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5cf5a454389ca301a78dd4ef066a0f0ec55dc46d
15
Commits
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5cf5a45438 |
feat(docker): opt-in gh + az CLIs with git credential helpers for private repos
Add Case -> Clone Repo could only reach public repositories in the Docker deployment. This lets a deployment opt in to the GitHub CLI and the Azure CLI (+ azure-devops extension) as git credential helpers. Codeman itself still collects no credentials. - server.Dockerfile / agent.Dockerfile: CODEMAN_INSTALL_GH / CODEMAN_INSTALL_AZ build args (0 or 1, default 0; anything else stops the build). Off leaves no apt repository, package, extension, helper script or credential entry, so a default build is unchanged. On installs from the vendors' apt repositories and configures system gitconfig helpers: github.com / gist.github.com -> `gh auth git-credential`, dev.azure.com / *.visualstudio.com -> new docker/git-credential-azure-cli (an Entra ID token from `az account get-access-token`, or AZURE_DEVOPS_EXT_PAT). A helper whose CLI is not signed in prints nothing, so a private clone still fails fast. - The extension lives in AZURE_EXTENSION_DIR outside HOME (/opt/codeman-az-extensions, runtime-owned; /opt/az-extensions, gid-0 group-writable in the agent image). - Hosts turn them on in docker-compose.override.yml: `build: args:` for the server image, `environment:` CODEMAN_AGENT_IMAGE_INSTALL_GH / _AZ for the agent image. build-agent-image.mjs and the in-app auto-build share one env -> ARG table (pinned by the parity test) and pass nothing when unset. docker-compose.yaml is untouched; .env.example only gains a comment, so the self-updater's environment gate sees no new keys. - Docker cases seed the gh sign-in (~/.config/gh/hosts.yml, config.yml) and the az sign-in files from ~/.azure per file, read-only, like pi/grok. - The Clone Repo AUTH_REQUIRED message says how to sign the server's git in instead of claiming private repositories cannot be cloned. - Docs: docker/README.md "Private repositories", docker-compose.md, docker-cases.md, the Quick-Start / Core-Concepts / Docker-Cases wiki pages, security-architecture.md, architecture-invariants.md, changeset. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0167CiuzLrmjYWxwKp3rMWjw |
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a0628a40e8 |
fix(cli-registry): address maintainer review on #380
Rebased onto current master (the one real conflict was the import line
in docker-hosts.ts Ark0N flagged; kept both), then addressed every
point from the review:
**1. Rebase.** Done — this branch now sits on current upstream/master.
**2. Agent-image special cases are data now, not an id-keyed table
outside stock.ts.** `AGENT_IMAGE_SPECIAL_CASE_IDS`/`AGENT_IMAGE_SPECIAL_CASES`
are gone. `CliDiscovery.install.agentImageLayer?: { kind: 'dedicated';
reason: string }` is a field on the registry entry itself (pi,
deepseek), `reason` is required by schema.ts, both producers
(docker-hosts.ts and cli-catalog.mjs) filter on its presence instead
of an id, and the coverage test reads it from the generated catalogue.
Also added the npm-package-name validation to the TS producer, which
only the .mjs one had — same SAFE_PACKAGE regex, duplicated
(necessarily, one side can't import the other) and now pinned
byte-identical by a new parity test.
**3. Changeset said five, it's eight.** (Not nine — see the DeepSeek
point below, which changes the true count.) Reworded to state it
structurally rather than pin a number that will go stale again.
Then the four behavior-changing findings:
- **DeepSeek was offered as a normal install option but can't actually
drive a pane.** `npm install -g @deepseek-ai/dsh` installs the
launcher only; DeepSeek ships no profile that can run standalone.
The generator now emits an empty install command for any
`launcherProfile` entry, so install.sh's menu (which requires a
non-empty command) skips it and falls through to its docs URL hint
instead — matching what the old hand-written code did before this
PR replaced it.
- **wget-only hosts lost every automatic install, including the npm
ones that never needed curl.** The menu-building loop now filters
PER ENTRY (only a command starting with `curl ` is held back) rather
than wiping the whole menu when DOWNLOADER != curl.
