The opt-in multi-user feature's only enforcement is web-layer scoping
(all sessions share one OS account). An adversarial review found 8 critical
+ 7 high cross-user holes that defeated it, plus mediums; all fixed here.
Single-user (flag-off) behavior stays byte-identical apart from documented
consistency deltas.
Ownership / confinement:
- DELETE /api/sessions (bulk) + /:id now owner-scope / findSessionOrFail
- quick-start, cron (create+fire), scheduled runs confine workingDir to the
owner's space; case link/docker-link/docker-import confine the host path
- resolveCasePath no longer resolves linked cases for non-admins; foreign
remote/docker cases are skipped (fall through to the caller's own local case)
- history, subagents/workflows, mux-sessions, orchestrator, cron run-history,
away-digest, and remote/docker host reads are owner- or admin-scoped
Permission policy (section 6.3):
- non-granted users are downgraded at every spawn site incl. legacy
/api/scheduled, PlanOrchestrator one-shots, remote launch, and the cron-fire
gemini/codex bypass switches; resolveClaudeModeForUsername now fails closed
Auth / store:
- verify-first login throttle (a correct password is never locked out),
/ws terminal subject to the change-password lockbox, cookie fast-path
re-validates identity live, role/grant changes revoke sessions, admin delete
runs the last-admin guard before any teardown
- users.json: distinguish missing (ENOENT) from corrupt/unreadable so a bad
read can't overwrite all accounts; unique per-process temp write path
Event streams:
- debounced session:updated + batched task:updated, clipboard, and push
notifications route by owner (fail closed); getLightState hides machine-wide
globalStats from non-admins
Tests: two suites updated to assert the fixed (secure) behavior. tsc, eslint,
and test:ci all green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Detach a session tab into its own browser window and back.
Detach/undock:
- GET /session/:id serves the SPA in "solo mode", reusing the existing
client (terminal, local-echo overlay, reconnect) so no terminal code is
duplicated. One PTY already fans out to N SSE/WS clients, so a detached
window is just another live client — no server fan-out work was needed.
- A pop-out icon per tab; detached tabs show a badge and focus the popup on
click; closing the popup re-docks. Cross-window state via BroadcastChannel
plus a WindowProxy poll, and survives a dashboard reload (roll-call).
app.detachSession(id) is a single idempotent entry point (future gesture
hook). <base href="/"> so relative assets resolve under /session/:id.
Beta-branch isolation (so it can run alongside a prod Codeman):
- Default port 3000 -> 5000.
- New src/config/instance.ts derives the data dir and tmux socket from
CODEMAN_INSTANCE (default "beta"): ~/.codeman-beta + tmux -L codeman-beta.
Every ~/.codeman path now goes through dataPath()/getDataDir() (state,
mux-sessions, settings, push keys, lifecycle log, screenshots, certs,
linked-cases, subagent window state). Overridable via CODEMAN_INSTANCE /
CODEMAN_DATA_DIR / CODEMAN_TMUX_SOCKET. Prevents a second instance from
discovering and attaching PTYs to the first instance's live tmux sessions.
Verified: tsc / eslint / prettier / lockfile clean; Playwright E2E (27 checks)
for detach/solo/redock; default isolation confirmed to see zero real sessions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codeman maintainer