mirror of
https://github.com/Ark0N/Codeman.git
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338
Commits
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327e440607 |
fix(codex): fold a codex session into its own rollout row
Review fixes for #386. Duplicate rows. A codex conversation showed twice, once live and once as a past rollout row, because nothing aliased a codex session to its thread id. That is worse than cosmetic: the stale row still resumes, so clicking it starts a second `codex resume` on a thread already open in another pane. - A RESUMED session knows its thread id up front, so it folds from its own side: add `codexConfig.resumeSessionId` to the `claudeSessionId` chain. Not only in the constructor — `start()` recomputes that id at two further points (the mux branch, and the unconditional "third reset point" whose own comment already warned that omitting omp's fallback there stomps the mux branch's resolved alias). Both listed Claude's and omp's ids only, so for codex every mux reattach and boot recovery reset the alias back to the Codeman id and the duplicate returned. - A FRESH session has no thread id until codex writes the rollout, so it is folded from the other side. The scanner now reports `session_meta.originator`, which is `codeman_<sessionId>` for every pane Codeman spawns, and `gatherUnifiedInputs()` stamps the matching live and persisted rows, newest rollout winning (`/new` inside the TUI leaves several rollouts sharing one originator). - Persisted rows read `codexConfig.resumeSessionId` too. A resumed session demoted to a persisted-only record would otherwise lose its alias, and the originator fallback cannot rescue that one: a resumed rollout keeps its ORIGINAL session_meta, so it still names the pane that created the thread rather than the pane that resumed it. Identity cache. It was written as soon as the thread id was known, but codex writes the first user message only when the user submits, so any scan in that window pinned `firstPrompt: undefined` for the life of the process — and the home screen, the command palette and the search-index refresh all scan. `shouldCacheIdentity()` now keeps an identity only once the prompt is known or the head read filled its whole window. Also from review: both caps count emitted rows rather than file index, so a store of sub-agent threads no longer spends the `lastPrompt` budget before the first row that needed it; the cache is an `LRUMap` sized like the one beside it; the unreachable filename fallback is gone; a rollout recording no cwd is dropped rather than emitted with `workingDir: ''`; and the unified-session module header names all three transcript stores. Tests. The resume wiring now has cases for a row with a thread id, a row without one, and a `resumeId` on a non-codex row; the "no continuation is wired" case narrows to gemini/antigravity, which is no longer true of codex. `codex-resume-alias-survives-start.test.ts` drives a real Session through `start()` rather than asserting on pre-stamped inputs — that gap is why the reset points went unnoticed. Plus the maintainer's own cache repro, the tail-budget case, a no-cwd case, and merge cases for both folds. |
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a2aaea3c0e |
docs(file-picker): state the Home/cases nesting the right way round, and document the new fallback chain
The two merge-time edits the #383 review asked for. The comment above the picker's fallback chain said Home is nested under Codeman Cases; on the native default it is the other way round (~/codeman-cases sits inside ~). And the "Filesystem path picker" paragraph in architecture-invariants still said the picker falls back to /mnt/d, which #383 changed to: the session's Current Folder, then the Codeman Cases root, then /mnt/d, then the first root. No code behaviour changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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097d585278 |
Merge pull request #383 from opticon454/fix/case-picker-default-root
fix(file-picker): default the case picker to Codeman Cases, not Home |
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8285fff91c |
feat(codex): list codex conversations and resume them
Codex conversations never appeared in the session list, and the resume path skipped codex, so picking one back up meant finding its thread id by hand and POSTing codexConfig.resumeSessionId to /api/sessions. Two gaps caused it: - The unified list is built from ~/.claude/projects plus omp's own store. Codex writes to neither: its rollouts live in ~/.codex/sessions/<y>/<m>/<d>. - terminal-ui.js sends a continuation only for the CLIs with a "continue most recent" flag. Codex has no such flag — it names a thread by an exact id — and nothing supplied one. Add codex-transcript.ts, the codex analog of omp-transcript.ts, and wire it into gatherUnifiedInputs() beside the omp scan. A rollout row carries `resumeId`, the thread id `codex resume` takes, and the resume path sends it as codexConfig.resumeSessionId. `resumeId` is what keeps the two kinds of row apart: only a transcript scanner sets it, so a LIVE codex row — whose sessionId is Codeman's own uuid — can never ask codex for a thread that does not exist. Three things measured against a real store of 519 rollouts rather than assumed: - Rollouts are far too large to read whole (median 407 KiB, p90 1.3 MiB, max 25 MiB, 381 MiB total), so this reads a 128 KiB head for the identity and the opening prompt and a bounded tail for the most recent one. session_meta is written once and never rewritten, so per-path identity is cached; a warm rescan of that store costs ~75ms against ~470ms cold. - codex 0.152.1 emits no event_msg/user_message rows at all. It writes event_msg/item_completed carrying an item.type of UserMessage. Both shapes are read, plus response_item as a last resort. - That last resort sees injected context, and the first such row is the repo's AGENTS.md every time, so injections are dropped rather than used as titles. Sub-agent threads (thread_source: 'subagent') are left out; codex spawns them for itself and on a real store they outnumber the resumable threads. |
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8ad2215118 |
fix(docker): close the three adoption gaps the negative guarantee missed
Review follow-ups to #357. Each is a path that still touched, or still hid, a container Codeman does not own. **Export still mutated it.** The four fail-closed layers cover create/start/ stop/remove, but `POST /api/docker-cases/:name/export` reaches the container twice through neither: a full export `docker commit`s it, and even a workspace-only export `docker pause`s it first for snapshot consistency. Pause freezes the owner's processes for as long as the tar takes, on a container we promised not to touch. Full export is refused for an adopted case (it packages someone else's container, with their logins, into a bundle Codeman hands out); workspace-only keeps working and no longer pauses, accepting a live filesystem the way `tar` does on any running host directory. **A freshly linked OWNED case became unusable.** The run menu now probes the container for its CLIs, and a failed probe hides every agent mode behind the reason. For an adopted case that is right. For an owned one the container does not exist until the first session launches it, so every newly linked Docker case answered `container "codeman-case-x" not found (adoption never creates a container — start it yourself first)` and offered nothing but Shell, for a container the launch chain was about to create itself. A failed probe is recorded only when the case is adopted; `CaseInfo.docker.owned` is on the wire so the frontend can tell them apart. Verified in a browser: owned-with-no- container offers all ten modes and no notice, adopted-but-stopped offers Shell and says why. **Multi-user gating.** Adoption is admin-only, unlike `docker-link` beside it. Linking creates OUR container, whose sole bind mount `isWorkingDirAllowed` has already confined to the caller's space; an adopted container's mounts are whatever its owner gave it, so one mounting `/` hands the adopter a shell over the whole host — exactly the workspace scoping multi-user mode exists to enforce. Listing the engine's containers and browsing directories inside an arbitrary one are machine-level reads and follow the docker-HOST policy for the same reason. The preflight is deliberately not admin-only: the run menu fires it for every docker case, so it admits a non-admin for a container already linked to a case they can access, and nothing else. Verified end to end against a real pre-existing root container (alpine + tmux, no bind mounts): adopt, claude session inside it, workspace export, session close and case unlink all left `StartedAt`, `RestartCount`, `Pid` and `Paused` untouched; the pane ran the CONTAINER's claude, without `--dangerously-skip-permissions`; a stopped container was refused at both preflight and launch and was never started. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TecFD9hvPYJ1mkkMtBQbT1 |
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3d8ffcb9a2 |
Merge pull request #357 from dignfei/feat/docker-adopt-existing-container