- **The DISPLAY/TRUSTED split and the catalogue refresh didn't hold up
under review** (refresh's only real write was the label; it ran
before the Node existence check; its own eval-detection test was
tripped by the word "eval'd" in a comment). Dropped entirely per
your own recommendation — embedded catalogue only, no network
fetch, no second array. install-sh-invariants.test.ts now asserts
the refresh/DISPLAY machinery does not exist rather than testing its
internals.
The three take-or-leave items, applied:
- `dsh_banner_probe`'s bash 3.2 empty-array bug: `${runner[@]}` →
`${runner[@]+"${runner[@]}"}`. Verified live in a real `bash:3.2.57`
container with `timeout` removed from PATH — crashed before, clean
now, full `detect_all_clis` path exercised end to end.
- `docker-agent-image-coverage.test.ts` now anchors on each layer's
`<binary> --version` proof line instead of `Dockerfile.includes(binary)`,
which stayed true if a layer were deleted but its comment survived.
- Doc drift: docs/docker-cases.md (four → five, and now describes the
data field), docker/agent.Dockerfile's "other four CLIs" comment (no
longer a magic number — CLI_NPM_PACKAGES is generated and can grow),
CLAUDE.md's install.sh size (104KB → ~112KB) and its stale mention of
the now-dropped refresh.
Verified: tsc clean, prettier clean, the full targeted suite (142
tests across the 8 affected files) green, and the full `npm test` gate
diffed BY TEST NAME against a clean upstream/master baseline run on
this same machine — identical 201-name failure set both sides (168
tests / 67 files, all pre-existing Windows-environment noise: symlinks,
PTY spawning, POSIX permission bits — none of it touching anything
this PR changes), zero new failures either side of the diff.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01R9ZSTEenc8soSu9bTi8Xru
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7af4dbc0f8 |
feat(docker): derive the agent image's npm CLI list from the catalogue
docker/agent.Dockerfile hardcoded the four npm-published CLIs it installs, one of the several lists that had to be kept in step with the registry by hand. It now takes them as `ARG CLI_NPM_PACKAGES`, supplied by scripts/build-agent-image.mjs from config/clis.stock.json, with the default set to today's list so a bare `docker build` still produces the same image. The arg is expanded unquoted because word splitting is what turns the list into several arguments, which is exactly why every token is validated against ^[@A-Za-z0-9][@A-Za-z0-9/._-]*$ on the producing side; a package name carrying a space or a metacharacter is refused rather than reaching the RUN line. Verified by building the layer: four packages in, four arguments out, and the default still applies with no arg. The list is filtered on each entry's `enabled` flag — the field whose absence was the maintainer's §3 finding, where a CLI shipping disabled still got baked into every image. No stock entry is disabled today, so that assertion would pass vacuously; a unit test feeds the pure helper a fabricated disabled entry so the fix is covered now rather than the first time someone ships one. ⚠️ It reads the STOCK catalogue, never the merged registry. A user's ~/.codeman/clis.json must not change what is inside an image tagged codeman/agent:base, or two machines holding that tag hold different images. Four CLIs keep hand-written layers because the registry cannot describe what makes them special: pi's --ignore-scripts, deepseek's pnpm companion and dsh-tui profile, and the three standalone installers. Rather than extend the schema for a Docker-only benefit, the coverage test requires each to carry a written reason AND still be present, so an exclusion cannot quietly become an omission. There are two producers of this command line and there have to be — the .mjs cannot import TypeScript, and src/docker-hosts.ts builds the same argv for the in-app auto-build — so a parity test pins them together, package list, arg pairs and rendered argv. Their order is pinned too: a different order is a different RUN string and so a needless cache miss between the two build paths. docker/server.Dockerfile is deliberately NOT edited (PRs #373 and #377 both modify it); its narrower list is asserted as a declared omission list instead, so the divergence is reviewable without touching the file. Also fixes the in-app hint at index.html, which the new coverage test caught still omitting omp. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_015EMxQreQUZX5ZyybxAGh12 |
