Security (MAJOR): the terminal-output codeman://attach scanner registered any
matching path server-side with no user confirmation and broadcast the rawUrl
over SSE. Terminal output is attacker-influenceable (a prompt-injected session
can print an arbitrary path), so on the default no-auth deployment this was an
arbitrary host-file (png/pdf/docx/pptx/md/txt) read primitive reachable by any
SSE client. Magic-link registration is now force-confined to the session
workspace (forceWorkspaceConfinement) regardless of the global confine setting;
deliberate cross-workspace attach still works through the explicit,
Origin-guarded POST /attachments route and 'codeman attach' (which POSTs
directly inside a managed session). Documented in security-architecture.md.
Regression (MAJOR): .png was rerouted from the image-popup path to
attachment:detected, which has no frontend consumer — silently breaking the
dropped/pasted-screenshot popup. PNG stays on image:detected; only pdf/docx/pptx
(which never had a popup) emit attachment:detected.
Also:
- raw route streams the freshly-resolved path, not the stored one, so a
post-registration symlink swap can't redirect the stream (TOCTOU).
- 50MB cap on the attachment raw route, matching file-raw / download.
- per-session attachment registry cap (200) to bound the POST path.
- CLI reads creds via dataPath('.env'), honoring CODEMAN_INSTANCE.
Tests: forced-confinement reject/allow cases; PNG popup-path assertions updated.
Review fixes for COD-54:
- Generated hook curl commands now present X-Codeman-Hook-Secret, read from
the secret file AT EXECUTION TIME via $CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE (exported
into every managed session's env by tmux buildEnvExports / the direct-PTY
env builders). Without this, every local hook 401'd the moment a managed
tunnel came up — the enforcement existed but nothing presented the secret.
Path-not-value keeps the secret off command lines and out of config files,
and running sessions pick up a newly generated secret with no respawn;
server.start() ensures the file exists up front.
- Hook-secret failures now count into a DEDICATED per-IP bucket
(hookSecretFailures) instead of the shared authFailures map. Legacy
(pre-secret) hook configs fire constantly from 127.0.0.1; counting their
401s against the shared bucket would 429 every cookie-less loopback
request — locking out the Basic-Auth login path (and, through a tunnel,
every client, since tunneled traffic also arrives as 127.0.0.1).
- docs/security-architecture.md: secret-gated hook exemption, dedicated
bucket, COD-55 refusal, and the residual caveat for EXTERNAL loopback
proxies (user-run cloudflared / tailscale serve), which the
managed-tunnel probe cannot see.
- test/cod54-hook-event-auth.test.ts: +3 tests — login path unaffected
after hook-bucket exhaustion; generated hooks reference the header +
$CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE without embedding the value; env builders
export the path only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- M7 (SSRF): add isSafePushEndpoint (https-only; reject internal/loopback/link-local/metadata IPs incl. IPv4-mapped); enforce in PushSubscribeSchema and re-check before webpush.sendNotification. + unit test.
- M1 (command injection): validate tmux session names with isValidMuxName in sessionExists, killSession, and reconcileSessions before they reach a shell call site.
- M5: keep the intentional /var/log + ~/logs log-tail roots (a tested feature) and document the wider read scope in docs/security-architecture.md section 5 instead of dropping it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
README: add a dedicated Security section (always-on Host/Origin
allowlist & DNS-rebinding defense, cross-site CSRF guard, raw
text/plain parser, WebSocket origin validation, XSS-escaped agent
output), plus an Orchestrator Loop section, Agent Teams, and a
More Features section (self-update, dual-CLI, effort/ultracode,
voice, image, gesture, multi-monitor, CJK). Correct stale stats
(tests 1435->2861, 13->15 route modules, 14->16 types, 9->10
config, server.ts 2697->2254, 9->18 frontend modules), fix the
keyboard-shortcut table to match the actual registry (drop the
unbound Ctrl+Enter/Ctrl+K), repoint a moved doc link, add
Orchestrator + self-update API rows, and add Orchestrator/Team
Watcher to the architecture diagram.
security-architecture.md: document the always-on Host-header &
Origin allowlist, text/plain hardening, WebSocket check, XSS
escaping, and CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS.
CLAUDE.md: add Host guard / CSRF guard rows + CODEMAN_ALLOWED_HOSTS.
security review report: add a remediation-status banner (the
pre-fix TL;DR now reads as v0.9.4 state; fixed in c669518).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Expand docs/security-architecture.md:
- Add a table-of-contents and an explicit "Trust model" section
framing the security boundary as network-bind + auth (not a
sandbox around --dangerously-skip-permissions), with an
actor/granted matrix and out-of-scope notes.
- Clarify the file-serving hardening: the octet-stream + attachment
+ nosniff combination (not the CSP, which allows 'unsafe-inline')
is what blocks SVG/HTML execution.
- Detail the actual transport security headers: enumerated CSP
widenings (cdn.jsdelivr.net, deepgram wss, data:/blob: img-src,
gesture wasm opt-in), HSTS, X-Frame-Options, localhost-only CORS.
- Add a "Key source files" table and a dated maintenance note.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
arkon