Two independent ways a tab description could be typed in and silently lost.
1. Session Options modal (deterministic). The Session Name input saves on
blur, and every autosave handler in the modal bails on a null
editingSessionId. closeSessionOptions() cleared that id BEFORE hiding the
modal, and hiding it is what blurs the input, so the save always ran too
late and returned early. Escape and backdrop-click lost the name with no
PUT at all; only the X button worked, because mousedown blurs the input
before the click handler runs. Fix: blur the focused modal field first,
then clear the id. That also covers the auto-compact prompt, which saves
on change and had the same fate.
2. Right-click inline rename (racy). The _inlineRenameActive guard from #81
sits in renderSessionTabs() (the scheduler) and _fullRenderSessionTabs(),
but not in _renderSessionTabsImmediate() (the debounced executor). A
render queued in the ~100ms before the rename opened still fires and the
incremental branch rewrites .tab-name's innerHTML, destroying the input
mid-keystroke: it commits a truncated name, or, if it lands before the
first keystroke, closes the rename so everything typed after goes
nowhere. Fix: guard the executor too. finishRename() re-renders on both
commit and cancel, so a render dropped there is picked back up.
Verified end-to-end against a live server on an isolated instance: all three
modal close paths now persist the name, and the rename input survives a
render mid-typing. Both regression tests were checked to fail with their fix
reverted; the render one was vacuous at first because the synthetic tab sat
on <body> instead of inside #sessionTabs, so it now builds the tab in the
real container.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release 1.9.8 (aicodeman) and 0.1.8 (xterm-zerolag-input).
Fixes macOS session start (`posix_spawnp failed.`, issues #6 and #204):
node-pty ships its macOS spawn-helper as mode 0644 and macOS launches every
PTY through it. `scripts/fix-node-pty.mjs` (npm run fix:node-pty) chmods every
helper, prebuilds/ included, then verifies by really opening a PTY; the blind
Node-22+ rebuild is gone. `spawnPtyWithHelperRepair()` self-heals an already
broken install on the first failed spawn.
Adds the phone home screen (session overview under 430px, per-device
`mobileOverviewEnabled`, default ON) and a guided Tailscale path in
install.sh, plus `install.sh tailscale` to retrofit it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds Antigravity as a sixth CLI backend alongside Claude Code, shell, OpenCode,
Codex and Gemini, following the existing pluggable-resolver pattern.
- `utils/antigravity-cli-resolver.ts` resolves the CLI, mirroring the other
resolvers; `GET /api/antigravity/status` reports availability and path.
- `ANTIGRAVITY_*` joins the `ALLOWED_ENV_PREFIXES` allowlist in schemas.ts, so
env overrides stay CLI-scoped rather than blanket-forwarded.
- Session, tmux-manager, mux-interface and types carry the new mode; secrets are
injected via socket-scoped `tmux setenv`, never on the spawn command line, so
the mode requires tmux with no direct PTY fallback like the other external CLIs.
- Frontend: Run-dropdown entry, agent-type option, `ag` tab badge and toolbar
colours. `runAntigravity()` routes remote/docker cases through
`POST /api/quick-start` and skips the local status probe for them.
Tests: test/antigravity-mode.test.ts, plus run-mode-ui and system-routes coverage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-ups from the PR #175/#176 reviews:
- Rewake helper self-terminates on its own 6h deadline and when orphaned,
instead of relying on Claude Code to reap the poller
- Rewake marker versioned (V2) with a version-agnostic ownership prefix, so
future script updates replace older handlers instead of duplicating them;
regression test covers the V1 to V2 swap
- HOOK_TIMEOUT_MS renamed to HOOK_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 10: the hook timeout
field is seconds (the CLI multiplies by 1000), so the curl hooks have
effectively had a ~2.8h timeout since COD-54
- Test echo PTY switches to raw mode: each input byte echoes exactly once
(tty line discipline doubled every line and buffered until Enter)
- test/setup.ts: drain in-flight console-log rpc forwards before environment
teardown (fixes the EnvironmentTeardownError that failed CI twice on the
merge commit with all 3820 tests passing), clean the temp home on process
exit (fully-skipped files leaked it), fix the Windows Playwright cache
fallback path
- test/webview-proxy.test.ts: stop naming the vitest environment directive in
prose; vitest matches it inside comments and silently ran the whole file
under the jsdom environment while the comment claimed node
- CLAUDE.md: document the temp-HOME and echo-PTY test isolation
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
PUT /api/settings service toggles now resolve from `merged` (persisted +
incoming) instead of the raw request body, so a partial PUT no longer
starts the subagent watcher and stops the workflow + image watchers by
treating every omitted key as "apply the default". Pinned by a 4-case
regression test verified to fail against the old handler.