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d5b5f8f618 |
fix(docker): make the dsh profile install survive pnpm's build-script gate
Follow-up to #350, which fixed the actual blocker (issue #352): `dsh plugin` is a thin forwarder that `spawnSync`s a literal `pnpm` with no npm fallback, so an image without pnpm dies at exit 127 and takes the whole build with it. That PR also pinned an allowlist of the two packages whose lifecycle scripts pnpm blocked at the time. Replace it with a policy that cannot go stale: pnpm, unlike npm, refuses dependency build scripts by default and FAILS the install over it (`ERR_PNPM_IGNORED_BUILDS`, exit 1, measured on pnpm 11.24), and the names to allow move between rebuilds because `@deepseek-harness-tui/dsh-tui` is resolved by dist-tag, not pinned: 0.9.3 pulled `@google/genai` (whose script is a literal `preinstall: no-op`), 0.10.0-beta.x does not. An allowlist of two names would have let the next tree break the build the same way. Allowing them wholesale is also the exposure this image already accepts three layers up, where `npm install -g` runs the install scripts of every transitive dep of the five CLIs above with no gate at all. Also correct a comment in the `/api/deepseek/install-profile` route that asserted the opposite of what #352 proved ("dsh bundles its own package manager, so no system pnpm is required"). The route's behavior is already right: dsh's own "pnpm not found on PATH" stderr reaches the caller as the OPERATION_FAILED detail, so the UI's "add a terminal profile" button names the fix. Documented the prerequisite in docs/deepseek-integration.md, and taught the docker-cases image smoke test about `dsh`/`omp` plus the profile check that `dsh --version` does NOT cover. |
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7762809202 |
Merge pull request #350 from opticon454/bugfix/dsh-pnpm
fix(docker): install pnpm for DeepSeek profile |
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d74cde759b |
feat(omp): install omp in the docker agent image, isolate its credentials
OMP had full routing at the Docker layer (default pane command, schema) but
was never actually installed in docker/agent.Dockerfile, and had no
credential-isolation entry in docker-hosts.ts's CRED_STORES - a Docker-mode
OMP session would have failed with "omp: command not found", and even with
the binary present would have had no config/auth seeded, despite the README
already claiming OMP has "seamless auth, isolated credentials" in Docker.
- docker/agent.Dockerfile: install omp via its own installer (standalone
binary, same shape as grok/antigravity - not on npm). Verified against a
real --no-cache build: the installer actually targets ~/.local/bin, not
~/.omp/bin as the resolver's OMP_SEARCH_DIRS ordering would suggest -
confirmed omp/18.0.8 installs and runs correctly inside the image.
- src/docker-hosts.ts: add a .omp/agent CRED_STORES entry. Unlike every
sibling CLI in this family, sessions/ is SHARED (RW), not seeded: Codeman
reads ~/.omp/agent/sessions/**/*.jsonl host-side for history recovery and
--resume pinning (omp-transcript.ts, omp-session-resolver.ts), the same
reason codex's sessions/ is shared rather than seeded. Seeding it instead
would silently break the kill-survival feature for Docker cases. Only the
small config files (config.yml/mcp.json/models.yml/settings.yml) are
seeded; the SQLite caches and terminal-sessions/ stay container-local.
- test/docker-hosts.test.ts: pin the new CRED_STORES entry's behavior.
