Commit Graph
75 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Codeman maintainer 1a99b5836c Merge pull request #430 from opticon454/custom-model-run-menu 2026-09-19 12:25:11 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 035bfbc2fe fix(remote): merge-time fixes for Wake-on-LAN
The MAC-count limit lived in two places that disagreed. RemoteHostSchema.wakeMac's
128-character cap admits seven comma-separated MACs while parseMacList takes at most
four, all-or-nothing, so a five-MAC value validated, was written to remote-hosts.json,
and then resolved to NO wake target: POST /api/sessions/:id/wake answered
"No wake-on-LAN target configured for this host" and the banner offered "Configure WoL"
for a host the user had just configured. MAX_WAKE_MACS now lives in
src/config/remote-wake-limits.ts and both sides refine against it. Its own module
because src/remote-wake.ts is import-fenced to session-routes.ts and server.ts (the
wiring guard that stops a watcher waking a host), and because schemas.ts must not drag
dgram/net/child_process into every request-validating module.

The documented 40 s request budget also omitted the wake's own cost. A `command` target
is bounded by REMOTE_WAKE_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS and runs BEFORE the readiness poll, so a
slow one pushed a wakeCommand host's worst case to ~68 s, past the 60 s
proxy_read_timeout the budget exists to stay under. _wakeAndWait now subtracts the
wake's measured elapsed time from the readiness budget, floored at one poll interval so
a wake that ate the whole budget still gets one probe. A magic packet is effectively
instant and is unaffected, which is why live testing never saw it.

Also: the two new endpoints are documented in docs/api-reference.md with the import
fence stated as the rule it is, CLAUDE.md's frontend module count moves to 34, and the
release changesets carry the Thanks section.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-19 12:18:40 +02:00
DevvynandClaude Sonnet 5 5fc391a47c fix(custom-model): address fourth pre-merge review + merge upstream master (Ark0N)
Merged upstream/master (22 commits: reboot-restore recovery feature,
terminal keycode229 recovery work, install.sh/CLI-catalog generator
changes, CHANGELOG/version bump to 1.30.0) into this branch. No
conflicts; git auto-merged every overlapping file (CLAUDE.md,
docs/api-reference.md, app.js, index.html, styles.css, routes/index.ts,
session-routes.ts, schemas.ts, server.ts).

Two required fixes from the latest review:

1. privilegedEnvKeys widening (stock.ts) changes behaviour outside this
   feature. The reviewer decided to keep both CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS
   and CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR listed (types.ts's rule that every traffic-
   redirecting var this feature introduces must appear there stays
   literally true), and asked for the real consequences documented
   instead of hidden:
   - Corrected session-env-clamp.ts's fileoverview, which stated the
     opposite of what the code now does (reboot-restore's clamp call
     used to be able to strip nothing for claude; it now strips a
     persisted CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR for a non-granted owner).
   - Corrected the rationale comments in stock.ts: privilegedEnvKeys
     has exactly one consumer (ownerClampedEnvKeys, feeding the
     generic envOverrides clamp on create/quick-start/reboot-restore),
     not the custom-model routes.
   - Added a CLAUDE.md line to the CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR gotcha covering
     the admin-only-in-multi-user-mode and reboot-restore-strips-it
     consequences.
   - Added a "Claude multi-user clamp" test next to the existing
     DeepSeek/OMP ones, pinning the new stripping behaviour.

2. GET .../running-status (custom-model-routes.ts) no longer passes
   the raw llama-swap `cmd` field (the literal launch line, which can
   carry model paths and --api-key) to the browser -- the frontend
   only ever reads model/state, cmd exists solely for server-side
   parseCtxFromCmd() during discovery. Added a test asserting the
   response never contains cmd or a planted secret.

Also regenerated config/clis.stock.json and install.sh's catalogue
block (npm run generate:cli-catalog) to clear drift introduced by the
upstream merge, since it was failing the sync check.

Left to the reviewer, as they said they'd take at merge: the two
"comments pointing at removed code" cleanups, the two stale CLAUDE.md
counts, and the small items list (mode==='claude' frontend branch,
isCliAvailable() unknown-id gap, shared confirmed flag ordering,
one-shot cancel toast severity, pumpLlamaSwapLogTail buffer cap).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Ea59JhUmHBm1gRCsiYF33R
2026-09-19 18:05:51 +08:00
DevvynandClaude Sonnet 5 e2034177c5 fix(custom-model): root-cause and fix DeepSeek's HTTP_404 (missing /v1)
DeepSeek Harness's own bundled provider module
(@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm-deepseek) builds its request URL as
`${DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL}/chat/completions` with no `/v1` insertion of its
own (its real public API, https://api.deepseek.com, expects the
caller's base URL to already carry any needed prefix), while
llama-swap/llama.cpp only ever serves the OpenAI-conventional
`/v1/chat/completions`.

Confirmed two ways:
- Installed the real @deepseek-ai/dsh package (all its actual
  published dependencies) into a scratch dir purely to read
  dsh-llm-deepseek's source: `fetch(`${connection.baseURL}/chat/
  completions`, ...)`, baseURL read straight from DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL —
  the same grep-the-real-source bar pi/grok's fixes were held to.
- Live against the test-picker's llama-swap: `POST <baseUrl>/chat/
  completions` -> 404, `POST <baseUrl>/v1/chat/completions` -> 200,
  same endpoint. dsh's own error template ("DeepSeek API error (HTTP
  ${status})") reproduces the originally-reported
  "dsh: HTTP_404: DeepSeek API error (HTTP 404)" exactly.

- New registry field `appendV1Suffix` (env kind only, deepseek's entry
  alone — claude/gemini must NOT get it, since claude was already
  confirmed working against the unmodified baseUrl). When set,
  buildCustomModelInjection runs endpoint.baseUrl through the same
  withV1Suffix() helper configDir-kind CLIs (pi/grok/codex) already
  use, instead of writing it verbatim.

Not yet re-run end-to-end through a real dsh binary — no install
available in this environment (not in PATH, and the test-picker
container doesn't bundle it) — so this is source-confirmed and
live-verified at the HTTP level, not yet promoted to "verified"
alongside claude/opencode/pi/grok/omp. Docs (custom-model-endpoints.md,
the plan doc's confidence table, the wiki page, CLAUDE.md) all updated
to reflect this precisely rather than leaving the old "root cause not
identified" claim in place.

2 new/updated tests for the /v1 suffix (including idempotency against
a baseUrl that already ends in /v1) plus a corrected mock-server
contract test. Typecheck/lint clean; full suite shows no new
regressions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RqZeHrRS6DYcGcGX2p9EwG
2026-09-17 13:41:19 +08:00
DevvynandClaude Sonnet 5 211b872335 feat(custom-model): skip Claude Code's first-run wizard on custom-model launches
A fresh, isolated CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR (used to keep an injected API key
away from a stored claude.ai OAuth login) looks like a brand-new Claude
Code profile to the CLI, so it replays its ENTIRE first-run sequence on
every single launch: the theme picker, the security-notes screen, the
per-project "trust this folder?" dialog, and (running with
--dangerously-skip-permissions) a one-time bypass-permissions warning —
confirmed live, none of which a real, already-onboarded profile shows
again.

- New registry-declared env-kind field `skipFirstRunPrompts` (alongside
  apiKeyTrustFile, which it reuses) — claude's entry only, carried
  through buildCustomModelInjection (pure) into
  applyCustomModelInjection (IO).
- seedFirstRunOnboardingState(): merges hasCompletedOnboarding: true and
  this session's own projects[workingDir].hasTrustDialogAccepted: true
  into the same <configDir>/.claude.json the API-key trust file already
  writes to — other projects and other fields on this session's own
  entry are left untouched.
- seedSkipBypassPermissionsPrompt(): merges
  skipDangerousModePermissionPrompt: true into <configDir>/settings.json,
  a separate file, same corrupt-tolerant merge behavior.
- applyCustomModelInjection() gains an optional workingDir parameter,
  threaded from session.workingDir (dedicated apply route) /
  resolvedCasePath (quick-start route) — boot recovery omits it
  (a dialog already answered once needs no re-seed on the same,
  persisted isolated directory).

Tests added at the pure-builder, IO-wrapper (including merge-preserves-
other-fields and corrupt-file-tolerance cases), and existing directory-
listing assertions updated for the new settings.json file. Typecheck/
lint/format clean; full suite shows no new regressions (baseline
pre-existing Windows-environment failures unchanged, 8 more passing
tests than before — the ones added here).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RqZeHrRS6DYcGcGX2p9EwG
2026-09-17 09:21:36 +08:00
DevvynandClaude Sonnet 5 97464bfa27 fix(custom-model): pre-approve the injected API key in the isolated Claude config dir
The CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR isolation from the previous commit fixed the cosmetic
auth warning but introduced a real regression: an otherwise-empty config
directory has none of a real profile's prior custom-API-key approvals, so
Claude Code stops at an interactive 'Detected a custom API key - use it?'
prompt on every single launch. Confirmed live. With nobody at a TTY to
answer, the prompt's own default ('No') silently refuses the very key this
feature just injected, which looks like the endpoint being ignored.

Adds apiKeyTrustFile to the env-kind customModelInjection capability shape
({relPath, shape: 'claude-api-key-responses'}), set on claude's entry to
{relPath: '.claude.json', shape: 'claude-api-key-responses'}. The apply step
merges customApiKeyResponses.approved: [apiKey] into
<isolatedConfigDir>/.claude.json - the exact field a real answered prompt
itself writes to (confirmed against a real ~/.claude.json after answering by
hand once), so this answers the prompt in advance rather than bypassing it.
Merges onto whatever the CLI already wrote into that file on an earlier
launch in the same isolated directory rather than overwriting it; a missing
or corrupt file is treated as empty rather than failing the apply.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RqZeHrRS6DYcGcGX2p9EwG
2026-09-16 13:08:07 +08:00
DevvynandClaude Sonnet 5 0e8b1981af fix(custom-model): isolate Claude config dir and inject real context length
Addresses two live-validation findings on the Run-menu custom-model picker:

1. Both claude.ai and ANTHROPIC_API_KEY set warning. Claude Code still
   coexists an OAuth login with an injected ANTHROPIC_API_KEY in the same
   config directory and warns about it (confirmed cosmetic - the API key
   wins for actual requests, verified via a real session's own API Usage
   Billing line). A custom-model claude session now gets an isolated
   CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR (registry-declared via a new configDirVar field, empty,
   no files written into it) so there is nothing to conflict with. projects
   is symlinked (junction on Windows) back into the real config dir so the
   response viewer, subagent windows and Read My Mind keep working for that
   session, best-effort.

