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docs(docker): merge-time note for the gh/az sign-in in multi-user mode (#472)

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Clone Repo clears the credential helpers for a non-admin, but a non-admin's
Docker case with credential seeding on still receives a copy of the server
account's gh/az sign-in when the agent-image switches are on, the same as
the Claude and Codex credentials. Say so in the multi-user notes so the docs
do not read as a stronger guarantee than they are.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Codeman maintainer
2026-09-23 11:40:03 +02:00
parent 697b05b118
commit fdfcc15c10
2 changed files with 2 additions and 2 deletions
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docker/README.md
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@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ az login --use-device-code # then: az devops configure --defaults organizati
After that, **Add Case → Clone Repo** accepts private `https://` URLs on those hosts, and `git clone` works from any session. Until a CLI is signed in its helper prints nothing, so a private clone fails immediately with the usual authentication error rather than waiting on a prompt. After that, **Add Case → Clone Repo** accepts private `https://` URLs on those hosts, and `git clone` works from any session. Until a CLI is signed in its helper prints nothing, so a private clone fails immediately with the usual authentication error rather than waiting on a prompt.
**Multi-user mode:** every Codeman user's git runs as the same server account, so these sign-ins would otherwise be shared. Clone Repo therefore runs a **non-admin**'s clone and preflight with every git credential helper cleared (`git -c credential.helper=`): a non-admin can clone public repositories and anything their own SSH setup allows, but not a private https repository through the admin's `gh`/`az` sign-in. Admins, and single-user mode, keep the helpers. A non-admin's own agent sessions still run as that same account; see `docs/security-architecture.md`, multi-user mode. **Multi-user mode:** every Codeman user's git runs as the same server account, so these sign-ins would otherwise be shared. Clone Repo therefore runs a **non-admin**'s clone and preflight with every git credential helper cleared (`git -c credential.helper=`): a non-admin can clone public repositories and anything their own SSH setup allows, but not a private https repository through the admin's `gh`/`az` sign-in. Admins, and single-user mode, keep the helpers. A non-admin's own agent sessions still run as that same account, and with the agent-image `gh`/`az` switches on, a non-admin's Docker case with credential seeding on also receives the server account's `gh`/`az` sign-in, the same as the Claude and Codex credentials; see `docs/security-architecture.md`, multi-user mode.
Azure DevOps is authenticated with an Entra ID access token that the helper requests from `az` for each Git operation, so nothing is written to disk beyond `az`'s own sign-in. An account that has to use a personal access token can set `AZURE_DEVOPS_EXT_PAT` for the container instead (for example under `environment:` in `docker-compose.override.yml`); the helper prefers it when present. SSH remotes are unaffected by any of this and keep using the account's own keys. Azure DevOps is authenticated with an Entra ID access token that the helper requests from `az` for each Git operation, so nothing is written to disk beyond `az`'s own sign-in. An account that has to use a personal access token can set `AZURE_DEVOPS_EXT_PAT` for the container instead (for example under `environment:` in `docker-compose.override.yml`); the helper prefers it when present. SSH remotes are unaffected by any of this and keep using the account's own keys.
docs/security-architecture.md
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@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ Full feature guide: [`docker-cases.md`](docker-cases.md).
- **Auth is a parallel branch** (`middleware/auth.ts`) that leaves the single‑user path untouched: per‑user scrypt verify (`timingSafeEqual`, timing‑equalized against user enumeration), identity‑carrying cookies, a per‑username failure bucket (a botnet can't brute one account across IPs; one NATed user can't lock out the rest), and a `mustChangePassword` lockbox. The hook‑secret loopback bypass, host guard, and Origin/CSRF guard are unchanged (hooks authenticate the INSTANCE, not a user). - **Auth is a parallel branch** (`middleware/auth.ts`) that leaves the single‑user path untouched: per‑user scrypt verify (`timingSafeEqual`, timing‑equalized against user enumeration), identity‑carrying cookies, a per‑username failure bucket (a botnet can't brute one account across IPs; one NATed user can't lock out the rest), and a `mustChangePassword` lockbox. The hook‑secret loopback bypass, host guard, and Origin/CSRF guard are unchanged (hooks authenticate the INSTANCE, not a user).
- **Ownership is enforced server‑side only** and fails closed: `req.authUser` (a synthetic admin in single‑user), `findSessionOrFail` returns NOT_FOUND (never 403) for a foreign session, list/SSE/WS/file‑preview/search all filter by `session.owner`, and SSE routing defaults session‑scoped events to their owner (unresolved owner → withheld). The load‑bearing rule is **non‑admin `workingDir` confinement**: a non‑admin's session/one‑shot working dir must realpath‑resolve inside `~/codeman-users/<name>/cases`, checked BEFORE any disk write. - **Ownership is enforced server‑side only** and fails closed: `req.authUser` (a synthetic admin in single‑user), `findSessionOrFail` returns NOT_FOUND (never 403) for a foreign session, list/SSE/WS/file‑preview/search all filter by `session.owner`, and SSE routing defaults session‑scoped events to their owner (unresolved owner → withheld). The load‑bearing rule is **non‑admin `workingDir` confinement**: a non‑admin's session/one‑shot working dir must realpath‑resolve inside `~/codeman-users/<name>/cases`, checked BEFORE any disk write.
- **Privileged actions are a one‑bit grant** (`canBypassPermissions`, default off): only granted users (and admins) get `--dangerously-skip-permissions` (others are silently downgraded to `--permission-mode auto`), shell‑mode sessions, cron `launchCommand`, and other CLIs' bypass flags. Machine‑level resources (remote/Docker host definitions, tunnel, self‑update, settings writes) are admin‑only. - **Privileged actions are a one‑bit grant** (`canBypassPermissions`, default off): only granted users (and admins) get `--dangerously-skip-permissions` (others are silently downgraded to `--permission-mode auto`), shell‑mode sessions, cron `launchCommand`, and other CLIs' bypass flags. Machine‑level resources (remote/Docker host definitions, tunnel, self‑update, settings writes) are admin‑only.
- **Clone Repo does not lend the server's git sign-in to non-admins.** A clone writes only inside the caller's own case space, so it is not admin-gated, but the server account's git credential helpers (the Docker image's opt-in `gh`/`az` helpers, or any `gh auth setup-git`) are shared by every user. A non-admin's clone and preflight therefore run with `git -c credential.helper=`, which empties the helper list including the URL-scoped entries (`cloneWithoutCredentialHelpers` in `case-routes.ts`, argv pinned in `test/git-clone.test.ts`). This closes the Clone Repo path only: the account's SSH keys still apply to an `ssh://` URL, and a non-admin's agent sessions run as the same account, consistent with the first bullet above. - **Clone Repo does not lend the server's git sign-in to non-admins.** A clone writes only inside the caller's own case space, so it is not admin-gated, but the server account's git credential helpers (the Docker image's opt-in `gh`/`az` helpers, or any `gh auth setup-git`) are shared by every user. A non-admin's clone and preflight therefore run with `git -c credential.helper=`, which empties the helper list including the URL-scoped entries (`cloneWithoutCredentialHelpers` in `case-routes.ts`, argv pinned in `test/git-clone.test.ts`). This closes the Clone Repo path only: the account's SSH keys still apply to an `ssh://` URL, and a non-admin's agent sessions run as the same account, consistent with the first bullet above. Docker cases are a second route to the same sign-in: with `CODEMAN_AGENT_IMAGE_INSTALL_GH`/`_AZ` on, a non-admin's Docker case with credential seeding on (the default) receives a copy of the server account's `gh`/`az` sign-in, exactly as it receives the Claude and Codex credentials.
- **Admin actions are audited** append‑only to `~/.codeman/admin-audit.jsonl` (acting admin, action, target, IP). Passwords set by an admin create/reset are one‑time (returned once, force change). Under Basic auth, `logout` only truly ends QR‑issued sessions — to lock someone out, disable the account or reset the password (a proper login form is a deferred Phase 6). - **Admin actions are audited** append‑only to `~/.codeman/admin-audit.jsonl` (acting admin, action, target, IP). Passwords set by an admin create/reset are one‑time (returned once, force change). Under Basic auth, `logout` only truly ends QR‑issued sessions — to lock someone out, disable the account or reset the password (a proper login form is a deferred Phase 6).
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