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Author SHA1 Message Date
RandalixandClaude Opus 5.5 6ba311f38d fix(git): pin git's locale for clone, so failures classify on any host 
classifyGitFailure() matches git's English stderr, but cloneRepository()
spawned git with gitNonInteractiveEnv(), which left the host's locale in
place. Under de_DE.UTF-8 a missing ref came back as FAILED / 422 instead of
REF_NOT_FOUND / 400, and a missing repository as 422 instead of 404; the
clone dialog showed "git failed: Schwerwiegend: …". gitNonInteractiveEnv()
now sets LC_ALL=C and LANG=C, as git-workspace-status.ts already does.

Two tests depended on the locale on their own:
- git-status-routes: the spy runner called git without the production
  runner's LC_ALL=C, so "Kein Git-Repository" was not recognised.
- custom-model-run-menu-ui: the modal formats with toLocaleString(), the
  test hard-coded 16,384 and 40,000.

Full suite under de_DE.UTF-8: 5 failed before, 0 after.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-10-09 17:48:28 +02:00
DevvynandClaude Opus 5.5 02e40f506b fix(docker): gate gh/az seeding on its switch; no shared git sign-in for non-admin clones 
Addresses the review on #472.

- CRED_STORES: `.config/gh` and `.azure` now carry `enabledByEnv`
  (CODEMAN_AGENT_IMAGE_INSTALL_GH / _AZ), and resolveDockerCredentialArtifacts
  skips a store unless that variable is exactly `1`, read at container
  create. A host that merely has ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml or a plaintext MSAL
  cache no longer copies them into every case container. Tests: the default
  environment seeds neither even with the files present, and each store
  follows only its own switch.
- Multi-user mode: a non-admin's Clone Repo clone and preflight run with
  `git -c credential.helper=` (GIT_NO_CREDENTIAL_HELPERS, placed before the
  subcommand), so the server account's helpers are never lent to them.
  Verified against a real private repo that it also clears the URL-scoped
  credential.<url>.helper entries, and that public clones still work.
  Tests: the argv in test/git-clone.test.ts, and the route decision
  (non-admin cleared; admin and single-user kept) in
  test/routes/case-clone-credential-helpers.test.ts.
- Docs: recreate the case container to pick up seeds (docker/README.md,
  Docker-Cases wiki, docker-cases.md); the multi-user behaviour in
  docker/README.md and security-architecture.md; "functionally unchanged"
  instead of "unchanged" for an image built with both switches off
  (server.Dockerfile comment, README, changeset).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0167CiuzLrmjYWxwKp3rMWjw
 2026-09-23 14:44:26 +08:00
DevvynandClaude Opus 5.5 5cf5a45438 feat(docker): opt-in gh + az CLIs with git credential helpers for private repos 
Add Case -> Clone Repo could only reach public repositories in the Docker
deployment. This lets a deployment opt in to the GitHub CLI and the Azure
CLI (+ azure-devops extension) as git credential helpers. Codeman itself
still collects no credentials.

- server.Dockerfile / agent.Dockerfile: CODEMAN_INSTALL_GH /
  CODEMAN_INSTALL_AZ build args (0 or 1, default 0; anything else stops the
  build). Off leaves no apt repository, package, extension, helper script
  or credential entry, so a default build is unchanged. On installs from
  the vendors' apt repositories and configures system gitconfig helpers:
  github.com / gist.github.com -> `gh auth git-credential`, dev.azure.com /
  *.visualstudio.com -> new docker/git-credential-azure-cli (an Entra ID
  token from `az account get-access-token`, or AZURE_DEVOPS_EXT_PAT).
  A helper whose CLI is not signed in prints nothing, so a private clone
  still fails fast.
- The extension lives in AZURE_EXTENSION_DIR outside HOME
  (/opt/codeman-az-extensions, runtime-owned; /opt/az-extensions, gid-0
  group-writable in the agent image).
- Hosts turn them on in docker-compose.override.yml: `build: args:` for the
  server image, `environment:` CODEMAN_AGENT_IMAGE_INSTALL_GH / _AZ for the
  agent image. build-agent-image.mjs and the in-app auto-build share one
  env -> ARG table (pinned by the parity test) and pass nothing when unset.
  docker-compose.yaml is untouched; .env.example only gains a comment, so
  the self-updater's environment gate sees no new keys.
- Docker cases seed the gh sign-in (~/.config/gh/hosts.yml, config.yml) and
  the az sign-in files from ~/.azure per file, read-only, like pi/grok.
- The Clone Repo AUTH_REQUIRED message says how to sign the server's git
  in instead of claiming private repositories cannot be cloned.
- Docs: docker/README.md "Private repositories", docker-compose.md,
  docker-cases.md, the Quick-Start / Core-Concepts / Docker-Cases wiki
  pages, security-architecture.md, architecture-invariants.md, changeset.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0167CiuzLrmjYWxwKp3rMWjw
 2026-09-23 08:57:09 +08:00
Codeman maintainer bb4ba79791 fix(repo-status): async git, single-flight TTL cache, credential redaction, local-upstream parse 
Post-merge follow-ups for #328 (GET /api/system/repo-status):

- Event-loop blocking: every git invocation in repo-status.ts is now async
  (promisified execFile), never execFileSync — the per-remote ls-remote +
  fetch could hold the event loop (SSE, PTY streaming) for up to ~60s per
  request. The whole computation is single-flight with a 45s TTL cache
  (createSingleFlightCache): concurrent requests share one in-flight
  promise, a fresh result is served without spawning git, and a rejected
  compute is never cached. Route handler shape and response fields
  unchanged; remotes still processed sequentially (concurrent fetches in
  one repo contend on ref locks).