2. Context-window overflow. Claude Code assumes a large default context
   window for a model id it doesn't recognise and never compacts, so a
   custom endpoint's real, much smaller context (verified live: a 400
   exceeding a 16384-token llama-swap model with a stock ~33.7K-token system
   prompt) silently overflows. Discovery now also learns each model's real
   context length from llama.cpp/llama-swap's GET /props?model=<id> (n_ctx),
   but ONLY for a model llama-swap's own /v1/models response already marks
   status.value === 'loaded' - never an unloaded one, since llama-swap
   treats ?model= as a routing hint and probing an unloaded model risks
   triggering an actual, slow, GPU-swapping load as a side effect of
   read-only discovery. A server with no status field at all gets no
   enrichment rather than a guess; a model not probed this round keeps its
   previously-learned value until it disappears from the list entirely.
   Stored per model (CustomModelHost.modelContextLengths) and applied via a
   new contextLengthVar registry field, set to
   CLAUDE_CODE_MAX_CONTEXT_TOKENS for claude.

Both new fields live on the existing env-kind customModelInjection
capability shape, declared only on claude's registry entry - every other
CLI's injection is unaffected (pinned by test).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RqZeHrRS6DYcGcGX2p9EwG
2026-09-16 12:08:26 +08:00
Codeman maintainer 942bf37e48 fix(custom-model): unset injected env on clear, resume on restart, select the model for pi/omp/grok
Custom Model Endpoint Profiles (#393) let a session point its CLI at a
custom OpenAI-compatible endpoint by injecting env vars or a config file
and restarting the CLI in place. Review of the apply path found four
things, two of them destructive. This lands all four plus the smaller
items from the same review.

1. Clearing a selection did not clear it. The injected vars reach the CLI
   via `tmux setenv`, which persists at the tmux-session level and is
   inherited by `respawn-pane` (measured: `setenv FOO bar` survived two
   successive `respawn-pane -k`), so deleting the keys from the session's
   envOverrides relaunched the CLI still pointed at the old endpoint, and
   for the configDir kinds at a HOME/CODEX_HOME/GROK_HOME that had just
   been deleted. `Session.setCustomModel()` now reports the removed keys,
   queues them (`_pendingEnvUnsets`), and `RespawnPaneOptions.unsetEnvKeys`
   carries them into `applyEnvOverrides()`, which `setenv -u`s them before
   re-applying the live overrides, on the same path that already unsets
   the legacy CLAUDE_CODE_EFFORT_LEVEL. Verified on a private tmux socket
   that `setenv -u HOME` hands the next respawn the global HOME back.

2. Applying a model to a local claude session killed the pane. The
   relaunch was `claude --session-id <id>` and Claude refuses an id that
   already has a transcript, and unlike the dead-pane respawn this one
   kills a working pane first. `restartCli()` now pins the live
   conversation id as the resume id for that respawn when the CLI's launch
   declares a `fallback` chain, which renders the same
   `--resume <id> || --session-id <id>` shape the docker and remote pane
   commands use. Gated on the registry shape, not the CLI id: an entry
   whose resume id is minted by the CLI itself never declares that chain.

3. pi, omp and grok wrote their config file and then launched without the
   `--model` that selects it, so the file was ignored. The registry entry
   now declares `customModelInjection.launchModel` (`custom/{modelId}` for
   pi and omp, grok's `[model.codeman-custom]` block name), the builder
   renders it, and `_withCustomModelLaunchModel()` applies it onto the
   respawn options through `legacyConfigField`, leaving the stored
   <Mode>Config untouched so a clear falls back to the user's own model.
   A model id the CLI's `model` token pattern cannot carry is refused
   with a 400 rather than silently dropped by the argv engine.

4. Remote (SSH) and Docker sessions reported `restarted: true` and changed
   nothing: their `restartCli()` reattaches the durable tmux rather than
   relaunching the agent, and the env lands on the local pane. Both are
   refused with a 400 until those paths are plumbed.

Smaller items from the same review:

- The selection survives a Codeman restart as the disk-only `__customModel`
  bookkeeping (endpoint, model, injected key NAMES, config dir, launch
  model; never the values, which carry the API key). Recovery re-derives
  the values from the endpoint store through the same apply path the route
  uses and keeps the bookkeeping even when the endpoint is gone, so a
  later clear still has keys to unset.
- Discovery goes through `webviewFetch()`, so the RESOLVED address is
  judged by the same egress guard the web-tab proxy uses, and `baseUrl`
  reuses `webviewUrlSchema` (http(s) only, no embedded credentials,
  link-local and cloud-metadata addresses refused). undici's `fetch failed`
  wrapper is unwrapped so the user sees the ECONNREFUSED underneath.
- `custom-model-hosts.json` is written 0600 via tmp+rename, the per-session
  config dir 0700/0600 (pi and omp embed the key literally), and that dir
  is removed with the session.
- `PR.md` is gone from the repo root and the design doc moved to
  `docs/custom-model-endpoints-plan.md` with the LAN address and the
  personal name scrubbed; every reference follows. The guide's `authStyle`
  text matches the shipped schema (`bearer | api-key`, default `bearer`)
  and says that `customModelEndpointsEnabled` is read by nothing until
  the picker lands.
- `config/tsconfig.scripts.json` typechecks `scripts/test-local-llm-harnesses.ts`
  (four real type errors fixed). It is not yet wired into `npm run typecheck`
  because that line differs on master; adding `&& tsc -p config/tsconfig.scripts.json`
  there is the one-line follow-up.

Tests: `test/session-custom-model-restart.test.ts` drives a real Session and
fails on the unfixed code for items 1 to 3; the route suite covers item 4
and the pattern refusal; `test/tmux-manager.test.ts` pins that the unsets
run before the overrides and that a shell-metachar key never reaches tmux.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-14 23:46:28 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 1e42cb4e2d Merge pull request #393 from opticon454/feature-custom-llm-server-support
feat: Custom Model Endpoint Profiles (local or cloud, all harnesses)
2026-09-14 23:46:27 +02:00
Ark0N e6e5a62d9b Merge pull request #380 from opticon454/feature/cli-catalog-consumers
feat(cli-registry): drive install.sh and the Docker agent image from the CLI catalogue
2026-09-14 15:55:08 +02:00
Michael GrundbergandClaude Opus 5 dae2ac580f fix(terminal): read the colour env from the registry on every local spawn path
buildClaudeEnv(), the direct-PTY fallback taken when mux creation fails, now
reads getCli('claude').env and applies its unset and exports lists. It used to
delete COLORTERM and CLAUDECODE from a hand-maintained list of its own, which
left it contradicting the registry entry that the tmux pane and the attach
client both read. An engine value needing a mux name has nothing to resolve
against on this path, so it is skipped rather than guessed.

Claude no longer unsets NO_COLOR. The invisible-background bug does not need
it, and unsetting it overrides a preference the user set deliberately, so a
user who exports NO_COLOR globally keeps monochrome panes. The other seven
truecolor CLIs still unset it; that inconsistency is intentional and the
comment on the entry says so.

The invariants doc gains a Terminal colour env paragraph under Session launch
modes, where a reader looking up Claude will find it — the previous sentence
sat under a heading that lists only the non-Claude CLIs. It now says the lists
are the stock catalog and a clis.json override replaces them wholesale, and
that the declarations reach the tmux pane, its attach client and the direct
PTY but not a remote pane, whose command carries no env exports at all. Docker
hands COLORTERM=truecolor to every mode, including the two the registry says
must unset it.

The changeset named six peer CLIs and there are seven: deepseek also exports
truecolor. A test beside the existing OpenCode assertion pins the new
behaviour, so a future registry edit cannot make the backgrounds vanish again
in silence.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 14:42:30 +02:00
Michael GrundbergandClaude Opus 5 7767b16d4f fix(terminal): let Claude use truecolor so its themed backgrounds render
Claude draws the user's own messages as a block of background color, and
inside a Codeman pane that block was invisible. tmux hands each pane
TERM=screen, which supports-color reads as 16 colors, and Claude's registry
entry deleted COLORTERM on top of that. Claude therefore quantized every RGB
color its theme asked for down to the basic palette, where rgb(55, 55, 55)
and every other dark background becomes ESC[40m, the terminal's own black.
Changing the color in a custom Claude theme moved nothing on screen.

Claude now exports COLORTERM=truecolor and unsets NO_COLOR, matching codex,
gemini, antigravity, pi, grok and omp. CLAUDECODE stays unset, because Claude
reads it as a signal that it is running nested inside itself. Both the tmux
session and the attach client read this one registry entry, so they cannot
disagree.