Also trims the links line from the Codeman callout in the
xterm-zerolag-input README.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Only CLAUDE.md conflicted: master restructured it into the short-rule +
docs/architecture-invariants.md pointer layout while this PR was open.
The response-viewer detail now lives in architecture-invariants, so the
Claude turn-grouping and restored-placeholder rebind notes moved there.
Changeset rewritten to record the measured effect on real transcripts.
Both picker endpoints are a second file-serving surface, and they
inherited neither the attachment guard's confinement nor its ownership
scoping. Two separate holes:
1. `sessionId` contributes that session's workingDir as a browse root,
but it was resolved straight off ctx.sessions/ctx.store with no owner
check, unlike the nine other session-scoped handlers in this file. A
non-admin could pin ANOTHER user's working directory as a root just
by passing their session id, then list and preview underneath it. Now
runs canAccessOwned and reports 404, which also avoids confirming
that a session id exists.
2. `Home` and `CASES_DIR` were unconditional roots for every caller.
Per-user spaces live at <USER_SPACES_DIR>/<username>, which is INSIDE
homedir(), so the Home root alone exposed every other user's
workspace. A multi-user non-admin now gets only their own
userSpacePath plus anything explicitly listed in
CODEMAN_FILE_PICKER_ROOTS. /mnt/d is dropped as well: a broad host
mount should be an explicit operator decision in a multi-user
deployment, and operators who want it can name it in that env var.
Admins and single-user mode keep the host-wide roots, so behavior is
unchanged unless CODEMAN_MULTIUSER is on (opt-in, off by default).
All three discriminating tests were verified to fail against the
previous code: browse and preview both returned 200 instead of 404, and
the roots came back as [Home, Codeman Cases, ...] instead of [My Space].
Full suite green, 3784 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The short-code distribution test asserted that no base62 character
deviated more than 15% from its expected count. That statistic is the
maximum over 62 correlated near-normal cells, so its tail is fat: at
n=36000 the per-cell relative SD is ~4.1%, which puts the 15% bound at
|z| ~ 3.65, and taken as a max over 62 cells it fires on a perfectly
uniform generator about 1.6% of the time. Measured directly: 48 spurious
failures in 3000 simulated runs. It had been rerun-to-green repeatedly
and most recently red-herringed a PR review.
Chi-square is the correct test for "is this multinomial uniform", and
unlike 0.15 its threshold is derivable. df=61, Wilson-Hilferty puts the
p=1e-6 critical value at ~129, so the bound is 130.
Power is unchanged. Removing rejection sampling from generateShortCode
reintroduces modulo bias (256 % 62 = 8, so eight characters draw five
chances per 256 instead of four) and was verified against the real code
in an isolated worktree: chi-square 243.06 against the 130 limit. The
threshold sits in a wide empty gap, 3000 clean runs peaked at 104 while
200 biased runs bottomed out at 174.5.
Also iterate the alphabet explicitly rather than the observed keys, so a
character that never appears counts as zero instead of being skipped.
Verified: 30/30 consecutive runs of the real test pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Only CLAUDE.md conflicted: master restructured it into the short-rule +
docs/architecture-invariants.md pointer layout while this PR was open.
Route counts reconciled against master's numbering (files 14 -> 16 for
the two new filesystem endpoints, total ~197 -> ~199) and the path
picker's detail moved into architecture-invariants under its own
section.
Three separate truncations, each cutting a clickable link short so it opened the
wrong target (or nothing at all).
