripts out of Past Sessions with
`entrypoint !== 'cli'`. That is an allowlist on a value, and the check
hides rows, so it fails CLOSED on anything Claude Code has not shipped
yet: the day it stamps a new interactive entrypoint (a rename, or a
second interactive host), no transcript matches 'cli' any more and the
entire Past Sessions list goes blank with nothing in the UI explaining
why.
Invert it to a blocklist on the SDK shape (`sdk`, `sdk-cli`, `sdk-py`).
An automated entrypoint we do not recognize yet now costs a few noisy
rows, which is the annoyance the filter set out to fix, rather than a
dead feature. Matches the fail-open reasoning #215 already applied to a
MISSING entrypoint field; only the unknown-VALUE case was inverted.
Test fails against the pre-fix line and passes after.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
extractTranscriptEntrypoint returned the FIRST entrypoint-bearing message's
value instead of scanning for any 'cli' occurrence, so a transcript that
started under an older Claude Code build (no entrypoint field) and later
picked up a non-'cli' entrypoint on some later message was wrongly excluded
from history — the opposite of the fail-open behavior the function's own
comment claimed. Now returns 'cli' the moment any scanned message carries it,
and only falls back to a non-cli value when nothing else qualifies. Head/tail
entrypoints are merged the same way (either side being 'cli' wins).
Also restructures scanProjectDir's head read into two tiers: try 16KB first
and escalate to 128KB only when that wasn't enough, instead of reading 128KB
for every file unconditionally. Measured against a real ~/.claude/projects
tree, the unconditional-128KB version roughly quadrupled scan cost to fix a
problem only a minority of files actually have; the two-tier version cuts
bytes read by ~36% and wall time by ~17% while producing identical output.
Also fixes a fallback regression where a failed head read (e.g. EMFILE) on a
file at or under the head buffer size no longer got a shot at the tail-read
fallback, silently dropping the session from history.
The comment implied the fallback could be "silently skipped" by the
stale hardcoded threshold, which isn't actually true -- the old
smaller numbers were always more eager to trigger the fallback, never
less (same correction as the commit this test belongs to). What the
test actually protects against is the fallback logic itself breaking
(e.g. a copy-paste slip dropping the check entirely), not the exact
threshold value. Reworded to say that.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two follow-ups from reviewing the entrypoint-filter and head-buffer
fixes before submitting them upstream:
1. extractTranscriptEntrypoint() scanned any line containing the
substring "entrypoint", not specifically the first "type":"user"/
"type":"assistant" message line (unlike its sibling
extractFirstUserPrompt, which does scope to type). A transcript
that started under an older Claude Code version (no entrypoint
field) and got resumed under a newer one mid-conversation could
pick up the field from a much later message than the true first
one, misattributing the session's origin. Scoped it to match.
2. Added a regression test proving the tail-read fallback still
engages correctly when bookkeeping accumulation exceeds even the
new 128KB head window, not just the 16KB it previously blanked at.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Blank firstPrompt rows weren't all oversized messages -- traced one
directly: a session restarted many times (mux deaths, redeploys)
accumulates a batch of small bookkeeping lines (mode/permission-mode/
last-prompt/queue-operation, one batch per restart) ahead of the real
first message. With enough restarts these alone crossed the old 16KB
head-read window, so extraction found nothing even though the actual
first message was tiny (measured case: ~17.5KB of bookkeeping pushed a
189-byte real message just past the boundary).
Raise the head buffer from 16KB to 128KB (matching the existing
precedent at the codex-history head-read a few hundred lines up) and
fix three now-stale `> 16384`/`> 65536` fallback thresholds to
reference headBuf.length instead of hardcoded numbers, so the tail-read
fallbacks stay correctly scoped to "beyond what head already covered."
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Automated tools (CI review bots, etc.) invoke Claude Code via the SDK
and write their transcripts into the same ~/.claude/projects tree as
real interactive sessions, but were never something a user can resume
into -- no PTY, no running process. Their one-shot review prompts also
embed the full diff inline as a single message, often exceeding the
16KB head / 32KB tail windows this scanner reads, so they cluttered
Past Sessions two ways: as blank rows when the huge message couldn't
be parsed, or as N identical "Review this change for security
vulnerabilities..." rows when it could.