PR #3 introduced the unset in February, citing xterm.js#484 for the claim
that xterm.js mishandles truecolor. xterm.js closed that issue in April 2019,
Codeman now depends on @xterm/xterm 6, and TmuxManager already sets
terminal-overrides ",*:Tc" on its own tmux server, so 24-bit color reaches
the browser today for every CLI that asks for it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-13 12:15:28 +02:00
DevvynandClaude Sonnet 5 a0628a40e8 fix(cli-registry): address maintainer review on #380
Rebased onto current master (the one real conflict was the import line
in docker-hosts.ts Ark0N flagged; kept both), then addressed every
point from the review:

**1. Rebase.** Done — this branch now sits on current upstream/master.

**2. Agent-image special cases are data now, not an id-keyed table
outside stock.ts.** `AGENT_IMAGE_SPECIAL_CASE_IDS`/`AGENT_IMAGE_SPECIAL_CASES`
are gone. `CliDiscovery.install.agentImageLayer?: { kind: 'dedicated';
reason: string }` is a field on the registry entry itself (pi,
deepseek), `reason` is required by schema.ts, both producers
(docker-hosts.ts and cli-catalog.mjs) filter on its presence instead
of an id, and the coverage test reads it from the generated catalogue.
Also added the npm-package-name validation to the TS producer, which
only the .mjs one had — same SAFE_PACKAGE regex, duplicated
(necessarily, one side can't import the other) and now pinned
byte-identical by a new parity test.

**3. Changeset said five, it's eight.** (Not nine — see the DeepSeek
point below, which changes the true count.) Reworded to state it
structurally rather than pin a number that will go stale again.

Then the four behavior-changing findings:

- **DeepSeek was offered as a normal install option but can't actually
  drive a pane.** `npm install -g @deepseek-ai/dsh` installs the
  launcher only; DeepSeek ships no profile that can run standalone.
  The generator now emits an empty install command for any
  `launcherProfile` entry, so install.sh's menu (which requires a
  non-empty command) skips it and falls through to its docs URL hint
  instead — matching what the old hand-written code did before this
  PR replaced it.
- **wget-only hosts lost every automatic install, including the npm
  ones that never needed curl.** The menu-building loop now filters
  PER ENTRY (only a command starting with `curl ` is held back) rather
  than wiping the whole menu when DOWNLOADER != curl.
- **The DISPLAY/TRUSTED split and the catalogue refresh didn't hold up
  under review** (refresh's only real write was the label; it ran
  before the Node existence check; its own eval-detection test was
  tripped by the word "eval'd" in a comment). Dropped entirely per
  your own recommendation — embedded catalogue only, no network
  fetch, no second array. install-sh-invariants.test.ts now asserts
  the refresh/DISPLAY machinery does not exist rather than testing its
  internals.

The three take-or-leave items, applied:

- `dsh_banner_probe`'s bash 3.2 empty-array bug: `${runner[@]}` →
  `${runner[@]+"${runner[@]}"}`. Verified live in a real `bash:3.2.57`
  container with `timeout` removed from PATH — crashed before, clean
  now, full `detect_all_clis` path exercised end to end.
- `docker-agent-image-coverage.test.ts` now anchors on each layer's
  `<binary> --version` proof line instead of `Dockerfile.includes(binary)`,
  which stayed true if a layer were deleted but its comment survived.
- Doc drift: docs/docker-cases.md (four → five, and now describes the
  data field), docker/agent.Dockerfile's "other four CLIs" comment (no
  longer a magic number — CLI_NPM_PACKAGES is generated and can grow),
  CLAUDE.md's install.sh size (104KB → ~112KB) and its stale mention of
  the now-dropped refresh.

Verified: tsc clean, prettier clean, the full targeted suite (142
tests across the 8 affected files) green, and the full `npm test` gate
diffed BY TEST NAME against a clean upstream/master baseline run on
this same machine — identical 201-name failure set both sides (168
tests / 67 files, all pre-existing Windows-environment noise: symlinks,
PTY spawning, POSIX permission bits — none of it touching anything
this PR changes), zero new failures either side of the diff.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01R9ZSTEenc8soSu9bTi8Xru
2026-09-13 17:43:14 +08:00
DevvynandClaude Sonnet 5 b6f75b87f5 fix(custom-model): don't clamp DEEPSEEK_API_KEY as a privileged env key
CI caught a real regression: DEEPSEEK_API_KEY was added to deepseek's
privilegedEnvKeys alongside DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL on the theory that "the pair
travels together," but that contradicts the documented and tested design
(clampEnvOverridesForOwner()'s own docstring in session-routes.ts) — a
non-granted owner supplying their OWN DeepSeek key removes privilege
rather than granting it, since the exfiltration vector is the BASE URL
(which redirects the server's own forwarded key to a foreign host), not
the key itself. Removed it from the list; test/deepseek-mode.test.ts's
existing two clamp tests now pass again.

Also swapped that test's "unrelated override" example off CODEX_HOME,
which the earlier commit in this same PR legitimately made privileged
(closing a real pre-existing gap, documented in PR.md) — so it stopped
being a valid "unrelated" example the moment that fix landed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017HqNWfmtBU2KN29SvSVWB3
2026-09-13 17:42:35 +08:00
DevvynandClaude Sonnet 5 61779745aa test(custom-model): make the harness smoke test dynamic, verify all 9 CLIs end-to-end
Rewrites scripts/test-local-llm-harnesses.mjs -> .ts to read the live CLI
registry (enabledClis()) and call the real production
buildCustomModelInjection()/applyConfigDirInjection() instead of keeping a
second hand-maintained copy of every CLI's env/config shape. A future
registry change (new CLI, edited env var, fixed config template) is now
picked up automatically with zero edits to this script; only the one-shot
invocation flags (info the registry genuinely doesn't model) stay in a
small hand-maintained ONE_SHOT table, and a registry CLI with no entry
there reports UNKNOWN rather than being silently skipped.

Extracted src/custom-model-injection-apply.ts (applyConfigDirInjection/
removeConfigDir) so the production route and this script share one
implementation instead of two.

Full end-to-end run against a real llama-swap server, inside a
codeman/agent:llm-test Docker image with all 9 CLI binaries:

- claude, opencode, pi, grok, omp: PASS, real "hello world" replies
- codex: confirmed FAIL for a real protocol reason, not a bug — it only
  speaks the Responses API since Feb 2026, which llama.cpp/llama-swap
  don't implement
- gemini: confirmed FAIL, unresolved after real investigation — an
  undocumented GATEWAY AuthType gemini-cli selects once
  GOOGLE_GEMINI_BASE_URL is set rejects every auth-key format/override
  tried
- deepseek: reaches the server (env vars are read) but gets a consistent
  HTTP_404; root cause not identified, documented as best-effort/unknown
- antigravity: SKIP, no known mechanism (unchanged)

Two real bugs found and fixed along the way (grok, pi/omp registry
entries in stock.ts): grok's original recipe (env vars) was flat-out
wrong, not just unverified — the real mechanism is a config.toml
[model.<name>] block redirected via GROK_HOME. pi/omp's PI_CONFIG_DIR
does nothing for either (grepped pi's entire bundled source — the string
appears nowhere); the real redirect is the child process's own HOME, and
both need `models` as an array of {id} objects, not an object keyed by
id (silently loaded zero models otherwise).

deployment_plan.md, PR.md, docs/custom-model-endpoints.md, and CLAUDE.md
updated with the final confidence table reflecting all of the above.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017HqNWfmtBU2KN29SvSVWB3
2026-09-13 17:42:35 +08:00
DevvynandClaude Sonnet 5 41416566aa feat(custom-model): Custom Model Endpoint Profiles (local or cloud, all harnesses)
Point any Codeman-supported harness (Claude, opencode, Codex, Gemini, Pi,
Grok, DeepSeek, OMP) at a custom OpenAI-compatible endpoint instead of its
native cloud backend, for a given session. Covers local hardware (llama.cpp,
Ollama, vLLM, DGX Spark, Strix Halo) and cloud (Azure AI Foundry, OpenRouter).
Off by default (customModelEndpointsEnabled, synced, default OFF).

- Registry: capabilities.customModelInjection per CLI entry (env /
  configContentEnv / configDir / unsupported kinds)
- Pure injection builder (custom-model-injection.ts) turning an endpoint +
  model id into the real env vars / config content per CLI
- Endpoint store + CRUD routes (custom-model-hosts.ts,
  custom-model-routes.ts), discovery via GET /v1/models, SSRF-guarded
- Session integration: Session.setCustomModel()/restartCli()
  (POST /api/sessions/:id/custom-model), reusing the existing
  respawn-pane -k primitive to restart the CLI process with new env
- Multi-user hardening: every new redirect-capable env var added to its
  CLI's privilegedEnvKeys, closing a pre-existing gap where several were
  already reachable via the generic envOverrides field's prefix allowlist
- Standalone scripts/test-local-llm-harnesses.mjs: spawns real CLI binaries
  against a real endpoint outside the web UI, independent of tmux/sessions
- Mock-server contract tests (test/fixtures/mock-openai-server.ts) replaying
  every CLI's injected values through a real HTTP shape

Real end-to-end validation against a live llama-swap server (inside a
codeman/agent:llm-test Docker image with all 9 CLI binaries) found and
fixed three real bugs before they shipped:
- Codex's config.toml schema was wrong ([model].default table instead of
  a top-level model string + [model_providers.custom]); fixing it then
  surfaced a genuine, documented protocol incompatibility (Codex only
  speaks the Responses API since Feb 2026, which llama.cpp/llama-swap
  don't implement)
- Claude Code's async session-title-generation call validates
  ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_HAIKU_MODEL against its own internal model list and
  hangs the whole -p invocation on an unrecognized name; documented for
  chunk 6, worked around in the standalone script only (--bare is NOT
  safe for a real interactive session, which needs hooks)
- The discovery route's authStyle: 'both' option (send both Authorization
  and api-key headers) reliably hung a real server; removed the option
  entirely rather than just changing the default

Status: draft. Chunk 6 (frontend toolbar/settings UI) not yet built — see
PR.md and deployment_plan.md for the full chunk breakdown and confidence
table.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017HqNWfmtBU2KN29SvSVWB3
2026-09-13 17:42:35 +08:00
Codeman maintainer d4fe3afc9d feat(files): raise the download cap to 2GB and stream /api/download
The 50MB cap on file-raw, the attachment /raw route and /api/download was
memory protection for a `readFile()` that no longer exists: file-raw and
/raw were rewritten to stream through `sendFileBody()` and answer Range
requests, so size costs a read stream rather than RSS (measured: a 600MB
download moved peak RSS by ~37MB). All the cap still did was refuse
legitimate downloads of build artifacts, videos and archives.