feat(docker): attach a case to an already-running container Conflicts came from work that landed after the PR was opened, and each is resolved onto the newer abstraction rather than by keeping the older code: - `defaultDockerCommandForMode` is registry-driven since #347, so the PR's `runsAsRoot` arm became `overlays.docker.rootCommand` (claude only). Claude Code still refuses `--dangerously-skip-permissions` as root in 2.1.261 and the refusal is visible only inside the container, so an adopted root container otherwise just shows a dead pane. Which flag to drop is a per-CLI fact, and `test/cli-registry-no-id-branching.test.ts` forbids expressing it as a branch. - The probe's mode list and its mode -> binary table both duplicated the registry. They now read `enabledCliIds()` / `discovery.binaries[0]`, which is also what fixes the merge's silent regression: the hand-written list predates `omp`, and the run menu gates every docker case on this probe, so owned containers would have lost that mode. `shell` needs no arm — it declares no binary, so it is dropped from the lookup and reported available regardless. - The per-mode `mode === 'claude' && !cliDir` chain in `tmux-manager.ts` is one `missingCliMessage(mode)` gate since #347; the PR's docker exemption moved onto it. Its test now pins the single gate instead of counting seven arms. - The create arm keeps #349's swap-limit warning filter, which the adopted arm never reaches; the run-mode list gains `omp` from #353. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TecFD9hvPYJ1mkkMtBQbT1 |
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06febfa032 |
fix(file-picker): default the case picker to Codeman Cases, not Home
The "Link Existing" case picker opens with an empty path and no sessionId, so the browse endpoint's fallback root picked whichever root happened to be first in the list — which was always `Home`. On the native default that's harmless (~/codeman-cases nests inside Home anyway), but a Docker deployment binds CODEMAN_APPDATA_PATH (Home) and CODEMAN_CASES_PATH at unrelated host paths, so the picker opened somewhere with no cases in sight. Worse: if CODEMAN_CASES_PATH is ever changed after cases already exist, the old cases directory lingers, still reachable, under Home — indistinguishable at a glance from the real one under the new Codeman Cases root. Prefer the Codeman Cases root in the fallback chain, ahead of the generic roots[0]. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01R9ZSTEenc8soSu9bTi8Xru |
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7e4914d991 |
feat(web): support a reverse-proxy base URL (--base-url / CODEMAN_BASE_URL)
Codeman can now be mounted under a sub-path behind a reverse proxy that forwards the prefix unchanged (e.g. https://host/codeman/). Default is `/` (root), which is byte-identical to the historical behavior. Design — few choke points, mirrored ingress/egress: - src/config/base-path.ts: pure single-source normalize/validate/join/strip. - Server ingress: stripBasePath() inside Fastify rewriteUrl, so routes stay declared prefix-agnostic; un-prefixed requests (hooks, health, docker bridge hitting the raw port) pass through unchanged. - Server egress: one onSend hook prepends the base to root-absolute Location headers (covers all redirects). - HTML: renderIndexHtml points <base href> at the mount and injects window.__CODEMAN_BASE__ — ONLY when a base is set (inert at root). - Frontend runtime URLs: CodemanBase.url() route builder in constants.js, applied transparently by a fetch wrapper and explicitly at the EventSource/WebSocket/window.open/<img|iframe|a>-src sites. - sw.js derives its base from self.location; manifest uses relative start_url/scope. - Web-tab proxy: proxyPrefixFor(cap, basePath) is the single base-aware root that cascades to the injected <base>, HTML/attr rewrites, runtimeUrlShim, Set-Cookie Path and Location; capabilityFromReferer strips the base off the browser Referer, while the ingress parsers stay base-agnostic (rewriteUrl already stripped it). --base-url rides the daemon relaunch (buildWebArgs) and the service unit (resolveServicePlan). constants.js is guarded against a missing `window` for isolated unit-test contexts. Tests: test/base-path.test.ts (pure helpers), base-path coverage in webview-proxy/render-index-html/daemon-control; CodemanBase stubbed in the vm-isolated panels-ui test contexts. Docs: Remote-Access.md (sub-path section + nginx example), security-architecture.md env table, CLAUDE.md pattern. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XUkPBxbumnct6qSrx4JDju |
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2ab21c1b32 |
fix(webview): revoke proxy capabilities on logout and stamp Referrer-Policy
WebviewCapabilityStore.revokeOwner() shipped for two releases with a docstring claiming logout called it and no caller at all. The capability is a bearer credential exempt from cookie auth with a rolling TTL refreshed on every use, so a proxy URL that leaked (browser history, a screenshot, a dashboard with a loose referrer policy) stayed valid for as long as anything kept polling it. - POST /api/logout revokes the caller's capabilities (all of them in single-user mode), the admin forced logout revokes the target user's, and user deletion revokes whatever that user had open. revokeOwner returns the count for the admin audit line. - Proxied responses carry `Referrer-Policy: same-origin` and the upstream's own policy is dropped: every URL inside the frame carries the capability, and a dashboard on no-referrer-when-downgrade or unsafe-url handed it to any third-party host it linked. Verified with Playwright that a sandboxed frame under an upstream `unsafe-url` sends no Referer to a third party while the root-absolute fetch and the CSS-triggered 404 fallback still reach the dashboard. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WKtW48T1UjAaecHAJxKobE |
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550e08a791 |
fix(webview): refuse link-local and cloud-metadata targets on the resolved address
The web-tab proxy, its Test probe and its WebSocket relay accepted any http(s) host. A live PoC relayed an IMDSv2-shaped PUT with custom headers to a loopback echo server through a capability and no cookie, and 169.254.169.254 (decimal, hex, IPv6-mapped, or via a DNS name) was as valid a dashboard as any other. Loopback and RFC1918 stay allowed on purpose: a localhost Grafana is the feature. Only link-local and the fixed cloud-metadata addresses are refused (169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10, fd00:ec2::254, 168.63.129.16, 100.100.100.200, metadata.google.internal), at three stages that are each load-bearing: - the Zod schema, so a save gets a clear refusal; - a synchronous hostname check at every connect site, because net.connect skips DNS for an IP literal and a lookup hook never sees one; - a `lookup` hook on an undici Agent (webviewFetch) and on the ws client, which judges the RESOLVED addresses of a name and refuses when any is blocked. This is what closes DNS rebinding, which a hostname-string check cannot. Adds undici@^6 so the proxy runs the package's own fetch with the package's own Agent; a package Agent handed to Node's bundled fetch can mismatch protocols. Verified live on an isolated beta: 169.254.169.254.nip.io (a real name resolving to the metadata address) is refused by probe, proxy (403) and WS relay (4003), while 127.0.0.1.nip.io still passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WKtW48T1UjAaecHAJxKobE |
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823f56a243 |
Merge pull request #373 from opticon454/feature/docker-self-update
feat(docker): restore in-app self-update in the Compose dep |
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268e4819ff | feat: auto-name sessions from first prompt | ||
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66eb01ba8f |
feat(docker): restore in-app self-update in the Compose deployment
Codeman running under docker/docker-compose.yaml lost the ability to update
itself from App Settings -> Updates. The image had no .git (excluded by
.dockerignore), so the install reported as "unknown"; there was no init system
for detectSupervisor() to find; the runtime stage had neither devDependencies
nor a build toolchain; and a pull into the baked /opt/codeman would have landed
in the container's writable layer and been discarded by the next `up`.
Restore it through configuration rather than a second updater, so the release
channel, auto-stash, status file and boot reconcile are all reused unchanged:
- The checkout Compose builds from is bind-mounted over /opt/codeman, so the
update's git checkout and rebuild land on the host and survive recreation.
- The restart is the server exiting; `restart: unless-stopped` relaunches the
container on the new dist/. This is the one supervisor whose updater does NOT
outlive the restart, which is safe only because the terminal "restarting"
marker is written first.
- node_modules and dist are named volumes over the bind mount, so
container-compiled native modules never enter the host checkout.
- The runtime image keeps devDependencies and gains python3/make/g++, since
`npm run build` is tsc + esbuild and node-pty has no Linux prebuild.
An in-place container update applies code only, because a restart reuses the
existing image and config. evaluateEnvironmentGate() reads the target release's
own files with `git show <tag>:<path>` and refuses when server.Dockerfile or
docker-compose.yaml changed, when .env.example gained keys the user's .env
lacks, or when the restart policy would not bring the container back. The
missing-key check matters most: Compose resolves an unset ${VAR} to the empty
string and starts anyway, so a new required setting would otherwise arrive as a
silently blank variable. Every unknown fails open, and the gate is re-evaluated
server-side on POST /api/system/update.
The four global agent CLIs are pinned, because an unpinned CLI bump is the one
environment change no diff-derived gate can see; pinning turns it into a
Dockerfile change the gate already detects.
Adds test/docker-compose-env-parity.test.ts as the merge-side guard (every
compose ${VAR} has an .env.example entry and the reverse) and
test/docker-self-update.test.ts for the pure gate decisions.