Claude Code stamps `entrypoint` on its own message records ('cli' for
a real interactive session, e.g. 'sdk-py' for an SDK invocation).
Exclude any transcript whose entrypoint isn't 'cli' from the history
list entirely, checked last so it reuses whatever head/tail the prompt
extraction already read. Missing entrypoint (older transcripts) reads
as interactive -- fail open, matching every other gating check in this
codebase. Shared by /api/history/sessions and /api/sessions/unified,
since both call the same scanProjectDir().
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes#212. The file-preview overlay can now edit workspace text files in
place, phone-first: agent writes a file, you review it in the viewer, tweak
two lines, save, tell the agent to continue.
Backend (file-routes.ts, policy in src/config/file-editing.ts):
- GET file-content?edit=1: read-for-edit that never truncates (a truncated
buffer must never become an edit buffer), 512KB cap (413 over it), and
returns the sha256 hash + detected EOL the client echoes back on save.
- PUT /api/sessions/:id/file-content: edit-in-place only, with no O_CREAT
anywhere in the handler. Confinement matches the read path (realpath +
workspace boundary + ownership via findSessionOrFail), plus sensitive-path
and attachment-guard blocklists, a .git subtree deny, and an extension
allowlist (svg and env deliberately excluded). Optimistic concurrency via
baseHash: mismatch is a 409 unless force. Writes are wx-temp + fchmod +
fsync + rename, closing the validate-then-write TOCTOU window.
- Corruption guards: NUL sniff + UTF-8 round-trip compare (refuses binary
and latin-1), and server-side EOL re-application so a textarea's LF
normalization cannot rewrite every line of a CRLF file.
- Plain reads gain an additive editable flag the UI keys the button off.
Frontend (panels-ui.js + overlay markup/styles):
- Edit button on editable text previews; textarea editor with Save/Cancel,
dirty indicator, discard-confirm on cancel/close, and a conflict dialog
that offers overwrite (force) when the file changed on disk mid-edit.
- Phone: full-bleed window sized by --app-height so the editor and Save bar
track the OS keyboard; 16px editor font (iOS zoom guard); no autofocus.
- zh-CN strings for the new chrome.
Tests: pure policy unit tests plus a route suite that deliberately does NOT
mock node:fs. It runs against a real temp workspace so symlink escapes,
write-through of in-workspace symlinks, mode preservation, CRLF round-trip,
409/force, and the no-create property are exercised for real. Also verified
end to end on an isolated beta instance: 39-check curl matrix, Playwright
desktop flow (real clicks and typing, bytes asserted on disk, live conflict
with an external rewrite), and a 393px phone profile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to #202. The dotdir decode landed there was reachable only when
nothing else matched first, and in the greedy half it was not reachable at all.
decodeProjectKey() splits the project key on '-', so the '/.' that the encoder
collapses leaves an EMPTY segment behind. Both loops offered that empty string
as a candidate directory name, and isDir(current + '/' + '') stats current + '/',
which always succeeds. So the empty segment matched unconditionally:
- backtracking half: ~/.sib resolved to "/home/x//sib" whenever a non-dot
sibling ~/sib existed (wrong directory, and a doubled slash that then fails
every string comparison against session.workingDir). Without a sibling it
only backtracked out by luck.
- greedy half: that loop is shortest-match-first, so the empty candidate
matched on the FIRST iteration and set matched=true, leaving #202's dotdir
branch permanently dead there.
An empty string is never a real path component, so skip it in both loops. The
unmatched tail then has to handle the empty segment too, or it would append a
bare '/' and re-introduce the '//' path it just stopped producing; it now emits
the dotdir guess instead, which is what the encoder implies.
Regression test asserts both halves: the dotdir wins over the non-dot sibling,
and the result never contains '//'. Verified it fails on #202 as merged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
decodeProjectKey() couldn't recover a dotdir path (e.g. ~/.codeman) from
Claude Code's encoded project-key names: the encoder maps both '/' and
'.' to '-', so the decoder's candidate joins never matched a hidden
directory on disk. It silently fell through to bare $HOME instead,
which corrupted workingDir for any resumed session under a dotdir case
(observed on ~/.codeman itself: history rows and state.json recorded
"/home/timkjr" instead of "/home/timkjr/.codeman").