Found in passing (NOT fixed here, unrelated and pre-existing on master): the
agent image's DeepSeek (dsh) plugin-install step currently fails on a fresh
build ("pnpm not found on PATH"), confirmed via git diff against
origin/master that this line is untouched by this branch. Worth a separate
issue/PR.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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26b4ffbb0f | fix(docker): install pnpm for DeepSeek profile | ||
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4cda150493 |
feat(deepseek): add DeepSeek Harness (dsh) as a ninth CLI run mode
Adds `mode: 'deepseek'` alongside claude/shell/opencode/codex/gemini/ antigravity/pi/grok, plus a shortcut that opens the harness's own browser UI as a Codeman web tab. DeepSeek is wired unlike its siblings in three ways, each of which is the reason for a design decision rather than an accident: 1. The agent is a PROFILE, not the binary. `dsh` is a launcher over $DSH_HOME/profiles/<name>, and DeepSeek ships only `web`, `headless` and `base` -- the interactive terminal front door is always a third-party plugin. So availability is two questions: `isDeepSeekAvailable()` (binary) and `isDeepSeekRunnable()` (binary AND a pane-capable profile). The Run button gates on the latter, because reporting only the binary would spawn a pane that dies on arrival. When the binary is present but no profile is, the run menu offers to install one (POST /api/deepseek/install-profile). 2. The permission switch is an env var, not a flag. The harness has no command-line permission option; its sandbox/approval rows read DSH_PERMISSION_MODE (read-only / workspace-write / danger-full-access). Exported via `tmux setenv`, never on the spawn line. Absent = the harness's own workspace-write, which still asks, so the multi-user clamp is the only-if-sent branch and clamps to workspace-write, never read-only. 3. It is the only non-claude mode that passes hooksAvailableForMode(), and it earned that. The terminal front door reports idle/working/blocked to a supervising process over a generic env-gated contract; a generated shim (deepseek-status-shim.ts) makes Codeman that supervisor and forwards each report to /api/hook-event as stop / agent_working / permission_prompt. So a dsh session gets definitive respawn triggers, real wait-endpoint signals and real Approvals Inbox items instead of output-stabilization guesswork. `agent_working` is new (157th SSE constant) and joins APPROVAL_RESOLVING_EVENTS so a dialog answered in the terminal clears its alert at once. The resolver needs the strictest identity probe of the family: `dsh` is not merely a squattable npm name, Debian ships an unrelated `dsh` (dancer's shell), so `dsh --help` must print the harness's own banner before a candidate is handed a spawn line. Model is deliberately not a session field -- it is a composition entry in the profile's config tree. Env allowlist gains DSH_* and DEEPSEEK_* only; provider keys named by a settings-file `apiKeyEnv` stay out, which is pi's 34-provider-key problem in a new shape. Verified live against dsh 0.1.1-rc.2 and @deepseek-harness-tui/dsh-tui: the status endpoint's two-part answer, the no-profile refusal, the profile bootstrap, a real session whose pane runs `dsh --profile dsh-tui` with the permission mode injected via setenv, and the full status bridge -- a send-and-wait returned signal "stop" from a real turn, and blocked/working created and cleared an Approvals Inbox item. Docs: docs/deepseek-integration.md (guide), docs/deepseek-integration-plan.md (decisions + honest gaps). Tests: test/deepseek-mode.test.ts, test/deepseek-cli-resolver.test.ts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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9cfd8e8989 |
fix(docker): survive xAI installer's own /usr/local/bin/grok symlink
The agent-image grok step copied /root/.grok/bin/grok onto /usr/local/bin/grok with cp -L. Newer versions of xAI's install.sh already create /usr/local/bin/grok as a symlink to that same binary, so the copy failed with 'same file' and the --no-cache rebuild died at the grok layer (2026-08-24). Stage the copy under a temp name, drop whatever the installer left at the destination, then move into place - correct against both old and new installers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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3f8c8e99d1 |
feat(grok): add Grok Build (xAI) as a seventh CLI run mode
SessionMode gains 'grok', a first-class backend alongside Claude Code,
shell, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity and Pi: its own PTY, tmux
session, charcoal tab identity ('gk' badge), welcome button, run-mode
entry, cron agentType, Docker and remote-SSH command defaults, and
clone-repo Brain option. Flag surface verified live against grok 1.0.5.
Grok mixes two existing shapes and the wiring follows from that:
- Codex-shaped on permissions: the bypass switch is GrokConfig.alwaysApprove
(--always-approve, grok's bypassPermissions mode; config-level deny rules
still apply on top). The Run button sends it true, like runAntigravity(),
and clampExternalCliBypassForOwner() puts grok in the only-if-sent branch:
a bare grok spawn is grok's own ask-mode default, which is already safe,
so only a sent config needs the flag forced off. Cron needs nothing for
the same reason.