- Credential disclosure: the redaction from git-clone.ts is extracted as
  exported redactGitCredentials() (sanitizeGitOutput now uses it) and
  applied via redactRemoteStatus() to every remote card's url and error
  string, so a scheme://user:token@host remote URL (or git stderr echoing
  it) never reaches a client.

- Non-interactive env: runGit() now uses the shared gitNonInteractiveEnv()
  instead of a partial GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT/BatchMode env, also closing the
  GIT_ASKPASS/SSH_ASKPASS/SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE/DISPLAY/GCM_INTERACTIVE
  prompt paths.

- Upstream parse bug: a local-branch upstream (@{upstream} with no slash,
  e.g. after `git branch -u otherbranch`) made slice(0, indexOf('/')) into
  slice(0, -1) and yielded garbage like "maste". parseTrackingRemote()
  (pure, unit-tested) returns null for it, and the bare ref is dropped so
  it cannot be mistaken for a remote-tracking ref downstream.

Tests extended in test/repo-status.test.ts (parseTrackingRemote,
redactGitCredentials/redactRemoteStatus, createSingleFlightCache
single-flight/TTL/rejection semantics).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-21 02:25:43 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 93df8188a5 fix(clone): harden per review: symlink-safe scaffolding, race-safe cleanup, decode guard, bounded git queue 
Addresses all four findings from the #251 review:

- Scaffolding no longer writes through repository-controlled symlinks.
  The guard lives in hooks-config.ts (settingsWriteBlocker) so it also
  covers quick-start/docker/ralph writers, not just the clone route:
  refuses a symlinked .claude or settings.local.json, a .claude that is
  a file, or one resolving outside the case. The clone route surfaces
  the refusal as a user-visible warning, and the CLAUDE.md write checks
  presence via lstat so a BROKEN repo-shipped symlink counts as present
  (existsSync follows links and would have created the outside target).

- Failed-clone cleanup can no longer delete a concurrent winner's tree:
  git clones into an attempt-owned temp sibling (.<name>.cloning-<rand>)
  which is atomically renamed into place; the loser reports
  DESTINATION_EXISTS and only ever removes its own temp dir.

- decodeURIComponent(url.pathname) is guarded: malformed percent-escapes
  now come back as BAD_SYNTAX instead of an uncaught URIError 500.

- The git pool's waiter queue is bounded (CODEMAN_MAX_GIT_QUEUE, default
  16): overflow answers BUSY immediately (HTTP 429 via RATE_LIMITED),
  and queue time counts against the operation's own deadline.

Tests: hostile symlink fixture repo (route level), settingsWriteBlocker
units, concurrent same-destination race, temp-dir leak assertions,
percent-escape rejection, and a fake-git pool-bounds suite.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-10 00:07:01 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 6cc7b4328b feat(cases): clone a Git repository as a new case (#236) 
Adds an Add Case -> "Clone Repo" tab plus two endpoints, implementing
@DodgyBadger's proposal in #236: clone a public repository straight into
codeman-cases/<name> and register it as a normal local case.

POST /api/cases/clone is synchronous by design (request held open, bounded
by GIT_CLONE_TIMEOUT_MS): no job store, no polling, no cancellation
surface. Success broadcasts the usual case:created event, so the case
still appears when a proxy idle-timeout kills the request mid-clone.

POST /api/cases/clone-preflight runs `git ls-remote --symref` so the UI can
say, while the user is still typing, whether the URL is cloneable without
credentials, what its default branch is, and which branches/tags exist.

Core lives in src/git-clone.ts, split into a pure half (URL parse, argv/env,
ls-remote parse, stderr classification) and a thin IO half, so every
security decision is unit-testable without spawning anything:

- `<name>::<payload>` transports are refused as a family, not by name:
  ext:: is the famous one, but any of them dispatches to git-remote-<name>
  and turns a clone into arbitrary command execution.
- A leading `-` is refused AND every spawn puts `--` before the operands.
  Either alone is one edit away from being a hole.
- argv arrays, never a shell. URLs carrying user:password@ are refused.
- gitNonInteractiveEnv() closes all four ways git can block on a prompt
  with no terminal attached (terminal prompt, askpass/GUI, ssh, GCM).
  HOME/PATH stay inherited, so a user's own credential helper or ssh agent
  keeps working; Codeman itself collects and stores nothing.
- The timeout signals the process GROUP, since clone fans out into
  git-remote-https/index-pack children that outlive a signal to the parent.
- Bounded output (redacted stderr tail, capped ls-remote stdout, 500 refs
  each) and a global 2-op pool, so N large clones cannot exhaust the host.

Repository contents beat scaffolding: an existing CLAUDE.md is kept, hooks
are merged into whatever .claude/settings.local.json the repo shipped, and
a repo that ships its own Claude settings is reported back as a warning
(those hooks run locally as soon as a session starts there). A failed clone
removes only the directory the attempt created, and refuses a pre-existing
destination outright, so it can never squat on a case name.

Not admin-gated in multi-user mode, unlike /api/cases/link: it writes only
inside the caller's own case space. Local-path/file:// sources are the
exception and stay admin-only there.

UI: live verdict under the URL field, case name filled from the parsed repo
until the user types their own, branch/tag as a datalist of the remote's
real refs, optional shallow clone, and a Brain picker (installed CLIs only)
that points the Run button at the chosen agent. Starting a session stays
opt-in. The tab hides itself when the server reports no git.

Tests: the pure half exhaustively (every refusal has a case), plus real git
against a real local bare repo for clone/ref/timeout/cleanup, and a
route-level suite with unmocked fs that clones through the endpoint.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-08-09 16:33:01 +02:00