Add a dot-prefixed candidate to both the backtracking decoder and its
greedy fallback so a leading empty split segment (the signature of a
literal '.' in the original path) is retried as a hidden directory.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds Antigravity as a sixth CLI backend alongside Claude Code, shell, OpenCode,
Codex and Gemini, following the existing pluggable-resolver pattern.
- `utils/antigravity-cli-resolver.ts` resolves the CLI, mirroring the other
resolvers; `GET /api/antigravity/status` reports availability and path.
- `ANTIGRAVITY_*` joins the `ALLOWED_ENV_PREFIXES` allowlist in schemas.ts, so
env overrides stay CLI-scoped rather than blanket-forwarded.
- Session, tmux-manager, mux-interface and types carry the new mode; secrets are
injected via socket-scoped `tmux setenv`, never on the spawn command line, so
the mode requires tmux with no direct PTY fallback like the other external CLIs.
- Frontend: Run-dropdown entry, agent-type option, `ag` tab badge and toolbar
colours. `runAntigravity()` routes remote/docker cases through
`POST /api/quick-start` and skips the local status probe for them.
Tests: test/antigravity-mode.test.ts, plus run-mode-ui and system-routes coverage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The viewer re-derived a pane's live conversation from the newest
~/.claude/history.jsonl entry for the pane's cwd. A cwd is shared with every
other Codeman tab on it, with tabs long since closed, and with any plain
`claude` the user runs in their own terminal, so the eye followed whichever of
those was typed into last — and since the match was written back through
adoptClaudeSessionId(), the mispin stuck.
Credit a history entry to a pane only when it lands within 10s of that pane's
own Enter and no other pane on the same cwd submitted closer, reusing the
last-submit correlation the Codex locator already relies on. Submit tracking
moves from _codexLastSubmitAt to a mode-agnostic Session.lastSubmitAt. With no
correlated entry the pane keeps the id it has: a viewer one turn behind beats a
viewer showing someone else's conversation.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
PUT /api/settings service toggles now resolve from `merged` (persisted +
incoming) instead of the raw request body, so a partial PUT no longer
starts the subagent watcher and stops the workflow + image watchers by
treating every omitted key as "apply the default". Pinned by a 4-case
regression test verified to fail against the old handler.
Also trims the links line from the Codeman callout in the
xterm-zerolag-input README.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Only CLAUDE.md conflicted: master restructured it into the short-rule +
docs/architecture-invariants.md pointer layout while this PR was open.
The response-viewer detail now lives in architecture-invariants, so the
Claude turn-grouping and restored-placeholder rebind notes moved there.
Changeset rewritten to record the measured effect on real transcripts.
Both picker endpoints are a second file-serving surface, and they
inherited neither the attachment guard's confinement nor its ownership
scoping. Two separate holes:
1. `sessionId` contributes that session's workingDir as a browse root,
but it was resolved straight off ctx.sessions/ctx.store with no owner
check, unlike the nine other session-scoped handlers in this file. A
non-admin could pin ANOTHER user's working directory as a root just
by passing their session id, then list and preview underneath it. Now
runs canAccessOwned and reports 404, which also avoids confirming
that a session id exists.
2. `Home` and `CASES_DIR` were unconditional roots for every caller.
Per-user spaces live at <USER_SPACES_DIR>/<username>, which is INSIDE
homedir(), so the Home root alone exposed every other user's
workspace. A multi-user non-admin now gets only their own
userSpacePath plus anything explicitly listed in
CODEMAN_FILE_PICKER_ROOTS. /mnt/d is dropped as well: a broad host
mount should be an explicit operator decision in a multi-user
deployment, and operators who want it can name it in that env var.
Admins and single-user mode keep the host-wide roots, so behavior is
unchanged unless CODEMAN_MULTIUSER is on (opt-in, off by default).
All three discriminating tests were verified to fail against the
previous code: browse and preview both returned 200 instead of 404, and
the roots came back as [Home, Codeman Cases, ...] instead of [My Space].
Full suite green, 3784 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Only CLAUDE.md conflicted: master restructured it into the short-rule +
docs/architecture-invariants.md pointer layout while this PR was open.
Route counts reconciled against master's numbering (files 14 -> 16 for
the two new filesystem endpoints, total ~197 -> ~199) and the path
picker's detail moved into architecture-invariants under its own
section.
Adds a "Web / URL" section to the Run dropdown. A saved URL renders as a tab in
the same strip as Claude/Codex/Gemini sessions, with the same Alt+1..9 numbering,
so Codeman is one mission control instead of Codeman plus a pile of browser tabs.
A webview is NOT a sixth SessionMode: no PTY, no tmux, no respawn, no idle
detection. It is a separate resource sharing only the tab strip and the main
content area, the same call that keeps Docker and remote-SSH as case overlays.
Dashboards are proxied through Codeman's own origin, because a direct iframe
fails three ways at once in the shipped deployment: prod serves HTTPS behind
tailscale serve, so http:// targets are hard-blocked as mixed content (with no
override at all on iOS Safari); Grafana/Portainer-class dashboards send
X-Frame-Options: DENY; and our own default-src 'self' CSP blocks cross-origin
frames. Proxying dissolves all three and leaves the production CSP byte-for-byte
unchanged, since /webview/... is already covered by 'self'. A useful side effect:
the fetch happens server-side, so a tailnet-only dashboard is reachable from a
phone that is not on the tailnet.
The proxy is not an API surface. It authenticates on a 192-bit capability in the
path (memory-only, rolling TTL, bound to the minting user, revoked on edit or
delete) and is correspondingly exempt from the cookie and Origin checks, because
a sandboxed iframe is opaque-origin: it sends no SameSite=lax cookie and its
writes arrive with Origin: null. The Host allowlist is never bypassed. A second
Referer-keyed form of the exemption exists for root-absolute assets and is fenced
to safe methods on non-/api, non-/ws, non-/q paths.
Iframes omit allow-same-origin unless a URL is explicitly marked trusted, since a
proxied page is served from Codeman's own origin and could otherwise read this
document and drive the agent-spawning API. Authorization and codeman_session are
stripped upstream in BOTH modes, so CODEMAN_PASSWORD cannot leak into a dashboard.
Two things only a real browser reveals, both presenting as the dashboard's own
"Failed to fetch" while the page itself renders fine:
- Runtime-built root-absolute URLs (fetch('/api/data')) escape <base href> and
land on Codeman's root. Widening the Referer fallback into /api would trade
security for it, so an injected shim patches fetch/XHR/WebSocket/EventSource
inside the frame instead, removing the class rather than the guard.
- An opaque-origin document CORS-checks every request, including to the host it
was served from. Script/css/img loads are not CORS-checked, which is why the
page renders while its API calls die. The proxy now emits CORS headers and
answers preflights itself. registerSecurityHeaders answered every OPTIONS with
a bare 204 before routing, carrying no ACAO for Origin: null, so that
short-circuit now exempts a valid capability.
Neither is reproducible with curl, which does not enforce CORS.
Also fixes a pre-existing bug found on the way: .toolbar has backdrop-filter,
making it a stacking context that trapped .run-mode-menu's z-index:1000, so
.welcome-overlay painted over the whole Run menu. With no session open, every
item in it (Claude Code included) was unclickable.
Verified end to end against a real tailnet dashboard: live data, WebSocket push,
no failed requests, and switching tabs does not reload the frame. 98 new tests
cover the pure rewrite helpers, the CORS helper, the shim's rewrite logic, route
CRUD, and every edge of the auth exemption.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolutions (sse-events.ts / constants.js / app.js): unions of the docker/
multi-user event registrations from master with the session-order/pin events
from this branch.
Additions on top of the merge:
- POST /api/sessions/:id/pin now falls back to the persisted store record when
no live session exists: COD-142 deliberately preserves pinned records after
kill (and cleanupStaleSessions skips them), so without this a pinned-then-
killed session could never be unpinned. Owner-scoped in multi-user mode.