It is now MAX_FILE_DOWNLOAD_BYTES in config/buffer-limits.ts, default 2GB,
env CODEMAN_MAX_DOWNLOAD_BYTES, 0 = unlimited. `parseByteLimitEnv()` is
separate from the `parseInt(...) || default` idiom used elsewhere in that
file precisely because that idiom reads 0 as falsy and would silently
restore the default for the one value that means "no limit".

/api/download was the last route that really did buffer the whole file. It
now shares sendFileBody() with the other two, so it streams, advertises
Accept-Ranges, and is resumable. Its Content-Disposition also goes through
buildContentDisposition() rather than raw interpolation.

Refusals move from 400 to 413 across all three, which is the correct status
for the case; with the cap at 2GB it is a path almost nothing reaches now.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-10 02:57:07 +02:00
Codeman maintainer f1b7283393 fix(cli-registry): guard workDetect.workingLine like every other config regex
#385 made the composer glyph and the working status line per-CLI registry
data, which is right, but `workingLine` arrived as a config-supplied regex
validated with a bare `new RegExp()`. That skips `compileVersionRegex()`,
the helper the registry uses for exactly this: a `~/.codeman/clis.json`
override can set the field, the compiled pattern is run against every
accumulated PTY chunk and every pane capture, and a nested quantifier there
backtracks on the event loop for the whole server rather than one session.

Route it through the helper in both places, which are not redundant: the
schema refine rejects the entry at LOAD time so a bad pattern never reaches
a session, and `_workingLinePattern()` compiles through the same helper so
the runtime cannot hold a pattern the schema would have refused. The helper
returns null instead of throwing, so the Claude-pattern fallback stops being
a try/catch and becomes structural. Both shipped patterns compile unchanged,
and Claude's is behaviourally identical to CLAUDE_WORKING_LINE_PATTERN.

Also match the Codex footer case-insensitively on the E. It was
characterised against codex-cli 0.152.1, which prints a lowercase `esc`;
a version capitalising it would make the whole fix silently inert, since
the pane would simply never look like it was working.

Docs: CLAUDE.md, architecture-invariants and cli-registry.md all still
stated the Claude-mode-only rule this PR retires, and none of them named
the new capability or the regex guard.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-07 22:42:20 +02:00
Ark0N a49be03f96 Merge pull request #385 from irisitymichaelgrundberg/fix/work-detection-external-clis
Merging with follow-up fixes applied on master: workingLine routed through compileVersionRegex() in both the schema refine and _workingLinePattern(), the Codex footer matched case-insensitively on the E, plus the doc passages that stated the retired Claude-mode-only rule.
2026-09-07 22:41:25 +02:00
Ark0N cfc8fe7e41 Merge pull request #381 from mtiller/feat/reverse-proxy-base-url
feat(web): support a reverse-proxy base URL
2026-09-06 23:10:23 +02:00
Michael Grundberg 51957e2ed4 fix(session): let each CLI declare how its own pane shows work
A Codex session reported `isWorking: false` for its entire life, including
mid-turn. Codeman has four paths that mark a session working, and all four were
inert for Codex:

- The spinner fast path tests eight braille frames, and Codex animates none.
- The activity-streak fallback was wrapped in `!isExternalCliMode(mode)`.
- The pane probe inside `_confirmIdle` would have matched, since Codex prints
  `esc to interrupt`, but arming it required the literal glyph `❯` and Codex
  draws `›` on its composer row.
- The text detector sat inside `_processExpensiveParsers`, whose first statement
  returns early for an external CLI.

Add an optional `workDetect: { promptGlyph, workingLine }` to CliCapabilities,
so the two strings that differ per CLI are registry data rather than constants
in the detector. Claude declares its existing pair and behaves as before. Codex
declares `›` and `esc to interrupt`. The text detector moves above the
external-CLI early return, guarded on the descriptor so a CLI without one still
skips the ANSI strip that the early return used to save it.

A CLI that declares no descriptor falls back to Claude's pair, and the
activity-streak gate now reads "has a descriptor, or is not external", so the
plain shell mode keeps the behaviour it had.

Rewrite the test that asserted the old premise in its own comment, so it makes
the same guarantee for a genuinely uncharacterised CLI, and add Codex coverage
built from verbatim pane captures on Codex CLI 0.152.1.
2026-09-06 17:41:01 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 3d8ffcb9a2 Merge pull request #357 from dignfei/feat/docker-adopt-existing-container
feat(docker): attach a case to an already-running container

Conflicts came from work that landed after the PR was opened, and each is
resolved onto the newer abstraction rather than by keeping the older code:

- `defaultDockerCommandForMode` is registry-driven since #347, so the PR's
  `runsAsRoot` arm became `overlays.docker.rootCommand` (claude only). Claude
  Code still refuses `--dangerously-skip-permissions` as root in 2.1.261 and the
  refusal is visible only inside the container, so an adopted root container
  otherwise just shows a dead pane. Which flag to drop is a per-CLI fact, and
  `test/cli-registry-no-id-branching.test.ts` forbids expressing it as a branch.

- The probe's mode list and its mode -> binary table both duplicated the
  registry. They now read `enabledCliIds()` / `discovery.binaries[0]`, which is
  also what fixes the merge's silent regression: the hand-written list predates
  `omp`, and the run menu gates every docker case on this probe, so owned
  containers would have lost that mode. `shell` needs no arm — it declares no
  binary, so it is dropped from the lookup and reported available regardless.

- The per-mode `mode === 'claude' && !cliDir` chain in `tmux-manager.ts` is one
  `missingCliMessage(mode)` gate since #347; the PR's docker exemption moved onto
  it. Its test now pins the single gate instead of counting seven arms.

- The create arm keeps #349's swap-limit warning filter, which the adopted arm
  never reaches; the run-mode list gains `omp` from #353.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TecFD9hvPYJ1mkkMtBQbT1
2026-09-05 16:21:51 +02:00
Michael TillerandClaude Opus 4.8 7e4914d991 feat(web): support a reverse-proxy base URL (--base-url / CODEMAN_BASE_URL)
Codeman can now be mounted under a sub-path behind a reverse proxy that
forwards the prefix unchanged (e.g. https://host/codeman/). Default is `/`
(root), which is byte-identical to the historical behavior.

Design — few choke points, mirrored ingress/egress:
- src/config/base-path.ts: pure single-source normalize/validate/join/strip.
- Server ingress: stripBasePath() inside Fastify rewriteUrl, so routes stay
  declared prefix-agnostic; un-prefixed requests (hooks, health, docker bridge
  hitting the raw port) pass through unchanged.
- Server egress: one onSend hook prepends the base to root-absolute Location
  headers (covers all redirects).
- HTML: renderIndexHtml points <base href> at the mount and injects
  window.__CODEMAN_BASE__ — ONLY when a base is set (inert at root).
- Frontend runtime URLs: CodemanBase.url() route builder in constants.js,
  applied transparently by a fetch wrapper and explicitly at the
  EventSource/WebSocket/window.open/<img|iframe|a>-src sites.
- sw.js derives its base from self.location; manifest uses relative start_url/scope.
- Web-tab proxy: proxyPrefixFor(cap, basePath) is the single base-aware root that
  cascades to the injected <base>, HTML/attr rewrites, runtimeUrlShim, Set-Cookie
  Path and Location; capabilityFromReferer strips the base off the browser Referer,
  while the ingress parsers stay base-agnostic (rewriteUrl already stripped it).

--base-url rides the daemon relaunch (buildWebArgs) and the service unit
(resolveServicePlan). constants.js is guarded against a missing `window` for
isolated unit-test contexts.

Tests: test/base-path.test.ts (pure helpers), base-path coverage in
webview-proxy/render-index-html/daemon-control; CodemanBase stubbed in the
vm-isolated panels-ui test contexts. Docs: Remote-Access.md (sub-path section +
nginx example), security-architecture.md env table, CLAUDE.md pattern.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XUkPBxbumnct6qSrx4JDju
2026-09-04 16:08:57 -04:00
Codeman maintainer a81e87f440 fix(cli-registry): log why clis.json was ignored, and say 0600 when that is the rule
The loader refuses a `clis.json` with any group/world permission bit, read bits
included, so a file created with a normal umask (0644) is ignored. That is a
defensible posture for a file that chooses the binaries Codeman spawns, but two
things around it made the override feature look dead: the warning said
"group/world-writable", which a 0644 file is not, and `LoadResult.warnings` was
returned to a caller nobody wired up, so nothing anywhere printed it. A user
following the docs got silence.

The message now names the rule and the command that satisfies it, the loader
logs every warning once on first load (the result is memoized, so once per
process), the module header stops claiming that nothing ever writes (the
quarantine rename of a malformed file is a write, on first use) and the
registry doc gains a short section on the override file with the 0600
requirement in it. Whether the check should relax to writable bits only is a
separate decision; this keeps the shipped behaviour and makes it visible.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Qg6bcATm1pNNY4kQWGwzgu
2026-09-04 13:51:20 +02:00
DevvynandClaude Opus 5 c5b84fb5f4 docs(cli-registry): annotate overlays.credStore as declared-for-later
Review item 4 named THREE live tables duplicating registry data. Two are now
read from the entry (`defaultRemoteCommandForMode`, `defaultDockerCommandForMode`);
the third, `resolveDockerCredentialArtifacts`, is not — and it was left neither
wired nor annotated, which is the state that item explicitly rules out.

It is not wired because the shape cannot express the live table: `credStore` is
ONE store per CLI, and `CRED_STORES` needs two for gemini (`.gemini` for the
CLI's own auth plus `.config/gcloud` for Vertex), while deepseek's entry declares
none at all even though `.dsh` is seeded. Wiring it means making the field an
array and correcting those two entries — a change to credential seeding, which
is at once the worst thing in that file to get wrong and the least covered by
tests, since every docker IO path is no-op'd under vitest. It belongs in its own
change, measured against a real container.

So it is annotated instead, at the field, in the type's declared-for-later
header, in docs/cli-registry.md, and in the pinned DECLARED_FOR_LATER list — the
last of which means wiring it later makes a test fail rather than leaving a
stale comment behind.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WQkoi1cNegqVwZHgzx5SbJ
2026-09-02 09:35:55 +08:00
DevvynandClaude Opus 5 4830e662f9 refactor(cli-registry): make CLI backends data instead of per-mode branching
Every run mode is now a `CliEntry` in `src/config/cli-registry/` — discovery
(search dirs, version + identity probes), the launch argv template, env
handling, the `capabilities` flags that replace per-CLI branching, and the
`overlays` that back the remote/docker pane commands. Code that used to ask
"which CLI is this?" reads the entry instead.

Behaviour is unchanged. `test/cli-registry-spawn-golden.test.ts` pins every
spawn command as a literal string, captured from the hand-written builders
before they were deleted, and `test/location-overlay-commands.test.ts` does the
same for all 20 remote and in-container pane commands.

Config can never contain shell text: an entry declares typed argv tokens,
literals are validated against a safe-word pattern at LOAD time (a bad literal
rejects the whole entry — a silently dropped `--no-approve` is not cosmetic),
and values resolve through patterns NAMED in code, so a user `clis.json` cannot
widen its own validation. `~/.codeman/clis.json` overrides any entry, read-only
in this release.

OMP is included as a registry entry rather than a tenth hand-written builder,
so `buildOmpCommand()`, the omp availability pre-flight, the omp arm of
`buildPathExport()` and the omp entries in the truecolor/NO_COLOR, alt-screen
and doctor ladders all drop out.

Guard rails:

- `test/cli-registry-no-id-branching.test.ts` fails the build if per-CLI-id
  branching reappears outside `stock.ts`, in any of its four shapes (`===`,
  `!==`, `switch`/`case`, `includes`) — an `===`-only version would miss the
  negated forms, which is how 36 of them survived an earlier pass. Every
  allowlisted branch carries its reason.
- `external`, `hooks` and `altScreen` stay three INDEPENDENT capabilities;
  deriving one from another shipped the `until=stop`-hangs-on-shell bug.
- `param` is two namespaces. `launch.params` keys, `configSetenv.fromParam` and
  `privilegedParams[].param` all name a LAUNCH param; the legacy `<Mode>Config`
  wire field is separate, bridged only by `legacyConfigAliases`. Getting
  `privilegedParams[].param` wrong is SILENT — it is the multi-user bypass
  clamp's only handle on a CLI's privilege switch, and a wrong name clamps
  nothing with no error and no failing test — so `schema.ts` rejects an entry
  naming a param it never declared.
- Registry data resolves AT CALL TIME (`sessionModeSchema()`,
  `allowedEnvPrefixes()`, `dependencyRegistry()`, the resolvers' `searchDirs`
  thunks). A module-level const freezes at first import, so a CLI enabled while
  the server ran moved the run menu but not that surface.
- Six fields are annotated DECLARED-FOR-LATER and read by nothing
  (`shortBadge`, `accent`, `capabilities.echo`/`wheelForward`/
  `keyboardAccessory`/`maxFrameBytes`): all frontend behaviour, transcribed
  rather than measured. A test pins the list so it cannot quietly grow.

Three user-visible changes, all deliberate and named:

- `probeDockerCliVersion()` derives the in-container binary from the registry
  rather than assuming it equals the mode name (`antigravity` runs `agy`).
- The remote CLI version probe now covers grok and deepseek, which the
  hardcoded map it replaces omitted while its own comment said the rule was
  "every mode except shell".
- `codeman doctor`'s CLI rows are generated from the entries, so Claude's
  install hint is the install command rather than a docs URL, five CLIs gain
  hints they never had, and the row order follows the catalog.

Also hardened along the way: `sessionModeSchema()` is bounded at 24 chars
(matching the `cliId` pattern) before its failure message quotes the value
back, and `deepMerge` skips `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype` when reading
the hand-editable `clis.json`.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01WQkoi1cNegqVwZHgzx5SbJ
2026-09-02 08:26:45 +08:00
Codeman maintainer 2a32b5064a Merge pull request #349 from opticon454/feature/docker-compose
Docker Compose deployment: Codeman runs in a container and spawns Docker cases
as SIBLING containers through the mounted host socket (Docker-outside-of-Docker).

Resolved the README conflict (master had grown to eight CLIs since the branch
was cut) and moved the Compose blurb out of the feature bullets into Quick
Start, next to the other ways of starting Codeman.

Three review findings from the PR discussion are fixed here rather than left
for a follow-up, because two of them are shipped-image problems:

- `.dockerignore` excluded `.env` only at the ROOT. A pattern is matched against
  the whole context-relative path, so `docker/.env` — which the deployment's own
  README tells the user to fill with CODEMAN_PASSWORD and provider API keys —
  was picked up by `COPY . .` and baked into the image at
  /opt/codeman/docker/.env. Verified in both directions against a real build
  context: with a canary secret in docker/.env, the unfixed ignore file lets
  /ctx/docker/.env through, and `**/.env` (plus `**/.env.*` and a negation for
  the checked-in .env.example) leaves only the example behind.
- `CODEMAN_CASES_PATH` moved the server's CASES_DIR but not the CLI's, which
  still hardcoded ~/codeman-cases, so `codeman skill install --case <name>`
  reported "Case not found" on exactly the deployment the override exists for.
  Both now resolve through config/cases-dir.ts. state-store.ts keeps its own
  literal on purpose: that one migrates the historical ~/claudeman-cases
  directory by name and is about the old default, not the active location.
- CLAUDE.md gained the Compose paragraph (the sibling-container inversion, the
  three env vars, the .dockerignore and root-owned-bind traps) and .dockerignore
  joins the documented list of files that genuinely belong in the repo root.

The PR's `mode === 'claude'` guard on dockerResumeId is an unrelated master bug
fix riding along: appendResumeFlag() maps a resume id onto codex/gemini/pi/grok/
deepseek/omp/antigravity and RESUME_ID_SAFE accepts a UUID, so a Docker case's
lastClaudeSessionId was handed to every non-claude CLI.

Full gate green in a merge worktree: 6360 tests, lint, format, frontend syntax,
public assets, lockfile.
2026-09-01 11:32:03 +02:00
timkjr 9841f4ffb9 refactor(omp): align omp resolver + doctor with upstream shared CLI resolver
- omp-cli-resolver.ts already uses createCliExecutableResolver; add dedicated
  test/omp-cli-resolver.test.ts mirroring pi's (version-probe accept/reject,
  negative-cache backoff, VITEST hermeticity gate)
- dependency-registry omp entry now requires OMP_VERSION_REGEX match like pi,
  so codeman doctor and the run-mode resolver agree on what counts as installed
- system-routes /api/omp/status surfaces version
2026-08-28 11:32:30 -05:00
timkjr 4f5678fac4 feat(omp): rebase OMP backend onto master (merge Pi + OMP modes) 2026-08-26 20:05:48 -05:00
Codeman maintainer 4cda150493 feat(deepseek): add DeepSeek Harness (dsh) as a ninth CLI run mode
Adds `mode: 'deepseek'` alongside claude/shell/opencode/codex/gemini/
antigravity/pi/grok, plus a shortcut that opens the harness's own browser UI
as a Codeman web tab.

DeepSeek is wired unlike its siblings in three ways, each of which is the
reason for a design decision rather than an accident:

1. The agent is a PROFILE, not the binary. `dsh` is a launcher over
   $DSH_HOME/profiles/<name>, and DeepSeek ships only `web`, `headless` and
   `base` -- the interactive terminal front door is always a third-party
   plugin. So availability is two questions: `isDeepSeekAvailable()` (binary)
   and `isDeepSeekRunnable()` (binary AND a pane-capable profile). The Run
   button gates on the latter, because reporting only the binary would spawn a
   pane that dies on arrival. When the binary is present but no profile is,
   the run menu offers to install one (POST /api/deepseek/install-profile).

2. The permission switch is an env var, not a flag. The harness has no
   command-line permission option; its sandbox/approval rows read
   DSH_PERMISSION_MODE (read-only / workspace-write / danger-full-access).
   Exported via `tmux setenv`, never on the spawn line. Absent = the harness's
   own workspace-write, which still asks, so the multi-user clamp is the
   only-if-sent branch and clamps to workspace-write, never read-only.

3. It is the only non-claude mode that passes hooksAvailableForMode(), and it
   earned that. The terminal front door reports idle/working/blocked to a
   supervising process over a generic env-gated contract; a generated shim
   (deepseek-status-shim.ts) makes Codeman that supervisor and forwards each
   report to /api/hook-event as stop / agent_working / permission_prompt. So a
   dsh session gets definitive respawn triggers, real wait-endpoint signals and
   real Approvals Inbox items instead of output-stabilization guesswork.
   `agent_working` is new (157th SSE constant) and joins
   APPROVAL_RESOLVING_EVENTS so a dialog answered in the terminal clears its
   alert at once.

The resolver needs the strictest identity probe of the family: `dsh` is not
merely a squattable npm name, Debian ships an unrelated `dsh` (dancer's shell),
so `dsh --help` must print the harness's own banner before a candidate is
handed a spawn line.

Model is deliberately not a session field -- it is a composition entry in the
profile's config tree. Env allowlist gains DSH_* and DEEPSEEK_* only; provider
keys named by a settings-file `apiKeyEnv` stay out, which is pi's
34-provider-key problem in a new shape.