- OpenCode-shaped on rendering: grok is a fullscreen alternate-screen TUI
with mouse support, so it stays OUT of isAltScreenStripMode() and lands
on the narrow tmux-attach strip and the 'buffer' local-echo fallthrough
(unmeasured against an authenticated composer; documented fallback is the
'off' branch).
- Pi-shaped on resolution: 'grok' has npm squatters (@vibe-kit/grok-cli
also installs a grok bin), so grok-cli-resolver.ts version-probes every
candidate (grok --version, killSignal SIGKILL, VITEST-gated) and
GET /api/grok/status surfaces path AND version; GROK_VERSION_REGEX is
shared with the dependency registry so doctor and run mode cannot drift.
Env allowlist gains GROK_* plus the XAI_* vendor namespace (XAI_API_KEY is
grok's documented headless auth var), the same narrow-vendor reasoning as
GOOGLE_* for gemini. Resume is id-regexed on purpose: grok's own --resume
also matches session titles, which are arbitrary user strings that must
never reach the bash -c spawn line.
Docker: grok is not on npm, so the agent image installs it in its own step
(xAI's installer has no --dir override; the binary is copied to
/usr/local/bin and root's ~/.grok dropped in the same layer), and
credentials are seeded per-file (auth.json, config.toml, pager.toml; the
dir also holds sessions/, memory/ and the ~160MB binary). Remote SSH routes
through the login-shell wrapper like the other agent CLIs.
Verified end to end on an isolated CODEMAN_INSTANCE with grok 1.0.5
installed: /api/grok/status resolves and reports the probed version,
quick-start spawns a pane whose command line ends in 'grok
--always-approve', the real TUI renders (OAuth device screen on an
unauthenticated box), and grokConfig round-trips through state.json.
Docs: docs/grok-integration.md (user guide) + docs/grok-integration-plan.md
(decisions, verification record, follow-ups).
Tests: test/grok-mode.test.ts, test/grok-cli-resolver.test.ts, plus
extended clamp/system-routes/render-index-html/run-mode-ui/mobile-overview/
local-echo-gating coverage. npm test (the CI gate) green: 5910 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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c5b59633d8 |
feat(pi): add Pi (pi.dev) as a sixth CLI run mode (#206)
SessionMode gains 'pi', a first-class backend alongside Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini and Antigravity: its own PTY, tmux session, rose tab identity, welcome button, run-mode entry, cron agentType, Docker and remote-SSH command defaults, and clone-repo Brain option. Pi is a different shape of CLI from the other four, and three decisions follow from that: - It has NO permission prompts and no sandbox, so there is no --dangerously-skip-permissions analog and none was invented. The privilege-shaped knob is the tri-state approveProjectTrust, which makes pi load and EXECUTE repo-local .pi/extensions TypeScript and install missing project packages. clampExternalCliBypassForOwner() therefore puts pi in the MATERIALIZE branch: a non-granted multi-user owner gets --no-approve even when no config was sent, because pi's own default is a prompt the session user could answer themselves. That helper had zero test coverage; it now has coverage for all four CLIs. - Only the PI_ prefix joins the env allowlist. Pi's ~34 provider key vars share no prefix and ALLOWED_ENV_PREFIXES is one global list with no mode context, so admitting them would widen the allowlist for every mode at once. Auth goes through pi's /login or the server's own environment. --api-key is deliberately never wired: it would put a provider secret on the spawn command line. - pi stays OUT of isAltScreenStripMode(). Its default TUI renders into the main screen with terminal-owned scrollback, and its 0.84.0 fullscreen mode is runtime-switchable via /settings; that flip was measured to put the pane into the alt screen, which the strip would have corrupted. pi-cli-resolver.ts additionally sanity-probes `pi --version` and requires semver-shaped output, because `pi` is a short generic name a stray binary can shadow; GET /api/pi/status surfaces path and version so a misresolution is diagnosable rather than presenting as a broken mode. Docker installs pi in its own --ignore-scripts step so that flag cannot affect the other four CLIs, and seeds its credentials per-file rather than whole-dir (~/.pi/agent also holds sessions, extensions and package trees). Verified end to end against pi 0.84.1 on an isolated instance: resolver search-dir fallback, flag construction, piConfig persistence across a full server restart, the trust prompt and its --no-approve suppression, the rose Run button on the default daylight-blue skin (the nested skin block eats per-mode gradients unless the rule lives inside it), and the buffer local-echo policy, which pi tolerates where codex did not. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0d0b772619 |