1. A single `&` ended the match. It is a query-parameter separator, so every real
query string was cut: a WordPress edit link resolved to `?post=1479` and opened
the post list instead of the editor, and Claude Code's own `/login` URL was not
usable at all. `&` is now part of a URL; `&&` stays a boundary, since that is
the shell operator and never appears inside one. A lone trailing `&` is still
trimmed as punctuation.
2. Links longer than the terminal is wide were cut at the row boundary. xterm
calls the link provider once per visible ROW and translateToString returns only
that row, despite a comment here claiming it handled wrapping. The provider now
stitches the continuation rows back into one logical line and maps match offsets
back to (x, y), so a link can span rows.
Two kinds of continuation exist and handling only the first is not enough. A
SOFT wrap is the emulator running out of columns, which flags the next row
`isWrapped`. A HARD wrap is the program wrapping its own output and emitting a
real newline, which flags nothing: Ink does this, which is why the /login URL
was cut at the window edge and why the clickable part grew when the window was
widened. A row that fills the full width is now treated as continuing into the
next, that being the only trace a hard wrap leaves behind. Bounded to 12 rows so
a screenful of wide output cannot make every hover re-scan the viewport.
3. Image and PDF paths were not matched at all. `.claude-images/paste-*.png`, what
Codeman writes for a pasted screenshot, rendered as plain text. Those extensions
are now linked and open the file preview, which renders images inline, rather
than the log viewer, which would show binary noise.
Verified in a real terminal: a 450-char /login URL hard-wrapped across 5 rows with
zero isWrapped flags in the buffer (so a genuine hard wrap, not the soft case)
links intact, as do soft-wrapped URLs and a wrapped attachment path. Regression
cases added to link-provider-regex.test.ts, which extracts the patterns from the
shipped source so they cannot drift. Its existing ReDoS guard still passes, which
matters because this changes a pattern that once froze the tab on hover.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a "Web / URL" section to the Run dropdown. A saved URL renders as a tab in
the same strip as Claude/Codex/Gemini sessions, with the same Alt+1..9 numbering,
so Codeman is one mission control instead of Codeman plus a pile of browser tabs.
A webview is NOT a sixth SessionMode: no PTY, no tmux, no respawn, no idle
detection. It is a separate resource sharing only the tab strip and the main
content area, the same call that keeps Docker and remote-SSH as case overlays.
Dashboards are proxied through Codeman's own origin, because a direct iframe
fails three ways at once in the shipped deployment: prod serves HTTPS behind
tailscale serve, so http:// targets are hard-blocked as mixed content (with no
override at all on iOS Safari); Grafana/Portainer-class dashboards send
X-Frame-Options: DENY; and our own default-src 'self' CSP blocks cross-origin
frames. Proxying dissolves all three and leaves the production CSP byte-for-byte
unchanged, since /webview/... is already covered by 'self'. A useful side effect:
the fetch happens server-side, so a tailnet-only dashboard is reachable from a
phone that is not on the tailnet.
The proxy is not an API surface. It authenticates on a 192-bit capability in the
path (memory-only, rolling TTL, bound to the minting user, revoked on edit or
delete) and is correspondingly exempt from the cookie and Origin checks, because
a sandboxed iframe is opaque-origin: it sends no SameSite=lax cookie and its
writes arrive with Origin: null. The Host allowlist is never bypassed. A second
Referer-keyed form of the exemption exists for root-absolute assets and is fenced
to safe methods on non-/api, non-/ws, non-/q paths.
Iframes omit allow-same-origin unless a URL is explicitly marked trusted, since a
proxied page is served from Codeman's own origin and could otherwise read this
document and drive the agent-spawning API. Authorization and codeman_session are
stripped upstream in BOTH modes, so CODEMAN_PASSWORD cannot leak into a dashboard.
Two things only a real browser reveals, both presenting as the dashboard's own
"Failed to fetch" while the page itself renders fine:
- Runtime-built root-absolute URLs (fetch('/api/data')) escape <base href> and
land on Codeman's root. Widening the Referer fallback into /api would trade
security for it, so an injected shim patches fetch/XHR/WebSocket/EventSource
inside the frame instead, removing the class rather than the guard.
- An opaque-origin document CORS-checks every request, including to the host it
was served from. Script/css/img loads are not CORS-checked, which is why the
page renders while its API calls die. The proxy now emits CORS headers and
answers preflights itself. registerSecurityHeaders answered every OPTIONS with
a bare 204 before routing, carrying no ACAO for Origin: null, so that
short-circuit now exempts a valid capability.
Neither is reproducible with curl, which does not enforce CORS.
Also fixes a pre-existing bug found on the way: .toolbar has backdrop-filter,
making it a stacking context that trapped .run-mode-menu's z-index:1000, so
.welcome-overlay painted over the whole Run menu. With no session open, every
item in it (Claude Code included) was unclickable.
Verified end to end against a real tailnet dashboard: live data, WebSocket push,
no failed requests, and switching tabs does not reload the frame. 98 new tests
cover the pure rewrite helpers, the CORS helper, the shim's rewrite logic, route
CRUD, and every edge of the auth exemption.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves the CLAUDE.md paragraph conflict with #162, skips the
windowTitle recompute for solo-session renders so a detached window
cannot reset the push-notification hostTitle prefix to the default,
and prettier-formats test/mobile/devices.ts (came in unformatted via
the #162 merge; CI format:check only covers src/**).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolutions (sse-events.ts / constants.js / app.js): unions of the docker/
multi-user event registrations from master with the session-order/pin events
from this branch.
Additions on top of the merge:
- POST /api/sessions/:id/pin now falls back to the persisted store record when
no live session exists: COD-142 deliberately preserves pinned records after
kill (and cleanupStaleSessions skips them), so without this a pinned-then-
killed session could never be unpinned. Owner-scoped in multi-user mode.
- SessionOrderUpdateSchema bounds (id <= 100 chars, <= 500 entries) so a buggy
client can't persist megabytes into state.json; empty strings still flow to
normalizeSessionOrder which drops them.
- Route tests for the persisted-record pin fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolutions:
- session.ts: keep the extracted _buildRespawnPaneOptions() helper (COD-108)
and add master's docker/owner fields to it
- tmux-manager.ts: docker branch first, then remote via buildRemoteSessionCommand
(now an options object threading claudeMode/allowedTools into
buildRemoteLaunchCommand, preserving the 6.3 multi-user permission downgrade)
- case-routes.ts: keep master's adminOnly helper; gate the new COD-105 discovery
endpoint admin-only in multi-user mode (hosts are machine-level infra)
- settings-ui.js: union of remoteAutoReconnect + master's header-button defaults
- session-routes.ts: union of imports; session gets remote + owner
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings the docker session-mode deep-review work (intended for the skipped
1.4.2) onto the 1.5.x line: deterministic-conversation-id resume across
container stop/recreate, config-drift detection + POST /api/docker-cases/:name/recreate,
docker model-picker support, import-manifest hardening, remote-daemon (context/
daemonHost) correctness, comma-in-path rejection, and the zh-CN README re-translation.
Conflicts resolved to preserve BOTH the multi-user security scoping already on
master (ownership checks, workingDir confinement, permission downgrade) AND the
docker features. Version kept at master's 1.5.0 (the 1.4.2 bump is superseded;
a fresh changeset bumps to 1.5.1). tsc, eslint, and test:ci all green (3548 tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The opt-in multi-user feature's only enforcement is web-layer scoping
(all sessions share one OS account). An adversarial review found 8 critical
+ 7 high cross-user holes that defeated it, plus mediums; all fixed here.
Single-user (flag-off) behavior stays byte-identical apart from documented
consistency deltas.
Ownership / confinement:
- DELETE /api/sessions (bulk) + /:id now owner-scope / findSessionOrFail
- quick-start, cron (create+fire), scheduled runs confine workingDir to the
owner's space; case link/docker-link/docker-import confine the host path
- resolveCasePath no longer resolves linked cases for non-admins; foreign
remote/docker cases are skipped (fall through to the caller's own local case)
- history, subagents/workflows, mux-sessions, orchestrator, cron run-history,
away-digest, and remote/docker host reads are owner- or admin-scoped
Permission policy (section 6.3):
- non-granted users are downgraded at every spawn site incl. legacy
/api/scheduled, PlanOrchestrator one-shots, remote launch, and the cron-fire
gemini/codex bypass switches; resolveClaudeModeForUsername now fails closed
Auth / store:
- verify-first login throttle (a correct password is never locked out),
/ws terminal subject to the change-password lockbox, cookie fast-path
re-validates identity live, role/grant changes revoke sessions, admin delete
runs the last-admin guard before any teardown
- users.json: distinguish missing (ENOENT) from corrupt/unreadable so a bad
read can't overwrite all accounts; unique per-process temp write path
Event streams:
- debounced session:updated + batched task:updated, clipboard, and push
notifications route by owner (fail closed); getLightState hides machine-wide
globalStats from non-admins
Tests: two suites updated to assert the fixed (secure) behavior. tsc, eslint,
and test:ci all green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- public/admin-ui.js (new, self-contained): on boot fetches GET /api/me and
stores window.__codemanUser; installs a fetch interceptor that opens a
change-password modal on any 403 PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED (and on boot when
mustChangePassword is set); for a multi-user admin, injects a "Users" tab into
the existing App Settings modal (create/reset/disable/enable/promote/demote/
grant-bypass/delete with typed confirm + one-time-password reveal). No header
button, so the mobile-header policy stays green; nothing renders in single-user
mode.
- me-routes: GET /api/me returns a `multiUser` flag so the UI distinguishes a
single-user admin (no admin UI) from a multi-user admin.
- index.html: load admin-ui.js after settings-ui.js, before session-ui.js.
Tests: test/admin-ui.test.ts (JSDOM: identity boot, Users-tab injection gating by
role/mode, forced change-password modal, script-order wiring). Backend verified
end-to-end by test/admin-routes.test.ts against a live server. A full Playwright
pass is recommended before merge.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- routes/admin-routes.ts: GET/POST /api/admin/users, PATCH/DELETE
/api/admin/users/:username, reset-password, logout. Multi-user only (404
otherwise), requireAdmin, last-admin invariants, one-time-password on create /
reset (returned once + mustChangePassword), disable/reset/delete revoke cookie
sessions, delete kills the user's live sessions first (normal teardown) and can
delete their space (guarded). Per-user stats (live/active sessions, case count).
- web/admin-audit.ts: append-only ~/.codeman/admin-audit.jsonl (timestamp, acting
admin, action, target, IP) for every user-management action.
- SSE admin:usersChanged + auth:passwordChangeRequired (sse-events.ts + constants.js).
fix(user-store): serialize users.json read-modify-write
touchLastLogin fires on every Basic auth (fire-and-forget) and was racing route
writes (create/update), clobbering records — a real corruption bug surfaced by
the admin tests. All mutators now run under a single write lock, and
touchLastLogin is throttled to once/minute per user to bound disk churn.
Tests: test/admin-routes.test.ts (8, live server) + user-store lock verified by
the existing user-store suite.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Threads per-user ownership through sessions, cases, cron, and the permission
policy. All scoping is a no-op in single-user mode (isMultiUserMode() guards).
Sessions
- Session.owner stamped at every create path from req.authUser / job.owner:
POST /api/sessions, /api/run, /api/quick-start, ralph start, cron launch,
plan generation. Round-trips through recovery (MuxSession.owner mirror, read
muxSession.owner ?? savedState?.owner) and the mux layer.
- findSessionOrFail(ctx, id, req) now does a NOT_FOUND owner check (never 403, so
other users' session existence is not leaked); wired at ~50 call sites.
- List endpoints filtered by owner: GET /api/sessions, /api/sessions/unified
(live+persisted+lifecycle scoped, host-wide transcripts admin-only), cron jobs.
Permission policy (section 6.3)
- resolveClaudeModeForUsername wraps getClaudeModeConfig at every spawn site so a
non-granted user is forced to --permission-mode auto (bypass -> auto), including
recovery (or a reboot would un-downgrade). buildPromptArgs now respects the
session's claudeMode, closing the one-shot (runPrompt) bypass hole.
- Shell mode and cron launchCommand require canBypassPermissions: 403 at
POST /api/sessions, /api/quick-start create, cron job create, AND cron fire time
(re-checked against the owner's current grant).
Cases
- resolveCasesDir(user): per-user ~/codeman-users/<name>/cases in multi-user, the
shared ~/codeman-cases otherwise. All case CRUD + ralph + plan + quick-start
resolve through it. resolveCasePath is owner-aware.
- GET /api/cases scoped per user (own folders; legacy linked cases admin-only;
remote/docker cases owner-filtered). RemoteCase/DockerCase gain owner, stamped
at link/quickcreate/import.
- Remote + Docker host CRUD is admin-only.
- Non-admin workingDir confinement (the linchpin): realpath must resolve inside the
user's space, enforced at POST /api/sessions and /api/run BEFORE any disk write.
Limits
- sessionCapacityState / sessionCapacityMessage centralize the global + per-user
cap (CODEMAN_MAX_SESSIONS_PER_USER, default global/2), replacing the 6 copy-pasted
MAX_CONCURRENT_SESSIONS checks.
Tests: test/ownership-scoping.test.ts (case isolation, host-CRUD gate, workingDir +
shell gates, and the scoping helpers). Deferred to phase 4: WS owner gate, SSE
fan-out filtering, file-route preview/thumbnail helper scoping, push routing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a parallel multi-user auth branch (the single-user Basic-auth path is
left byte-identical). Off unless CODEMAN_MULTIUSER/--multiuser.
- middleware/auth.ts: mode-selecting registerAuthMiddleware. New async
multi-user hook verifies username:password against the user store (scrypt),
mints identity-carrying cookies, decorates req.authUser, enforces a per-IP
AND per-username failure bucket, and the mustChangePassword lockbox. The
hook-secret loopback bypass is now a single shared helper used by both
branches. FastifyRequest.authUser module augmentation.
- ports/auth-port.ts: AuthSessionRecord gains username/role/mustChangePassword.
- user-store.ts: verifyPassword (timing-equalized against user enumeration).
- route-helpers.ts: getAuthUser (synthetic admin fallback), canAccessOwned,
requireAdmin, revokeUserSessions; findSessionOrFail gains an optional req for
a NOT_FOUND owner check (dormant until phase 3 wires callers).
- routes/me-routes.ts: GET /api/me (synthetic admin in single-user) and
POST /api/me/password (verify current, min 8, clear mustChangePassword,
revoke other sessions).
- QR: QrTokenRecord + AuthSessionRecord carry a username; tunnel-manager
mintUserToken / consumeTokenWithIdentity / getQrSvgForCode; /q/:code binds
the cookie to the token's user (rejects identity-less tokens in multi-user);
GET /api/tunnel/qr mints a per-user token. Single-user keeps the rotating token.
- server.ts: bootstrap the initial admin from CODEMAN_USERNAME/PASSWORD on first
boot (refuse to start with no users); multi-user with >= 1 user satisfies the
non-loopback auth requirement and the tunnel-enable guard; userFailures bucket
disposal.
- types/api.ts: FORBIDDEN, PASSWORD_CHANGE_REQUIRED, USER_EXISTS, USER_NOT_FOUND,
LAST_ADMIN error codes (message + status wired).
- Session.owner field + getter/setter, SessionState.owner, MuxSession.owner,
CreateSessionOptions.owner (foundation for phase 3 ownership threading).
Tests: test/multiuser-auth.test.ts (10, live server on 3170/3171). Existing auth
suite (auth-security, qr-auth, cod54-hook-event, network-auth-policy) unchanged
and green; full test:ci sweep passes (3519 tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds Anthropic's classifier-guarded low-prompt mode (--permission-mode
auto) as a fourth ClaudeMode alongside skip-permissions/normal/allowedTools.
Wired through both spawn paths (buildPermissionArgs for direct PTY,
buildClaudePermissionFlags for tmux), the getClaudeModeConfig validator,
and the App Settings Startup Mode picker. Exports buildSpawnCommand for
test coverage.
This is the prerequisite for multi-user mode section 6.3, which downgrades
non-granted users' sessions to 'auto'.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codeman maintainer