Verified live against dsh 0.1.1-rc.2 and @deepseek-harness-tui/dsh-tui: the
status endpoint's two-part answer, the no-profile refusal, the profile
bootstrap, a real session whose pane runs `dsh --profile dsh-tui` with the
permission mode injected via setenv, and the full status bridge -- a
send-and-wait returned signal "stop" from a real turn, and blocked/working
created and cleared an Approvals Inbox item.

Docs: docs/deepseek-integration.md (guide), docs/deepseek-integration-plan.md
(decisions + honest gaps). Tests: test/deepseek-mode.test.ts,
test/deepseek-cli-resolver.test.ts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-24 03:37:56 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 3f8c8e99d1 feat(grok): add Grok Build (xAI) as a seventh CLI run mode
SessionMode gains 'grok', a first-class backend alongside Claude Code,
shell, OpenCode, Codex, Gemini, Antigravity and Pi: its own PTY, tmux
session, charcoal tab identity ('gk' badge), welcome button, run-mode
entry, cron agentType, Docker and remote-SSH command defaults, and
clone-repo Brain option. Flag surface verified live against grok 1.0.5.

Grok mixes two existing shapes and the wiring follows from that:

- Codex-shaped on permissions: the bypass switch is GrokConfig.alwaysApprove
  (--always-approve, grok's bypassPermissions mode; config-level deny rules
  still apply on top). The Run button sends it true, like runAntigravity(),
  and clampExternalCliBypassForOwner() puts grok in the only-if-sent branch:
  a bare grok spawn is grok's own ask-mode default, which is already safe,
  so only a sent config needs the flag forced off. Cron needs nothing for
  the same reason.
- OpenCode-shaped on rendering: grok is a fullscreen alternate-screen TUI
  with mouse support, so it stays OUT of isAltScreenStripMode() and lands
  on the narrow tmux-attach strip and the 'buffer' local-echo fallthrough
  (unmeasured against an authenticated composer; documented fallback is the
  'off' branch).
- Pi-shaped on resolution: 'grok' has npm squatters (@vibe-kit/grok-cli
  also installs a grok bin), so grok-cli-resolver.ts version-probes every
  candidate (grok --version, killSignal SIGKILL, VITEST-gated) and
  GET /api/grok/status surfaces path AND version; GROK_VERSION_REGEX is
  shared with the dependency registry so doctor and run mode cannot drift.

Env allowlist gains GROK_* plus the XAI_* vendor namespace (XAI_API_KEY is
grok's documented headless auth var), the same narrow-vendor reasoning as
GOOGLE_* for gemini. Resume is id-regexed on purpose: grok's own --resume
also matches session titles, which are arbitrary user strings that must
never reach the bash -c spawn line.

Docker: grok is not on npm, so the agent image installs it in its own step
(xAI's installer has no --dir override; the binary is copied to
/usr/local/bin and root's ~/.grok dropped in the same layer), and
credentials are seeded per-file (auth.json, config.toml, pager.toml; the
dir also holds sessions/, memory/ and the ~160MB binary). Remote SSH routes
through the login-shell wrapper like the other agent CLIs.

Verified end to end on an isolated CODEMAN_INSTANCE with grok 1.0.5
installed: /api/grok/status resolves and reports the probed version,
quick-start spawns a pane whose command line ends in 'grok
--always-approve', the real TUI renders (OAuth device screen on an
unauthenticated box), and grokConfig round-trips through state.json.
Docs: docs/grok-integration.md (user guide) + docs/grok-integration-plan.md
(decisions, verification record, follow-ups).

Tests: test/grok-mode.test.ts, test/grok-cli-resolver.test.ts, plus
extended clamp/system-routes/render-index-html/run-mode-ui/mobile-overview/
local-echo-gating coverage. npm test (the CI gate) green: 5910 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-23 08:39:03 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 64c8048dda refactor: resolve the tmux socket from the instance config
The socket name was computed inside tmux-manager, which the TUI cannot import
just to learn which `-L` name its degraded-mode listing belongs on (that module
is the server's tmux driver, not a lookup table). The resolver moves next to
`dataPath()`, where the other half of the instance identity already lives, so
both processes agree by construction instead of by a copied default.

Behaviour is unchanged: the override still wins only when it is a name that can
be passed to `tmux -L` safely, and TmuxManager keeps warning about one that
cannot.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-22 14:13:57 +02:00
d fei dab432b3fd fix(terminal): bound shell history replay 2026-08-21 08:23:31 -04:00
Codeman maintainer 86c78fece3 fix(pi): align the doctor with the pi resolver, correct the strip rationale, update the skill
Second review pass on #282, the three items left open after f4dcfbe.

1. `codeman doctor` and the run mode disagreed about pi. The registry entry
   accepted a bare `which pi` hit while pi-cli-resolver demanded semver-shaped
   `--version` output, so the Dependencies panel could report an installed Pi CLI
   on a box where Run Pi stays hidden, which reads as a broken mode rather than a
   missing install. Both sides now share one exported PI_VERSION_REGEX, and
   PathResolver gains an opt-in `requireVersionMatch` so a binary that fails the
   shape check is reported MISSING instead of installed-with-unknown-version.
   Only pi sets it; every other tool keeps its current behaviour.

2. The isAltScreenStripMode comment justified excluding pi with "the alt screen
   is load-bearing for its fullscreen TUI". That is not what exclusion does: pi
   is tmux-backed, so it falls through to isMuxAltScreenOnlyStripMode, which
   strips the alt-screen toggles anyway. What exclusion actually preserves is
   `\x1b[3J` and the mouse DECSETs, which is the real reason (pi renders into the
   main screen and is mouse-aware). Comment and changeset now say that, and state
   the consequence: fullscreen pi paints into the main buffer, like vim in a tmux
   shell session.

3. skills/codeman still enumerated the five pre-pi modes in nine places, telling
   agents a backend does not exist and understating class-wide caveats by one
   mode. All updated, plus stale session.ts line references refreshed.

Tests: a new static guard derives the mode set from the Zod schema (not a copy)
and fails when a skill enumeration lists a partial set of external CLIs, verified
by mutation. It also documents the one legitimate exception it found: the "writes
no transcript" lists drop codex, which does write a rollout Codeman reads back.
Plus doctor cases for an unrelated `pi` on PATH and registry/resolver regex parity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 17:41:44 +02:00
Codeman maintainer c5b59633d8 feat(pi): add Pi (pi.dev) as a sixth CLI run mode (#206)
SessionMode gains 'pi', a first-class backend alongside Claude Code,
OpenCode, Codex, Gemini and Antigravity: its own PTY, tmux session, rose
tab identity, welcome button, run-mode entry, cron agentType, Docker and
remote-SSH command defaults, and clone-repo Brain option.

Pi is a different shape of CLI from the other four, and three decisions
follow from that:

- It has NO permission prompts and no sandbox, so there is no
  --dangerously-skip-permissions analog and none was invented. The
  privilege-shaped knob is the tri-state approveProjectTrust, which makes
  pi load and EXECUTE repo-local .pi/extensions TypeScript and install
  missing project packages. clampExternalCliBypassForOwner() therefore
  puts pi in the MATERIALIZE branch: a non-granted multi-user owner gets
  --no-approve even when no config was sent, because pi's own default is
  a prompt the session user could answer themselves. That helper had zero
  test coverage; it now has coverage for all four CLIs.
- Only the PI_ prefix joins the env allowlist. Pi's ~34 provider key vars
  share no prefix and ALLOWED_ENV_PREFIXES is one global list with no mode
  context, so admitting them would widen the allowlist for every mode at
  once. Auth goes through pi's /login or the server's own environment.
  --api-key is deliberately never wired: it would put a provider secret on
  the spawn command line.
- pi stays OUT of isAltScreenStripMode(). Its default TUI renders into the
  main screen with terminal-owned scrollback, and its 0.84.0 fullscreen
  mode is runtime-switchable via /settings; that flip was measured to put
  the pane into the alt screen, which the strip would have corrupted.

pi-cli-resolver.ts additionally sanity-probes `pi --version` and requires
semver-shaped output, because `pi` is a short generic name a stray binary
can shadow; GET /api/pi/status surfaces path and version so a
misresolution is diagnosable rather than presenting as a broken mode.

Docker installs pi in its own --ignore-scripts step so that flag cannot
affect the other four CLIs, and seeds its credentials per-file rather than
whole-dir (~/.pi/agent also holds sessions, extensions and package trees).

Verified end to end against pi 0.84.1 on an isolated instance: resolver
search-dir fallback, flag construction, piConfig persistence across a full
server restart, the trust prompt and its --no-approve suppression, the
rose Run button on the default daylight-blue skin (the nested skin block
eats per-mode gradients unless the rule lives inside it), and the buffer
local-echo policy, which pi tolerates where codex did not.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-13 13:54:47 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 4b51ba306e feat(voice): dictate through the server's Claude Code login, no API key
The mic button previously needed a Deepgram API key, or fell back to the
browser's Web Speech engine. It can now transcribe through the same
speech-to-text service Claude Code's own /voice mode uses, so anyone signed
in to Claude Code on the server gets dictation with no third-party account.

Claude Code's voice mode cannot be driven directly: it opens the HOST's
microphone (sox/arecord), and the CLI runs in a headless tmux pane while the
human is in a browser somewhere else. So capture stays in the browser and only
the transcription backend is borrowed.

Audio goes browser -> Codeman -> Anthropic. The OAuth token never reaches the
page: the browser sends PCM16 (16 kHz mono, produced by an AudioWorklet since
MediaRecorder cannot emit raw PCM) and receives text.

- GET /api/voice/status reports readiness and never the token
- GET /ws/voice/stream relays one dictation, with the same Host/Origin upgrade
  guard as the terminal socket, plus caps on concurrency, stream length and
  frame size
- credentials are read-only: Codeman never refreshes them, since a refresh
  rotates the refresh token and could sign the user out of their own CLI
- claudeVoiceEnabled (synced, default OFF) gates the whole server side
- voiceSettings.provider picks auto/claude/deepgram/webspeech; auto prefers
  Claude, then a configured Deepgram key, then the browser

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-10 11:19:51 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 6e89eb9ec1 fix(web-tabs): bound time-to-headers, not the whole proxied exchange (#237, #238)
Reported by @DodgyBadger.

#237: the proxy wrapped each upstream fetch in a 30s `AbortSignal.timeout`, which
bounded the ENTIRE exchange rather than the wait for response headers. A dashboard
endpoint doing model inference, and any actively streaming response, both died at
30s as a generic 502 that Codeman never logged, so it read as an intermittent
network error. The timeout now bounds time-to-headers only and is cleared the
moment headers arrive, so a slow endpoint and a long stream both survive. The
default moves to 300s because "the app is thinking" is normal for the dashboards
people proxy; abandoned upstreams are reclaimed by the client-hangup abort rather
than by this value.

A browser that navigates away mid-request now aborts the upstream fetch, guarded
by `writableFinished` for the same reason as `abortOnClientHangUp` in
session-routes: `close` also fires after a completed response and must not abort
anything. Header timeouts are logged as a warning with a sanitized identity
(method plus origin plus path, never the query string, which can carry the
dashboard's tokens), and a client hangup is deliberately not warned since nobody
is listening and it would read as the dashboard being broken.

The WebSocket handshake keeps its own 30s budget
(`CODEMAN_WEBVIEW_WS_HANDSHAKE_TIMEOUT_MS`), decoupled from the request timeout:
a handshake is connection establishment, and waiting minutes on one only delays
the browser's reconnect logic.

#238: the web-tab guide covered sandboxed dashboards having no cookies, but not
cookie authentication in front of Codeman itself (Cloudflare Access and similar),
where a sandboxed frame's asset and API requests carry no auth cookie, bounce to
the login provider, and leave the embedded app looking unstyled or broken while
trusted mode works. Documented, and the Test button's result now says it probes
server-to-upstream reachability only, not how the page behaves in a sandboxed
frame.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 04:06:23 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 085f4acb60 feat(cli): codeman web -d and codeman service install (#231)
Two ways to keep the server running, split by how long it should last.

`codeman web -d` relaunches the same entry script detached (setsid), with
`--stop` and `--status` alongside it. A pidfile and log live in the data
dir. `nohup` is not what makes this work: Node re-arms SIGHUP to its
default disposition even when it inherits "ignore", and cli.ts handles
SIGHUP with a graceful shutdown, so a delivered HUP still stops the
server. Removing the shell's ability to send one is the fix.

`codeman service install|uninstall|status` writes and loads the systemd
user unit or the LaunchAgent, with the installing shell's PATH baked in
(launchd hands a job /usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin, which finds neither a
Homebrew/nvm node nor tmux/claude). install.sh already covers one-liner
installs; this is for npm globals.

Both refuse to start when a server is already up on the data dir, since a
second instance on the shared tmux socket attaches PTYs to the first
one's live sessions. Both poll /api/status until the child answers or
dies rather than reporting a success they have not seen. `--stop` checks
the pid still looks like a Codeman server before signalling it.

The systemd unit name and launchd label move to config/service-names.ts
so install.sh, detectSupervisor() and service install cannot drift into
supervising two copies. Instance-scoped, unchanged for the default
instance.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 01:34:55 +02:00
Codeman maintainer d26f26fe34 chore: version packages
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-09 01:18:03 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 4ea781c80f feat(file-viewer): edit mode for text files (edit + save in the viewer)
Closes #212. The file-preview overlay can now edit workspace text files in
place, phone-first: agent writes a file, you review it in the viewer, tweak
two lines, save, tell the agent to continue.

Backend (file-routes.ts, policy in src/config/file-editing.ts):
- GET file-content?edit=1: read-for-edit that never truncates (a truncated
  buffer must never become an edit buffer), 512KB cap (413 over it), and
  returns the sha256 hash + detected EOL the client echoes back on save.
- PUT /api/sessions/:id/file-content: edit-in-place only, with no O_CREAT
  anywhere in the handler. Confinement matches the read path (realpath +
  workspace boundary + ownership via findSessionOrFail), plus sensitive-path
  and attachment-guard blocklists, a .git subtree deny, and an extension
  allowlist (svg and env deliberately excluded). Optimistic concurrency via
  baseHash: mismatch is a 409 unless force. Writes are wx-temp + fchmod +
  fsync + rename, closing the validate-then-write TOCTOU window.
- Corruption guards: NUL sniff + UTF-8 round-trip compare (refuses binary
  and latin-1), and server-side EOL re-application so a textarea's LF
  normalization cannot rewrite every line of a CRLF file.
- Plain reads gain an additive editable flag the UI keys the button off.

Frontend (panels-ui.js + overlay markup/styles):
- Edit button on editable text previews; textarea editor with Save/Cancel,
  dirty indicator, discard-confirm on cancel/close, and a conflict dialog
  that offers overwrite (force) when the file changed on disk mid-edit.
- Phone: full-bleed window sized by --app-height so the editor and Save bar
  track the OS keyboard; 16px editor font (iOS zoom guard); no autofocus.
- zh-CN strings for the new chrome.

Tests: pure policy unit tests plus a route suite that deliberately does NOT
mock node:fs. It runs against a real temp workspace so symlink escapes,
write-through of in-workspace symlinks, mode preservation, CRLF round-trip,
409/force, and the no-create property are exercised for real. Also verified
end to end on an isolated beta instance: 39-check curl matrix, Playwright
desktop flow (real clicks and typing, bytes asserted on disk, live conflict
with an external rewrite), and a 393px phone profile.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-05 08:44:47 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 26cbbe0dcb feat(cli): Antigravity run mode
Adds Antigravity as a sixth CLI backend alongside Claude Code, shell, OpenCode,
Codex and Gemini, following the existing pluggable-resolver pattern.

- `utils/antigravity-cli-resolver.ts` resolves the CLI, mirroring the other
  resolvers; `GET /api/antigravity/status` reports availability and path.
- `ANTIGRAVITY_*` joins the `ALLOWED_ENV_PREFIXES` allowlist in schemas.ts, so
  env overrides stay CLI-scoped rather than blanket-forwarded.
- Session, tmux-manager, mux-interface and types carry the new mode; secrets are
  injected via socket-scoped `tmux setenv`, never on the spawn command line, so
  the mode requires tmux with no direct PTY fallback like the other external CLIs.
- Frontend: Run-dropdown entry, agent-type option, `ag` tab badge and toolbar
  colours. `runAntigravity()` routes remote/docker cases through
  `POST /api/quick-start` and skips the local status probe for them.

Tests: test/antigravity-mode.test.ts, plus run-mode-ui and system-routes coverage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 12:59:40 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 80e7249a39 fix(hooks,test): harden background rewake, fix hook timeout units, stabilize CI teardown
Follow-ups from the PR #175/#176 reviews:

- Rewake helper self-terminates on its own 6h deadline and when orphaned,
  instead of relying on Claude Code to reap the poller
- Rewake marker versioned (V2) with a version-agnostic ownership prefix, so
  future script updates replace older handlers instead of duplicating them;
  regression test covers the V1 to V2 swap
- HOOK_TIMEOUT_MS renamed to HOOK_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 10: the hook timeout
  field is seconds (the CLI multiplies by 1000), so the curl hooks have
  effectively had a ~2.8h timeout since COD-54
- Test echo PTY switches to raw mode: each input byte echoes exactly once
  (tty line discipline doubled every line and buffered until Enter)
- test/setup.ts: drain in-flight console-log rpc forwards before environment
  teardown (fixes the EnvironmentTeardownError that failed CI twice on the
  merge commit with all 3820 tests passing), clean the temp home on process
  exit (fully-skipped files leaked it), fix the Windows Playwright cache
  fallback path
- test/webview-proxy.test.ts: stop naming the vitest environment directive in
  prose; vitest matches it inside comments and silently ran the whole file
  under the jsdom environment while the comment claimed node
- CLAUDE.md: document the temp-HOME and echo-PTY test isolation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-31 08:47:52 +02:00
Codeman maintainer b34fcaf928 feat(web-tabs): open dashboard URLs as tabs beside agent sessions
Adds a "Web / URL" section to the Run dropdown. A saved URL renders as a tab in
the same strip as Claude/Codex/Gemini sessions, with the same Alt+1..9 numbering,
so Codeman is one mission control instead of Codeman plus a pile of browser tabs.

A webview is NOT a sixth SessionMode: no PTY, no tmux, no respawn, no idle
detection. It is a separate resource sharing only the tab strip and the main
content area, the same call that keeps Docker and remote-SSH as case overlays.

Dashboards are proxied through Codeman's own origin, because a direct iframe
fails three ways at once in the shipped deployment: prod serves HTTPS behind
tailscale serve, so http:// targets are hard-blocked as mixed content (with no
override at all on iOS Safari); Grafana/Portainer-class dashboards send
X-Frame-Options: DENY; and our own default-src 'self' CSP blocks cross-origin
frames. Proxying dissolves all three and leaves the production CSP byte-for-byte
unchanged, since /webview/... is already covered by 'self'. A useful side effect:
the fetch happens server-side, so a tailnet-only dashboard is reachable from a
phone that is not on the tailnet.

The proxy is not an API surface. It authenticates on a 192-bit capability in the
path (memory-only, rolling TTL, bound to the minting user, revoked on edit or
delete) and is correspondingly exempt from the cookie and Origin checks, because
a sandboxed iframe is opaque-origin: it sends no SameSite=lax cookie and its
writes arrive with Origin: null. The Host allowlist is never bypassed. A second
Referer-keyed form of the exemption exists for root-absolute assets and is fenced
to safe methods on non-/api, non-/ws, non-/q paths.

Iframes omit allow-same-origin unless a URL is explicitly marked trusted, since a
proxied page is served from Codeman's own origin and could otherwise read this
document and drive the agent-spawning API. Authorization and codeman_session are
stripped upstream in BOTH modes, so CODEMAN_PASSWORD cannot leak into a dashboard.