- SessionOrderUpdateSchema bounds (id <= 100 chars, <= 500 entries) so a buggy
client can't persist megabytes into state.json; empty strings still flow to
normalizeSessionOrder which drops them.
- Route tests for the persisted-record pin fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolutions:
- session.ts: keep the extracted _buildRespawnPaneOptions() helper (COD-108)
and add master's docker/owner fields to it
- tmux-manager.ts: docker branch first, then remote via buildRemoteSessionCommand
(now an options object threading claudeMode/allowedTools into
buildRemoteLaunchCommand, preserving the 6.3 multi-user permission downgrade)
- case-routes.ts: keep master's adminOnly helper; gate the new COD-105 discovery
endpoint admin-only in multi-user mode (hosts are machine-level infra)
- settings-ui.js: union of remoteAutoReconnect + master's header-button defaults
- session-routes.ts: union of imports; session gets remote + owner
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The opt-in multi-user feature's only enforcement is web-layer scoping
(all sessions share one OS account). An adversarial review found 8 critical
+ 7 high cross-user holes that defeated it, plus mediums; all fixed here.
Single-user (flag-off) behavior stays byte-identical apart from documented
consistency deltas.
Ownership / confinement:
- DELETE /api/sessions (bulk) + /:id now owner-scope / findSessionOrFail
- quick-start, cron (create+fire), scheduled runs confine workingDir to the
owner's space; case link/docker-link/docker-import confine the host path
- resolveCasePath no longer resolves linked cases for non-admins; foreign
remote/docker cases are skipped (fall through to the caller's own local case)
- history, subagents/workflows, mux-sessions, orchestrator, cron run-history,
away-digest, and remote/docker host reads are owner- or admin-scoped
Permission policy (section 6.3):
- non-granted users are downgraded at every spawn site incl. legacy
/api/scheduled, PlanOrchestrator one-shots, remote launch, and the cron-fire
gemini/codex bypass switches; resolveClaudeModeForUsername now fails closed
Auth / store:
- verify-first login throttle (a correct password is never locked out),
/ws terminal subject to the change-password lockbox, cookie fast-path
re-validates identity live, role/grant changes revoke sessions, admin delete
runs the last-admin guard before any teardown
- users.json: distinguish missing (ENOENT) from corrupt/unreadable so a bad
read can't overwrite all accounts; unique per-process temp write path
Event streams:
- debounced session:updated + batched task:updated, clipboard, and push
notifications route by owner (fail closed); getLightState hides machine-wide
globalStats from non-admins
Tests: two suites updated to assert the fixed (secure) behavior. tsc, eslint,
and test:ci all green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Docker cases: seamless Claude auth (seed ~/.claude.json instead of the
corruption-prone single-file mount), full credential-store isolation for
claude + codex/gemini/gcloud/opencode (share only transcripts/rollouts,
seed the rest), auto-build the base image on first use, C.UTF-8 locale
(fixes box-drawing), collapsed/shortened Create-Case UI + short "(docker)"
case-menu tags, and w<n>-<case> tab naming for docker/remote sessions.
Also: opt-in File Viewer header button; fix a TZ-boundary flaky test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pin/unpin a session via POST /api/sessions/:id/pin {pinned}; pinned sessions
sort above unpinned in the unified session manager list (COD-121), ordered by
pinnedAt descending. Pin state lives on SessionState, persists to state.json,
and survives reload/reconnect/restart (persisted-input carries pinned; the
merge skips undefined so a recovered live session can't clobber it). New SSE
event session:pinned re-sorts the open list live across clients. Pin/Unpin
affordance in the session-row kebab menu with a 📌 glyph + amber highlight.
(cherry picked from commit 82749747039afcd4a3104f6a97ce7d3c2ddd048d)
Tab reordering (drag-and-drop + Ctrl+Shift+{/}) persisted only to
localStorage (codeman-session-order), so each device kept its own private
order. Add server-side persistence so the order follows the user across
devices, live. Takes the issue's recommended default (a): one global order,
server authoritative, localStorage as offline fallback.
- session-order.ts (new, pure + unit-tested): normalizeSessionOrder (coerce
to string[], drop empty/non-string, dedup) and mergeSessionOrder (the
pushing device's order wins; ids the device hadn't loaded fall to the end
in their existing relative order, never dropped — graceful for
closed/remote/parked sessions absent on that device).
- AppState.sessionOrder?: string[]; StateStore get/setSessionOrder + the field
added to buildPartialJson() (the incremental serializer whitelists fields,
so without this the value never reached disk / survived a restart).
- PUT /api/session-order (session-routes): parse -> merge -> persist ->
broadcast session:orderChanged; getLightState() init snapshot now carries
sessionOrder so a fresh load/reconnect restores it.
- SSE event session:orderChanged registered in sse-events.ts + constants.js.
- app.js: handleInit seeds localStorage from the server snapshot before
syncSessionOrder(); saveSessionOrder() also PUTs to the server (debounced
400ms, covers drag + both keyboard moves); _onSessionOrderChanged adopts a
remote order and re-renders (no-op-guarded to avoid echo flicker).
Verified (orchestrator re-ran all gates): tsc 0, lint 0, frontend-syntax +
prettier clean, build ok; session-order + session-order-routes + state-store
56/56. Functional round-trip on an isolated beta: PUT {a,b,c} -> status
snapshot reflects it; merge PUT {c,a} vs {a,b,c} -> {c,a,b} (b preserved at
end); malformed payload rejected with a clean 400; sessionOrder persisted to
state.json and survived a restart.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 79415f2fdfbdf3fbe362a063534e7f84c553eefb)
Phase 2 of the remote-tmux arc. Discover codeman-* tmux sessions already
running on a remote host (created by the remote's own Codeman or another
instance) and attach to one this Codeman didn't launch, with detach-not-kill
ownership for non-owned sessions.
- remote-hosts.ts: listRemoteCodemanSessions (ssh, VITEST-guarded, never throws)
+ pure parseRemoteSessionList + buildRemoteListSessionsCommand. Parser splits
on the LITERAL \t the remote tmux emits (next-3.7 does not expand \t) AND a
real tab. toAttachedSessionRemote builds a non-owned SessionRemote; toSessionRemote
now marks the COD-104 launch path owned:true.
- tmux-manager.ts: buildRemoteAttachCommand (sibling of buildRemoteLaunchCommand);
buildRemoteSessionCommand selects attach vs launch by ownership. killSession gains
a detach-not-kill early return for non-owned remote sessions: tears down only the
LOCAL pane (kills local ssh -> remote attach detaches), NEVER issues a remote
kill-session.
- types/session.ts: RemoteSessionInfo; SessionRemote.owned + remoteSessionName.
- schemas.ts: CreateSessionSchema.attachRemoteSession {hostId, remoteSessionName};
fixed a pre-existing no-useless-escape lint error in the jumpHost regex.
- case-routes.ts: GET /api/remote-hosts/:hostId/sessions (explicit discovery).
- session-routes.ts: attachRemoteSession create path -> non-owned session.
- UI (index.html/session-ui.js/styles.css): explicit "Discover existing sessions"
button + Attach action (owned:false). No auto-discover.
Verified on aa-desktop: discovered codeman-disco1, attached (attached=1, shared
view), killed local probe pane -> remote SURVIVED_DETACH (attached=0). Tests:
parse/attach-cmd/ownership unit + discovery route, session-routes + case-routes green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 55f5ada9db6d01518a4adf6b752e460b5df39524)
Includes review fixes: full route-test coverage for the rollout locator/parser (originator/uuid/pin resolution, dedup, injected-context filtering), LRU caches, multi-block text joins.
# Conflicts:
# src/web/routes/session-routes.ts
Includes review fixes: real _wsState lifecycle (connecting/connected/disconnected), per-tab supersede identity (multi-tab coexistence), preserved reconnect backoff, connection-dot CSS for connected/fallback states.
Includes review fixes: explicit ?full=1 trigger wired from initial page load, capture maxBuffer sized from config with -S line bound, capture returned alone (no byte-buffer duplication), early byte-cap before normalization.
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