Documented in docs/docker-self-update.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013yAQ2y9t81jzSfpStUxx5T
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4830e662f9 |
refactor(cli-registry): make CLI backends data instead of per-mode branching
Every run mode is now a `CliEntry` in `src/config/cli-registry/` — discovery (search dirs, version + identity probes), the launch argv template, env handling, the `capabilities` flags that replace per-CLI branching, and the `overlays` that back the remote/docker pane commands. Code that used to ask "which CLI is this?" reads the entry instead. Behaviour is unchanged. `test/cli-registry-spawn-golden.test.ts` pins every spawn command as a literal string, captured from the hand-written builders before they were deleted, and `test/location-overlay-commands.test.ts` does the same for all 20 remote and in-container pane commands. Config can never contain shell text: an entry declares typed argv tokens, literals are validated against a safe-word pattern at LOAD time (a bad literal rejects the whole entry — a silently dropped `--no-approve` is not cosmetic), and values resolve through patterns NAMED in code, so a user `clis.json` cannot widen its own validation. `~/.codeman/clis.json` overrides any entry, read-only in this release. OMP is included as a registry entry rather than a tenth hand-written builder, so `buildOmpCommand()`, the omp availability pre-flight, the omp arm of `buildPathExport()` and the omp entries in the truecolor/NO_COLOR, alt-screen and doctor ladders all drop out. Guard rails: - `test/cli-registry-no-id-branching.test.ts` fails the build if per-CLI-id branching reappears outside `stock.ts`, in any of its four shapes (`===`, `!==`, `switch`/`case`, `includes`) — an `===`-only version would miss the negated forms, which is how 36 of them survived an earlier pass. Every allowlisted branch carries its reason. - `external`, `hooks` and `altScreen` stay three INDEPENDENT capabilities; deriving one from another shipped the `until=stop`-hangs-on-shell bug. - `param` is two namespaces. `launch.params` keys, `configSetenv.fromParam` and `privilegedParams[].param` all name a LAUNCH param; the legacy `<Mode>Config` wire field is separate, bridged only by `legacyConfigAliases`. Getting `privilegedParams[].param` wrong is SILENT — it is the multi-user bypass clamp's only handle on a CLI's privilege switch, and a wrong name clamps nothing with no error and no failing test — so `schema.ts` rejects an entry naming a param it never declared. - Registry data resolves AT CALL TIME (`sessionModeSchema()`, `allowedEnvPrefixes()`, `dependencyRegistry()`, the resolvers' `searchDirs` thunks). A module-level const freezes at first import, so a CLI enabled while the server ran moved the run menu but not that surface. - Six fields are annotated DECLARED-FOR-LATER and read by nothing (`shortBadge`, `accent`, `capabilities.echo`/`wheelForward`/ `keyboardAccessory`/`maxFrameBytes`): all frontend behaviour, transcribed rather than measured. A test pins the list so it cannot quietly grow. Three user-visible changes, all deliberate and named: - `probeDockerCliVersion()` derives the in-container binary from the registry rather than assuming it equals the mode name (`antigravity` runs `agy`). - The remote CLI version probe now covers grok and deepseek, which the hardcoded map it replaces omitted while its own comment said the rule was "every mode except shell". - `codeman doctor`'s CLI rows are generated from the entries, so Claude's install hint is the install command rather than a docs URL, five CLIs gain hints they never had, and the row order follows the catalog. Also hardened along the way: `sessionModeSchema()` is bounded at 24 chars (matching the `cliId` pattern) before its failure message quotes the value back, and `deepMerge` skips `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` when reading the hand-editable `clis.json`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WQkoi1cNegqVwZHgzx5SbJ |
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2a32b5064a |
Merge pull request #349 from opticon454/feature/docker-compose
Docker Compose deployment: Codeman runs in a container and spawns Docker cases as SIBLING containers through the mounted host socket (Docker-outside-of-Docker). Resolved the README conflict (master had grown to eight CLIs since the branch was cut) and moved the Compose blurb out of the feature bullets into Quick Start, next to the other ways of starting Codeman. Three review findings from the PR discussion are fixed here rather than left for a follow-up, because two of them are shipped-image problems: - `.dockerignore` excluded `.env` only at the ROOT. A pattern is matched against the whole context-relative path, so `docker/.env` — which the deployment's own README tells the user to fill with CODEMAN_PASSWORD and provider API keys — was picked up by `COPY . .` and baked into the image at /opt/codeman/docker/.env. Verified in both directions against a real build context: with a canary secret in docker/.env, the unfixed ignore file lets /ctx/docker/.env through, and `**/.env` (plus `**/.env.*` and a negation for the checked-in .env.example) leaves only the example behind. - `CODEMAN_CASES_PATH` moved the server's CASES_DIR but not the CLI's, which still hardcoded ~/codeman-cases, so `codeman skill install --case <name>` reported "Case not found" on exactly the deployment the override exists for. Both now resolve through config/cases-dir.ts. state-store.ts keeps its own literal on purpose: that one migrates the historical ~/claudeman-cases directory by name and is about the old default, not the active location. - CLAUDE.md gained the Compose paragraph (the sibling-container inversion, the three env vars, the .dockerignore and root-owned-bind traps) and .dockerignore joins the documented list of files that genuinely belong in the repo root. The PR's `mode === 'claude'` guard on dockerResumeId is an unrelated master bug fix riding along: appendResumeFlag() maps a resume id onto codex/gemini/pi/grok/ deepseek/omp/antigravity and RESUME_ID_SAFE accepts a UUID, so a Docker case's lastClaudeSessionId was handed to every non-claude CLI. Full gate green in a merge worktree: 6360 tests, lint, format, frontend syntax, public assets, lockfile. |
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ccfda623fe |
fix(session): learn the live Claude conversation from the CLI's own hook
Which conversation a pane is on was re-derived by correlating ~/.claude/history.jsonl against Session.lastSubmitAt — and lastSubmitAt is bumped only by input that flows through Codeman's own write path (Session.write / writeViaMux). A user who attaches to the pane's tmux session directly never set it, so resolveActiveClaudeSessionIdFromHistory() returned at its first line for that pane's whole life and the response viewer stayed pinned to the launch conversation, showing a pre-/clear transcript indefinitely. A UserPromptSubmit hook reports the live conversation id from inside the CLI process, delivered under the pane's own $CODEMAN_SESSION_ID. That binding is a fact rather than a correlation: it never consults workingDir, so it cannot be claimed by a sibling pane on the same folder, a closed tab, or a bare `claude` in the user's terminal. A pane holding such an id skips the correlation entirely, so the number of prompts eligible for cwd-based guessing goes DOWN, never up — the naive alternative (relax the guard, or synthesize an anchor from PTY activity) is the reverted bug the resolver's own comment describes. The hook also stamps lastSubmitAt, so it finally means "a prompt was submitted" rather than "typed into Codeman's web terminal". Conversations vouched for first-hand — and only those — extend a persisted claudeSessionChain, whose tail re-pins the conversation when a surviving tmux session is re-attached after a restart. ⚠️ start() resets the id at THREE points and the last one runs unconditionally after the mux branch, so the tail is applied there too; patching only the mux branch looks right and silently does nothing. ⚠️ The hook's stdout is discarded with curl's own -o /dev/null. Claude Code injects a UserPromptSubmit hook's stdout into the model's context ("Exit code 0 - stdout shown to Claude"), and a trailing >/dev/null does NOT work: curlCmd already ends `... 2>/dev/null || true`, and in `pipeline || true >/dev/null` the shell binds the redirection to `true`, which never runs on the success path. The discard is opt-in so the five SSE-fed events keep byte-identical command text and no workspace's settings file is rewritten for them. The staleness marker is quote-free for the matching reason: hooksJson is JSON.stringify'd, so a quoted needle never matches and the gate would rewrite every workspace on every spawn. Existing workspaces heal on their next Claude spawn through the staleness sweep. |
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3eff1feb5d |
fix(web): render one Claude response-viewer message per model message
The Claude reader concatenated every assistant row between two human prompts
into one card, fusing up to 74 distinct model messages into a single card, and
it never read the attachment rows that hold a prompt typed while the agent was
working. Measured over 57 real transcripts on 2026-09-01, the viewer shows
1,806 messages instead of 356 and 353 user cards instead of 178, with the
assistant text sequence unchanged row for row and the response without
?context=full byte-identical on all 57 files.