Two things only a real browser reveals, both presenting as the dashboard's own
"Failed to fetch" while the page itself renders fine:

- Runtime-built root-absolute URLs (fetch('/api/data')) escape <base href> and
  land on Codeman's root. Widening the Referer fallback into /api would trade
  security for it, so an injected shim patches fetch/XHR/WebSocket/EventSource
  inside the frame instead, removing the class rather than the guard.
- An opaque-origin document CORS-checks every request, including to the host it
  was served from. Script/css/img loads are not CORS-checked, which is why the
  page renders while its API calls die. The proxy now emits CORS headers and
  answers preflights itself. registerSecurityHeaders answered every OPTIONS with
  a bare 204 before routing, carrying no ACAO for Origin: null, so that
  short-circuit now exempts a valid capability.

Neither is reproducible with curl, which does not enforce CORS.

Also fixes a pre-existing bug found on the way: .toolbar has backdrop-filter,
making it a stacking context that trapped .run-mode-menu's z-index:1000, so
.welcome-overlay painted over the whole Run menu. With no session open, every
item in it (Claude Code included) was unclickable.

Verified end to end against a real tailnet dashboard: live data, WebSocket push,
no failed requests, and switching tabs does not reload the frame. 98 new tests
cover the pure rewrite helpers, the CORS helper, the shim's rewrite logic, route
CRUD, and every edge of the auth exemption.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-27 17:06:36 +02:00
Codeman maintainer f496e35d71 feat(multiuser): phase 1, user store, mode plumbing, CLI
Opt-in multi-user foundation (off by default; no behavior change without
CODEMAN_MULTIUSER/--multiuser):

- src/config/multiuser.ts: isMultiUserMode(), getUserSpacesDir()/userCasesDir(),
  maxUsers(), maxSessionsPerUser() (per-user fairness cap = global/2).
- src/types/user.ts: UserRecord/PasswordHash/AuthUser/PublicUser/UserRole.
- src/user-store.ts: ~/.codeman/users.json (atomic tmp+rename, mode 0600, short
  TTL cache). scrypt hashing with per-record params + timingSafeEqual verify plus
  rehash detection; createUser/setPassword/updateUser/deleteUser with last-admin
  invariants; guarded deleteUserSpace (symlink + realpath confinement, section 8);
  pure section-6.3 resolvers (resolveClaudeModeForUser downgrades bypass to auto
  for non-granted users; canRunPrivilegedCommands); bootstrapInitialAdmin.
- src/cli.ts: "codeman users add|passwd|list|rm" (hidden prompt or
  --password-stdin) operating directly on users.json; a --multiuser flag on the
  web command.

Tests: test/user-store.test.ts (29 tests: hashing/verify/rehash, username
validation, atomic 0600 write, last-admin invariants, 6.3 resolvers,
delete-space guards, bootstrap).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 02:58:51 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 83779cab4d Merge PR #141 from chatgptkrylor/feat/scheduler: recurring cron-style scheduled jobs
Includes review fixes: multi-line prompt rejection, prompt-file confinement hardening (realpath + attachment-guard blocklist), per-job autoClosePreviousSession lifecycle, live-session-only concurrency counting, wired launchCommand.
2026-07-12 20:01:16 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 84ab4ff07b fix(review): harden cron security, session lifecycle, skip policy (PR #141)
- Reject multi-line prompts end-to-end: schema refines on promptText/
  launchCommand, runtime check in resolvePrompt (prompt-file content;
  trailing newlines tolerated), matching cron-ui form validation — delivery
  is single-line only, so multi-line was silently corrupted (typed mode
  fused lines, paste mode submitted partials)
- Close the workingDir confinement bypass (arbitrary server-side file read,
  e.g. workingDir=/proc + /proc/self/environ): realpath-resolve workingDir
  before the containment check, reject '/' and blocked/pseudo-fs trees
  (/proc, /sys, /dev + the attachment-guard blocklist) at fire time AND at
  job create/update (workingDir must exist and be a directory)
- Session lifecycle: new per-job autoClosePreviousSession (default true,
  recurring schedules only; ignored for 'once') — the previous run's
  still-open session is closed via the normal cleanupSession path when the
  next run fires; UI switch added; 50-session cap math documented in
  docs/cron-guide.md §8
- skip_if_same_agent_running: count only live sessions (exclude
  stopped/error dead tabs), exclude sessions created by this job's own runs
  (fixes the fire-once-then-skip-forever self-deadlock), and a skipped
  'once' job stays armed and retries next tick instead of being consumed;
  liveness filter mirrored in cron-ui _countActiveAgents
- Wire launchCommand (was accepted+documented but dead): shell mode sends
  it via writeViaMux as the first input line after startShell readiness
  (single-line, schema-enforced); form field shown for shell agent type
- Record delivery failures: a false writeViaMux result now fails the run
  instead of recording a false 'prompt_sent'
- Cap saved jobs at MAX_CRON_JOBS (100) to bound state.json growth
- Surface field-specific schema messages (drop parseBody custom
  errorMessage on cron create/update)
- Tests: workingDir create/update validation, /proc bypass regression,
  single-line enforcement (schema+runtime+trailing-newline tolerance),
  live/own-session skip filtering, once-skip re-arm, auto-close on/off/once,
  job-count cap

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 19:25:42 +02:00
Codeman maintainer 246f7b532d fix(review): clamp env-path trim below max; revert unwired scrollback raise (PR #138)
- UNBOUNDED-MEMORY: DEFAULT_TERMINAL_BUFFER_TRIM_BYTES from CODEMAN_TRIM_TERMINAL_TO
  had no relation to DEFAULT_TERMINAL_BUFFER_MAX_BYTES — setting only
  CODEMAN_MAX_TERMINAL_BUFFER=2097152 left the 24MB trim default in force, making
  BufferAccumulator.trim() (slice(-trimSize)) a no-op: unbounded growth past the cap
  plus a full string re-join on every append (O(n²)). Trim default is now clamped to
  75% of the resolved max (the 24MB/32MB default ratio, preserved as hysteresis);
  regression test re-evaluates the module under the env via vi.resetModules.
- OVERCLAIM: reverted DEFAULT_TERMINAL_SCROLLBACK_LINES 100k -> 50k — it has zero
  consumers; browser xterm scrollback is the separate hardcoded DEFAULT_SCROLLBACK
  (50k) in constants.js and deliberately stays 50k (mobile-memory hazard). The tmux
  history-limit raise (50k -> 100k) and PTY 32MB/24MB raise remain (those are wired).
  Module docstring now claims only what is wired; fixed the stale tmux-manager.ts
  comment saying the tmux limit "matches the xterm-side default in constants.js".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 12:39:46 +02:00
Aamer Akhter ad71a92f29 COD-80 raise terminal history/scrollback/buffer defaults
Bump the centralized terminal-history defaults: tmux scrollback 50k->100k and
PTY buffer cap 2MB->32MB (trim 1.5MB->24MB). Both remain env/settings overridable
and bounds-clamped. Worst-case 20-session buffer budget rises 40MB->640MB.
Stacked on the terminal-history config commit.
2026-07-01 13:00:08 -04:00
Aamer Akhter 8c0c94540c COD-80 centralize terminal history/scrollback/buffer limits into config
Introduce src/config/terminal-history.ts: one place for terminal scrollback,
tmux history-limit, and PTY buffer byte caps, each overridable via env var or
the settings object and bounds-clamped via resolveTerminalHistoryConfig().
Defaults match the prior hardcoded values, so this is behavior-neutral. Wires
the resolver through buffer-limits, tmux-manager (incl. a setHistoryLimit so a
settings change applies live), session, server, system-routes, session-routes,
schemas, and the config port. Adds 4 optional settings keys (terminalScrollback
Lines, tmuxHistoryLimit, terminalBufferMaxBytes, terminalBufferTrimBytes) with
bounds + a trim<=max cross-check.
2026-06-30 19:52:49 -04:00
KrisandClaude Opus 4.8 d9c2c6420d fix(cron): harden cron fixes against adversarial-review findings
Two blind adversarial reviewers found real holes in the prior cron commits:

SECURITY (was CRITICAL): the prompt-file guard was blocklist-only by default,
so promptFilePath:/proc/self/environ leaked the SERVER PROCESS's entire
environment (every secret) into the agent session, and /dev/zero or a FIFO
caused an unbounded readFile → OOM/hang DoS. A denylist is the wrong posture
for an exfil-into-LLM sink. resolveSafePromptPath now:
  - confines the realpath-resolved file to the job's working dir (ALLOWLIST) —
    closes /proc, /dev, other homes, modern cloud-cred paths, and symlink escapes
  - requires a regular file (rejects dirs/FIFOs/char devices)
  - caps the read at MAX_PROMPT_FILE_BYTES (1 MiB)
  - keeps the /etc,/root,secrets blocklist as defense-in-depth

LOGIC:
  - once-rearm (was MED, defeated in prod): the edit UI round-trips the full
    job, so the field-PRESENCE re-arm check always fired → a renamed fired
    once-job could be resurrected via edit→re-enable. Now compares schedule
    VALUES; an unchanged schedule never re-arms.
  - skipped-run history (was HIGH): recording a skip every tick was unbounded
    state.json growth. Now coalesces consecutive skips (one record per streak)
    and prunes global run history to MAX_CRON_RUN_HISTORY (500), covering the
    launch path too.
  - skip bookkeeping (was MED): a skip no longer advances lastRunAt (nothing
    ran); lastStatus still reflects 'skipped'.

Regression tests added/updated (43 pass): /proc/self/environ + outside-workspace
+ symlink-escape + non-regular + oversized all blocked, in-workspace file
passes; UI-path once resurrection blocked; consecutive skips coalesce to one
record; skip leaves lastRunAt null.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01PmvZR12aX2v8K7YhqxPUAU
2026-06-29 12:05:04 +05:30