feat: make Antigravity a first-class CLI across docs, installer and UI
Antigravity (agy) was wired into the session layer but never propagated to the surfaces around it, while Gemini CLI stayed documented as a consumer product despite being enterprise-only since Google's cutover. Gemini keeps full support; Antigravity now sits beside it everywhere. Functional fixes: - docker/agent.Dockerfile never installed agy, so a docker case with mode 'antigravity' died on command-not-found. agy is not on npm, so it gets its own installer step. --dir /usr/local/bin is load-bearing: the default $HOME/.local/bin resolves to root's home at build time and is unreachable by the `agent` user the container runs as. Verified inside codeman/agent:base (v1.1.10, reachable as `agent`). Note the binary is ~190MB, the largest layer in the image. - Welcome screen gained a Run Antigravity action, gated on agy being present like the other CLI buttons, with a cyan identity matching the toolbar run button and run-mode dot. - install.sh now detects agy (search paths mirroring the resolver), counts it as a satisfying AI CLI, and recommends it over Gemini in the install hints. Detection only, no new auto-install path. Docs corrected where they were factually wrong: - architecture-invariants documented isExternalCliMode() as opencode/codex/gemini when the code has included antigravity for a while, said "all three modes", and omitted ANTIGRAVITY_ from the env prefix allowlist row. - cron-guide's agentType enum, cron-discovery's SessionMode, and remote-sessions' RemoteCommandMode were all stale. Also: README + README.zh-CN (five CLIs, Gemini marked enterprise-only), package.json keyword, and comment drift in 8 places. test/run-mode-ui.test.ts now covers the new welcome button; verified it fails without the settings-ui wiring. Antigravity nests its whole state under ~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/, not ~/.antigravity, so the existing .gemini docker credential seed already covers it. Recorded as a comment so nobody adds dead config later. isAltScreenStripMode() deliberately still excludes antigravity: whether its TUI needs the alt-screen strip is a behavioural question that needs a real agy session, not a guess. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ca731c67b3 |
feat(docker): harden session mode + File Viewer button (v1.4.1)
Docker cases: seamless Claude auth (seed ~/.claude.json instead of the corruption-prone single-file mount), full credential-store isolation for claude + codex/gemini/gcloud/opencode (share only transcripts/rollouts, seed the rest), auto-build the base image on first use, C.UTF-8 locale (fixes box-drawing), collapsed/shortened Create-Case UI + short "(docker)" case-menu tags, and w<n>-<case> tab naming for docker/remote sessions. Also: opt-in File Viewer header button; fix a TZ-boundary flaky test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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5f4c89b990 |
fix(docker): auto-assign agent uid (node:22 already occupies uid 1000)
node:22-bookworm-slim ships a `node` user at uid 1000, so `useradd -u 1000` failed. Auto-assign the uid and rely on gid-0 + group-writable HOME so any runtime `--user <hostUid>:0` can write $HOME. Verified: image builds; toolchain (node/tmux/claude/codex/gemini/opencode) present; `--user 1000:0` writes /home/agent and `claude --version` runs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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54615e2371 |
feat(docker): agent base image + local build script
docker/agent.Dockerfile: node:22 + claude/codex/gemini/opencode CLIs + git/ tmux/ripgrep/curl, secret-free, OpenShift arbitrary-uid-writable HOME (gid 0). scripts/build-agent-image.mjs: local build (decision "build locally on first use"), docker/podman auto-detect, --engine/--image/--no-cache flags. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |