COD-54 gated the /api/hook-event + /api/status-telemetry localhost bypass
behind the shared X-Codeman-Hook-Secret only WHILE a managed tunnel was
running, keeping a plain localhost bypass otherwise. But Codeman can't detect
a user's OWN loopback reverse proxy (their own `cloudflared --url`,
`tailscale serve`, nginx -> 127.0.0.1), which proxies internet traffic into
the loopback origin with req.ip === 127.0.0.1 — so that setup kept the unsafe
plain bypass.
Require the secret on the loopback bypass unconditionally. Managed-session
hooks already always present it (X-Codeman-Hook-Secret from
$CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE, generated for every instance), so the legitimate
hook channel is unaffected; only the previously-unguarded own-proxy path is
now rejected. Drops the now-unused getTunnelRunning param from
registerAuthMiddleware.
Tests: cod54-hook-event-auth (tunnel-down now also requires the secret, plus
a good-secret positive case); auth-security (hook tests present the secret to
reach schema validation).
Review fixes for COD-54:
- Generated hook curl commands now present X-Codeman-Hook-Secret, read from
the secret file AT EXECUTION TIME via $CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE (exported
into every managed session's env by tmux buildEnvExports / the direct-PTY
env builders). Without this, every local hook 401'd the moment a managed
tunnel came up — the enforcement existed but nothing presented the secret.
Path-not-value keeps the secret off command lines and out of config files,
and running sessions pick up a newly generated secret with no respawn;
server.start() ensures the file exists up front.
- Hook-secret failures now count into a DEDICATED per-IP bucket
(hookSecretFailures) instead of the shared authFailures map. Legacy
(pre-secret) hook configs fire constantly from 127.0.0.1; counting their
401s against the shared bucket would 429 every cookie-less loopback
request — locking out the Basic-Auth login path (and, through a tunnel,
every client, since tunneled traffic also arrives as 127.0.0.1).
- docs/security-architecture.md: secret-gated hook exemption, dedicated
bucket, COD-55 refusal, and the residual caveat for EXTERNAL loopback
proxies (user-run cloudflared / tailscale serve), which the
managed-tunnel probe cannot see.
- test/cod54-hook-event-auth.test.ts: +3 tests — login path unaffected
after hook-bucket exhaustion; generated hooks reference the header +
$CODEMAN_HOOK_SECRET_FILE without embedding the value; env builders
export the path only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two hardening fixes for the public-tunnel exposure path (COD-54 / COD-55).
COD-54 — gate the /api/hook-event localhost bypass when a tunnel is up:
`cloudflared --url http://127.0.0.1:port` proxies internet traffic INTO the
loopback origin, so a tunneled hook request arrives with req.ip === 127.0.0.1
and the old bare-localhost bypass would pass it unauthenticated. Now:
- tunnel running → bypass requires a shared per-instance hook secret
(X-Codeman-Hook-Secret header; constant-time compare) + per-IP rate limiting
- tunnel not running (loopback-only, the normal case) → unchanged, so
already-deployed credential-less hooks keep working.
New src/config/hook-secret.ts; auth middleware takes a getTunnelRunning probe
(wired from server.ts via tunnelManager.isRunning()).
COD-55 — refuse starting the Cloudflare tunnel without auth:
enabling the tunnel publishes full terminal control to a public URL; with no
CODEMAN_PASSWORD the auth middleware is inactive and the bind guard never trips
(tunnel binds loopback). PUT /api/settings now refuses tunnelEnabled:true with a
403 (before persisting) unless CODEMAN_PASSWORD is set or
CODEMAN_ALLOW_UNAUTHENTICATED_NETWORK=1 is acknowledged. New
isUnauthenticatedNetworkAcknowledged() in network-auth-policy; settings-ui
surfaces the refusal as an error toast and reverts the toggle.
Scope: the always-on CSRF/Origin guard, Host-header allowlist, and
network-auth-policy itself are already upstream (#113) and not re-proposed here.
Verification: tsc, eslint, prettier, check:frontend-syntax clean; full test:ci
green (2723 passed), incl. test/cod54-hook-event-auth and
test/routes/system-routes-tunnel-guard.
Aamer Akhter