One assistant row IS one whole model message: in that corpus no assistant row
carries more than one content block and no message id carries more than one
text block, so there was nothing to reassemble. Each row becomes its own
message carrying an additive {kind, label, turn}, and the frontend renders a
same-role run inside one turn as badge-less continuation segments — which is
what keeps a p90 of 11 messages per turn from reading as card spam. A numeric
turn gates that rendering, so Codex, the external-CLI pane parser and an older
server keep one badge per card.
A prompt typed while Claude is working is recorded ONLY as an
attachment/queued_command row. Taking it when origin.kind is 'human' and
commandMode is 'prompt' recovers 162 user cards from 163 such rows — one is a
verbatim repeat inside an unanswered user run and is collapsed by the existing
dedup guard — and restores the turn boundary whose absence let the assistant
runs fuse. The CLI's own queue entries are cleanly separable: of 322
queued_command rows, 159 are commandMode 'task-notification' and not one of
them carries an origin key.
This narrows #169 rather than reverting it: sidechain exclusion, the
restored-<uuid8> rebind, replayed-snapshot dedup and synthetic-row filtering
are all unchanged and still asserted.
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d5b5f8f618 |
fix(docker): make the dsh profile install survive pnpm's build-script gate
Follow-up to #350, which fixed the actual blocker (issue #352): `dsh plugin` is a thin forwarder that `spawnSync`s a literal `pnpm` with no npm fallback, so an image without pnpm dies at exit 127 and takes the whole build with it. That PR also pinned an allowlist of the two packages whose lifecycle scripts pnpm blocked at the time. Replace it with a policy that cannot go stale: pnpm, unlike npm, refuses dependency build scripts by default and FAILS the install over it (`ERR_PNPM_IGNORED_BUILDS`, exit 1, measured on pnpm 11.24), and the names to allow move between rebuilds because `@deepseek-harness-tui/dsh-tui` is resolved by dist-tag, not pinned: 0.9.3 pulled `@google/genai` (whose script is a literal `preinstall: no-op`), 0.10.0-beta.x does not. An allowlist of two names would have let the next tree break the build the same way. Allowing them wholesale is also the exposure this image already accepts three layers up, where `npm install -g` runs the install scripts of every transitive dep of the five CLIs above with no gate at all. Also correct a comment in the `/api/deepseek/install-profile` route that asserted the opposite of what #352 proved ("dsh bundles its own package manager, so no system pnpm is required"). The route's behavior is already right: dsh's own "pnpm not found on PATH" stderr reaches the caller as the OPERATION_FAILED detail, so the UI's "add a terminal profile" button names the fix. Documented the prerequisite in docs/deepseek-integration.md, and taught the docker-cases image smoke test about `dsh`/`omp` plus the profile check that `dsh --version` does NOT cover. |
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da91b4353b |
Merge pull request #353 from timkjr/omp-mode
feat: add OMP (Oh My Pi) as a new session backend |
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47ee49128c |
style: match the prettier version the lockfile pins
Format check failed twice, on different files each time, because three prettier versions were in play: package.json says ^3.4.0, package-lock pins 3.8.3 (CI runs npm ci, so that is the one CI uses), and the local node_modules had 3.9.6. Files formatted with 3.9.6 were then "fixed" with 3.4.2, pushing session-routes and system-routes onto a third style — every version change moved the failure to a different set of files. Line-break placement in `await import` and a union type only; no logic changes. |
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8e5e207386 |
fix(docker): send the probe body as an object, and explain an unreachable container
The run menu still offered every mode for an attached container. The browser's
actual request showed why:
POST /api/docker-cases/adopt-preflight -> 400
{"error":"Invalid input: expected object, received string"}
_api serializes `body` and sets Content-Type itself, and three call sites each
passed an already-stringified body, so it was encoded twice and the server saw a
JSON string where it expects an object. curl was fine throughout, so nothing in
the server logs pointed at it.
Also fixes the design defect underneath: a failed probe fell through to "do not
gate", which silently offered every mode. When the container has been recreated,
is stopped, or the engine is unreachable, the user sees claude, clicks it, and
it can only fail — with the reason visible nowhere. A failed probe now hides
every agent mode (Shell needs no CLI and stays) and shows the server's own
reason at the top of the menu.
Two static guards switched from a character window to brace matching. They
sliced between two call sites, and _loadRunModeHistory's call appears above its
definition, so the slice came out empty and the assertion verified nothing —
the same trap twice in one file.
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5452ad5c5a |
feat(docker): add a folder picker to both path fields
Both paths in the adoption form had to be typed. Each gets a Browse button using the same path-input-group markup Link Existing uses, so the two look and behave alike. What they can browse differs, and that is the point. The host workspace path reuses the existing host picker. The container workdir cannot: an adopted container has nothing mounted at a matching host path, so a host listing would be a different filesystem — and getting this field wrong is the source of the opaque OCI chdir error at launch, which makes it the field that most needs to be clickable. Adds a read-only POST /api/docker-cases/browse: one `ls` through docker exec, no writes, no lifecycle, path shell-escaped like every other value. `ls -Ap` marks directories with a trailing slash and keeps names with spaces intact. PathPicker takes an optional fetchListing source rather than being forked: the container variant only swaps where the rows come from, and reuses the rendering, navigation, Up and Choose/Select unchanged. |
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23ab2e77fd |
fix(files): give the picker a root when the server runs as root
Link Existing's Browse did nothing: GET /api/filesystem/browse answered 403
"No filesystem browse roots are available".
Two rules were fighting. /root is a default blocked tree in the attachment
guard, and Codeman running as root — containers, plenty of servers — makes
homedir() exactly /root, so the picker's own allowlisted Home root was blocked;
the other candidates live under it or do not exist. The root list came out
empty and there was nothing the user could open.
The blocked trees exist to keep ~/.ssh and friends out of reach, not to seal off
the user's own home. Only trees that would swallow a configured root whole are
dropped now: /root goes when Home is it (or sits inside it), /etc holds no
configured root and is untouched. Secrets stay protected — isSensitivePath
independently matches .ssh/, .env and credentials* at any depth, and it is what
the directory probe asks about.
⚠️ Navigation must reuse the same narrowed list the roots were chosen with.
Handing the raw trees downstream admits a root and then refuses every path
inside it, which reads as a picker that opens and does nothing.
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3685ad85bc |
fix(docker): stop requiring the CLI on the host for a container session
Attaching a container, picking claude and hitting Run gave one line — `execvp(3) failed.: No such file or directory` — and the run-mode menu offered every mode. Three separate defects, found on a real deployment. TmuxManager.createSession resolved the CLI directory without distinguishing a docker session, so a host with no claude threw, the catch fell back to a direct PTY, and that PTY exec'd the CLI on the HOST. The failure surfaced as a bare execvp error naming nothing. A docker session runs its CLI inside the container; the host does not need it. All eight modes now sit behind a cliRunsInContainer guard, and whether the container has the CLI is settled by the adoption preflight or the image gate before launch. The running check used a bare double quote and command substitution. The whole chain is embedded in an outer `bash -c "…"`, so the unescaped quote closed that string early and the remainder was re-tokenized. It is now a `grep -qx` pipeline using only the single-quote form every other line in the builder already uses. Claude Code refuses --dangerously-skip-permissions as root. Our base image runs a non-root user, so an owned container never hit this; an adopted container's user belongs to its owner and is frequently root, and keeping the flag killed the pane with a message visible only inside the container. The preflight now reports runsAsRoot and the launch chain drops the flag for it. The menu also showed every mode because the container CLI probe only started when the menu opened. It is warmed when the case is selected instead. |
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2f83a37c6d |
feat(docker): take run-mode availability from the container
The run-mode dropdown hides CLIs that are not installed on the HOST (#201). That is right for local sessions and wrong for a container case, whose agents run inside the container: a host with no claude installed hides the mode while the container ships one, which is exactly what happened on a real deployment. The adoption preflight already probes what the container has, so that result is persisted on the case and surfaced through CaseInfo. Docker cases gate on it; every other case keeps the host probe unchanged. An absent list reads as "do not gate" rather than "nothing available": an owned container runs our base image, which ships every CLI, and treating unknown as empty would leave the menu with Shell alone. |
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34c12ca18b |
feat(docker): make the container field a picker you can also type into
Typing a container name from memory is error-prone. The field becomes a native datalist: pick from the engine's containers, type to filter, or type a name that is not listed (the engine may be remote, or the container may not exist yet). A datalist gives all three natively, so no dropdown state machine is introduced. Adds listDockerContainers and GET /api/docker-hosts/:hostId/containers, following the listRemoteCodemanSessions discovery precedent: read-only and never throwing, so an unreachable daemon returns an empty list and the field degrades to plain text instead of erroring. Stopped containers stay in the list, sorted after running ones and labelled. Attaching does require a running container, but hiding stopped ones turns "my container is not in the list" into a dead end, while showing `Exited (137) 8 days ago` says exactly what to fix. |
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c98a59d709 |
fix(docker): verify the container workdir and end the probe with exit 0
Two defects that only a real container exposes. The probe chained `command -v X && echo X` with semicolons, and a script's exit status is its last command's. A container without the last probed CLI made the whole `sh -lc` exit 1, so a perfectly healthy container with tmux and claude was reported as "could not exec into the container". A missing CLI is data here, not failure, so the script now ends with `exit 0`. containerWorkdir defaulted to hostWorkspacePath. That default holds for an owned container only because the create-time bind mount puts the host directory at that exact path; attaching mounts nothing, so the two are independent facts. A host path absent inside the container makes `docker exec --workdir` fail with an OCI chdir error that surfaces in the pane as a bare "execvp failed". The preflight now proves the directory exists inside the container and refuses at link time. |
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15eebde832 |
feat(docker): attach a case to an already-running container
Docker cases could only run in a container Codeman created itself. Attaching to one the user already built and runs means Codeman must leave that container's lifecycle completely alone, which the launch chain could not do: it was `image inspect` -> `inspect || create` -> `start` -> `exec`. Adds `DockerCase.owned`, mirroring the `owned:false` contract remote-SSH already uses for attached sessions. Absent (every existing case) means owned, so current behaviour is byte-identical. `false` means the container belongs to the user and Codeman may only exec into it. The launch chain for an attached container only looks, then execs: no image gate (the image is theirs), no create, and no `start` — starting a container we do not own is the very mutation attaching promises not to perform. A missing or stopped container fails closed with an actionable message instead. Credential seeding is skipped too: those copies read from create-time read-only mounts that do not exist here, and writing host credentials into someone's container is not ours to do, so its CLIs must already be authenticated inside it. Four fail-closed guards. buildDockerStopCommand and buildDockerRemoveCommand throw during pure string construction, so no caller bug can turn into a `docker stop`/`rm` on a container we do not own; removeDockerContainer refuses again at the lowest layer; drift reports "none" for an attached container, which carries no `codeman.confighash` label and would otherwise always look drifted and 409 the launch gate forever; and the orphan reaper skips attached containers through a check deliberately independent of the two conditions already covering them. `owned` is applied AFTER the config hash is computed. dockerConfigHash takes an explicit field list, so ownership can never shift an existing case's hash — if it did, every pre-existing case would trip the drift gate at once, and the remedy the UI offers is "recreate the container". Adds POST /api/cases/docker-adopt and a read-only POST /api/docker-cases/adopt-preflight. The preflight refuses at LINK time rather than at session launch, where the only ways out would be a dead pane or starting a container we do not own. Tests assert the negative guarantee directly — that create, start, stop, rm, restart and kill are absent from the generated commands while `docker exec -it` and `new-session -A` remain — since it cannot be observed by using the feature. |
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65e994d29a |
fix(omp): correct docs/counts/URLs, resolver install-path order, stray comment + CSS
Small cleanup items from upstream review (Ark0N/Codeman#353): - OMP_SEARCH_DIRS now leads with ~/.local/bin, matching omp.sh's real installer target (~/.omp/bin was an earlier unverified guess, confirmed wrong against a real --no-cache Docker build). - docs/omp-integration.md: fixed the dead GitHub URL (can1357/omp -> can1357/oh-my-pi), corrected the CLI count (ninth backend, tenth SessionMode incl. shell -- not eighth), matched the install-path guidance to the resolver fix, updated the version example to the actually-tested 18.0.8, and added a Docker-section caveat: --resume pinning does not currently reach an in-container omp process, since Docker panes never see ompConfig. - docs/architecture-invariants.md: fixed a heading missing ", OMP" (CLAUDE.md already linked to the -omp anchor, so the link was dead) and added an OMP specifics paragraph -- the one external CLI missing an entry in this doc. - .changeset/omp-backend.md: corrected the sibling-CLI list (was missing Pi, Grok, and DeepSeek Harness) and the backend count. - Removed a stray orphaned comment fragment in the quick-start docker branch and split two CSS lines that had two declarations jammed onto one line. |
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f18dccace1 |
fix: don't discard codex/gemini/antigravity conversations on Resume; fix DELETE ownership dup + missing broadcast
resumeHistorySession() creates the resumed row in its own mode via a modeConfigKey map (opencode/pi/grok/omp -> continueSession, deepseek -> resumeSession) and retires the old row afterward. codex, gemini and antigravity were missing from that map, so resuming one of their rows started a brand-new session with NO continuation while still deleting the row it came from -- silent data loss dressed as the duplicate-row fix. Gate row retirement on continuesSomething (true only for modes that actually got a continuation config) instead of wiring an unverified sessionId->native-conversation-id assumption for the three affected CLIs. DELETE /api/sessions/:id reimplemented the ownership 404 check inline in two places instead of going through findSessionOrFail, and its persisted-only-session branch never broadcast session:deleted, so other open tabs kept the retired row until their next unrelated fetch. Extract the shared 404 into sessionNotFoundError(), add findPersistedSessionOrFail() alongside findSessionOrFail() in route-helpers.ts (same ownership contract, returns a SessionState instead of a live Session), and use both from the route instead of inline checks. Add the missing broadcast. |
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2ee2eacb4b |
fix(omp): clamp OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL/TOKEN, correct the env-allowlist docs
The docs claimed omp "has no documented vendor-key namespace of its own" and "the multi-user clamp has nothing to gate" for omp — both false. Per omp's own docs/environment-variables.md, it reads ~40 provider keys from env (pi's known 34-key problem in the same shape), and its own knobs are mostly PI_* (already globally allowlisted): PI_CONFIG_DIR, PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR, PI_CODING_AGENT_SESSION_DIR, PI_SUBPROCESS_CMD, PI_SHELL_PREFIX. The first three also move the ~/.omp tree omp-session-resolver.ts/omp-transcript.ts hardcode, silently degrading pinning/history — a known gap shared with pi, documented but not fixed here. The OMP_* prefix this PR adds brings in OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL/ OMP_AUTH_BROKER_TOKEN, where omp resolves credentials from — the same shape DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL is already dropped for in clampEnvOverridesForOwner(). Add both to OWNER_CLAMPED_ENV_KEYS so a non-granted owner in multi-user mode can't redirect them, and correct the false claims in CLAUDE.md, docs/omp-integration.md, and the stale resolveOmpHome() comment. Also documents omp's default tools.approvalMode: yolo, which was previously unstated. |
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853681f970 |
harden(omp): resume-path test coverage, silent-fallback logging, cwd validation
Follow-up from a full-branch review pass (Opus) of the omp-mode integration: - Add pinning tests for resolveOmpConfigForCreate() (session-routes.ts), exported to make it testable: the exact "resume this OMP row from history" pipeline that mangleOmpWorkingDir's earlier bug lived in had zero coverage despite being the resolver module's whole reason to exist. - Log a warning when findLatestOmpSessionId() finds nothing on disk and continuation silently degrades to omp's own ambiguous --continue, in both call sites (session create and respawn pinning) - previously silent, making the degradation invisible to anyone debugging it. - Require an absolute cwd before trusting a session file's working directory in omp-transcript.ts's parser, so a corrupted/malformed session file can't point a downstream resume at a relative or empty path. - Document (don't speculatively fix) an unverified symlinked-$HOME edge case in mangleOmpWorkingDir(): the review's suggested realpath() fix assumes omp itself resolves symlinks before mangling, which is unconfirmed - guessing wrong there would trade one silent mismatch for a different one. - Incidental: fixed unrelated pre-existing prettier drift in session-routes.ts (antigravity/opencode dynamic import line-wrapping) that was blocking the pre-commit formatting gate on this file. Confirmed as a non-issue: the model-name regex allowing "/" is intentional (provider/model ids like "crof/glm-5.2" were used successfully in live testing). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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54a930c80e |
feat(omp): survive a full session kill by reading omp's own transcripts
Claude conversations survive "Kill Tmux & Claude" because Codeman reads them back independently from ~/.claude/projects, not from its own session bookkeeping. omp conversations had no equivalent: kill the Codeman session and the conversation vanished from Past Sessions entirely, even though omp itself never forgot it on disk. Adds omp-transcript.ts, a scanner over omp's own ~/.omp/agent/sessions/<mangled-cwd>/<uuid>.jsonl files (the same shape as Claude Code's own transcript scanner, but simpler -- these files are small enough to read whole instead of doing head/tail windows). Each file's own "session" header line carries the real cwd and session id directly, so unlike Claude's mangled-directory-name decoding this never has to guess. Wired into gatherUnifiedInputs() as a second history source alongside the Claude scan, and HistoryInput/ mergeUnifiedSessions() now carry an optional `mode` so a non-claude history-only row still gets a real mode badge. Also fixes the ambiguity behind the "continue picks the wrong conversation" report from this session's testing: omp mints its OWN session uuid, unrelated to Codeman's, so a live/persisted row and its own history-scan row would otherwise show up as two separate entries for the same conversation the moment the id gets resolved. Reuses the existing claudeSessionId alias field (mergeUnifiedSessions' fold-into- owner mechanism) to point at the resolved omp id, threading it through every place `_claudeSessionId` gets (re)computed -- the constructor, _resolvedOmpRespawnConfig, and a new _maybeCaptureOmpSessionId() that opportunistically resolves it the first time a brand-new omp session (one that has never gone through a respawn) goes idle. Also closes a THIRD instance of the "ompConfig never got wired in here" gap this session kept finding: restoreMuxSessions() in server.ts restores every sibling CLI's config from persisted state on boot except omp's, so a boot-recovered omp session always lost its resolved resume id and fell back to guessing again. Verified live end-to-end: told a session a secret, killed it fully (Kill Tmux equivalent, killMux=true -- the Codeman session AND its tmux pane both gone), and the conversation still showed up in the unified list as a history-sourced row with the real first prompt as its title and an omp mode badge, keyed by omp's own session id. Known remaining gap, not fixed here: the claudeSessionId alias doesn't yet resolve reliably on every boot-recovery path for a session that was never respawned while alive (e.g. a plain re-attach to a pane that was never dead) -- worth a follow-up, but doesn't affect the two things that matter most: the conversation surviving a kill, and continuation correctness once an id has been resolved (which happens on the very next respawn either way). |
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4c332c6141 |
fix(omp): retire the old row on resume, and let DELETE remove persisted-only sessions
Every non-claude "Resume" click creates a brand-new Codeman session (there is no id to reattach to), but the old row was never cleaned up -- click resume on the same conversation a few times and the session list fills up with duplicate rows sharing one name. resumeHistorySession now retires the row it resumed from after the new one starts. That retirement needs DELETE to actually work on a row that was never live in the first place (the normal case for anything showing up in "Resume Conversation"): findSessionOrFail only checks the in-memory live-session map, so DELETE 404s on a persisted-only entry today. Give the route a fallback: when the id isn't live, look it up in persisted state instead and demote/remove it there (respecting the existing pinned-session protection). Verified live against a real persisted-only row via the API, and added route-test coverage for both the success and still-truly-unknown-id cases (which needed a demoteOrRemoveSession mock the route harness didn't have). Also includes an unrelated pre-existing prettier drift fix picked up by npm run format (omp-cli-resolver.ts, antigravity/opencode import wrapping in session-routes.ts). |
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b85f7659b7 | feat(docker): add Compose deployment support | ||
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4f5678fac4 | feat(omp): rebase OMP backend onto master (merge Pi + OMP modes) | ||
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b00ab3ceea | feat(web): show Codex plan usage in header | ||
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93a1042bb3 |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/feat/deepseek-harness' into feat/deepseek-agent-workers
# Conflicts: # CLAUDE.md |
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a628737d1f |
fix(deepseek): review-driven hardening across the harness integration
Fifteen review findings on the dsh mode, the serious ones first: - Multi-user: DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL joins the owner-clamped env keys. _configureDeepSeek() forwards the SERVER's own DEEPSEEK_API_KEY into every dsh pane and applyEnvOverrides() lands after it, so a non-granted owner who could redirect the base URL would have the operator's key sent as a bearer credential to a host of their choosing. - Wait registry: until=stop/blocked is refused on docker and remote-SSH dsh sessions (new deepSeekBridgeUnreachable fact in sessionHookOptions). The HERDR triple is set via LOCAL tmux setenv, which crosses neither docker exec nor ssh, so such a session can never post a hook event and the wait burned its whole timeout on every turn. - Approvals: a dsh item is an ALERT, not an answerable card. The answer route refuses (the '1'/Esc keystrokes are Claude-dialog-shaped and the option parser cannot read a third-party TUI's frames, so an answer was a blind keystroke into a foreign composer), and the push notification carries no Approve/Deny actions for dsh sessions. - Status shim (v3): --seq is forwarded and the server drops stale retried reports inside a 60s window (the TUI retries with backoff, so a retried 'working' could land after 'blocked' and resolve an approval whose dialog was still on screen); 4xx responses exit 0 instead of retrying, so one misconfigured session cannot feed the auth rate-limit bucket until the hook endpoint 429s for the whole instance. - Web-UI server: concurrent starts are serialized through a lock (two racing POSTs used to pick the same port and orphan the winner), and the readiness poll / timeout paths only clear or stop the singleton while it is still theirs. First click actually opens the tab now (refreshWebviews, not the nonexistent loadWebviews). DELETE /api/deepseek/web requires the privileged grant in multi-user mode. - Cron: deepseek jobs run the same two-part launch gate as the HTTP create paths (impl moved into the resolver so all three share it) and no longer stamp a Claude default model on the session. - Parity sweeps: quick-start's docker branch rejects deepSeekConfig like the remote branch; the Ralph auto-enable list gained deepseek; HookEventType gained agent_working; the phone overview run menu filters managed webview records like the desktop menu. - install.sh: the dsh identity probe closes stdin (under curl|bash a child that reads stdin eats the rest of the script), bounds the exec with timeout where available, and is memoized to one scan per install. - Welcome screen: .welcome-btn-deepseek styled in the #4d6bfe brand identity (it rendered as an unstyled UA-grey button); stale markup comment about the web shortcut rewritten; clamp docs updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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015b865f56 |
fix(deepseek): review fixes for the transcript reader — docker/remote gate, poll memo, honest pairing docs
Four review findings on the worker-transcript feature: - Docker and remote-SSH dsh sessions now keep the pane segmenter: their transcripts live in the container's / remote host's own ~/.dsh, which the local reader can never see, so the transcript path returned 'nothing said yet' forever and an agent polling such a worker starved on an answer that existed. Gated on !session.docker && !session.remote (statically pinned) and documented in the integration guide. - last-response reads are memoized on (path, mtime, size, blocks): the skill's last_text polls once per second, and each poll decompressed and reparsed the whole file on the event loop even when nothing had been appended. An unchanged poll now costs one stat. - The pairing ladder's comment claimed /new is served by step 2; in truth the boot-window transcript wins for as long as it exists (deliberately: preferring newest-eligible would hand a worker its busier sibling's reply). The comment now states the real tradeoff instead of the aspirational one. Same for decodeZstdFrames' 'skipped' wording — a corrupt frame truncates the decode there, which is the safe behavior. - stripReasoningPrefix no longer runs on user prompt text, so a prompt containing a literal </think> renders whole in blocks view. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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d1bc0c517d |
feat(deepseek): read dsh session transcripts for last-response
`GET /api/sessions/:id/last-response` is how an agent (and the Response Viewer) reads what a worker said. DeepSeek was falling through to the pane segmenter with the other external CLIs, which for this mode is not merely coarse but wrong: dsh-TUI paints a full-screen splash, so a `last-response` call on a fresh dsh session answered with its ASCII-art logo -- and anything polling for a worker's first reply reads that as a reply. dsh does not belong in that group. It writes a structured JSONL transcript per session, so read it. Four things in that file shaped the reader, all measured against real transcripts on disk: 1. dsh appends ONE ZSTD FRAME PER WRITE, and Node's zlib zstd decoder (one-shot and streaming alike) stops at the first frame end: a real 56-line transcript decoded as 1 line / 158 bytes -- the session header alone, i.e. a silent truncation that reads as "nothing said yet" forever. `zstdFrameRanges()` walks frame and block headers to find exact boundaries; splitting on the 4-byte magic would corrupt everything after a magic sequence occurring inside compressed data. zstd is resolved at RUNTIME because it landed in Node 22.15 while the project floor is 22.0, so an older Node keeps the pane behaviour. 2. Every turn also records a plugin-sourced `user/message` (the runtime context snapshot), which must not render as the user's own words. 3. A turn that ends in an error carries the provider's message; it is surfaced as `Turn error: …` (and a non-error early stop as `Turn ended: …`) rather than as an empty string, which an agent reads as "still thinking" through fifteen polls. 4. Reply text is assembled per (turn, step): a finalized message wins and the streamed deltas fill in only for a step that never finalized, so a partial answer is readable mid-turn and never doubled. "Finalized" is tracked as a set of steps rather than as non-empty text, because a step whose whole reply was reasoning strips to '' at the `</think>` boundary and would otherwise resurrect the raw deltas in its place. Session-to-transcript pairing is by the transcript's own header `cwd` plus a boot window against the session's createdAt, never by reproducing dsh's directory mangling (already two forms on disk) and never by newest-mtime alone -- mtime alone handed a freshly spawned worker its predecessor's answer in the same case directory. An empty result still wins over the pane; only a Node that cannot decode zstd falls back to it. |
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c30dfaf0e7 |
fix(deepseek): run the web UI server in the background, not in a shell tab
Clicking "DeepSeek web UI..." opened two tabs: the web tab asked for, and a shell tab running the server next to it. The shell was deliberate - the server lived in an ordinary session so it was visible, scrollable, killable and died with its tab, and nothing new had to supervise a long-lived HTTP server. That reasoning was sound and the result was still wrong in use: opening a dashboard should open one tab, and after the first launch the terminal is pure noise. The server moves to a background child process owned by a new `src/deepseek-web-server.ts`, behind `POST /api/deepseek/web`. What the session gave away for free is now explicit, which is most of the module: - Exactly one server. A second click reuses the running one instead of racing it for a port; the session flow could not do this at all, because two clicks were simply two sessions. - Restarted when the requested authority changes. `--trusted-host` fences dsh's own /api against the browser authority, and a Codeman reachable at both loopback and a tailnet name has two. Reusing a server fenced for the other origin renders a page whose every call 403s, which reads as a broken dashboard rather than a misconfigured one, so a mismatch restarts instead. - Killed on shutdown. The child is detached so its whole plugin tree can be signalled at once, which also means it would outlive Codeman and hold its port against the next start - the exact EADDRINUSE this feature already got wrong once. - Boot output captured and returned. With no shell tab there is nowhere else for a stack trace to land, so a failed spawn reports its own tail. The endpoint is fenced at the same bar as the profile installer and for the same reason: booting a dsh profile executes the plugin code in it, so this is a privileged action even though it reads as "open a page". `authority` comes from the client (`location.host`) because only the browser knows which origin is in play, and it is regex-confined at the schema boundary - defence in depth behind the argv-array spawn, admitting host:port in the shapes a browser authority can take and nothing readable as a second argument. `GET /api/deepseek/web-port` is gone; port selection moved into the supervisor, which is the thing that knows whether a server is already running. The two client-side probe helpers went with it, since the server now owns the wait. Verified over the tailnet authority end to end: no session is created (session count unchanged, one tab), the server runs on 3081 beside the user's own dsh web on 3080, status reports the tailnet authority, and the proxied dashboard renders with zero 4xx. Full gate green (6148 passed, +6). |
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15ae5f5d81 |
fix(deepseek): make the web-UI shortcut pick a free port, verify it, and trust its frame
The `Run > DeepSeek web UI...` shortcut failed three ways at once against a real
install, and the three are independent.
1. It hardcoded `--port 3080`. That is dsh web's OWN default, which makes it
precisely the port a DeepSeek user is most likely to be serving on already,
so the launch died with EADDRINUSE against the user's own server. The port
now comes from `GET /api/deepseek/web-port`, which walks 3080..3119 for a
free loopback port by BINDING it (a connect probe cannot tell "free" from
"listening but not answering yet").
2. It opened the tab unconditionally. The crashed server left a saved dashboard
pointing at nothing, with the failure only visible in a shell tab nobody had
a reason to look at. The launch now polls the existing webview probe until
the URL answers, and on timeout reports the error naming the shell tab
instead of persisting a dead dashboard.
3. The saved tab was untrusted, so the frame was sandboxed without
`allow-same-origin` and the dashboard was broken twice over: the dsh
client-runtime reads `localStorage` while loading its plugins and died there
("the document is sandboxed and lacks the 'allow-same-origin' flag"), and an
opaque-origin frame sends `Origin: null`, so dsh's own trust fence 403'd
every `/api` call no matter which authority `--trusted-host` named. Passing
`location.host` only means anything once the frame actually carries that
origin, so `--trusted-host` had never once done its job. The managed tab is
now created `trusted: true`.
That trade is real and deliberate: a trusted proxied frame is same-origin
with Codeman and can reach Codeman's API. It is defensible only because this
dashboard is an agent harness Codeman just started itself, on loopback, which
can already run code as the user. It is not a precedent for trusting
third-party dashboards, which is why it is set at this one call site rather
than defaulted.
Separately, the shortcut listed its own dashboard twice: once as the menu entry
that starts it and once as the row that entry had written on the previous click.
Webviews now carry an optional `managed` marker, managed rows are filtered out
of the saved-dashboard list, and a relaunch repoints the existing row rather
than stacking one dead dashboard per restart (which the per-launch port would
otherwise guarantee). `managed` is declared in the schema because a plain
`z.object` strips undeclared keys, so an undeclared marker would never survive
the round trip.
`DEEPSEEK_WEB_PORT` is gone from constants.js; its doc comment asserted that a
hand-started `dsh web` and the shortcut "land on the same place and share one
saved tab", which is the bug stated as a feature.
Verified on a real install with the user's own `dsh web` holding 3080: the
shortcut takes 3081, the server answers, exactly one DeepSeek entry shows in the
run menu, and the proxied dashboard renders its workspaces and completes its own
API calls (the previously-403'd `api/settings.describe` now succeeds). Full gate
green (6142 passed), typecheck/lint/format/public-assets clean.
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2034719d61 |
fix(deepseek): close the env-var clamp hole, bound the profile install, make the hook gate per-session
Three review findings on the DeepSeek Harness mode, plus one the third exposed. 1. The multi-user clamp was bypassable by a sibling field on the same request. clampExternalCliBypassForOwner() clamps deepSeekConfig.permissionMode, but DSH_* is an allowlisted envOverrides prefix and applyEnvOverrides() runs AFTER _configureDeepSeek(), so a non-granted owner sending envOverrides.DSH_PERMISSION_MODE landed last and won. Measured on an isolated instance: a session created with permissionMode "read-only" and that override ran with DSH_PERMISSION_MODE=danger-full-access in its pane. Every other CLI's bypass is a command-line flag reachable only through the per-CLI config, which is why the config clamp alone is the whole gate for them. clampEnvOverridesForOwner() adds the env-var half: for a non-granted owner it DROPS DSH_PERMISSION_MODE and DSH_HOME (dropping falls through to what _configureDeepSeek() exports, i.e. the clamped value). DSH_HOME is on that list because it aims the launcher at a profile tree whose plugin code runs at boot, before any approval row can apply. Verified end to end in real multi-user mode: a non-granted user sending both now gets workspace-write and no DSH_HOME, while an unrelated DSH_TELEMETRY_MODE passes through untouched. 2. POST /api/deepseek/install-profile could hang forever. spawn's own `timeout` signals only the direct child, and a plugin install fans out into package-manager children that keep the inherited stdio pipes open, so `close` never fires and the held-open request leaks with no route-level deadline. Reproduced: with a 1.5s built-in timeout the promise was still unsettled after 6s and both fan-out children were alive. Now detached: true plus negative-pid SIGTERM/SIGKILL, the same escalation runGit() uses for the same reason, with a last-resort reap for a grandchild that escaped the group. Same probe after the change: close fires, direct child and both grandchildren dead. 3. hooksAvailableForMode() promised more than a dsh session can deliver. deepSeekConfig.statusReporting: false disarms the HERDR_* export, and that triple is the only reason a dsh session posts hook events, so `until=stop` was accepted and then blocked for the caller's whole timeout: the exact infinite-wait-dressed-as-a-timeout the predicate exists to prevent. It now takes HookCapabilityOptions and every call site passes sessionHookOptions(), with the deepseek arm reading `!== false` so a forgotten one degrades to the old behaviour. The refusal names the setting rather than saying "no Claude Code hooks", which would send the caller hunting a bug that is really a setting they chose. Profile conformance stays unknowable at request time and is documented as such. The stale "True for `claude` and nothing else" docblock is corrected. 4. Exposed by (3): hooksAvailableForMode() was doing double duty as "is this a claude session". Read My Mind (POST /api/sessions/:id/readmymind) and intent capture read Claude's own transcript, and adding deepseek silently widened both to a mode that has none. They compare mode === 'claude' directly now, and a static check pins them there. Verified: full CI gate green (6132 passed), typecheck/lint/format clean, and the wait-signal gating exercised against a live server with a real dsh 0.1.1-rc.2 -- bridge off plus explicit until=stop is a 400 naming the setting, bridge off with no `until` still 200s on idle/exit, bridge on accepts stop. |
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4cda150493 |
feat(deepseek): add DeepSeek Harness (dsh) as a ninth CLI run mode
Adds `mode: 'deepseek'` alongside claude/shell/opencode/codex/gemini/ antigravity/pi/grok, plus a shortcut that opens the harness's own browser UI as a Codeman web tab. DeepSeek is wired unlike its siblings in three ways, each of which is the reason for a design decision rather than an accident: 1. The agent is a PROFILE, not the binary. `dsh` is a launcher over $DSH_HOME/profiles/<name>, and DeepSeek ships only `web`, `headless` and `base` -- the interactive terminal front door is always a third-party plugin. So availability is two questions: `isDeepSeekAvailable()` (binary) and `isDeepSeekRunnable()` (binary AND a pane-capable profile). The Run button gates on the latter, because reporting only the binary would spawn a pane that dies on arrival. When the binary is present but no profile is, the run menu offers to install one (POST /api/deepseek/install-profile). 2. The permission switch is an env var, not a flag. The harness has no command-line permission option; its sandbox/approval rows read DSH_PERMISSION_MODE (read-only / workspace-write / danger-full-access). Exported via `tmux setenv`, never on the spawn line. Absent = the harness's own workspace-write, which still asks, so the multi-user clamp is the only-if-sent branch and clamps to workspace-write, never read-only. 3. It is the only non-claude mode that passes hooksAvailableForMode(), and it earned that. The terminal front door reports idle/working/blocked to a supervising process over a generic env-gated contract; a generated shim (deepseek-status-shim.ts) makes Codeman that supervisor and forwards each report to /api/hook-event as stop / agent_working / permission_prompt. So a dsh session gets definitive respawn triggers, real wait-endpoint signals and real Approvals Inbox items instead of output-stabilization guesswork. `agent_working` is new (157th SSE constant) and joins APPROVAL_RESOLVING_EVENTS so a dialog answered in the terminal clears its alert at once. The resolver needs the strictest identity probe of the family: `dsh` is not merely a squattable npm name, Debian ships an unrelated `dsh` (dancer's shell), so `dsh --help` must print the harness's own banner before a candidate is handed a spawn line. Model is deliberately not a session field -- it is a composition entry in the profile's config tree. Env allowlist gains DSH_* and DEEPSEEK_* only; provider keys named by a settings-file `apiKeyEnv` stay out, which is pi's 34-provider-key problem in a new shape. Verified live against dsh 0.1.1-rc.2 and @deepseek-harness-tui/dsh-tui: the status endpoint's two-part answer, the no-profile refusal, the profile bootstrap, a real session whose pane runs `dsh --profile dsh-tui` with the permission mode injected via setenv, and the full status bridge -- a send-and-wait returned signal "stop" from a real turn, and blocked/working created and cleared an Approvals Inbox item. Docs: docs/deepseek-integration.md (guide), docs/deepseek-integration-plan.md (decisions + honest gaps). Tests: test/deepseek-mode.test.ts, test/deepseek-cli-resolver.test.ts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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c173ae0264 |
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into worktree-grok-mode
# Conflicts: # src/web/public/app.js |
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74194e4fc0 | feat(tabs): COD-359 add owner-scoped tab layouts | ||
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3f8c8e99d1 |
feat(grok): add Grok Build (xAI) as a seventh CLI run mode
SessionMode gains 'grok', a first-class backend alongside Claude Code,
shell, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity and Pi: its own PTY, tmux
session, charcoal tab identity ('gk' badge), welcome button, run-mode
entry, cron agentType, Docker and remote-SSH command defaults, and
clone-repo Brain option. Flag surface verified live against grok 1.0.5.
Grok mixes two existing shapes and the wiring follows from that:
- Codex-shaped on permissions: the bypass switch is GrokConfig.alwaysApprove
(--always-approve, grok's bypassPermissions mode; config-level deny rules
still apply on top). The Run button sends it true, like runAntigravity(),
and clampExternalCliBypassForOwner() puts grok in the only-if-sent branch:
a bare grok spawn is grok's own ask-mode default, which is already safe,
so only a sent config needs the flag forced off. Cron needs nothing for
the same reason.
- OpenCode-shaped on rendering: grok is a fullscreen alternate-screen TUI
with mouse support, so it stays OUT of isAltScreenStripMode() and lands
on the narrow tmux-attach strip and the 'buffer' local-echo fallthrough
(unmeasured against an authenticated composer; documented fallback is the
'off' branch).
- Pi-shaped on resolution: 'grok' has npm squatters (@vibe-kit/grok-cli
also installs a grok bin), so grok-cli-resolver.ts version-probes every
candidate (grok --version, killSignal SIGKILL, VITEST-gated) and
GET /api/grok/status surfaces path AND version; GROK_VERSION_REGEX is
shared with the dependency registry so doctor and run mode cannot drift.
Env allowlist gains GROK_* plus the XAI_* vendor namespace (XAI_API_KEY is
grok's documented headless auth var), the same narrow-vendor reasoning as
GOOGLE_* for gemini. Resume is id-regexed on purpose: grok's own --resume
also matches session titles, which are arbitrary user strings that must
never reach the bash -c spawn line.
Docker: grok is not on npm, so the agent image installs it in its own step
(xAI's installer has no --dir override; the binary is copied to
/usr/local/bin and root's ~/.grok dropped in the same layer), and
credentials are seeded per-file (auth.json, config.toml, pager.toml; the
dir also holds sessions/, memory/ and the ~160MB binary). Remote SSH routes
through the login-shell wrapper like the other agent CLIs.
Verified end to end on an isolated CODEMAN_INSTANCE with grok 1.0.5
installed: /api/grok/status resolves and reports the probed version,
quick-start spawns a pane whose command line ends in 'grok
--always-approve', the real TUI renders (OAuth device screen on an
unauthenticated box), and grokConfig round-trips through state.json.
Docs: docs/grok-integration.md (user guide) + docs/grok-integration-plan.md
(decisions, verification record, follow-ups).
Tests: test/grok-mode.test.ts, test/grok-cli-resolver.test.ts, plus
extended clamp/system-routes/render-index-html/run-mode-ui/mobile-overview/
local-echo-gating coverage. npm test (the CI gate) green: 5910 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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12a996b107 |
Merge pull request #331 from dignfei/fix/shell-history-performance
fix(terminal): bound shell history replay |
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dab432b3fd | fix(terminal): bound shell history replay |